

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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**THE FOREIGN POLICY
AND
DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY
OF THE USSR**

(April 1985—October 1989)

A Survey Prepared by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOSCOW, 1989

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TO "INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS" READERS

Below is a survey, "The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR (April 1985-October 1989)", which was prepared by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It was first put before the people's deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet on October 23, 1989, in what is both a revival of tradition and a break with tradition.

It is a break with the tradition under which foreign-policy decisions were taken in a narrow circle, so that now and again even the members of the political leadership were left uninformed of the most important decisions affecting the vital interests of the state. It is a revival of the tradition of Lenin's day, when the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs used to present annual reports to the Congress of Soviets. It is a revival of Lenin's principles of open diplomacy addressed not only to the governments, but also to the peoples of our country and of other countries.

Effective legislation puts on the Foreign Ministry the duty to see that the Soviet Union fulfils international agreements which pledge the states to observe democratic norms of behaviour in their external and internal political activity. This puts the duty on our diplomacy to be a model in acting on the principles which follow from these agreements and to observe the generally recognised standards of glasnost and openness.

It is in this tradition that the USSR Foreign Ministry has prepared a survey of Soviet foreign policy over the past five years. Our people's deputies, all Soviet citizens and world public opinion are being given a full picture of the country's philosophical and worldview approach the international sphere and of the state of affairs along concrete lines. We speak of our successes, provide information on the problems that have yet to be solved, and make no secret of our omissions.

Foreign policy is no longer a zone outside the ambit of glasnost, and that is something in which the USSR Foreign Ministry itself has a vital stake. Hardly anyone can now remain indifferent to international affairs, for interaction with the surrounding world is increasingly a part of the daily life of the state and its citizens. On the kind of relations we have with our neighbours, near or distant, depends our own survival and that of mankind as a whole, and the well-being of nations and individual families.

We want Soviet citizens to have a fuller understanding that our foreign policy serves perestroika and is one of its motive forces and reserves. A bad foreign policy means wasteful expenditures, a tightening of belts, fear, and restricted democracy.

A foreign policy ensuring favourable international surroundings means cutbacks in unproductive expenditures, access to the wealth of world experience, tranquil skies overhead, and greater scope for democratising the whole of our life.

I hope that this survey of our foreign policy over the past five years shows that when foreign policy is being restructured successfully, the whole country, all its peoples and every single citizen stand to gain. More security guarantees have been created for our state.

Political developments in our day are headlong. Not very much time has passed since the day the survey was put before the USSR Supreme Soviet, but there is virtually not a single section in the survey to which one should not like to add something or to give greater precision to some formulations.

Indeed, there are bound to be new and important world developments by the time readers have this issue of our Journal before them.

Nevertheless, we have decided to publish the survey in the form in which it was presented to our deputies, confining ourselves, whenever necessary, to minor factual addenda and editorial footnotes on the especially important events which have taken place since the survey was sent off to the printers.

However, I feel that I must say a few words about the most significant of these.

Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Finland took place on October 26 and 27, and it has largely determined the prospects for Soviet-Finnish cooperation on the solid foundation laid over the preceding decades. The Soviet-Finnish Declaration, "The New Thinking in Action", is of especial and principled significance, for it carries the relations between our two countries to a qualitatively new level and constitutes their joint contribution to building a common European home.

A meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, which was held in Warsaw at the same time, demonstrated the urge of the allied countries to go on developing cooperation in the interests of their states and for peace and security in Europe. Generally speaking, special attention is paid to relations with socialist countries. Contacts with the leadership of Poland and the GDR give such an example.

Another major international event is Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Italy. The meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush in early December should be an important stage in preparation for the talks that are to be held in the United States in the course of Mikhail Gorbachev's official visit to the USA in late spring or early summer of 1990.

These steps testify to the Soviet Union's urge to go on following the course of improving the international situation, strengthening peace, and developing mutually advantageous cooperation in every way, as described in the survey.

EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE,
Member of the CPSU CC Political Bureau,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

This survey, submitted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the USSR Supreme Soviet, describes succinctly and chiefly in terms of facts the main lines of the foreign policy of the USSR in the years of perestroika. The introductory chapter contains a brief analytical exposition of the changes that have come about in our country's foreign policy as a result of evolving the concept of new political thinking and the early steps towards putting it into practice. Subsequent chapters present more specific information based on facts, negotiations and agreements.

The survey summarises what is seen as positive results of the work done and describes the more complex problems facing Soviet foreign policy today and likely to do so in the foreseeable future. It accentuates unsolved problems that have accumulated over many years. This is, among other things, a manifestation of the Ministry's own dissatisfaction at what has not yet been carried through to the end. There is still much work ahead.

The survey restores a practice of the early years of Soviet power, when the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs submitted reports to the congresses of Soviets. With a rule-of-law state in the making in our country, the Foreign Ministry regards it as its duty to submit such materials on a regular basis.

This first attempt at such a survey after a long interval is probably far from complete. The Ministry would appreciate all criticisms, suggestions and specific recommendations that could help make this kind of information as useful as possible to the foreign policy activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Chapter I. PERESTROIKA IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF THE TIMES

Perestroika in every sphere of Soviet life, a process led off by deep-lying internal factors, had a vast international context from the outset. What played an important role in its maturing, inevitability and formation was also *external circumstances*: the changes taking place in the world at the boundary between two millennia and the place held in it by our country and by socialism as a whole. The April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC, which marked the beginning of the revolutionary period of perestroika, prompted us to assess without bias and from the standpoint of contemporary socio-philosophical, scientific and technological knowledge both the truly unprecedented opportunities opening up for our country and the whole of humanity and the disastrous dangers threatening all.

With due regard to fundamental priorities and on the basis of combining the national interests of countries with universal values, we made a thorough, occasionally radical revision of inherited stagnant guidelines for approaching world processes and of our own stereotyped actions divorced from life and clashing manifestly and increasingly with reality. Negotiating postures known to threaten deadlock had raised obstacles to progress towards detente, fair cooperation and a lessening of the war menace.

An objective, scientifically accurate analysis was all the more necessary because the world was undergoing *changes* unparalleled in scope and pace.

The rapid scientific and technological progress of recent years has lent humanity a new quality, with production and hence many other fields of human activity changing fast. A dynamically developing economy based on new technologies, primarily electronics and information technology, is becoming a key source of influence in the world. Countries where traditional industries are predominant, especially those producing raw materials, are relegated to the role of involuntary tributaries of those whose might is based on investment in products of the human intellect. Global communications are giving rise to a single world information area. No frontiers can stop news or its interpretation from being transmitted immediately to any part of the Earth. The information revolution has only just begun, yet its influence on the life of society and its every member is daily becoming more tangible. Attempts to shut out the rest of the world are particularly ineffective today, to say nothing of their unfavourable political consequences. Application of the latest achievements of science in agriculture (the "green revolution") has reliably solved the problem of food supply for developed and some developing countries. Countries which have been unable for various reasons to use these achievements are up against serious social problems made worse by population growth. The world is becoming more and more compact and technologically unified. Along with this, new technologies give rise to new problems, contradictions and contrasts.

Scientists and experts of various countries, including the Soviet Union, are at one in considering that human civilisation is entering a *qualitatively higher stage* in its development. And while grasping this transition in terms of worldview is still in its initial phase, it is already safe to say that we are witnessing a phenomenon in human history equal to changing established notions of man's present and future.

Our country now admits openly that it was very slow to respond to the increasingly strong and persistent signals of scientific and technological progress. In spite of mistakes and deformations, it has built up a tremendous scientific, technological and intellectual potential over the past decades. However, this potential was not properly geared, partly through our own fault, to active participation in the new worldwide spiral of upsurge in science and technology. To end the resultant lag and improve our people's lives, we must not only exert enormous internal efforts but create a favourable foreign political environment.

There is a mounting trend towards an *interpenetration* of economic mechanisms, towards integration at regional and global level. The world economy is becoming a single whole as far as its main characteristics are concerned, and no country left outside it can keep abreast of the times. The new industrialised countries that have emerged and were backward until recently are gaining ground on the world market as they compete with industrial giants. On the other hand, many countries cannot yet enter today's society because they are shackled by the legacy of a colonial past, underdeveloped structures, a shortage of competent personnel, a growing foreign debt burden, involvement in devastating conflicts that are draining them of their lifeblood.

The problem of the gap between the development levels of those ahead and those behind, acute food shortages and a menaced environment have assumed a global political dimension. Until not so long ago, the nuclear danger was seen as almost the only one to threaten the survival of humanity, but now it is matched by the danger of an environmental collapse and the possibility of economic problems growing so acute as to pose a threat of global political upheavals.

Changes in the material base of contemporary society, including supermodern technologies, are hastening *changes in the political sphere*. The ideas of freedom and democracy, the supremacy of law and order,

and freedom of choice are increasingly taking hold of people's thinking. Individuals and peoples who are now in a position to compare things are demanding conditions and a quality of life that technological progress can provide. Nations, ethnic communities, states are becoming more active politically; taking shape is an international community in the full sense of the phrase. The more elements of equality for all countries, of extensive democracy and glasnost in discussing and solving problems bearing on the fortunes of the planet there are in this process, the more lasting it will be.

By the mid-eighties, the most fundamental truth has fully come to light: those who fail to respond adequately to the challenges of this complex period of transition involving the very foundations of human being in the economic, political, humanitarian or any other sphere of material and intellectual life will find themselves in the margin of world civilisation.

A change is taking place in the very concept of *national security*. No nation can consider itself secure unless it commands a powerful, dynamic economy. Those that have put the emphasis on military means are themselves at a disadvantage. More and more, it is economic, technological and monetary factors that are at work as sources of political influence in the world and of secure national interests whereas huge arsenals that have swallowed so much effort and expenditure can provide no reasonable response to the challenges of today. These armaments are so powerful that they cannot be used without putting one's own country, one's neighbours and, indeed, the whole planet at the risk of destruction. Military means of ensuring national security are objectively giving way to political and economic ones.

The creation by our country of its own nuclear potential was a necessity in the conditions prevailing between the late forties and early fifties. The fact that we achieved *military strategic parity* remains important. On the other hand, having allowed ourselves to be drawn into a race in both nuclear and conventional armaments and being carried away by the quantitative aspect, we often responded to our opponents symmetrically and massively whereas we needed to do so asymmetrically, at a lower quantitative but a higher qualitative level.

Having taken sober stock of developments, we came to realise that possession of an immense nuclear arsenal did not produce the political results we had aimed at achieving and that, second, concentration on military effort had diverted resources from other sectors important to the country: ensuring technologically high-standard production for peaceful purposes, providing proper health services and meeting the priority requirements of the population. It became perfectly obvious that foreign policy moves, including steps to safeguard national security, must be strictly harmonised with national priorities, the country's real potentialities and the Soviet people's requirements.

The reports submitted by Mikhail Gorbachev to the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, the CPSU CC General Secretary's Statement of January 15, 1986, and other major political documents gradually shaped the foundations of the philosophical concept rightly called *new political thinking*. They convincingly showed on the strength of a dialectical analysis that socialism has by no means exhausted its possibilities, its historical potential for peace and humanism. At the threshold of new times, in an entirely new situation, the socialist idea we are renewing is equal to serving the progress of civilisation as a beacon, to offer its own alternative of social development. It is anything but accidental that the Soviet Union was the state which appreciated the essence and scope of changes, summed up and generalised the results

of intensive quests by many people and countries and brought them to a single system of views inspired by the idea of universal solidarity, individual rights and freedoms, and concern for peace and man's natural and intellectual environment.

Underlying the new system of views is the conclusion that the *unity and interdependence of the world* have a fundamentally new quality today. It manifests itself variously: positively, through an early sharing of experience and the beneficial effects of progress, and negatively, for the problems and troubles of one region tell immediately on the general climate of the planet, on its political, social, economic and environmental condition.

This leads logically to the demand for the *supremacy of universal interests* over all others but not in the sense of opposing the interests of a class, nation or people to the universal interest. On the contrary, this demand implies that each social group can realise its aspirations more fully only if it correlates them with the good of humanity as a whole.

One of the key aspects of the concept of new political thinking is the principle of *freedom of choice*. It treats the multiformity of social development in various countries as rightful and therefore considers it necessary to tolerate others' views and preferences. There can be no one-dimensional standard to which the world could adapt all the diverse forms of social consciousness and social being. It is in conditions of diversity and not an artificial levelling that the world can attain genuine unity.

New political thinking presupposes renunciation of the concept of confrontation as a principle of foreign policy; it is aimed at ending the domination of ideological standards and at *deideologising state-to-state relations*. All the countries of the world are expected to learn to cooperate, to respect each other regardless of distinctions in ideology and to search for common ground in the interests of all rather than subordinate their foreign policy to the ideological principles of a large or small section of humanity, principles that are often antithetical in content. Needless to say, this conception of the problem does not annul our own convictions prompted by our worldview.

The fragility of today's world due to the means of destruction brought into being by man makes it imperative to effect *demilitarisation*, to gradually reduce armaments and advance to the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, which are endangering the very existence of life on Earth. The Soviet Union unqualifiedly rejects war as a means of settling political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes between states.

The unity and interdependence of the world and the involvement of further nations in planetary politics call urgently for *democratisation and humanisation* of international relations. Reliable solutions to global problems can be found only if all countries join in a search for them as full-fledged participants and if account is taken of the views, interests and peculiarities of all states, big, medium-sized and small alike. No one may decide the destiny of any people behind their backs. The Soviet Union favours universal recognition of the priority of law in state-to-state relations.

The principles of new political thinking were put at the basis of the *comprehensive concept of international security* advanced by the 27th Party Congress. This concept advocates security not based on strength or a balance of means of mutual deterrence but one searched for and found by combining interests and taking account of each other's requirements in every sphere: political, economic, environmental, humanitarian.

This concept served as the basis for starting a broad and intensive

multilateral *dialogue*, with the result that virtually the majority of the countries of the world were brought into it. In this way there has begun the difficult process of translating the concept into political practice and concrete moves.

In carrying on this activity, Soviet foreign policy has drawn on all that had been achieved in earlier years: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the SALT-1 and SALT-2 treaties, the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin, the Treaty with the FRG, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

The foreign policy principles of new thinking must operate without fail in relations between *socialist countries*. There is not and cannot be two systems of values, that is, one for "us" and the other for the rest. Our country has resolutely discarded various approaches (often called "doctrines" in the West) implying that relations between sovereign socialist countries must be based on principles different from those universally accepted and that they are above international law. These relations should be characterised by fuller creative use of the opportunities offered by universally recognised standards of state-to-state relations.

The task of strengthening relations with *allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation*, that guarantor of the security of the socialist member countries and European stability, has always been a priority.

Unfortunately, relations established within the WTO seldom went in the past beyond the framework of official formulations: complete equality and respect for the independence of each fraternal party and each state in solving national problems and, at the same time, cooperation in various fields and solidarity. The new spirit of democracy, of taking each other's interests into account, of partnership and comradeship, makes it possible to get rid of the extraneous elements existing in relations between the allies in the period of stagnation, when contacts between allied leaders were tinged with pomp while at the same time there was a shortage of trustful and pragmatic ties. By now the contribution of each allied country to the formulation of an agreed foreign policy line has increased substantially. This lends a new dimension to the potential of our allies and the alliance as a whole. The process of coordinating positions and a common line has become more labour-intensive and makes higher demands, in particular on ability to evolve flexible approaches taking account of all points of view. However, this benefits foreign political interaction within the WTO and is bound to benefit it still more.

A major foreign policy achievement of the Soviet Union in this period of perestroika is the *normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations*, which has ended a prolonged and painful period of alienation, distrust and occasional hostility in relations between the two socialist powers. The May 1989 meeting between the top leaders of the two countries in Peking, the first for 30 years, ushered in a qualitatively new stage in mutual relations. These relations are coming now to rest on a durable and sound basis made up of three fundamental factors.

First, it is the universally recognised principles of state-to-state relations, such as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equal rights and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence. The two sides adopted in Peking a decision of principle on both refraining from a return to the relations of the fifties and completely ridding Soviet-Chinese relations of the confrontational atmosphere of the sixties and seventies. Another factor is the ongoing active political dialogue on all levels and lines—state, parliamentary and social—and mutually beneficial economic and cultural cooperation. The third factor is cooperation in solving current interna-

tional problems. A very important proposition formulated during the meeting is that the Soviet Union and China lay no claim to hegemony and will not build their mutual relations in a way detrimental to the existing structure of their relations with other states.

Greater mutual understanding and confidence will enable our countries and peoples and the younger generation to concentrate more fully on peaceful constructive effort and to multiply resources for the solution of current problems of Soviet perestroika and Chinese reform. During the Peking talks, the two sides put forward a great many concrete proposals and ideas in favour of promoting comprehensive economic, scientific and cultural ties and interregional cooperation between the two countries' territories and regions, especially those lying in the border area.

Many new positive elements have been added over the past years to our relations with other socialist countries: the *MPR*, *DPRK*, *SRV*, *Cuba*, the *SFRY*. This applies to the political, economic and cultural spheres alike.

Altogether, for all the difficulties and problems confronting the socialist countries as they adjust to new realities, our relations with them are becoming healthier and acquiring a new content.

The deliverance of our country from the oppressive moral and material burden of involvement in the *Afghan war* is one of the biggest international achievements of perestroika. It was made possible by a radical revision of our own policy and by the agreements which the Afghan and Pakistani governments reached on this basis at Geneva in 1988, with guarantees from the Soviet Union and the United States, and which provided for an end to foreign interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. Whatever the intentions of Soviet and Afghan leaders or the peculiarities of the situation in and around Afghanistan may have been in 1979, our involvement in the fratricidal Afghan war was actually seen in most countries of the world as a bid to expand our sphere of influence by taking advantage of a regional conflict. The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan not only froze our relations with many countries of the world but called in question what had been accomplished in the years of detente. The votes cast at the UN by the overwhelming majority of member states showed that they were not on our side.

Now that several months have passed since the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, it is obvious that the political decision of principle on this matter adopted as far back as December 1985 was perfectly correct if very difficult. Its implementation took time and necessitated intensive preparations on all lines, including diplomacy. Worthy of special note is the courageous and highly constructive stand taken by the Afghan leadership under President Najibullah. As a result of its bold and resolute yet flexible moves in favour of national reconciliation and respect for international law, the positions of the Afghan government, far from weakening after the withdrawal of our troops, became stronger and have since enjoyed growing confidence among that country's people. This latter circumstance is further evidence that the decision to move our troops into Afghanistan in 1979 was taken without an in-depth analysis of the actual situation.

Working in close coordination with other departments and organisations, including public ones, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is actively seeking a return to their homeland of the Soviet military personnel who were taken prisoners by the Afghan armed opposition. Making use of all available channels, including contacts with the countries that are in a position to influence the solution of the problem (Pakistan, Iran, other Islamic nations and nations of authority in the Non-Alignment

Movement, and, of course, the USA). We have persevered in pressing the issue of the Soviet POW's release in all our contacts with the Afghan opposition. We shall continue active efforts aimed at liberation of our compatriots.

Soviet initiative has brought about a qualitative advance on the issue of *limiting and reducing armaments*.

The situation that arose in this sphere in the mid-eighties gave cause for growing concern. East-West relations were characterised not only by a high degree of mutual distrust and military confrontation but by a continuing stockpiling of armaments and a constant aspiration to outpace the other side either quantitatively or qualitatively. The United States banked on developing weapons using the latest achievements in science and technology and on keeping ahead in this field. The disarmament talks remained in effect deadlocked. Following our deployment of intermediate-range missiles, American missiles of great accuracy and with minimum flight-in time appeared in Western Europe, a development which greatly increased the threat to our security.

What helped improve the situation in this most important sector was a reappraisal of conceptual military political principles, the advancement on January 15, 1986, of an extensive programme for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the proclamation by the Soviet Union of a defensive military doctrine and of the principle of sufficiency, which was written into a joint statement by the top leaders of the WTO countries.

Subsequently we had to take a new approach, convince a large body of public opinion of the soundness of this approach and translate it into specific accords, something which necessitated prolonged talks on every point, including technicalities, with partners who are anything but easy to deal with. Nevertheless, impressive results were achieved in a relatively short time. The Soviet-US summit meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow played a tremendous role.

Most important in this respect is the INF Treaty, which was signed on December 8, 1987, and came into force on June 1, 1988. This genuine breakthrough on the road to real disarmament leaves no room for doubt that the task of phased deliverance from nuclear arms is not Utopian.

As of now, progress has been made on *all the main lines* of containing the arms race:

- talks with the United States on a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons, with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972 left intact;

- multilateral talks in Vienna on cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe;

- the drafting at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament of a convention on the prohibition and complete elimination of chemical weapons;

- talks on limiting and eventually ending underground nuclear tests;

- confidence-building measures in the military area.

The appreciable reserve of proposals and coinciding views recorded to date give hope for serious progress (more on this later on). The sphere of disarmament talks is widening and becoming more active.

By setting out with determination to bring about disarmament accords and by effecting reasonably admissible unilateral reductions without detriment to its security, the Soviet Union succeeded in reversing an unfavourable trend in armaments. At the same time it is obvious that the attainment of many of the set goals is still far off.

We have completely altered our approach to *control* over disarmament agreements. In operation even now are far-reaching control measures adopted, of course, on a reciprocal basis. We have as big a stake in strict control as our Western partners. And it is now we who

are seeking in our own interest a tightening of control, including on-site inspection, with the United States, for one, often opposing us. The agreeing of a control mechanism in line with the 1986 Stockholm accords on confidence-building measures and the 1987 Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles were milestones in the history of disarmament and paved the way for further accords.

Renewal involves all the main sectors in which Soviet foreign policy is at work:

- Attention focusses on both universal and *regional* security. In Europe, this has found expression in the progress made by the idea of a common European home, and in Asia, in singling out as a separate and important line the task of thoroughly improving the situation on the continent and in the adjacent areas of the Pacific and Indian oceans; in ending tensions anywhere by political means.

- Effort to bring about through real deeds effective international cooperation in order to solve *global problems* relating to the economy, the environment, the elimination of disease, hunger, international terrorism, drug addiction, and so on.

- An orientation to enhancing the role of the *UN* and other international organisations in the solution of all key problems of today.

- A change for the better in *humanitarian issues*; full compliance with international obligations by the Soviet Union and similar demands on our partners.

- An improvement in our *bilateral relations* with practically all the countries of the world. In any case, the years of perestroika have not seen our relations with any one of them deteriorate.

New principles and new approaches to the task of eliminating ideologised, confrontational stereotypes have made it possible to build civilised relations with all countries, both socialist and capitalist, developed and developing. In this context, we also take a new approach to the problem of effectively pursuing vitally important aims of our country in fast-changing external conditions, and this not in a way detrimental to others' interests but on the basis of harmony between universal and national interests

The principles of peace and of freedom from violence and the nuclear menace are enshrined in the famous Delhi Declaration.

The renewal of Soviet foreign policy met with tremendous public response all over the world. It helped form in all sections of the world community a broad consensus in support of new approaches to the problem of human survival. At present this factor is acquiring independent significance. People's diplomacy and international dialogue on all levels—from governments and MPs to working people and children—is breaking down the barriers of incomprehension, alienation and distrust that have arisen. This is strengthening the trend in favour of making the international situation healthier and of searching for practical solutions to still existing international problems.

The overall result may be described as a visible lessening of international tension. The war menace has receded. We have provided more favourable conditions for perestroika work at home and are increasingly harnessing our foreign policy activity to its requirements. The years of perestroika have brought out the new image of the Soviet Union as a socialist state which has taken the initiative of approaching world affairs in a new way, with the survival of humanity as the ultimate goal.

On the other hand, the positive changes under way in the international situation have yet to become irreversible. The situation in the world remains rather complicated, and resistance to our initiatives and moves is still considerable. We cannot rule out the possibility of recur-

rences of the policy from a position of strength, flare-ups of tension and retreats—throughout no fault of ours—from positions won in settling this or that regional conflict. The situation in some socialist countries is shaping up in most intricate, nationally distinctive and historic conditions. The ideas of comprehensive security have been slow to gain ground at the UN and in international practice.

Against this background, Soviet foreign policy sees its mission in implementing a line based on new thinking, doing so still more perseveringly, imaginatively, in terms of quests, and borrowing all that is sound and constructive. The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR stressed that this is "not a tactical ploy, not a zigzag, not a concession to anyone, but a well-founded strategy expressing the interests of the Soviet people and meeting the interests of humanity as a whole".

Undoubtedly, there are still major potentialities for implementing the line approved by the party and the people, and the Foreign Ministry realises this.

Chapter II. THE PROGRAMME FOR COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN ACTION

1. PREVENTING WAR, LIMITING ARMAMENTS; DISARMAMENT

By the mid-eighties, world tensions had risen so high, as we have noted, that the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC had to state the options of humanity as follows: "either stepping up tension and confrontation still further or searching in a constructive spirit for mutually acceptable accords that would stop the process of material preparations for a nuclear conflict".

The central task set by the Soviet leadership was to restore the *Soviet-American dialogue* stalled since 1979, for a marked worsening of the relations between the two powers had cast a shadow on practically the whole spectrum of international relations. It was necessary to achieve mutual understanding on issues of objectively common interest irrespective of ideological divergences: preserving peace and gradually winding down the arms race.

The starting point was the Soviet-US summit in Geneva (November 1985), at which the Soviet side arrived with a specific constructive programme intended to reverse the trend of world development. The meeting confirmed that dialogue was possible and that common ground could be found, primarily on the problem of staving off nuclear war. Assessing the results of the meeting, both sides expressed the conviction that a nuclear war must not be allowed to break out and that it could not be won. On the same occasion, it was declared that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would seek military superiority over the other side.

During the Geneva meeting and the subsequent four meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan,* the two sides laid a solid conceptual groundwork for the development of lasting, mutually beneficial relations and searched for concrete solutions aimed at winding down the arms race.

Prompted by the principle of sufficiency and without waiting for the disarmament talks to achieve practical results, the Soviet Union took a

* Reykjavik, October 1986; Washington, December 1987; Moscow, May-June 1988; New York, December 1988 (the latter meeting was also attended by President-elect George Bush). In addition to summits, the 1985-1989 period saw over 30 meetings between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State during which a painstaking search was carried on for mutually acceptable solutions to the more complicated problems involved in the talks.

series of steps to reduce its armed forces and armaments *on a unilateral basis*. In the six months that have passed since the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a relevant decree, the strength of our armed forces has diminished by 148,900 men and officers (the reduction is to total 500,000), 6,680 tanks and 1,070 artillery systems. Also, 40 ships and 591 combat aircraft have been withdrawn.*

Also unilaterally, we have decided to stop producing chemical weapons, reduce armed forces on the territory of our allies, withdraw tactical nuclear warheads from there and cut military spending. These are measures adopted with due regard to the actual state of affairs in each particular area and without detriment to the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. The decisions taken by us are a practical expression of the thesis of the 19th CPSU Conference which says that defence-essential construction must be carried on chiefly according to *qualitative parameters* in regard to military science and technology as well as to the composition of the armed forces.

After April 1985, the Soviet leadership set out to extend glasnost in the military sphere. Our public now knows of the level of military spending, which amounted to 77.3 billion rubles in 1989,** of the total strength of Soviet military personnel, which stands at 4,258,000, the strength of our troops and armaments in Europe and the Far East, our stocks of chemical weapons, and so on.

In line with this policy, we had numerous visits by delegations of foreign political and military leaders and representatives of foreign public opinion to military facilities, to areas which previously were considered closed security zones, including Sevastopol, Vladivostok, Severomorsk and Baikonur. The defence ministers of the United States, France and other countries as well as other foreign guests had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with models of new military equipment. There were also return visits by our military delegations.

The new policy of *control* over disarmament agreements has become an important element of change. We have adopted in deeds, not in words, the most deep-going and comprehensive control measures, doing so, needless to say, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States and without detriment to our security interests. The Soviet Union has agreed in principle to the concept of "open sky" advanced by President George Bush and is willing to participate in a relevant conference. For our part, we have proposed opening land, water expanses and outer space to openness to make transparency and confidence comprehensive. In so doing, we took account of the existence of military bases around the Soviet Union.

The most important result of these changes was the signing of the *INF Treaty* on December 8, 1987, and its entry into force on June 1, 1988. The treaty provides for the complete elimination of two classes of Soviet and US nuclear missile weapons: missiles having a range of 500 to 5,500 km, their launchers and related facilities***.

* As of November 1, the Soviet Union's armed forces are down by 235,500 men, 7,120 tanks, 2,964 artillery systems and 735 combat aircraft—*Ed.*

** This sum is distributed among five key expense items: the purchase of armaments and military equipment, 32.6; research and development, 15.3; the maintenance of the Army and Navy, 20.2; military construction, 4.6; payments on pensions to servicemen transferred to the reserve, 2.3; and other expenditures, 2.3 billion rubles.

*** By June 1, 1991, the Soviet side is to destroy 889 deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of the RSD-10 (SS-20), R-12 (SS-4) and R-14 (SS-5) types and the American side, 677 Pershing-2 ballistic and BCM-109G cruise missiles. By December 1, 1991, the Soviet Union must eliminate 957 shorter-range OTR-22 (SS-12) and OTR-23 (SS-23) missiles and the United States, 169 Pershing-1A ballistic missiles. Also to be destroyed as "tested but non-deployed" are Soviet land-based RK-55 cruise missiles and American Pershing-1Bs. The total number of the missiles to be eliminated is 1,846 for the Soviet Union and 846 for the United States.

A problem which has been settled outside the framework of the INF Treaty is that of the Pershing-1A missiles belonging to the FRG and stationed on US territory. In response to our representation, the Federal German government decided to eliminate this weapon by the end of October 1989. We consider this decision an action contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament.

Also to be eliminated are the nuclear warheads of all the missiles listed, including 72 American warheads for the Pershing-1As belonging to the FRG.

The INF Treaty provides for a unique mechanism of control over compliance by both sides. Apart from the use of national control facilities, it provides for exchanges of data and for notification of the facilities covered by the Treaty as well as for on-site inspections on both a permanent and a sporadic basis.*

The INF Treaty also bans the production and testing of weapons covered by it. To monitor compliance with this provision, permanent checkpoints have been set up at the gates of missile plants in Votkinsk, Udmurt ASSR, USSR, and Magna, Utah, USA.

The experience of implementing the treaty since it came into force invites the conclusion that the treaty has been functioning effectively. Both sides have been carrying out its provisions in conformity with the obligations assumed by them.

By October 5, 1989, the Soviet Union had eliminated 1,326 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles; the US figure was 376. Our country has abolished 41 of the 72 missile bases it had as of June 1, 1988, and America has abolished three of its nine bases.**

We can firmly put it on record that the conclusion of the INF Treaty was justified. The treaty was the first step towards nuclear disarmament; it removed a direct threat to many targets on the territory of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries and marked a psychological change in the approach to disarmament problems by reviving the hope that further progress is feasible; the treaty provisions, particularly the one concerning the control mechanism—provisions that have passed the test of practice—can undoubtedly serve as a useful basis for negotiating new disarmament agreements; the treaty has released some manpower, technological and financial resources for civilian production purposes, something which gives a tangible spur to the conversion*** of military production, it has become possible to gear the defence industry's research and production potential being released

* On-site inspections are conducted on the territory of the signatories—the Soviet Union and the United States—as well as on that of the countries where the missiles to be eliminated were deployed: the GDR and Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and the FRG, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, on the other. Over a period of 13 years, the Soviet Union can effect about 240 inspections in the United States and the Western countries mentioned; the United States can effect about 400 inspections in the Soviet Union, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The reason for the United States having the right to conduct a larger number of inspections is that the Treaty provides for the elimination of a larger number of weapons in the Soviet Union and a larger number of facilities under the Treaty in the Soviet Union, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. As of now, the Soviet side has conducted about 90 inspections.

** As of November 1, 1989, the Soviet Union eliminated 1444 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles; the USA 385.—Ed.

*** The economic effect of the treaty cuts in military expenditures and of their redistribution for economic needs between 1988 and 1990 will exceed 400 million rubles a year and upwards of 600 million rubles annually in the 13th five-year plan period. The manufacturing capacities used for making intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is being switched to the manufacture of new types of drilling equipment, metal cutting tools, highly efficient machinery for the processing of agricultural products, washing machines, children's bicycles, kitchenware and other items for peaceful uses. Units released as a result of the elimination of combat complexes are being turned over to the economy free of charge; they include about 400 chassis for heavy MAZ-547 trucks.

to the development and production of civilian goods items as well as to return part of the means saved to the national budget to be used for social needs.

A most serious task is the drafting of a treaty on a *50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States*. The main parameters of the treaty have already been agreed,* and progress has been made on issues relating to the future control mechanism. However, the issue of the connection between future reductions and the two sides' compliance with the *ABM Treaty* of 1972 remained a major snag at the talks for a long time.

Lately notable headway has been made on this issue. The Soviet Union expressed a readiness to sign and ratify a treaty on strategic offensive weapons (SOWs) even in the absence of an accord on anti-ballistic defence by the time the draft is completed. This is not to say that we have gone back on our position regarding the connection between limitations on SOWs and the limitations on antiballistic defence laid down in the 1972 treaty. We found a different way. We stressed that such a solution would be possible provided both sides abided by the *ABM Treaty* as signed in 1972. (Such a commitment was recorded in connection with the results of the Soviet-US summit in Washington in 1987.) It goes without saying that in that case each side would have the right to withdraw from the SOW treaty if the other side failed to respect the *ABM Treaty*. The Soviet proposal also provides for agreeing at nuclear and space arms talks a common conception of activity prohibited or permitted under the *ABM Treaty*.

These new Soviet proposals make it possible to preserve the *ABM Treaty* as a pillar of strategic stability. Such a solution would enable the two sides to untie a knot which has so far hampered talks. Another advance consists in the United States having retracted its earlier proposal for banning mobile ICBMs. Still, there remain some other questions, namely:

—*The question of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)*. At the Washington summit, the two sides agreed on the need to limit long-range SLCMs under effective control. Nevertheless, the United States evades a substantive discussion on limiting SLCMs, claiming that such a limitation cannot be verified.

To arrive at a mutually acceptable accord, the Soviet side proposed during the talks between its foreign ministers and the US Secretary of State in the United States last September that the problem of SLCMs be examined in the broader context of naval arms limitation. The two sides will continue with due regard to the nuclear-space weapons talks to search for ways of verifying limitation of such missiles. As for setting quantitative limits to SLCMs, appropriate mutual obligations and control measures could be laid down outside the text of the treaty but in connection with it.

—*The question of including heavy bombers (HBs) and their armaments in agreed SOW levels*, in particular the rule of counting air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). We propose counting the real number of ALCMs for which HBs are actually equipped. The Americans propose a count according to an average number—10 missiles per bomber—which would make it possible to exceed somewhat the agreed maximum of warheads. There also remain differences over what missiles should be included in this category; we say "all missiles" having a

* The accords reached by the two sides provide that each of them shall limit itself to 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles. The sublimit established by the accords is 4,900 warheads for land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles, and the sublimits for heavy ICBMs are 1,540 warheads and 154 missiles.

range of over 600 km (as under the SALT-2 Treaty) while the Americans insist on missiles with a range of over 1,000 to 1,500 km.

—On the question of control, the United States shows a tendency to impose a selective approach, that is, stricter and more rigid control over Soviet SOWs and more liberal control over their American counterparts. What we are seeking is adequate control measures applying equally to both sides.

The talks on these points are continuing. We hope the two sides may be able to round the last curve on the road to a SOW treaty by the time the next Soviet-US summit, set for the late spring and early summer of 1990, takes place.

In March 1989, 23 countries met in Vienna to negotiate reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. The negotiating parties agreed that their aim is to establish a durable and secure balance of conventional armed forces on lower levels; to remove imbalances injuring stability and security; to accomplish the priority task of eliminating the potential for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.

In joining in the talks, we proceeded from the assumption that reaching accords on these questions could create a fundamentally new political climate in Europe, one offering prospects for extensive mutually beneficial cooperation. Of course, the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies would be reliably safeguarded from the purely military point of view by agreed restrictions on the West's armaments.

A careful appraisal of the situation showed that we could effect unilateral reductions at the threshold of the talks, without detriment to the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. In accordance with the decision adopted, the Soviet forces stationed in Europe will be reduced by 240,000 men and officers, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 820 combat aircraft, in 1989 and 1990, the Soviet forces on the territory of Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia are to be cut by 50,000 servicemen, 5,300 tanks, 260 combat aircraft and 24 tactical missile launchers. By August 1, 1989, we had withdrawn from our forces abroad 3,100 tanks, 690 guns, 162 aircraft and 31,800 servicemen.* The steps taken by us plus reductions in armed forces carried out by our WTO allies created a favourable political climate for the Vienna talks.

A considerable political and moral effect was produced when, on January 30 last, the Soviet Union and its allies released factual data on the strength of their armed forces and armaments. This made for a businesslike atmosphere at the talks and averted a debate on figures, such as the one that had paralysed the earlier talks on reductions in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

At the initial rounds of the talks, the parties succeeded in drawing their positions somewhat closer together. They decided that the original agreement would cover all six categories as proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies, namely: military personnel, aircraft, helicopters, tanks, combat armoured vehicles, artillery. (The original proposals of NATO called for attaining equal levels in only three categories of armaments: tanks, combat vehicles and guns.) It is understood that in the case of armaments the sides will establish levels below the lowest levels which any one of them has attained to date. Mutual understanding was reached on the advisability of establishing sublimits for armaments region by region in Europe, for armaments at the disposal of one state and for the armaments of each alliance outside national ter-

* As of November 1, 1989, the Soviet forces abroad were cut by 768 gus, 351 aircraft and over 50,000 servicemen.—Ed.

ritory. The two sides are also agreed that it is desirable to reach an initial accord as early as 1990 and that armaments should be reduced to levels to be agreed within two or three years. In terms of figures, these reductions are likely to be 20,000 tanks and 28,000 combat armoured vehicles for each side. The proposals regarding artillery levels are not very far apart: NATO calls for 16,500 pieces and the WTO, for 21,000 to 24,000.

At the same time, substantial differences remain for the time being as to approach:

—There is no coincidence on the two sides' approach to the issue of the specific arms systems (aircraft, tanks, combat armoured vehicles, artillery) to be included in the levels mentioned earlier.

—The socialist countries propose reducing combat aircraft of the front (tactical) air force because it is these aircraft that can be used for a first-strike and in support of wide-ranging offensive operations. NATO insists on reducing all land-based combat aircraft, including air defence planes, which make up a considerable part of the Soviet Air Force, as well as medium bombers.*

—The Warsaw Treaty countries have proposed fixing the maximum levels for the strength of the armed personnel of both alliances at 1,350,000 throughout the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals and at 300,000 outside national territories.

The West proposes fixing concrete levels (at 275,000 servicemen on each side) for only the personnels of Soviet and US ground and air forces stationed outside national territories in Europe. As regards the overall troop levels for either alliance, the NATO countries affirm that there is no need to fix them since a reduction in the five main weapons would lead automatically to a cut in personnel as well.

—Difficulties are still encountered over the regional division of the reduction zone from the Atlantic to the Urals and over regional sub-limits, the two sides proposing dissimilar approaches

—There are also differences over counting armaments in dumps.

By now the 23 countries' talks have entered the stage of a detailed examination of all questions. Reaching mutually acceptable decisions will depend primarily on the political will of the participating states.**

In view of the significance which solution of the problem of cuts in armed forces and armaments would have for Europe and the world, the Soviet Union has proposed holding in the second half of 1990 a meeting of the heads of state of Europe, the United States and Canada to conclude an agreement on conventional armaments. Such a meeting could be preceded by a working meeting of foreign ministers.

Removing the threat of nuclear conflict is unthinkable without solving the problem of *tactical nuclear weapons* (TNWs)*** Now that the talks on conventional armaments have started, it would be wrong to leave out this important component of the military political situation on the European continent. The problem is compounded by the intention of certain NATO countries to speed implementation of the prog-

* During the third round of the talks that ended on October 19, 1989, the WTO nations made an additional proposal regarding air defence interceptor fighters, namely, to establish certain levels, on the understanding that there would be no increases in the armaments which these aircraft are intended to fight—Ed

** A headway was noted resulting from the third round of talks: the definition of artillery systems was agreed upon, positions were brought closer on tanks, combat helicopters and armoured vehicles. It was found there are no differences of principal nature on matters of information exchanges and control. Thus, the most complicated problem that remains is negotiating the parties' positions on aircraft and personnel.—Ed.

*** This category comprises tactical carrier aircraft, short-range missiles (up to 500 km) and atomic artillery, or what is known as theatre weapons

ramme for the development and deployment of a new missile complex, Lance-2, on the pretext of modernising US missiles stationed in Western Europe.

On April 11, 1989, the Warsaw Treaty countries presented the NATO countries with a proposal for separate talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear component of dual-purpose weapons. The Soviet Union backs with deeds its readiness to reach agreement on reductions in tactical nuclear arms. According to decisions made by agreement with our allies, 500 nuclear warheads (166 mounted on aircraft, 50 in artillery shells and 284 on missiles) are to be withdrawn from our allies' territory by late 1989. Within the framework of a unilateral reduction in the strength of Soviet troops and armaments in Europe, we will also reduce in the 1989-1990 period delivery vehicles for tactical nuclear weapons, including 24 tactical nuclear missile launchers. The Soviet Union has expressed its willingness to effect further unilateral cuts in tactical nuclear missiles deployed in Europe provided the NATO countries are willing to hold talks on TNWs. It is not modernising its tactical nuclear missiles, not even replacing them, and in common with its Warsaw Treaty allies it calls on the NATO countries to refrain on a reciprocal basis from modernising tactical nuclear weapons.*

At the NATO Council session in Brussels on May 29 and 30 last, the Western countries agreed in principle to talks on tactical nuclear weapons. However, they made the start of such talks conditional on the implementation of a future agreement on reductions in conventional armed forces in Europe. The stand taken by NATO has some aspects essentially unacceptable to us. It is important to note, however, that the NATO countries now tend to depart from the complete negativism which they showed before.

Also important is the fact that the NATO session resolved to defer until 1992 action on introducing and deploying a new missile complex, Lance-2.

A noteworthy milestone on the road to a climate of genuine confidence and to a lowering of military confrontation in Europe was the successful conclusion in September 1986 of the *Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe*. The conference carried forward and extended the confidence-building measures in force under the Helsinki Final Act and made them binding. It agreed new measures, in particular inspection without the right of refusal. The Soviet Union applied in these accords its new approach to the issue of control, confirming its readiness to adopt the most rigid and extensive verification measures on a reciprocal basis.

The three years since the Stockholm accords became effective have shown that the participating states scrupulously honour their obligations, and this has made a tangible contribution to a healthier international situation.

On March 6, 1989, 35 countries began in Vienna talks intended to work out confidence measures of a new generation.

The WTO countries proposed the following main lines on which to develop confidence and security-building measures:

—limiting military activity, in particular the scale, number and duration of major war games;

* As Mikhail Gorbachev was on a visit to Finland on October 26 and 27, 1989, announcement was made of the Soviet Union's decision to eliminate unilaterally certain categories of our sea-based nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea. The USSR has already removed two nuclear submarines from the roster; before 1990 is over the USSR shall eliminate its four nuclear submarines and their nuclear missiles that remain there.—Ed.

—extending confidence measures to the activity of air forces and navies, including measures for notification, observation and limitation of such activity;

—greater openness and predictability in military matters, including information exchanges, control and verification.

The WTO countries also advanced the idea of establishing a centre for the reduction of the war menace and the prevention of surprise attack in Europe as an agency discharging information and consultative functions and capable of contributing substantially to effort to strengthen confidence and stability in Europe.

The NATO countries proposed going no further than a certain improvement of the Stockholm accords on measures relating to the activity of ground forces. At the same time, they are against extending confidence measures to the activity of naval forces on the plea that such measures would impair NATO's ability to defend its sea and oceanic communications; they refuse to restrict military activity, alleging that in view of the existing imbalances in conventional armed forces in favour of the WTO, such measures could have a negative effect on the defence capacity of NATO; they only agree in part to extending confidence measures to the activity of the Air Force (they propose exchanging static information on land-based aircraft on the ground that by virtue of their mobility, air forces do not lend themselves to control).

In spite of differences, the talks are substantive and free of confrontation, and this gives reason for some optimism.*

The Soviet Union is taking part in the *talks on banning chemical weapons* at the Conference on Disarmament, which is attended by 40 member countries, and in parallel, within the framework of bilateral Soviet-American consultations. The drafting of a universal international convention on a general and complete ban of chemical weapons and on the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and industrial facilities for their manufacture has reached the final stage. What made this possible in decisive measure was a number of successive Soviet initiatives carrying forward the Statement of January 15, 1986, in particular our proposals for monitoring the elimination of facilities for chemical weapons production and their non-production in civilian industries, control over chemical weapons stockpiles, obligatory verification upon request, exchanges of data and confidence-building measures, and an experiment to test control over non-production of chemical weapons.

At bilateral Soviet-US consultations (there were twelve rounds), the two sides worked out joint proposals for inclusion in a draft convention on facilities for the production of chemical weapons (definition, control over destruction), the procedure of destroying stocks of chemical weapons and production facilities and on the procedures of conducting inspections upon request. At their meeting in September 1989, the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State adopted a joint statement putting on record the possibility of an early decision on the remaining questions and of signing a convention on banning chemical weapons very shortly.

Measures of openness and confidence are an important prerequisite for the success of the talks. The Soviet Union has unilaterally adopted a series of such measures. In 1987, we admitted for the first time that we possessed chemical weapons, disclosed data on our stocks (which do not exceed 50,000 tons of poison) and announced that we had stopped producing them, were building an experimental facility for the dest-

* Resulting from the third round of talks completed on October 20, 1989, an agreement was reached to hold in Vienna on January 16 to February 5, 1990, a seminar to discuss and compare the military doctrines.—*Ed.*

ruction of stocks and had no chemical weapons on the territory of other countries. The years 1987 to 1989 saw reciprocal trips by Soviet and Western experts with a view to acquainting themselves with the technology of destroying chemical weapons.

In September 1989, the Soviet Union concluded a special agreement with the United States providing that even before the convention came into force, the two sides would exchange information on their military chemical capabilities, pay a series of visits to the military and civilian facilities concerned and conduct on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of data made available. This agreement, which established new standards of openness, is aimed to facilitate for the Soviet Union and the United States the process of negotiating, signing and ratifying a convention.

There is the problem of preparing in advance for the convention's entry into force. This will necessitate installing equipment for the destruction of existing stocks in the fairly short period of ten years. It will not be easy either so to site it as not to damage the environment or to secure the substantial resources needed for building facilities and ensuring their operation. Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is necessary to remember that the benefit to be derived by renouncing this weapon of mass destruction will be obvious if the expenditures to be borne are compared with the losses that the country could incur in the event of chemical weapons ever being used.

Generally speaking, however, it should be admitted that the drafting of a convention to ban chemical weapons comes very late. The situation in the world would have made it possible to stop their production as far back as the late seventies, which could have played an important part in improving the climate of the planet. At present it is much more difficult to reach agreement, one reason for this being the threat of proliferation of chemical weapons. Experts estimate that about 20 countries now have a potential for their production.

This makes it particularly important to prevent a proliferation of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union regards measures to this end as an intermediate stage on the road to a convention that would reliably solve the problem by banning all transfer of such weapons.

In January 1986, the Soviet Union established rules for control over the export of chemicals which are used for peaceful purposes but could also be used for producing chemical weapons (in July 1989, these rules were replaced by new and more effective ones).

The problem of non-proliferation of chemical weapons is also discussed in bilateral consultations with the United States.

The Soviet Union has been making vigorous efforts to get the problem of *ending nuclear tests* off the ground.

The moratorium on all nuclear explosions which the Soviet Union announced unilaterally and which was in force for eighteen months, from August 1985 to February 1987, roused world opinion and won support from many countries of the world. The Group of Six (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) stepped up its activity to a considerable extent and called on the United States to respond positively to the Soviet initiative. The Soviet Union, for its part, accepted an offer of the Six for assistance in monitoring a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons.

In the end we had to renounce the moratorium, for the Soviet Union could not endlessly show unilateral restraint in the face of an intensive programme of nuclear explosions undertaken by the United States. But the Soviet Union is ready to resume at any moment a moratorium on nuclear blasts on the basis of reciprocity with the United States.

As the United States links the possibility of ending tests to prog-

ress in other areas of disarmament, the Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate with it a phased solution on a bilateral basis.

In November 1987, the two countries began talks on limiting and ending nuclear tests.

By now they have agreed a control protocol to the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. They have made considerable headway towards agreeing a protocol to the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests to 150 Kilotons. (The United States never ratified these two treaties, alleging that their control mechanism was not reliable enough.) An accord was brought nearer by a joint control experiment carried out on test ranges in Nevada (August 17, 1988) and Semipalatinsk (September 14, 1988).

During their meeting in Wyoming, USA, on September 22 and 23 last, the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State agreed the key components of a control mechanism for the 1974 Treaty, which include on-site hydrodynamic measurements, on-site inspections and seismic stations on the territory of the controlled side. The delegations to the talks were instructed to complete the agreeing of a protocol to the 1974 Treaty at the earliest possible date, which would allow both treaties—those of 1974 and 1976—to be submitted for ratification.

The attainment of this goal would make it possible to move to the next stage agreed on at the start of the talks, that is, to working out further intermediate restrictions on nuclear tests as the two sides advanced to the ultimate goal, an end to all nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process.

The Soviet Union is working to ensure that opportunities for multilateral talks are used in the interest of banning nuclear weapons tests. In particular, we support the proposal made by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela for a conference of the signatories to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to discuss an amendment which would extend the treaty to underground tests.* Consultations on holding such a conference are underway now.

The Soviet Union sees the *task of ending production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons* as a component of the programme for eliminating nuclear weapons put forward by it.

In April 1989, the Soviet Union announced the discontinuance from 1989 onwards of the production of highly enriched uranium as well as the shutdown in 1987 of one reactor producing weapon plutonium and the planned shutdown in 1989 and 1990 of two more such reactors without replacing them with new ones. By now the Soviet Union has stopped three plutonium reactors. We have called on the American side to join us in drafting a bilateral agreement on controlled discontinuance of the production of all fissionable materials for weapons. On September 26, 1989, we announced at the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly our intention to shut down all remaining plutonium reactors in the Soviet Union by the year 2000. Also, we called on all nuclear states to begin preparations for signing an agreement on ending and banning production of fissionable materials on the understanding that in verifying compliance, use could be made of the experience of IAEA guarantees.

Currently there are favourable prerequisites for such an agreement. In July 1988, the United States stopped for technical and ecological rea-

* By the terms of the treaty, the amendment would be considered approved if backed by a majority vote of all the signatories, including the votes of the original signatories, that is, the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain.

sons the last three of the 14 reactors for the production of weapon plutonium (weapon uranium production in the United States was ended in 1964). In July 1989, the House of Representatives of the US Congress appealed to the administration to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on ending production of such materials and gave an assignment for working out recommendations on the technicalities of verifying compliance with a possible agreement.

The US administration has still not responded positively to our proposal for talks on controlled discontinuance of the production of all fissionable materials for weapons. What causes concern is the administration's attempt to further a new wide-ranging programme for setting up qualitatively new technological facilities for the production of fissionable materials and tritium.

Nor do the other nuclear powers—Great Britain, France and China—show activity in the matter of banning fissionable materials production for weapons.

In the short term, the problems of banning production of fissionable materials (especially in view of the drafting of an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in SOWs) should extend to another important matter: the destiny of the nuclear explosives being released as a result of nuclear disarmament, including the working out and agreeing of measures to guarantee further non-use of them for the development of other nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union is working steadfastly to help consolidate the regime of *nuclear non-proliferation*—an effort which we regard as an important condition for bringing about the elimination of all such weapons. The 18 years that have passed since the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force have demonstrated the efficacy of this instrument of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons over the planet. The number of signatories goes on growing and stands at 140 today. However, two nuclear powers, China and France, have still not joined the treaty, nor have a number of major nuclear states: India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa.

The Soviet Union, which is a depositary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty along with the United States and Great Britain, has been working consistently for the strengthening of the IAEA system of guarantees envisaged by the treaty. Regular contacts and consultations between the depositary countries and achievement of common positions by them in support of the treaty are an important factor for its viability. We also present practical questions of non-proliferation to nuclear powers which have not signed the treaty. France and China invariably reaffirm their intention to proceed according to the principles of the treaty as if they had signed it.

The Soviet Union has supported the creation of nuclear-free zones in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the South Pacific (the Rarotonga Treaty). It has declared in favour of creating such zones in Central and Northern Europe and the Balkans. Whereas solution in the central part of the continent hinges on the beginning of the talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe proposed by us, in the Balkans and Northern Europe it is conditioned by problems arising from the presence there of US and Soviet nuclear weapons, respectively. The Soviet Union is prepared to act as a guarantor of these zones by taking the necessary steps to pull out its nuclear forces. The United States, however, shows no readiness to make a similar commitment.

Plans for the creation of nuclear-free zones have been put forward with regard to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, Southeast and South Asia, the Korean Peninsula. The Soviet Union intends to continue supporting these proposals, for it considers that their reali-

sation would be a major contribution to the fulfilment of the task of eliminating nuclear arsenals everywhere to build a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

The Soviet Union comes out for curbs on international *deliveries and sales of arms*. This problem is gaining in acuteness. While arms deliveries are not the prime cause of conflict, they add their share to it. Arms purchases by developing countries tell on their efforts towards solving acute economic and social problems and ending their lag. Imports of military technology serve as a basis for fast-growing domestic military production; a number of countries which until recently were classed as developing have become major manufacturers or even exporters of arms.

Of course, such problems can only be solved on a reciprocal basis. Hence the chief task now is to set up an international mechanism making it possible to tackle them. We are already taking appropriate steps and have, among other things, signified our readiness to join in establishing within the UN a register of arms sales and deliveries to foreign countries, including specification of parameters for such a register.

In maintaining contacts with foreign countries, we advocate establishing rules for the provision of military aid, including aid from the Soviet Union, in line with our new approach to comprehensive security.

An increasingly acute problem is that of the *proliferation of missile technology*, including that of missiles capable of delivering nuclear and chemical weapons over long distances. International trade in missiles is on the rise. Extension of the range of countries possessing such missiles could greatly heighten the danger of armed conflict.

The several rounds of Soviet-US consultations of the problem of non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology as well as Soviet consultations with Britain and France have demonstrated a common interest in searching for mutually acceptable accords.

In line with new political thinking, the Soviet Union has decided to *cut military spending* by 14.2 per cent and *production of weapons and military equipment*, by 19.5 per cent.

We are carrying out these decisions. We have converted 40 per cent of our defence industry potential to civilian production; by 1995, this level is to exceed 60 per cent. By that time, these industries are planned to be producing 4,000 items of new civilian equipment.

Before the end of the 12 five-year plan, the defence industries will produce consumer goods worth more than five billion rubles (in addition to meeting five-year plan targets).

Civilian production is expected to go up under the 13th five-year plan. Compared with production under the current plan, it should achieve a 170 per cent increase in equipment for the processing industries of the agroindustrial complex and an 80 per cent increase in equipment for light industry, trade and public catering.

Work is nearing completion on a plan to convert three defence plants: the Yoshkar Ola and Yuryuzan mechanical plants and the Lenin Smithy Shipbuilding Yard. We expect to shift them from military to civilian production and to use military equipment in the economy after withdrawing it from the armed forces and adjusting it.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry is participating in the promotion of international cooperation in this field. In 1989 we presented to ILO answers to its questionnaire concerning employment and the pattern of the workforce in the defence industry; we have sent ILO a report on the conversion of the Votkinsk plant to be included in a special publication of that organisation; Soviet representatives are going to par-

ticipate more extensively in relevant international actions; preparations are under way for a special UN conference on conversion to be held in Moscow in 1990; a Soviet national commission has been formed to contribute to conversion.

The Soviet Union continues seeking an international dialogue on steps to *lessen military confrontation on high seas*.

We have put forward proposals aimed at starting a substantive discussion of naval problems and at reaching practical accords on real measures.

These efforts have so far produced no results due mainly to the negative stance of the United States. The recent meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State in Wyoming showed that the American side is still not ready for a dialogue on naval forces.

The Soviet Union is a party to practically all the agreements now in force on arms limitation and disarmament as well as to a number of agreements intended to lessen the war danger. It scrupulously *meets its obligations* under these treaties and agreements and attaches great importance to unfailing compliance with their provisions by all other parties.

Fulfilment of the commitments under the ABM Treaty is examined by the Soviet-US standing consultative commission set up in 1973. In 1989, a special control commission was appointed to make decisions on questions relating to implementation of the INF Treaty.

Operating within the framework of these bodies, the two sides have satisfactorily cleared up certain doubtful situations, with the result that mutual confidence has grown. Nevertheless, there still remain unresolved questions, in particular questions concerning the AMB Treaty. We have yet to receive a satisfactory answer to our concern about US activity directed towards setting up a wide-ranging ABM system.

The United States had raised complaints against the construction of the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station by us. Reaffirming its earnest intention to preserve the ABM Treaty as a pillar of strategic stability and aiming to fully pave the way for the early conclusion of a SOW treaty, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to dismantle and abolish the Krasnoyarsk RS. We must admit that we disregarded the ABM Treaty as we set out to build the RS and that this resulted in a great political loss, to say nothing of wasted investment in construction and dismantling of the station.

On our part we stated that the Soviet side expected the USA to take appropriate steps to alleviate the Soviet concern regarding the US radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. For the first time the American side did not decline our demands; it limited itself to statements that these would be studied. Thus, we have got a real possibility to preserve the ABM Treaty.

There were exchanges of claims related to radioactive fallouts outside the national territories in the course of underground tests in the USA and the USSR banned by 1963 Moscow Treaty on banning nuclear tests in air, space and under water. Every step is being taken by the Soviet side to prevent such fallouts.

Under the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe the WTO member states conducted in 1987-1989 15 inspections of the NATO nations' military activities. (Respectively, the NATO nations conducted 17 inspections of the WTO nations' military activities.) The inspections confirmed observance of the obligations assumed by the nations.

2. SETTLING REGIONAL CONFLICTS BY POLITICAL MEANS

This is a line of Soviet foreign policy which in the perestroika years has become highly relevant. It is fair to say that our country has joined actively in the elimination of long-standing regional tensions, fully respecting the fundamental principle of each people's freedom to choose development paths and models for their social and political organisation. Of course, not all tensions have been ended; the positions of the adversaries are often far apart and there persist major divergences on a number of points between the Soviet Union and the United States and other big powers. Nevertheless, recent years have witnessed progress towards settling practically all conflicts, if in varying measure. This is an unquestionable result of, among other things, the effort of the Soviet Union.

The most obvious case in point is the withdrawal of our troops from *Afghanistan*, mentioned earlier.

The Soviet Union took an active part in coordinated steps by the permanent members of the UN Security Council which led to the adoption of Resolution 598 and then, on August 20, 1988, to a ceasefire accord on the *Iran-Iraq front*. While the armistice is still not reliable enough and the past year has shown that further patient efforts will be required for a final settlement of the conflict, the important thing is that the flames of a protracted bloody war have been subdued. The Soviet Union continues searching actively for ways of drawing the positions of the sides closer together and helps the UN Secretary-General and his representative in their mediatory mission. We maintain intensive contacts on various levels with both Baghdad and Tehran; these contacts are not intended as a substitute for Perez de Cuellar's mission but are to help both parties to the conflict overcome the wall of alienation and establish minimum confidence.

There are signs of progress towards solving the problem of the *Middle East* although it is slower than we would have liked. On this issue, the Soviet effort has become considerably more active and assumed a multidimensional character. Cooperation with all Arab countries, primarily with those directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, has been coupled with seeking a dialogue with the United States and Israel and inducing the UN Security Council and its permanent members to play a more active role. The task is to really help both sides embark on a practical settlement of the conflict. It is necessary to search for solutions that would make it possible to combine an end to the occupation of Arab lands and realisation of the Palestinian people's legitimate right to national self-determination with guaranteed security for Israel within recognised boundaries.

The main road to this leads through an international conference on the Middle East. The idea of calling such a conference is hailed widely today. The Soviet Union's concrete suggestions for preparations were set out by its Foreign Minister during his tour of Middle East countries in February 1989. They consist essentially in using flexible and multiple-channel mechanisms, such as informal discussions in the UN Security Council, unofficial consultations between its five permanent members, a multilateral or bilateral dialogue between the parties seeking a settlement, it being implied that the dialogue would be carried on either directly or through mediators.

The Soviet Union endorsed the decisions of the Palestine National Council's extraordinary session (Algiers, November 12-15, 1988) and subsequent statements by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, which recognised the right of Israel as well as a Palestinian state to existence in peace and security, agreed to talks with Israel within the framework of an international conference on the basis of

Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and confirmed the renunciation of terrorism in any form. This was a serious step towards recognising the priority of political methods of struggle; it helped enhance the prestige and strengthen the international positions of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. A step towards a formal dialogue with the PLO was taken by the United States but it is not clear as yet how consistent the American position is.

Worthy of emphasis is the role which the Intifada, that is, the uprising launched by the Palestinians on the occupied territories in December 1987, has been playing in the evolution of the situation in the Middle East. Last May, the Israeli government advanced the so-called Shamir Plan in an attempt to put an end to it. The purpose of the plan is to hold elections on the occupied Palestinian lands in order to elect representatives of the population who could negotiate with the Israeli government the establishment of administrative autonomy for the Palestinians and then a solution to the problem of the final status of these lands. The plan flatly rejects the idea of founding a Palestinian state as well as PLO participation in deciding on the destiny of the Palestinian people.

The Palestinians interpret the Israeli plan as a continuation of attempts to bring about a split between the population of the occupied territories and the PLO and to find among the Palestinians amenable leaders who might accept Tel Aviv's terms. Nevertheless, the PLO has shown a readiness to discuss the proposal for elections on the understanding that they would be held under international control and would constitute an inseparable part of a comprehensive settlement within the framework of an international conference. The PLO is of the opinion that the Palestinian delegation to talks with Israel should include spokesmen for the PLO. This position of the PLO was backed by Arab leaders at the Casablanca Summit (May 23-26, 1989).

There are also other ideas aimed at bringing about a dialogue between the parties to a settlement. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt has put forward proposals containing reasonable elements. The Soviet Union considers that there are opportunities of discussing all proposals in order to try to reduce them to a common denominator acceptable to all. This could be done at consultations between the five permanent members of the Security Council, whom the parties directly concerned could join subsequently.

A problem causing concern is the *situation in Lebanon*, where armed clashes break out periodically between the opposing forces. What makes the Lebanese conflict distinctive is its nominally internal character. This circumstance complicated in no small measure international efforts to settle the conflict. Arab countries and the Lebanese themselves consider it advisable to continue seeking a solution by using the mechanism of the League of Arab States' Committee of Three.

In contacts with all the countries concerned and the forces directly involved in the Lebanese strife, the Soviet Union favours such an approach. It contributes vigorously to the success of the committee's mission so as to help consolidate the ceasefire, achieve national reconciliation on a durable basis and preserve the territorial integrity of Lebanon. That the Lebanese intent—for all the volatility of the situation in their country—to engage in dialogue is also a result of the Soviet Union's constructive effort.

The Soviet Union has come to play an active part in the settlement of the *Cambodian conflict*. With due regard to the situation shaping up in and around Cambodia, the government of that country proposed national reconciliation late in 1987. This move provided decisive prerequisites for furthering the process of political settlement, and the Soviet Union contributes its share by proceeding in permanent contact with the Cambodian

and Vietnamese governments and maintaining an intensive dialogue with the ASEAN countries, the United States, France and China.

In the period of 1988-1989 a certain progress was made in settling the situation inside Cambodia and providing favourable external conditions for this.

In August 1989, Paris hosted an international conference on Cambodia attended by the Soviet Union. While the conference failed to reach comprehensive accords, its deliberations resulted in setting up an international negotiating mechanism to help continue the search for a solution.

On September 26, 1989, Vietnam completed the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia. This major military political action opened a qualitatively new stage in the evolution of the situation in and around the country. At present efforts should concentrate on removing the threat of a genocidal regime being reimposed on Cambodia. From this point of view, it is highly important to avert an escalation of hostilities there, let alone a civil war. One way to achieve this aim would be to end arms deliveries from without to all the Cambodian parties in the conflict and desist from interfering in Cambodia's internal affairs, in any form, from moves likely to aggravate the situation. The Soviet Union has called on some countries to announce a moratorium on military aid to all Cambodian forces.

The past year or two have been marked by a high degree of activity aimed at settling *regional conflicts in Africa*. The Soviet Union, as well as hailing this trend, made a substantial contribution to it. The Soviet position was largely instrumental in arriving in a relatively short time at formulas of solutions to extremely complicated tensions in various parts of the continent.

Consultations with a wide range of African and other nonaligned countries as well as Western countries play a big role in this respect; they have assumed a regular and substantive character. Soviet-US cooperation within the UN and on a bilateral basis is an important factor today.

As a result of sustained efforts, a package agreement on an *Angolan-Namibian settlement* was signed on December 22, 1988, in New York. It was a major breakthrough in ending one of the long-standing conflicts in Southwest Africa. The accords reached made it possible to use UN mechanisms for the decolonisation of Namibia. In spite of the difficulties and complications that arise, there is reason to expect that the UN plan for granting independence to that country, adopted over ten years ago, will be implemented to the full and within the set time limits. After the general election in November 1989, Namibia should enter the last stretch of her long road to independence, which is to be proclaimed before April 1, 1990.

Guaranteeing the external security of the *People's Republic of Angola* is an important result of the settlement in Southwest Africa. South Africa's troops have pulled out of Angola. This made it possible to proceed to a phased withdrawal of the Cuban troops stationed in Angola at the request of its legitimate government to repulse South African aggression.

A logical sequel of this process was the beginning of a dialogue on *national reconciliation in Angola*, where a bloody devastating civil war had been going on for 14 years.

The plan for an intra-Angolan settlement drawn up in June 1989 by the leaders of 18 African countries at a meeting in Gbadolite, Zaire, on the basis of the Angolan leaderships' proposals won the approval of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the international community as a whole. The Soviet Union, for its part, gave full support to this

important initiative and is taking the requisite steps towards providing favourable external conditions for reconciliation in Angola.

But many obstacles arose on this road from the first. The anti-government UNITA grouping refuses to honour its commitments with regard to ending military operations and interprets the Gbadolite accords in its own way. It is encouraged in this respect by continuing armed aid and political support from the United States and South Africa.

Some changes for the better are coming about in *Mozambique*. The practical aspects of settling the situation in that country were the object of talks which started through mediators between the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the leadership of the so-called Mozambique Resistance. As in the case of the intra-Angolan settlement, Soviet diplomacy fully supports the peace effort of African countries and is ready to contribute to the normalisation of the situation in Southeast Africa.

In line to be done is the dismantling of the *apartheid* system in *South Africa*. The Soviet attitude to apartheid is unchanged. It emphatically condemns Pretoria's racist policy and supports the national liberation and democratic movement of the people of South Africa and the African National Congress (ANC).

In recent years, South Africa has been going through a certain evolution under the powerful impact of anti-apartheid forces and the uncompromising attitude of the world community. The country's new leadership says that it is for advancing to the abolition of apartheid. In this case too, a political settlement of the conflict would be the most acceptable. It can be brought about through a nation-wide dialogue involving all the sides concerned. The ANC declares with support from the "frontline" states that it is ready for such a dialogue. Soviet diplomacy, for its part, uses contacts with the official authorities of Pretoria within the framework of the Namibian settlement as a means of contributing to a political settlement of the conflict in southern Africa with all its complex aspects.

The end of *armed confrontation between Libya and Chad* has improved the situation in Africa. The Soviet Union favours a peaceful, political settlement of the dispute there and is working painstakingly with the parties directly involved in the conflict and with other African countries as well as with France and the United States.

In May 1989, the leadership of *Ethiopia*, a country close and friendly to the Soviet Union, took a major *peace initiative*. It called on Eritrea's organisations to start talks without strings in order to end the years-long fratricidal war in the northern part of the country. The first round of such talks has already taken place in Atlanta, USA.

The Soviet Union has pledged full support for the peace initiative; it is willing to contribute by every means at its disposal to the negotiating process between Addis Ababa and the Eritrean organisations. To this end it has established contacts with the People's Liberation Front of Eritrea.

All in all, however, the situation in Ethiopia remains complicated and explosive. Sustained efforts are also being made to stabilise the situation in the *Horn of Africa* and bring about good-neighbour relations and cooperation between countries in the region.

Throughout recent years, the Soviet Union has been steadfastly stepping up its efforts to contribute to a peaceful political *settlement in Central America*, to support moves by Latin American countries themselves. The Soviet Union backed the peace proposals of the Contadora Eight, and afterwards, when the initiative of dealing with the problem was taken over by the countries directly involved in the conflict, it backed the accords reached at meetings of the Presidents of Central American

states. This line of ours is appreciated by the Cuban and Nicaraguan leaders. The Soviet Union makes concrete proposals for ending Soviet and US arms deliveries to Central America, for announcing a moratorium on such deliveries. During Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Havana last April, we proposed ending arms deliveries to Central America from anywhere; our initiative was supported by the Cuban and Nicaraguan leaderships.

After President George Bush had taken office, the US approach to the situation in Central America showed signs of a certain positive evolution, and the Soviet-American dialogue on the problem of a settlement in the region assumed a more constructive character.

In view of an overall detente in the military political situation in Central America and following appropriate consultations with the Sandinista government, the Soviet Union suspended from early 1989 arms deliveries to Nicaragua. This decision played an important part in creating an atmosphere that helped the five Central American Presidents reach agreement. Also, it provided useful prerequisites for a gradual normalisation of relations between Nicaragua and the United States. The Soviet Union is in favour of using international mechanisms to supervise implementation of the accords that are reached.

The main thing now is to make a Central American settlement irreversible. This can be achieved through a continuous and intensifying negotiating process between the region's countries themselves, on the basis of strict compliance with the obligations assumed by them and unfailing respect for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Central American states, which the United States has repeatedly ignored and continues ignoring, and by building up the peace-making, stabilising role of the UN.

The situation on the *Korean Peninsula* has still not been settled although some advances have been made there as well. The DPRK and South Korea have taken a series of steps towards searching for ways to ease military political confrontation and begun discussing preparations for a meeting between their prime ministers and talks between their parliaments. A serious factor for tension on the peninsula is the presence in the south of a 43,000-strong US force equipped with nuclear arms. The Soviet Union has invariably supported the constructive initiatives of the DPRK; we appreciate any step in favour of ending confrontation and improving the political climate on the peninsula.

A new factor in the situation on the Korean Peninsula is the establishment by the Soviet Union of direct trading, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and sporting ties with South Korea at non-governmental level. This move should and already does have a positive effect on the evolution of the situation in Korea and the Far East as a whole, all the more since the close relations of alliance between the Soviet Union and the DPRK naturally remain intact.

The Soviet Union helps search for a settlement of the *Cyprus question*, a long-standing regional problem in the Eastern Mediterranean, and supports the procedure of intercommunal talks and the good offices mission on Cyprus entrusted by the UN Security Council to the Organisation's Secretary-General. Our country avails itself of every opportunity for a constructive dialogue on the problem with Greece, Turkey and both Cypriot communities as well as with the United States and other permanent members of the UN Security Council and with non-aligned countries.

In conclusion of this section, it should be stressed that throughout the years under review, the Soviet Union has been exerting considerable efforts to prevent a regional proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and to restrict on a mutually acceptable basis deliveries of conventional

arms to any area. This problem has been gaining in importance, for the extent to which the opposing sides in the regions of tension are armed is increasing and the increase is marked in some cases. The Middle East, for one, as well as some other areas are literally crammed with arms. The international community must act without delay, and the Soviet Union stands for this.

3. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SECURITY

These aspects are coming to the fore today in appraising both various components of the international situation and the situation in each particular country. The uneven development of individual countries and regions, the processes of integration and competition, the redistribution of economic power, the widening gap between countries that have forged ahead and countries lagging behind and burdened with a back-breaking debt are all sources of today's political problems and of problems and possibly upheavals to come.

The revolution in information technology has lent the world economy *unprecedented dynamism* and is transforming the social and economic panorama of the planet. Never before has humanity built up its production potential at so high a rate as in recent decades. The pace of development is quickest in countries which spend a notable part of their GNP on new research and promptly put its results to use: Japan, the United States, West European countries. One of the necessary conditions for this is steadfast effort in the sphere of education and personnel training. The countries in question account for 65 to 70 per cent of world industrial output. It is on the basis of new industries that South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and other so-called new industrial countries have achieved spectacular growth.

The internationalisation of production is going deeper as transnational production cycles are brought into being and the *interdependence and interpenetration of national economies* increase. With integrational processes going on, new vast economic areas come into existence, such as the European Economic Community. A further indicative reality is the activity of the seven leading countries of the West whose leaders meet at regular intervals to coordinate the main parameters of their economic and financial policies. An active search for integrational forms is on in Asia and Latin America. The world economy as a whole is becoming a single entity, and no state can stay out of it irrespective of how far that country's development has gone in its development or what social system it belongs to.

Along with this, the *gap* between developed and developing countries is widening. From 1965 to 1987, the real amount of GNP per head of population went up from 140 to 270 dollars in low-revenue countries, from 980 to 1,680 dollars in medium-revenue countries and from 8,820 to 14,550 dollars in the industrial countries of the West. *

The developing countries' external debt is mounting; it increased from 831 billion dollars in 1982 to 1,320 billion dollars in 1988, with annual debt payments up from 99 to 131 billion dollars. The net flow of financial resources to Third World countries dropped from 18.2 billion dollars in 1982 to 4.6 billion dollars in 1983, and in later years it gave way to a net flight of resources from debtor countries that reached 43 billion dollars in 1988.

The developing countries' payments on debts already swallow not only the whole amount of new credits obtained by them but a sizable part of internal accumulations. This makes it difficult to effect a restructuring

* The United States, Japan, France, Great Britain, the FRG, Canada, Italy.

in order to restore the solvency of developing countries and tends to destabilise the social and political situation generally.

The chronic indebtedness of Third World countries compels them to solicit foreign loans and credits again and again, thereby adding to the debt burden. At the same time, this consolidates the virtual monopoly of the main countries of the West and their banks on the credit market, at least as regards large loans in convertible currency. The process is coupled with such "traditional" devices of appropriating part of the product of the developing countries' labour as taking advantage of the play of prices for raw materials and final goods. The scientific and technological revolution makes for the growing dependence of the Third World in the area of sophisticated technology, including information technology.

Problems of the developing world are made worse by unfavourable *demographic trends*. According to forecasts by the UN and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the population of the globe, which now exceeds five billion, will reach 6.25 billion in the year 2000 and 7.1 billion in 2010. The bulk of this growth (around 92 per cent) will be provided by the developing countries, which are prepared least of all to assure the mass of their people with jobs, food, medical aid and social services. The highest population growth rate will be registered in Africa, whose population is expected to be up 42 per cent (to 886 million) by the year 2000 and 240 per cent (to 1,490 million) by 2020. In spite of substantial advances in world food production, *mass hunger* and under-nourishment among hundreds of millions have yet to be eliminated in developing countries.

The Soviet Union's fundamental approach to the problems of developing countries' foreign debt, hunger, the connection between disarmament and development, was set out in Mikhail Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure and Nuclear-Free World" and in his UN address on December 7, 1988. First and foremost, the Soviet Union calls for an end to the arms race, if the resources being wasted on arms production were spent on development, many problems which now seem unsolvable could be settled in a historically short time.

Further, our approach implies that the problem of the developing countries' debt can only be solved by joint efforts, by rendering these countries ample international aid in organising a profitable economy. It cannot be solved without making the technological achievements of the Western and other advanced nations available to developing countries. The Soviet Union, which considers that technological egoism is out of place today, has taken a relevant initiative. It has also worked out specific proposals, including a proposal for announcing a moratorium of up to a hundred years on debt servicing by the least developed countries and for forgiving debts altogether in some cases.

As a major creditor of developing countries, the Soviet Union is directly affected by the consequences of the debt crisis. The developing countries' debt under Soviet state credits is close to 72 billion rubles.

A major reason why the problem of repaying Soviet credits has gained in acuteness is that the granting of new credits and the renegotiation of previous loans were often done without proper economic consideration. There is still practically no stipulation to the effect that Soviet credits in aid shall be coupled with recommendations to debtor countries for the adoption of measures to guarantee repayment and foster economic growth. This necessitates a revision of our credit policy to make it more flexible and effective in the new economic context.

Until recently, the role and place of the Soviet Union in the world economy used to be assessed according to such indicators as our growing share in the production of steel, coal and other items. At the same time, we ignored structural changes in the world economy and discounted negative

results of our foreign economic relations as to quality. After 1985, we had to thoroughly reappraise the economic aspects of the Soviet presence in the world. Our country, which shares in world output with approximately 20 per cent, accounts for a mere four per cent of international trade, and as regards foreign trade turnover per capita, it holds last place among industrial countries, including the socialist countries of Europe.

The technological lag of some Soviet industries has translated into a low competitiveness of our output on the world market. As a consequence, Soviet exports are markedly dominated by raw materials. The major items in 1988 were oil (144.2 million tons), natural gas (87.4 billion cu. m.), coal (39.4 million tons), iron ore and pellets (43.1 million tons), merchantable wood (20.8 million cu. m.). The share of final goods in Soviet exports is one-third of the world average.

These factors plus some others made the Soviet economy highly vulnerable in the given world structure. This found concrete expression in recent years, when the decline in world oil prices, * which went hand in hand with price increases for certain Soviet imports (in particular food and equipment), led to a considerable worsening of the index of "trading conditions" for the Soviet Union. Whereas an improvement in these conditions in the 1971-1985 period earned our country an additional 67.3 billion rubles, the worsening that occurred in three years of the current five-year plan entailed a loss amounting to 30.6 billion rubles, including 14.5 billion rubles in 1988 alone. For the first time since 1973, we ran a 3.7 billion dollar deficit in trade with socialist countries. We also registered a negative balance to the tune of 2.4 billion dollars in our trade with the West. Recourse to foreign loans resulted in a growth of the country's external debt, which now stands at 34 billion rubles.

The greatly increased significance of economic factors in ensuring national security called for a reassessment of the role of foreign policy and the foreign policy service in this sphere. We became keenly aware of the need for a politically incisive appraisal of the ongoing world economic processes and for realistic consideration of both the given situation and what the world will be like in 10 to 15 years judging by current trends. This necessitated a fresh look at, among other things, the activity of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in the area of international economic cooperation and its role in the solution of the country's economic problems.

The economic work of the Ministry, which closely coordinates it with that of other government agencies, has gained substantially in scope. But the increase is plainly inadequate. In the context of the radical economic reform under way in the country, new forms of cooperation, joint ventures, and so on, the central apparatus of the Ministry and our embassies can and must be much more helpful in all these activities, must keep a watchful eye on all shortcomings, all cases of failure to fulfil agreements and contracts in the sphere of trade, the economy and finance, and call the government's attention to them where necessary. Besides, they can use diplomatic channels more intensively for the conclusion of profitable deals with foreign partners, their realisation and a search for forms and areas of cooperation of interest to us.

The Soviet Union took an unusual step to promote the idea of *multilateral economic cooperation* by proposing contacts with the Seven, first in the form of meetings of experts to ascertain the methodology of gauging and harmonising economic processes and eventually in the form of linking up the mechanisms of macroeconomic coordination at global level. The early reaction to our initiative indicates that there are opportunities for cooperation in practice.

* From 160 rubles per ton in 1985 to 60 rubles in 1988.

We are engaged in an increasingly active effort to induce the West to lift trading and economic *restrictions* on deals with this country, in particular by repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, curbs imposed by COCOM, and so on. Under the influence of the new political climate, some West European countries have lately begun to revise their attitude to such restrictions. At the same time, the US stand shows little change for the moment, and this is a serious obstacle to better trading and political conditions in East-West relations.

The Soviet-American talks in Wyoming, at which we proposed for the first time discussing the problem of how far the two countries' national economic mechanisms are compatible, showed that frank professional discussion can be really helpful in removing that hurdle. Agreement was reached on continuing a substantive discussion of ways to Soviet-US economic cooperation in the context of the main trends of world economic development.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry is participating in talks with a wide range of countries aimed at working out agreements on reciprocal protection of investments; without this it would be hard to expect normal progress in bilateral trade and credit and financial relations or an expansion of the area of joint business and other new forms of foreign economic ties. Talks with the United States and France concern a settlement of *mutual financial claims* (they were preceded by similar talks with Britain).

We are making a special effort to prepare in advance for the emergence of new highly integrated formations on the world scene, primarily a *single internal market of the EEC countries*. The task is to prevent a drastic increase in the difficulties attending Soviet economic cooperation with West European countries on both a multilateral and a bilateral basis.

The need for the early integration of the Soviet economy into the world economy on the principles of the contemporary international division of labour calls for a revision of our earlier negative attitude to *international economic organisations*. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) have proved in the decades since they came into being that they are effective regulators of world economic ties. The activities of the IBRD and IMF involve 151 of the 159 UN members.

We have taken steps to establish close ties with GATT. With due regard to the reaction of this agency's members, we are exploring ways to improve the foreign economic instruments of our country and analysing them to see how far they accord with the standards and principles of GATT. We are drafting a memorandum on the mechanism of regulating the foreign economic ties of the Soviet Union.

Close relations with the IMF and IBRD would help us search for optimum models of effecting economic reforms, strengthen commodity-money relations, open the Soviet economy to the world economy more widely and prepare for its incorporation in the world system of economic ties. Cooperation with the Fund and Bank would also help solve the serious and difficult problems of making the ruble convertible. Late 1988 and early 1989 saw initial meetings between Soviet experts and representatives of the IMF and IBRD Secretariats. The meetings showed that the problem of Soviet membership of these organisations can hardly be solved at an early date.

We are developing useful contacts with the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). We now have an Office of the Permanent Observer of the USSR at the Rome headquarters of FAO. Soviet representatives join in some actions undertaken by FAO or associated with it, such as

sessions of the FAO fishing commission, agricultural committees, regional economic commissions of the UN, and so on. We are studying the possibility of the Soviet Union joining FAO as a full-fledged member.

Full and effective Soviet participation in the world trading, economic, monetary and financial system and the multilateral mechanisms used by the system presupposes glasnost and openness in foreign economic relations. This means that we must publish in an internationally comparable form more *statistics* and other data on the state of our economy, in particular our balance of payments. The recommendations of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE contain some commitments of this nature.

With due regard to the realities of interdependence, Soviet diplomacy is working to provide conditions for the development of our international economic relations on a durable, predictable and reliable basis. This is also the purpose of the idea of ensuring *international economic security (IES)*, which we are promoting at multilateral level and which has won the approval of the UN.

The task now is to move on from the conceptual stage to the phased implementation of concrete IES provisions. Within the framework of this effort, the UN has adopted coordinated decisions to start work on the early detection of problems arising in the world economy and on exchanging experience of developing new forms of foreign economic relations, including joint ventures, areas of joint business, joint-stock companies.

Work is continuing on the idea of convening a *World Congress on Problems of Economic Security* in the foreseeable future. The Economic Forum and the Symposium on International Economic Security to be held in 1990 in Bonn and Moscow, respectively, within the framework of the European process will be definite stages on the road to the realisation of this idea.

4. ECOLOGY AND DIPLOMACY

The growing danger of global ecological disaster has put environmental protection among the most important and pressing world political problems of today. Preserving and often restoring the ecological balance are objectively becoming a task inseparable from the formation of comprehensive international security. The world has come to a pass where the fortunes of world civilisation and ultimately human survival hinge on how effectively this task is fulfilled. Thus the sphere of politics, having linked up with the sphere of nature conservation, has given rise to a new field of constructive effort by humanity, *political ecology*.

Solving environmental problems calls for highly coordinated action by states, internationalisation of their efforts, the immediate adoption of decisions at regional and global level meeting the highest political standard. This also implies adequate participation in the funding of appropriate international actions.

The Soviet Union has signified at top level its readiness for extensive international environmental cooperation and proposed a number of large-scale measures for the environmental revival of the planet. They include the ideas of setting up an emergency environmental aid centre under the UN, establishing an international system for space monitoring of the environment, raising the role of the UN and its bodies in promoting international environmental cooperation. These initiatives as well as our specific proposals for coordinating and improving the conservation activity of states, have met with a favourable international response.

We must admit, however, that the Soviet Union was *manifestly slow* in opting for extensive environmental cooperation at international level. We still lack a single state programme for environmental protection and for rational use of our natural resources.

The Chernobyl tragedy cast a stark light on the imperative need for dependable environmental control in any part of Soviet territory, prompt and objective assessments of the changing parameters of the environmental situation, precise instruments and competent personnel, the supply of accurate information on developments to the local authorities and the population to ensure that the measures taken are really adequate to the proportions of a threat. Chernobyl also taught us that to cope with trouble, we absolutely need glasnost, need to pass information to other countries without the slightest delay, to cooperate on crucial environmental phenomena at international level with the diplomatic corps, foreign journalists and specialists as well as with appropriate international organisations. The Foreign Ministry took an active part in operation aimed at overcoming the effects of the Chernobyl accident. It will go on doing all in its power for the protection and conservation of nature by promoting effective and *bona fide* international cooperation.

Environmental cooperation is a sphere called upon to develop in the conditions of complete openness of information on the environmental situation, including incidents and accidents, of unhampered exchanges of scientific and technological information on environmental problems and of advanced conservation technology. *Glasnost, openness, authenticity* must be key elements of nature conservation.

Our transition to active cooperation with other countries necessitates and implies a readiness to put the environment at home in proper order. Unless we improve the environmental situation inside the country and draw up our own national programme for nature conservation, we will hardly be able to participate in international dialogue as a full-fledged party and in the most effective manner.

Work in this direction is on but its pace and above all its results to date can by no means be considered satisfactory. We therefore can and must lodge complaints which are perfectly justified from the point of view of international standards and regulations against Soviet government agencies directly responsible for measures to protect the environment and improve its quality.

Soviet involvement in the international nature conservation mechanism, in all its components new existing or being brought into existence, enables our government agencies and public opinion to acquaint themselves with the many achievements of other countries in nature conservation and is conducive to the enshrinement in our legislation of conservation norms and standards similar to those established by international law and adopted by leading industrial nations.

We may cite as a *concrete result* of collective conservation measures at international level our participation in the Vienna convention on the protection of the ozone layer and the Montreal protocol to it on substances destroying the ozone layer. The Soviet Union has expressed a readiness, just as the leading industrial countries of the West have done, to end production and use of all ozone-destroying substances (chlorofluorocarbons) by the year 2000.

A tangible confirmation of our willingness to join in international cooperation in nature conservation is the Soviet Union's declaration of intent on joining international environmental agreements to which our country is not a party as yet. According to data released by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), there are over 140 international nature conservation agreements, including 55 signed by the Soviet Union as well. Currently the Soviet Foreign Ministry and other government agencies concerned are exploring the possibility of joining another 36 international acts of this kind (most other agreements are local or exclusive).

A fact worthy of note is that, for the time being, there is no international environmental accord containing the more important general principles of state-to-state cooperation in nature conservation. World realities necessitate the drafting and adoption of what may be called a *code* of civilised environmental *behaviour* defining and establishing an organic connection between the rights and duties of states. This idea could find reflection in the decisions of the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development whose mission the Soviet Union sees in working out on the basis of a broad international consensus recommendations for the world community regarding safe environmental coexistence for the decades to come. We are preparing actively for this major international action and have proposed carrying it out at top political level.

In line with the policy of mobilising the efforts of the international community to conserve the environment, the Soviet Union has increased its participation in *UNEP*. We consider that the role of *UNEP* in coordinating the conservation efforts of members of the world community should grow substantially. To achieve this, *UNEP* needs both political and financial support from the members countries. The Soviet Union has expressed a readiness to increase its contribution to the *UNEP* voluntary fund.

Environmental problems are particularly acute in heavily populated and industrially developed *Europe*. It is this continent that could become a model of organising international cooperation in environmental protection. Shaping up here are definite trends and procedures of international environmental cooperation, and there is a real material basis for pursuing a regional environmental protection strategy and making rational use of natural resources.

Work has begun on improving the legal mechanism of bilateral cooperation in nature conservation with the socialist countries of *Europe*. This cooperation should help in considerably extending the area of interaction and turning it mainly into cooperation and specialisation in the development of conservation equipment and environmentally safe technologies.

Our concept of a common European home implies a collective search for mutually acceptable solutions ensuring progress. Some concrete proposals in this sense were put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Great importance attaches to the *Ecoforum in Sofia*, held for the first time within the European process and which discussed steps to prevent and limit trans-frontier effects of industrial accidents and the problem of handling potentially dangerous chemicals as well as problems arising from the pollution of trans-frontier waterways and international lakes. It is necessary to harness the large potential of the Economic Commission for Europe with its vast experience of environmental research and projects to the solution of continental conservation problems, doing so effectively and fully. We see a positive sign in the fact that the European Communities express in more and more concrete terms a willingness to cooperate both at European level and on a bilateral basis with the Soviet Union on environmental problems.

In fulfilment of the Murmansk programme advanced by the Soviet Union in 1987, an international legal mechanism is being evolved to regulate cooperation between the Nordic countries in civilian areas, including the environment. The Soviet Union has backed an important initiative of Finland—that country's proposal for a conference on environmental protection of the Arctic.

Ecology and developing countries constitute a separate and highly important theme. It is this category of states that is protected least of all environmentally although trans-frontier incidents affect them as much as developed countries. Lately there has been a new and very dangerous

trend in the form of attempts by certain industrial countries to set up dangerous industries in developing countries, thereby "exporting" their environmental problems to other continents. Furthermore, we come more and more often across attempts to ship noxious, toxic or even radioactive waste to developing countries legally or illegally.

This practice can hardly be regarded as other than shortsighted and unwise, as being intended to evade response to a real environmental menace, since the unsolved environmental problems now being exported "overseas" are bound to boomerang in the end, hitting the interests of the world in general and the developing countries concerned in particular.

A concrete study is worth undertaking into possibilities of using the experience of the world community to improve the situation in our environmentally unsafe areas as well as to improve long-term planning and the forecasting of economic processes and natural phenomena. *Some progress* has been made in this direction: an international environmental research centre has been set up on Lake Baikal; discussion is going on of possibilities for international aid in reviving the Aral Sea and of cooperation in environmental protection and rational development of areas of the Far North; the Soviet Union has proposed to the FRG doing joint research into general problems of the water ecosystems of the Volga and the Rhine, and so on. These are only initial steps, of course; they must be carried forward.

Closer links between diplomacy and nature conservation made it necessary to reorganise the work of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to a definite extent. The Ministry established a Division of Environmental Problems within the Directorate of International Scientific and Technological Cooperation. We now have a group under the Ministry called the Interministerial Commission for Foreign Policy and International Legal Aspects of Environmental Cooperation. The Ministry maintains what is generally businesslike contacts with other entities active in the ecological sphere, primarily the USSR Committee on Nature Conservation, USSR Hydrometeorological Committee and USSR Academy of Sciences. We believe the Foreign Ministries of the Union republics could help greatly in solving this national problem.

5. ASSERTING THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION

The 27th CPSU Congress put the humanitarian problems of foreign policy on an equal footing with the political, military political and economic aspects of comprehensive security.

In this period of qualitative renewal of every sphere of life, humanitarian matters and hence the theme of freedom of the individual, full application of the citizens' creative and intellectual potentialities, social protection and individual rights are acquiring proper significance in foreign policy as well. The line of asserting the supremacy of international law can succeed only if each country begins with itself.

This work is distinctive in that by far the greater part of it is internal in character. It is a question of bringing legislation, administrative regulations, the functioning of government bodies and all practice into harmony with international standards and covenants as well as with accords reached at European meetings.

All that is done to extend democracy and glasnost and build a law-governed state, in particular by the USSR Supreme Soviet, helps us meet our international commitments. Consistent and unqualified compliance with them is in keeping with the real meaning of building a socialist society, the strategic interests of our policy and the needs of our economy. No improvement can be expected in the climate of state-to-state relations

without progress in humanitarian matters. Needless to say, Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the assumption that nobody can establish or improve internal order for us.

Evolving international standards of human rights in common with other countries and following them are part of the task of incorporating our country in the world community as an equal member and of setting out on the main road of development at the threshold of the 21st century.

The readiness of a state to respect international rules, including those concerning so sensitive a sphere as human rights, is a requisite for confidence in it. Experience has shown that without such confidence there can be no reasonably lasting detente, no breakthrough in the area of disarmament, no serious economic, scientific or technological cooperation.

Perestroika in the Soviet Union has objectively extended the possibilities of the UN in the area of human rights as well as the framework of the European process in the humanitarian sphere. What international forums rely on is not a confrontational approach but correctness, use of the experience of other nations, effort to bring about a cooperation really improving the situation over human rights in every country. The Soviet Union, seeking humanisation of international relations, has declared without qualification in support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and confirmed its allegiance to international covenants on human rights, the Helsinki Final Act and other basic documents. It has recognised as binding the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on all the main agreements concerning human rights.

The Soviet Union's active participation in the drafting and agreeing of the *Vienna accords* on humanitarian issues is a matter of fundamental importance.

The European process demonstrated its viability even during protracted and deep-going declines in the international situation. It now forms the basis for the concept of a common European home. At the Vienna Meeting, all the participating states committed themselves to improve their laws, administrative regulations and political practices relating to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and the main freedoms and to apply them in order to guarantee effective exercise of these rights and freedoms. Special attention is devoted to ensuring protection of the human rights and main freedoms of members of ethnic minorities in order to encourage their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity and guarantee their complete equality with others.

As the Vienna accords have been in force ever since they were approved, the CPSU CC Political Bureau on January 24, 1989, or immediately after the Vienna Meeting, recommended to the Soviet ministries and other government agencies concerned to set out immediately to put them into practice and assigned the function of coordinator to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Generally speaking, the task of implementing international accords has moved into the sphere of practice. But what has been accomplished to date is far less than what has yet to be done. In December 1988, the Soviet Union, addressing the UN on the most authoritative level, announced the drafting of legislation on freedom of religion, glasnost, social associations and organisations, and so on. The relevant bills are being discussed by the USSR Supreme Soviet or prepared for submission to it.

Intensive work has been started in the context of perestroika to deal with specific humanitarian cases that have accumulated primarily in relations with the United States, the FRG, France and Canada. We have settled many matters involving trips by Soviet citizens to other countries, emigration, family reunifications. In 1988, trips abroad for various reasons

were made by 1.8 million Soviet citizens. The abolition of administrative restrictions on foreign travel has practically eliminated the urgency of a sensitive problem concerning human rights. The adoption of new regulations has resulted in the number of emigrants going up from 4,100 adults in 1986 to 75,100 in 1988. It is essential, however, to finalise the changes now taking place by enacting a *law on entry into and departure from the USSR by Soviet citizens*.

The Soviet state, while recognising the right of its citizens to leave the country, has no intention of encouraging emigration, a phenomenon breeding a number of serious problems, such as a brain drain or double citizenship, including problems for the receiving countries, such as the difficulty of providing housing, growing unemployment and crime, a hostile attitude to immigrants on the part of the local population, and so forth. With due regard to the democratisation of Soviet society some Western countries tend to desist from treating immigrants from the Soviet Union as "political refugees". They are beginning to extend to this category general standards applying to economic emigrants. Some of these countries have adopted administrative curbs on the flow of immigrants from the Soviet Union. The problem of emigration has a further aspect. There are about 20 million people abroad who hail from our country. Many of them are drawn to their homeland and would like to restore practical ties or spiritual bonds with it. In addition to a psychological reversal of our attitude to these people, we will have to make a series of legal and practical decisions in the interests of both these citizens and the Soviet state, to see to the preservation of historical roots and the country's cultural heritage. The Foreign Ministry takes an active part in the discussion and settlement of these problems, some of which are not simple at all.

The situation in psychiatry needs to be improved from the point of view of the Soviet Union's international commitments. Specialists are of the opinion that the rules now in force do not make it possible to completely preclude arbitrary recourse to psychiatric treatment. We need a special law on rendering psychiatric aid and on protecting the rights and legitimate interests of mental patients.

We must pay special heed to the provisions of international covenants and the Vienna Concluding Document concerning the rights of ethnic minorities. They are taken into account in the CPSU Platform on the Nationalities Policy of the Party. The European standard which provides for protection from discrimination on ethnic grounds and assures ethnic minorities equal rights and opportunities without any qualification whatever should be borne in mind in the course of current debates on the problem of nationalities.

The situation of ethnic groups in the Soviet Union which have compatriots abroad (Greeks, Germans, Jews and others) has foreign political aspects as well. The states and social and ethnic organisations concerned carefully follow the manner in which our country deals with the problems of preserving ethnic traditions, culture and language as well as the extent to which these minorities are represented in elected and executive bodies. This offers a sphere of activity to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Union republics and to local government bodies.

There remain many humanitarian problems. They are due to both the fact that not all our partners have given up or always give up attempts to exploit human rights as a means of scoring propaganda points as well as to our own internal problems and the inadequate performance of the Foreign Ministry and other agencies. It is in the interest of perestroika and the new image of the Soviet Union to settle humanitarian cases still worrying our public opinion.

It is highly desirable that the USSR Supreme Soviet consider a

series of bills relating to the humanitarian sphere. Specifically, we mean the need to translate the following international commitments into Soviet legislation: the right to free movement and freedom of choosing a domicile for anyone who is residing lawfully on the territory of a state (Art. 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); the right to freedom of religion (Art. 18 of the same Covenant); the right to free expression of one's opinion (Art. 19); the right to freedom of association (Art. 22); the right of every citizen irrespective of ethnic origin, birth or any other circumstance to participate in the conduct of affairs of state, to vote and to be elected by universal and equal suffrage (Art. 25); the right of ethnic and religious minorities to use their culture and confess their religion as well as to use their mother tongue (Art. 27).

In its address to the UN on December 7, 1988, the Soviet Union announced at the highest level its intention to participate more extensively in human rights control mechanisms under the UN and within the framework of the European process. This implies, in particular, joining the optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides for the possibility of citizens seeking UN assistance on their rights. However, differences of opinion between Soviet government agencies so far have prevented our country from joining the protocol.

Lately members of the *main UN agencies for human rights* have succeeded to a considerable degree in moving from confrontation to substantive cooperation. This was made possible by, among other things, such Soviet steps as the ratification of the convention against torture (March 3, 1987) and our active participation in the work of the committee concerned, our withdrawal of reservations regarding the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under six international conventions on human rights (1989), our constructive contribution to the drafting of a convention on the rights of the child, which will probably be adopted at the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly, our cooperation with the UN in the solution of the problem of Afghan refugees and the organisation of international humanitarian relief for Afghanistan.

On August 4, 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified on the proposal of the Foreign Ministry the supplementary protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, for the Protection of War Victims. The Soviet state announced its recognition of the powers of the International Commission concerned on the basis of reciprocity, a step which is bound to make international standards more effective.

Bilateral contacts between states in the humanitarian sphere were started virtually from scratch.

Within the framework of the Soviet-French dialogue on humanitarian issues, we advanced the idea of a common European legal area. It is primarily a question of harmonising as far as possible legislation, administrative regulations and judicial practices and of eventually working out and codifying international standards covering the whole range of relations between the parties to the European process.

Progress has gone furthest in relations with the United States; while difficulties remain and a confrontational approach recurs now and then, the theme of serious bilateral cooperation has come to the fore.

At the September 1989 meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State, the two sides signed a joint statement on a common interpretation of the international legal standards regulating the peaceful passage of ships, including warships, through territorial waters. Thereby conditions were created for avoiding in the future incidents similar to the one that occurred in February 1988, when US war-

ships appeared off the Crimean coast. A Soviet-US document was approved on mutually acceptable conditions concerning recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice of the UN. This accord is being presented to the three other permanent members of the Security Council—China, France and Britain—for discussion.

Last September saw the signing of Soviet-US agreements on reciprocal trips by inhabitants of the Bering Straits area and on setting up a commission for the Bering Straits to help organise regular cooperation between the frontier authorities and local bodies of the Chuckchee Autonomous District and the State of Alaska.

Some important initiatives in the humanitarian sector of Soviet foreign policy have not yet been put into effect for objective reasons or due to differences in the approach of the government agencies concerned. The more important of them are as follows:

- a detailed programme for legal cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, including seminars, exchanges of specialists, with the participation of the USSR Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs and the USSR Procurator's Office;

- establishing contacts and evolving universally recognised standards of psychiatry with the participation of the USSR Ministry of Health;

- programmes for the protection of labour and health and for safety techniques, as in coal mining and some other industries;

- programmes for dealing with problems of the elderly, invalids, children and youth encompassing the USSR Committee on Labour and Social Matters and the USSR Ministry of Health.

All these initiatives were reflected in the "new agenda" discussed with the American side.* The parliamentary contacts which the USSR Supreme Soviet and the US Congress have been vigorously promoting of late are likely to contribute to the implementation of these programmes.

The process of evolving a *common conception* of the more important international standards is also going on at multilateral level.

We have drawn up and are carrying out a programme for more active involvement of the Soviet Union in the struggle against *international terrorism*.

By joining in 1987 the international convention on taking hostages (1979) and the Tokyo convention on crime and some other acts committed on board aircraft (1973), the Soviet Union became a party to all universal agreements in force on combating concrete manifestations of terrorism. In 1988, new international documents were adopted in this sphere: convention on combating illegal acts against the security of sea shipping, protocol on the protection from such acts of stationary platforms situated on the continental shelf (signed by the Soviet Union) and protocol on combating illegal acts of violence in airports serving international civil aviation (ratified by the Soviet Union). An international accord is being drafted to prevent terrorism using plastic explosives.

At a time when a worldwide atmosphere of unqualified rejection of terrorist methods is shaping up, cooperation in combating terrorism can also be carried on in the absence of diplomatic relations. A case in point is the fact that in December 1988 Israel extradited the criminals who had taken a group of schoolchildren hostage and hijacked an Aeroflot liner.

The Soviet Union is drawing up on the basis of international standards and with the participation of the Foreign Ministry a state program-

* During the October 1989 visit to Moscow of the US Attorney General Richard Thornburgh there was discussed the broadening of spheres of cooperation in humanitarian area between the USSR and the USA. In particular, discussion centred on organised crime, narcobusiness, terrorism and problems of emigration from the USSR.—Ed.

me for the security of civil aviation from acts of illegal interference; the purpose of the programme is to eliminate the Soviet people's justified concern at increasing attempts to hijack aircraft.

Cooperation in combating terrorism is also coming into its own on a bilateral basis; it involves the United States, Britain, France, the FRG, Italy and some other countries.

Soviet participation in combating *drug addiction and trafficking* has risen to a qualitatively new plane. In 1988, the UN adopted a new important document, the convention on combating illicit traffic in narcotic and psychotropic substances. The early practical results are there already, as was indicated by the successful completion of a Soviet-British operation to detect the smugglers of 3,5 tons of hashish and a similar Soviet-Canadian operation which made it possible to confiscate five tons of marijuana.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry is working to provide a legal basis for direct cooperation between Soviet law-enforcement agencies and their foreign partners and international organisations. The purpose of this cooperation is to exchange experience of *combating organised crime*, technical and technological achievements in safeguarding the security of individuals and installations against various encroachments; prompt information on crimes whose detection is in the interest of both sides; information on the establishment of trans-frontier contacts between criminal gangs. We can usefully draw on international experience of combating such phenomena as illicit financial operations, money laundering, racket, smuggling, the theft and smuggling out of cultural and other values, money counterfeiting, the import of firearms and explosives.

The problem of strengthening the *legal regime on the seas* is in the interest of the whole of humanity. The main controversy in this respect has arisen over the 1982 convention on the law of the sea, a comprehensive universal treaty settling practically all questions of using the world's oceans, including the problem of using the resources of the seabed, which are seen as a common heritage of humanity. The provisions of the convention regulating exploitation of the resources of the seabed set unwarrantedly rigid economic conditions for future exploiters of these resources and envisage the possibility of making decisions contrary to the opinion of major countries. This is why most countries refrain from ratifying the convention and why some major states (the United States, Britain, the FRG) have not even signed the convention. The Soviet Union is striving to make the convention universally acceptable by working out realistic standards and rules of activity on the seabed and to bring about a settlement of disputes through reasonable compromises.

The Soviet Union has adopted in common with other countries measures to strengthen the Antarctic Treaty, which safeguards the continent and adjacent waterways against all military activity and serves as a basis for the development of peaceful research and scientific cooperation in the area. A convention on Antarctic mineral resources adopted in 1988 bans uncontrolled exploitation. France and Australia have proposed signing a comprehensive convention on Antarctica to turn the continent into a natural reservation. The proposal is being considered by the other parties to the Antarctic Treaty.

The system of control over compliance with international treaties concluded by the Soviet Union calls for improvement. Proposals are now being worked out for revising the Law of 1978 to bring it into line with the new structure of Soviet government bodies and ensure unfailing fulfilment of our country's obligations under international law. Effective parliamentary control over compliance with international treaties ratified by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR or the USSR Supreme Soviet could serve as an important means of achieving this aim.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry promotes interparliamentary contacts in various forms. Acting within the framework of the European process, the Soviet delegation has put forward proposals for increasing the role of parliaments in cooperation on human rights.

6. A BLUEPRINT FOR COMMON EUROPEAN HOME

The Soviet concept of the common European home consists in establishing new-type inter-state relations in Europe based on all-round cooperation. This is becoming possible in present-day Europe, which is ridding itself of medium- and shorter-range missiles and enjoying the favourable effects of the improvement in the world climate as a whole. The common European home is being erected on the foundation of respect for the choice made by each European people and definite consideration for territorial and political realities. The Helsinki Final Act passed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1974 remains the mainstay of the common European home.

The mainspring of the favourable changes in building a common European home is the political dialogue with West European states and the meetings between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President François Mitterand, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and other leaders. They have shown that Western Europe is moving towards a realisation of the need for mutual understanding and cooperation with the Soviet Union. For all the peculiarities and even differences of views and assessments, a similarity with the USSR's West European counterparts on conceptual issues of European cooperation is revealing itself. The Soviet Union calls upon all the European countries and also the USA and Canada to carry on the inaugurated multilateral dialogue for joint elaboration of a concept and specific measures to implement it.

Security matters figure most prominently in the building of a common European home. The philosophy of the concept of a common European home rules out the very possibility of the use or threat of force, above all military force. It proposes replacing the doctrine of containment and intimidation with a doctrine of restraint, one which the very logic of European development demands.

Over the period since 1985 substantial steps towards providing *political and legal safeguards for security in Europe* have been taken.

The success of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and of the Vienna meeting of the CSCE member states ushered in a new stage in the Helsinki process, bringing it to the point of lessening the military rivalry in Europe. The accord at the Stockholm Conference, in September 1986, on specifying and rendering effective the principle of non-use or threat of force in all its forms, especially in its most dangerous manifestation—the use of military force—was of great importance. Different new confidence-building measures were coordinated at the conference and have been implemented since then. The accord on monitoring compliance with confidence-building measures, including on-site inspections, was of special significance.

The talks on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and also the talks on a new generation of confidence-building measures are of exceptional importance in this context. It is in Europe that the world's highest concentration of armaments is preserved to date.

At the Vienna meeting, ended in January 1989, consent to the mandatory involvement of a third party, when a dispute cannot be settled

by other peaceful means, was attained during the consideration of the matter of peaceful settlement of disputes.

Without losing sight of the ultimate goal of eliminating the military-political alliances in Europe (the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO) and, as a first step, their military organisations, the Soviet Union jointly with its allies has advanced the idea of *transforming relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO*. For the purpose, the emphasis must be shifted from the military facets of the alliances' activity to the political ones, and contacts must be established and cooperation developed between them in the effort to reduce armaments, settle regional conflicts, limit the weapons trade, ensure the safety of water and air trade routes, fight international terrorism and narcotics trafficking, etc. The Appeal of the Warsaw Treaty Member States to the Member States of the North Atlantic Alliance adopted in May 1989 points out that ties through military channels could play a substantial role in the efforts to eliminate mistrust between them, and it is being proposed to establish relations of political dialogue between both alliances and also contacts between their representatives.

An accord has been attained on discussing, in January 1990, the military doctrines of the alliances within the framework of the Vienna talks. Contacts through military channels between the Soviet Union and the NATO countries have been resumed. Participating in them are defence ministers, general staffs, military units, military training institutions and the like. Mutual understanding and even mere acquaintance along these lines is a special element of confidence-building and the predictability of military activity. However, there are still difficulties in establishing direct contacts along Warsaw Treaty-NATO lines, which are mainly due to the reserved attitude of the NATO states to this idea.

The Soviet Union advanced the long-term task of forming a *broad European economic area* with a high level of interconnection and complementariness of its Eastern and Western parts. The conference on economic cooperation in Europe scheduled for spring 1990 in Bonn is called upon to play an important role in this field.

The need for an economic link-up between East and West was reflected in the *establishment of official relations between CMEA and the European Communities (EC) in June 1988*. Soon afterwards, in August 10, 1988, official relations were established between the USSR and the EC*. After official relations were established with the EC, the USSR opened a permanent office in Brussels, and talks began on the conclusion of a framework agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the EC. During the first round of talks the sides exhibited a consensus that the agreement would provide for mutual granting of most-favoured nation treatment in regulating trade matters, measures to improve the performance of businessmen, and the development of industrial cooperation and joint ventures. Talks are simultaneously being conducted on the conclusion of individual agreements with the EEC—on trade in textiles and cooperation in the fishing industry, and possibilities are being explored for mutually beneficial cooperation in other fields.

The integrational processes in Western Europe are acquiring the new quality of a single internal market. We are to do a great deal to enable our ties with the EEC to fit into the context of the European economic area.

Implementation of specific projects for European cooperation in different spheres, such as a transEuropean rail expressway; a European pro-

* The European Communities include the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

gramme to create new technologies and engineering for harnessing solar energy and for processing and burying nuclear wastes and making nuclear power stations safer; additional channels for information transfer with the use of light fibres; and systems of European satellite broadcasting, could yield mutual benefit to East and West.

Political dialogue between the Soviet Union and the EC is developing. In September 1989 a meeting was held between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the foreign ministers of all 12 EC member countries during the 44th session of the UN General Assembly in New York. Contacts are being established with the Commission of the European Communities, the executive body of the EC, which is vested with supranational powers in a number of matters. Nikolai Ryzhkov met with ECC President Jacques Delors in April 1989 in Luxembourg.

General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Strasbourg and his meeting with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe* imparted a considerable impetus to our relations with this most representative and oldest West European inter-governmental organisation. A mutual preparedness for political dialogue manifested itself, and prospects were opened up for practical cooperation with the Council of Europe in culture, education, the ecology, television and other areas. The point at issue is our possible accession to numerous conventions and agreements of the Council of Europe which the USSR Supreme Soviet considers to be in accord with Soviet interests. A bilateral working group of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Council of Europe for the development of contacts and cooperation on the inter-governmental level has been formed and is functioning actively.

A true breakthrough in *European humanitarian cooperation* was achieved thanks to the decisions adopted at the Vienna meeting of the CSCE member states. A fresh approach to the humanitarian problem—the concept of the human dimension of the CSCE—was elaborated. A European mechanism providing for a combination of bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation, consultations and exchange of information on human rights and the humanitarian sphere was created for the first time on this basis. Closely related to this is the decision to hold a three-stage Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in Paris, Copenhagen and, at the conclusive state, Moscow. The proposal advanced by the USSR at the very start of the Vienna meeting is thus being implemented.

The Paris meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (May-June 1989) showed that dialogue in these matters can be constructive and mutually beneficial rather than confrontational.

The Soviet initiative for the gradual creation of an *integrated juridical area* in Europe is consonant with the ideas advanced by France, as a result of which it was possible, for the first time in the Helsinki process, to elaborate a joint Soviet-French proposal for establishing as a long-term goal a common juridical area in Europe on the basis of law-based states. The involvement of the FRG, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and San Marino, and also the positive reaction of many other countries open up favourable prospects for its gradual implementation.

The Soviet proposals for broadening cooperation among parliamentarians of the member states on issues pertaining to the human dimension of the CSCE, and also for elaborating specific measures to

* The Council of Europe member states are Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, San Marino, Portugal, Turkey, Finland, the FRG, France, Switzerland and Sweden.

humanise the entire range of consular relations and on holding a meeting on the consular matters within the European framework likewise garnered support at the meeting.

A great contribution to the work of the Paris meeting was made by the deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet who spoke at press conferences and briefings as well as the meeting itself. They showed the effectiveness of the parliamentarians' influence on the formation of public opinion and on the actual course of the diplomatic talks, for that matter.

At the *Information Forum* (April-May 1989) in London there was a debate among representatives of governments and the mass media of the CSCE member countries. Some 70 proposals were introduced, and the ideas advanced by the Soviet side, including those on the *transformation of the European continent into an area of openness*, and on a European information and cultural programme were well received. The Soviet proposal to form a European information council to improve journalists' working conditions was met with interest, albeit no unequivocally so.

European *cultural cooperation*, exchange of cultural values, is becoming increasingly important. Impressive results have been attained here, too, over the period beginning in 1985, specifically, the matter of building cultural centres on a mutual basis is being decided. Agreements to the effect have been signed with the FRG and France, and talks are being held on concluding such agreements with the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Finland and Greece.

Security in Europe is closely linked with the *preservation of peace in the Mediterranean*. The signatories to the CSCE Final Act pledged to promote peace in the Mediterranean, a reduction of armed forces in this region, the strengthening of security, a lessening of tensions, and extension of the sphere of cooperation. The Vienna meeting of the CSCE adopted a decision to hold, in Palma de Mallorca in 1990, a European conference on the Mediterranean which is to discuss economic cooperation and environmental protection in the region.

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the development of *cooperation in the Balkans* and supports the efforts of the Balkan countries to develop regional cooperation in various spheres. The conferees at a summit meeting in March 1988 in Belgrade stated support for the initiatives of Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece aimed at less military activity in the Balkans and at the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military bases from the peninsula. The Soviet Union will provide the requisite safeguards if it is decided to create a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans.

The concept of the policy of security and cooperation in the North of Europe set forth in the well-known Murmansk speech by Mikhail Gorbachev on October 1, 1987 is gradually beginning to materialise.

Helsinki played host to a Soviet-Finnish interparliamentary seminar on these issues in April 1988. A delegation of the committee of North European parliamentarians to explore the prerequisites for creating a regional nuclear-free zone (the so-called Jorgensen Committee, October 1988) visited Moscow, and meetings of parliamentarians on the ecology of the North (January 1989, Moscow; October 1989, Copenhagen) were held. The matter of establishing contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Nordic Council is being studied.

The chief barrier to the start of a dialogue aimed at limiting naval activity in the North and at introducing a set of confidence-building measures here, remains, as in the case of the Mediterranean, NATO's reluctance to discuss naval problems. All the same, positive trends have manifested themselves here, too. A visit to the Kola Peninsula by the military committee of the Norwegian Parliament was arranged in March 1989. Discussion began on the conclusion of an agreement on prevent-

ing incidents on the sea and in the air space over it, which the Norwegians had previously declined.

The Nordic countries are displaying an interest in the proposals on cooperation in developing the natural resources of the North and the Arctic, the Kola Peninsula first and foremost, and multilateral cooperation in the Arctic has been inaugurated. The continued development of this cooperation will require considerable efforts by all our ministries and departments, research institutions, public organisations and especially the legislative branch.

The development of interparliamentary ties is instrumental to the building of a common European home. An important step forward in this direction was taken in late 1988 in Warsaw, where the first meeting of parliamentarians from the 35 CSCE countries was held.

Our contacts with West European integrational organisations along parliamentary channels are becoming increasingly important of late. Such contacts were established for the first time with the parliamentary assembly of the EC—the *European Parliament*. Beginning in December 1985 a number of delegations of the Europarlament, including its main factions, as well as the Europarlament chairman, visited the Soviet Union. In 1987 a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet made a visit to Strasbourg and Brussels. The talks that took place with EC parliamentarians showed their vested interest in developing and diversifying ties with the USSR Supreme Soviet and rendering them more stable and regular.

Exchanges of parliamentary delegations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) were launched in mid-1987. The granting to the USSR Supreme Soviet in June 1989 of the "special guest" status under PACE, on the basis of which Soviet parliamentarians are already taking part in this assembly's proceedings, was symbolic from the standpoint of Western recognition of the international importance of perestroika in the Soviet Union.

Contacts with the Western European Union (WEU) * began developing in April 1987, when a delegation of the WEU Assembly headed by its President Jean-Marie Caro, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union. A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet made a return visit to Paris in July 1989. An accord of principle on an annual exchange of visits by parliamentarians was reached.

* * *

The idea of erecting a common European home advanced by General Secretary Gorbachev is one of the biggest and most promising considering the importance of the tragic and positive experience of Europe not only for Soviet policy but for all Europeans and for the world community as a whole. It is a model of new political thinking, one that is gradually materialising, and a prototype of comprehensive security. Holding a conference, in 1992, of the top leaders of the 35 states participatory to the European process (Helsinki-2) could be an exceptional step forward on this path.

High-level contacts and ones along diplomatic lines, and the sentiment of the European public at large graphically show that the idea of a common European home is being accepted more and more energetically and is gaining support and momentum.

7. PROBLEMS OF SECURITY IN THE ASIAN-PACIFIC REGION

The approach to Soviet policy in the Asian-Pacific region was drastically revised

* It is comprised of Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, the FRG, Spain and Portugal

The APR, a huge part of the globe where two-thirds of humanity live, has entered a period of rapid political, economic and social growth and has already become one of the main centres of international affairs. At the same time, dangerous trends have been gradually gaining momentum here; they are manifest above all in the active involvement of the region in the conventional and nuclear arms race, intensification of military rivalry, and exacerbation of old regional conflicts and the appearance of new ones.

For a number of reasons, above all the low economic development level of our eastern regions, our own presence here has been limited thus far. Bilateral ties between the USSR and the APR countries have been marginal, and in a number of instances, unsuccessful. Against this background the efforts to buttress the defence of the country's eastern areas have encountered a suspicious reaction on the part of many APR countries which called our peaceable intentions in the region into question. Soviet involvement in the Afghan war exerted a very negative impact on ties with Asian states.

To drastically improve the situation in the region the USSR elaborated a *comprehensive programme* for ensuring peace, security and cooperation in Asia and the adjoining basins of the Pacific and Indian Oceans which, as is known, was advanced in General Secretary Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, and was then specified and developed in his addresses during his visit to India in November 1986, his interview with the Indonesian newspaper "Merdeka" on June 21, 1987, and in his Krasnoyarsk speech of September 16, 1988.

In a nutshell, this programme provides for galvanised external political activity in four main areas: more dynamic and constructive bilateral relations between the USSR and all the countries situated in the APR; innovative decisive steps to settle regional conflicts, including the policy of national reconciliation; practical measures to lower the level of military confrontation; enhanced efforts to develop regional economic, scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation.

Normalisation of relations with the People's Republic of China and settlement of conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia have become particularly important within the framework of this programme. As far as *military-political* detente is concerned, the emphasis here is being placed on halting the proliferation and build-up of nuclear weapons in Asia, lessening naval activity in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and radically reducing armed forces and conventional arms in the region and creating for the purpose the appropriate bilateral and multilateral negotiating mechanisms. Specifically it was proposed to discuss lowering the level of military rivalry in the region where the coasts of the USSR, China, Japan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea draw together. In an effort to provide favourable conditions for a dialogue, the Soviet Union took a number of major unilateral actions, among them its consent to scrap all its medium- and shorter-range missiles in the Asian part of the country, its commitment not to increase the number of any nuclear weapons in the APR, and its decision to reduce the troop strength of the Soviet Armed Forces by 200,000 effectives in the eastern part of the country and by 60,000 in the southern part within the framework of the overall reduction of 500,000 men within two years' time.

In the *economic sphere*, the USSR stated its intention to take part in the development of regional economic cooperation, which includes participating in the proceedings of the Conference on Pacific Economic Cooperation (CPEC) and a number of other regional organisations, elaborating measures for preferential treatment with due consideration for the specifics of Siberia and the Far East in order to step up external economic ties, and creating zones of joint enterprise in the Far East.

The USSR also declared its intention to open Vladivostok for foreigners after a number of preparatory measures are taken.

Analysing the results of our work over the past four-odd years in the Asian-Pacific area, we can state that the greatest progress was made in *bilateral relations* with the APR countries. In a relatively brief period it has become possible to develop, and in a number of instances to effectively establish anew, political dialogue, including at the highest level, with many countries in Asia and the Pacific. Exchange of visits on the level of heads of state and government, officials of foreign policy departments, and representatives of parliamentary and public circles and the business and scientific communities has become extensive.

Since 1985 the USSR has expended considerable efforts to strengthen trust and reduce the level of military rivalry in the APR. They include the scrapping of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the pledge not to increase the number of any nuclear weapons in the APR, the Soviet Union's decision to unilaterally reduce its armed forces and arms in the country's east and south, which is being implemented,* and the considerable Soviet troop reduction in Mongolia.** Great importance is attached to talks with China begun this past November on mutual reductions of armed forces in the regions adjoining the Sino-Soviet border and confidence-building measures in the military sphere. The first steps have been made towards greater openness in the military sphere with regard to the APR. Specifically, statistics on the deployment and personnel of the armed forces in the Soviet Far East have been made public. The Soviet side invited representatives of the APR countries to attend as observers the exercises of the Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan in July 1989. The presence of observers from India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam at them bears out the possibility for practical confidence-building measures in the military sphere in the Asian-Pacific region.

The Soviet Union's accession to the protocols of the *Rarolonga Treaty*, which formalised the creation of the first nuclear-free zone in the APR, is a specific measure reaffirming our desire to reduce the nuclear rivalry in the APR. Mention should be made in this context of our stated readiness for consultations with the ASEAN countries, both on an individual and a collective basis, on the fundamental elements of the ASEAN concept of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia, and of the confirmation of Soviet support for the idea of turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

All this taken together has exerted a positive influence on the overall political climate in the APR, lessened the military tension here somewhat, and made for fresh initiatives on military detente in the region by a number of countries. These initiatives include, in particular, the Australian proposal for confidence-building measures in the North Pacific

* As of January 1, 1991 the army and navy is to be reduced by 200,000 effectives in the eastern part of the USSR and 120,000 in the Far East, ground forces are being reduced by 12 divisions, 11 air regiments are being disbanded, 16 warships are being removed from the Pacific Fleet.

** In 1987 the Soviet troops in Mongolia were reduced by 8,300 men. In 1989-1990 five divisions (one motorised rifle, two tank and two air) are to be withdrawn. The overall troop strength to withdraw is to be 50,000 effectives, or 75 per cent of the present number. The Soviet Union has expressed a readiness to withdraw all its troops in future under agreement with the Mongolian side. To date (from May to September 1989) one tank division, two brigades, three separate regiments, eight individual battalions, 12 other institutions and units, and one base have been withdrawn from Mongolia. Preparations are being taken to reduce the Soviet military presence at the next stage in 1990.

and the proposal of Malaysia to upgrade the system of communication between the military command of the USSR and the USA in the Pacific. The recent Mongolian initiative for devising a mechanism of political consultations between the countries of the northeast part of the APR is considered important as well.

However, a fundamental improvement in the military-political situation in the region has yet to take place. The deployment and modernisation of American nuclear weapons, including sea-based cruise missiles, continue. The naval activity of the USA and its allies is being stepped up. The level of military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula is high. Many countries are becoming more involved in military preparations. Soviet efforts notwithstanding, the proposals for creating a regional negotiating mechanism for security and cooperation problems have not been implemented in the APR.

The reason for this lies above all in the stand of the USSR's chief opponents in the APR, namely, the USA and Japan, which regard implementation of the Soviet initiatives as a possible weakening of their own influence in the region.

Being forced to reckon with the growing sentiments in favour of more active Soviet participation in regional affairs, the Americans are stating in general terms their readiness to "welcome the Soviet Union as a Pacific power". However, when it comes to practical terms, the USA, which enjoys a patent superiority in armed forces in the APR, is exhibiting a reluctance to discuss matters pertaining to its naval activity in this area. It alludes to "the need to ensure the safety of sea lanes and stability in the region". Conditions are being advanced which the Soviet Union is supposed to meet as proof of the sincerity of its intentions to ensure peace, security and cooperation in the APR. These conditions, among others, include: "cessation of the occupation" by the Soviet Union of the "northern territories" of Japan, the opening of Vladivostok, and the creation of special economic zones in the Soviet Far East. Japan for its part is making it clear that its reserved, and in many areas negative, attitude to the Soviet initiatives in the APR is determined by the unresolved "problem of the northern territories".

The Soviet Union took energetic efforts to become involved in *economic cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region* within the framework of the Vladivostok programme. The region possesses a mighty technological potential and considerable investment possibilities. Its role in the world economy is growing. The APR has amassed unique experience of effective economic management. It is here that the two biggest capitalist economic giants—the USA and Japan, are located, as well as China and India, which are rapidly gaining economic potential, and also the group of the so-called new industrialised countries (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) which are also dynamically developing economically and which have advanced to the forefront over a short span. The region exhibits a rapid growth of trade and investment flows.

Soviet involvement in regional economic activity has been very modest, the share of the leading APR countries comprising 5.8 per cent of the USSR's overall trade. This is largely due to the weak economic potential of the USSR's Asian part and especially the Soviet Far East, where only 2.6 per cent of the country's population lives and 2.9 per cent of the aggregate volume of industrial output is produced.

The limited trade and economic participation of the USSR in regional processes in the APR frequently evokes mistrust here towards our foreign policy initiatives, which, for its part, hamstrings possibilities for the development of trade and other business contacts. For this reason, enhancement of the country's external economic ties in the Pacific area

is of exceptional importance not only for the economic and social development of the regions of Siberia and the Far East but also for consolidating the positions of the Soviet Union in the APR.

The external economic part of the long-term state programme for the comprehensive development of the productive forces of the Far Eastern Economic Region (FEER) adopted in August 1987 requires, as the record has shown, considerable revision, above all in terms of specifying priority projects of cooperation and sources of financing. The pace at which measures to create a preferential treatment system in the Far East are taken is insufficient as well. This is one of our weak points in pursuing our policy in the Asian-Pacific area.

Opening many regions for free entry by foreign citizens and organising joint economic activity are definite prerequisites for speeding up the external economic activity of FEER. With due account for the weak potential of the region's industrial enterprises, we need to revert to the matter of providing them benefits over and above those already envisaged.

One possible promising form of cooperation with the APR countries, especially with the "new industrialised countries", is import of consumer goods from them on commercial terms that are much more profitable for the USSR in comparison to those existing in the West. By and large, we unfortunately take far too little advantage of the industrial and technological potential of the "new industrialised countries".

The matter of Soviet involvement in *multilateral economic cooperation* in the Asian-Pacific region has got off the ground of late. Our ties with the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) are developing energetically. Our participation in the Commission's work enables us to conduct an extensive multilateral dialogue with all interested APR countries in such spheres as new types of technology, development of transport, exploration of natural resources, comprehensive maritime research expeditions, environmental protection, preventing and dealing with natural disasters, etc. A conference on the ministerial level on environmental protection in the region is to be held in May 1990 under ESCAP auspices.

Business contacts with the *Conference on Pacific Economic Cooperation* are now being established as a result of the formation of the Soviet National Committee for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Soviet representatives have become vigorously involved in the proceedings of the sectoral groups and forums of this conference—for transport, communications and tourism, trade policy, and the fishing industry.

We are exploring the possibility of joining the *Asian Development Bank* (ADB), which would enable us to acquire direly needed experience of participation in international currency and financial operations. Soviet representatives are already taking part in the sessions of the ADB's Council of Administrators as observers.

We will continue to follow closely the development of integration processes in the APR, including the progress made by the Australian proposal for setting up a regional economic grouping—the Asian-Pacific Economic Forum, and to vigorously uphold the view that this organisation should be open to all and not be of a bloc nature.

On the whole, the Vladivostok comprehensive programme for improving international relations in Asia and the adjoining basins of the Pacific and Indian Oceans is working. Under the impact of the Soviet initiatives and the overall positive changes in the world the situation in the APR is changing for the better. A transition from confrontation

to dialogue has in fact started. New approaches to solutions of the problems that have amassed and to the creation of conditions for greater security for the peoples of the Asian-Pacific region are in the making. The image of the USSR as an enemy which is cultivated by individual foes of ours is eroding, and the conviction that the USSR is a constructive and reliable partner is gradually establishing itself.

Another fact of no small importance is that the improvement in our relations with many APR countries is closely bound up with the notable warming in relations among other countries of the region. The dialogues which are being conducted between India and China and between India and Pakistan, as well as Sino-Indonesian and Sino-Vietnamese contacts look encouraging in this sense.

However, the process of the USSR's entry into the APR is only at its initial stage. Political cooperation is notably outstripping military detente and greater economic cooperation. Levelling out this imbalance is a major task for the future.

Chapter III. THE USSR IN THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The new approach of the Soviet Union to the United Nations is to fully return to the UN its role as an instrument of keeping peace, strengthening international security and developing extensive cooperation among states, the role that was enshrined in its Charter. At the current stage, when the make-up of the UN has broadened considerably (from 51 member countries in 1945 to 159 today), owing to the developing countries first and foremost, this organisation is called upon to fulfil the role of a world democratic forum.

Today we can talk about the beginning of the UN's rebirth, its becoming a universal centre for coordinating the actions of states and for jointly exploring a new model of inter-state relations. The activity of the UN was imparted fresh dynamism and its status was enhanced by General Secretary Gorbachev's policy-making and in many respects revolutionary address at the General Assembly on December 7, 1988. The growing *peacemaking potential* of the UN was one of the factors behind the stepped-up activity of its main bodies. The Security Council reacts more promptly and, most important, more effectively to international crises. The decidedly polemical nature of past years is increasingly giving way to a businesslike nonconfrontational approach to the search for solutions.

Revealingly, since 1984 we have not exercised *the right of veto in the Security Council* which we have used over 100 times throughout UN history. The Soviet Union is pursuing a line for realistically implementing the Charter-enshrined principle of coordinated actions by the five permanent members of the Security Council in decision-making on the most pressing issues of ensuring international peace and security. This is furthered by periodic meetings of the foreign ministers of the five permanent members at the beginning of the yearly sessions of the UN General Assembly. In September 1985 a sitting of the Security Council at the ministerial level was held for the first time since 1970.

The General Assembly is notably enhancing its contribution to the search for ways to resolve international problems. The recent tendency towards an increased share among the General Assembly resolutions of decisions being taken on the basis of a consensus deserves all manner of support on our part.

We share the growing international recognition of the peacemaking mission of *the UN Secretary General*, who in a number of instances is assigned a considerable role in diplomatic contacts for defusing regional

conflicts, such as the Afghan and Iran-Iraq ones. The Secretary General has begun exercising his Charter prerogatives more energetically.

It was the UN that became the forum where discussion was launched on the concept of a comprehensive system of international security advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress, which enriched our initiative with the views of other states. This approach made it possible as early as the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly to reach a new level of mutual understanding. The resolution to the effect was supported by a greater number of developing countries, and, for the first time, it received the approval of a number of Western states.

The UN is the forum where the Soviet Union tables its proposals for resolving the foremost problems of the day, including peace, disarmament and development. It has proven possible to translate many of these proposals into decisions; however, even in instances when it is impossible to win the support of the West, without which an adopted decision will not be duly effective, raising the issue in the UN is justified, since it helps, in open debate, shape world public opinion for subsequently accomplishing the tasks posed. For example, the idea advanced by the Soviet Union for enhancing the UN's role in the control sphere won broad support. Elaboration of a multilateral convention on preventing incidents beyond the bounds of territorial waters is energetically being discussed.

The steps to make the UN more effective that have been taken with the active involvement of the USSR have yielded particularly palpable results in the effort to settle regional conflicts. The difficult endeavour to defuse hotbeds of tension is being carried out on the basis of decisions and plans elaborated within the UN framework, be they the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan or the fundamental Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 on the Middle East, 435 on Namibia, 598 on the Iran-Iraq conflict, etc.

One of the most effective peacemaking instruments in the UN's arsenal are *peacekeeping operations* in the nine volatile areas of the planet. Taking part in UN operations are over 10,000 armed forces members and civilian observers from different countries, including Soviet people (36 officers in the group of UN military observers in the Middle East, and also some 10 Soviet staff-members from the UN Secretariat assigned to Namibia).

We consider it necessary to use the UN mechanism for preventing the international conflicts and disputes that arise. Proceeding from this premise, the USSR tabled for consideration by the 44th session of the General Assembly its considerations on the matter of stepping the UN's preventive functions.

Our course for implementing all the provisions of the UN Charter incorporates consistent *financial support* for the UN. The annual contribution of the USSR, including the Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia, stands at some 90 million dollars today. By paying 25 million dollars in 1988, the Soviet Union set about liquidating its debt for UN peacekeeping operations.

Like other countries, the USSR has a vested interest in UN funds being used *rationally and effectively*. One of the ways of reducing our currency outlays is to take an active part in the material and technical supply of UN operations. We took a direct part for the first time in providing transport for UN operations in the Iran-Iraq settlement and in Namibia. Aeroflot was paid 1.5 million dollars in remuneration for commercial carriage of UN supplies and personnel. This is a promising area and, evidently, a coordinating centre is needed to maintain everyday business cooperation with the UN Secretariat and ensure that the appropriate departments place the requisite equipment and services at the UN's disposal.

Measures were taken during the period under review to render *the USSR's participation in specialised agencies of the UN system* more effective and practical.

The Soviet Union actively supports the *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)*, ridding it of what used to be overly ideological approaches and concentrating on practical returns from tackling tasks peculiar to the very subject of this organisation's work. Topical matters regarding enhancing cooperation between the USSR and UNESCO were discussed during the meeting between UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor and the Soviet leadership during his official visit to the USSR in July 1989.

Participating in UNESCO yields direct benefit to the Soviet Union. Alongside extensive international cooperation in education and culture, UNESCO's cultural programmes are the channel through which world experience in science and technology is exchanged. Such spheres of cooperation as environmental protection, the resources of the World Ocean and the Earth's crust, applied microbiology and biotechnology, information science, power engineering, and prevention of natural disasters directly accord with the tasks of speeding up the USSR's socio-economic development. UNESCO's activity covers three of the five areas of the Comprehensive Programme of the Scientific and Technological Progress of the CMEA Member Countries for the Period up to the Year 2000.

A number of major UNESCO international programmes and projects such as the Man and Biosphere ecological programme, the oceanographic programme and the geological correlation programme are sources of important scientific and technological information, which makes it possible to reduce expenditures for conducting analogous research in the USSR as a result of using ready technological designs.

One important area of Soviet involvement in UNESCO programmes is verification of our scientific forecasts with the aid of an independent international expert commission. It was for this purpose that the major international research forums on power engineering on the threshold of the 21st century and biotechnology at the turn of the 21st century were held, in Moscow between 1987 and 1989.

Impressive progress was registered in Soviet participation in the UNESCO cultural programmes. Our involvement in UNESCO helps us in our efforts to protect the cultural heritage of the Soviet peoples. In 1988 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified two UNESCO conventions—the convention on measures aimed at the prohibition and prevention of the illegal import, export and transfer of ownership rights to objects of art and the convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage.

UNESCO is one the first international organisations to have helped finance the efforts to deal with the earthquake in Armenia. Two hundred thousand US dollars were allocated for sending an international mission of experts to the affected areas, the building of a school in Spitak, and the organisation of an international symposium to prevent earthquakes, and on earthquake-resistant construction.

The USSR's contribution to the UNESCO budget in 1989 was 26.68 million dollars.

The USSR is increasing its participation in the work of the *International Labour Organisation (ILO)*, which gives the USSR access to the experience of different countries in handling social and labour matters, including conventions and recommendations on labour issues and trade union rights.

An ILO Encyclopaedia on Labour Safety and Hygiene was translated into Russian and published. Russian editions of ILO handbooks on labour

productivity, management and organising cooperatives are being prepared as well.

The ILO materials on legal regulation, leaves, comparative data on the cost of living and social standards, regional differentials of labour remuneration, and pensions are used in elaborating different normative acts in this country and also drafts of would-be resolutions and laws.

In 1989 Soviet representatives took part in expert conferences on conversion of military production and problems of employment, on use of conventions and recommendations, and safe application of mineral and synthetic fibres.

The USSR's annual contribution to the ILO is around 20 million dollars.

The Soviet Union is active in the *United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)*, whose purpose is to promote the industrial development of the developing countries. Through UNIDO the Soviet Union and other developed countries render assistance in these matters. In 1989 the USSR paid 9.2 million dollars into the UNIDO annual budget.

UNIDO-sponsored exchange of experience, and of scientific and technical information is very useful for this country in its efforts to speed up its socio-economic development.

Soviet organisations take part in the activity of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology formed under UNIDO auspices. An analogous centre for new materials is to be instituted next. UNIDO has amassed rich experience in such areas as development of low-waste and waste-free technology, recycling and processing of by-products, energy saving and the development of alternative sources of energy, prevention of environmental pollution, industrial security, and systems of planning in the event of emergencies. Warning systems and procedures for dealing with disasters at chemical plants are being created.

Great possibilities for drawing on the world experience of using the latest industrial technologies are provided by the establishment in the USSR of the UNIDO Centre of International Industrial Cooperation. The creation of the Centre should promote direct economic and scientific and technological cooperation between Soviet enterprises, associations, research institutions, industrial cooperatives and other organisations, on the one hand, and foreign counterparts under UNIDO auspices, on the other.

The Soviet Union energetically supports the *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)* in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy. The USSR placed part of its civilian nuclear activity under IAEA safeguards as an act of goodwill. With the USSR's national-currency contribution to the IAEA technical assistance fund, different international seminars and symposiums and refresher courses for experts in the field of nuclear energy are held in the Soviet Union through Agency channels, equipment and materials are delivered, technologies transferred, etc.

The IAEA played a positive role in advancing in the international arena the programme for the creation of an international regime of safe development of nuclear power, which was advanced by the USSR in 1986. As a result, it has proven possible to elaborate draft conventions on prompt warning of nuclear disasters and rendering of aid in the event of such disasters, principles which in effect laid the foundation for the regime of safe development of nuclear power engineering which we proposed.

The USSR and the IAEA began exchanging views on the possible forms and the financial conditions for arranging international investigations in the research centre proposed by the Soviet side at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

The IAEA is a source of scientific and technological information useful to us in such matters as nuclear energy and its fuel cycle, nuclear security, an international system of nuclear information, nuclear physics, and use of isotopes and radioactive rays in science, industry, agriculture and medicine. Using the findings of IAEA research programmes is reducing our outlays for this work. The IAEA is amassing considerable information on the findings of research at enterprises and laboratories of the nuclear industry of Western countries. We have relatively free access to this information through the international nuclear information system functioning within the IAEA framework.

The USSR's contribution to the IAEA budget in 1990 will be 1.79 million US dollars and 178,800 Austrian schillings.

The USSR's cooperation with the *World Health Organisation (WHO)* is of great importance for resolving the global problems of providing health care, wiping out epidemics and preventing different diseases, and also for the Soviet health care system and medical research.

Soviet organisations, scientists and practising physicians are active in its numerous scientific committees, research groups and symposiums, which enables them to exchange experience in health care and medicine, and also to receive advanced scientific and technological information.

One hundred thirty WHO centres and projects have been set up and function in the USSR on the base of 65 Soviet research institutions. They are partially financed by WHO, which includes delivery of medical equipment, vaccines, cultures, standard preparations, medicines, etc.

When necessary the Soviet Union receives qualified expert assistance through WHO channels. This aid, for example, was rendered in connection with the illness of children in Chernovtsy, the outbreak of AIDS in Elista, and the earthquake in Armenia.

The USSR's contribution to the WHO budget in 1989 was 29.4 million dollars.

The USSR also participates in other specialised organisations within the UN, namely, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

The overall total of the Soviet Union's yearly contributions to the UN's international organisations of which it is a member was 255 million US dollars in 1989.

Chapter IV. INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION

Until recently the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not regard *international scientific and technological cooperation* as a priority. However, the growth in the volume of such ties and the drastic increase in their share in international relations required that the ministry—within the bounds of its competency, of course—engage in this problem. The appropriate subdivision was formed for the purpose.

The Soviet Union concluded some 200 *inter-governmental agreements* on scientific and technological cooperation. They provide for joint work along a wide range of fundamental and applied scientific and technological areas. However, in a number of instances the theme linked with the most advanced fields of science and technology which provide an opportunity for drastically raising the level of theoretical and practical research and development is insufficiently represented in these agreements.

The matter of the specific returns we receive from scientific and technological cooperation is a highly topical one, too. We have much room

for improvement here. The main reason is that, on the one hand, cooperation is excessively formalised, and this deprives it of the necessary mobility and flexibility. On the other, the absence of a statewide concept of development of scientific and technological cooperation with foreign countries that would make it possible to distribute efforts in the most rational way and attain goals with the least outlays is felt.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is becoming actively involved in the efforts to render practical assistance to Soviet ministries and departments in taking specific measures in international scientific and technological cooperation (the "World Laboratory", a non-governmental organisation pursuing the goal of uniting scientists around the world for joint open research programmes; global cooperation in high-definition television, the fight against AIDS, etc.).

Work is being done to involve the Soviet Union in European projects for technological cooperation within the framework of the *Eureka programme*. Formidable difficulties need to be overcome here, difficulties determined by the specifics of the foreign political and economic goals of the Western countries and their discriminatory restrictions in exchanges with the socialist countries. Certain, albeit still small, changes for the better have been observed at present.

International cooperation in *peaceful use of atomic energy* is particularly important today. The Soviet Union has agreements on cooperation in peaceful use of atomic energy with 25 countries, including the USA, Great Britain, France, the FRG, Japan, Canada, India, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and Ghana. The overall assessment of these agreements and the development outlook for cooperation in this sphere is positive.

The tragedy in Chernobyl and the realisation of its bitter lessons have made it imperative to step up the formation of a comprehensive international safety regime for the development of nuclear power engineering. A policy-making document which was tabled at the IAEA by the USSR, was prepared on this score. Multilateral conventions on prompt warning of a nuclear disaster and assistance in case of a disaster, which were drafted with the participation of the USSR, became the fundamental elements of an international regime of safe development of nuclear power engineering. These documents were supplemented by a series of bilateral agreements the Soviet Union concluded with the FRG, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland (similar agreements with Great Britain and Turkey were prepared for signing).

The Soviet Union initiated the formation at the IAEA of working groups for handling radioactive wastes and liability for nuclear damage. The theme of safe nuclear power engineering became an integral component of all consultations and talks linked with cooperation in the nuclear sphere and IAEA activity. Bilateral contacts were stepped up with a number of countries that are advanced in the field of nuclear power engineering (the USA, France, the FRG) for building more reliable and safe new-generation reactors.

The course for openness played a key role in dealing with the international consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. Several days after the disaster IAEA Director-General Hans Blix was provided an opportunity to receive first-hand information about the scope of the disaster and its actual consequences. Shortly afterwards a detailed report on the technical aspects and causes of the disaster was prepared and sent to the IAEA; it was highly assessed by experts as an honest and objective document. The Agency is provided additional information when necessary. Without a due level of openness the Chernobyl misfortune could have remained for many years a factor undermining trust in the Soviet Union and hampering our contacts with other countries.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs renders assistance in implementing the idea of the development of an *international experimental thermonuclear reactor* which was advanced by the Soviet Union. This project, which is being carried out with the resources of the USSR, the USA, Japan and the European Communities, is presently at the initial stage, when the concept of the would-be installation is being shaped. The matter of deciding on the transition to engineering design and then to the construction of the thermonuclear reactor is on the agenda.

In June 1986 the Soviet Union advanced in the UN a comprehensive stage-by-stage programme for joint practical actions by states for studying and utilising *outer space for peaceful purposes*. We simultaneously stated our desire to develop cooperation in outer space with all states on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Among other things, the USSR indicated its preparedness to launch civilian space apparatus of other countries with Soviet carrier-rockets on mutually acceptable terms.

The greatest advance over the preceding period has been attained in the development of bilateral cooperation. Agreements to the effect were concluded with the USA, Great Britain, the FRG, Australia, Austria, Italy, Finland, Brazil and India. Draft agreements with Canada, the Netherlands and also the European Space Agency were elaborated.

Progress has been slower with implementing the proposal for commercial launchings of spacecraft. We are encountering discriminatory barriers (COCOM regulations) and outright opposition from foreign competitors which are hampering Soviet penetration of the space services market. Despite this fact, such an advanced form of cooperation as manned flights on commercial terms (accords were reached with counterparts in Austria, Great Britain and Japan) became prominent.

The idea of establishing a *World Space Organisation* which we advanced has yet to win the required support. We are quite at fault here, too. In particular, it is a fact that by dint of the long period of secrecy in our space activity, the space programmes of the developing countries were oriented primarily at Western science and technology, while Soviet proposals were not evoking solid responses.

Foreign *cultural ties* are an important component of the USSR's foreign policy course and a channel for intercourse among people and for the establishment of the principles of new political thinking in the international arena.

Perestroika and the energetic participation of Soviet intellectuals, including the creative intelligentsia, in it, and the democratisation of Soviet culture are also exerting a decisive influence on the nature of the Soviet Union's cultural ties with foreign countries. Positive changes are taking place in what has to do with tapping the country's cultural potential in the field of international cooperation. Initial moves have been made to democratise and decentralise cultural ties, broaden independent action in this sphere by the constituent and autonomous republics and the local Soviets, spread the practice of direct ties between Soviet creative unions and cultural organisations, arts groups, etc., on the one hand, and their foreign colleagues, on the other, and establish and formalise personal contacts between Soviet cultural and scientific figures and their foreign colleagues. The matter of opening, on a mutual basis, our cultural and informational centres in Western countries and analogous institutions in the USSR, a matter which was difficult in the recent past, has been decided in principle. Agreements to the effect have been signed with the FRG, France, India and Egypt, and talks on concluding agreements with the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Finland and Greece are being held. Of course, such agreements have also been signed with socialist countries that voiced a desire to broaden their cultural presence in the USSR.

European cultural development in the light of the provisions of the Final Document of the Vienna meeting is figuring more and more prominently in the USSR's foreign cultural ties. Possible Soviet accession to European conventions in the field of culture and education is being studied, and preparations for a symposium on the cultural heritage in Cracow (May 1991) have begun.

In all these endeavours the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a detached observer. Our staff members are active in the drafting of inter-governmental agreements in the cultural sphere, whether the point at issue is the principles for cultural cooperation, youth ties, exchanges of schoolchildren or the formation of cultural centres and the preservation and return of the historical and cultural heritage. Diplomats encourage the participation of Soviet intellectuals in the work of international organisations functioning in education, science and culture. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes part, albeit largely formally thus far, in the elaboration of cultural exchange programmes and the preparation of drafts of yearly state plans for exchanges and their coordination, in conjunction, of course, with the Ministry of Culture, creative unions, and the constituent republics. One major shortcoming is the fact that in synchronising these programmes and plans the political and moral atmosphere of countries and their specifics and tastes are still not being sufficiently taken into consideration. Planned or already declared cultural events often fail to take place. This does damage to the USSR's prestige and hurts cultural figures on both sides. Our embassies report all this to us. Things should be set in order here, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to promote this. The Soviet embassies have been instructed to aid our cultural celebrities abroad, and to maintain contacts with our compatriots living there who are prepared to help preserve national cultural values.

At present the Soviet Union has cultural exchanges with approximately 130 countries. There are exchanges with 115 of them along state lines, i.e., on the basis of inter-governmental agreements and programmes. This number has not changed over the past few years.

Upwards of 50,000 cultural figures have been going abroad through state and public channels of late, and over 30,000 are received in the USSR (in 1985 the respective figures were some 30,000 and 20,000). Thus a certain growth in the quantitative indices of cultural exchanges has taken place over the years of perestroika. The past few years have exhibited a trend towards increased exchanges with capitalist countries (at present 50 per cent in those sent and 30 per cent in those received), as a result of which the socialist countries, while remaining in the first place in the number of cultural figures being sent to the USSR, have in the aggregate total been behind the capitalist countries in hosting Soviet cultural figures. The statistics that have been adduced do not indicate that the socialist countries have lost their place as priority partners of the Soviet Union in the field of cultural ties. In intensity and diversity of exchanges and the level of joint creativity, cultural cooperation with the socialist countries is still more qualitative than our ties with other states. We need to take into account the difficult financial and economic situation in a number of socialist countries (hence their line for limiting the volume of exchanges). On the other hand, in the context of independence, some Soviet departments, creative unions and organisations place the emphasis above all on receiving revenues in convertible currency by sending groups and artists to capitalist countries. It is mainly financial and economic difficulties that account for the USSR's limited (10-15 per cent of the overall volume) cultural ties with the developing countries. Cooperation in personnel training remains the basis of ties with this group of states.

Certain incongruities, such as the lack of clarity on the matter of rights of constituent republics and local Soviets in entering the foreign market, above all in the financial and economic sphere, have revealed themselves in the process of democratising and decentralising cultural exchanges.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is taking efforts to modernise forms and raise the qualitative level of cultural cooperation (involvement of new participants in exchanges, encouragement of direct ties, joint creation, personal contacts between cultural figures, and emphasis on youth exchanges).

By and large, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intends to step up its work on cultural ties and cooperation, also drawing on assistance from members of the cultural and artistic community, creative unions, the Cultural Fund and other interested organisations themselves.

Chapter V. THE USSR'S BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

Over the period that has elapsed since the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee sweeping changes have taken place in the cooperation of the USSR with the European socialist countries. With good traditions being kept up, relations have become more trusting on the one hand and more realistic on the other. The domestic changes in the countries influence this as well.

The revamping of relations with the European socialist countries, above all with our Warsaw Treaty allies, means that now these relations are based on strict observance of the principles of full equality, consideration for mutual interests, respect for the independence of each state in tackling national problems while simultaneously upgrading and enhancing solidarity and cooperation, and developing integrational processes. Respect for freedom of choice, non-interference in internal affairs, is a vital element of the Soviet Union's line vis-à-vis European, and not only European, socialist countries. This choice cannot and must not be abolished by force, any manifestation of power politics and any arm-twisting is categorically unacceptable.

Cogent conduct of this course has made it possible to eliminate many extraneous features typical of the period of stagnation and to switch from declarativeness to concreteness in political cooperation, and from window dressing and edifying tones to a businesslike approach.

At the same time, many problems that have amassed in the community have surfaced in the period of perestroika, revealing an ambivalence of approaches of the socialist countries to the further development of relations and to new phenomena in the world. The heterogeneity of the processes in the socialist countries, the differences in the levels of the transformations, and the certain contradictoriness of the new stage of international relations have had their effect here, too. The new atmosphere that has taken shape in Europe and the rest of the world has largely led to certain shifts in national security priorities, advancing to the forefront the economic factor, the ability of a country to draw on international cooperation to resolve its own economic problems. Socialist integration in its current form does not appear capable of meeting these new requirements.

In the context of the democratisation of allied relations, specific national interests of individual socialist countries have stood out in bolder relief; coordination of multilateral initiatives has become more difficult, and frictions in bilateral ties have become more acute. Our approach to such situations has invariably been based on the premise that

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all matters had to be decided by the involved countries themselves with due account for the interests of the community as a whole. The Soviet Union has always striven to promote settlement of problems arising among the allies in the spirit of comradely cooperation and partnership. At present the greatest difficulties in finding a common denominator that would take into account the viewpoints of all the allies are manifest in the humanitarian and legal sphere.

By and large, the European socialist countries have now arrived at a new stage in the development of their relations, when work is apace to bring all forms and methods of cooperation in line with the real needs and potentialities of the countries. Despite the positive shifts that have been attained, this activity cannot be considered completed. The Soviet Union is taking an active part in it.

Today the Warsaw Treaty not only preserves its significance as an important factor for the security of the socialist states and for the European stability; it is also an effective instrument in the endeavour of disarmament, establishment of broad international cooperation, ecology, and human rights.

The alliance is gradually transforming from a military-political organisation to a political-military one. This is already reflected in the theme of discussions, in which general political questions, economic cooperation, ecology and human rights are figuring more and more prominently.

That the alliance is changing is also manifest in the fact that *political ways of ensuring security* are becoming ever more predominant in the Warsaw Treaty decisions. Over the past few years the alliance has advanced a number of initiatives in the sphere of arms reduction and disarmament which promoted the start of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and confidence-building measures in Europe, and the overall improvement of the political climate in Europe.

The proclamation of a defensive military doctrine, in May 1987, by the Warsaw Treaty members was a major contribution to European security. To develop this move the Soviet Union is withdrawing part of its troops from the territory of a number of allied states.

The main Warsaw Treaty mechanisms have become more effective. The decision taken at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in Budapest in June 1986 to hold PCC conferences annually and sessions of the Foreign Ministers' Committee twice a year was of great importance here. A new form of these bodies' proceedings was endorsed: meetings of the heads of delegations (at PCC conferences, of foreign ministers as well) in a small composition, without a previously endorsed agenda. Cooperation on the working level was stepped up, and the number of meetings of deputy ministers and other representatives of foreign ministries, and sessions of expert groups was increased. However, a more effective and economical arrangement of cooperation is being explored. By decision of the PCC conference held in Warsaw in July 1988, a group of experts from representatives of the foreign ministries and defence ministries of the allied states is working; its functions include preparing coordinated practical considerations and proposals for upgrading the mechanism of political and military cooperation within the alliance framework.

The PCC conference in Bucharest on July 7-8, 1989 was a milestone. A frank debate took place which pinpointed both common approaches of the allies, especially in disarmament, and differences in stands, above all on issues linked with revitalising and improving socialism. Our course for respectable, truly equitable relations with the allies and for encouraging their initiative in international affairs made for a greater contribution of each state to the elaboration of a coordinated foreign policy line. This tapped the potential of the allies and of the Warsaw Treaty as a

whole in a new way (The Warsaw meeting of the CMEA [October 26-27, 1989] paid much attention to implementation of the agreements made at the Bucharest Conference of the PCC, progress of the Vienna talks on conventional armaments, and development of the European economic cooperation. For the first time in the allied practice the meeting was attended by the ministers responsible for external economic affairs.—Ed.)

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to overhauling CMEA's work. At the initiative of the Soviet side a programme for revamping the mechanism of economic and scientific and technological cooperation and for shifting integrational processes to economically sound foundations was drafted and is being implemented. The gradual formation of a united market has been placed on the agenda. Accomplishment of these wide-scale tasks is complicated by the worsening situation in the economy of the CMEA member countries and by the unevenness with which their internal economic structural reforms are proceeding.

The energetic work in this area notwithstanding, the current state of affairs in CMEA is extremely unsatisfactory. There have been no palpable results from the Comprehensive Programme for Scientific and Technological Cooperation and the Collective Concept of the International Socialist Division of Labour. The imposition of customs restrictions by some socialist countries on the export of a number of goods to other socialist countries likewise attests to the difficulties in economic cooperation. There has been a growing need for a mighty political impetus in favour of sweeping reforms in CMEA, above all in the mechanism of socialist economic integration. We will have to surmount divergencies in the notions of the CMEA member countries of the patterns of socialist economic integration and bring closer together their stands on use of economic instruments of cooperation, volumes of inter-governmental regulation of trade, direct cooperation between immediate producers, and the like.

Progress in restructuring multifaceted cooperation among the CMEA members is largely hampered by the imperfect economic mechanism in the USSR, the absence of wholesaling in the means of production, the economic imbalance, the poor export potential, above all in mechanical engineering and other sectors of the manufacturing industry, the nonconvertible ruble and its unrealistic exchange rate, etc.

The trade structure, which is unfavourable for the Soviet side, is a major dilemma for the Soviet Union in its external trade ties with the socialist countries. The predominance of fuel and raw materials in our export and that of finished goods, machinery and equipment in our import makes this trade highly unprofitable for the USSR.

On the whole, the development of the USSR's economic relations with the allies is encountering a number of new difficulties, such as the tendency towards reduced volumes of trade, the growing imbalance in mutual settlements, and the USSR's debt to a number of European socialist countries. The new patterns of cooperation, such as direct production and scientific and technological ties between enterprises and joint ventures to name but two (at present, agreements on establishing and developing such ties have been concluded between 160 partners in the USSR and the GDR, between over 600 partners in the USSR and Poland, and 370 partners in the USSR and Czechoslovakia) still fail to yield the maximum economic effect. Production cooperation in this sphere is still only paving a way for itself. The chief obstacle here is the unresolved currency and financial issues, differences in the domestic pricing system, and the like.

Over the past few years the contractual base of relations between the USSR and the socialist countries has broadened noticeably in all areas and has been supplemented with documents on cooperation in ideology,

science and culture signed between the CPSU and the communist and working-class parties of the allied countries. Agreements on opening their cultural and information centres in Moscow have been concluded with most states (Bulgaria, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia), although considerable difficulties have to be overcome if they are to be implemented.

Impressive progress has been made in the field of humanitarian cooperation, in people-to-people contacts. The procedure for private visits by citizens of the allied countries has been greatly simplified. A total of some three million Soviet people and Poles alone visited each others' countries in 1988, which is more than 100 per cent higher than the 1986 figure. However, the further growth of exchanges is being held back by a number of unresolved organisational problems, such as the capacity of border checkpoints, customs formalities, and the like.

The level of cooperation with the *People's Republic of Bulgaria* has been high. Five summit meetings and numerous other meetings were held beginning in 1985. A programme for cultural cooperation between the CPSU and the Bulgarian Communist Party was signed in April 1989. A group of friendship and cooperation between the National Assembly of Bulgaria and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, and the Georgian SSR was formed in May 1988, and agreements were concluded on the development of direct ties with Bulgaria.

The draft Concept of Scientific and Technological and Economic Cooperation between the USSR and Bulgaria for the Period Ending in the Year 2005 was prepared. Elements of the economic cooperation mechanism are being upgraded. Bulgaria accounts for one-fourth of all new forms of cooperation (NFC) which are used in our relations with the socialist countries: 38 joint ventures, 29 science and production associations, and 28 organisations were instituted, 260 direct ties have been established, an agreement on the use of the national currencies of the USSR and Bulgaria in mutual settlements within the framework of NFC was signed, and a mixed chamber of commerce and industry, the Bolgar-sovinvest Soviet-Bulgarian finance company, and the Sovbolgarkoop cooperative trade joint venture were formed. Trade still stands at 13 billion rubles a year.

Our revitalised trade and economic cooperation with Bulgaria provides broad vistas for solving the problems that have amassed—ensuring stable development of trade and raising the quality and technical level of exports and imports, and balancing payment relations. However, these opportunities are not being taken advantage of in full, and little progress is being made on implementing the accords on the development of NFC which is being hamstrung by still many unresolved economic, legal and organisational matters.

Ties between public organisations and creative unions are being revamped. The programmes for further all-round development of cooperation and convergence in the field of culture between the USSR and Bulgaria was signed on October 1987, and the agreement on the further development of cooperation and convergence between the trade unions of the USSR and Bulgaria was signed in July 1986. The Cultural and Information Centre of Bulgaria was opened in Moscow and it has branches in Kiev, Minsk, Leningrad, Kishinev and Syktyvkar.

The cooperation between the USSR and Bulgaria in foreign policy is characterised by close interaction and a unity of views on the key international problems.

In April 1985 *Soviet-Hungarian relations* began undergoing sweeping changes, the general orientation of which is determined by restructuring

turing and renewal processes that are intensively developing in both countries.

In the political sphere, a regular top-level dialogue is maintained, one which we intend to continue, in the spirit of openness and a businesslike approach, with due account, of course, for the changes in the alignment of political forces in Hungary.

Bilateral relations in the economic sphere are having difficulty making headway. The inflexible trade structure, the absence of due motivation of economic organisations to develop new patterns of cooperation—all this is reducing the volume of trade (in 1987 the figure was 9.7 billion rubles, in 1988, 9.4 billion, and in 1989 we expect 8.8 billion). At present we are exploring jointly with the Hungarian side the transition to a new mechanism of economic cooperation between our two countries, including settlements in freely convertible currency.

Impressive shifts have taken place in Soviet-Hungarian humanitarian cooperation. Our line for creating the most favourable conditions for the Hungarian national minority (170,000 persons) living on Soviet territory (Transcarpathian Region in the Ukraine) is evoking a positive response in Hungary. A simplified procedure by which citizens living in border areas may cross the border has been in effect since March 1, 1989. A Hungarian studies centre has been formed at Uzhgorod University.

The political relations between *the USSR and the GDR* have been developing steadily, bilateral dialogue at all levels being exceptionally intensive and substantive. In 1986 we reached a top-level accord on enhancing bilateral relations, which was concretised during the subsequent contacts, in September 1988, and June and October 1989. Its implementation is being promoted by the notable broadening of the contractual base of relations and the signing of a number of important inter-party, inter-governmental and inter-departmental agreements and accords which impart fresh impetuses and a promising orientation to our cooperation.

Our German friends backed our initiative to involve the GDR in work with Soviet citizens of German nationality for the purpose of promoting their national cultural identity. Partnership ties have been established between Schwerin District and Pavlodar Region in Kazakhstan, where there is a large community of Soviet Germans.

In the economy, science and technology, cooperation with the GDR takes prominence in the entire system of the USSR's foreign ties. The republic's share in Soviet foreign trade stands at 11 per cent; 63 per cent of the import from the GDR is comprised by machinery and equipment, through which we meet 20 per cent of our import needs for this commodity group. A tendency towards a decline in trade is observed: in 1985 it was 15.2 billion rubles, while the 1989 estimate is 13.7 billion rubles. To rectify the imbalance it is envisaged to develop production, sectoral and group cooperation more energetically, and effectively implement joint proposals for deepening cooperation in select spheres. Coordinated changes in some terms of trade in sources of energy and raw materials to the GDR for the next five-year plan period will help level out the imbalance in trade between the USSR and the GDR. These types of goods will be delivered in the next five-year period in exchange for high-quality output of the GDR's manufacturing industry.

It is a known fact that some quarters in the FRG have been exerting constant political, economic and ideological pressure on the GDR. Under the circumstances the GDR leadership displays particular concern for preserving stability in society and pursues a line for gradual change under the slogan "continuity and renewal".

The participation of General Secretary Gorbachev in the festivities marking the 40th anniversary of the formation of the GDR on October 6-7, 1989 and his meetings and talks with the country's leadership was of great importance from the standpoint of further developing relations between the two countries and rendering support to our German friends in what is a difficult period for them. (On November 1, 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev met in Moscow with the then General Secretary of the SUPG Egon Krenz. At the meeting both sides expressed their willingness to expand and deepen their political interactions along the party, government and public lines, and to expand contacts of all kinds.—*Ed*)

On the whole, *Soviet-Polish* relations after the coalition government headed by Solidarity came to power in Poland continue to develop normally. The statement by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki that the new Polish government would comply with its allied commitments linked with membership in the Warsaw Treaty is of principled importance. Our side is taking the requisite efforts to maintain the development of Soviet-Polish relations and the high level of mutual understanding and cooperation that has been attained. (On October 24-25, 1989, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs paid a visit to Poland. His talks and discussions with Poland's President Wojciech Jaruzelski, Council of Ministers Chairman Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, meeting with the First Secretary of the PUWP Mieczyslaw Rakowski revealed the sides' common opinions in that further development and consolidation of the good-neighbourly relations, mutual observance of the allied obligations fully meet vital interests of both countries and peoples, and the tasks of ensuring security and stability of the European continent.—*Ed*.)

The concept of economic and scientific and technological cooperation between the USSR and Poland for the next 15 to 20 years that was adopted in January 1989 lays the foundation for a new model of interaction for the purpose of deepening economic integration. Trade with Poland is generally stable, standing at some 13 million rubles over the past few years. Poland's debt to the Soviet Union from earlier-granted loans and credits is 5.7 billion rubles and 1.6 billion dollars.

However, negative tendencies linked with the incompleting economic reforms in both countries and the imperfect currency and financial and pricing mechanisms are increasingly manifest in the USSR's economic relations with Poland.

Of late many Polish enterprises are taking less of an interest in developing ties with Soviet counterparts. At present measures are being explored to upgrade the currency and financial mechanism of cooperation, including a possible transition to trade with settlements in hard currency at world prices. This will make it possible to ensure that trade is truly mutually beneficial and that the interests of both partners are taken into account.

Multifaceted ties between twinned cities, regions and republics of the USSR and Polish provinces are developing dynamically and cross-border contacts are deepening. Border constituent republics, above all the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania, are becoming energetically involved in cooperation with Poland. Highly ramified ties in culture and science have become particularly developed. The signing in 1987 at the summit level of the Declaration on Soviet-Polish Cooperation in Ideology, Science and Culture was of great importance in this sense. The prerequisites have been provided for extensive contacts between citizens of our two countries, and the formalities linked with this are being simplified. The Polish side is displaying a vested interest in establishing cultural and educational associations of Soviet citizens of Polish descent in a number of constituent republics.

The preparedness of the leadership of our two countries to solve the problem of the so-called blank spots in the history of relations between the two countries is instrumental to improving the climate of mutual trust. However, the slow progress being made by a commission of Soviet and Polish scholars to determine the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Polish officers near Katyn and decide other complicated matters are evoking a negative reaction from the Polish side.

The Soviet Union vigorously cooperates with Poland on the international scene, in building a common European home, and in the effort to limit and reduce arms and to strengthen confidence-building measures. The vital interests of the USSR and Poland coincide in the fundamental issues of European and world security.

Soviet-Romanian relations developed steadily in the latter half of the 1980s. Meetings between the leaders of our two countries became more regular, contacts on virtually all levels were stepped up, and a dialogue was maintained, which made it possible to conduct a frank and multifaceted exchange of views.

At the same time, there are a number of differences in the approaches of the leadership in our two countries to ways to develop socialist society.

Over the past few years Soviet-Romanian economic ties have been generally characterised by dynamic development.

In the current five-year plan period the trade volume is increasing by between 40 and 60 per cent in comparison to the 1981-1985 span (a volume of 5.5 billion rubles is expected in 1989). The introduction of new forms of cooperation, establishment of direct production ties, and the broad development of specialisation and cooperation are promising but thus far poorly developed areas of interaction between the USSR and Romania. However, the further deepening of economic cooperation is hampered by its predominantly extensive nature, the imperfect structure of commodity turnover, and the growing divergence of economic mechanisms.

The range of cooperation in foreign policy has widened notably. The stands of both countries on the main problems in the international arena are similar or they coincide. Specific elements are preserved in matters pertaining to upgrading cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty and CMEA.

Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation is characterised by broadening multifaceted ties and the traditionally amicable atmosphere of relations. Contacts between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia have been developing dynamically at all levels. The Programme for Ideological Cooperation Between the CPSU and the CPCz was signed in 1988. Ties between the constituent republics of the Soviet Union and the republics of Czechoslovakia have been stepped up. The CPCz leadership supports the USSR's efforts to revamp and democratise Soviet society. While carrying out reforms in its own country, it naturally proceeds from its own conditions, potentialities and needs and studies the experience of other socialist countries.

Certain difficulties have manifested themselves of late in the trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Trade dropped from 13.6 billion rubles in 1987 to an estimated 12.5 billion in 1989. Its volume is expected to decline further in 1990. The balance of payments on trade operations, which was negative for the USSR, stood at 1.2 billion rubles as of August 1, 1989. To resolve the difficulties that have arisen, comprehensive measures in the entire economic cooperation system are being explored, and changes are being introduced into the tactics and strategy of its continued development.

Cultural ties and tourist exchange need to be revitalised and made more efficient.

Our two countries closely cooperate in foreign policy and support each other's peace initiatives.

A distinguishing feature of *Soviet-Yugoslav relations* over the years of perestroika has been their enrichment and broader cooperation in all areas, including ideology as opposed to the state of affairs in the past. A milestone was General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1988, when both sides voiced their resolve to raise their relations as a whole to a new and higher level. Over the past few years much has been done to make contacts constructive on all levels and imbue them with mutual trust.

Aside from regular ties along party, parliamentary and governmental lines, direct amicable links covering all the republics, territories and 12 cities of Yugoslavia have figured prominently. The matter of heightening their effectiveness and overcoming elements of formalism in this area remains topical.

Trade and economic cooperation is being conducted in the complicated context of an imbalance in mutual settlements which is caused by the unfavourable structure of Soviet export and the decline of prices on fuel and raw materials on the world market. Concern is evoked by the downtrend in trade (7.2 billion dollars in 1985; 5.7 billion dollars in 1988).

The contractual and juridical underpinnings of Soviet-Yugoslav relations have been consolidated, and a consular convention and an agreement on mutual recognition of documents on education and scholarly degrees and on the establishment of a Yugoslav cultural and information centre in Moscow have been signed. The signing of an inter-governmental agreement on cooperation in the information sphere is of great importance. Work is drawing to a conclusion on documents regulating trips of Soviet and Yugoslav citizens to each other's countries, social insurance for Soviet and Yugoslav citizens, and cooperation in environmental protection.

Soviet-Albanian relations are in effect non-existent. Albania ceased taking part in CMEA work in the early 1960s, and it left the Warsaw Treaty in 1968. However, some of the new processes that have begun in Albania's policies since the mid-1980s have not affected Soviet-Albanian relations. The Soviet side is still prepared to normalise relations with Albania.

It should be noted that a study of archive materials has shown that the divide between our two countries could have been prevented in its time.

2. RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE OTHER ASIAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

The extent to which *Sino-Soviet relations* declined beginning in the late 1950s is well known. Political dialogue was halted, the situation along the border became more and more tense, trade dropped to a minimum, and other forms of bilateral ties were curtailed almost to the limit.

The causes of this unfavourable development are the subject of a special analysis. It is obvious, however, that they were rooted not in some objective, immanent contradictions between our two countries but in the poorly verified assessments, ill-considered decisions and nervous reactions, the responsibility for which falls to a certain extent on both sides.

The decades of alienation between our two countries cost both the Soviet and the Chinese peoples dearly. The Sino-Soviet confrontation also did damage to the influence and prestige of socialism and left a

negative imprint on the situation in the Asian-Pacific region and in the world as a whole.

The worsening of relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC went so far that even after efforts to normalise them had already been launched, years were needed to accomplish this task.

Both countries cleared away the obstacles that had amassed and paved the way to new relations. This was promoted by the new approaches to domestic and world affairs that were affirming themselves in the Soviet Union and China. By the mid-1980s the unsettled nature of Sino-Soviet relations had already been perceived as an anomaly in both countries.

The constructive approaches to a number of fundamental aspects of relations with China that were set forth at the 27th CPSU Congress, at the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, and in the Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk speeches began to be consistently transformed into specific proposals backed up by energetic steps towards normalising relations, towards respecting in deed the equality of the sides, and taking each other's interests into account.

A new atmosphere began to take shape gradually through the efforts of both sides; it promoted a frank and businesslike discussion of all matters of interest to the USSR and China, including topical global problems such as peace and development, curbing the arms race, ecology, settlement of regional conflicts, and specific aspects of the broadening cooperation between the two countries in practical spheres.

As has been noted above, the *Sino-Soviet summit* held in May 1989 was a milestone in the normalisation of inter-state relations between the USSR and China and the resumption of ties between the CPSU and the Communist Party of China. At the meeting principles for contacts between our two countries were agreed upon, which was formalised in a joint Sino-Soviet communique. They include mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. A return visit by one of the top Chinese leaders to the USSR scheduled for spring 1990 is to be a new important step.

Importantly, Sino-Soviet convergence is taking place at present not in an atmosphere of confrontation with the Western countries but in the context of an overall easing of East-West tensions.

A system of bilateral negotiating mechanisms in the *political sphere* is taking place today. Direct channels of consultations and exchange of information on international problems between the different subdivisions of the foreign policy departments of the two countries have been set up. Recently, a draft special protocol on consultations between the foreign ministries of our two countries was turned over to the Chinese side. Talks on border matters are being intensified. Crossing along more than 80 per cent of the border has already been agreed upon during them. Discussion of troop reductions along the Sino-Soviet border and on confidence-building in the military sphere are to begin in the immediate future.

Although differences still exist between the USSR and China on some international matters, their range is narrowing. The stands of the two countries are similar or coincide on the most important issues, namely, disarmament, the need to reduce nuclear arsenals, prevention of the militarisation of outer space, scrapping of chemical weapons, and reduction of military activity in the Pacific area, and in their approach to a number of volatile international situations.

The volume of *Sino-Soviet trade* is almost 2,000 million rubles a year, up from approximately 200 million rubles at the start of the 1980s. Industrial consumer goods, food products and food raw materials will account for almost 80 per cent of Chinese imports to the USSR in 1989.

Machinery and equipment make up about half of the USSR's exports to China. Crossborder trade between the two countries, which stood at some 80 million rubles in 1988, is being energetically developed. Several dozen industrial facilities in China are being refurbished with Soviet assistance, and implementation of projects for establishing joint ventures on the territory of both states has begun. Quite a few Chinese workers are employed at different economic facilities in the Soviet Far East.

The conclusion, on the whole, of the process of the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations does not mean that all the problems and differences that have amassed are swept away immediately and automatically. We are hardly protected against a possible appearance of new problems or differences in views. However, today both sides are at one in their understanding of the fact that any of the problems in their relations should be resolved through a constructive dialogue.

Over the past four years relations between the USSR and *the other socialist countries of Asia* have strengthened markedly, ties have become more multifaceted; mutual understanding and cooperation based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit have deepened palpably, and there is more confidence and openness. Realism has begun predominating in assessments of the existing difficulties and problems.

The relations between the USSR and the *Mongolian People's Republic* have become more intensive and fuller. However, many unresolved problems requiring urgent solutions had accumulated in them by the mid-1980s.

Regular meetings of the top leaders of the USSR and Mongolia and constant working contacts between the foreign ministers have played an important role in elaborating approaches to these problems. Processes of a transition from the former stereotypes of the sham "problemlessness" of our relations to a model of totally equitable partnership cooperation that would ensure a better balancing of the national state interests of both sides are beginning to develop, albeit not without difficulty, in the political, economic, cultural and other spheres. A more sober, and therefore selective, approach to the Soviet experience and to cooperation with the USSR has become noticeable.

This applies to economic ties especially. On the whole, they are profitable to both countries. The Soviet side has a vested interest in importing Mongolian raw materials, foodstuffs and consumer goods. The USSR accounts for 83 per cent of the volume of Mongolian's foreign trade and 90 per cent of the credit it receives. However, our credit assistance, which was implemented chiefly according to the "input-maximising method", has not led to a levelling of the trade balance. In the current five-year plan period Mongolia received 3,700 million rubles in credits from us, including 1,350 million rubles for balancing commodity turnover (incidentally, in the previous five-year period these figures were less—2,200 million and 1,100 million respectively).

The revision of the pricing system in mutual settlements with the transition to the basis of current world prices figures prominently in the course of the present coordinating of the economic plans of the two countries for the next five-year plan period. The USSR State Planning Committee estimates that the switchover to the new system of pricing based on 1990 world prices will yield Mongolia a profit of 1,000 million rubles for the five-year period.

As in the past, the Soviet Union and Mongolia are working together today for peace, security and disarmament. We actively support the foreign policy initiatives being advanced by Ulan Bator and its galvanising contacts with countries in Asia and the Pacific. Certain steps to revitalise the system of foreign policy cooperation with Mongolia have been taken with due account for the legitimate aspiration of our Mongolian

friends to broaden the framework of their activity in the international arena. Specifically, systematic consultations between the foreign ministries of our two countries have become more intensive and substantive.

Beginning in 1985 the Soviet side took additional efforts to develop our relations with the *Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, which became fuller and more diverse. A considerable role here was played by contacts between the leaders of our two countries. Comrade Kim Il Sung made a working visit to Moscow in October 1986. At the request of the Korean side, Kim Il Sung met in Khabarovsk in July 1988 with representatives of Soviet central economic bodies and officials of party, government and economic organisations of the territories and regions of the Far East and Siberia. Ties were also stepped up at other levels along party and government lines and between public organisations and in science, culture and sport.

When the volumes and areas of economic cooperation for the 12th five-year plan period were being coordinated, it was envisaged to bring the volume of bilateral trade up to 7,000 million rubles (for the five-year period) and to at least double the scope of Soviet economic assistance to the DPRK in building industrial enterprises and other economic facilities. The requests of the Korean leadership on major issues dealing with strengthening the DPRK's defence capability were honoured.

However, some problems in our trade and economic cooperation with the DPRK have been arising in recent years.

Construction is still being dragged out at some facilities of Soviet-Korean economic cooperation. The Soviet side is largely at fault here. After individual enterprises built with Soviet assistance are commissioned, they cannot for a long time reach their full rated capacity and produce quality output. New advanced forms (production, scientific and technological cooperation, joint ventures, etc.) are being introduced with difficulty. The record of our ties with the DPRK attests to the inefficiency of the Intergovernmental Soviet-Korean Consultative Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Questions. It is expedient to speed up the signing of the already prepared programme for developing economic, scientific and technological cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK for the period ending in the year 2000.

Soviet diplomacy vigorously backs the DPRK's initiatives to normalise the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The sides successfully worked in concert to prepare and stage this summer the 13th World Youth and Student Festival in Pyongyang—an important event on the international public scene. On the whole, the relations between our two countries remain traditionally friendly. The potential for long-term mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK is great.

The development of bilateral relations with the countries of *Indochina* over the previous period was accompanied by a review of some approaches to cooperation with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia that had become traditional but failed to accord with the spirit of the times. An impetus to the search for new forms of cooperation between the USSR and all these countries were the summit meetings in 1987-1988, during which the guidelines for revamping mutual ties were mapped out. The visit of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs to the countries of Indochina in March 1987, the first of its kind in the history of our mutual relations, was geared to stepping up cooperation with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the State of Cambodia in the international arena.

The leadership of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia embarked upon the path of sweeping economic and political reforms. The Indochinese countries as a whole assessed positively the concept of new political thinking. They actively backed with practical measures the fresh major initiatives

of the USSR in disarmament and the Soviet initiatives to establish relations of peace in the APR.

Cooperation in the economic sphere is of key importance at the current stage. Over the past few years the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have adopted a number of decisions to overhaul economic ties with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and ensure the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.*

The efforts taken by both sides to improve economic ties have yielded certain results. Soviet credits were reoriented in part to cooperation in implementing the priority economic programmes of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Utilisation of the production potential created with Soviet assistance improved somewhat. Exports from the Indochinese countries to the USSR, including foods and some industrial consumer goods, began to increase. Thus, Vietnamese exports to the Soviet Union increased in 1988 by 21 per cent (Soviet exports remained unchanged), and in the current year it is planned to boost the volume of Vietnamese exports by an additional 24 per cent.

However, we have failed thus far to attain the main goal, that of creating a thrift model of economic cooperation. The present practice of financing cooperation from the state budget prevents input-maximising methods of interconnections from being broken down, allows crediting of excessively protracted construction projects, hampers reductions in the size of Soviet personnel at sites, etc. Both sides are focusing on efforts to resolve these problems without delay.

In the new situation that is taking shape today in Indochina additional possibilities are opening up for developing multifaceted fruitful cooperation between the USSR and the State of Cambodia, with which we have amicable relations. The Soviet Union applauds and supports the policy of national reconciliation and permanent neutrality being pursued by the Cambodian leadership and its line for developing all forms of the negotiating process, including inter-Khmer dialogue with the aim of comprehensively settling the Cambodian problem.

The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia drastically changes the situation in the region and promotes the establishment of good-neighbourly relations with all the ASEAN countries. The USSR welcomes the dialogue that has been launched between Vietnam and China and the further development of relations between Laos and China.

3. CUBA

Relations of very broad cooperation have taken shape between the Soviet Union and Cuba over the past three decades. These relations are regulated by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and by a whole complex of other agreements in various fields. A high degree of mutual understanding and trust between the leadership of both countries are typical of them. The peoples of the Soviet Union and Cuba are linked by tight bonds of friendship.

The official friendly visit of General Secretary Gorbachev to Cuba in April 1989 was a milestone in Soviet-Cuban relations. It demonstrated the commonality of the stands of the USSR and Cuba on the key problems of world development and the unity of approaches to the changes taking place in the international arena under the impact of new political thinking. Our Cuban friends value highly the fraternal internationalist

* The overall volume of Soviet economic assistance to Vietnam during the current five-year plan period will be 8,700 million rubles, including 4,360 million for balancing mutual accounts, 2,000 million for technical assistance, 2,200 million for refinancing payments on the main debt, and 150 million in gratuitous aid. Vietnam's debt to the USSR stands at some 9,000 million rubles.

aid from the USSR and underscore its decisive importance for their country's development.

Over 400 industrial enterprises, facilities and other projects have been built or refurbished with Soviet technical assistance. Some 200 different economic facilities are being put up or renovated. Upwards of 16,000 Cuban experts have received an education at Soviet institutions.

The volume of Soviet-Cuban trade amounted to 8,300 million rubles in 1988, which was slightly more than 7 per cent of the Soviet external trade turnover and 72 per cent of that of Cuba. Soviet imports from Cuba cover a third of our sugar needs and 40 per cent of all our consumption of citrus fruits. We would have to pay hard currency for these goods were we to buy them on the world market.

At present we are exploring fresh approaches to trade and economic ties that accord with the conditions that are emerging during the economic transformations in the USSR and Cuba.

Bilateral ties in the humanitarian sphere are generally developing successfully. We are cooperating in science and culture in accordance with our agreements.

There is reason to assume that all-round Soviet-Cuban cooperation will continue to strengthen, helping to fully unlock socialism's potential in our two countries and to resolve the problems that humanity is encountering today.

4. RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND OTHER SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

Historically, India has always been an extremely important partner for us, and it figures prominently in Soviet foreign policy. It is quite logical that the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR instructed the government to pay special attention to amicable relations with this country.

Of late, Soviet-Indian cooperation has been deepening and becoming more important as an independent major stabilising factor in the entire system of international relations.

The mutual attraction and interaction of the USSR and India are based on their similar approaches to philosophical and universal values, the coincidence or similarity of stands on the key issues of the day and the trust and friendship between the two peoples that have been created by their joint efforts.

The development of bilateral cooperation between the USSR and India in the international arena is largely stimulated by the intensive dialogue between the leaders of our two countries. There have been seven meetings between General Secretary Gorbachev and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi since 1985. The Soviet leader made two official friendly visits to India, in 1986 and 1988, and Rajiv Gandhi paid three visits to the USSR, in 1985, 1987 and 1989. During this period Nikolai Ryzhkov visited India, in 1987, and the Indian President, Ramaswami Venkataraman, made a trip to the Soviet Union, in 1988. Such regular contacts have brought Soviet-Indian cooperation to a qualitatively new level both in international affairs and in bilateral relations.

It was during the summits that one of the first major international documents of new political thinking—the *Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World* (1986)—was drafted. Having organically blended the world outlooks and practical intentions of the two powers and having singled out the main point—common concern for the inadmissibility of nuclear war, for disarmament and international cooperation, the Soviet and Indian leaders formulated the fundamental concept for building a safe world and indicated specific ways of implementing it.

The Delhi Declaration became the foundation of cooperation between the USSR and India in the interest of improving international relations and remaking them in the spirit of new political thinking. This applies, specifically, to actions to implement our programme for the complete scrapping of nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons by the year 2000 and its related Indian action plan to establish a nuclear-free and non-violent world order by the year 2010. We duly appreciate India's efforts to play a role in world and regional affairs that befits its international status and to promote the affirmation of the principles of the Delhi Declaration in all the regions of the planet, including the most extensive one—Asia and the Pacific.

The government of India shares the main goals and guidelines of the *Vladivostok Programme* for ensuring security and developing cooperation in the APR and displays a vested interest in taking steps to create a climate of trust here and to overcome elements of confrontation. Concern over normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations, which used to be widespread in India, has largely disappeared nowadays. Not the least reason for this was the recent changes for the better in Indian-Chinese relations as well.

India is a major *trade and economic partner* of the USSR among the developing countries. It fulfils its commitments to repay credits received conscientiously and timely. Over 70 different facilities have been built with Soviet aid in key sectors of the Indian industry, and about 50 of them are at the construction or design stage. Energetic work has been done of late to improve the entire cooperation mechanism in the economy, trade, science and technology, and to switch over to intensive development. We seek to pinpoint more fully new potential which is being created in the course of the economic reforms and modernisation in the USSR and India, although much more is to be done in this field than has already been done.

The recent inter-governmental accords are aimed at imparting new qualities to our cooperation—deeper production interaction, formation of joint ventures, and establishment of direct ties between Soviet and Indian associations and firms. The first steps were taken to elaborate through joint efforts advanced technologies and materials, and cooperation is developing in the production of civilian aviation technology. Hotels in Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara are being built with Indian participation, and joint ventures for the production of a number of consumer goods are being launched.

However, the generally positive picture of Soviet-Indian cooperation is not devoid of objective and subjective shortcomings. Thus, despite the efforts being taken, we have failed to surmount the substantial decline in trade with India which emerged as a result of the drop in world prices for energy and other raw materials which still predominate in our exports to this country (in 1985 sales totalled 3,100 million rubles, and in 1988, only 2,300 million). Exports of Soviet machinery and equipment, above all for facilities of economic cooperation with India, should become the main promising area of trade growth.

The ties between the USSR and India are increasingly taking on a human dimension, the role played by the public greatly enhancing in them. This was vividly manifest in the festivals of India and the USSR, in 1987 and 1988, which did much to bring the Soviet and Indian people closer together and promote their mutual cultural enrichment. However, after these events such activity slumped notably.

Relations with *Pakistan* have been developing unevenly over the past few years. Their complicated nature manifested itself in particular in connection with the arrival, in the late 1970s, of the Zia ul-Haq military

regime, which began interfering in the affairs of neighbouring states and actively supporting the Afghan opposition.

After April 1985 Soviet foreign policy embarked upon an intensive search for ways to improve relations with Pakistan. These efforts by the Soviet Union yielded a certain effect. Pakistan ultimately acceded to the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan. The signing of these documents and the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in full accordance with them inspired the hope that a basis for levelling out Soviet-Pakistani relations would appear. Certain possibilities for this were also opened up by the changes in Pakistan itself, namely, the arrival, following general elections in late 1988, of a civilian government headed by Benazir Bhutto, which stated its vested interest in developing bilateral relations, above all in the economic sphere.

The decision for the Soviet Foreign Minister to make a visit, in February 1989, to Islamabad—a first in the history of our relations with Pakistan—was dictated by a desire to considerably clarify the prospects for good-neighbourliness between our two countries and peoples and to prompt the Pakistani leadership to comply with the Geneva accords. Calling the attention of the Pakistani leaders during the visit to the urgent need for an end to the interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, the Soviet side sought to have Islamabad display greater realism in its policy in the region, take account of the balance of interests, and understand the futility of further staking on a settlement of the conflict by military means. The Pakistanis were also informed of the USSR's readiness to take specific steps to broaden economic ties. One of the results of this visit was the Soviet-Pakistani statement, in which the Pakistani side agreed with the need to bend every effort to promote a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Regrettably, further developments showed that Pakistan continues—contrary to the commitments it took—to pursue its former course in Afghan affairs. Its interference in domestic Afghan affairs has actually increased rather than ended. The military-political tensions have also been exacerbated by the establishment on Pakistani territory of the "transitional Afghan government", which has taken a line for continuing the fratricidal war and rejecting dialogue with the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Some details in Pakistan's stand appeared only very recently, and it is hard to say whether they will be developed.

Under the circumstances, it is imperative, of course, to continue a purposeful political dialogue with Pakistan, and it should be prompted to take a more realistic stand on Afghan affairs.

Soviet experts render assistance to Pakistan on commercial basis in prospecting for oil and natural gas. Implementation of an agreement on assistance in building a large thermal power station has begun, and talks are in progress on the construction of a second line of an iron and steel plant in Karachi to raise its capacity to three million tons of steel a year. The overall volume of Soviet credits to Pakistan under signed agreements and contracts at the present junction is 1,150 million rubles, of which 780 million have been realised. Pakistan regularly liquidates its credits in hard currency. There is reason to believe that our two countries have fine prospects; however, a great deal hinges on the approach of Pakistan itself, above all with regard to an Afghan settlement.

The Soviet Union's relations with *Bangladesh, Myanma (Burma), Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Republic of Maldives* have been traditionally friendly. The stands of these countries on many topical international problems coincide with ours, and business cooperation and cultural ties have been established, albeit in small volumes.

Frankly, we have yet to find the most effective forms of cooperation with the so-called small countries of Southern Asia that would accord to

the greatest extent with the specifics of their economies and their development level, and with our own interests.

5. WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

In addition to active Soviet participation in multilateral cooperation in Europe, there has been a visible rise since April 1985 in the level of our bilateral relations with Great Britain, France, the FRG, Italy and other West European countries.

Soviet-British relations are developing largely under the influence of top-level contacts. The five official and working meetings held to date were concerned with determining the key lines to be followed in bilateral relations and extended the area of confidence and mutual understanding.

Margaret Thatcher takes a keen interest in the perestroika processes unfolding in the Soviet Union; she realises that they benefit the trend of development in Europe and the world. The British side expresses a readiness for a serious and frank exchange of views on a wide range of problems, for cooperation with the Soviet Union in such sectors as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, banning of chemical weapons, settlement of conflicts, environmental protection, struggle against drug addiction and crime. The developed mechanism of political dialogue now in use comprises the parliaments, foreign ministries and other entities of the two countries. In July 1989, the Soviet Defence Minister visited Britain for the first time in the history of Soviet-British relations.

Over the past four years, the two countries have signed an agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas; an agreement on settling mutual financial and property claims; memorandum on new areas of cooperation in the fields of information, culture and education; an agreement on cooperation in studying and using outer space for peaceful purposes; an agreement on the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments; a memorandum on questions relating to the issuance of visas; other documents extending the treaty and legal basis of contemporary Soviet-British relations.

Bilateral trade has come close to 25 billion rubles, the level set for 1990.

On the other hand, Britain remains a difficult partner for us, and as far as nuclear issues are concerned, it is also one of our main opponents. London rejects the concept of a nuclear-free world and comes out against eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, bringing Britain's nuclear forces into the disarmament process and extending it to the Navy. Some of the remaining problems of bilateral relations have to do with the tough visa quota regime governing the functioning of Soviet institutions in Britain. The Soviet side has been working steadfastly with the British on all these matters.

Today's *Soviet-French* relations rest on long-time traditions. Cooperation and political dialogue between the Soviet Union and France, an influential continental European power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, are a major factor for European and international security. It was in cooperation with that country that the first steps towards a policy of East-West detente were taken and the European process got under way. Soviet-French relations still retain their role as a testing ground of European and international politics. Nor was it accidental that the idea of building a common European home was advanced and spelled out during the 1985 summit talks in Paris. A reality of fundamental importance is the continuing coincidence or closeness of Soviet and French interests and approaches as regards key aspects of security and stability in Europe and global problems facing humanity at the threshold of the 21st century.

Five Soviet-French summit meetings have taken place since 1985. Perestroika processes in the Soviet Union constantly draw the attention of President François Mitterrand, who shows an interest in their favourable evolution. More and more, the two sides move from acknowledging the existence of mutual understanding to concrete cooperation which covers diverse aspects of disarmament, greater international security, a deepening of the Helsinki process, regional problems.

Our ties and interchanges with France are extensive and manifold; they involve practically every sphere of life. The recent period has seen large sections of the public, unions of creative workers, informal organisations join in these interchanges ever more actively.

Economic, scientific and technological cooperation with France is far from being entirely in keeping with the two countries' possibilities, which is also due to various restrictions, including controls imposed by COCOM. Our trade with France has fallen off notably. It was worth 3,779 million rubles in 1985 and 2,769 million in 1988.

During the Paris summit in July 1989, the Soviet Union and France concluded 22 new agreements covering various fields, in particular exchanges of youth groups and cooperation in digital and high-definition television and training in economic management. The task is to use the potential of these agreements as efficiently as possible in order to contribute to the solution of our social and economic problems.

The *Federal Republic of Germany* holds a special place in the West European sector of Soviet foreign policy. In close cooperation with our allies, primarily the GDR, we carried out a set of measures which led to a breakthrough in our relations with West Germany and to new forms and a new quality of political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other ties with it.

Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the FRG from June 12 to 15, 1989, marked a turning point in Soviet-West German relations. The Joint Statement signed on June 13 has fundamental significance as the first document in which two major European states belonging to different systems and different alliances outline their political aims on the strength of a philosophical appraisal of changes in the world. The document constitutes a new stage in that, expressing the will of the peoples of both countries, it puts an end to the postwar period of the complicated history of relations between them and provides for vigorous cooperation in many fields on the principles of confidence, equality and mutual benefit. The Joint Statement carries forward in a new context the ideas of the Moscow Treaty, which remains the foundation of Soviet-West German relations. Its pivotal provision is the two sides' commitment "unfailingly to respect the territorial integrity of all the states in Europe within their present boundaries".

The Soviet Union and West Germany are cooperating more and more actively in the CSCE process and in important international forums. The problems of achieving security and disarmament have become a priority in the bilateral dialogue. In 1988, the two countries signed an agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea, the first agreement in the history of our relations to bear on the military sphere.

The important change for the better in our political relations with the FRG opens promising vistas for intensified economic, scientific and technological cooperation, which cannot be considered satisfactory as a whole for the time being. It is now necessary to lend substance to the twenty treaties and agreements signed in Moscow and Bonn during top-level visits. Soviet government departments must study the offers of West German partners more vigorously and promptly, must draw more readily on the experience gained by the FRG in agriculture, industry, consumer goods production, environmental protection. Our trade turnover

with West Germany is nearly unchanged; it amounted to 5,578 million rubles in 1986 and 5,628 million in 1988.

The sky over Soviet-West German relations is not entirely cloudless. The negative phenomena in the FRG that make themselves felt are revanchist actions, calls for a revision of European frontiers, pressure on the GDR, attempts to infringe certain provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin signed on September 3, 1971. The evolution in Poland and the difficulties encountered by the GDR, have led to stepped-up activity in the FRG by forces calling for an end to the status quo in Europe, for the absorption of the German socialist state and the restoration of "Germany within its 1937 frontiers". Speaking to the 44th Session of the UN GA, the Soviet Foreign Minister described these calls as disturbing evidence of revanchist sentiments. The Soviet side will go on countering in a fitting manner trends of this nature in West German politics.

The Soviet Union favours a further improvement in the situation around *West Berlin*; it promotes direct ties with the city, nor does it have anything against the city joining in cooperation at European and international level provided its special status is properly respected. Taking a firm stand for strict compliance with the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, the Soviet Union searches steadfastly for solutions to practical problems typical of West Berlin, including various aspects of Soviet-West German relations.

Italy is an important partner of our country in the European political process and in international affairs generally. The groundwork laid for cooperation with it is solid. Since April 1985, there have been two top-level contacts, 11 meetings between the foreign ministers and four visits by parliamentary delegations of the Soviet Union and Italy. The two countries' armed forces have resumed their contacts broken off in 1979. There was an exchange of visits by warships, and in May 1989 a delegation of Italy's centre for higher defence studies stayed in our country for the first time.

We consider our economic cooperation with Italy very important. By late 1988, Italy ranked fourth in Soviet trade with industrial capitalist countries (after the FRG, Finland and Japan), bilateral trade turnover adding up to 3.01 billion rubles (against 3.5 billion in 1987). We have signed an agreement on credits totalling 720 million dollars to be granted by Italy to the Soviet Union for reconstruction and development of light and food industries. Italian enterprises are among the foremost foreign enterprises promoting ties with Soviet partners.

Bilateral cooperation includes such new lines as direct ties between the media, combating international drug trafficking, emergency measures during natural calamities, cooperation in space exploration for peaceful purposes. Exchanges of experience in converting military industry are worthy of special note as a promising form of cooperation with Italy. Eventually it should be possible in principle to move to direct cooperation between enterprises being converted to civilian production.

Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Italy, the first top-level visit to that country, is bound to play a key role in carrying forward the Soviet-Italian dialogue.

The group of our main trading partners in Western Europe is coming to include *Spain*, a dynamically developing European and Mediterranean nation holding fifth place in Western Europe in absolute GDP and ranking among the most advanced countries in some technological, scientific and technical fields. Spain is pursuing an active foreign policy and takes a realistic stand on major international problems, such as that of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.

Progress in Soviet-Spanish relations was exemplified by such important political contacts as the official visit to the Soviet Union by Prime Minister Felipe González during which he had talks with our country's top leaders (May 1986) and by Foreign Minister F. Fernández Ordóñez, who arrived in Moscow in March 1989.

Trade and economic cooperation are on the rise. Trade turnover went up from 296 million rubles in 1986 to 781 million in 1988, and in 1989 it is expected to come close to one billion rubles. The Canaries play an important role in repairing and supplying the Soviet fishing fleet based in the Atlantic. On the whole, however, the potentialities of our cooperation with Spain are by no means being used in full measure, and as for our government agencies, they are slow to consider business offers from Spain.

Our cooperation with *Greece* is intensifying. The leaders of the two countries exchange on a regular basis messages on problems of world politics and Soviet-Greek relations. Another regular practice is meetings between the two countries' Foreign Ministers during UN GA sessions. Greece has backed many foreign political initiatives of the Soviet Union. Bilateral interparliamentary ties have gone further, as have cooperation in science and culture and contacts in the military sphere. Still, trading and economic links developed unevenly in the same period. From the peak reached in 1985, when trade turnover amounted to 728 million rubles, the volume of our trade with Greece has slipped to 402 million rubles.

Soviet-Norwegian relations have been making fairly dynamic progress ever since 1985, which allowed a rather long period of coolness to be overcome. The summit meeting held in Moscow in December 1986 led to the resumption of normal political dialogue. The Soviet Foreign Minister meets regularly at UN GA sessions with the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of Norway. In January 1988, after a 17-year interval, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers visited Norway. The dialogue confirms that there are common ground and reasons for bilateral cooperation on a wide spectrum of issues ranging from environmental protection and Arctic research to military political problems of the North and of Europe as a whole.

Parliamentary exchanges have been resumed. In 1988, the Soviet Union was visited by a delegation of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Storting, and in the spring of 1989 there came a visit by its Military Committee, the first of its kind to be paid by a delegation from a NATO country. An unsolved problem of Soviet-Norwegian relations is still that of delimiting the Barents Sea area (talks have been going on since 1970). A final solution of this problem can only be brought about on the basis of a political compromise envisaging the possibility of mutual geographical corrections in the disputed area.

Our political relations with *Denmark* over the past four and a half years have been characterised by a developing dialogue at top, high and other levels. It received a strong impetus with Prime Minister Poul Schlüter's official visit to the Soviet Union in 1986, the first such visit after a thirteen-year break. The two countries' Foreign Ministers have met eight times since 1985. There is a bigger promise now of bilateral cooperation thanks in particular to the signing of four important documents, including an agreement on cooperation in the area of the agro-industrial complex. Parliamentary contacts are maintained on a satisfactory level. A direct result which Soviet-Danish relations owe to perestroika was the settlement in mid-1989 of all the outstanding humanitarian problems of our relations, a development appreciated by the Danes.

Our political relations with *Iceland* have come to cover a wider range of problems discussed during top- and high-level visits; exchanges of parliamentary and other delegations have increased in comparison

with earlier years. "Reykjavik '86" is a term indicating the possibility not only of a nuclear-free world but of a new stage in Soviet-Icelandic relations. The top leaders of the two states made a principled appraisal of the state of bilateral relations and outlined prospects for their development. A further spur was given during Prime Minister Steingrímur Hermannsson's visit to the Soviet Union in 1987. The Icelanders are the only ones in NATO to have suggested that the completion of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces be followed by talks with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries on confidence-building measures and disarmament on the seas.

The Soviet Union maintains a regular high-level political dialogue with *Belgium, the Netherlands* and *Luxembourg*, a fairly influential group of countries. In April 1989, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers paid a first-ever visit to Luxembourg, with which we have long been linked by traditionally friendly relations. In November 1986, the Soviet Union was visited by the Dutch Prime Minister. The Netherlands never set out to station US nuclear missiles on its soil, thereby refusing to carry out a relevant NATO decision. We have been conducting a meaningful political dialogue with Belgium, a country taking a realistic stand in international forums on the issue of disarmament, in particular the proposal for banning chemical and germ weapons.

Our relations with *Portugal* show a constructive trend after years of stagnation. President Mario Soares's visit to the Soviet Union in 1987 and the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Lisbon in 1988 enlivened our political dialogue with that country.

The year 1985 saw the onset of more active ties between the Soviet Union and *neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe*, which play a noteworthy positive role in the reshaping of international relations in Europe on the principles of the CSCE Final Act.

Soviet-Finnish relations have become something of a laboratory for restructuring East-West relations. The two countries maintain a permanent top-level dialogue, which is the chief instrument of improving cooperation and settling problems. Mikhail Gorbachev's planned official visit to Finland (October 25-27, 1989) will be of fundamental importance from the point of view of deciding on ways to further Soviet-Finnish cooperation on the international scene and in the area of bilateral relations.*

Viewed against the background of our sound political relations with Finland, the serious difficulties besetting our trading and economic ties give cause for concern. In the past five years, the Soviet Union's share in the foreign trade of Finland has dropped from 25 to 13 per cent, entailing a substantial debt.

In April 1986, there was an official visit to the Soviet Union by Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson of *Sweden* and in January 1988, an official visit by Nikolai Ryzhkov to Sweden, which resulted in the solution of a problem that had burdened Soviet-Swedish relations for nearly 20 years. The two countries signed an agreement on the principles of delimiting the Baltic Sea area.

An unfreezing of relations has begun in the military sphere.

Delegations of the Swedish Riksdag and the USSR Supreme Soviet exchanged visits in 1987 and 1988, respectively.

By September 1989, thirty-six joint ventures had been set up in the

* Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Finland brought our cooperation into a further phase of openness and pragmatism giving our relations a dynamism consonant with the times. The talks revealed wide-ranging agreement between the two countries' approaches to international problems and their bilateral relations. Accords and agreements reached map out major guidelines for all-round promotion of Soviet-Finnish relations. A mechanism for constant monitoring of their practical implementation was set up within the system of Soviet state bodies.

Soviet Union with the participation of Swedish capital. Nevertheless, our trade with Sweden still falls short of the level attained in the political dialogue. The idea of exchanging experience of social and economic development in the two countries—an idea put forward by the Swedish side—is being put into effect.

The Soviet Union maintains traditionally intensive relations with *Austria*. In 1986 and 1988, our country was visited by Austria's Prime Ministers, and in the summer of 1987 Nikolai Ryzhkov visited Austria. The Soviet Foreign Minister has repeatedly met with Foreign Minister Alois Mock of Austria to settle practical questions of bilateral relations and discuss current international problems. Substantive contacts between our countries relating to the European process are developing fruitfully. The two countries' parliaments maintain regular links on a reciprocal basis.

The contractual basis of relations has expanded considerably in recent years: about 10 agreements were signed from 1985 to 1989, and some further agreements are in preparation.

Relations in trade, the economy, science and technology have been developing on a long-term basis and with generally satisfactory results. Fifty-six joint ventures were registered; Austrian business shows a willingness to join in the construction and modernisation of Soviet industrial enterprises.

The Soviet Union is carrying on a frank, substantive exchange of opinion with the Austrian government in connection with plans for Austria's entry into the EEC. We draw the attention of the Austrian side to the need to search for ways of so solving its problems vis-à-vis the EEC as not to call the country's neutral status in question, any more than its obligations under the State Treaty.

The meeting which Mikhail Gorbachev had with a delegation of the Federal Council of *Switzerland* in Geneva in November 1985 spurred the development of our relations with that country. There have been contacts between various government agencies (the ministries of the interior, the defence ministries). Inter-parliamentary ties are developing; bilateral consultations between the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland have assumed a regular character. Our trade turnover with Switzerland in 1988 reached 1.2 billion rubles (against 884 million in 1987). We succeeded in increasing Soviet exports by 18 per cent. The two countries have signed 12 agreements on setting up joint ventures in our country with the participation of Swiss firms.

The Soviet Union maintains traditionally friendly relations with *Cyprus*. Our constructive position on the Cyprus question plays a notable positive role in this respect. The political dialogue has been making particularly vigorous progress; it has risen to the plane of exchanges of messages between the leaders of the two countries. Soviet-Cypriot high-level contacts are practically regular today. There have been repeated conversations between the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and Cyprus in New York; two conversations took place in Vienna and Paris in 1989. Consultations between the two foreign ministries now cover a considerably wider range of subjects.

We need to carry further our relations with *Malta*. The only political contact of significance effected in the two-odd years since the present government of the Nationalist Party took over was the visit which a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet paid to Malta in April 1988.

The Maltese are concerned about the inadequate fulfilment of the protocol on trade turnover (1987-1990) resulting from a reduction in our purchases in Malta.

A turning point in our cooperation with *Ireland* came with the meet-

ing between Mikhail Gorbachev and the leadership of that country in April 1989 in Shannon. During that meeting, it was stressed that we valued the opportunity to discuss global, European and bilateral problems and to lend dynamism to every aspect of Soviet-Irish relations.

Contacts with the Vatican have been active since 1985. They benefited from the positive response of the Roman Catholic Church to perestroika and from constructive, humanist elements in the Vatican's position on global problems of today.

On June 13 last, Mikhail Gorbachev received in the Kremlin the Secretary of State of the Vatican, Cardinal Agostino Kazaroli, who handed him a personal message from Pope John Paul II. Late in August, a reply was sent to the Pope. It touches on key problems of strengthening peace and justice on earth and expresses a readiness to carry forward contacts between the Soviet Union and the Vatican. An important advance in the dialogue with that state was Mikhail Gorbachev's meeting with the Pontiff during the Soviet leader's visit to Italy.

6. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Bilateral relations have become an indispensable item on the agenda of the Soviet-US dialogue, in particular at top level.

One of the positive factors for this was our renunciation of an excessive ideologisation of relations with the *United States*. Our reorientation to practical results and mutual benefit plus our increased efficiency and pragmatism evoked an adequate response from the American side.

American public opinion and many people on the American political scene actively supported a search for more constructive relations with the Soviet Union. Our perestroika became a fundamental factor in gradually raising the quality of the dialogue, in making it more and more constructive. The revolutionary changes taking place in the Soviet Union with the development of glasnost and the democratisation of Soviet society have a strong effect on sentiments in the United States. Taking shape in the Americans' minds is the new image of a more open and humane Soviet Union whose internal organisation no longer fits in with the stereotypes of earlier confrontational notions of a "totalitarian regime".

Contacts and exchanges covering a fairly wide range of issues have become more active; the mechanisms of joint commissions have begun operating under intergovernmental agreements. This has resulted in changing the general tenor of our talks with the United States on bilateral problems and ensured progress toward a series of new major accords.

The bilateral sphere of Soviet-US relations is the only sector unaffected by the "pause" that set in with the advent of a new administration following the 1988 presidential elections, that had to study the legacy of the previous administration and define its own approach to relations with the Soviet Union.

The meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State on September 22-23, 1989, enabled them to put it on record that both sides had a stake as in the past in quickening the pace of developing bilateral relations and in lending them a new quality. The documents signed by the two statesmen carried the number of intergovernmental agreements on bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States to 41, including 14 agreements signed after the autumn of 1985. Among them are the general agreement on contacts, exchanges and cooperation in science, technology, education, culture and other spheres; the agreement on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes; agreements on basic research, transportation science and technology, mutual relations in the fishing industry, search and rescue at sea, the development of a united radio navigation

system in the Northwest Pacific, combating illicit international drug trafficking as well as pollution in the Bering and Chuckchee Seas in emergencies, and so on. In September 1989, intergovernmental agreements were signed on reciprocal trips by inhabitants of the Bering Straits area and on a regional commission in the Bering Straits area as well as a joint statement on a common interpretation of standards of international law regulating the peaceful passage of ships through territorial waters.

Using contacts with the United States, we actively discuss such subjects as sea shipping and fishing; safety in air and sea transport; controlled thermonuclear fusion and safe nuclear power; exploration of the World Ocean; delimitation of areas in the Chuckchee and Bering Seas as well as in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, environmental protection in these seas and oceans; the prosecution of Nazi criminals; archives; problems of international law and consular administration; humanitarian issues and human rights; contacts and interchanges in science, culture, education, sports, and so on. Some relevant agreements may be signed on these issues.

Soviet-American cooperation since April 1985 has been geared more and more to the solution of global problems of universal significance. Transnational themes have become a separate section of the agenda of Soviet-American relations. It is a question of bilateral cooperation on problems of environmental protection, the climate of the globe, preserving the ozone layer of the Earth, exploring the Arctic and Antarctic areas, forecasting natural disasters and eliminating their effects, combating international terrorism, drug trafficking, terrible diseases like AIDS, drug addiction, alcoholism, and so on.

Cultural ties, contacts and exchanges between social, creative workers' and youth organisations as well as contacts between people are an appreciable component of bilateral relations today. Currently bilateral cooperation involves tens of thousands of Soviet and American citizens representing diverse social groups. The two sides have come in principle to terms on opening cultural and information centres in Washington and Moscow.

Direct scientific and technological cooperation between Soviet ministries and other government departments as well as scientific organisations and American private companies is fairly extensive and generally fruitful.

Still, not everything is going as it could have been expected, for occasionally the search for an accord drags on for years. The Washington administration's selective approach to promoting bilateral relations is not entirely a thing of the past.

It is obvious, however, that the effort to extend effective cooperation with the United States encounters certain difficulties on our part as well. First among these are the lack of interdepartmental coordination and of a proper innovative approach, which is coupled with many ill-advised and ill-founded "initiatives"; a belated response to offers from American partners; a decline in the level of expert evaluation and analysis which in many cases attends the process of reorganising ministries and other entities and moving new Soviet trading and economic agents into the international arena, and so on.

Trade and economic links remain a complicated sphere of our relations with the United States. In the years of confrontation, the American side imposed numerous restrictions, bans and embargoes. A gradual warming in this respect has been going on since 1985. The more offensive bans and embargoes, such as those on exports of oil and gas equipment or flights by Aeroflot liners, have been lifted. The previous administration gave a green light for so-called "peaceful trade" with the Soviet

Union. Nevertheless, many restrictions remain. They include primarily the denial of a most favoured nation status in trade, the ban on granting state credits and guarantees, export controls.

Debates over the issue of normalising the regime of trading and economic ties with the Soviet Union have become livelier of late. Our dynamic position, in particular on humanitarian issues, deprives conservative American advocates of a "tough line" of their "trump cards". The US Congress is seriously discussing the possibility of abolishing a number of discriminatory controls on trade with the Soviet Union. Over 30 joint ventures have been set up with American firms over the past two years; nearly 50 more projects are under discussion. In this context, joint business in the United States involving Soviet capital is gaining in potential.

Questions relating to the humanitarian aspect of international relations have for decades been among the most complex in Soviet-US relations. One of the main "evils" that we were constantly accused of was "violations of human rights"

At present the Soviet-American dialogue in the humanitarian sphere is calm and substantive. It is being conducted on a regular basis both at top level and at the level of ministers as well as at a working diplomatic level and at meetings between experts (lawyers, physicians, officials in charge of "entry and exit") and spokesmen for social organisations. In the course of these contacts, we inform the American side of the democratisation of every sphere of life in our country, the drafting of laws designed to extend individual rights and apply the standards of ensuring the citizen's rights and freedoms, measures for the preservation and advancement of the cultural heritage of Soviet peoples, and so on. Participants in the dialogue with American representatives and with representatives of our country raise specific humanitarian questions concerning the legal system and guarantees for human rights in the United States and their correspondence to international standards of legal defence.

Parliamentary contacts have become an important part of our political dialogue with the United States. This applies to both official delegations and visits by individual legislators. Since 1985, the Soviet and US parliamentarians have made over 30 trips under mutual agreements. This period has seen roughly every fifth Congressman visit the Soviet Union. During conversations between delegations and members of the Soviet leadership, the participants discussed in a constructive spirit the state and prospects of Soviet-American relations and the possibilities of extending relations in many areas. One indication of the change for the better which the Congressmen's position has undergone is an official resolution adopted by the Senate in connection with the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The resolution hails steps toward translating the democratic process in the Soviet Union into reality and expresses hope that the process will be continued. In turn, a group of People's Deputies of the USSR visited the United States early in August 1989 to study that country's experience of parliamentary activity.

The deep-rooted differences persisting between the Soviet Union and the United States on disarmament and the approach to the task of settling certain regional problems, in particular due to US interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, are mentioned in other sections of this survey. It will take a great deal of effort on both sides to overcome the difficulties still there.

Relations with *Canada* show a substantial improvement. The two countries have not only restored practically all that was achieved previously but was subsequently wound down when the international situation worsened; they have also made notable further progress. An end to

the past was put by the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Ottawa in September-October 1986.

Lately there has been growing evidence of an uptrend in the Canadians' confidence in our country and its innovative foreign policy, of an increased interest in cooperation with us on the international scene. The Canadian leadership declares explicitly in support of the perestroika processes in the Soviet Union and encourages Canadian business to develop cooperation with us.

Bilateral cooperation with Canadian traditional fields (agriculture, fishing, trading and economic links) is becoming closer. Cooperation in new spheres covers joint efforts in the Arctic, the prosecution of Nazi criminals, measures against drug trafficking. Contacts have been established between the two countries' Supreme Courts, and their law-enforcement bodies have begun cooperating.

The Soviet Union and Canada are mastering new forms of economic cooperation: they have set up over 20 joint ventures, some of them in the production sphere, and are preparing many projects, including major ones. We have renewed the protocol signed with the export development corporation on granting credits for deliveries of Canadian machinery and equipment to the USSR. A serious obstacle to a more balanced trade with Canada is still the limited potential of our economy, its structural lag and its inability to offer competitive products as well as the fact that we still need Canadian wheat.

We have signed five intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements on cooperation and are negotiating another ten: on cooperation in the Arctic, environmental protection, peaceful uses of space and nuclear power, combating drug trafficking, the protection of investments, and so on.

7. OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE ASIAN-PACIFIC REGION

Relations with *Japan*, our Far Eastern neighbour, have always been important to the Soviet Union. The role of that country in world politics—a role buttressed by a growing economic potential—has increased noticeably of late. This necessarily added to the significance of Soviet-Japanese relations, especially in the context of our Vladivostok initiatives.

Soviet policy towards Japan has invariably been aimed at promoting full-scale good-neighbour relations between the two countries and mutually beneficial cooperation on an equal footing in every sphere. This aspiration of ours did not always meet with a positive response in Japan—far from it. And it is chiefly for this reason that throughout the postwar period Soviet-Japanese relations have been following an uneven course marked by ups and downs, by progress alternating with stagnation and occasionally even with rolling back.

The perestroika process that unfolded in our foreign policy after April 1985 made it also possible to approach Soviet-Japanese relations from a non-standard standpoint, to reappraise the problems and difficulties existing in them. As a result, many irritants in these relations were removed or alleviated.

The political dialogue is visibly more active now. There have been meetings between Soviet leaders and Japanese statesmen and politicians. Reciprocal visits by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries and meetings between them during UN GA sessions and other international forums have become regular. There is an upturn in interparliamentary ties. All this provides conditions in which a more vigorous search can be carried on for constructive solutions to the problems existing in Soviet-Japanese relations. The official visit which Mikhail Gorbachev is expected

to pay to Japan may usher in a new stage in mutual relations and in the progress of our policy throughout the APR Preparations for the visit, the first-ever visit to Japan by the top leader of our country, are under way.

Some headway has been made in trading and economic ties. From what the 1988 balance indicates, Japan is again one of the three main trading partners of the Soviet Union among developed capitalist countries (it ranked fifth in 1987). In 1988, trade with Japan amounted to 3,135 million rubles (a 20.5 per cent increase over 1987). Exports went up 21.8 per cent, or to 1,184 million rubles, and imports increased to 1,951 million rubles, or by 19.8 per cent.

Some initial steps were taken towards cooperation in new forms. Twenty joint Soviet-Japanese ventures have been registered to date; they are to produce sawn lumber, build and run sporting and fitness facilities, process fish, reproduce salmon, and so on. Economic ties between the two countries were furthered by the implementation on a compensatory basis of economic cooperation projects for the working of natural resources in Siberia and the Far East. Three such projects are now being carried out: mining in the South Yakutian Coal-Fields, oil and gas prospecting on the shelf of Sakhalin and the second general agreement on wood chips. A promising line is the contacts that are being established to bring about trilateral Soviet-Japanese-Chinese economic cooperation.

A certain progress has been made in the area of scientific and technological links; cooperation in fishing is extensive by tradition; cultural and humanitarian exchanges are intensifying. The work of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees on economic cooperation has been put on a regular basis. However, Soviet-Japanese trading and economic relations are compounded by serious problems due to artificial discriminatory restrictions imposed by Japan and, on the other hand, to imbalances in trade and the raw-material slant of our exports. The establishment of joint ventures, especially in the Far East, still lags noticeably behind the overall trend.

Currently the efforts of the Soviet side are aimed at dealing with the problems we have listed, building on positive trends in Soviet-Japanese relations and lending ties between the two countries dimensions and a quality in keeping with the potentialities of both countries and with the political and economic realities of today's world.

In the political sphere of Soviet-Japanese relations there remain very difficult problems, the biggest of them being the absence of a peace treaty between the two countries. This situation is due to the attitude of Tokyo, which makes its consent to signing a treaty as well as to carrying Japanese-Soviet relations generally much further conditional on our satisfying Japan's claim to the South Kurile islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Habomai and Shikotan. Some steps were taken in the recent period to search for ways to draw the positions of the two sides on the issue of a peace treaty closer together. In addition to talks at the level of Foreign Ministers, a working group was set up on our initiative in December 1988 for a substantive discussion of the whole range of problems relating to a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan. The discussions held by the group showed that both sides are at one in realising the importance of signing a peace treaty, which would advance our relations considerably and raise them to a qualitatively new plane. However, we still disagree seriously over the boundary line between the USSR and Japan.

It is our view that the issue of signing a peace treaty that would also determine the boundary line must be settled with due regard to the outcome of World War II and to the realities that emerged in the Far

East after the war, on the basis of the wartime and postwar accords agreed by the Allied Powers and of the obligations assumed by Japan. We consider this attitude honest and fair and intend to abide by it. Regrettably, the Japanese side insists on its fundamentally different approach to the problem. It is to be hoped, however, that patient and well-intentioned discussion coupled with steady progress in bilateral relations will result in advancing to the conclusion of a peace treaty, thereby raising our relations to a fundamentally new level.

With due regard to the growing role of the ASEAN countries in regional and world political and economic processes and to the closeness of our positions on many international problems, steps were taken to impart dynamism to our relations with these countries. ASEAN members generally take a positive view of our initiatives in favour of a healthier situation in the Asia-Pacific region and link possibilities for expanding trade and economic ties with our country to perestroika in Soviet foreign economic activity. Over the past three or four years, we have succeeded in visibly intensifying our relations with all ASEAN countries except Brunei, with which diplomatic relations are still lacking.

We devote considerable attention to improving relations with *Indonesia*, a major world power, which holds fifth place in population and plays an increasing role in the solution of global and regional problems and in the Non-Aligned Movement. The Soviet-Indonesian dialogue is regular and intensive now. The visits paid by the Foreign Ministers and other politicians of the two countries from 1987 to 1989 created a proper atmosphere for a gradual extension of contacts in other fields. In 1985, we signed a protocol on establishing a mixed commission for trade and economic cooperation. President Suharto's official visit to the Soviet Union in September 1989 was a most important event. The statement on the foundations of friendly relations and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Indonesia that was signed during the visit laid the groundwork for raising Soviet-Indonesian relations to a new plane and for extending cooperation at international level, including cooperation in the APR. The visit offered additional opportunities to promote durable and mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation and intensify scientific and technological ties, including peaceful uses of space.

The Soviet-Indonesian summit meeting, which came after 25 years of estrangement, marked the complete normalisation of our relations with that dynamically developing country, which are rich in sound traditions.

Relations with *Thailand*, a state linked with our country by long-time historical and cultural bonds, have been going up. Thailand is living through a period of rapid economic modernisation. It commands a capacious and dynamic market for medium- and higher-standard industrial products. Thailand owes its place in our policy to the important role which it is playing in the effort for a Cambodian settlement. This subject was a priority in our contacts with Thailand (meaning the visit by Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda to Moscow in May 1988 and the visits exchanged by the two countries' Foreign Ministers in 1987); lately the leadership of that country has also taken an increasingly realistic and constructive approach to Cambodian affairs. Bangkok's desire to develop trading and economic ties with our country, borne out by a number of specific agreements, should be regarded as a positive trend.

We have intensified our ties with *Malaysia*, a fast-developing Asian country which is rapidly coming to the fore in the world in a number of fields, particularly trade in goods meeting up-to-date technological standards. The Malaysian leadership takes concrete steps and advances noteworthy initiatives with a view to bringing into being at both official

and unofficial level mechanisms for discussing current problems of cooperation and confidence-building between APR countries. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's official visit to the Soviet Union in 1987 provided real prerequisites for a gradual extension of bilateral relations in various fields. Special mention should be made of the role which some Union republics, in particular Uzbekistan and Estonia, have lately been playing in this process on their own initiative. In 1988 and 1989, Malaysia was visited by G. Kadyrov, Chairman of the UzSSR Council of Ministers and I. Toome, Chairman of the ESSR Council of Ministers, both of whom explored the possibilities of establishing direct ties with that country.

The advent of President Corazon Aquino to power led to visible progress in our relations with the *Philippines*, where there is a growing mood in favour of following a balanced line and diversifying foreign political ties. The visits exchanged by the two countries' Foreign Ministers in 1988 and 1989 prepared the ground for President Aquino's trip to the Soviet Union, planned to take place in 1990. We note with satisfaction that the expanding political dialogue between the two countries, one indication of which was the signing in 1988 of a Soviet-Philippine protocol on political consultations, is backed by both sides' effort in favour of growing trading, economic, scientific and other ties. This process is expected to be stimulated by agreements on economic and technological cooperation (1989) and the accord on appointing a Soviet-Philippine commission to take charge of it.

We have been working to intensify relations with *Singapore*, which a number of development indices place next to Japan. It is a major financial centre of the APR and a world port second in importance. Two Soviet-Singaporean shipping and fish-processing companies, Sinsov and Marissco, have been operating successfully in Singapore for many years. The profitableness of the Singapore subsidiary of Moscow Narodny Bank and the regional office of Aeroflot remains high enough. Preparations are going on for setting up several joint ventures. We are exploring the possibilities of purchasing consumer goods in Singapore on commercial credit terms. In the political sphere, however, the position of Singapore on a number of important issues having a direct bearing on relations with our country differs from ours, which indicates a need to step up the dialogue with that country, in particular on a high level.

While bilateral relations with ASEAN countries, primarily in the political sphere, have made progress, the process of establishing contacts between our country and ASEAN as an organisation is going slowly for the time being. There are reserves in this respect in, among other things, our economic activity in ASEAN countries.

Relations with Australia, New Zealand and some insular states in Oceania, which until recently were in effect terra incognita for our foreign policy, have scored visible advances. Our growing interest in countries of the region is prompted by the realisation that in view of global interdependence, the geographical remoteness is no longer a decisive obstacle to developing mutually beneficial contacts. Furthermore, we are sympathetic to the positive changes coming about in the policy of these states. Gaining ground in it are anti-militarist and anti-nuclear trends, which were demonstrated very clearly by the signing of the Rarotonga Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Thanks to the Soviet Union's signing and ratification of the protocols to this treaty as well as other foreign policy actions of ours, the distrust and wariness in regard to us that had struck strong root in these countries are giving way to a desire to do business with our country.

We have virtually rediscovered so important a partner in our policy towards the APR and a number of world problems as *Australia*. The Soviet-Australian political dialogue has attained a higher qualitative level. In March 1987, the Soviet Foreign Minister paid the first-ever visit to Australia, and late in the same year Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia visited the Soviet Union and had a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, which created prerequisites for our relations with Australia to enter a new stage. Contacts between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries during UN GA sessions and other international forums take place regularly, and ties between the two parliaments are more active now. The contractual foundations of Soviet-Australian relations are steadily expanding and growing stronger. The 1986-1989 period saw the signing of seven intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in agriculture, the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes, medicine and public health, and so on. A number of further agreements are ready for signing. We have set up a mechanism for bilateral political consultations. Trading and economic ties are expanding. Trade turnover in 1988 amounted to 376 million rubles (against 360 million in 1987). However, the balance of trade is unfavourable to us (with Soviet exports at 26 million rubles and imports at 350 million). Besides, we encounter serious difficulties in carrying out various projects in the area of trade and economic cooperation due to their extremely slow preparation by Soviet agencies.

Our relations with *New Zealand* show greater dynamism than before. Political contacts on diverse levels have become more regular. Late in 1988, the Soviet Union was visited by the then Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand, Palmer, who now heads that country's government. The visit led off an active Soviet-New Zealand dialogue on the level of the two countries' political leaderships and paved the way for intensifying bilateral relations in various fields. Meetings between the delegation heads of the two countries during UN GA sessions and political consultations between the two Foreign Ministries have become a regular practice. Ties are developing between the two parliaments as well as between parties. Trade between the Soviet Union and New Zealand is characterised by a persistent imbalance in favour of New Zealand. Trade turnover in 1988 rose to 112 million rubles (Soviet exports were worth 10 million rubles and imports, 102 million). Both sides are working on new forms of trade and economic cooperation. In 1989, we signed an agreement on the first joint venture on Soviet soil for the use of gas fuel in road transport.

We have begun establishing contacts with independent *insular states of Oceania*. There are nine such states, and we maintain diplomatic relations with six of them, relations with Vanuatu dating from 1986 and with Nauru, since 1987. Agreement has been reached on opening a Soviet Embassy in Papua-New Guinea; it will be our first diplomatic mission in the South Pacific.

The official visits which Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, is going to pay to Australia, Thailand, and Singapore late in January 1990 at the invitation of these countries' governments are expected to contribute in large measure to the development of our relations with APR countries and to the realisation of our Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk initiatives.

8. THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

While seeking stronger and qualitatively new ties with Arab countries (Syria, Iraq, Algeria, the PDRY and others) the Soviet Union has also been working to improve relations with those Middle East countries

where the relations have made little progress. Overall trade and economic cooperation, including that in the military sphere, exceeded 72 billion rubles and should reach 82 billion by the end of the current five-year period. And while relations with some countries are occasionally aggravated by the problem of repaying Soviet credits, there are clear prospects of a higher rate of mutual benefit to be achieved by improving the forms of doing business with our Arab partners who supply us with oil and consumer goods.

For nearly half a century now, the Soviet Union has maintained friendly relations with *Syria* in a variety of spheres, and recent years have witnessed increasingly trustful exchanges of opinions and political coordination at the UN and in other international forums. Economic, military, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation as well as cooperation in other fields has assumed a large scale. The search for a mutually acceptable and complete solution to the debt problem is continuing.

Soviet-Iraqi relations are characterised by a fairly high level of political and economic exchanges. As in the case of *Syria*, they are in the nature of a good tradition. Positive developments in them include summit meetings and consultations between the two countries' leaders, an impressive record of Soviet aid in carrying out important economic projects in Iraq, well-organised military cooperation, regular repayment on earlier Soviet credits. The Iraqi leadership is keen to extend cooperation with the Soviet Union and make it "exemplary". Bilateral cooperation bids fair to grow, especially now that Iraq is engaged in postwar rehabilitation.

Our relations with *Algeria* are friendly and manifold and may on the whole be described as mutually beneficial. President Chadli Bendjedid's visit to Moscow in March 1986 and his talks with the Soviet leadership created further incentives for bilateral cooperation and foreign policy coordination.

In view of the constructive political role of that major country in Arab affairs and the large volume of bilateral business ties with it, the Soviet Union seeks to build its relations with *Algeria* on a durable basis, an effort which meets with a positive response from the Algerian leadership.

In pursuing its political dialogue with *Libya*, the Soviet Union aims at achieving greater mutual understanding, primarily on issues relating to the situation in the Middle East and to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

At the same time, we are doing our best to extend the civilian line of our assistance to that country, which has been chiefly military so far. In the years since the two countries began cooperating, the Libyans have paid over 10 billion dollars in fulfilment of their obligations.

Our relations with *Egypt*, a leading Arab state, have fully returned to normal in recent years and are developing at a dynamic pace. Their entire structure in various fields has practically been restored and yields satisfactory results. The Soviet-Egyptian dialogue, which takes diverse forms, is gathering momentum.

The agreement on settling the debt owed to the Soviet Union which we signed with *Egypt* in March 1987 removed hurdles to the promotion of ties in trade and the economic field. We have signed a five-year agreement on cooperation in trade, the economy, science and technology. The two sides are working on the problem of expanding and modernising facilities built in *Egypt* earlier with our technological aid.

Normal diplomatic relations with *Persian Gulf* countries are gaining in scope. Cooperation with *Kuwait*, our long-time partner in the region, is developing. Soviet embassies were opened in the UAE, Oman and Qatar. Although the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia have no embassies in each other's capitals (they established diplomatic relations as far back as

1926, and these were never broken off), bilateral political contacts on key regional issues intensified in the second half of the eighties. These issues include Afghanistan, for Saudi Arabia maintains close links with certain groups of the armed Afghan opposition.

The Gulf countries, which have a stake in the region becoming a zone of peace, security and multilateral cooperation, may eventually become major business partners of our country.

The friendly relations existing between the Soviet Union and *both Yemeni states* are an important factor for greater stability and security in the *south of the Arabian Peninsula*. Soviet-North Yemeni relations, established in 1929, are steadily developing in spite of the serious changes that have occurred in the meantime in both North Yemen and the region as a whole.

Constructive political cooperation is going on between the Soviet Union and the PDRY. Our country has invariably rendered that state, which is friendly to us, assistance in economic development, personnel training, the strengthening of its defences.

Seeking normal mutual relations, the PDRY and YAR have reached agreement, not without help from us, on joint oil production in the border area. To this end a consortium is being set up that will involve French, Soviet, American and Kuwaiti companies and organisations.

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and *Israel* continued at meetings in Paris, Cairo and New York in 1989 the dialogue on the situation in the Middle East and an Arab-Israeli settlement. Working contacts take place between representatives of the two countries' Foreign Ministries. A Soviet and an Israeli consular groups are functioning in Tel Aviv and Moscow. Trips to Israel by members of Soviet public organisations are more frequent now. More and more Soviet and Israeli citizens travel to Israel and the Soviet Union to visit with relatives. All in all, there is a growing awareness in Israel, as far as we can say, that peace and security in the Middle East cannot be attained without the constructive role of the Soviet Union.

In maintaining relations with the Middle East states, the Soviet Union comes up against certain political and economic complexities. Some of these are an indirect consequence of the Arab states approaching the region's problems in their own way, a circumstance which also strains relations between themselves. This makes it imperative for us to pursue our line carefully, with due regard to all the diverse factors at work there.

Lately an important change has been brought about in relations between the Soviet Union and *Iran*. Our country has always stood for maintaining healthy good-neighbour relations with Iran irrespective of internal changes there. New political thinking gave an additional incentive to this approach of ours. Soviet-Iranian relations have been completely normalised by now. The end of the Iran-Iraq war and the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan played an important part in this.

Early in 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ruhollah Khomeini exchanged messages stating that both countries had an interest in extending and deepening bilateral relations. In recent years, constructive dialogue was furthered by repeated meetings at the level of the two countries' Foreign Ministers and their deputies. In the summer of 1989, A. A. Hashemi Rafsanjani paid an official visit to the Soviet Union during which a number of documents of fundamental importance were signed.

It was agreed that cooperation in trade, the economy, science and technology is to cover 15 spheres. Our country consented to resuming ties with Iran in the military area on the explicit understanding that this will not injure the security of third countries nor make for a change in the power balance in the region.

Worthy of special note is the fact that, in developing contacts with

Iran, the Soviet Union watches that country's policy towards Afghanistan and seeks to bring Iran into a political settlement of the Afghan problem.

Relations between the Soviet Union and *Afghanistan* in the recent period have been conditioned primarily by the situation resulting from the signing of the Geneva accords and the withdrawal of the Soviet force. While rendering our Afghan friends all the requisite aid and support, we see the important thing in carrying the peaceful political solution of the Afghan problem through to the end in a way meeting the interests of the Afghan people and taking account of the actual situation in Afghanistan.

It is important to point out the broad legal basis of bilateral relations provided initially by the 1921 treaty of friendship and the 1931 treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression. In 1978, the two countries signed a treaty of friendship, good-neighbour relations and cooperation. A factor of paramount importance is regular top-level contacts: recent years have seen five meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and President Najibullah; from 1987 to 1989, the Soviet Foreign Minister visited Afghanistan seven times, and Afghan heads of government visited the Soviet Union three times. Permanent intensive contacts are maintained at the level of the leaderships of the Foreign Ministries and between other governmental as well as non-governmental organisations. Interparliamentary ties are expanding. Cooperation in the form of cultural and scientific exchanges, personnel training and other activities is growing.

In 1988, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a long-term programme for economic and technological cooperation and trade for a period extending to the year 2000. It provides for aid in restoring, reconstructing or building a number of mining, processing, agricultural, power, transportation and other facilities of the Afghan economy and for more extensive bilateral trade. The new forms of bilateral economic relations in use in recent years, especially since Afghanistan proclaimed its policy of national reconciliation, are represented by joint ventures, co-operation with Afghan private capital, cross-border trade, direct links between some Union republics, regions and cities and Afghan provinces and cities. The Soviet Union takes an active part in the UN programme for providing emergency relief to Afghanistan.

At the same time, the continuing conflict in Afghanistan objectively limits the possibilities of traditional bilateral economic cooperation and compels our country to deliver substantial quantities of arms and ammunition.

We have gone on promoting relations with *Turkey*. In recent years, there is a better understanding in that country's leadership that closer good-neighbour relations and cooperation are the only correct line towards the Soviet Union. A NATO member ranking second in armed strength after the United States, Turkey proceeds with sufficient circumspection in situations threatening to involve it in conflict; it steers clear of further nuclear commitment, and in late years it has advocated the creation of a "peace zone" around its territory.

Soviet-Turkish meetings on various political levels show a considerable intensification. This has helped find common ground on many international problems, including the need to normalise Turkish-Bulgarian relations.

In the 1987-1989 period alone, trade turnover increased more than twofold and came close to one billion dollars. There are promising lines of cooperation with Turkey in construction, joint ventures, cross-border and coastal trade.

9. AFRICAN COUNTRIES SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

We have maintained fairly varied and durable friendly relations with countries of that vast African region. Politically they are based on a

common stake in building a more secure and durable world, doing away with vestiges of colonialism, eliminating racism and apartheid and establishing a new international economic order. There is a high degree of mutual understanding on the main items on the international agenda, which concern shifting the problem of disarmament to the area of practice. Solution of this problem is particularly important to the states of the region, for their development is going through a crucial period.

Soviet policy towards countries in *Tropical Africa* remains consistently well-intentioned; it is aimed at supporting their legitimate national aspirations with regard to reinforcing the foundations of independent statehood and improving the lives of their peoples. The Soviet Union is linked by treaties of friendship and cooperation with a number of countries which have proclaimed a socialist orientation: Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the Congo.

Within the framework of perestroika in Soviet foreign policy, we made a critical reappraisal of the experience of our work in the African sector. Our earlier approach had been superficial, with an unrealistic view of developments in Africa. We underestimated such factors as close links between the economies of African countries and the capitalist economy, the place held by the West in their social structures and hence the West's ability to influence them; nor did we take proper account of the tenacity of the traditional mode of production. Our analysis of social and political processes in these countries often followed simplistic patterns.

An exhaustive analysis of the processes going on in Tropical Africa enabled us to reappraise development problems typical of it in the post-colonial period. In striving to adapt to the requirements of the scientific and technological revolution, African states encounter serious difficulties many of which are rooted in both their colonial past and contemporary evolution.

In African countries, financial and economic problems and the crisis phenomena which they generate in the social sphere have assumed a particularly acute character. Nearly two thirds of the countries in the region are classed by the UN among the least developed in the world. By 1989, their foreign debt stood at 230 billion dollars (against 21 billion in 1976), or 70 per cent of their GDP. Twelve Tropical African countries are on the verge of insolvency, and another 18 have already become insolvent. In 1987, over 60 per cent of the population of the region lived below the poverty line against 43 per cent in the developing world as a whole. For a number of years past, the region, where the eighties saw about 100 million suffer periodically from hunger, has been racked by the worst food crisis. It can only meet 60 per cent of its food requirements, and in the next decade the shortage of grain there may increase to 100 million tons, for population growth is ahead of growth in agricultural production. Hence the world's highest rate of infant mortality. The UN Children's Fund estimates that it will reach the 50 million mark before the year 2000.

The disastrous situation in the region imperatively demanded raising aid for it to the plane of a humanitarian problem of universal significance. The issue of initiating extensive international cooperation to this end became relevant. The priority task was to settle decades-long regional conflicts. Progress in this direction helps pave the way for creating an atmosphere of peace, stability and security on the African continent, which needs it so badly for making fuller use of its immense natural resources.

The Soviet Union's African policy as a whole is becoming more specific, active and dynamic. As well as maintaining close ties with traditional partners, we have restored diplomatic relations with Côte d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic and Liberia and are normalising relations with Somalia and Chad. Our relations with Nigeria and Zaire, two

major African countries, are moving to a new level. Among the 46 African countries south of the Sahara, the only ones with which we have no diplomatic relations are South Africa, Malawi and Swaziland. Political cooperation is intensifying. Many leaders from Angola, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Zambia, Mali and other African countries have visited Moscow in the past four years. In 1988 and 1989, working contacts took place in Moscow with the Foreign Ministers of five Tropical African countries: Sao Tome and Principe, Bourkina Fasso, Burundi, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. Special envoys of the Soviet leadership and emissaries of the Soviet Foreign Ministry visit the continent more often than before. Exchanges of personal messages with the heads of African states are more frequent now. The political dialogue covers both regional and global problems.

The quality of relations between the Soviet Union and African countries that emerges in the course of contacts and joint practical steps is increasingly characterised by mutual confidence and a businesslike, concrete approach to problems. Experience has shown, however, that our mutual ties are still inadequate. We still owe a debt to many African leaders who would like to visit the Soviet Union and exchange views with us on current problems of their countries and the international community as a whole. The time has come for a tour of African countries by the Soviet Foreign Minister, particularly in view of the fact that so far no leader of our foreign policy department has crossed the equator in Africa. In reviewing our approach to African policy, we also discovered ample possibilities for constructive cooperation with the West, primarily in solving problems common to the whole continent and putting an end to military tensions. It emerged that as far as these problems are concerned, our interests do not necessarily clash with those of the United States or other Western countries and may even coincide to a certain extent. There are appreciable opportunities for joint or parallel effort for the good of the peoples of the continent.

Soviet political priorities in Africa include a restructuring of the whole range of trading, economic, technological and scientific ties, which show major shortcomings and miscalculations. As of now, the Soviet Union has agreements on economic, and scientific cooperation and trade with 37 African countries under which 348 major projects have been built while another 300 are at the stage of construction or designing. In compliance with relevant requests, we also assist some African countries in building up their armed forces. Our state credits to African countries total upwards of 10 billion rubles. Without making proper critical estimates, we based many cooperation projects on requests from African leaders motivated by considerations of prestige for the construction of industrial or infrastructural projects in the absence of an adequate economic basis in the country. The forms and methods of our economic effort in African countries also reflected shortcomings in our economic mechanism, such as a slow pace of construction, low technical standards, shortages of spare parts, and so on. As a consequence, the economic effect of our aid to the countries concerned turned out to be a great deal less than we had planned, and besides, a number of African countries contracted debts which they cannot repay. We have so far achieved little in restructuring our economic ties with Africa although in some countries we have reduced by mutual agreement the number of projects to be built with funds and assistance from the Soviet Union. To be sure, there are objective difficulties arising from the ongoing implementation of an economic reform in our country as well as from the critical financial and economic situation in African countries. But making itself felt at the same time is the wrong idea of Africa conceived by many of our economic agencies, which have a poor knowledge of the peculiarities of the African market, of the con-

ditions prevailing there, and still prefer to do business with some African countries through their offices in London and Paris. African countries account for less than two per cent of Soviet trade turnover.

Against the background of the deep crisis afflicting most Tropical African countries, environmental problems have gone from bad to worse; the population explosion expected in the region early in the next century is likely to have dangerous consequences. A further drift of African countries towards the precipice may occasion the gravest social upheavals in that part of the globe and affect the whole system of world economic ties, the East and the West alike. The Soviet Union considers it necessary to search for new opportunities of fostering international cooperation in order to help make Africa a strong regional component of a comprehensive international security system in its military political, economic, environmental and humanitarian dimensions.

10. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

For a fairly long period, our ties with Latin American countries remained on what may be called the periphery of our foreign policy activity. While we had established relations with many of them decades before, they were lacking in proper political and economic content and, indeed, were nominal in many cases. Besides, the many military regimes of the continent, which took their cue from the United States, refused to enter into contact with the Soviet Union.

Recent years have seen the Latin American continent travel a long road. Major countries like Argentina, Brazil or Mexico have come close in development to the leading countries of Western Europe. They have made notable progress in the aerospace industry, nuclear power, electronics, the chemical, pharmaceutical and other industries, which ensure scientific and technological progress. Information technology is coming rapidly into its own. However, many countries had to pay for this breakthrough by incurring a gigantic foreign debt. It is these countries that are in the "lead" as debtors, Brazil owing 120 billion dollars, Mexico 102 billion, and Argentina 60 billion.

Growing national consciousness and contradictions with the United States and other capitalist countries prompted an effort to achieve greater political independence. This process was also stimulated to a considerable degree by US policy in the region, which revealed the unwillingness of the United States to reckon with new realities. Such US actions as the invasion of Grenada in 1983, attempts to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government, 30 years of economic and political blockade against Cuba, support for Great Britain during that country's armed conflict with Argentina over the Falklands in 1982, pressure on Panama in 1989, and so on, had a sobering effect on Latin Americans.

The foreign policy of Latin American states benefits from democratisation processes in their internal politics, which are growing stronger as the national bourgeoisie consolidates its positions. In the eighties, the restoration of civilian forms of government is a fact in the majority of Latin American countries ruled earlier by military and totalitarian regimes.

The foreign political activity of many Latin American states went beyond their regional interests long ago. They are pursuing a dynamic policy in favour of peace, disarmament and the solution of pressing problems of humanity. Two of them, Mexico and Argentina, belong to the Group of Six, which advances initiatives in favour of nuclear disarmament.

The struggle for a political settlement in Central America led to the appearance of the "Latin American Eight": Mexico, Venezuela, Pa-

nama, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay. The states in this group give priority to issues of preserving peace in and outside the region, for a just solution to the problem of foreign debt, to the struggle against protectionism in international trade. They declare for maintaining a steadfast multilateral dialogue with socialist countries.

Soviet policy on the Latin American continent became considerably more active after 1985. Our new line takes account of the great political diversity of the states in the region and builds on coinciding or close positions on many global and regional problems. We are rediscovering Latin America, as it were. What is equally if not still more important is that Latin America, in turn, is discovering the Soviet Union in its new quality deriving from perestroika. All this has the most positive effect on the general atmosphere of our relations with Latin America.

Soviet-Latin American relations today are marked by a reciprocal aspiration to promote multiple ties and political and economic cooperation on a long-term basis with due regard to the real interests and possibilities of both the Soviet Union and its Latin American partners. We consider that the growing leverage of the continent in world affairs can and must be used for strengthening peace and furthering the cause of disarmament, for establishing much healthier international economic relations. It is also necessary to draw on the existing considerable potentialities for profitable cooperation with the more developed Latin American countries, which are trying to diversify their foreign economic ties.

Lately the political dialogue with leaders of the main countries of the continent on key issues of today has tended to become more and more regular. It helps extend the area of mutual understanding and of coinciding or close positions on international problems. In Latin American conditions, growing contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliaments of countries of the continent have played a definite role in the past and are bound to play an even bigger role in the period ahead.

Our relations were given a strong spur by the initiatives of Soviet diplomacy aimed at promoting a peaceful political settlement of the situation in Central America. Mikhail Gorbachev roused a wide response during his visit to Cuba in the summer of 1989 by stating that the Soviet Union was seeking no political or military strategic benefits in the Western Hemisphere and considered that the South American continent should not be used as an arena for East-West confrontation. Latin Americans are gradually discarding stereotyped notions of the Soviet Union as a power having a stake in destabilising the continent, undermining its traditional ties with other powers or trying to impose its development model. Hence a willingness to develop extensive links with the Soviet Union and Latin American leaders' interest in establishing personal contacts with the Soviet leadership. In the 1986-1988 period, for the first time ever, the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay visited the Soviet Union while the Soviet Foreign Minister visited these countries, as well as Mexico, likewise for the first time. The declaration on the principles of interaction for peace and international cooperation, signed in October 1988 with Brazil, that Latin American giant with which we have very satisfactory ties, reflects a qualitatively new phase in our relations with Latin American countries. Like the Delhi Declaration, it practically introduces the principles of new thinking into world affairs. Our new approach to international affairs is perceived as coinciding with the Latin American democratic forces' long-time tradition of allegiance to the fundamental principles of international law, political pluralism and non-interference.

Viewed against the background of successfully developing political cooperation, our trading and economic ties with the countries of the

hemisphere (with the exception of Cuba and Nicaragua) lag behind. The Soviet Union's share in the foreign trade of Latin American countries is slightly more than one per cent and tends to diminish. It involves mostly raw materials. Progress toward new forms of cooperation, in particular joint ventures, is slow primarily because we are ill-prepared for extensive application of such forms. But some initial steps have already been taken. Subsequent development will depend above all on the pace of perestroika in our economic mechanism. However, it is clear even now that we do not make proper use of opportunities to cooperate with the private sector or promote trading and economic ties at the level of provinces and other administrative divisions.

Nicaragua remains a close partner of our country in the region. For a number of years, we have been building relations with it with due regard to the priority need to help the Nicaraguans preserve the achievements of the Sandinista revolution. To this end we have been giving the government under Daniel Ortega the requisite diplomatic, military and material support. This support was one of the main factors enabling the Nicaraguan people to effectively defend their freedom and independence in the face of a serious threat from the United States, including that of outright armed intervention.

Bilateral relations in the foreign political sphere have been developing dynamically. They are particularly fruitful from the point of view of coordinating the two countries' effort to bring about a political settlement of the Central American conflict.*

The onset of a peaceful stage in the development of the Sandinista revolution and the prospect of providing conditions for the economic stabilisation of the country will make it possible to place Soviet-Nicaraguan trade and economic relations on a basis of mutual benefit.

By and large, Latin America's internal evolution and its formation as a component of the international community may be said to have entered a period of transition. This period is not simple, for it calls for the solution of difficult social and economic problems. However, the overall trend is perfectly obvious: the importance of the continent for the general state of world economic ties and its impact on international affairs are steadily growing. In these circumstances, it is undoubtedly in our interest to carry on the dynamic and realistic policy of promoting durable and mutually beneficial relations with the majority of Latin American countries, of extending various bilateral interchanges with them and cooperating with them more closely on the international scene.

Chapter VI. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The Soviet Union has traditionally supported the aims and principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. It actively maintains contacts with the movement itself and with many of its 102 member countries and with national liberation movements. Founded at the height of the cold war on the initiative of outstanding leaders of the time—Jawaharlal Nehru, Josip Broz Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah—the Non-Aligned Movement placed at the basis of its policy non-involvement in military political blocs, support for the inalienable right of peoples to national independence, an equal status for new states in the world community, respect for their sovereignty, resistance to pressure and interference in the affairs of non-aligned countries from without.

The Soviet Union welcomes the aspiration of non-aligned countries

* During the recent talks in Managua between the two countries' Foreign Ministers full Soviet support was declared for the Nicaraguan leadership's peaceful initiatives as well as our readiness to assist their implementation.

for active partnership in world affairs and is open to a continued fruitful dialogue and interaction with them.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Non-Aligned Movement have a solid basis and have traditionally been characterised by mutual understanding and solidarity expressing the closeness or coincidence of the approaches of socialist and non-aligned countries to important international problems. This is evident, in particular, at UN General Assembly sessions: the position of the non-aligned states, which command two thirds of the votes cast in the Assembly, on major international issues is similar to ours in the absolute majority of cases.

With the transition from confrontation to international dialogue, our relations with the NM gained appreciably in substance and acquired a new content. There is reason to speak of the extension of the basis for cooperation with them inasmuch as the fundamental politico-philosophical principles of new political thinking are consonant with the main postulates of the doctrine of non-alignment.

Within the framework of deideologising state-to-state relations, the Soviet Union also introduced new important elements into its approach to the Non-Aligned Movement. We declared that we recognised the NM as an independent factor in world politics and respected its principles and objectives. We stressed our support for the right of all countries and peoples to choose their path of development without interference from outside. Our country does not view the NM from the standpoint of East-West differences.

The Soviet Union's constructive approach to international affairs, its active diplomacy in favour of disarmament and an end to regional conflicts, its initiative aimed at solving the problem of the foreign debt of developing countries were generally received well among non-aligned countries. They hailed the Soviet-US agreement on signing the INF Treaty and declared for the early conclusion of an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of both powers. And they welcomed the Geneva accords on Afghanistan as an important incentive for a political settlement of conflicts in other regions as well.

It is beyond question that the NM can play a still bigger role in the settlement of regional conflicts. The Soviet Union expects in common with the NM that the favourable changes which have begun in the world will encompass international economic relations and help end the hardships of developing countries in this sphere.

Dialogue and cooperation between the Soviet Union and non-aligned countries of diverse political orientations have gained considerably in scope. Along with preserving and furthering our long-standing close ties with Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia and other members of the NM, we have made visible headway in contacts not only with great India but with states of a different social and political orientation. Indonesia, Argentina, Egypt, Malaysia and others. We maintained fruitful contacts on a regular basis with President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who held the post of Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement from 1986 to 1989. The prospects for cooperation with the newly-elected Chairman of the NM, Yugoslavia, are good.

At the same time, positive changes on the international scene and the resultant prospects for a further easing of confrontation between the two blocs plus the more distant outlook for their dissolution pose something of a challenge to the Non-Aligned Movement, inducing it to search actively for its place in the new historical context. All the signs are that the important thing in a renewed role for the NM will be the movement's renunciation of traditional forms of opposition to the great powers in favour of active and equal participation by non-aligned countries

in common with other influential forces in the solution of global problems facing humanity today.

Indicative in this respect is the fact that the NM is ever keener and increasingly concretises its position on the problems of nuclear disarmament and conventional arms reductions (Havana Non-Aligned forum, 1988), ensuring development through disarmament, strengthening international law and order (NM forum at The Hague, 1989), searching for new approaches to the restructuring of international economic relations on just democratic principles, resuming the constructive "North-South" dialogue between developed and developing countries.

The Ninth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which sat in Belgrade from September 4 to 7, 1989, reaffirmed the aspiration of the Non-Aligned Movement to join in initiating a broad international dialogue directed towards solving current problems of a universal nature. The decisions adopted in Belgrade are characterised by a manifestly less confrontational attitude to the great powers' policy; they are constructive and aim to evoke a favourable and wide-spread international response. Confirming the importance of efforts to bring about real disarmament and strengthen security, the Conference devoted special attention to the world economy and the situation of developing countries in it. For the first time in NM history, the Belgrade Conference passed special resolutions on protecting the environment and combating terrorism, state terrorism included, and drug trafficking. It stressed the importance of supporting the UN as a universal instrument of multilateral efforts to solve problems of peace, security and development.

The Belgrade Conference marked a new stage in the evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement; it made a rewarding contribution to positive trends emerging in the world.

The problems facing the Non-Aligned Movement have become part of the fabric of Soviet foreign policy in recent years. The Foreign Ministry has set up a new subdivision called the department of problems of the Non-Aligned Movement, thereby making it possible to establish useful contacts with many non-aligned countries and add purposiveness and efficiency to work in this direction. We enlist the assistance of noted Soviet scholars in evolving the main lines of cooperation with the Non-Aligned Movement.

The special attention which non-aligned countries pay to the search for ways to more effective economic growth lends increasing relevance to work on translating the concept of disarmament for development into reality and to a concretisation of the Soviet Union's propositions regarding solution of world economic problems, in particular the problem of underdevelopment, by the joint efforts of North and South, East and West. Increasing Soviet cooperation with the Non-Aligned Movement may become an important factor in establishing a new international order based on the supremacy of law, unqualified respect for the principle of free choice and the allotment of a proper place in the world community to all peoples, big and small alike.

Chapter VII. RESTRUCTURING THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

The application of the principles of the new thinking in Soviet foreign policy has shed light on the need to review many aspects of the activity of the diplomatic service. Radical steps have been required to invigorate, make more efficient and renew the negotiating positions and the quest for fresh approaches to the accumulated problems, to restructure the forms and methods of work of the diplomatic apparatus at the Centre and abroad, and to improve its internal structure.

The concrete tasks along this line and the ways of fulfilling these were thoroughly discussed at a conference of foreign-policy workers at

the USSR Foreign Ministry in May 1986. The conference was attended by CPSU CC General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who formulated the principally new tasks in foreign policy and diplomacy, its art and style, and gave clear-cut reference points for realising in practice the resolutions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU.

The practice of back-room discussions and decision-making is relegated to the past: all the key questions are discussed at weekly meetings of deputy ministers and decided at regular sittings of the Ministry's Collegium. Concrete measures are being taken to stimulate the initiative of all personnel, regardless of their post or rank.

A realistic approach to actual developments, the need for an in-depth and unbiased analysis of events and trends in international life, and the provision of objective information on the processes under way in the various countries and regions have become one of the primary demands of the Soviet diplomatic service. It is no secret that in the past the information coming in from Soviet missions was marred by an urge to tailor the facts of life to the established notions and stereotypes, or even to please the Centre with an embellished picture of events.

Soviet missions abroad will no longer have to play the role of mere performers of directives, as they were now and again inclined to regard themselves. They have to act vigorously in conducting our foreign policy and seeking promising forms of political dialogue, interaction and other forms of cooperation.

The information coming in from Soviet diplomatic and consular missions abroad is becoming more objective. Soviet representatives abroad have been providing franker information about the problems in relations with foreign countries, without trying to put any gloss on their reports about the responses to the USSR's foreign-policy initiatives and its internal processes. In-depth assessments and conclusions, and interesting and well-considered proposals have become more frequent. Our missions abroad have turned away from the preset ideological confrontation attitude to a search for points of contact with foreign partners.

For its part, the Centre has been providing constant orientations to Soviet embassies and missions on the key internal political acts in our country, helping them to avoid dramatisation of various internal processes and to impart confidence in official circles and public opinion in the host country concerning the successful advance of the perestroika. Soviet embassies and delegations have been regularly supplied with information about our foreign policy initiatives and with arguments in favour of their broad and convincing explanation.

Efforts to *consolidate the scientific foundations of foreign policy* and efficient use of the potential of Soviet and foreign science are a key line in the Foreign Ministry's activity in applying the new political thinking. A mechanism is being created for the all-round and scientific study of major foreign-policy measures. A Scientific Coordination Centre has been set up at the Ministry for the organisational backup of constant ties between diplomacy and science. Over the past four years, more than 60 discussions and conferences have been held with the participation of scientists on the most pressing problems of the USSR's foreign policy and international relations, but the Centre has yet to operate smoothly, and it will have to undertake more essential functions in the Ministry's activity.

The Ministry-wide scientific and practical conference, "The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy", in July 1988, was the major measure accumulating the scientific prognostication and practical lines of the Foreign Ministry's activity. It heard a report by the Minister and was attended by almost 1,000 persons, including many of our ambassadors, heads of other government agencies, prominent scientists,

workers in culture and journalists. It had a very broad response within the country and abroad as a living embodiment of the new thinking in foreign policy and diplomacy.

A system of economic-contract relations between the Ministry and research centres, with ever wider inclusion of scientists in Soviet official delegations at negotiations began to be introduced in 1989. The foreign ministries and research centres of the Union Republics are being involved in the cooperation between diplomacy and science. Good results have come from the first few systematic contacts with foreign science. At the same time, there is yet inadequate involvement in the cooperation with science of Soviet institutions abroad, and the Ministry is short of funds for financing economic-contract research projects. Additional reserves lie in broader participation by diplomatists themselves in research projects. The potential of several hundred doctors and candidates of science working at the Ministry is still being used inadequately.

Measures are being taken to *improve the structure* of the Central Apparatus and foreign establishments of the USSR Foreign Ministry in accordance with the tasks advanced by the perestroika. Independent subdivisions have been set up to handle matters of disarmament, humanitarian cooperation and human rights, questions of cooperation and security in Europe, cooperation with the Non-Aligned Movement and cultural cooperation, and a special subdivision on international scientific and technical cooperation. Some of the territorial units of the Ministry have been and will be amalgamated. The Evaluations and Planning Directorate, the Information Department, the Department of International Economic Relations and the International Law Department have been reorganised in accordance with present requirements. Economic and law units have been set up under all the directorates and departments of the Ministry. The posts of envoy counsellors on economic matters have been instituted at some embassies for the first time.

The Department on Liaison with the USSR Supreme Soviet in Inter-parliamentary Cooperation, and the Department for the Union Republics of the USSR were set up at the Ministry in 1989.

The juridical foundations of the work of the Foreign Ministry and its institutions abroad are being consolidated. Statutes on the Ambassador and the Embassy of the USSR have been adopted, and other political norms are being formulated. The adoption of a USSR law on the diplomatic service is a question now coming up on the agenda.

Effective dispatch of diplomatic business is in need of modern information technology. Work has been started to introduce automated data processing. A decision has been taken to set up a sectoral automated system of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

The tasks in restructuring the country's internal and foreign policy called for new approaches to the *involvement of the Union Republics* in formulating and implementing the foreign policy of the USSR. Following a meeting of the foreign ministers of the republics in the summer of 1987, a number of measures were taken to vest the Republican foreign ministries with broader powers. The meeting helped to enhance the authority of the Republican ministries and gave an impetus to their more vigorous activity. There has been some improvement in the supply of information to the foreign ministers of the Union Republics from USSR Foreign Ministry subdivisions and Soviet institutions abroad, but this work calls for further concern and attention. The holding of scientific and practical conferences on international problems in the Republics is being arranged.

Measures are being taken—up to now inadequate ones—to extend the practice of dispatching officers of the foreign ministries of the Republics for long terms of service, for short missions and for training at Soviet missions abroad. More representatives of the Republics are being in-

cluded in Union delegations taking part in negotiations and consultations. The Ministry is faced with basically new tasks in coordinating the foreign-policy activity of the Union Republics in view of the restructuring of the federative system of the Soviet state, and this great effort will call for a sense of responsibility on every side.

The Ministry is engaged in important *restructuring of its personnel system*, and steps have been taken to renew and improve the officer corps and to raise the professional skills of Soviet diplomatists.

Seventy-five per cent of the Ministry's top echelon has been renewed: 9 new deputy ministers have been appointed, and three-quarters of the ambassadors and two-thirds of the consuls-general have been replaced. Key sectors in the Ministry and its institutions abroad are now headed mainly by competent and usually younger officers with greater initiative, but this work will, of course, be continued on a regular basis and with the utmost exactingness.

Official certification of diplomatic officers has been introduced for the purpose of verifying and further checking their professional standards. Its purpose is mainly one of education and self-discipline. The practice of bidding for vacant diplomatic posts has been tried out. Among those who are entitled to take part in these competitions are workers at other institutions and organisations, apart from professional diplomats. Tough and purposeful action is being taken to eradicate favouritism. There is a strict approach to the once widespread nepotism, but there is no going to extremes, with the emphasis on assessing the business, political and moral qualities of every individual worker.

As of July 1, 1989, there were 3,737 personnel at the Central Apparatus of the USSR Foreign Ministry, with roughly one-half of them diplomatic officers, and the rest office workers and administrative and technical personnel; 9,038 persons work at the Ministry's institutions abroad,* and 40 per cent of them are diplomatic officers. The greater volume of work has not led to an increase in staffs.

Among those who work at the USSR Foreign Ministry are representatives of 40 nations and nationalities, including such small ones as the Uigurs, Adygeis, Dungsans, and Kumyks. It is planned to enlarge the national make-up of the personnel in the light of their political and professional merits. There are 101 women in diplomatic posts at the Ministry (at the Central Apparatus and abroad). A drive is on to recruit more women for diplomatic work (more of them are being enrolled at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations). In the recent period, appointments to leading diplomatic posts included that of Zoya Novozhilova as USSR Ambassador to Switzerland, and R. Otunbayeva as a member of the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium (executive secretary of the USSR Commission for UNESCO affairs). That is, of course, not much for the time being, for women must be more significantly represented at the higher rungs of Soviet diplomacy.

Over the past several years, the diplomatic composition of the Ministry has been markedly rejuvenated: 78.2 per cent of diplomatic officers are under the age of 50 years, while those of pension age (60 years and over) do not add up to more than three per cent of the total. The age of those who head subdivisions at the Central Apparatus averages 56.7 years, and that of Soviet ambassadors, 57.5 years. The average age of ambassadors appointed in 1988 is 52 years.

A total of 519 diplomats have the highest diplomatic ranks (Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, First and Second Class).

* The USSR has 206 institutions abroad: 124 embassies, 6 permanent missions at international organisations, 68 consulates-general, 6 consulates, and 2 consular agencies.

All our diplomatists have a higher education. They are mainly graduates of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations and the Diplomatic Academy; 59 per cent of those who work at the USSR Foreign Ministry have a knowledge of two foreign languages, and 14 per cent, of three or more languages. Almost 700 diplomatic officers have scientific degrees of Candidate or Doctor of Sciences.

Roughly 200 new operational diplomatic workers are taken on by the USSR Foreign Ministry every year, most of them graduates of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations and the Diplomatic Academy, and an equal number of diplomatists stop working at the ministry in view of retirement, transfer to other work, or for other reasons.

The Ministry pursues a policy of combining the use of young personnel and experienced high-skilled officers, including pensioners. A group for work with veterans was set up in 1989 under the Central Personnel Directorate and academic institutions.

The Council of Veterans, which has about 1,200 members, and the Young Specialists Council have been of some help in solving the problems which arise in the Foreign Ministry's practical activity.

The functions of the USSR Foreign Ministry in consolidating the Soviet Union's personnel positions in international organisations have been enhanced. There is a change in the criteria of efficiency, and a switch from mainly quantitative assessments to purposeful activity in achieving real and high-quality results. Much is being done to bring out and sum up the problems which are of concern to Soviet specialists in international organisations.

Meanwhile, the Inter-departmental Commission set up under the USSR Foreign Ministry has so far failed to bring about any radical changes in the system of training and advancement to international organisations of truly high-skilled, competitive specialists from the USSR with a knowledge of foreign languages. To this day we often find these posts filled by people with inadequate competence and now and again even with an inadequately developed sense of civic responsibility or with a total lack of moral scruple. The status of Soviet personnel in international organisations still presents some outstanding problems.

Considerable efforts are being made to restructure the academic institutions under the USSR Foreign Ministry. Enrollment at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations has become open and socially fair, and it helps to bring in more young people from the country's various regions. Citizens from 14 socialist and developing countries are also enrolled at the institute. The establishment of an extension training department at the Diplomatic Academy marks the completion of a coherent system for raising professional skills.

However, not all the personnel problems lend themselves to rapid solution. The rejuvenation and appointment of fitting cadres is a process that is still not rapid enough. There is no substantial advance in solving the problem of interregional rotation of personnel, and this is having a serious effect on the interests of diplomats stationed in hard-climate regions. The Collegium has made a special examination of the whole problem of improving the working and living conditions of personnel stationed in countries with a hard climate and a complicated political and military situation. After all, many Soviet diplomats have to work in a situation of raging war.

A number of measures have been taken to improve the *consular service*, including high-level personnel changes. A conference of consular officers, held in December 1988 for the first time in the history of the USSR Foreign Ministry, laid down the main lines for radically improving consular work.

Ensuring the interests of Soviet citizens abroad has pride of place in the work of the consular service. Apart from those who work on long-term and short-term business trips, almost 150,000 Soviet citizens now permanently live abroad. In 1989, they were enabled, for the first time, to take part in the elections of People's Deputies of the USSR.

Conclusions have been drawn from Soviet mass media criticism of some cases in which inadequate attention was given by consular institutions to Soviet citizens temporarily going abroad. Steps have been taken to simplify the exit of Soviet citizens from the USSR for official and personal reasons, and agreements have been concluded with a number of countries to shorten the period in which these applications are considered and to ease visa formalities.

Ties with organisations of compatriots have been extended, and their interest in the perestroika processes in the Soviet Union, in the study of their mother tongue and events in our country is being more fully satisfied. For them, formalities for entry into the USSR have been simplified.

A significant step in the consular relations area was the USSR's adherence in 1989 to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. It extended the USSR's consular relations with foreign states and opened up fresh potentialities for wide contacts between people.

The perestroika of the Soviet Union's foreign-policy activity has had an influence on Soviet *diplomatic protocol*, in the sense that it has become less pompous than it was in the past, with an eye to providing the best conditions for the business part of state-level visits. Reception practices have been simplified.

The Reception-Room and the Letters Group of the USSR Foreign Ministry have been working more vigorously: in the course of 1988, the Reception-Room had almost 13,000 visits from Soviet and foreign citizens, and more than 15,000 letters and applications were received.

Steps have been taken to cut the ruble and foreign-exchange cost of maintaining the Ministry and its missions abroad. These economies (without resort to further appropriations) have made it possible to open a Soviet embassy in the United Arab Emirates and a Consulate-General in Munich, while embassies are being instituted at Qatar and Papua New Guinea.

Since 1986, the Ministry has been fulfilling, according to plan, the government programme for building its own premises for its missions abroad.

In view of the fact that for a long time there was much delay in tackling these matters, many Soviet missions abroad are in need of better premises, because their present ones fall short of meeting standards of representation and security requirements, while their technical state fails to provide normal conditions for diplomatic work. The need to lease premises abroad results in over-spending of foreign-exchange funds. The facilities at schools for the children of Soviet personnel working abroad are also in an unsatisfactory state.

The cost of maintaining the institutions abroad and the Central Apparatus come to 2126 million rubles, including 117.4 million foreign-exchange rubles. In addition, the building of Soviet embassies abroad, the maintenance of institutions under the USSR Foreign Ministry (Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Diplomatic Academy, schools, health care, etc.) cost 50.8 million rubles, including 33.6 million foreign-exchange rubles. The total is, therefore, 263.4 million rubles, including 151.0 million foreign-exchange rubles.

Let us note by way of comparison that appropriations for the activity of the US State Department in the current fiscal year add up to \$2.3 billion.

One should also bear in mind that the USSR Foreign Ministry has an annual income of 45 million foreign-exchange rubles, mainly from its consular services, and the amount has been steadily growing from consular fees.

Outlays on the Central Apparatus are 25.0 million, and were this year reduced by 1.5 million.

One should bear in mind, however, that the maintenance costs of the Central Apparatus include the maintenance of coding personnel, consular administration, and the diplomatic courier service, which, apart from the Foreign Ministry, cater for all the other ministries as well.

The Ministry leadership has been giving much attention to the thrifty and rational spending of the appropriated budget funds, but one should draw attention to the fact that Soviet diplomacy is frequently forced to work abroad in conditions which do not accord with the prestige of a great power. Service premises are often poorly adapted to normal work and many officials have to live in straitened circumstances.

One could say on the whole, however, that there is an ever more pronounced spirit of democracy, free comparison of views, collegiality, a higher sense of responsibility, and an organic comprehension of the party's vanguard role in the country's entire internal and foreign-policy activity in the work of Foreign Ministry personnel at the Centre, at the embassies, and at negotiation forums. In short, there is no sign of the perestroika waning along any of the lines in the work of the Ministry: the diplomatic, the political and social, the organisational, and the personnel areas.

Chapter VIII. FOREIGN POLICY AND SOVIET PUBLIC OPINION

The perestroika urges the need to study and take account of public opinion in the country with respect to foreign-policy problems as well, the need to make a daily effort in explaining the USSR's every important step in the international arena. Glasnost and organic ties with public opinion are being established in the diplomatic service.

The forms and methods of the USSR Foreign Ministry's work have been adjusted for a broader involvement of the public in this process. A special subdivision was set up in 1986 with the main task of helping Soviet social and international democratic organisations in their activity.

Foreign policy has been made more open by the arrangement and holding in Moscow of such major political and public acts as the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity, the World Congress of Women, the session of the Council for Cooperation Between Former Heads of Government, celebrations of the millennium of Christianity in Russia, etc., the formation and activity of a number of new Soviet and international public bodies, notably, the International Fund for Mankind's Survival and Development, the Soviet Cultural Fund, the V. I. Lenin Children's Fund, and others.

The USSR Foreign Ministry has been promoting the extension of international ties of Soviet non-governmental organisations on the assumption that *people's diplomacy* has an important role to play in surmounting the cold war stereotypes, dispelling the image of the enemy, establishing an atmosphere of trust, filling international relations with a moral and humanistic content, and asserting the ideals of socialism.

Among the Foreign Ministry's practices is the regular holding of meetings with representatives of Soviet public bodies to discuss practical matters and give them expert consultative assistance. This has also affected the religious associations in our country on matters with a foreign-policy dimension.

One could say, on the whole, that people's diplomacy is becoming an active partner of official diplomacy.

The Press Centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry has been working on a new basis since May 1985; at the Centre, leading officers of the Foreign Ministry and other Soviet organisations hold regular press conferences and briefings on current international problems, so being able not only to inform world public opinion, but also to respond without delay to meaningful international news reports. Meetings have also been held at the Press Centre with the participation of leaders of the Soviet state, people's deputies of the USSR, and prominent public and political leaders of the USSR and other countries. From May 1985 to August 1989, there were 171 press conferences and 453 briefings, always attended by Soviet journalists and by the 560 foreign journalists accredited in Moscow from 64 countries (in 1984, there were 353 foreign correspondents in Moscow).

In the past two years the *International Affairs* journal has acquired the authority of a foreign-policy publication and has become a forum for creative discussions of what are sometimes controversial issues, helping to muster the intellectual potential of professional diplomats and members of the public in solving perestroika problems in foreign policy.

Since August 1987, the USSR Foreign Ministry has been issuing an official periodical, *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del* whose purpose is to keep the public informed of the main lines of diplomatic activity, to present official documents on current issues, and also materials from the archives.

A centre for the study of Soviet public opinion on Soviet foreign-policy problems has been set up at the USSR Foreign Ministry with the assistance of the Institute for Sociological Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The centre has carried out a number of studies which have been used in practical work on such subjects as nuclear disarmament and the ending of nuclear tests, the role of the United Nations in strengthening peace and security, the priorities of Soviet foreign policy, Soviet-US and Soviet-Japanese relations at the present stage, the Soviet Union and Western Europe, and regional conflicts.

While sociological studies in foreign policy are only at their beginnings, the important thing is that a mechanism is being set up, on the one hand, to correlate and take account of public opinion in planning foreign-policy acts, and on the other, to foster and form public opinion. Open public political hearings are being introduced into the practice of the USSR Foreign Ministry, and there is a proposal to set up a popular club of diplomacies.

Researchers are being given greater access to the *Ministry's archives*. In the first half of 1989, 136 researchers were working at the Archives of the Foreign Policy of the USSR (36 in 1986, and 50 in 1987), including researchers from Bulgaria, the GDR, Denmark, Yugoslavia, and other countries.

Restrictions on access to the archives of Russia's foreign policy have been lifted, and there are now almost 250 scientists working at the Archives, including over 40 foreigners. Within three years, the USSR Foreign Ministry has declassified something like 10,000 archive files, and a proposal has been put before the government on automatically declassifying foreign-policy archive documents following the expiry of a fixed period of time (as is the practice in other countries). A volume of archive documents on relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1939 and 1940, and other documents are being prepared for publication. The study and opening up of archives help to restore the good name of workers of the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs who were subjected to unlawful repression in the 1930s, 1940s, and in the early 1950s. Up to

now, the names of 113 leading workers of the diplomatic and consular service who were subjected to unlawful repression have been established, among them 101 diplomats have already been rehabilitated along state and party lines.

Diplomatic members of the USSR Foreign Ministry make regular contributions to the press and deliver lectures to Soviet public audiences. The practice has been introduced of Soviet ambassadors, when on visits to the USSR, travelling to various cities to hold public meetings.

The USSR Foreign Ministry will continue to conduct the line of expanding contacts with the Soviet public and to regard these contacts as a reliable way of directly tying in foreign-policy activity with the Soviet people's interests.

Chapter IX. THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE WITHIN THE RULE-OF-LAW STATE SYSTEM. THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET AND THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY

The perestroika and the creation of a rule-of-law socialist state open up possibilities while requiring the establishment of a qualitatively new type of cooperation between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Up to now, this cooperation came down mainly to such matters as ratification by the Supreme Soviet of international treaties concluded by the Soviet Union, and assistance by the Ministry to the country's supreme legislative body in the maintenance of its foreign relations. That is no longer enough. The old forms of cooperation must be given a new and more profound content. There will also be a need for qualitatively renewing and expanding the forms and methods of cooperation in the light of the status of the legislative power and the executive agencies within the rule-of-law state system. The relevant considerations have been put before the International Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet have laid the foundations of a constitutional-powers mechanism for discussing and adopting the key foreign-policy decisions based on the paramount role of the representative organs of power, which have the duty of determining the fundamental parameters of the country's foreign-policy course—just as the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR did in its Decree on the main lines of internal and foreign policy.

The USSR Foreign Ministry, an organ of executive power, has the responsibility of working out and implementing, upon due approval, the practical steps and initiatives which embody in day-to-day affairs the function of safeguarding the country's foreign-policy interests, the USSR's representation in the international arena, the conclusion of international treaties and agreements, and their implementation. The Ministry, which has a collective of skilled experts, has the task of studying and analysing the international situation and the foreign policy of other states for the purpose of identifying in due time all the trends that could have an effect on the country's external position and on the conditions of its economic and social development. The whole of this activity proceeds within the framework of the resolutions passed by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet in accordance with the Soviet Constitution. It goes without saying that the Ministry does not exercise these functions on its own. All the main diplomatic initiatives and acts, and the formulation of positions on the most important international problems are effected under the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government collegially,

together with the Ministry of Defence, the State Security Committee, and other organisations and ministries involved in foreign policy and external economic activity, before these initiatives and acts go through the higher echelons of legislative and executive power. At this stage, there are often sharp discussions and formulation of alternative approaches, with the discussions always conducted in a businesslike, party spirit.

Within the framework of the USSR Constitution, the Foreign Ministry has the duty of taking part in the government's presentation to the USSR Supreme Soviet of foreign-policy issues that are of vital significance for the state and the Soviet people. The decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet on these issues create reliable guarantees that could totally rule out in the future any unpublicised adoption of foreign-policy decisions on matters of basic importance. This means, in particular, that such important decisions as the use of contingents of the USSR Armed Forces outside the borders of the national territory in the event of there being a need to fulfil international treaty obligations in maintaining peace and security will in the future be discussed by the organs of representative power, and the USSR Foreign Ministry will have the duty of presenting its conclusion both on the existing situation and on the prospects for its evolution, something that will enable the deputies to weigh all the consequences. A situation like the Afghan one will never be repeated again.

Foreign Ministry assistance in the exercise of legislative functions by the Supreme Soviet and its organs in international activity is becoming an important line, especially in connection with the drafting of the country's new Fundamental Law and the need to review and express in more concrete forms some of the provisions bearing on the external functions of the Soviet state.

The USSR Foreign Ministry is prepared to take part in the work of the Supreme Soviet and its International Affairs Committee in ensuring scrupulous fulfilment of the international treaties and agreements being concluded. The function of monitoring observance of such agreements is assigned to the USSR Foreign Ministry by effective legislation. Its cooperation with the Supreme Soviet in this area may assume various forms, including participation in hearings before the International Affairs Committee, preparation of reports, special studies and papers, etc. The Ministry is prepared for such work and is capable of providing, whenever necessary, the required expertise and consultations in helping to assess any measures which are being planned or implemented.

It is most important to have the USSR's international obligations taken into account in due time in the adoption of draft laws, in the approval of various programmes, and in the appropriation of budget funds. We would have had no such problem as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar station if this matter had been considered by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Foreign Ministry allowed to express its view that this step related to the country's obligations under the ABM Treaty—before the funds for its construction had been appropriated.

In what concerns control over the fulfilment of international obligations, concrete plans have already been drawn up on a broad spectrum of matters, including disarmament, ecology, and humanitarian cooperation. In this context, the International Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet has planned for the Foreign Ministry's participation in its control activity with respect to the fulfilment of the USSR's international commitments. Open public hearings on this score were held in September of this year.

Measures to accord internal laws with international norms and obligations must also become a component part of our overall effort along this line. This work is still far from completion, and here the legislative

power will undoubtedly have the final say. The Ministry, for its part, is prepared to provide the necessary expertise and consultations in assisting the work of the Supreme Soviet agencies concerned in this area.

It must be a matter of course for statements to be made at sittings of the Supreme Soviet and its agencies at their request by the Minister, his deputies, and other responsible officers of the Ministry on various matters of the international activity of the state. The Foreign Ministry has made it known to the diplomatic representatives of the USSR in foreign countries and at international organisations about the intention of the people's deputies to institute regular hearings before the International Affairs Committee with their participation.

The question of people's deputies being included in Soviet delegations to keep in touch with the course of negotiations is also being considered in practical terms. In November, a delegation of the International Affairs Committee took part in the work of the session of the UN General Assembly.

Together with the Secretariat of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Foreign Ministry plans to arrange information work with the deputy corps and to hold regular briefings for deputies on pressing foreign-policy problems, on the results of state visits, and on the most important international developments.

In August 1989, the USSR Foreign Ministry set up a new subdivision, the Department for Ties with the Supreme Soviet and for Inter-parliamentary Cooperation, whose mission is to keep in touch with the supreme organs of state power and their apparatus, and to promote wider contacts with the deputy corps. It is within the competence of the Department to prepare answers to deputies' questions, to arrange the Ministry's participation in hearings held by the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Committees, and discussions, whenever necessary, of candidates for the post of ambassador and Soviet representative, and to provide information to the Supreme Soviet's committees and the commissions of its chambers concerned with various aspects of international relations. Primary attention is to be given to secure response without delay to the matters being raised in the course of sittings of the supreme organs of state power, together with the relevant analytical work and all-round and efficient feedback connections in order to enable the Ministry's activity to take full account of the views expressed by the people's deputies.

PAASIKIVI

(Continued from page 233)

known as the Paasikivi Line. Yet no one could discount the importance of the personal factor. He was at all times guided by a long view of Finland's national interest without being swayed by shifting international currents or by the desire to seek personal popularity. He provided one more essential element for success—statesmanship.

¹ *Paasikiven Päiväkirjat 1944-56*. "Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtio", Helsinki, 1985, 1986.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND CONVERSION

Yevgeni ADAMOV

A FEW MONTHS AGO I had occasion at an international conference to explain to a British colleague of mine the contradictory processes under way in our economic life. Neither of us was a trained economist, and we even had some difficulty with the terminology involved, but the inquiring mind of the professor (who was also a Justice of the Peace) helped to clear every hurdle. In an effort to find an analogy to his notion of the curious combination of the administrative and self-regulation principles in the structure of our economic management, the professor recalled that his island country was the only one in Europe which had a left-hand drive on its motorways. Time and again there are calls to harmonise the driving rules with the rest of the world. Meanwhile, the most circumspect reformers propose to start with an experiment by running buses alone on the right-hand side of the street. We did not discuss conversion, but I should certainly hate to see the role of such a bus in store for it.

I expect not only readers abroad but also many of my own compatriots to regard if not as absurd, then, at any rate, as not so obvious my assertion that a mere transfer of funds between budget items, say, the fabrication of nuclear warheads and medical services, may not quite solve the problem of public health care. Indeed, many of those who stood as candidates for the Congress of People's Deputies had as a key part of their programme the proposal to cut defence spending as the most realistic source for meeting social wants, and such programmes were clearly most popular, both as peace-making and helping to lower the level of armed confrontation, and as pointing out the way for the fastest solution of acute social problems. It is a pity that, for all their attractiveness, these proposals were not the fruit of solid reflection, to put it mildly.

The state of the economy in general and of its consumer sector, in particular, will continue making it utterly impossible to try to compensate a real saturation of the market with ideological twaddle. That is evidently where one should look for the roots of the purely administrative decisions from which conversion has up to now sprouted. I can well imagine the amazed reader asking what do you mean administrative? Many believe that conversion is linked to the very gist of the perestroika and is just short of being its economic foundation. But the hard truth is that while conversion and economic perestroika certainly come from one and the same family, conversion and the self-regulating mechanisms of the economy are not even kith or kin.

When the administrative system, within whose entrails conversion originated, got down to its actual implementation, one could have assumed,

at any rate, that within these same entrails the attendant problems had been analysed and the solutions duly weighed and thoroughly considered, even if in the narrow mould of the old traditional behind-the-closed-doors policy. It is true that there arises the problem of making a choice between two rather different views of the rough parity between the two opposing blocs: either it has been achieved with excess in some types of armaments on our part; or, if the parity is a genuine one, we are, in effect, engaged in unilateral disarmament.

What other motivations apart from quick political dividends, did the candidates for people's deputies have in proposing defence expenditure cuts? Cuts in what? Cuts in what none of the people knew except those who, by virtue of our hereditary credulity, believed that defence spending came to 20 billion rubles. Let me risk making a heretical statement: even the incumbent government does not know exactly the amount of these expenditures, and not only because of the notorious secrecy, which often protected individual and group interests instead of the true interests of the state. Apart for the ways invented by the state to conceal expenditures, there is bound to be all kinds of departmental sleight of hand, together with the blemishes of statistics (double counting) and our absolute inability to take account of the effects of technological innovations.

These preconceptions, which are rooted in the solicitous concern of the bureaucracy to make sure that the rules do not allow any inventor to earn more (i.e., more than the bureaucracy itself) have deprived our highly inventive people of material incentives to make inventions, and our very economic life, of precise knowledge of just how much, for instance, thermonuclear power, which is barren for the time being in terms of end results, has given us profit through the application of technologies owing their origination to this still half-baked super-creature of 20th-century technical progress. However unresourceful, we have made enough use of vacuum and cryogenic hardware, plasma technologies, ion-implanted doping, and super-conductivity, even if in its low-temperature version, to say that the outlays on thermonuclear power have been justified over and over again. CERN, the European fundamental research centre, has no problems in placing orders with industry for the most sophisticated and technologically unique experimental devices. What is more, CERN pays at cost price, and industry reaps the benefits later, when the uniqueness of this one-off order from the scientists is translated into real market profit. Try and put in an appearance at a solid plant in this country with a similar task! Our undoubted priority in the Tokamak area has been dissipated in our "struggle" against our builders and industry.

But let us return to defence expenditures, assuming that I am wrong and that the government knows the price of every aspect of our defence potential. In that case, I feel, there would be no point, as we are to break-up dogmatic directives, to use a screen of arguments about the inconvertibility of the ruble. The fact that wages and the cost, say, of a car in our country are incomparable has not prevented the publication of their accepted ruble denominations and their equivalents in the currencies of countries buying these cars. The First Congress of People's Deputies for the first time officially stated that military expenditures added up to about 77.3 billion rubles, a very modest figure, as compared with the estimates. Unless doubt is cast on this figure, as was the case with the state budget deficit announced by the erstwhile Minister of Finance, and unless it starts markedly creeping up, there is hardly any reason to regard defence expenditure as the main source for solving our social problems.

What is more, a parliament in its own right should demand that Igor Belousov substantiate the adequacy of these expenditures to ensure the defence capability of the state, he being the Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR responsible for the defence industries. Considering the striking difference between these outlays and the US budget, the idea of sufficiency can hardly be proved through a mere reference to the difference in servicemen's pay and the cost of services provided by personnel in the defence industries. The deputies must certainly have been gratified to hear of the deputy prime minister's readiness actively to involve the defence potential in the treatment of 10 painful points, as he called them, but the total lack of information, even if only in the habitual imperative *terminus*, concerning the level of our defence capability is surprising, to say the least, as is, incidentally, also the lack of interest in this problem among the deputies: is that perhaps the reverse side of the many years of what is now regarded as hypertrophied attention to defence?

The haulage of cargoes by the transport aircraft of the Air Force instead of training flights without any economic benefit certainly helps to combine the training of flight personnel and the maintenance of hardware in due operational order with the actual effect of reducing the tension in freight flows. Even building battalions, for all the obvious inefficiency of their use of labour resources (labour productivity in these battalions is six times lower than it is, say, in Zlobin's team), are socially useful. Unless one finds a way of obtaining a greater effect with lesser inputs in the same conditions in which the labour of building battalions is used, it is not right to reduce this activity of our army's engineering troops or the number of their personnel out of general considerations of primitive conversion, for this kind of leap-frog change will do nothing but harm, although it is possible and necessary to draw up and implement in the shortest possible time a programme for gradually abandoning the performance of building operations by young men doing military service and to obtain, as a result, every possible social and economic advantage.

It is even truer that any reduction in the quantitative indicators of armaments cannot keep the potential invariable without a qualitative change in these armaments. Indeed, the quantified balance is fit only for the material indicators of production and also for a direct comparison between the volume of armaments of the opposed blocs. When new hardware is being developed, overall percentage cuts must go hand in hand with a scrutiny of programmes and projects, as it is done, for instance, by the relevant committees of the US Congress. Considering that the Americans have not yet abandoned further SDI projects, it would do our people good to know whether our so-called "asymmetrical response", as it is often called, will survive.

The obvious lack of attention on the part of our supreme state organ to the structure of defence spending, together with the ingrained practice of the apparatus to carry every innovation to the extreme of absurdity (if one is to plant maize, then it has to be planted from one pole to the other) and also with the established tradition of primarily exposing our science as a "whipping boy", gives one ground for the apprehension that the storm of budgetary changes will sweep away new development projects instead of the excessive production of batch-produced weapons. All it takes to do so is to have an even distribution of the announced reduction percentage between production and R&D projects.

Consequently, the sufficiency of the defence budget and the possibility of drawing on it for funds for other social requirements continues to be an open question. The members of the Supreme Soviet did not hear any due explanations about it being possible to move along this way or any

arguments in favour of the announced further cuts in defence spending, and, oddly enough, did not demand any.

Nevertheless, it is hard to name a manufacture product that is not being planned for the defence industries to turn out. For the electronic industry, for the Ministry of Communications, and for the radio industry, conversion merely signifies an increase in the scale of their involvement in the household electronics market already worth billions, naturally with the attainment of new horizons in the consumer properties of these products. The erstwhile Ministry of Medium Engineering, now the Ministry of the Nuclear Energy Industry, is still to appear on the consumer goods market. It is gratifying that this benefit performance holds promise of solving problems like the making of modern personal computers, Polaroid-type cameras, batteries, whose shortage is in inverse proportion to their quality, and complete plant for the processing of milk with after-sale services. The other enterprises of the so-called "Nine" are also joining in the conversion.

Why then do we look to defence enterprises when seeking a way out of our economic difficulties, although it is already quite obvious that there is hardly any prospect of some kind of big deal in purely budgetary terms? These hopes are apparently pinned on the use of the potential which has been built up in the defence industries over a period of many years, and which can hardly be reduced to their material aspects of supply but, rather, to the intellectual wealth concentrated in this sphere. There is no doubt that the practice of priority supply of defence enterprises, a necessity which actually existed for many years and which was subsequently cultivated through the force of momentum, as a rule led to better technical and technological development and yielded social benefits for the work collectives. However, the priority of production over the social sphere, as an element of long-established state policy, has held in this area as well, and in the 1980s, the unwarranted egalitarian trends virtually levelled down the advantages of social security for the personnel of defence enterprises. Until a certain period, participation in strengthening the "Motherland's defence capability" as we called it for many years, helped to make moral priorities both of army service and of projects for developing and improving military hardware. Let us note that this incentive, a fairly powerful one, say, in the 1950s, was in the 1980s transformed almost to its opposite, something that was bound to have an effect both on the present state and, especially, on the prospects of the defence enterprises' maintaining the leading positions as compared with the other enterprises in the national economy.

The Chernobyl disaster, the earthquake in Armenia, the gas blast in Bashkiria, and major catastrophic events in other countries have, as a rule, involved the use of army units as the most mobile force best trained for action in situations of extremity to mitigate and eliminate the effects of tragic accidents. This mode of action is, incidentally, also most acceptable to the society in economic terms, because it does much to reduce the cost of eliminating the effects of disasters as compared with any other option open to the state, and the more harsh its action in such situations, the better the results. The breakdowns in the Urals and at Chernobyl, which are comparable in scale, had very much heavier economic consequences for the country in 1986. As those who were on the spot after the disaster know very well, the scale on which resources were brought in and the level of organisation, especially in the initial period, were far from exemplary. The costs to the state after the earthquake in Armenia were also many times larger than the absolutely necessary minimum. The conversion of administration, started in 1985, has yet to yield any tangible results in terms of living standards, but as these disasters showed, it very soon weakened the state itself.

With the prospect of cuts in army spending, and viewing the effects of democratisation in a realistic light, a process which has, regrettably, been attended with a sharp drop in labour discipline, I shall risk making the proposal—which lays no claim to being a popular one—that army specialists should be used to run dangerous lines of production, primarily nuclear power installations, and this not by way of slicing numbers off the army, but through a conversion of its concerns. I feel fully justified in saying that with the reduction in the number of nuclear submarines and a transfer of their personnel to nuclear-power-plant shops which are crucial to security, we could feel more at ease in these troubled times.

An analogy may, perhaps, be discerned by the impatient reader who has already noticed the ambivalence of my attitude to conversion (rather, to the way in which it is being realised). Specialists often assess as disastrous the state of the economy in the foreseeable future, and economic administration as such already. It would be logical from this angle, one should think, to opt for the scenario of conversion that is, in effect, being put through: the assignment of economic tasks to defence enterprises. The personnel changes among the management of the industries involved in conversion have been so slight that a florid member of the old generation of managers addressing a managerial conference on conversion declared—apparently out of ingrained habit—that “the tasks set by the party will be fulfilled at any cost”.

But it is the cost that has to be most closely scrutinised, and not only, and perhaps not primarily, in terms of the cost and price of new products on the new markets. We have already been suffering the initial costs or, rather, the initial losses in view of the erosion of the potential that has been built up in the defence industries and that is now being assigned the role of a magic wand. I have already mentioned the trends evident in this connection, and the most important of these are the problems in reproducing the high-skilled personnel in view of the declining prestige of working in the sphere of defence and the change in the vector of social interests. The spontaneous processes which have led to the present state of things have nothing in common with an awareness of social necessity. Hardly anyone would, upon sound reflection, undertake the responsibility for the orientation of this policy. It is impossible to conceive of a state deliberately regulating the economy in such a way that the income of a worker who is not required to display high skill, and whatever the quantity and quality of his labour, should be larger than that of a specialist with a good education and working conscientiously in accordance with his knowledge.

Is it surprising, therefore, that we have been staging an economic Chernobyl every year by recruiting urban working people, military men and students to help take in the crop on the farms? In the old days, the administrative system made the dismantling of new hardware, instead of repairing the machinery that had not run through its service life, a criminal offence, but it was a practice widespread in the countryside for reasons of despair or sheer negligence. But were these decisions not passed in the same spirit as those which disrupted the normal rhythm of industrial enterprises, the tuition process in colleges and universities, and the creative atmosphere in research (at those institutes, of course, where it did exist)?

It is evident to one and all that the ruble will not be made convertible by government order, and a debate is on only about the stages preceding the partial or full convertibility of our currency. But is there not, after all, a similar glaring difference—a veritable yawning gap—between the wage ruble and the ruble in the economic relations between socialist enterprises, a gap created over the decades of our economic development by administrative-command methods? Without changing the system, was it

right to allow the emergence of cooperatives, whose status is still radically different from that of state enterprises, in spheres of activity where they have been able to boost prices as the basis of their rapid enrichment and evident breach of social justice in society?

Academician Abalkin, now also deputy prime minister, was evidently right when he said that for the time being the impact of the cooperatives on the economy was not a crucial one. But how is one to measure the indirect harm that is statistically connected only with the activity of state enterprises whose management has been trying to find ways of not losing out in the competition with the cooperatives for labour resources? Could this, perhaps, be the root of the ailment that has led to an exponential growth of cash payments, an ailment that the proposed new tax regulations attempt to treat, with the obvious danger of further enhancing the inequality of enterprises with different forms of property and labour organisation. It is all very well for the country's leading newspaper to wax ecstatic over the fact that a cooperative truck driver makes as much as 1,300 rubles a month, but if we take that as the benchmark, we shall have to pay nothing less than 2,000 rubles to the university-educated and highly efficient research specialist. Yet the self-same *Pravda* cited cases of some researchers being paid as much, but these were reported as facts of money-grubbing not to be emulated, but condemned out of hand.

As to the prices of conversion products, this question has not yet been fully exposed and will probably be made evident not before the end of 1990-1991, but neither the practice of price-formation, nor the existing distinctions in the cost structure at enterprises under various ministries hold out any hope that the prices of the products turned out by plants under the defence ministries will be anything like acceptable to the national-economic consumer. This is exemplified in our past experience both by the Kirovets tractor and the Don harvester (while they are not made at any defence enterprise, they are quite appropriate examples in the context of our consideration of prices). However, it is all very well for us to curse the administrative-command period, but at that time decisions were balanced, so that the state defrayed the additional cost of meat, which was a planned loss-maker (incidentally, it became a loss-maker only in the 1960s), and also did the same, for instance, for fuel and energy resources, for combines and tractors. Let me remind those who imagine such decisions to be a purely national trait of ours that the coal industry in the FRG, for instance, is also a loss-maker, and that the cost differential between coal mined in West Germany and world prices is also covered from the state budget.

There is hardly any doubt in anyone's mind that the quality of the plant made by the Nine for the processing of milk or meat and for the light and other industries will be very much higher than that of traditional suppliers, but the price will certainly be different as well. While the problem of the German miners is solved quite naturally at the taxpayer's expense, as a social problem rooted in the past, the looming problems of price disbalance for the products of the Nine and the possibility of it being paid for by national-economic consumers are being created by us only because, having announced the transition to a state run in accordance with economic laws, we have continued to solve our problems by administrative methods. In this context, the humour of my British colleague tends to turn into a somewhat sombre reality.

Following the tragic events in the submarine fleet, many journalistic darts were thrown at the existing problems in working conditions and even the safety of military specialists at various defence production facilities. But what was ignored was the simple fact that authoritarian states are able to concentrate resources on the fulfilment of circumscribed target-oriented tasks, like developing the A-bomb and its delivery vehicles,

but are incapable of attaining standards in every sphere of its people's life which are higher than the level of culture and organisation in society as a whole. In order to develop the A-bomb, everything (from mining and ore processing to theoretical physics) had to be concentrated in one industry. With the generally known lag in our computer facilities, our Buran was landed automatically, whereas all the Shuttle flights had to be manned in the United States, which is well ahead in the level of automation. It would, therefore, be a big mistake for the politicians of the Western world to assume that bans on the delivery to the USSR, say, of computer facilities could have an effect on our defence capability. It will have an effect—and it is already having a real effect—only on progress in the areas which determine our people's living standards, and also on the speed with which ecological problems are solved, and these problems, incidentally, have a direct effect not only on the health of our own population, but also on the environment in countries whose leaders have continued to conduct such an archaic policy.

But it would be equally wrong to assume that the general level of education, the attitude to work, and the imperfections of our economic mechanisms can be compensated by stretching the blanket of intellectual and material resources of the defence complex to the whole of the national economy. The voice of reason is already being heard in the calls to understand that our wellbeing will not change from a change in the mechanisms of distribution, say, of the available stocks of food. Nevertheless, conversion is being everywhere presented as a cure-all for our ills.

The press now provides our readers with an abundant critical menu. There is now a natural interest not so much in negation or in explanations, however elegant, of why this or that sphere is in a poor state, as in pragmatic programmes and realistic proposals. In this context, the author of the preceding part of this article may well be reproached for his critical tone or, at any rate, asked this question: "Are you for conversion or against? If you are for, how is it to be carried through?" I can give a straightforward answer to only the first of these two straightforward questions: I am certainly for. As to how... After all, an honest doctor will not undertake to try to cure a patient without knowing what is actually wrong with him. At any rate, following the principle of the ancient physician "Do not harm!", he will do nothing unless he is sure that what he does will not worsen the state of his patient. In the critical preamble of this article, I have tried to drive home to the reader that unacceptable harm has already, regrettably, been done in practice by acts which—to pursue the medical analogy—seem to amount not so much to a treatment of the unhealthy part of the organism, as to a destruction of the normally functioning part of it.

Everyone has by now evidently realised that there was a stiff dose of cunning in the assertions about problems relating to 18 million administrative personnel in the country: this figure turned out to include—through no kind of oversight, and not without design, I think—not only ministerial chiefs, but also the personnel of enterprises, down to the foremen of producer segments. However, another hard fact of our day is being perceived with much less clarity: the 12 million workers and office personnel in our agriculture. It is this army that was borne in mind when state orders were placed for turning out 50 per cent more tractors than do Japan, the United States, the FRG and France, taken together. The harvester picture is known to be not much better, and here we can fully trust our statistics, in contrast to the data on agricultural output: for instance, we see nothing on our shop shelves of the 86 per cent of the produce abundance of the United States. Would the state order for equipment for every sphere of the national economic complex prove to be just as flimsily grounded as it was in the past?

Judging by US and West European roads and highways, conversion is also in store for those who make our trucks: we find nothing similar to our GAZ and ZIL trucks plying their autobahns and city streets. Tractor and harvester plants are also evidently faced with the conversion task of altering their product mix, despite the fact that these plants (or their corresponding lines of production) have not been a part of the defence industry. The costs of conversion have to be borne because of the inadequacy of the mechanisms of administration and management in the preceding period, but have these mechanisms changed all that much to guarantee the defence industry against a repetition of the situation which has taken shape in the tractor and harvester industry? It is not, after all, the producers of milk and meat or the enterprises processing these that file their orders for the supply of plant, the same old structure of state plan formation is still very much alive. The famous Beetle, the Volkswagen, has beaten all Western records of conveyer-line longevity, but it is the market that has kept it there. This phenomenon did not in itself prevent the development of the modern Mercedes. Our Volga also seems to be a record-breaker, but it owes its "achievement" to the car-shortage and the so-called "planned economy". Evidently, we have no hope of producing our own Mercedes in the near future.

By indicating our desire to join in the international division of labour, are we not making a new mistake in trying to develop to world standards all types of products, including those in which we are hopelessly behind? After all, even the resources of the Nine are not sufficient to start turning out a Mercedes within three years to suit the market. Would it not be more correct to concentrate along the lines in which we are on the same level as the West or are even ahead of it—yes, I mean ahead of it, however odd it may be to hear in the recent period of critical mentality that we actually do have such lines of production. In the fields requiring high technological standards, I still have in mind our space and nuclear hardware and technology. We have various lines in science whose fruits are being much more efficiently used by Western industry than we have managed to do through the unnatural process of "introduction".

It is not conversion as such, as a strategy of reorienting social resources towards our people's vital wants, but the tactic used in realising it that is a source of serious anxiety. Now that we have proclaimed a transition to economic forms of administration and management, we must not allow conversion to be realised by administrative methods. It is not right to exclude defence itself from the sphere of the vital requirements of the members of our society. The obvious and primary concerns at every level of state administration are concentration on the patently defective sectors of the national economy, like the production of foodstuffs, building, and transport, with their vast internal reserves of labour resources. Realised by economic methods, the relevant measures will also naturally make use of the potential of the defence complex: the intellect of its specialists and the industrial fist built within it. Just as the corporations which are leaders in the defence complex in the so-called "capitalist countries" are also those which naturally lay down the law on the market of high-technology consumer goods, so the enterprises of the Nine will reach out for well-considered orders under the right economic relations.

This is the point at which one should note the essential distinction between most of the enterprises not only of the Nine, but also of our national economy generally and firms in the market economy countries. For years, the planned economy implied economic balances struck only on the level of the country, the region or, partially, the industry; the individual enterprise did not, as a rule, operate either as an independent economic unit or as the final producer of marketable products. For all pra-

etical purposes we still find even today the "research—development—output—aftersale service" cycle being sundered. In these conditions, the setting up of economic barriers between enterprises worsened the situation to an even greater extent in terms of the final consumer effect.

The emergence of self-standing concerns outside industries is nothing but an attempt to solve the problem of linking up the entire chain in creating the consumer product. But if one is not to lose touch with the realities of the present day (with its shortages, the lack of an economy based on a hard currency unit, and the whimsical combination of the administrative structure with self-regulation factors), one will find that three concerns which have spun off from their departmental origins are nothing but new microdepartments from the standpoint of organised state administration with separate items of their own in planning, supply and funding. Would it not be simpler to discern a direct analogy between most of our industries and foreign corporations?

While displaying concern about antimonopoly barriers, one could create out of such ministries as the Ministry of the Aviation Industry several major concerns whose establishment would, incidentally, absorb a sizeable part of their administrative apparatus. With a different goal-oriented function, the present-day administrators, economists and other departmental specialists, who are being subjected to unmerited social ostracism, will make up the backbone of the body of managers of socialist firms and concerns. From the standard of socially optimising the use of labour resources and the professional potential, this is much more efficient than the pensioning off of those who are being sacked from the administration before they have reached pension age, or those who are being offered casual jobs at enterprises which have no need of them under the existing structure. Let us note that all of this is proceeding simultaneously with tremendous efforts to retrain into managers specialists at enterprises who have no management experience.

The concern set up on the basis of the Tupolev or Ilyushin design office will receive in the form of what has been left of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry an organ placing orders on behalf of the state and not interfering in any way in running the concern. So long as the scarcity-economy is still there, the Ministry will have the functions of disposing not only of the credits, but also of the allocated stocks and warrant orders, i.e., of all the rudiments of state administration. These functions should wither away not in response to some decree, but in a natural way. The appearance of uncommitted building capacities on the market will instantly abolish the function of allocating stocks and funds for subcontractor works, and so on.

Free-economy states have never given priority to antimonopoly policy. This problem comes on the agenda only under a sufficiently developed economy, and its solution is a multifaceted one. In the United States, for instance, there are several concerns like Westinghouse or General Electric operating on the market of R&D projects and suppliers of nuclear power plant, but in France there is only one giant, Framatome. The operation of nuclear power plants in France is also monopolised by Electricité de France. The results are remarkably different: in France, where 70 per cent of the electric power is generated at nuclear power plants, the cost of building nuclear power plants over the past 15 years has gone up by roughly 70 per cent, and in the United States, where the building and running of nuclear power plants are completely demonopolised, the cost in the same period multiplied more than 6-fold. It has been generally recognised that with the internal monopoly, Framatome, which started by buying a US licence, has outstripped its US rival in its latest projects.

While Framatome has a monopoly inside the country, it is engaged in fierce competition on the international markets with its counterparts like Westinghouse or Mitsubishi. In our efforts to raise our products up to world standards, we could initially turn into concerns entire industries, like nuclear engineering. There is no reason to worry about any lack of competition in the world. Only a pooling of the research, design and engineering potential can guarantee us a place on the international market, and it is only operation on this market that will raise the standard of our products. The restructuring of some industries into a number of concerns or the conversion of some industries into concerns seem to me to be the urgent stages of structural transformations as the crucial factor in introducing authentic economic relations, naturally, in new property conditions.

"Just a minute," I can well hear the meticulous reader of various official speeches saying. Economic relations are, after all, already being put in place, and since 1989 all enterprises have been operating on complete cost-account basis. Contractual relations have been declared to be the basic form of horizontal relations throughout the economy. Much else has also been announced and declared. But just as the dining room at our institute has been steadily, month in, month out, receiving ever lesser quantities of the staple foodstuffs, with unflagging indicators in statistical reports, so the principle of barter trade has increasingly dominated relations between enterprises. There is a visual picture of the disintegration of the functioning socialist market system, however bad it may be (with all its superfluous warrant orders, stocks and allocations), as it is being replaced by an extra-state system of extra-economic relations. Those are the conditions in which the logic of material incentives may be upset, so that social priorities are stood on their very head. With the existence of scarcities, the goods and services market inevitably evolves into a black market. The extrapolation of these trends is a simple matter, and one can do no more than marvel at those who marvel at the inefficiency of the state's acts in combatting crime or at the facts of a transport sabotage which leaves an entire republic without the means to deliver everything that is necessary for its vital activity.

Having begun our perestroika with the basic problems facing our state, and having determined the main reasons for the poor functioning of our economy, the basis of any social formation, we have suddenly branched off along a totally different way. It may well be that the dogmas are much too ingrained in my mind, but I still seriously believe that the superstructure is secondary to the basis, and I got much further confirmation of this when I visited various countries among those which our press but yesterday used to call "free" in quotation marks. In none of these did I find such striking differences between the economic level and the level of culture and democracy. It is now hard to draw a distinction in our reality between the true advocate of social progress and the skillful demagogue solving the problems of his political career not only by playing up the hardships of our everyday life, but now and again on the blood of his compatriots. It is just as necessary to create political institutions preventing a takeover of power by a dictator or a junta, as it is to revive an opposition as a motivating factor of social development in every sphere. But why does this have to be done at the expense of priority economic interests? Really, the presence of modest stocks on shop counters seems to me to be a much greater social success than the possibility of freely discussing Gorbachev's personal life or relishing the obvious mutual dislike of Yeltsin and Ligachev (it would be much more useful, I think, to have these two political leaders hold a public debate in the press or on television, for then one could perhaps understand in what

way these two one-time regional party secretaries, who were so alike but yesterday, differ in matters of principle).

Much of what is being done before our very eyes, including the mistakes, is not done out of any ill intent. The prime source of haste is, as a rule, the desire to correct and improve everything as soon as possible, but just as the way to hell is paved with good intentions, as the old saying has it, so haste in responsible decisions always carries the risk of giving the ship of state an undesirable list. Once it has been realised that the way is the wrong one, the course ahead must be very thoroughly plotted so as not to dissipate any energy in a Brownian chaos of random movements. One must, of course, debate where we should spend our borrowed foreign exchange: to buy cars and videos or to build plants for their manufacture. But one must be aware that both methods have already been tried out (GAZ before the war and VAZ in the recent period, and the purchase of consumer goods throughout the years of the oil Klondike). But none of these methods helped to solve the basic problem: the provision of incentives for highly productive labour by the overwhelming section of the society.

One could start by turning down a proposal about cutting back capital investments in the country, and then go on to apply it in a hyperbolised volume, but one must clearly see that it is not the volume of capital investments that is the bane of our building industry; it is a low labour productivity that ranks next to that of agriculture and that goes hand in hand with the highest level of average wages at state enterprises. However low capital investments may be, they will not release any resources for the market because of our practice in the excessive waste of resources. Whether these are stolen, whether they fall victim to mismanagement or backward technologies, or are lost in some other way is not all that important. The important thing is that the pace at which all the national-economic problems, including social problems, are being solved is bound to slow down. Once again we are trying to cure the pain instead of the disease, to act on the outward manifestation instead of the in-depth processes.

The reader must be tired by now and may well ask, what has all that got to do with conversion? All of that is most relevant, unless one regards the problem of conversion as a change of tank production for tractor production, although one must be aware that up to now this is the way the problem is sometimes being presented. We have excellent specimens of conversion, people who have carried out conversion from the level of general indifference to the level of self-immolation, and who achieved high social results even in the period of stagnation. We need a genuine conversion of social consciousness, a conversion of politics and, of course, above all a conversion of economics away from its firmly established and largely petrified forms, to the freedom to develop on the basis of economic laws. One should not make haste to act before one has understood these laws. There is only one line along which the society may go on allocating resources without ever being wasteful, however large these allocations: it is education and culture.

THE WALK IN THE WOODS

Paul NITZE

THE WALK'S AFTERMATH

THE NEXT MORNING—Saturday—I talked with Gene Rostow and told him that the “walk” had taken place. However, I held back the details, believing it wisest to give them first to the President or to his national security assistant, Judge William Clark.

On Monday, July 19, I gave the members of the U.S. delegation a general description of the “walk,” omitting mention that a specific package had been worked out. I said it was too early to assess whether I had been successful in eliciting a useful reaction from the Soviet side. The delegation sent back a reporting telegram in the same vein. I left for Washington via London the next day.

When I arrived back in Washington, Rostow and I had a preliminary meeting with Judge Clark on the afternoon of July 27. Clark had with him General Richard Boverie, one of his most able NSC assistants. I brought along three copies each of two lengthy memoranda. One was a reporting memorandum describing the “walk in the woods” in full detail, including the four papers I had taken with me on the walk. The other memorandum was an analysis of a number of questions arising from the “walk” with respect to the Soviets, our allies, and public opinion.

Clark and Boverie read my memoranda with care. After an hour or so of discussion, Clark was called out to see the President. Boverie, Rostow, and I continued to talk. Boverie seemed much impressed. He said that it looked to him as though this could be the breakthrough the President had been looking for. As Rostow and I left, Boverie reminded us that Judge Clark had asked that we talk to no one about the walk in the woods until he had been able to brief the President.

A meeting chaired by the President was held several days later at the White House to discuss the walk in the woods. I flew back from my vacation in Maine to be there. Others who attended included Secretary of State George P. Shultz (who had recently replaced Haig after the latter had had a falling out with Reagan); Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger; the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John W. Vessey, Jr.; Director William J. Casey, Clark, Rostow, and the President's White House triumvirate—Edwin Meese, Michael Deaver, and James Baker. The attitude of all the senior officials seemed to be generally favorable. However, they all thought further study should be given to the package and its various provisions before they could give the President a specific recommendation. As a result, the President issued a memorandum allowing each of the principals to bring one additional person into the circle of those fully informed in order to conduct an urgent analysis of the package.

Paul Nitze is a US politician of note. In 1981-1983 he headed the US delegation at the talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe.

Second of Paul Nitze's two exclusive articles written for “International Affairs” (the first article was published in “International Affairs” December issue, 1989).

The basic question was whether Kvitsinskiy had received as favorable a reception in Moscow as I had in Washington. But as the weeks passed, no word came from the Soviet embassy. It seemed to me more and more probable that our package had met with a much colder reception in Moscow. And the more the package received closer attention in Washington, the more concerns began to develop on our side. In order to do the analysis in the depth that the NSC principals thought necessary, more people were brought into the circle of those informed about the walk-in-the-woods package. But unfortunately, none was given full access to my memoranda. As a result, there were some serious misunderstandings about the finer points in the package.

One concern—perhaps the most important—was that the Soviets might not treat the package as a final outcome but instead as a new U.S. proposal, and then try to split the difference between it and the formal Soviet position. My belief is that this was the primary concern of those who had problems with the “walk.” Indeed, several officials who opposed the “walk” in the summer of 1982 subsequently told me that they could have accepted it as a final outcome had the Soviets agreed to it; their opposition was based mainly on their fear that the Soviets would abuse our acceptance of the package and turn it against us. Such concerns grew as August passed and there continued to be no word from the Soviet embassy.

I returned to Washington for a further meeting of the NSC principals on September 7. By that time the lines were fairly clearly drawn. State and ACDA, while recognizing that Moscow likely had problems with the package, favored taking a positive approach to it, but did not believe we should commit ourselves to a position. The Pentagon, however, was increasingly concerned about the absence of any contact from Kvitsinskiy. (By that time, seven weeks had elapsed without any word.) They interpreted this to mean that Moscow had rejected the package (as did I) and would seek to pocket our acceptance of it as a concession. They therefore wished to disavow it.

I regretfully concluded that the package had not found favor in Moscow. The package had been designed to be an outcome acceptable to both sides, not as a unilateral change in the U.S. position. If the Soviets were going to reject all or part of the package, it was advisable that we also make it clear that without the Soviet concessions called for by the package, the United States was not prepared to make the concessions the package called upon it to make. I still strongly believed, however, that the direct, informal Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel should be kept open.

As a result of the September 7 discussion, the President issued a decision paper addressed to Secretary of State Shultz and me. Secretary Shultz was scheduled to see Gromyko in connection with a UN meeting in New York on September 28. I was scheduled to meet with Kvitsinskiy for the beginning of the next round of the INF talks in Geneva on September 29. Neither of us was to initiate a discussion of the walk-in-the-woods package. If Gromyko initiated such a discussion, Shultz would make the point that the United States had examined the package and considered it to be unequal because the United States was not permitted to have in Europe any missiles comparable to the SS-20, and was allowed only slow-flying cruise missiles. In addition, the Soviet Union was permitted to maintain ninety SS-20 missile launchers in the eastern USSR which, given their mobility, could reinforce the SS-20s in European Russia targeted against the West. The United States, however, was fully prepared to continue the exchanges begun in the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel. If Gromyko did not raise the subject of the walk-in-the-woods package, but left it to Kvitsinskiy to do so the next day, I was to execute the same instructions.

On September 28 Gromyko did not raise the subject. Secretary Shultz sent me a cable saying he and Gromyko had agreed that both the INF and START negotiations were being handled in a serious and professional manner. Gromyko added, however, that the U.S. position in both negotiations could not be a basis for agreement. Specifically, Gromyko said the zero-zero option was impossible since the Soviets would have to disarm unilaterally. Shultz told Gromyko that it remained to be seen what might come of the walk-in-the-woods procedure, but that he believed this pattern of communications was worthwhile.

On my arrival in Geneva, I was informed that Kvitsinskiy would like to have another walk in the region of St. Cergue on September 29.

This time we walked along a road headed toward a restaurant called the Cave of the Huntsman. Kvitsinskiy lost no time in getting to the point. He said the reaction in Moscow to our package had been wholly negative. He said, "You may as well read what I am instructed to say to you." He then handed me a single typed page. It made the following points:

The Soviet Union will enter into no INF agreement which:

(1) does not provide full compensation for British and French nuclear systems;

(2) limits Soviet systems outside the range of targets in NATO Europe,

(3) does not provide for serious and equal reductions in nuclear-capable medium-range aircraft within range of Europe, whether based on land or on sea; and

(4) is not fully consistent with the principle of "equality and equal security."

Moscow having thus turned down the walk-in-the-woods package, I then executed my instructions precisely as I had been ordered to do. I emphasized, however, that the United States was ready and had authorized me to continue to pursue informal negotiations in our private channel.

Thus, at the beginning of the third round of the INF negotiations in the fall of 1982, the Soviets laid to rest the walk in the woods, as well as any future explorations on a similar informal basis. Kvitsinskiy later confirmed what he had told me earlier, that there had been a basic INF arms control policy review in Moscow that summer. The conclusion reached was that the Soviet Union should not accept any agreement that permitted deployment of even a single Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missile. To do so would put Soviet approval on such U.S. deployments and would undercut the peace, antinuclear, environmentalist, and anti-American movements in Western Europe. The Moscow group had decided that INF could best be used as a political device to sow dissension within NATO and to drive wedges between the United States and its European partners. Soviet acceptance of the walk in the woods or other successful explorations in the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy channel would have undercut that strategy.

THE EQUAL REDUCTIONS EPISODE

FROM THIS POINT ON the INF talks in Geneva became much more formal and generally unproductive. However, very near the end the Soviets came up with a most bizarre initiative. The "walk in the park", as the episode came to be known, was mysterious, Byzantine, and ended with my feeling some bitterness toward Kvitsinskiy. It took place during the final month of the final round of the INF negotiations, culminating in the Soviet walkout of November 23, 1983.

The episode had its roots in a late October dinner conversation at our apartment on the Quay Gustav Ador overlooking Lake Geneva. We had invited my executive assistant, Norman Clyne, his wife Alice, several Swiss friends, and Ambassador Kvitsinskiy and his wife. The Kvitsinskiys were somewhat late in arriving. Kvitsinskiy took me aside on entering the apartment and told me that he had been watching a TASS news briefing on Moscow television which he was able to receive via a dish antenna on the roof of the Soviet mission. The TASS broadcast reported on an interview with General Secretary Yuri V. Andropov, who had succeeded Brezhnev in November 1982 upon the latter's death, which would appear in the next day's issue of *Pravda*. In it Andropov, among other things, announced a change in the Soviet INF position. The Soviets were now prepared to reduce the number of their SS-20 launchers within range of NATO Europe to 140 (their preceding position had been that they must have 162 such SS-20 launchers in order to be compensated for the 162 British and French SLBM tubes and IRBM launchers). They were also amending their position with respect to aircraft and with respect to missiles in the Far East.

Later in the evening Kvitsinskiy said, "Why don't you propose equal reductions?" I replied that this sounded to me like a proposal Paul Warnke had made a year earlier, which at the time Kvitsinskiy had told me was no less objectionable to Moscow than the U.S. interim proposal of March 1983 for equal levels of U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missile warheads. Kvitsinskiy said that what he had in mind was somewhat different. It would bring the total of Soviet SS-20 launchers in Europe down to about 120. Furthermore, it would avoid the issue of compensation for British and French systems, which could be dealt with in "future negotiations."

On November 2, Kvitsinskiy and I met for lunch at La Réserve. After an extended discussion of Andropov's newest proposals, we returned to the subject of Kvitsinskiy's equal reductions suggestion. Kvitsinskiy confirmed that my recollection of what he had suggested was correct. He added that for political reasons their side could not put such a proposal forward; the proposal must appear to come from the U.S. side. I observed that I took it from what Kvitsinskiy had said that if the United States put such a proposal forward, it would be favorably received in Moscow. Kvitsinskiy replied that he had so hinted. I then asked if this also applied to the walk-in-the-woods package, since I had heard that some on the Soviet side had said that that package might also be acceptable to Moscow if the United States put it forward. Kvitsinskiy replied firmly in the negative, should the United States propose such a package formally, he said, the Soviet Union would reject it in its entirety. He added that I seemed to think that statements by the various spokesmen on their side were fully coordinated when, in fact, some on his side spoke out of turn, which much annoyed him.

The next day there was a reception for the two delegations at the residence reserved for the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations Committee on Disarmament. Kvitsinskiy took me out in the garden for a private talk. During our conversation he noted that the point of his suggestion was not only a Soviet reduction to 120 missile systems but a way of deferring the problem of future increases in British and French warheads to future negotiations. He also said that when he had made the suggestion that the United States look at equal reductions ending up with 120 SS-20s in Europe, I had asked him a number of questions and that subsequently I had raised the matter again, asking further questions. Did that indicate any interest on my part? I said that I did not mean to give Kvitsinskiy any false hopes. I asked questions only in order to be sure that I fully understood his suggestion. I also warned him that, per-

sonally, I did not think the Soviet offer would be well received in Washington.

On Saturday evening, November 12, Phyllis and I had already gone to bed and were quietly reading when the telephone rang. It was Kvitsinskiy. He said that he had received instructions from Moscow and needed to meet with me the next morning. I suggested we meet in the Botanical Gardens, which was across the Avenue de la Paix from the U.S. delegation's offices, to which he agreed.

When we met on Sunday morning Kvitsinskiy went directly to the business at hand. He said he had been directed to say that Moscow had studied with great care his report of the discussion that he and I had had on the subject of equal reductions. His telegram of instruction officially directed him to tell me that, if the U.S. government were to propose equal reductions of 572 warheads on each side, the Soviet government would accept that proposal and that it was Moscow's view that the remaining issues could be equitably worked out. The Soviet government would reserve the right to raise the issue of British and French forces in an appropriate future negotiating forum. I asked whether, in reporting our previous discussions, he had made it clear to Moscow that the idea of equal reductions had been his and that I had said I did not believe that it would be acceptable to Washington. Kvitsinskiy did not give me a clear answer.

When I reported this conversation back to Washington I included a concluding comment recommending that the State Department promptly inform our NATO allies of the Soviet equal reductions move; I thought that if we failed to do so the Soviets would likely go to them behind our backs.

Kvitsinskiy and I met the following morning, Monday, again in the Botanical Gardens, this time at my request. I told him that President Reagan, after consulting with the U.S. allies, had decided to fill out his September initiatives by proposing a specific global limit of 420 on the number of longer range missile warheads on each side. I had received instructions the preceding evening to present the number at our next plenary session scheduled for Tuesday morning. To avoid any misunderstanding, I had a paper with me describing this move. I gave it to Kvitsinskiy to read. He said that the answer to this proposal in Moscow would be negative. I pointed out that the proposal left open the question of the level of deployments in Europe as well as the percentage of that level which would consist of Pershing IIs; it thus opened up a wide range of possibilities and seemed to be a useful basis for moving forward toward a mutually acceptable solution. Kvitsinskiy retorted that it did not look hopeful to him.

Shifting to his equal reductions proposal made in our November 13 meeting, Kvitsinskiy asked me when I expected to receive a response from Washington. I said I was not sure. I said that I had a few more questions about Moscow's proposal. In reporting it back to Washington, I had described the Soviet position on compensation for British and French systems to be that such compensation could be addressed "in an appropriate future forum." Was that correct? Kvitsinskiy said it was; however, he amplified that statement with the comment that his instructions had said that the Soviet side would reserve the right to raise the issue of compensation for British and French systems "in this or another forum." I asked what that terminology meant. Kvitsinskiy said "this forum" meant the INF negotiations. As to "another forum," Kvitsinskiy had proposed to Moscow that the forum be START. He said he presumed that was what Moscow had had in mind by "another forum."

At the end of our discussion, I referred to an article that had appeared the day before in London in *The Sunday Times* saying that the

first U.S. cruise missiles might arrive in England any day. Kvitsinskiy said that he understood that Britain's defense minister, Michael Haseltine, had promised, upon arrival of the missiles, to make an appropriate announcement in Parliament. I said this was also my understanding. Kvitsinskiy said that if Haseltine were to make that announcement that day or the next he did not believe that the Soviet delegation would be able to meet with the U.S. side on Tuesday as scheduled; he would have to consult Moscow. I said that would be wholly regrettable; progress had been made during the last few weeks and this was not the time to walk out. Kvitsinskiy replied, "We'll see."

The Soviet delegation did appear for the next day's plenary session, despite the British announcement that the first GLCMs had arrived in the United Kingdom the day before. As instructed, I formally presented the President's proposal for a 420 global warhead limit. That evening my deputy, Mike Ghitman, and his wife, Chris, held a reception for both delegations at their residence in Coppet, outside Geneva. I opened my discussion with Kvitsinskiy by noting that Washington was working hard on Moscow's Sunday equal reductions proposal. The heart of the matter was whether Washington, taking the equal reductions proposal as a Moscow initiative, could regard it as opening a possible path to agreement. I proposed thus to advise Washington unless he told me not to do so. Kvitsinskiy agreed that "the heart of the matter" was whether Washington thought the proposal could open a path to agreement; should an agreement eventuate, it would be a joint package.

Kvitsinskiy then again asked me how long I expected it would take for Washington to respond to their equal reductions initiative. I said I had no way of knowing, but Washington had posed a number of questions. I thought there were the usual divergent viewpoints in Washington and would be surprised if I received an answer in less than five days from then. Kvitsinskiy said he would report to Moscow that I believed there would be at least a five-day delay before I received instructions on how to respond.

I had no doubt in my mind that Kvitsinskiy's equal reductions idea was unacceptable to our side. It seemed to me, however, that rather than reject flatly the Soviet initiative, it would be wiser to come back with a counterproposal using the concept of equal reductions to arrive at a more equitable outcome. After two days of imaginative hard work by the U.S. delegation in Geneva, we came up with a formula which did exactly that.

We sent a telegram back to Washington noting that the Soviet side was positioning itself so that, when it carried out its long-standing threat to break off the talks, they could cite as reasons both the U.S. rejection of Kvitsinskiy's equal reductions proposal and the Bundestag vote as well. (The German Bundestag was scheduled to debate and vote November 21-22 on whether to accept Pershing II deployments and the Soviets appeared to be attempting to isolate the Federal Republic by "ignoring" the earlier arrival of GLCMs in England.) We suggested that the best way to rebut this ploy and reduce pressure on West Germany was for the United States not to reject Kvitsinskiy's proposal but to make a counteroffer, which could pick up the equal reductions idea but modify its method of application in such a way as to produce an outcome consistent with U.S. criteria for an acceptable agreement. We then outlined in the telegram the basic elements of such a U.S. counterproposal.

On Thursday, November 17, while Washington was considering our counterproposal suggestion, the Soviet mission in Geneva and the Soviet embassy in Washington concurrently began to circulate rumors that I had made a proposal to the Soviet side, that Moscow had accepted it, and that Washington had rejected it. At eight o'clock that evening the Soviet

embassy in Bonn delivered to the West German Foreign Office a note signed by Soviet Ambassador Semenov asserting that I had made a proposal of equal reductions by 572 warheads on each side, that Moscow had reacted favorably, that Washington had rejected the idea, that the whole thing was a nefarious scheme, and that Moscow was sure the West German government would wish to be informed of the dirty tricks the United States was playing behind its back. The next day similar notes were delivered to other NATO governments. Fortunately, we had already briefed out NATO allies, so they were aware that the facts were the reverse of what the Soviet notes were asserting.

On Saturday, November 19, I received instructions from Washington directing me without delay to convey the following points to Kvitsinskiy with regard to his informal equal reductions proposal of November 13. First, that proposal would leave the Soviet Union with a large force of SS-20 missile systems in Europe while barring the United States from any countering deployments. The United States and its NATO partners had made clear that they could not accept a Soviet monopoly in longer-range INF missiles. Second, while Washington had noted with interest Kvitsinskiy's indication that the Soviet side was willing to drop its explicit demand for compensation for third-country forces, the negotiated outcome of an agreement must provide for equality of rights and limits on a global basis between the United States and the Soviet Union. And finally, while the United States was prepared to study carefully any proposal that the Soviet side might wish to put forward in these negotiations, Washington—and, I added, I personally—found unacceptable Soviet attempts in direct approaches to our allies to misrepresent the informal Soviet suggestion of November 13 as an American proposal.

At my request, Kvitsinskiy came to my office at the Botanic Building at 12 30 that afternoon. Without introduction I handed him a paper containing the above points. After Kvitsinskiy had read the paper I asked if he had any comments. He said the assertion that equal reductions was a Soviet suggestion was incorrect; it was an American proposal. I could not prevent Kvitsinskiy's shameless mendacity from angering me, though I knew it would do no good for me to lose my temper.

I said I could not understand the notes conveyed to NATO governments by Soviet ambassadors. What they contained was simply contrary to fact. Kvitsinskiy objected that all this had been turned into "a filthy thing," asserting that there had been leaks on November 17 by someone on the U.S. side saying the USSR had abandoned the British-French issue. This had been used by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to influence the Bundestag debate. I interjected that the suggestion that the Soviets were willing to drop the British-French issue would not be helpful to Kohl in that debate. Kvitsinskiy asserted that this whole episode was a plot on the U.S. side.

Kvitsinskiy said that on November 13 I had indicated I would do my best on equal reductions. I responded that I had said I would do my best to get an answer to Moscow's proposal. Kvitsinskiy insisted that I had indicated I was hopeful of a positive outcome. I replied that I had made it clear early on in our conversations that I personally saw little hope of the United States reducing from 572 warheads to zero while the Soviet Union maintained a large number of longer-range INF missiles. Insofar as I had not completely rejected the Soviet approach, it was because I had had in mind that the new Soviet position on British and French forces and a formula incorporating equal reductions but producing an equitable, not an unequal, outcome might offer the possibility of opening a way to an acceptable agreement. However, I had made clear to Kvitsinskiy that, overall, I was pessimistic about the concept.

At this point, Kvitsinskiy abruptly left my office. He wandered down

the wrong corridor toward the elevator where a member of our team encountered him. Kvitsinskiy seemed dazed and asked how to get to the "lift." In the elevator on the way out his only remark was: "Everything's finished."

That evening I worried about our heated exchange. On reflection I concluded that while my anger with Kvitsinskiy and with his government for blatantly falsifying the facts was wholly justified, it would be unwise to press the matter. It was important to preserve the channel of communication through Kvitsinskiy.

On Monday morning I invited Kvitsinskiy to lunch at La Réserve. During the luncheon I asked him what the United States should expect to happen on Wednesday, which was the date of our next scheduled plenary. He replied that he expected to receive instructions the next day. I asked if the instructions would be sent out after the Bundestag vote, which was to take place Tuesday. He replied that they would. He added, however, that everything was settled. He would only be able to repeat two pertinent phrases from Andropov's recent *Pravda* interview—that the USSR could not continue the negotiations if he missiles were delivered, and that it could continue if the deliveries were postponed.

I commented that the upcoming period was bound to be rough; Kvitsinskiy agreed. I said I was confident that Semenov's note to the West German government would become public. Kvitsinskiy disagreed, saying there was no reason for it to become public. I told him that Egon Bahr, the spokesman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) on arms control matters, had called me on Friday morning to inquire about a rumored initiative in our negotiations. I had told him that Kvitsinskiy, under instructions, had said that if the United States made the equal reductions proposal, the Soviet government would accept it; I had explained that, although the immediate deal would not be linked to British and French systems, compensation for future increases would be claimed in this or another forum, and the 120 SS-20s would be considered to be partial compensation. Kvitsinskiy said Bahr had called him as well, but he had not wanted to talk on an open line so he had referred Bahr to Semenov.

I asked Kvitsinskiy if he had seen Semenov's note to the Germans. Kvitsinskiy said he had. I said I did not see how the Soviets could have thought the Germans would give the note any credence. Kvitsinskiy said that the initiative was now dead. He said the Semenov note was not directed against me; there was a certain prestige in being known as the author of a proposal. I responded that the Semenov note was aimed at using me against President Reagan.

Wishing to shift the subject, I suggested to Kvitsinskiy that he and I not get into recriminations; the facts were bound to come out. The point was to see whether there was anything the two of us could do to help the negotiating process between the United States and the USSR so that, to the extent possible, we could continue, or rather return to, businesslike discussions. Despite the current serious check, negotiations should continue.

Kvitsinskiy said he did not see where his side could go. His current instructions stopped at the 140 proposal. I said I saw no immediate prospect of a change in my instructions either, but still I thought the sides should keep on trying.

Kvitsinskiy stated that on Wednesday, the twenty-third, he intended to make a short statement. If I made an extended one, he would be prepared to answer. The Soviet side had said that they would call the talks off. He said that he was not authorized to offer any prospect of a resumption. I noted that the Soviet side could always change its mind.

On Wednesday, November 23, the Soviet delegation arrived at our offices in the Botanic Building. The German Bundestag had voted late

the previous evening to proceed with deployments. A crowd of peace marchers was in the street with banners and placards; word had spread that the Soviets would probably walk out that day.

In his opening statement, Kvitsinskiy announced that the Soviet delegation "declares this round of negotiations discontinued, without setting any date for resumption." He cited the West German Bundestag vote of November 22 as well as earlier votes by the United Kingdom and Italian parliaments as giving the green light to deployments in those countries. He ended by asserting: "Thus the U.S. and its above mentioned allies knowingly created the situation of which the USSR has warned."

I expressed profound regret at the Soviet decision, calling it as unjustified as it was unfortunate. I noted the progress we had made and expressed the continued commitment of the United States to negotiate until an acceptable accord had been reached.

Thus ended the "walk in the park" episode. Shortly after the negotiations collapsed, Kvitsinskiy submitted an article for publication in *The New York Times* on January 12, 1984. In it he continued to insist that the equal reductions proposal had originated with the United States and that it had been "a tactical move aimed at creating an illusion of progress just when the United States started delivering missiles to Europe." The upshot, Kvitsinskiy insisted, was to thwart what he described as the Soviet Union's efforts to effect "large-scale, meaningful arms cuts." In a typically Kvitsinskiy manner, he completely turned matters around, partly to save face, no doubt, but also to preserve the fiction that his masters in Moscow had gone to such pains to invent.

The question remains as to what actually had gone on on the Soviet side. Had Kvitsinskiy been authorized in advance to make his October 26 suggestion, or did this start as purely a Kvitsinskiy operation? If he had been authorized to do so, was it only the man in Moscow whom Kvitsinskiy wished to protect who had authorized him to do so? How much of our discussions had he accurately reported to Moscow? Who in Moscow authorized his November 13 instructions? Who prepared and authorized the Semenov note to the West German Foreign Office on the seventeenth? Did the Soviets really hope, with the purpose of affecting the Bundestag debate, to catch the United States in a position of not having informed its allies of an important move? Or was the entire scheme a serious effort to explore an endgame ploy leading to U.S. acceptance of a proposal which would have left the USSR with a dominant deployment of SS-20s in Europe with no U.S. offsetting counter-deployments, while doing so in a way in which the Soviets could avoid the United States pocketing their willingness to give up compensation for British and French systems if, in the end, the United States did not agree to the rest of the Soviet proposal? In the event of failure they could deny that they had made any offer whatever by asserting it was my proposal. The answer is probably to be found in a combination of these elements

DON'T SAY YOU HAVE NOT BEEN IN THAT WAR

Svetlana ALEKSIEVICH

THIS WAR still does not have a history. It hasn't been written. We know as much about it as is not dangerous for us to know, so as not to see ourselves the way we are. But this war does have witnesses. Thousands of witnesses. And they want to be heard before they are thought of in a way convenient to and needed by some. They wanted to be needed by truth. They are different; they saw different things and they understood different things. Some want to be called heroes. Others don't know who they are. Still others are desperate to get at their true identity. We need to understand all of them because they are our children, our husbands, our brothers

Do not say that you weren't in this war. Not so! We all returned from there.

●
"I KEPT HEARING VOICES; no matter how I strained to figure out whose they were, they were voices without faces. They would leave and then return. It seemed I'd already thought I was dying. And then I opened my eyes.

"I regained consciousness in Tashkent after the explosion. My head was aching from my own whispering—I couldn't talk louder than a whisper. The hospital in Kabul was behind me. My first sensation was regret that nothing would return, that I wouldn't see my buddies, but, most importantly, I would not be able to pull myself up to a horizontal bar.

"I spent two years less 15 days in hospital. I underwent 18 operations, four of them under general anaesthesia. Medical students wrote examination papers about what I have and what I don't. I could not shave myself, so my friends shaved me. The first time, they poured toilet water on me, but I shouted, 'Give me a different one. This one has no odour. I can't smell it. They pulled everything out of the nighttable: sausage, cucumbers, honey, candy—I couldn't smell anything. I could distinguish colours and could taste food, but I had no sense of smell. I nearly went out of my mind! Spring had come and the trees had blossomed. I could see all this but couldn't smell it. Five years have passed, and I still can't make out the smell of flowers, tobacco smoke and women's perfume. I can smell toilet water if the odour is crude and strong, but you have to put the scent-bottle right under my nose.

"In the military hospital I received a letter from a friend. I learned from him that our armoured personnel carrier had hit an Italian-made high-explosive mine. He saw a person flying out with the engine. He was waving his hands and suddenly stopped. It was me.

"I was discharged from the hospital and even given an allowance—300 rubles. For a slight wound you're entitled to 150, and for a serious

Svetlana Aleksievich, a writer and the author of the books "War Does Not Have a Feminine Face" and "The Last Witnesses".

one, 300. From there you're on your own. The pension's peanuts. Live off your parents. My father's got plenty of his own problems without the war. He's all grey, and suffers from high blood pressure.

"I didn't begin to see clearly during the war. I began to see the light afterwards. And everything was turned upside down.

"I was called up to the army in 1981. The war had already been on for two years, but civilians knew and spoke little about it. Our family believed that since the government had sent troops there, this was what had to be done. That's the way my father and my neighbours thought. I don't remember anyone having a different opinion. Even women didn't cry, as all this was far away—the horror wasn't affecting anyone back home. This wasn't like a real war, it was something strange, without casualties and prisoners. No one had seen zinc coffins yet. It was later that we learned that coffins were already being brought into the city, but were being buried secretly, at night, at tombstones that read 'died', not 'killed in action'. However, no one asked why 19-year-old guys had suddenly begun dying here. Was it from vodka or the flu, or perhaps poison mushrooms? Their relatives mourned for them, and everyone else kept on living as they had been, if this did not affect them directly. The newspapers wrote that our soldiers were building bridges and planting friendship-lanes of trees, while our physicians were working in Afghan maternity wards.

"At basic training in Vitebsk it was no secret that we were being prepared for Afghanistan. One guy admitted that he was afraid that we'd all get shot. I began to disdain him. Right before our departure another one refused to go. First he tried to worm his way out by claiming his Komsomol membership card had been lost. The card was found. Then he thought up the story that his girl was pregnant. I considered him abnormal. We were going there to make a revolution! That was what we were told. And we believed. We thought there was something romantic in store for us.

"A bullet hits a person. You hear it—you can't forget it or confuse it with anything else, that tell-tale wet smack. Your buddy next to you falls face down into the ash-acrid dust. You turn him onto his back—clenched in his teeth is the cigarette you'd just given him. It is still burning. The first time you act as if in a dream: you run, pull, shoot, but you don't remember anything after the battle. Everything is as if behind glass. It's like you're having a nightmare. You wake up from the fright, but you can't remember anything. To experience horror, so it turns out, you have to remember it and grow accustomed to it. Two or three weeks later, nothing is left of your former self, only your name. All that's still you is your name. And when this person sees someone that has been killed he no longer gets frightened, but thinks calmly or vexedly about how he is going to drag him down a mountain or for several kilometres in the heat.

"There is no secret about death for men at war. Killing is simply pulling the trigger. We were taught that the one who shoots first stays alive. Such is the law of warfare. 'Here you have to know how to do two things—walk fast and shoot accurately. I'll do the thinking,' our commander used to say. We shot where we were ordered to. I was training to shoot where I was ordered to. I shot without feeling sorry for anyone. I could have killed a child. Everybody was fighting against us—men, women, old people, children—the entire nation.

"A column was marching through a mountain village. The engine of the first truck broke down. The driver stepped out and raised to hood. A kid about ten years old stabbed him in the back, near the heart. The soldier fell on the motor. We made a sieve out of the boy. If the command had been given, we would have turned the village into dust. Each

man tried to survive. There was no time to think. We were 18- to 20-year-olds. I was used to other people dying, but was afraid of my own death. I saw how nothing would remain of a guy in one second. It was as if he'd never existed. And they'd send his parade uniform home in an empty coffin. They'd put foreign soil in it to give it the right weight.

"We wanted to live. Nowhere else did we want to live as much as we did there. We would return from battle, laughing. I never laughed as much as I did there. We even got big kicks out of old jokes.

"A black marketeer went to war. The first thing he found out was how many checks (coupons used to buy goods in short supply in the USSR—*Ed.*) a captured dushman cost. Eight checks. A day or two later the dust was rising near the garrison—he was bringing in 200 prisoners. Another soldier requested: 'Sell me one for seven checks.' 'Are you kidding? I bought each for nine myself.'

"No matter how many times somebody tells this story, we're going to laugh. We guffawed over every trifle.

"A dushman sniper saw three small stars—lieutenant—50,000 afghanis. Bang! One big—major—200,000 afghanis. Bang! Two small stars—staff sergeant. Bang! At night the ringleader paid up—for the lieutenant—give the afghanis, for the major—give the afghanis. For . . . what? A staff sergeant? You've killed our benefactor. You're going to be hanged!

"We talked a lot about money—more than about death. I brought nothing from there. A piece of shrapnel which they pulled out of me. That's it. Some guys brought back porcelain, precious stones, decorations and carpets from the villages after the fighting. Others bought them or bartered for them. A cartridge clip for a set of make-up—rouge, eye-shadow—for the girl back home. We used to sell boiled bullets. A boiled bullet does not fly out of the barrel, it splashes out. You can't kill with it. We used to put up pails or basins and throw cartridges in them and boil them for two hours. In the evening we would take them to be sold. Everybody had some kind of business going. Officers and soldiers. Heroes and cowards alike. In the canteen, knives, bowls, spoons and forks would disappear. In the barracks, cups, stools and hammers would be missing. Bayonets from sub-machine guns, mirrors from cars, spare parts and medals would get lost. In teahouses we would take everything, even the garbage that was taken out of the garrison cantonment: food cans, old newspapers, rusty nails, pieces of plywood, plastic bags. Garbage was sold by the truck. That's the kind of war it was.

"People call us 'Afghans'. This is our handle. We're different from everybody else. What are we like? I don't know who I am. A hero or a fool whom people have to point their finger at. Or maybe I'm a criminal. They're already saying that this was a political mistake. Today this is being said quietly. Tomorrow the voices will be louder. But I spilt blood there—my own and others'. We were given decorations there which we don't wear. We are going to return them yet. Decorations received honestly in a dishonest war. We're asked to speak at schools. But what can you talk about? I'm not going to talk about hostilities. What should I talk about? About how I'm still afraid of the darkness, that I shudder if something falls? About how we took prisoners but did not bring them to the regiment? About villages which after artillery shelling looked not like places to live but a dug-out field? Is this what schoolchildren want to hear about? No, they need heroes. But I remember how we destroyed, killed and built, and gave out presents there. All this existed to close together that I can't separate them to this day. I'm afraid of these recollections. I try to run away from them. I don't know a single person who returned from there and didn't drink or smoke. Light cigarettes do

not save me, I look for the Okhotnichy brand we used to smoke there. We used to call them 'death in a swamp'.

"Don't write about our sense of brotherhood in Afghanistan. I don't believe in it. In the war we were united by fear. All of us were deceived, we all wanted to stay alive and we all wanted to go home. Here we are united by the fact that we have nothing. We have the same problems: pensions, obtaining flats, good medicine, prosthetic devices, furniture, sets. We'll handle them, and our clubs will fall apart. Come hell or high water, I'm going to get myself a flat, furniture, a refrigerator, a washing machine, a Japanese video-cassette recorder—and it will immediately become obvious that I've got no business being in this club any more. Young people don't relate to us. They see us at the cemetery; they see that's we're drunk and singing some songs. They can't understand us. We are supposedly equated with the participants in the Great Patriotic War, but they defended their homeland, while what did we do? We played the role of Germans, as a friend of mine put it. And we're mad at them. Here they listened to music, danced with girls and read books while we ate raw gruel there and were blown up by mines. Anybody who wasn't with me there, who didn't experience what I did means nothing to me.

"This is all I've got left—my home, wife, and the child she'll soon have, a few friends from Afghanistan. I don't believe anybody any more."

Private Oleg Lelyushenko, grenade thrower

"Every day I told myself there, 'I'm a fool. Why did I do this?' I got to thinking about this especially at night, when I wasn't working, but during the day there were other thoughts—how to help everyone! Young lads lay there with horrible wounds. I was shocked—why such bullets? Why ever invented them? Could man have really invented them? The inlet was small, but inside everything was cut up. It wasn't enough to kill and wound—they had to suffer so, too. They would always cry, 'Mamal' when it hurt, when they were scared. I never heard any other name.

"..I'd wanted to leave Leningrad, for about two years. My child had died, and then my husband. There was nothing to keep me in that city; quite the contrary, everything was a bitter reminder, which I wanted to get away from. It was there that I'd gone out with him and we'd first kissed. It was in this maternity home that I gave birth...

"The head physician summoned me and asked:

"Would you go to Afghanistan?"

"Yes."

"I had to see that others were worse off than I was. And I did see it.

"The war, as we were told, was a just one, we were helping the Afghan people put an end to feudalism and build a thriving socialist society. That our boys were dying was somehow hushed up. We understood that there were many infectious diseases there—malaria, typhoid fever, hepatitis. In 1980, at the beginning, we landed in Kabul. We were given English stables to turn into a hospital. There was nothing here—one syringe for everyone. Officers would be given spirits to drink, and we would treat wounds with petrol. Wounds healed poorly, as there was little oxygen. The sun helped. A bright sun kills germs. I saw the first wounded men in underwear and boots. Without pyjamas. Pyjamas did not appear soon afterwards. Nor did slippers or blankets.

"Soon we set to thinking: Who are we? People didn't like our doubts. There were no slippers or pyjamas, but the slogans, appeals and posters that had been brought were already being hung about. Against the background of the slogans were the gaunt sad faces of our boys. That's the way they were imprinted in my memory forever. Twice a week we had political training. We were constantly being taught: this was our sacred

duty, the border has to be protected. The most unpleasant thing in the army is informing. The commander orders you to inform on others. Down to the smallest trifle. On every wounded or sick man. This is called 'knowing the mood'. The army should be healthy. It was proper to inform on everyone. You couldn't spare anyone. But we did. It was on pity that we kept going.

"To save, to help, to love—it was for this that we came. Some time would pass, and I'd catch myself thinking that I hated. I hated that soft light sand, which burned you like fire. I hated those mountains. I hated those squat villages from which you could be shot at from one minute to the next. I hated just any Afghan carrying a basket with melons, or standing next to his house. You didn't know where they would be at night. An officer I knew who had been treated at the hospital was killed. Two tentfuls of soldiers were butchered. In other place the water was poisoned. Someone picked up a nice cigarette lighter, and it blew up in his hand. These were our boys getting killed. This has to be understood. We are no better or worse than you who were not there. We are just like you.

"I am in a good profession—saving lives—and it saved me, too. I lived up to expectations. We were needed there. What was most horrible was that we did not save everyone we could have saved. I could have saved more, but there wasn't the medicine that was needed. Also, the wounded were brought in too late. (Serving with me in the medical companies were poorly trained soldiers who had learned only to bandage.) I could have saved them, but I couldn't rouse the drunken surgeon. We couldn't even write the truth in the death notices. They were killed by mines. But we wrote: killed in an automobile accident, fell into an abyss, food poisoning. When the numbers were already in the thousands, we were allowed to tell the relatives the truth. I grew used to corpses. But it was impossible for me to reconcile myself to the fact that this was a man, a dear countryman.

"Even in death they were not the same. For some reason we felt sorer for those who were killed in action. We felt less for those who died in hospital. They screamed so much while they were dying. I can remember a major dying in reanimation. A military adviser. His wife came to see him. He died right before her eyes. She started screaming horribly. I wanted to close all doors so that no one could hear. Because next door soldiers, boys, were dying. And there was no one to mourn them. They died alone. She was superfluous amongst us.

"A man showed his true colours under those circumstances. If he was a coward, it quickly became obvious that he was a coward. If he was an informer, it was immediately clear that he was an informer. If he was a lady's man, everyone knew this. I'm not sure whether anyone will admit it here, but there I heard from people that one can like killing, that killing is pleasure. Before leaving for home a staff sergeant I knew said in all frankness. 'How am I going to live now? I really did killing!' People spoke about this calmly. Boys talked ecstatically about how they had burned a village and trampled everything underfoot. Had everyone gone mad? Once an officer came to visit us; he had arrived from the Kandahar area. That evening he had to bid us farewell. He locked himself in an empty room and shot himself. It was said that he was drunk, but I don't know. It was rough.

"It was difficult getting through every day. A guy shot himself at his post. Three hours in the sun. He was a homebody. He just couldn't take it. There were many who had gone out of their minds. At first they were kept in general rooms; later they were put in separate ones. They started running away—they were frightened by the bars. It was easier being with everyone else.

"Everybody smoked—anasha, marijuana—whoever could get what. You become strong, and free of everything. First and foremost, of your body. It's as if you're tip-toeing. You feel lightness in each cell. You sense each muscle. You want to fly. It's as if your flying! The joy is uncontrollable. You like everything. You laugh at any bit of nonsense. You hear and see better. You distinguish between more smells and more sounds. And you're not afraid of anything. You want to do something heroic. The country loves its heroes! You feel no pain. There's no pity. It's easy to die. You're not afraid. You get the sensation that you're wearing a bullet-proof vest, that you're armour-plated.

"Guys would smoke some grass and go on a raid. I tried the stuff twice—when my endurance was at the breaking point. I was working in the infectious disease department. There were supposed to be 300 beds, but 1,000 men were lying there, suffering from typhoid fever and malaria. We gave them beds and blankets, but they lay right on their great-coats, right on the ground, in their underwear. Their heads were shaven, but lice were all over their clothes and heads. I will never see so many lice again. In the neighbouring village Afghans were walking around in our hospital pyjamas and our blankets on their heads. Yes, our boys would sell everything. I'm not censuring them, mind you. Our boys were dying for three rubles a month.

"It was horrible returning from there. It was strange somehow. It was as if they'd torn all the skin off you. I cried all the time. I couldn't see anyone other than the people who were there. I would spend day and night with them. The conversations of others seemed vain and meaningless. It was this way for half a year. And now I curse on the meat line myself. You try to live a normal life, the way you did 'before'. But you can't. I started being indifferent towards myself and my life. There was nothing to look forward to. But with men this acclimatisation is still more agonising. A woman can cling to her child, but they have nothing to cling to. They return, fall in love, get married, have children, yet Afghanistan figures foremost for them. I want to understand why this is the case myself. What was this? What was all this for? Why does this touch me so? There it was locked up inside me, and here it's surfaced.

"Everyone who was there should be pitied. I am an adult—I was over 30, yet what an unsettling experience that was. But they were young and didn't understand anything; they were told and promised: you are taking part in a sacred cause, the Motherland will not forget you. Now everyone is turning his eyes away from them. People are trying to forget this war. Everyone! Even those who sent us there. Even we ourselves talk less and less about the war when we get together. No one likes this war. However, I still cry when the Afghan national anthem is played. I really came to like all Afghan music. I hear it. It's like a narcotic.

"Recently I ran into a soldier in a bus. We had treated him. He remained without his right arm. I remembered him well—he was also from Leningrad.

"Do you need any help, Sergei?"

"But he replied bitterly, 'You can all go to hell!'

"I know that he'll find me and apologise. But who'll ask forgiveness from him and from everybody who was there? Who was broken by the war? I'm not talking about cripples. How they must have disliked their own people to send them into such a thing."

Galya Pavlova, nurse

"I'd received a letter: 'Don't worry if no letters come. Write to the old address.' Two months of silence. I had no idea that he was in Afghanistan. I packed my suitcases to go to him at his new service location.

"He did not write that he was in the war. He claimed he was getting

a tan and fishing. He sent me a photograph of himself sitting on a donkey, knee-deep in sand. I did not know that people were being shot at and killed until he came home on leave. Then I realised that he was at war, that there was killing. Earlier, he had never played with his little daughter, he had never had paternal feelings, perhaps because she was too little. When he came he would spend hours sitting and looking at the child, and there was such melancholy in his eyes that it was frightening. Mornings he would get up early and take her to kindergarten. He loved sitting her atop his shoulders and carrying her. In the evening he would pick her up. We would go to the theatre or the cinema, but he liked to stay home most of all.

"That day I went to the cinema. I looked at the screen and didn't see anything. I felt an unusual anxiety inside, as if someone was waiting for me, as if I had to go somewhere. I barely sat through the film. Evidently he was in battle at the time.

"For a week I knew nothing. But I was out of sorts all this time. I would turn on the television and turn it off. I would pick up a book and put it down. I walked like I was abnormal. I even received two letters from him. Normally I would have been glad and would have kissed them, but now I was angry: how much longer am I going to have to wait for you?!

"At 5 a.m. on the ninth day a telegram came—the mailman just shoved it under the door. The telegram was from his parents: 'Come. Pyotr's been killed.' I immediately started screaming. I woke the child up. What to do? Where to go? I had no money. It was on that day that his certificate was to arrive. I remember wrapping my daughter in a red blanket and going outside. It was early, the buses weren't running yet. A taxi stopped.

" 'To the airport,' I told the driver.

" 'I'm going back to the garage,' he said, and closed the door.

" 'My husband was just killed in Afghanistan.'

"He silently got out of the car and helped me get in. We stopped at my girlfriend's to borrow money. At the airport there were no tickets to Moscow, and I was too scared to pull the telegram out of my bag and show it. Maybe it was a mistake? If I thought he was alive, then he would be alive. I was crying—everyone was looking at me. They put me on a small plane to Moscow. That night we flew into Minsk. I had to go farther—to Starye Dorogi. Taxi drivers don't want to go there, it's too far—150 kilometres. I begged them. One agreed: 'Give me 50 rubles and I'll take you there.'

"I arrived at 2 a.m. Everybody was crying.

" 'Maybe it's a mistake?'

" 'It's no mistake, Tamara, it's for certain.'

"That morning we went to the military registration and enlistment office. The answer was militarily curt: 'We will notify you when the body is brought back.' We waited another two days. We phoned Minsk: 'Come and pick it up yourself.' We arrived there. At the regional office we were told: 'He was taken to Baranovichi by mistake.' This was another 100 km, and our bus did not have enough gas to get us there. There was nobody at the airport in Baranovichi, as the work day was over. A watchman was sitting in a booth.

" 'We've come...'

" 'Over there,' he said, pointing to the far corner, 'there's some box. Go look. You can take it if it's yours.'

"On the field there was a dirty box, on which 'Lieutenant Dovnar' was written in chalk. I tore off the board in the place where there was a small window in the coffin: the face was whole, but unshaven, and no one had washed him. The coffin was a bit too small. The smell was so

bad that we couldn't bend down to kiss him. That's the way they returned my husband to me.

"I got down on my knees before what had been the most cherished thing for me.

"This was the first coffin in the village of Yazyl, Starye Dorogi District. I remember one thing—the horror in people's eyes. No one understood what was going on, or why. They lowered him into the grave. No sooner had the straps on which he was lowered been pulled out than a horrible thunder and hailstorm began. I remember the hail as white gravel on the blossoming lilac, crunching underfoot. Nature itself was against this. I could not leave his home for a long time because his soul was here. His mother and father and I spoke little. It seemed to me that his mother hated me—I was alive while he wasn't I would remarry, while she wouldn't have her son. Now she says, 'Tamara, get married again.' Back then I was afraid to meet her eyes. His father nearly went mad. 'The bastards, what a lad they killed!' My mother-in-law and I assured him that Pyotr had been decorated with an order, that we needed Afghanistan, that our southern borders had to be protected. He did not want to listen.

"The most horrible part was yet to come—getting used to the idea that I did not have to wait. I had no one to wait for. One morning I woke up sweating in horror: 'Pyotr will come, and Oleska and I are living at another address.' I had to realise that now I was alone and would be alone. But I checked the mailbox three times a day. But all that I received was my own letters that he had not managed to receive, stamped 'Addressee unknown.' I came to dislike holidays. I stopped going visiting. All I had were my memories. Only they gave me joy. I remembered our best moments.

"I was 24 when I was widowed. If any man had approached me in the first few months I would have got married immediately. I was going out of my mind! I did not know how to save myself. Life around me was taking its course—people were building dachas, buying cars, receiving flats, purchasing carpets, red tiling for the kitchen. The normal lives of others proved to me that mine wasn't like that. Only now have I started to buy furniture. I've not got around to baking pies. Can there really be a holiday in my house? In the Second World War the entire country suffered a misfortune. Each family had lost someone. People knew why they had lost near and dear. Women would wail together. The food-preparation school where I work has a staff of 100. I am the only woman whose husband was killed in a war which others only read about in the newspapers!"

**Tamara Dovnar, widow of Lieutenant Pyotr Dovnar
killed in action**

"It was like in a dream, as if I were watching this somewhere, in some film. I now get the feeling I never killed anyone.

"I went voluntarily. I enlisted. I had this overwhelming desire to test myself, to see what I was capable of. I was studying at an institute but there you can't prove yourself. You can't find out who you really are. I wanted to become a hero. I was looking for an opportunity to become one. I left in my second year. People were saying it was a man's war. A boy's war. Only kids fresh out of school were doing the fighting.

"...Above, there were the sun-baked mountains. Below, a little girl was shouting at goats. A woman was hanging out laundry. Just like in the Caucasus back home. I was even disappointed. That night there was a shot at our bonfire. I picked up the teapot, and a bullet was lying under it. The thirst on marches is agonising and humiliating. Your mouth is dry, and you can't gather enough saliva to swallow. It seems you have a

mouth full of sand. We would lick the dew and swallow our own sweat. I had to live I wanted to live!

"In my first battle I saw how some guys get combat shock. They lose consciousness. Some of them even vomit from the very recollection of how they killed. I held out! One of our boys was a hunter who bragged that before the army he'd shot hares and wild boars. But he was always vomiting. Killing an animal is one thing but killing a man is quite another. In battle you become wooden. Cold reason, calculation, mathematics. My sub-machine gun was my life. The gun became a part of your body. Like another arm. I loved it. I used to kiss it.

"It was guerilla warfare there; big battles were a rarity. It was always you against him. You become as sensitive as a lynx. You shoot a burst, and he sits down. You wait. Now what? You've hardly heard the shot, but you've already felt how the bullet has whizzed by. You crawl from one stone to another, hiding. You chase after him, like a hunter. You're a wound spring. You don't breathe. You seize some instant. If it's close quarters, you can kill him with the butt. You've killed, and you sense that you're alive! I'm alive again! There's no joy in killing someone else. You kill to return home.

"It was back home that I came to know the fear of death. When I returned my son was born. I was afraid that if I died my son would have to grow up without me. I remember seven or eight bullets. They could have sent me to the Man upstairs. They barely missed me. I even had the sensation that I had not finished playing, that I had not finished fighting. I was like a lucky hunter. Everything ended quickly.

"I have no guilt feelings, and am not afraid of nightmares. I always chose an honest duel—it was me against him. When I saw two guys beating a POW, his arms tied and laying there on the ground like a rag, I separated them, I didn't let them beat him. I despised people like that. One guy picked up a submachine gun and shot at an eagle. I punched him in the mouth. Why did he have to kill an innocent bird?

"Relatives would ask me:

"‘How was it over there?’

"‘Sorry, I'll tell you later.’

"I graduated from an institute and work as an engineer. I don't want to reminisce. However, I don't know what will become of us, the generation that survived. This is the first time I've spoken out like this. Like two strangers meeting in a train, talking for a while and getting out at different stations. My hands are trembling, I'm nervous for some reason. But it seemed to me that I got out of the game easily. If you write about me don't mention my last name. I'm not afraid of anything. I just don't want to be in all this story."

Sergeant Tomas N., infantry platoon commander

A VIEW FROM PYONGYANG

KIM YONG NAM

Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION AND THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION

THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION (APR) holds an important place in the world, and therefore lasting peace on earth can be guaranteed only if stability in the region is preserved.

This is because the APR accounts for three-fifths of the population and takes up nearly half the surface of the globe. Any upheaval or regional dispute here is fraught with a very great danger for world peace and stability.

There are welcome signs now which make it possible to look forward with optimism to the APR being transformed into a peaceful and prosperous region and to expect the 21st century to become the "era of the Pacific Ocean". This is clear above all in the light of continuous measures for arms reductions and a vigorously unfolding movement for the creation of nuclear-free peace zones.

Ever since 1985, the Soviet government has been coming up with successive initiatives in favour of lowering military confrontation in the region. It has taken steps to cut the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the country's Asian area by 200,000 men and to reduce its military equipment there.

The Chinese government has committed itself to the world not to use nuclear weapons first and taken steps to reduce its armed forces by one million men and to cut military spending by a substantial margin.

The Mongolian government has carried out measures to reduce its armed forces and convert military equipment to civilian uses.

South Pacific countries have by joint efforts concluded a treaty on turning the region into a nuclear-free zone and are working to implement this document. Efforts to create nuclear-free and peace zones are being made in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

Also, the process of resolving regional disputes is being stepped up in the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet Union has evacuated part of its armed forces from Mongolia and withdrawn all its forces from Afghanistan. A cease-fire has been brought about between Iran and Iraq. Efforts to solve the Cambodian problem are intensifying.

The growing trend towards increasing mutual confidence and cooperation between countries of the region may be regarded as a further inspiring sign of positive processes in the APR.

Kim Yong Nam was born in 1928 in Pyongyang. He headed the International Department of the WPK CC from 1972. He has been a member of the WPK CC Political Bureau since 1978. In December 1983, he became Deputy Premier of the Administration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK.

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In short, the legacy of the cold war period—distrust and confrontation—is being gradually overcome, and an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation is shaping up.

On the other hand, contrary to the general trend towards a positive evolution of the situation in the APR, attempts to obstruct the process of detente which pose a threat to peace in the region are continuing. Here the United States, refusing to abandon its obsolete "policy of strength", is implementing a global aggressive, anti-socialist strategy. It is using Northeast Asia as the main theatre for the pursuit of its Asia-Pacific strategy, with the Korean Peninsula becoming the latter's focus. The United States considers South Korea a "forward line of American strategy" and is working hard to set up a system of military aggression in the area. Building up armed forces and nuclear armaments in South Korea, it is spearheading its offensive against our Republic. Every year, in spite of condemnation from world opinion, the United States mobilises large forces and conducts wide-ranging nuclear military manoeuvres code-named "Team Spirit" to train for a preventive nuclear strike against our Republic. It also draws Japan and the South Korean puppet army into "Pacex" and "Rimpac", large-scale military manoeuvres held every year, thereby forcing the pace of the formation of a USA-Japan-South Korea military triangle and trying in effect to set up in the APR an aggressive military bloc of the NATO type.

At the same time, we must note that the United States is all for the "settlement" of regional disputes having no particular bearing on its interests but approaches regional questions such as the Korean one, which has a close relation to US interests, from the position of a "policy of strength". It affirms that in order to settle disputes in other regions, it is necessary to withdraw foreign troops from there. But speaking of American forces in South Korea, it insists on keeping them there and building them up. Such affirmations cannot be backed by any arguments.

All the facts show that solution of the Korean problem is of paramount importance for detente in the APR. Unless tension on the Korean Peninsula is eased, however, lasting peace and security in the world, let alone in the APR, will be out of the question.

Detente is becoming a universal trend today. We see the approach to the Korean question on the part of countries striving for peace and detente as a criterion and the touchstone of the sincerity of their policy.

We sincerely wish the current process of dialogue and detente in international affairs to extend to solving the Korean problem. Korean reunification is emerging on the world political scene as a problem that must be solved.

THREE PRINCIPLES OF REUNIFICATION

THE PROBLEM of Korean reunification consists essentially in ending dominance and interference on the part of external forces, bringing about full national sovereignty, calling a halt to distrust and confrontation between North and South and achieving national cohesion.

The problem of unifying Korea must therefore be settled by establishing Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo (DCRK) on the three principles—*independence, peaceful unification and a great national consolidation*—agreed by the North and the South in their joint Statement of 1972 and unveiled before the world.

The proposal for Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo put forward by the great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, at the Sixth WPK Congress (1980) consists, to put it briefly, in unifying the Motherland by founding a Confederate Republic. It implies that on the basis of reciprocal recognition of the ideologies and systems existing in the two zones, a common national government would be formed and that it would comprise representatives of both zones on an equal footing. The North and the South, led by this gov-

ernment and having equal powers and duties, would each function under a system of regional self-government.

Our proposal correctly defines the status of both the united government and the zonal governments, thereby firmly guaranteeing the possibility of confederative rule. It grants the united government the status of a common national government within the framework of the DCRK while at the same time granting the zonal governments the status of regional governments exercising regional self-government.

This definition of the status of the united government and the zonal governments is very rational by virtue of making it possible to recognise differing ideologies and systems, on the one hand, and to achieve the goal of national unification and guarantee the peculiarities of each system, on the other. The definition of the status of the united government as a common government of the whole nation reflects our people's ardent aspiration and will for unification.

The definition of the status of the zonal governments as regional governments exercising regional self-government reflects realities of our country, which demand that the peculiarities of the social systems of both zones be preserved.

The North and the South of our country differ from each other in ideology and system. In these circumstances, a bid by the North or the South to absolutise its ideology and system and impose them on the other side would inevitably lead to confrontation and collision and deepen the division of the country. Hence in order to unify the country, it is necessary to preserve the peculiarities of the social systems of both zones—North and South—through the mechanism of state power.

In line with this requirement, the proposal for Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo defines the status of the political system of each zone and the zonal governments as that of a system of regional self-government under a self-governing government. Each zonal self-governing government would have to ensure the autonomy of its zone and contribute at the same time to national cohesion and the unitary development of the country.

The proposal therefore regards the two zones—North and South—as zones within one country that would function under a system of self-government, not as independent states of any kind. It also defines the status of the zonal governments as regional self-governing governments enjoying the requisite autonomy under the leadership of a common government of the whole nation, not independent states exercising full power.

The united government would be vested with powers to provide all-round leadership in the interest of national unification and unitary development and with due respect for the autonomy of the zonal governments and the social systems of both zones. In other words, the common government would have to discuss and make decisions on questions of the policy and defence of the Motherland, questions of foreign relations and other matters involving the interests of the country and nation as a whole in accordance with the nation's aspiration for cohesion, unity and cooperation and to speed effort towards ensuring that the country and nation developed on unitary lines.

The common government would also have to respect the social systems of the North and the South and the opinions of the administrative bodies and all the parties, groupings and diverse sections of the population of both parts of the country and to perform a governing function in order to prevent either side from imposing its will on the other.

The zonal government would be empowered to exercise self-government and pursue an autonomous policy, doing so, however, under the leadership of the confederative government and within bounds meeting the fundamental interests and requirements of the whole nation. It would also be obliged to work for the reduction of distinctions in any sphere between

the North and the South and for the guaranteed development of a single country and nation.

Truly, the proposal for Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo provides a correct definition of the statuses of the confederative government and the zonal governments. It is the most realistic and reasonable proposal for building a common state. It allows national cohesion to be achieved, for it is based on the nation's common demands and interests and rises above distinctions in ideology and system.

At present the South Korean population considers the three principles of unifying the Motherland "the highest principles of national unification". It sees their embodiment, the proposal for a Confederate Republic, as an appropriate method of unifying the Motherland and is vigorously advocating its realisation.

With due regard to these conditions and real possibilities and with a view to discussing unification through the establishment of a confederation, we have proposed holding in Pyongyang a political consultative conference of leading representatives of the North and the South who could express the will of all the parties, groupings and diverse sections of the population of both zones.

Yet internal and external splitters, persisting treacherously in intrigues aimed at forming "two Koreas", refuse to respond properly to our proposal. The rulers of South Korea, who have proclaimed a so-called "Northern policy", are trying at active US instigation to demolish the "wall of socialism" and to achieve a breakthrough in the matter of forming "two Koreas" by bringing about "cross-recognition" of these and their "entry into the UN".

Imitating Reagan's absurd call for burying socialism in the grave of history, Bush has said that Americans had watched the failure of ideals and were reading the last chapter of socialism. This is why, for Bush, the effort to use South Korea as a showcase displaying the "superiority" of capitalism on the Korean Peninsula and as a strike force intended to disrupt the socialist countries, primarily our Republic, ideologically and politically amounts to an attempt to kill two birds with one stone.

Not long ago, the rulers of South Korea made a so-called "proposal to unify the country by establishing a Korean national community". The "proposal" is aimed at setting up a transitional system, an intermediate stage on the road to unification. In short, it comes down to perpetuating the present split by separating the North and the South for ever.

It is unrealistic to treat the problem of unifying the Motherland as one of establishing a common system throughout the country, to chart complex "stages" and regard unification itself as a matter for the distant future. This virtually means turning one's back on the nation's innermost aspiration, that is, taking a stand against unification of the Motherland.

Such attempts notwithstanding, we have lately renewed our proposal to the authorities, political parties and organisations of South Korea for convening a conference on national unification, for a meeting of the authorities of North and South and all the parties, groupings and diverse sections of the population to find common ways to unification.

We are certain that the proposal for Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo in the conditions prevailing in our country is a priority unification measure and the only one that the nation can choose. Nevertheless, prompted by the principles of mutual agreement, respect and concessions, we have expressed readiness to discuss without bias and exhaustively also other proposals for unification and to accept them if they are conducive to unification.

If the rulers of South Korea and the leaders of its political parties and social organisations really love their country and people and desire unification, they should not hesitate to rise to the level of a dialogue that could

unite the nation's will for unification, and should work sincerely for the successful holding of a conference on national unification.

A unified Motherland is the greatest and innermost national aspiration of our people. Our people's will for the earliest possible unification of the Motherland and the reconnection of the severed blood vessels of the nation is unshakable.

There may be various difficulties on the road to unification but we will patiently seek a dialogue on unification and will complete at all costs the cause of unifying the Motherland.

DPRK-USSR

OUR PEOPLE'S JUST STRUGGLE for a unified country enjoys widespread international support.

The party, government and people of the Soviet Union actively support the proposal for establishing Democratic Confederate Republic and for high-level military political talks between the North and the South as well as other initiatives of our party and government directed towards an independent peaceful unification of the Motherland. In particular, they express support for and solidarity with our people's struggle for the withdrawal of the US troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea. They declare against intrigues designed to form "two Koreas" and for an independent peaceful unification of the Motherland.

To build up relations of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union is a line which our party and government are steadfastly pursuing. Korean-Soviet relations are entering a new stage of development in the spirit of the accords reached during the meeting between the two countries' leaders in October 1986.

Steps to expand and develop economic and technological cooperation and comprehensive exchanges between Korea and the Soviet Union with due regard to the development of relations between them fully meet the interests of the peoples of both countries.

We will continue working in response to the vital requirements of the revolution and construction in our country, which have entered a new and higher stage, for the further active expansion and development of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union in diverse forms, including economic entrepreneurship.

In conformity with agreements between the two countries, we are going to take an active part in the construction of various projects aimed at developing the Far Eastern and other economic areas.

We are confident that traditional Korean-Soviet friendship will grow in breadth and depth in the interests of both peoples and the common struggle to realise the socialist cause. We will continue doing all in our power to expand and develop it.

TOWARDS A COMMUNITY OF RULE-OF-LAW STATES

ANY PERIOD OF HISTORY is, of course, one of transition, but far from any period of transition is a historic one. It seems, however, that the impression prevailing among the observers in many countries is one of genuinely historic changes taking place at the turn of the 1990s in societies inhabiting our planet, as well as in the conditions of their existence and the character of connections between them.

The point they make most of all, perhaps, is about the eventuality of a basically new type of East-West relationship. For the first forty post-war years this relationship had been dominated by an enemy image and so was ever fraught with a danger of conflict with a fatal outcome for all humanity. That is why it has been so great a relief for many everywhere to find that there is a prospect for it to be deideologised and, at the same time, to become civilised and mutually beneficial.

While everybody welcomes this prospect, in principle, the reasons behind it and the possible implications are seen differently. On the one hand, there is a witty idea of the American political scientist, F. Fukuyama, about the end of history, who holds that the ultimate model of social organisation has been found—"liberal democracy", American style, which all will arrive at, thus bringing about a kind of global social slumber in the context of affluence. On the other hand, there are gloomy predictions by American and, in fact, other observers about destabilised societies and relations between them, resulting from the destruction of black-and-white political and ideological dogmas and corresponding schemes of social, including international, relations.

This confusion in the face of a possibility of having no more of the customary stereotypes of "unprincipled" Western political scientists amazingly resembles the adamant refusal of some mourners over socialism to surrender their principles or the nostalgic hankering for a strong arm of our "liberals"!

And still it is objectively necessary for international relations to be deideologised. World War II and the cold war cost humanity too much. Quite a few nations experienced the "blessings" of ideological bigotry. Fascism, racialism, Stalinism, McCarthyism, fundamentalism... The feeling is that modern civilisation must be made reliably immune from all these "isms" being translated into national policy and from any belief in the only right scheme of social order. It is not the deadends of ultimate schemes but the recognition of diversity and freedom to choose the path of development that bids fair to become the distinguishing feature of the closing decade of the 20th century.

This was the unequivocal feeling of delegates to the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly, which was keynoted by the determination to cast off the shackles of ideologised polemics, the legacy of the cold war, and discover effective solutions to the many uneasy problems facing each nation in particular and the world community in general. The top priority for the growing number of states today is not to possess a particular type of weapon but to be able to assure its population a decent standard of living in the context of democratic freedoms. That is what will determine each nation's

international standing at the close of the century. And, as time goes on, the threats not only to the prestige but also to the security of nations are increasingly seen to arise not so much from external and military factors as from internal and, above all, social and economic sources, although some, especially those who have achieved little in their development, are still trying to unearth internal and external enemies. The world is generally turning away from idol worship to man with his immediate concerns. But does it follow from this that social apathy is setting in and there is no more room for a dedicated search of ways to social progress? This is a premature conclusion as can be seen if only from the fact that far from all even in the USA have been overtaken by the boredom of material affluence, as demonstrations of thousands of homeless in the nation's capital have shown. For millions in other countries, such an idea may sound like a bad, not just funny, joke.

This means that diverse, sometimes conflicting, interests—class, national, cultural and individual—are imperatively making themselves felt. They are bound to clash. But a confrontation, above all, armed confrontation, comes about only if the mechanisms of civilised expression of interests and of balancing them fail to work. This is as true for individual nations as it is for all of them combined. It is not by chance that the UN Charter, this generally recognised Constitution of the world community, require the states not to resort to force and settle disputes peaceably, along with enjoining them to respect the self-determination of peoples, the rights and dignity of every human being. And it was only too natural for the USSR and the USA to take a joint initiative, the first-ever in the entire history of the UN, at the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly by making the appeal to all nations to reaffirm their allegiance to the Charter and to follow the principles enshrined therein.

A pluralist world is not a kingdom of anarchy and unprincipled scramble of everybody against everybody else for their interests. Such pluralism would inevitably resolve itself into violence, first at national, and then at international level. Genuine pluralism is only that which is governed by the rule of law and expresses, in its diversity, the unity of human civilisation.

Universal principles (not a uniform scheme) of resolving social problems in the context of law and order have been worked out by collective experience on the basis of the UN Charter not just by any one country. They are embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the accords reached within the framework of the CSCE process. They imply that all citizens and everyone in particular, irrespective of nationality, religion or other characteristics, can uphold their persuasions in their respective countries, but must not impose them on those who are in the minority, and that all are free to contest open competitive elections of replaceable government bodies and obey the laws passed.

Only a rule-of-law state, based on these principles, can secure the requisite confidence of its own citizens and of other nations. It is capable of democratically working out the most difficult solutions and enforcing them, consolidating society on a sound basis and opposing the forces of destabilisation, aggression and crime. Noting the universal value of these inferences, the UN Secretary-General underlined in his report for 1989 that "the stability of national and international society can only rest upon a foundation of assured human rights".

A democratic system of government can and must be strong. But, unlike an authoritarian system, it is legitimate, and therefore capable of openly and intelligently resolving problems collectively and peaceably, instead of sweeping them under the carpet. It is particularly important to remember this during crisis periods so as to avoid repeating the same old mistakes. Only mistrust of the people and of the humanistic potential of socialism can explain the fear of the hectic debate going on in the USSR Supreme Soviet

and in the country, as a whole, in the run-up to the elections of Republican and local Soviets. Of course, there are deplorable tidal waves of conservatism taking the insufficiency of reforms with an eye to the market economy for the flaws of the market concept as such and choking cooperatives instead of the system of management by injunction, which had been freeing shortages, profiteering and theft for decades. There is, on the other hand, the disheartening sloganising radicalism plumping for a reckless plunge into the free market, instead of proposing a system of "parachutes" in the shape of social guarantees and stimulants for those who will, otherwise, have found themselves out in the cold (for there can be no dynamic economy to speak of without the bankruptcy of thousands of unprofitable enterprises, collective farms and state farms), the decisive, but stage-by-stage moves. Nor can one feel any optimism about the tendency of replacing a serious search for optimal solutions to urgent economic problems by theological disputes about what is and what is not socialistic, as though socialism must mean anything short of the good of the people. Generally speaking, I think that ideology will not feed the people in the coming decades either and attempts at sharpening the "class struggle" between the working class and the intellectual community, cooperators and "non-collective-farm" peasantry can produce no stabilisation except that of a GULAG type, and equality in poverty.

Obviously, there are some interests behind all that; in the first case, those of the hostages of nomenclature-administrative division, fearful of the inevitable and indispensable shake-up in the process of passing over to performance-related distribution, to the true competition in supplying human needs, in which they have to strike the balance themselves by buying or rejecting the commodity produced on the open market. In the second, those of individuals who do not wish to engage in serious politics, let alone in the hard work of reform. And, in the third, those of individuals who are in the habit of associating the "defence" of socialism with protecting their monopoly of power. Sometimes "unparliamentary" debates in our parliament call to mind the ironical aphorism of a prominent politician of Britain, the "birth-place" of parliamentarianism, to the effect that democracy is a disgusting system but nobody has invented anything better as yet. In this sense, history is, indeed, coming to a close, in a way... unless, of course, we find barrack-room socialism of the Stalinist-Brezhnevist brand to be a sensible alternative.

Whatever the passing sacrifices, naturally with violence out of the question, the cauldron of the political debates has to boil passions and crystallise positions, specific proposals lending themselves to rational comparison and consolidation on the perestroika platform. The choice, then, has to be made at the polling stations and, subsequently, by the People's Deputies in the Soviets. Now, the judgement has to be formed by policies, not by individual acts. Only in that case will the Party be discharging its proper political function, the Parliament legislating, and the government doing its real job, without shepherding everybody else. To come together on the ground of democratic process we must first come apart in the campaign period, while, naturally, most carefully protecting the constitutional foundations of the state. In some countries, there is a multi-party system that does it. We may have different forms. But the universal principle, enunciated by the UN, is that to ascertain the will of the people, there must be a process of elections, envisaging real alternatives and that this process must assure all citizens an equal opportunity to stand and to state their political convictions individually or in cooperation with others. Any inaccuracy in the implementation of this principle leads not to good order but, on the contrary, to political disorder fraught with the danger of translating unrealised emotions and ill-considered slogans into most extremist forms, barring the way to the necessary integration.

A rule-of-law state does not resort to violence over its own people and this means that it does not strive for acts of violence upon anybody else.

Therefore, a community of rule-of-law states, with their relations progressively deideologised, far from presenting any danger of destabilisation, consistently nullifies it through openness and cooperation.

All that, apparently, explains the sympathies that our reform process, perestroika, has been winning around the world. So it is without anything like messianic self-adoration, but with a rightful sense of pride in our ability to gain a clarity of vision and in our involvement in world civilisation, that one may quote this passage from the declaration of the First Congress of the Soviet People's Deputies: "...going by international standards and principles, including those laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Accords and agreements at the Vienna meeting, and bringing its domestic legislation into harmony with them, the USSR will contribute towards creating a world community of rule-of-law states." There is no doubt that, building on this ground, the Second Congress of the Soviet People's Deputies will take decisions that will be our country's tangible contribution towards ushering in a new phase of civilised history, the prologue to which can and must be written in the coming decade.

THE WINTER WAR

(Continued from page 215)

The Finns replied that they were willing to begin negotiations, although we had not communicated any specific conditions to them, and it was not clear what the Finns agreed to, properly speaking. Therefore, we additionally passed on our demands to the Finns in writing, and again received their reply about their consent to negotiations.

Germany, on the other hand, did not tell us about the Finnish request (Schulenburg nods his assent)

As far as Britain is concerned, Molotov continues, our plenipotentiary representative was instructed to brief the British Government in broad outline on the subject, as we presume it to have been briefed by the Swedes as well.

We did not touch on the issue of the Åland Islands in these negotiations.

As far as the Petsamo area is concerned, although we had occupied it, we returned this area to Finland, meeting her halfway, since it had been ceded to her by the Soviet Union under the 1920 Treaty. We laid down no conditions concerning Finland's foreign and domestic policies, considering that to be up to Finland herself. Our only reservation was that no military bases must be created in the Petsamo area. The task we set ourselves was to ensure the security of Leningrad and then that of Murmansk and the Murmansk Railway. The issue of renting the Hanko Peninsula was raised with the same view of assuring security.

Schulenburg asked Molotov twice whether or not the question of the Åland Islands had been raised.

Molotov replied each time that the question of the Åland Islands had not been raised.

Schulenburg, having thanked Molotov for his information, declares that that was exactly how he saw the course of these negotiations but, since he had instructions from Ribbentrop, he wanted Molotov to inform him once more, he had to ask for it.

SOVIET REACTORS FOR SDI?

Daniel HIRSCH

IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION

TO BEGIN WITH, I would mention two recent events, both involving unique collaborations between members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and American colleagues

The first event occurred in May 1988. After months of technical studies performed collaboratively by the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, chaired by the then-Director of the Space Research Institute, Academician Roald Sagdeyev, and the Federation of American Scientists, chaired by Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel, the two groups called a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, D. C., to announce a joint proposal for a ban on nuclear power in earth orbit.

U.S.-Soviet scientific collaboration concluded that a ban on nuclear power in earth orbit was feasible and desirable from both a military and environmental point of view.

A JOINT PROPOSAL

TO BAN NUCLEAR POWER IN EARTH ORBIT

The proposal which we put forward on behalf of our two organizations (after two joint workshops) to ban nuclear power in earth orbit grows out of our efforts to prevent both the radioactive contamination of the earth's surface and the extension of the arms race into space. In particular, this agreement would prevent the use of reactors in earth orbit by either side for any purpose—whether offensive or defensive, including the use of reactors to power surveillance satellites.

The use of nuclear power in space is still at an early stage but already there have been accidents which have caused worldwide concern.

An agreement to ban nuclear reactors from orbit would be a major barrier to any future arms race in space since nuclear reactors are compact sources of large quantities of power necessary for many military purposes. Meanwhile, as far as civilian activities are concerned, solar energy collectors and fuel cells will be a more convenient and safer source of energy in earth orbit for the foreseeable future. Energy sources powered by quantities of radioisotopes below and agreed safe threshold could also be permitted for these purposes.

Daniel Hirsch is Director of the Program on Nuclear Policy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and chairs the Working Group on Space Nuclear Power of the Federation of American Scientists. At present he is President of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, Los Angeles, Ca., a non-government political science body researching problems involving nuclear energy use in space.

This article was contributed to INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

The ban on reactors in orbit would not prevent the use of nuclear power for deep space scientific or exploratory missions with associated very limited tests under agreed safeguards of such deep-space reactors in earth orbit.

Verification of a ban on nuclear power in orbit would be relatively straight forward because an operating (or even recently operating) nuclear power source would emit large amounts of detectable infrared, gamma and neutron radiation.

We therefore call for an international agreement to ban nuclear power in orbit and our two organizations plan to continue to work on the technical aspects of this ban in the context of our 5-year Joint Verification Project.

**Ronald Sagdeyev, Chairman of
the Committee of Soviet Scientists
Against the Nuclear Threat**

**Frank von Hippel, Chairman
of the research arm of the
Federation of American
Scientists**

Entirely coincidentally, within hours of the wire service announcement of the press conference, a new story moved on the wires—that Soviet ground controllers had lost control of a reactor-powered satellite known as Cosmos 1900. Its orbit was decaying and unless the situation somehow changed, within a few months it would re-enter the earth's atmosphere, as had a number of other past space nuclear power launches, both Soviet and American.

Despite this unfortunate news, Academician Sagdeyev was outspoken at the news conference, critical both of the American government for its plans to develop dozens of very powerful space reactors for Star Wars purposes and of the Soviet government for continuing to launch reactor-powered satellites such as Cosmos 1900 which can suffer severe accidents. In calling for a ban on all such nuclear sources in orbit, Academician Sagdeyev was asked if he was also calling on his own country to stop using such devices. His response: "The 'new thinking' means getting rid of the old garbage." Academician Sagdeyev's work with American colleagues in trying to find new ways of restraining the militarization of space and the endangerment of the world environment was a powerful lesson in the promise of glasnost and perestroika.

A little more than half a year later, another chapter in the evolving saga of U.S.-Soviet collaboration was written. This time it involved a group of Soviet scientists involved in designing and promoting space reactors, and the American program with which they were cooperating was, of all things, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

This remarkable incident occurred last January at a meeting of key Star Wars contractors and U.S. government SDI officials, held in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The managers of the Strategic Defense Initiative power program and many of their industry colleagues were repeatedly complaining at the meeting how public opposition to space nuclear power, exacerbated by the loss of control of COSMOS 1900 the previous year, was making life much more difficult for those charged with building the devices to power the Star Wars weapons systems and associated sensors. In addition to the troubles faced by Cosmos 1900, in the back of everyone's minds was the public proposal by the American and Soviet scientists' groups for a ban on nuclear power in earth orbit.

The sense of depression that pervaded the large gathering of space nuclear power advocates and SDI managers was perhaps touched off in part by the keynote address by Congressman George Brown, a supporter of the proposal for a ban. Brown, citing the long history of accidents in both the Soviet and American space nuclear power programs as well as the importance of such devices in orbit for the militarization

of space, told the audience that he would be reintroducing legislation into the U.S. Congress to legislate such a ban, contingent upon the Soviet Union ceasing its use of nuclear power in earth orbit as well. Those present recognized that were this proposal to be successful on the American side, and were the Soviets to agree to make the ban reciprocal, the Strategic Defense Initiative would be substantially restrained. Then-director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization General Abrahamson had told the same symposium the year before that space nuclear power would be essential for the second phase of SDI.

The gloomy spirit finally lifted on the last night of the conference. Hope for those managing and building the systems to power Star Wars battle stations and sensors came from a most unlikely place, however—the Soviet Union. A delegation of senior Soviet scientists actively involved in Soviet space nuclear power work had been invited to attend. A special session had been set aside for them. The great hall was packed. Chairing the session was Richard Verga, director of the SDI power office. Co-chairing was Academician Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi, from the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in the USSR. Accompanying Ponomarev-Stepnoi were several other key participants in the Soviet space nuclear power program.

It was a remarkable "love-fest." Those who build the power sources to operate the Soviet RORSAT satellites which track and target U.S. naval groups shared a podium with those who are building the power sources to operate the Star Wars systems to be aimed at the Soviet Union's nuclear missile forces. But the Soviet visitors did more than share a podium. They provided useful technical information as well as political support for the beleaguered U.S. space nuclear power program. Whereas the arms control advocates had their collaboration with Soviet scientists who called for a ban on space nuclear power, the SDI managers had found the cooperation of other Soviet scientists, who not only opposed a ban but called for the expansion of the use of reactors in space. The SDI program officials were beaming, scarcely able to conceal their pleasure.

But the most surprising aspect of this cooperative endeavor was not merely the presence of the pro-nuclear Soviet delegation. Nor was it even the technical presentations they made, providing suggestions that could be useful to the assembled American audience in designing their own reactors. The most remarkable aspect of the entire event was the effort by the Soviet delegation to arrange to sell to the U.S. Soviet space reactors. Driven largely by SDI, which is so opposed by the Soviet Union, the U.S. program to develop reactors, facing a wide range of technical problems, was being offered assistance in the form of offers of already-tested Soviet reactors!

It is indeed a strange new world. One member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences can join with American colleagues in criticizing U.S. plans to use space reactors for Star Wars purposes as well as calling on his own government to cease its use of such devices, while another member of the Academy can join with American SDI officials in opposing such a ban and even offer to sell to Americans Soviet reactors, which could conceivably be used against the Soviet Union.

At the end of the Albuquerque conference, Academician Ponomarev-Stepnoi was asked whether there was opposition within the Soviet Union to the continued use of space nuclear power. He replied that there was such opposition, and went on to say that before he left Moscow, he had received a letter from Academician Sagdeyev arguing that such devices should be banned from earth orbit. The two of them met face-to-face thereafter to discuss the matter further. They continued to disagree about whether there should be such a ban. Ponomarev-Stepnoi said, "He (Sagdeyev) told me his opinion and I told him mine. And we were both so

glad that we each could tell each other our own opinion in our own country finally." To which the audience replied with a rousing round of applause.

This article will attempt to explore the background of this debate: why SDI advocates in the United States so oppose a ban on nuclear power in orbit, and why those concerned with arms control and the environment believe such a ban would be beneficial in preventing the militarization of space and the radioactive contamination of the earth. Perhaps this will help illuminate the debate which is occurring within the Soviet Union as well: should reactors in orbit be banned, or should they be sold to the Americans?

SUMMARY OF CONCERNS ABOUT SPACE NUCLEAR POWER

THOSE CONCERNED WITH slowing or stopping the drift towards the weaponization of space have long faced a difficult verification task. The systems of concern are so varied, and the monitoring problems so complex, that some have wondered whether existing treaties such as the agreement limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems can sustain the assault on them posed by exotic technologies such as laser weapons.

One creative approach to limiting weapons in space has recently been advanced—that of limiting the power sources for such weapons. For a number of reasons, space nuclear power appears to be an important requirement for at least some key components of likely military uses of space. These space weapons applications generally require very large amounts of power, capable of being generated over long periods of time, from very compact energy sources. Nuclear power is widely said to meet these requirements. Controlling nuclear power in orbit may thus be a useful way of restraining the militarization of space.

A ban on orbital uses of such devices would be readily verifiable. After all, reactors give off powerful signals—they produce strong gamma, neutron, positron, and infrared emissions. The presence of reactors in orbit in violation of an agreement banning them would be rapidly known.

In fact, the nuclear emissions from current Soviet reactors have been accidentally and detrimentally detected for years by satellites from the international scientific community engaged in gamma ray astronomy. It has recently disclosed that radiation from Soviet reactors powering RORSATs (Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites) has been producing spurious signals in detectors on board scientific satellites attempting to probe the universe for gamma ray emissions, seriously interfering with these scientific endeavors. A ban would protect this important enterprise; a substantial increase in the number and power of orbiting reactors could well mean the end of gamma ray astronomy.

In addition to restraining the militarization of space and protecting an important arena of civilian international scientific inquiry, a ban on nuclear power in earth orbit would provide significant protection for the earth environment itself. Approximately 15 % of past space nuclear power missions, both Soviet and American, have suffered accidents or malfunctions of one sort or another. Several of these have involved release of radioactive material into the environment. These risks are likely to increase by orders of magnitude unless there is a change of course. Current plans to markedly increase both the number and energy output of nuclear power sources in orbit suggest that we stand at a threshold of risk. If a bilateral ban can be adopted now, before these major space weaponization projects are launched and these very much more radioactive devices are built, the earth environment would receive

important protection from nuclear accident and space would be given a useful reprieve from threatened weaponization.

These benefits are discussed in more detail below.

BACKGROUND

THERE ARE TWO BASIC TYPES of space nuclear power—reactors and radioisotope generators. The former operates by the splitting of a fissile material, generally uranium-235, the latter by using the heat generated by the radioactive decay of a radioisotope source, generally plutonium-238. In each case the energy released is then transferred into useful form, in most cases by direct conversion into electricity.

To date, the United States has tended to rely on plutonium radioisotope sources for space uses, while the Soviet Union has focused on space reactors. That is now changing, with the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative spurring development of a number of new and much more powerful space nuclear systems to operate orbital Star Wars devices, all but one of these new systems are reactor-based.

The early history of space nuclear power is quite similar in both countries. The U.S. launched its first radioisotope generator in 1961, the USSR in 1965. The U.S. launched its first nuclear reactor in 1965; the USSR in 1968. More ominously, the U.S. suffered its first space nuclear power accident in 1964, just three years after its first launch; the first Soviet space nuclear power accidents are believed to have occurred in 1969, just four years after the first Soviet launch of a nuclear source.

The United States has launched 22 spacecraft with plutonium sources and one with a reactor (which failed after 43 days). The Soviet Union has launched over 30 reactors and several radioisotope sources. The last U.S. launch was in 1977, the last for the USSR was in early 1988, shortly before control was lost of COSMOS 1900. Since the Cosmos 1900 affair, the Soviet Union has observed an informal, unannounced moratorium on space reactor launches, as it did after the previous accidents with COSMOS 954 and COSMOS 1402. The world watches closely to see if the near-miss with COSMOS 1900 has caused some "new thinking" in the Soviet Union regarding space nuclear power, or whether it will once again resume the practice of placing highly radioactive and accident-prone power sources in near-earth orbit.

THE SOVIET PROGRAM

THE SOVIET UNION uses space nuclear power primarily to operate its Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSATs). These are designed to track U.S. naval groups. RORSATs are reactor-powered because they operate at low altitude where solar collectors would provide too much atmospheric drag. The reactor core is designed to be boosted into higher orbit at the end of its useful life to prevent reentry while still radioactively dangerous. It is precisely the failure of that boosting system that led to the accidents involving Cosmos 954 and 1402 and the problem faced by Cosmos 1900 much of 1988.

The earliest of the Soviet space reactors was the Romashka, said to have produced on the order of .5 kilowatts of electricity using uranium carbide fuel in graphite. The subsequent Topaz space reactors are reported to have had a power level up to 220 kilowatts of thermal energy, utilizing 12 kg of fuel, enriched to 90 per cent. Debris recovered in Canada from the Cosmos 954 accident in 1978, however, indicated that the reactors used to power the RORSATs were neither Romashka nor Topaz designs. Information released to the IAEA at the time of the Cosmos 1900 incident indicates that that reactor uses uranium-molybdenum

alloy, 90 per cent enriched uranium, for a total weight of 31.1 kilograms. The reactor core contains 37 cylindrical elements with facing beryllium reflectors.

Recently it was revealed that the Soviet Union had space-tested a new, more efficient model of the Topaz reactor, producing about 10 kilowatts of electricity. Two were launched in 1987. Reactor operation for the first was reportedly terminated after 6 months because of failure of attitude control for the satellite. The second was shut down after a year of operation because of a degradation in performance of reactor power output.

Some in the U.S. military view the Soviet reactor-powered RORSATs as a major threat because of their capability to assist in targeting U.S. naval groups for attack. In fact, in recent months the RORSATs have become a primary justification for efforts to renew American Anti-Satellite (ASAT) programs after a several-year Congressionally-mandated moratorium. Additionally, in Congressional testimony, in 1989, the Director of Naval Intelligence said, in the context of his claim that a Soviet space-based laser may be demonstrated in the next few years, "Recent introduction of a more powerful, compact nuclear power module (by the Soviet Union) may be a critical step toward development of a space-based ASAT by the mid-1990s." Thus, both the RORSAT program, currently suspended in the wake of the COSMOS 1900 accident, and the development by the Soviet Union of more powerful reactors are viewed as threatening and used by advocates within the U.S. military for ending the current U.S.-U.S.S.R. moratorium on ASAT testing.

SDI AND U.S. SPACE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS

TO DATE the United States has relied primarily on relatively small plutonium isotope power sources, largely for navigational, meteorological, lunar, and deep space missions. None has been launched since 1977, although a plutonium source for the Galileo mission to Jupiter was scheduled to be launched by the space shuttle in the trip immediately after the ill-fated Challenger mission. After the Challenger exploded, reassessment of the risks of having a plutonium source aboard with a liquid rocket upper stage in the cargo compartment led to delay and redesign of the mission with a solid rocket booster to get Galileo on its way to Jupiter once released from the shuttle.

The small scale and generally non-military character of the U.S. space nuclear program changed dramatically with the advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Major efforts are underway to design reactors orders of magnitude more powerful and longer-lived than any reactor ever put into space before by any of the terrestrial nations. Under some scenarios, SDI might require in the range of one hundred of these large reactors in orbit.

SDI power officials indicate that space nuclear power could provide energy for Star Wars battle stations and sensors in three different modes of operation: "housekeeping," "alert," and "burst" modes. Space reactors could power weapons, such as lasers and particle beams and hypervelocity guns, as well as tracking and targeting sensors and radars, in addition to numerous other components of overall architectures. It is often argued that space nuclear power is uniquely suited for these military purposes, because of its relative hardness and survivability, compact size and low mass of its fuel, and its ability to provide very large amounts of power over long periods of time. It is precisely these attributes that make space nuclear power so attractive for weapons purposes in space that make the control of space nuclear power such an attractive means of restraining the weaponization of space.

Despite pledges by President Reagan that SDI would be "non-nuclear," approximately 10 per cent of the SDI budget goes for the development of nuclear-bomb-pulsed or nuclear-powered systems. SDIO has worked on five bomb-pulsed concepts and five that require nuclear power. The nuclear bomb-pulsed systems include the X-ray laser and four less well-known concepts that require the detonation of an nuclear explosive. The SDI concepts that rely on nuclear reactors or radioisotope systems are: SP-100—a liquid-metal-cooled, fast reactor, fueled with weapons-grade uranium, designed to operate at about 2.3 megawatts (thermal), providing 100 kilowatts of electricity for 7 years. Future designs are supposed to increase the reactor power to about ten times the original design.

Multi-Megawatt Reactor—planned to provide tens of megawatts of electricity for up to a year for alert mode for battle stations or hundreds of megawatts for hundreds of seconds for burst mode for directed energy and related weapons. This system is much less far along than SP-100, but would doubtless be very large, one design concept involves radiators the size of football fields.

Dynamic Isotope Power System (DIPS)—a system providing up to 10 kilowatts of electricity from the heat generated by the decay of several dozen kilograms of plutonium-238, an extraordinarily large amount from a radiological protection standpoint, if released in an accident.

FALCON (Fission Activated Laser Concepts)—a reactor concept involving direct pumping of a laser weapon by fission fragments from an operating reactor.

Centaurus—a second reactor project involving direct pumping by a nuclear reactor of a directed energy weapon. Full cost of the program, to time of completion, is estimated as \$2.5 billion.

General Abrahamson, the United States Department of Energy, the American Physical Society, and the U.S. Congress's Office of Technology Assessment have all indicated that nuclear power may be essential for at least a second phase of SDI. General Abrahamson has pointed out the needs for large amounts of energy to power the Star War's battle stations and sensors and said that without space nuclear power, "that's going to be a long, long lightcord that goes down to the surface of the earth." The risks associated with large amounts of power available for weapons purposes in space are substantial.

Additional dangers come from the risk of accident. Because these risks increase markedly as the size and number of space reactors increase, the world soon may, unless orbital space nuclear power is banned, cross a threshold both in the risk of militarizing space and in contamination of the earth with radioactivity.

HISTORY OF ACCIDENTS

THE HISTORY of space nuclear power is a troubled one. On the order of one in seven launches involving such sources has ended in some kind of failure. The most serious of these to date are probably the U.S. SNAP-9A accident in 1964 and the Soviet COSMOS 954 accident in 1978. The former tripled the amount of plutonium-238 in the world environment, and increased by about 4 % the amount of all isotopes of plutonium; the latter spread radioactive debris over about 100,000 square kilometers of northwest Canada. A summary of past accidents, Soviet and American, follows, drawing largely upon a compilation prepared by Steven Aftergood of the Committee to Bridge the Gap, which monitors space nuclear power developments. (See "Towards a Ban on Nuclear Power in Earth Orbit," Space Policy, February 1989.)

- 1964 A U.S. Transit navigational satellite with a radioisotope power source on board failed to achieve orbit. The plutonium-238 device disintegrated in the atmosphere, where it was spread globally. About 17,000 curies of plutonium-238 were released into the world environment.
- 1965 The only reactor launched into space by the U.S. malfunctioned after 43 days. Although shut down and in a long-lived orbit, portions of the satellite are reported to have begun to break up.
- 1968 Another U.S. satellite containing plutonium power sources suffered an accident when the mission was aborted due to a launch failure. The plutonium devices fell into the ocean just off Santa Barbara, California. After a search of nearly half a year, the plutonium sources were recovered.
- 1969 A Soviet launch failure is reported early in the year which may have involved a reactor-powered RORSAT.
- 1969 Later in the year, two unmanned lunar probes were launched by the USSR. Both reentered the atmosphere; it is believed one or both carried a polonium-210 source and it is reported that radioactivity was detected in the atmosphere following re-entry.
- 1970 Apollo 13, a US lunar mission, was aborted. The lunar lander was jettisoned and fell into the Pacific Ocean with its plutonium power supply on board.
- 1973 Due to a launch failure, a Soviet reactor-powered RORSAT fell into the Pacific north of Japan.
- 1978 Perhaps the most famous accident to date, COSMOS 954 reentered the atmosphere and broke up, spreading thousands of pieces of radioactive debris over a wide area of Canada. The accident led to widespread condemnation of the Soviet Union and calls for banning reactors in orbit.
- 1983 The Cosmos 1402 reactor core re-entered the atmosphere, disintegrated, and dispersed its radioactive inventory.
- 1988 For nearly half a year, Cosmos 1900 failed to respond to radio commands to boost into a higher orbit and automatic backup failed to work. The reactor-powered RORSAT slowly decayed, until, miraculously, just days before it was to reenter, one back-up system was finally triggered.

The most recent accident, that of COSMOS 1900, kept the world's attention most of the summer last year as the reactor slowly lost altitude, bringing it ever closer to return to earth and release of its radioactive inventory. Safety systems that had failed to operate as planned for many months finally became operational only days before final reentry would have occurred. It is reported in the West that what caused the last-minute activation of the boosting backup system after half a year of not working was that the satellite finally ran out of attitude control propellant, causing one of the safety systems to at last be activated. This fortuitous last-minute event would be analogous to a car speeding out of control towards a group of children, brakes not working, which at the last possible moment runs out of gas.

Cosmos 1900, as well as the previous accidents, Soviet and American, represent a warning: rethink the use of nuclear power in space before there is a quantum leap in risk. Unfortunately, some space nuclear power advocates in both countries have failed to get the message. In fact, shortly after the Cosmos 1900 affair ended, TASS reported that major figures in the Soviet space nuclear power program "arrived at a conclusion that the success of the operation makes it possible to substantially reduce restrictions on the scope of application of nuclear power plants in outer space." Substantial expansion of these programs and reduction

of safety restrictions would be "old thinking" or "status quo plus." The current situation calls for something quite different.

THE PROLIFERATION RISKS

AN ADDITIONAL RISK associated with space nuclear power is that of nuclear proliferation. These reactors generally use highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficiently enriched to make the weapon-grade. Soviet reactors are reported to use fuel enriched to 90-93 per cent. The U.S. SP-100 reactor will use on the order of 200 kilograms of uranium, most of it enriched to 97 per cent. In either case, the material is of sufficiently high enrichment that it could be used to fabricate nuclear bombs if it got into the wrong hands.

This poses more of a problem for reactor designers than may be at first apparent. Soviet space reactors were at first designed to reenter intact. When radioactive fragments from the Cosmos 954 accident were scattered over a large area of Canada, creating an international incident, the reactors were redesigned to disintegrate upon reentry into the atmosphere. The radioactivity is not eliminated, but rather dispersed globally. US space nuclear power designers initially designed for disintegration in the atmosphere upon reentry, but after the SNAP-9A accident in 1964, in which the plutonium was dispersed throughout the world, subsequent devices were designed for intact reentry. There is no good solution--either the radioactivity comes down in chunks in one area or is dispersed globally.

When one is dealing with large quantities of weapons-grade uranium, however, the design problem becomes more difficult. Should the reactor come back intact, particularly before the reactor has been operated for any substantial period, many bomb's worth of weapons-usable material could be available for a nation or even group interested in obtaining a nuclear capability. Given the extreme interest some parties have evidenced in obtaining such materials, and given the overriding international interest in preventing such proliferation, the prospect of a couple of hundred kilograms (many bomb's worth) of HEU literally falling out of the sky is troubling. U. S. designers--faced with the quandary of designing for intact reentry and thus being caught with this proliferation risk or designing for high-altitude burnup and thus global dispersion of the radioactivity--at one point proposed a typical bureaucratic compromise, to design the reactor to break apart into sub-25 kilogram quantities of HEU (25 kilograms of HEU represent the threshold levels of the International Atomic Energy Agency for diversion of strategically significant quantities of weapons-grade uranium). The proposal was rejected, but is indicative of the range of problems associated with space nuclear power. It makes possible the militarization of space, it risks repeated accidents involving release of radioactivity into the environment, and it can make possible the spread of weapons-grade uranium in a world where lack of access to such material is the primary remaining barrier to acquisition of nuclear weapons.

INTERFERENCE WITH GAMMA RAY ASTRONOMY

IT HAS RECENTLY BEEN DISCLOSED that the current Soviet reactors have been interfering with gamma ray astronomy being conducted by the international scientific community. Light "light pollution" from cities interfering with nearby optical groundbased astronomical observatories, the presence in earth orbit of radioactive reactors has made life very difficult for scientific satellites designed to watch for minute bursts of radiation from the far reaches of the universe. These gamma

ray observatory satellites have been picking up for years gamma ray emissions from Soviet reactors. In addition, the reactors emit positron-electron pairs, which form artificial radiation belts through which other satellites then fly, resulting in annihilation events in the scientific satellite, overloading its sensors. Current space nuclear power operations have damaged these scientific endeavors; a major increase in either the power or number of such reactors in earth orbit, as is proposed, could well mean the end of this very important aspect of our efforts to better understand the universe in which we live.

VERIFICATION OF A BAN

THE ABOVE DISCUSSION of interference with gamma ray astronomy by emissions from space reactors has a positive side to it, however. It shows that a ban on reactors in orbit would be readily verifiable.

Studies performed by the Federation of American Scientists and the Committee of Soviet Scientists have demonstrated that such a ban could be verified in a number of ways. The radiators for the reactors will give off strong infrared emissions. These could be detected from earth or by satellites as far away as geosynchronous orbit. The gamma ray emissions from the reactors could be detected at substantial distances in space or even by balloon-borne instruments in the atmosphere, as evidenced by the repeated detection of current reactors by civilian gamma ray observers. The positron emissions likewise provide a powerful indication. The neutron emissions are one more indicator. In addition to all these radiation signals, standard optical, radar and operational characteristics would provide high confidence in monitoring a ban on reactors in orbit.

PRESERVATION OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER FOR LEGITIMATE SCIENTIFIC DEEP-SPACE MISSIONS

WHEREAS MISSIONS requiring use of space nuclear power in earth orbit appear to be exclusively military, there are certain potential applications for scientific and deep space exploratory purposes. This is particularly true of missions extending far from the sun, making the use of solar cells impractical. The proposed ban was carefully crafted so as to not impact adversely on legitimate scientific uses of space nuclear power. By drawing a dividing line this side of the moon, the proposed ban prohibits precisely those activities which pose military and environmental threats while permitting those which are largely environmentally benign and scientifically beneficial.

CONCLUSION

THERE ARE NUMEROUS REASONS for supporting a ban on nuclear power in orbit. It would be a useful way of restraining the weaponization of space. It would provide a strongly verifiable way of maintaining existing treaty regimes such as the ABM Treaty, currently under such attack. A mutual ban, affecting both Soviet RORSATs and the American SDI space nuclear program, would both reduce political and military pressures for breaching the current bilateral ASAT testing moratorium and remove a major power source that could be used for such ASATs. The ban on reactors in orbit would save gamma ray astronomy from possible interference or even its elimination, and it would preserve the space nuclear option for legitimate scientific deep space missions. A ban would protect the earth environment from accidents involving release of radioactivity from re-entering space nuclear power sources, and would eliminate a nuclear proliferation risk.

There is an important moral issue involved as well. When a space reactor re-enters the atmosphere, the potential radiation consequences of the accident will generally be borne by nations other than that which launched it. The people affected will have had no say whatsoever in the decision; the nations bearing the injury will not be the same as that which determined it would have a benefit by launching the device in the first place. Benefit—such as it is—accrues to one nation, the decision is made by one nation, but the risk is borne by all.

This is an important time for consideration of such an agreement. The Soviet Union has in place an informal moratorium on launches of further space reactors, in the wake of the COSMOS 1900 accident. After previous accidents, similar moratoria have been established, but they have to date always been temporary. The world will be closely watching whether the lesson of the risks involved has been finally learned, or whether this will be merely another pause in the Soviet space nuclear power program.

The Soviet Union has major financial pressures on its space program. It is to be expected that there will be debate as to whether space nuclear power is a high priority expenditure in the wake of those pressures; such debate is occurring in the U.S., where many doubt that the \$1 billion estimated cost for flight-testing the first SP-100 space reactor will be justified in light of the budget constraints being felt.

But most importantly, this is an important time to seriously consider a ban on nuclear power in orbit because we stand at a major threshold of risk. To date these devices have been relatively small in number and in power. But both countries are contemplating more powerful reactors, and the U.S. is considering a program that may involve as many as a hundred such devices for its Star Wars program. Before that threshold is crossed, let us seriously rethink the matter.

When I was in Moscow in September 1989, during the COSMOS 1900 crisis, I was told by officials in the Foreign Ministry, "If the U.S. government were to say to the U.S.S.R. 'Let us consider neither of us launching into outer space nuclear power,' and such a matter were to be mutual, it would be very seriously considered by the Soviet side." I asked if I could pass that message on to the representatives of the U.S. government, and was told I could. A few days later I briefed representatives of the U.S. State Department and testified before a Senate Committee on the matter. Perhaps the time has now come for the Soviet government and the American government to begin such direct discussions. An initiative by either side to begin such consultations might be quite appropriate and produce useful results.

The other alternative is for the Soviet Union to end its informal moratorium on space reactor launches imposed after the COSMOS 1900 affair and to proceed to offer to sell such devices to the Americans, and for the U.S. to proceed with its plans for perhaps scores of space reactors to power its Star Wars systems. Whatever the decisions reached, they should occur only after thorough and public debate in both countries.

The Pause in the Revolution?...

Akbar ZAIDI

WITH THE FAILURE of socialism in the Third World and with the end of the myth of the socialist orientation, there has been a growing intellectual lobby, notably in the Soviet Union, which has begun to propagate the theory that to achieve socialism in developing countries one needs to pass through capitalism. This theory proceeds that to achieve a socialist revolution, it is necessary to go through the process of a bourgeois democratic revolution, and we need to fulfil most bourgeois democratic tasks before we make any attempt to achieve the goal of socialism.

There are two typical statements:

"The relatively rapid growth of capitalism in the Third World over the past two-odd decades has merely confirmed the Marxist conception of social progress, this process, as well as being natural, has been greatly expedited by the economically more powerful and dynamic capitalist system, there being no serious counterweight to it, above all with the emergence of transnational companies as an effective instrument for promoting capitalism in the Third World."

"Where the social class structure is immature and social consciousness low, collective forms of property cannot, as a rule, play a steadily progressive role in the national economy. On the contrary they are likely to hamper social and economic progress. As regards private capitalist enterprise, its historically progressive role goes beyond providing material prerequisites for socialism. It is in this phase of capitalist development that the basis for bourgeois democracy is laid and a civilian society formed. Besides, the proletariat gets schooling in the class struggle, which is slack in state enterprises."

This is Alexei Kiva's opinion. He is the head of the Sector of the Working Class and Communist Movement at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies and the quotes above are taken from his recent article "Developing Countries, Socialism, Capitalism" which has been published in the influential *International Affairs* (March 1989). Kiva's article typifies an approach towards the Third World which has been developing over the last few years following perestroika in the Soviet Union (see recent issues of *International Affairs*, *Asia and Africa Today*, *Social Sciences*, etc.). So when speaking about his views I mean some other Soviet authors as well.

The present Soviet thinking about the development towards socialism especially in the Third World, is a complete about turn from what was being said in the past concerning Imperialism and revolution. The need to reassess and reevaluate their previous thinking, has come about, as they say, due to an evaluation of the Third World countries in the last three decades which were until recently strongly vested in the pro-Imperialist camp. The change has also been resulted by a much more important process which is still going on, that of perestroika. The new

Soviet thinking about every concept, old and new, has been affected markedly by the changes brought about by Gorbachev and representatives of the New Soviet Society. Although this is not the forum to discuss the pros and cons and effects of perestroika, one thing is clear that the new Soviet thinking has developed due to the numerous contradictions and inefficiencies in their economic and political structure.

One dimension of the economic quagmire of Soviet society and the result of perestroika has been the need to develop and expand trade and economic relations with even bourgeois and repressive states, whether developed or underdeveloped. The reasons for ignoring the class and state structure of these countries result from the appalling state of the Soviet economy and thus the need to find whatever means possible so that the poor Soviet economy can prosper (see recent Soviet publications). Thus the economic considerations of the Soviet economy outweigh by far, the ideological dimension of the theory and practice of developed socialism. This impact of perestroika on how the Soviet Union views the Third World, will profoundly influence the prospects of revolution in underdeveloped countries and will give a new dimension to the working class and revolutionary movement in these countries.

It is the purpose of this essay to explore the potential impact and consequence of the new Soviet thinking regarding the revolutionary road in underdeveloped countries.

At this stage, I need to point out an important aspect of the debate and of my critique. My only interest with theory is how it relates to practice. The topic under discussion deals with a theory being propagated which will have grave consequences for the revolutionary process in the Third World. The Soviet Union is considered to be the intellectual leader of the International Revolutionary Movement, and any theory which gains credence in the Institutions of Advanced Thought and Learning in Moscow, is considered the final word for the hundreds of Communist and Revolutionary parties all over the world. We have suffered the consequences of this blind faith in the recent past when the meaningless Non-Capitalist Path of Development was dictated onto the underdeveloped countries by Moscow under the guise of the National Democratic Revolution. Before such a mistake is repeated, and taking advantage of the (used and misused) phenomenon and concept of "perestroika", there is need for abundant debate among all revolutionaries in all quarters of the world, developed and underdeveloped.

THE SOVIET THESIS

ALEXEI KIVA not only has the advantage of living and working in a state based on the teachings of Marx and Lenin, the fact that he heads an important department at the Institute of Oriental Studies, gives him abundant direct access to the revolutionary movement in practice, as well as to a theoretical analysis of it. Again, Kiva's official position at the Institute also allows him access to many trends in the revolutionary movement. But it is his official position itself which gives his work and words the authority of opinion and thus, he cannot be given the luxury of irresponsibility. True, these are not the days of Stalinism when there was no such thing as a personal independent opinion, but, nevertheless, Kiva's work must exemplify a strand (if not *the* strand) in the official Soviet view regarding the revolutionary process in the Third World.

Kiva is a Marxist, but as I proceed to show, his lack of understanding of Hegel and of dialectical materialism, makes his a literal, vulgar and mechanistic Marxism. But first, to his main thesis.

In the 1960s, Kiva writes, "It [public opinion] rejected capitalism as a system which has bred colonial rule, as an inhuman system incompatible with traditional concepts of social justice, collectivism and humanism. Capitalism was also rejected because it was believed incapable of assuring backward countries rapid economic growth" (p. 55).

Some underdeveloped countries which had gained freedom from colonialism preferred socialism, according to Kiva, because their leaders wanted to impose political power on their people and wanted to control a centralised (Stalinist) state structure. For this reason, they were allergic to Western democracy and to bourgeois parliamentary government: "any democratic form of government, whatever its social class substance, was an obstacle to their setting up dictatorial and in many cases totalitarian regimes" (p. 56). However, there were major problems with the mere desire for socialism, and as Kiva says, the material basis for socialism was non-existent "Most countries which declared to be committed to socialism lacked both developed industries and a modern proletariat..."

The result: "The hopes for rapidly ending the economic backwardness by following a non-capitalist road were .. dashed. So was our hope that new states of Asia and especially Africa would substantially reinforce world socialism by joining it" (p. 57).

Kiva concludes his analysis of socialism in the Third World by saying that the idea that "it was considered possible to build socialism virtually regardless of how backward the country concerned was .. was evidence of a vulgar approach to social processes" (p. 58). And socialism is not feasible in underdeveloped countries because there exists "a backward social class structure of society, primarily the absence of a developed proletariat, ... the predominance of traditional forms of ideology and the inability of archaic social consciousness to adopt and assimilate an advanced ideology, Marxism-Leninism" (p. 59). After the reasons why socialism cannot triumph in the underdeveloped countries, Kiva goes on to the analysis of "a backward society and capitalism".

We are told that if a society is too underdeveloped for socialism, this does not necessarily mean that it is ripe for rapid capitalist development; nevertheless, "capitalism is 'genetically' closer to these societies than socialism" (p. 59). He asks after an analysis of developed capitalism: "what does the situation of developing countries suggest in the present historical context, against the background of today's balance of world forces? Calling a spade a spade, we must admit that the development of capitalist relations in new states is historically progressive for all its drawbacks. Attempts to prevent it where there is no alternative can merely prolong the existing backwardness" (p. 61). For Kiva, "capitalism has shown exceptional vitality in many states... while the majority of socialist-oriented countries are in a state of deep stagnation" (p. 62). Thus, the new strategy for the working class and revolutionary movement in underdeveloped countries is defined: *bring in capitalism*.

A MARXIST CRITIQUE

IN THIS SECTION I will attempt a Marxist critique on the theoretical and especially the political consequences of adopting the Kiva strategy, which, as I hope to show, is a road which would lead to the suicide and annihilation of the working class and revolutionary movement in most of the Third World.

Kiva has overlooked two important tenets of dialectical materialism and thus his thesis is inapplicable in the way he would like us believe.

Firstly, he fails to see developments and phenomena in their specific historical context, in space and time. In addition, he does not appreciate how things connect with each other and how the development of one affects other factors.

For Kiva, if something, a process or a phenomenon, was good and progressive in the 18th or 19th century, it is still considered good and progressive at the dawn of the 21st century. Capitalism, and even colonialism were progressive in a certain historical context, when in Europe, capitalism was indeed building a proletariat, uniting workers, etc., and colonialism was sweeping away pre-feudal and pre-capitalist economic and social obstacles to progress. But, can one still feel the same way about capitalism, either in the developed countries or in the underdeveloped countries, or about Imperialism at the dawn of the 21st century? I fear not. Capitalism is a progressive phenomenon, but only upto a point. This progressive nature has been passed long ago in developed countries, and even in many underdeveloped countries (notably Latin America, some Far Eastern countries, India, Pakistan, Iran, etc., and even in some African countries). So, few countries still exist with a dominant pre-capitalist mode, while a handful of others may have pockets of underdeveloped areas which are, nevertheless, vociferously being drawn into the expanding capitalist orbit. So, capitalism has enveloped most of what is called the Third World, but is it the same force as it was and as Kiva would like it to be in the 18th century? Certainly not.

The world economy since the beginning of this century and much more so since the Second World War has changed dramatically and such grand, sweeping comparisons as Kiva makes with the earlier and middle period of capitalism, are unscientific, to say the least. Capitalism conditioned by a dominating Imperialism at the dawn of the 21st century bears no resemblance to the earlier European capitalism, even in those areas of the Third World which are only just coming into the wider orbit of capitalism. Where capitalism is only just being implanted, even in these areas the seeds that have been planted are *completely different* from those of the 18th and 19th centuries. *There is no comparison.* Kiva is unwilling to entertain the possibility that capitalism may have changed in very significant ways during the last 150 years. Thus, any attempt to show the similarity between a process a couple of centuries ago with a *different process* today, is meaningless. Only an evaluation of the completely different and new form of capitalism, but with the continuity of history (the present as a historical process) can help us see the present dynamics in the Third World.

And what has this capitalism done in the underdeveloped countries since its inception? Most certainly, it has revolutionised society, made productive sectors grow, increased the quality of the working class, and so on. But again, is this an endless process? Does capitalism always remain progressive, destroying pre-capitalist forms, or does a stage in history confront us where capitalism fails to remain a progressive revolutionary force which it may have been in the same country a few decades ago? Latin America, the earliest region of the Third World to become capitalist and to be thoroughly integrated into the world capitalist economy, is a good example where capitalist development (other than in a few pockets), no longer plays the progressive role attributed to it.

Imperialism today is again, certainly not what it was in the guise of colonialism a couple of centuries ago. Not only were the colonial/Imperial powers at a different stage (both qualitatively and quantitatively) of development that they are now, today, the Scientific and Technical Revolution and militarism have given a completely *uncomparable*

dimension to the form and role of colonialism of the 18th and 19th century. Kiva fails to see the effects of Imperialism at the dawn of the 21st century, the new type of Imperialism, more advanced, more sophisticated, more ruthless. In the discussion below, I will deal in more detail with the political effects of Imperialism in underdeveloped countries, but for now it would suffice to reach a conclusion using Kiva's logic. If Imperialism is such a progressive force, in the sense that it is the most developed and advanced form of capitalism as Kiva would like us to believe, and with the help of this Imperialism we in the Third World can throw away the vestiges of pre-capitalist formations and 'develop' like our fellow human beings in the advanced capitalist countries, then it should follow that it is in our interest that we should ask the United States and other Imperialist powers to take over the Third World unfettered, and we should not create any barriers to stop this process. If we follow Kiva, we should give our countries to the Imperialist powers, maybe on a contractual rental basis and let them come here and develop our societies, while we wait until the fruit is ripe and drops in our lap. Let them develop the poor countries, this is an easier solution than the attempt to develop, given the numerous constraints, ourselves. And thus, we should not condemn Apartheid, for the white settlers are from an advanced mode of production than the native blacks and this white civilization is far superior to the black South Africans and they are fools when they fight against the white people, for they should accept and appreciate the modern, sophisticated and advanced culture.

Ronaldo Munck has adequately summarised the grave shortcoming in Kiva's faith in capitalism today. Munck says that "we must dispense with any unilinear model—whether liberal or Marxist—which expects historical replication in today's Third World of what happened in Western Europe in the last century".¹ Kiva has seen the problems of the Third World through Eurocentric glasses and has used problems and concepts of the developed countries and applied them to the underdeveloped countries. He fails to realize that the Third World is different from the developed countries *at any stage in their history*, and thus his faith in capitalism as a necessary and liberating force in the modern age of Imperialism disregarding time and space is meaningless. He has fallen into the trap of "using Marx's works as conclusions rather than as guides for inquiry".

Kiva seems to be quite obsessed with the growth of productive forces without really considering the many ramifications, of the growth of capitalism. For him, it produces a working class, the grave-digger of capitalism. This of course is over-simplistic and the development of capitalism has important political repercussions which are discussed in more detail below. Kiva fails to see that the growth of capitalism also develops other forces which may not be as amicable to the revolution as are the working class. Furthermore, there is no longer a simplified (18th and 19th century) correlation between capital and labour. The development of capitalist enterprise need not mean a very great increase in the working class. The Scientific and Technical Revolution has to some extent done away with a large potential pool of the working class, and automation, computers and mechanisation have replaced the traditional work force. And this is more marked in advanced capitalist countries. When they invest overseas in underdeveloped countries they prefer to build automated plants rather than deal with troublesome labour problems. Thus, advanced capitalism overseas does not produce the abundant overthrower of capitalism as Kiva would have us believe.

The experience of capitalist development *almost everywhere in the Third World*, with very few exceptions, has, for at least half a century

beginning with Latin America, led to oppression and even, as is often the case, to fascism. But Kiva naively ignores the political dimensions of the growth of capitalism, and is content as long as he sees the numbers of the working class increase.

One can cite numerous examples, ranging from Chile to Iran to the Philippines, where capitalist development (a development which has taken place almost always only due to the integration with, and benevolence of, Imperialism) has meant the growth of the productive forces, at the cost of severe repression. The development of capitalism brings a form of oppression and repression unknown to classical capitalism, and is a system which destroys the working class and revolutionary movement, rather than builds it for the overthrow of capitalism. The hundreds of thousands murdered by every dictator in Latin America should be proof enough. The murder of over a hundred thousand in Iran and the liquidation of political (even very bourgeois-liberal) opposition in almost all countries where we have experienced the marvels of Imperialist-aided capitalist development, speaks volumes about the condition of the working class and revolutionary movement which is mechanistically supposed to bring in socialism as Kiva believes.

The development of capitalism and the resulting political system have destroyed the working class and revolutionary movement in most underdeveloped countries. This should also put to rest the myth propagated by Kiva that is based on an 18th/19th century thinking and is not applicable today.

Kiva: "It is in th[c] phase of capitalist development that the basis for bourgeois democracy is laid and a civilian society formed. Besides, the proletariat gets schooling in the class struggle" (p. 63). Yes, maybe in the 19th century, but today. India is possibly the only exception to a rule of abject terror throughout the Third World. As for Latin America, the emerged political structures can hardly be seen as the bourgeois state my opponent likes to see.

Civil society is weakly developed and, even worse, its elements often come into contradiction with actually existing bourgeois rule, as with the recent radical role of the Catholic church in Central America. The state is everything, but its very strength and omnipotence shows the unstable basis of bourgeois rule. Consent is replaced by naked terror as the cement of bourgeois society. The 'armed bodies of men' on which the state is based are no longer the ultimate recourse for the bourgeoisie but a pre-condition for their day to day survival in many countries.

POLITICAL TASKS BASED ON KIVA'S THESIS

THE POLITICAL TASKS emanating from Kiva's thesis for revolutionary and working class parties and intellectuals should be very clear. The revolutionary movement, wherever it is and whatever its specific socio-economic, cultural and political conditions (for Kiva is a master at generality and avoids any form of specificity), should support capitalist development and the bourgeois democratic revolution. This strategy raises many questions, some of which we deal with below.

In the present stage of world history (i.e., where indigenous bourgeoisies are weak, where the Imperialist system dictates local productive patterns), is it at all possible to have capitalist development in underdeveloped countries (which given the blueprint by Kiva must necessarily and desirably be Imperialist-aided), without the form of oppression that is familiar today? The obvious answer is No. In that case, should the left and working class parties condone this oppression as inevitable, chanting the slogan that the working class is "being prepared for socialism and will soon take over"?

Should intellectuals try and write about the benefits of humane capitalism (a contradiction in terms) or should they also just be patient? If our Party supports the bourgeois democratic revolution and bourgeois development, as Kiva suggests, how are we to work in the working class? Are we supposed to tell them of the "historical mission" of capitalism and ask the working class not to rebel or come out into the streets for otherwise there will be instability and the local and foreign capitalists won't invest and thus our tasks will remain unfulfilled? Or is it not more progressive, given the theory, to do away with all obstacles and resistance to allow capitalism to really flourish and prosper? In this case we should do away with all trade unions, workers rights and such other troublesome concepts otherwise the capitalists will flee. Even Kiva's clearly defined task for progressive forces: "working to lend capitalist development a democratic character and resisting the growth of reactionary trends in it instead of combatting stronger capitalist relations as such" (p. 63), is also a non-progressive step, for as we argue, dramatic capitalist development (the real thing!) is linked with reactionary governments, and if we try to "democratize" society we are only putting hurdles on the road to freedom. Furthermore, most democratic governments have to answer to the people, and given public pressure have to implement social and popular (unproductive) programmes, thus temporarily slowing down the growth in productive forces. It may be better for the real gung-ho reactionaries to take over as they never have to answer to the people.

Is bourgeois development possible without Imperialism in under-developed countries? Probably not. It may need, at least, a substantial boost to get off the ground which only Imperialism can provide. But when does Imperialism leave once it has established itself? Are Imperialist-generated capitalist development and bourgeois democracy reconcilable in the present stage of history? At the end of the 20th century, the answer is probably No. In the countries gaining independence after World War Two where there has been Imperialist-aided capitalist development such as Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, most of Latin America, there has been no semblance of democracy and repression is the norm. Only in some countries recently have we seen the easing of military terror to be replaced by weak, controlled democracies—Pakistan, the Philippines.

If the task of revolutionaries is to work for the greater development of capitalism and for bourgeois norms, is it not better to abandon Communist parties and become "the radical section" of a bourgeois party with a broader popular base? This way, given the present tasks (which obviously does not include an anti-imperialist position for it is with the Imperialists that we are going to build our future), we shall support the bourgeois programmes and bring a more aggressive, bolder, refined, advanced and complete capitalism so that we can "increase the productive forces and do away with pre-capitalist vestiges". Of course, since we no longer choose to remain anti-imperialist we should not be disturbed about the prospects of being further integrated into the world capitalist economy and left to the whims of developments in the developed countries. Also, by liquidating our Communist parties, we will not have to bear the burden of history by building an already existing weak bourgeoisie into a stronger one, as the tasks imply.

There are other questions which need an answer. When does the bourgeois democratic revolution stop being progressive? For Kiva there is no answer, no tomorrow, when the old needs to be replaced by the new. Does India, (probably the only case in the Third World of successful capitalist development with bourgeois democracy) need a furthering of capitalism and thus the support of the bourgeoisie by Communist and revolutionary forces, or should the revolutionary movement strive towards

socialism? When will the conditions be "ripe"? Will they *ever* be ripe? Or is Kiva's ideal view of the Third World, a sort of India? The problem with him is that he fails to appreciate sufficiently, the dynamism of capitalist development which has been experienced in the advanced capitalist countries. If capitalism has failed to become socialism and has shown brilliant resilience in the advanced capitalist nations why should it not do so in underdeveloped countries? Why will capitalism be transformed here and not be as adaptable and intelligent as in the developed countries? In other words, following Kiva's prescription, India may become a Third World version of the United States by the middle of the 21st century rather than a socialist state, as capitalism will stretch and adapt *ad infinitum*, while revolutionaries will still be trying to complete the (then new) bourgeois tasks, again, *ad infinitum*.

CONCLUSIONS

THE PURPOSE of the deliberate rhetorical approach taken above, was done precisely to reveal the many absurd conclusions which emanate from the work of Alexei Kiva and the New Soviet Thinking. Kiva has correctly rejected the nonsensical Non-Capitalist Path of Development and the attempts at socialism in the Third World, but has also rebounded with a plea to develop capitalism aggressively aided by Imperialism.

It is true that the *form of socialism* adopted in most of the Third World has led to unmitigated disaster and there has been little progress. But that certainly does not mean that the models of capitalist development as applied in the underdeveloped world are so prosperous and successful that the failure of socialism need be replaced by these models.

Marxist theory, especially post-perestroika, is standing at an important historical juncture. Many myths are being broken and dogma is giving room to logic, common sense, and most of all, dialectics. The study of the transition to socialism, in underdeveloped countries is an extremely important ideological and political task. The realisation that we have failed in the past is an immense leap forward in the understanding of ourselves and of the future. However, it is important to point out that one cannot jump from one extreme to another as the new Soviet thinking is doing. This is precisely the stage where we need to discuss issues in more detail than has been done in the past, before reaching definitive conclusions which may again lead to disaster. This article is an attempt to keep the debate going and I hope will warrant significant attention so that we can begin to think about new and specific alternative programmes for revolution in different regions and countries of the underdeveloped world.

¹ Mumek, Ronaldo, *Politics and Dependency in the Third World. The Case of Latin America*, 1984, p. 352.

...THE REVOLUTION IS GOING ON

Alexei KIVA

I HAVE BEEN to developing countries in these perestroika years and heard comments on it as well as on new political thinking. I am therefore not surprised at Professor Akbar Zaidi's position although I must say I do not quite understand his political creed. It is not difficult to say who is who. Today's leaders of Ethiopia call themselves Marxists but so do many of their adversaries belonging to diverse opposition fronts; members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and, say, the insurgents who are hostile to them and are fighting a jungle war. Besides the CPI and CPI (Marxists), there are scores of other organisations in India alone most of which describe themselves as Marxist.

But the problem goes deeper than that. People are people everywhere. I mean not only the difference in their attitudes, which is natural even among Communists. Drastic changes in life often outpace changes in consciousness and baffle people by confronting them with new realities. Our perestroika is in its fifth year now, yet many people, leaders included, are far from grasping what has really happened in our society. When listening to or reading statements by some Soviet people or foreigners whose views are close to ours, I occasionally have a feeling that they have still not parted with a distant past full of myths. They refer to realities that disappeared long ago, concepts which have been rejected by life, great achievements that never existed, and define what is a norm of social development as a crisis. They are blind to the bloodshed and sorrow brought on by revolutions, for they poeticise these. Even the current crisis in our country, which has spared neither intellectual life nor social relations and has cast doubt on the viability of some of the more important propositions of our social ideal, tells them little. They still imagine that previous notions of socialism have not come into conflict with reality and that our fundamental theory requires no renewal. They do not see the contradiction between a recognised fact, the working people's alienation from power and the means of production in favour of a bureaucracy which becomes a quasiclass under the command system, and the thesis about the dictatorship of the proletariat and the latter's leading political role under socialism. They perceive even the transformation of the political vanguard into an "order of sword-bearers" by this or that dictator, who makes it a driving belt of his terrorist policy, as merely an annoying episode.

Yet one ought to begin doubting the ability of any individual—be he even a genius—to forecast or "plan" the evolution of society. Many world humanists spoke about this as far back as the last century. The worst misgivings about the consequences of the destruction of the existing pattern of society—patterns which take centuries to shape up—about the abolition of whole classes and strata of society, are coming true. Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Gandhi questioned the right of an insignificant revolu-

tionary minority to impose its will on a gigantic majority and pointed to the disastrous effect which total violence as a means of reforming society would have. Their views have new meaning today.

Experience has shown that violence is like a chain reaction hard to stop once it has started. Violence has both its evolutionary logic and its morality, a morality turned inside out that may be defined laconically by quoting Machiavelli "The end justifies the means." The trouble is, however, that amoral, anti-human means strangle the end in passing, as it were. I recently read an interview with a leader of the People's Liberation Front operating in Sri Lanka. It made me shudder, for it conjured up Stalinist scenes. I again found myself in the presence of that aspiration to make others "happy" by means of Utopian ideas, that right (granted by God knows whom) to divide people into good and bad and control their lives at will, that boundless cruelty, that rabid fanaticism. God forbid that power should fall into the hands of such would-be leaders.

Dostoyevsky said that we all hailed from the land of Gogol's "The Greatcoat". Most Marxist revolutionaries in the onetime world of colonial rule have a Stalinist background. *A Short History of the CPSU(B)* was our desk companion. Its spirit or that of its slightly refurbished analogues dominated the left movement until recently. It is still dominant here and there. Stalin's conception of the laws governing social progress was admittedly simplistic and primitive. He renounced the principle of historicism and the Marxian law of development by formational stages, adhering to naked subjectivism and petty-bourgeois revolutionariness and substituting barrack for Marxist socialism. He used many false propositions, scientifically indefensible terms, concepts meaning the exact opposite of what they should have implied by logic. For instance, he demanded respect for the Leninist principle of rigorous party discipline at a time when the dictator had turned the party into an instrument of violence and the principle of a class approach at a time when the bureaucracy had removed the working people from power. It was also on the principle of perverted concepts that Stalin based "revolutionary morality" (which implied informing on people, slander, betrayal).

I have tried to understand why the third world, including (and occasionally above all) the Left, is somewhat wary of perestroika and new political thinking. I believe there are many reasons for this. What makes itself felt primarily is dogmatism and vulgar sociology. And this is largely our fault. I am referring to Stalin's model of barrack socialism, our textbooks, our teachers. Our country was really seen in a measure as the citadel of socialism, of its theory and practice. The point is, however, that stagnation shackled theory for decades. Nobody dared to say anything new, this being the prerogative first of the "wise leader" and then the "great Leninist" and, later, the "loyal Leninist". This had the most tragic effect on the fate of the country and, to a notable extent, on that of socialism as a whole and told on the international revolutionary movement.

A doctrine either is or is not. It is there if it is steadily developing, gaining new experience, drawing on new scientific discoveries and jettisoning all that is accidental, all that has failed to prove its worth or is obsolete. And it is non-existent if it has been reduced to a set of dogmas, a catechism, something of a dead language. To admit this is painful but it would be worse not to do so, to pretend that nothing terrible has happened to our classical heritage or that we have put into practice what Marx, Engels, Lenin and many other outstanding Marxists dreamed of.

In the sphere of consciousness, we will probably go on for a long time reaping the fruits of the brutal, decades-long confrontation between the two world systems, of the ideologisation of everything. Many of us

have evolved a confrontational mentality, and the principle of confrontation has also taken hold of our consciousness. Strictly speaking, the lives of all who had allied themselves with the Left and, indeed, our own lives followed the principle of "we and they". According to this principle, "we" possessed the only scientific method of cognition. "We" alone could show humanity the way out of the historical dead end. The future belonged to "us" (our system) alone. "Our" society was the most just of all, the most humane, and so on. As for "them", we used the most derogatory terms to describe them, such as a "doomed system", "decaying" or "dying" capitalism, and so on. Our whole propaganda was based in effect on this approach. And we worked among the people on the same principle. On the one hand, there was socialism, a system good, excellent throughout if wrestling with temporary difficulties. On the other, the "world of exploitation", the "society of violence", the "world lacking a future" and about to breathe its last. Discussions at the meetings and rallies I attended in a developing country not so long ago followed much the same lines.

We were too frivolous with the term *imperialism*, too. Imperialism did exist. But we used the term as a word of abuse, without making any particular effort to grasp its meaning. Anti-imperialist slogans became a handy form of mobilising the masses. We did not have to explain anything, for it was enough to proclaim the slogan "Down with imperialism" for everybody to understand everything. True, it was not clear what imperialism was like, where it was or what we were going to do to it. Whole generations were brought up in the spirit of this slogan-like anti-imperialism, some making a career with its aid and getting quite cushy jobs. Even regular reactionaries like Idi Amin or Bokassa juggled freely with anti-imperialist slogans. It sounds preposterous but even Ferdinand Marcos, who during his term in office grabbed from 10 to 20 billion dollars, cursed an unspecified imperialism whenever he found it opportune. Hapless leaders, big officials and others blamed all their miscalculations as well as their incompetence, indolence or carelessness on imperialism. As for those on the other side of the barricades, they did not take offence because they never associated themselves with imperialism.

It was all smooth sailing for decades: "Down with imperialism", "Down with capitalism", "Long live the revolution", "Long live social progress". But once in a while it was necessary to stop and think what was meant by "revolution" or "social progress". And the thinking had to be done on a scientific level, with due regard to realities, not to slogans. Where this was done it occasionally emerged that what we had called a "revolution" was actually a counter-revolution from the point of view of social progress, for it was throwing society back, and that "social progress" was in effect social regression, with regimes using leftist slogans as camouflage, dooming people to poverty and denying them their lawful rights. This was exemplified by the evolution of Burma and of Guinea under Sékou Touré.

Some revolutionaries were so carried away by the idea of remaking the old world and had so clear a vision of the "radiant future" to set in before long that, in planning a coup, they completely discounted the development level of their country, the balance of social and class forces, the situation of the country in the region and the likely response of world public opinion to a new regime.

Most importantly, they hardly gave any thought to the likely tragic consequences of their action in countries where social differentiation had not gone far enough, where tribal relations were still strong, and where the interests of historical development did not call for class differentiation (on which those revolutionaries put the emphasis) but, on the con-

trary, for the consolidation of what was a polyethnic (multitribal), multi-confessional society and for encouragement of the process of building a nation-state.

There's a time for everything. Take Lebanon, for one. Who can now tell between what classes bloody skirmishes break out there time and again? Even in Afghanistan, the civil war departs from the class principle completely or at least to a degree. And what about Angola or Mozambique, where there are still no classes proper? Lastly, a class approach can give no real insight into the long-running civil war in Ethiopia.

Those in the third world who make a fetish of revolutionary violence understandably greeted new political thinking with distrust. They feared that it could tie them down or that the Soviet Union might stop supplying military hardware and assigning advisers to regimes posing as radical yet pursuing a dubious policy, to say the least. Delivering arms to the Idi Amin regime was a shameful thing to do but we did deliver them. What enabled that "revolutionary" with cannibalistic inclinations to mesmerise Brezhnevian diplomacy? He highlighted his accession to power by hitting hard at the private sector: trade, the service industry, and so on. As a consequence, the people found themselves deprived of salt, matches, soap, food, everything. Afterwards it transpired that the property of Indians, Pakistanis and other Asians had been confiscated not so much for the common good but in favour of Amin and his immediate entourage.

Our perestroika underlines the need to encourage democratisation and glasnost, rotate personnel, eliminate hidebound routine and rigid standards, revise many dogmas, canons and methods of party work and the structure of the party, end the party practice of appointment as the only rule and rid the party of command methods as well as of leaders who have exhausted their creative potential and lag behind reality or find themselves at their posts by chance, being neither gifted nor educated. All this annoys some people, others find it unacceptable, and still others cannot stomach it.

My foreign friends have told me privately that stagnation is by no means a purely Soviet phenomenon. It was a universal phenomenon in a sense. There were certain other cases of aging leaders and a weakening leadership, with fresh blood being injected in a barely perceptible trickle. This also went for the area of theoretical thought, in which certain strategies and tactics had become obsolete, methods of work among the people called for renewal, and so on. In addition, perestroika raised many complex problems. In the past, my friends stressed, the people were told that everything was shipshape in socialist countries and as for criticism of the Soviet Union, it was described as malicious anti-Sovietism. But now it appeared that this "anti-Sovietism" had been right on quite a few points. What was to be done? Should they admit that previously they had misstated certain facts, having been misled? But people would argue that those who said so had repeatedly visited the Soviet Union, had been shown around collective and state farms and must have seen everything with their own eyes because on returning to their countries they had spoken of the advantages of socialism, socialist economic management and socialist democracy whereas they were now saying something entirely different. But it was also possible to take a different path by dismissing perestroika as a "departure from the general line", using that familiar phrase of an earlier period. That would be a way out of the situation if an illusory one because the only alternative to renewing the policy line and the forms and methods of everyday work among the people was political non-existence.

It was hard to disagree with my foreign colleagues.

I keep calm when representatives of developing countries ask me whether we are not guilty of a "right deviation", are not drifting to petty-

bourgeois socialism and renouncing the class approach (an allusion to our proclaiming the primacy of universal over class values). My reaction is calm because they may not know our realities. But when my compatriots respond by defending themselves I resent it very strongly. We who have sacrificed tens of millions of lives to the revolution (and to Stalin's counter-revolution), depleting our genetic pool, and have gone through superhuman ordeals find ourselves in a cul de sac. We cannot feed ourselves although we have three quarters of the world's black earth at our disposal, and we live like paupers, with a quality of life as low on many counts as that of medium-developed new states. Must we now that we are searching for a way out of the crisis defend ourselves by arguing that we remain revolutionaries and internationalists? Why, had there been no Soviet Union, neither would there be a third world—not in its present form, anyway. Besides, everybody knows our principled support for the fight of third world peoples for national liberation, against imperialism and neocolonialism. Do we really have to defend ourselves?

MY OPPONENT stresses that his interest in theory "applies primarily to the impact of theory on practice"

That is what I, too, am interested in most of all. Yes, I do see a road to socialism (barring possible exceptions) through capitalism, through a bourgeois democratic revolution. But this is neither a conclusion nor a whim of mine—humanity so far has invented nothing else. Look around to make sure of this.

Stalin decided to "outwit" the laws governing social evolution. He abandoned the New Economic Policy, which Lenin expected to last long, and forced the pace of socialist construction. The result was a command system reviving some elements of serfdom and set up for its own sake rather than for the people's. Someone has rightly described this model of society as one disinheriting both the victims and their butchers but also uniting them, all of them playing the role of puppets of an invisible force. I remember how mighty members of Stalin's Politbureau trembled to think every time they started out for the "Masters's" dacha that it might be their last trip, as they admitted afterwards. Does Akbar Zaidi have any valid reason to believe no such thing can happen in less developed countries embarking on socialist construction in defiance of the laws of history? I retain too vivid a memory of Pol Pot's experiment in Cambodia, which he decided to take out of semifeudal, semicomunal system and into communism, skipping all intermediate stages.

I am not trying to impose my point of view on anyone. Personally I take it as a reality that various left forces differ completely with us over the road to socialism or Stalin's legacy. After all, the peculiarities of each country tinge both the social ideal and the ways and means used there for attaining it. What is good for Ivan is not necessarily good for John. In Soviet society today, mass consciousness associates Stalin's practices with monstrous crimes against our people and regards Stalinism as an inhuman theory, a criminal policy, ideological poverty and a social deformity.

The phrase "barrack socialism" is a common expression today. It is because of this "socialism" that we are only just beginning to learn democracy. At the same time, some sections of the Left in developing countries still consider Stalin a classic of scientific socialism and are busy disseminating his postulates. The concept of barrack socialism does not at all deter people in countries where the military has taken power under socialist slogans. Currently we see food coupons as a disgrace to a socialist country but they are a blessing in countries trying to extricate themselves from chronic poverty and hunger.

A word about the substance of new political thinking, seeing that my opponent has touched upon it. New thinking is neither an abstract philosophical category nor a fruit of idle speculation. It is a theoretically perceived new reality. I will try to refer to realities particularly familiar to developing countries. Some regard it as just an abstraction when we say that we can no longer build our lives on confrontational principles because we have come to a pass where civilisation on earth may be wiped out by a nuclear war. Nor is everybody convinced that modern communications and the internationalisation of political, economic, scientific, cultural and other ties tend to bring continents, regions and countries closer together. This means that an armed conflict somewhere may affect the interests of countries lying thousands of kilometres away from the trouble spot and lead as a consequence to an escalation of the conflict. Many have yet to awaken to the implications of even the Chernobyl tragedy. But imagine what would happen if, in the event of war, dozens or even hundreds of nuclear power plants were blown up. Would the third world be left out? I am not accentuating the environmental problem although I think it is obvious to anyone that developing countries, especially those of Africa, cannot solve the problem without colossal efforts by the whole world community.

Take, however, such extremely acute problems as those of hunger and development. African countries cannot do without food from other continents. Yet that food comes from precisely the "ruthless imperialism" mentioned by my Karathi opponent. Can Pakistan's neighbour, Bangladesh, feed its people without aid from other countries? My answer is that 87 per cent of Bangladesh's budget appropriations comes in the main from the same source. Unfortunately, there is no substitute for the source of food and financial relief to developing countries. Even the Soviet Union buys an annual 40 to 50 million tons of grain, chiefly in countries of "ruthless imperialism", being compelled to do so as a result of the triumph of Stalin's "model of socialism".

And now for development. We have cursed monopoly and the transnationals any number of times. I myself have repeatedly done so for the radio, or filling a "social contract" from the APN News Agency. But see what happens. Development is where transnationals are at work. You may call it dependent, bastard or rickety but it is development. It is attended by many negative phenomena and often greatly aggravates social problems but I repeat that it is development. And where there is development there is also progress. You can build no society of social justice without development. You can only force people into barracks, supply them with meagre rations, torture or destroy them if they protest, isolate them from the outside world and even ban them from listening to foreign broadcasts. But that is not the kind of society people long for. Compare Indonesia under Sukarno, a country which fought against imperialism and monopolies and was proud of its poverty, with today's Indonesia, which is not exactly democratic but then is developing fairly fast although it encounters many acute social problems. Or compare Burma, whose economy literally fell apart under the burden of social experiments by a military regime which promised to build socialism in that backward country, with neighbouring Thailand, which currently exports several billion dollars' worth of chips alone. South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and other countries have reached under our very eyes the threshold of creating scientific and technological productive forces. And who is cooperating in "open zones" with China, whose spectacular economic progress over the past ten years is recognised all over the world? It is transnationals, in this case as well. Unfortunately, there is no alternative to them. Whether developing countries like it or not, they are compelled to participate in the international division of labour, in which

it is not the socialist countries that set the tone but the opposite system, the transnationals. Such is reality, and to see it as leading to nothing but losses would be wrong.

I wish to stress that I am not defending the transnationals at all, for I am aware of both aspects of their activity in third world countries. Still less am I offering an apologia of capitalism, for I know well the effects of capitalist development. But I am a historian and must respect the principle of historicism. I must not only have some knowledge of history but be able to compare and generalise phenomena. I have been to many countries of the world, including nearly all African countries. When, on arriving in India for the first time, I witnessed mass poverty there and heard about the plight of bond workers and appalling acts of violence perpetrated against members of listed castes and tribes I fairly boiled over with indignation. But when I had calmed down a little, I began looking deeper into Indian life by talking to scholars and politicians. Subsequently I put one and the same question to different people: "If an attempt were made to feed all the hungry and deliver everybody from poverty", I asked, "what would be the effect on the development of the country?" "It's impossible," they replied. Some said it would "undermine the foundations of extended or even simple reproduction and doom the country to complete failure and regression". A final answer to my question was given by glasnost, for we learned that in our own country tens of millions are living below the poverty line.

Ever since then, I have had a clearer idea of revolution, of its real predestination and potentialities, and have distinguished between political or social revolution and coups aimed at simply taking power to exploit it. "What do you want to take power for?" I asked a "revolutionary" one day. He was surprised. "What do you mean?" he replied. "I mean, what are you going to use it for?" I specified. "Wait till we take it, and then we'll see," he parried without hesitation, and even added a quotation from Lenin. That is how some take power. Having no real knowledge of the laws governing social evolution, they begin by putting the cart before the horse, that is, set out in a poor, underdeveloped country to nationalise the means of production, try to force people into production cooperatives, with the hoe as the basic implement, and assign as overseers a huge army of bureaucrats who invariably seek benefits and privileges for themselves. As for the people, on whose behalf that power is said to be exercised, they remain in the clutches of poverty and hunger.

Unlike Professor Zaidi, I am a Marxist. I trust I am one of those who approach Marxism creatively, as recommended by its founders, who insisted on calling everything in question. But Marxism has such everlasting components as the following: (a) no formation dies before it has exhausted all its inherent potentialities; (b) revolution is the midwife of a society pregnant with a new system. And there is a further important proposition flowing from Marxism and its methodology: attempts to restore obsolete forms of social life and to establish a new social system for which history has not yet paved the way in either the material or the intellectual sphere are equally reactionary. This invites definite conclusions.

Capitalism, far from having used up its capacity for development, is still on the rise. It is not decaying, let alone dying, as we believed earlier. Besides, its development is not quite going along the way we had thought it was.

Akbar Zaidi and others tend to distinguish between the capitalism of the past as a developing and progressive system, so to speak, a system bringing democracy, and today's capitalism as a reactionary system steeped in militarism through and through and inseparable from imperialism. I take a different view. Capitalism passes through diverse stages

as it develops. The highly developed capitalism of today really bears little resemblance to the capitalism of Marx's day. But it is apparently in its mature phase now. Our socialism—mature socialism—has not developed from mature capitalism, as it should have done according to Marx and Engels. It is a result of alternative formational development, which was made possible by the existence of a relatively developed economy and a relatively developed proletariat in the country and of a scientific theory of socialism in the world.

Thus social development assumed a bipolar character. There arose a situation unforeseen by the founders of scientific socialism where socialism as a social system could not be said to be on a higher level than capitalism. It would have been if it had grown from highly developed capitalism. Neither we nor the West should insist on having the best system, and neither system should foretell the end of the other. Generally speaking, I consider that the more socially (formationally) diversified the world is, the richer this makes it. What would things be like had there been no capitalism? I am not sure that socialism would be better off in that case. There would be no example or competition but there would be all the more reason for complacency and stagnation. By the same token, capitalism would not be what it is like today had there been no October Revolution with its impact on world developments. As a matter of fact, the socialisation processes that have gone deep in nearly all highly developed countries did not begin until after the October Revolution.

I think anyone who sees capitalism as a system incapable of self-development and self-improvement has an unrealistic idea of contemporary bourgeois society. One might imagine that monopoly, the bourgeoisie, the military-industrial complex are the only ones to be shaping the destiny of capitalist countries. But what about the people and public opinion? And speaking of the middle class, which accounts for the majority of the population in nearly all developed countries, it certainly cannot be described as a compact reactionary mass, for it is this class that decides at the polls which of the parties shall rule. And it is high time we stopped affirming, as we did until recently, that elections do not mean anything and that monopoly capital will stay in power no matter what. This is a very primitive notion indeed, as the case of Sweden demonstrates.

Let us finally give serious thought to the concept of imperialism as a stage of capitalism and not just a policy. It is in all probability not the last phase of capitalist development but one of its phases that is bound to go just as it has come, according to the laws governing both the economy and society as a whole, to the law of negation of the negation. Ask any competent economist whether extended reproduction in highly developed capitalist countries can now be effected on a national basis but, needless to say, within the framework of normal world economic relations. He is certain to say yes. Capitalist development has a definite "genetic pool." Initially, the system required cheap material and manpower resources, markets for industrial goods, and so on. That stage passed. We thought capitalism would be unable to recover after the disintegration of the colonial system. Yet it not only recovered but sharply stepped up its development tempo. Colonialism became neocolonialism. And now neocolonialism is being eroded in this turn. It will pass too, both in conformity with economic laws and under the combined pressure of the working people of capitalist, socialist and developing countries. At the same time, there is no overlooking the deep-going and generally positive social processes taking place even in capitalist citadels. True, they have to be fought for but then all progress exacts a price, in one form or another.

If we were to adopt a nihilistic position on the possibility of capitalism getting rid of all that we associate with imperialism (although the

latter now lacks many of the characteristics listed by Lenin), it would mean both deadlocking creative thought and confronting ourselves with an insolvable political problem. Assuming that capitalism is inseparable from imperialism and that imperialism is characterized by expansion, aggression and war, the world must give up all hope of building international relations on fundamentally new principles and provide itself with a shroud in preparation for a nuclear catastrophe. I mean relations guaranteeing every nation the right to make its social choice freely, without any interference from without, develop sovereignty, unfold maximum mutually beneficial cooperation with other nations, draw on their experience, and get help and support from them if necessary

●

A SOCIAL REVOLUTION cannot be accomplished at will. This prompts me to ask my opponents what new system society in countries of Tropical Africa is pregnant with. Surely it is not socialism. I would also like to ask whether a socialist revolution is possible where there is a relatively developed economy but the highly developed, class-conscious, politically enlightened section of the proletariat is only a small group compared with a multitude of preproletarians, semiproletarians, paupers and lumpens. Where marginal groups are the main component of the social base, socialism itself is bound to be a pauper and lumpen socialism, not a proletarian one. This is possible but then it is regression rather than progress.

A social revolution can be considered such only if it destroys obsolete production relations impeding growth of the productive forces. A political revolution can carry all this deeper, proceeding stage by stage. But what if a political revolution is used in an attempt to break off a national phase of historical development? Can it be considered a genuine revolution? I am not sure it can. One should not act on emotions in this. Lenin held a system providing higher productivity of labour to be more progressive historically.

Emotions will not do where arguments are needed. If anything, they obscure the role of laws governing social development. The latter is an objective phenomenon leaving no room for likes or dislikes. The slave-owning system could not possibly suit the slaves, any more than feudalism could be to the serfs' liking, but a return to tribal communism—an incomparably more humane system—would have thrown society far back. Capitalism in the West took hundreds of years to come into being and has been developing for hundreds of years. The peoples of Britain and other European countries went through terrible hardships before they achieved their present prosperity. But the socialist road is no safeguard against the effects of underdevelopment. There are advocates of a "third way" or a "third theory", and I wish them every success. However, I know of no "African", "Arab" or other kind of "national socialism" such as has been able to offer the people new methods of transformation greatly speeding social progress. The only exception is countries having vast reserves of petrodollars (as some Gulf states). Taking shape there is a society bearing little resemblance to earlier models.

We must remember, however, that developing in new states is a so-called tertiary capitalism having many peculiarities. ("Primary" capitalism exists in Britain and France and "secondary" capitalism, in Germany, Italy and elsewhere). It is occasionally this capitalism that is described as the "third way".

In the light of the foregoing, I have come to the conclusion that most one-time colonies and semicolonies are at the stage of bourgeois democratic revolutions which allow fairly wide scope for organised struggle to improve the people's social and material situation, extend their rights and

freedoms and embark on an independent, progressive foreign policy.

Lenin, recognising the capitalist stage of development as inevitable and logical, spelled out the Russian Bolsheviks' attitude in a letter to Gorky dated September 3, 1911. He did not at all urge the proletariat to disarm, to wind down its revolutionary struggle in the country. On the contrary. But he respected objective laws and called on the proletariat and its party to evolve a correct strategy and proper tactics. I would suggest that Akbar Zaidi read that letter through carefully. Whenever the Bolsheviks departed from the materialist conception of history, the inevitable result was setbacks. These can be most terrible, expressing themselves in the destruction of culture, centuries-long traditions and the peasant form of production, in the reduction of peasants to the position of day-labourers and partly of lumpens, in the transformation of a notable section of the proletariat into lumpens.

Akbar Zaidi has touched, somehow casually, on a further matter of overriding significance. He alleges that the Soviet Union is prepared to go to any lengths, ignoring the class approach in its relations with other countries, in order to remedy its dire economic situation. The logical inference is that this is also the purpose of new thinking, which allegedly leaves aside the interests of the working-class and revolutionary movement in developing countries. I will not follow my opponent's example by using words like absurd or naive. I prefer to turn to logic and certain figures. Does the developing world benefit from tensions, the arms race or regional conflicts? Just think of the effects of confrontation, of the escalation of hostility and distrust between countries in one and the same continent or region. Africa, a continent which cannot feed itself, is in urgent need of massive international relief and owed the world 230 billion dollars in 1988, increased its share in world military spending from 0.4 to 3.8 per cent in two decades. It spent 140 billion dollars for military purposes from 1976 to 1987, according to an estimate made by the USSR AS Institute of Africa. Besides, conflicts and regional wars provoked amid international tensions, regional instability and ethnic strife ruined a number of Asian and African countries. Look at bleeding Lebanon. Premature revolutions followed by civil war and regional conflict have had a disastrous effect on whole peoples and complicated the overall international situation. Surely this is out of keeping with the national interests of third world countries, to say nothing of any genuine revolutionary movement.

I cannot agree with you, Professor Zaidi, because the application of new political thinking, which is what the Soviet Union is working for, would meet the innermost interests of the peoples of developing countries. And this is one reason why it cannot run counter to the interests of an intensifying revolutionary process in the third world, provided one approaches this process from a scientific position and does not cherish the hope of building socialism in, say, a society living by the laws of the Stone Age.

Every revolutionary movement adheres to its own laws. It cannot be stimulated by exporting revolution. Revolutions are not "made" but are a product of the people's effort. This explains why revolutionary explosions are largely spontaneous. Where the prerequisites for a revolution are ripe it takes place and is generally led by forces which have entered the political scene thanks to natural historical development. Immature forcible revolutions must become a thing of the past once and for all. It is not by forcible means that nations score their most outstanding achievements. I think the time has come for a reappraisal of Mahatma Gandhi's legacy, for he, too, used revolutionary methods.

One other comment in conclusion. While it could have been flattering to me, the views I express in *International Affairs* and other periodicals

are not only mine. Many other Soviet authors take a different view of the revolutionary process in the third world. Basically, I am hardly qualified to "uphold an official line".

With reference to developing countries, I wish to point to a tremendous problem. What is in store for countries which have virtually come to a halt (while others are retracting) and are classified by the UN as the least developed? They are integrating into the world economic system very poorly. They lack the means needed for simple, let alone extended reproduction. There are really scant prerequisites in these countries, not only for socialism but even for capitalism. I do not think they can stand on their feet without help from the world community. Hence what is needed in this respect as well is cooperation, not confrontation.

Currently, overt and covert battles in connection with universal and class problems are being fought, in effect, over a new strategy for the revolutionary forces. This strategy would be expected to preclude bloodshed as a means of achieving one's ends and to base these aims on a deeper-going conception than before of the laws of social progress, without either divorcing them from universal values formed over hundreds and thousands of years or separating politics from morality. What we have is a duel between new and old thinking, between an outgoing and an approaching age.

THE UN IN THE COLD WAR YEARS

(Continued from page 222)

I LEFT NEW YORK for Moscow in February 1953 and got home at the end of the month. A couple of days later, all routine radio broadcasts were broken off. You could only hear serious, sad music. Stalin was very ill. He died a few days after.

His death marked the end of one of the most complex stages in Soviet history, the period of the personality cult condemned by the party and the people, a period of horrors that shocked the country.

That death also had a strong impact on international affairs. Nevertheless, the cold war did not come to an end after 1953. There is no escaping the deplorable fact that it went on in one form or another in the subsequent period as well. It subsided once in a while, with international tension easing somewhat, as in the 1970s. But the relaxation invariably turned out to be temporary.

Now that new thinking has taken root and the international situation shows an appreciable improvement, important prerequisites are shaping up for removing for all time whatever has to do with the concept of cold war and for bringing about real cooperation and interaction between all countries in the name of preserving and augmenting universal values, above all by strengthening world peace and furthering universal progress. Time will show whether this trend towards improvement prevails. In any case, the changes taking place in international affairs today give cause for confidence and hope.

It is regrettable that these positive developments did not set in immediately after the war and that the cold war delayed their advent for decades.

Has the cold war benefited anyone politically or otherwise? Certainly not. Hence the paramount task today is to ensure that the cold war remains a chapter of past history and a lesson to remember well.

"SEVEN SHOTS" IN THE WINTER OF 1939

Alexandra KOLLONTAI

June 1, 1939

[...] HITLER'S PLANS encompass the Nordic countries but does he see them as only a bridgehead? A British-Soviet alliance in a new war would guarantee the survival of Sweden even if the whole of Northern Europe were turned into a battlefield between Germany and the allies (including the Soviet Union, of course). People both believe and refuse to believe in our peace policy. They realise and agree that we are no aggressors. But what would Moscow demand if the Red Army were in Stockholm?

This is what makes an agreement between Britain and Moscow so important and desirable. As for the talks, nothing gets into the Swedish press, and this country's intelligence service is chary of rumour.

Along with this, Moscow stints me of information.

The Swedish government, or Prime Minister Hansson to be exact, is for neutrality in all circumstances. But the group of Social Democrats headed by Ström and Höglund stands for a defensive alliance of the Nordic neutrals against Germany—and against us, too, should Finland be affected.

I talked to Ström the other day. After all, both of them—Ström and Höglund—are former Zimmerwaldists who in 1915-1917 followed Lenin and were active on our side. I have decided to tell Ström what I myself know about the Moscow talks. I want him to appreciate our peace policy at this tense moment as well.

I will sum up our relations with Finland to make my conversation with Frederik Ström easier. He is close to Prime Minister Hansson and may come in handy as a mouthpiece for conveying certain guidelines and ideas. The Social Democratic left in Sweden is afraid of us and our plans regarding Finland. But Hitler has already signed a non-aggression pact with the Finns. The Nazis are clearing the decks for German victories in Finland as they prepare for a repetition of Spain. Doesn't Ström really see that?

A defensive alliance of the Nordic countries (including Finland) would not save Sweden if the Germans were to occupy Finland. On the contrary, it could, if anything, make things worse for Sweden and would inevitably drag it into war.

Alexandra Kollontai (1872-1952), a prominent political figure, took an active part in the October Revolution. After beginning her diplomatic career in 1922, she served as Ambassador and Trade Representative in Norway, Ambassador in Mexico and Minister in Sweden. We offer the reader excerpts from Kollontai's unpublished "Notes on 23 Years of Diplomatic Work" (Notebook 14: "The Eve of World War II, 1938-1939"; Notebook 16: "Diplomatic Diary, Sweden 1939-1940").

The Swedes need to tell themselves where they stand, on whose side they are. The Nordic Ministers' meeting on May 9 and their declaration saying that they would stay neutral as they did during the last war do not solve any problem. I must remind Ström of that cartoon, "War on land and sea". It shows an island lying close to Sweden, with an inscription reading: "This is the frontier—beyond it is a neutral country."

Progressive Swedes are concerned about Finland's fate. So why don't they prevail on the Finnish government to accept the Soviet proposals?

We propose to the Finns self-defence against Hitler. We say we will help Finland if necessary. We offer Finland guarantees for its independence if it puts up resistance to the Germans, and we promise to pull back our troops after the war. Should there be a military agreement with Finland, we would consent to fortify Åland. We offer Finland an advantageous trade treaty.

Finland's answer to all these good-neighbour peace proposals of ours is a flat NO. Such was Kajander's * answer in March, and the Finnish position at the talks with the Soviet Union remained unchanged. On April 2, the Finns signed a pact with Germany. Who has ever seen such a thing? How can we, the Soviet Union, help being alarmed? Don't the Swedes really see where the treat comes from? Farther than seeking a mutual assistance pact between the Nordic countries, honest left Social Democrats ought to pressure their friends in Finland into signing a treaty with the Soviet Union based on the provisions listed above. This is the only way for Sweden to avoid war and safeguard Finland's interests.

I talked to Ström. But those "left" Social Democrats are so cagey, so non-committal. Ström seemed to understand and agree with me when I said that the danger of attack on the Soviet Union must be staved off at all costs, but the idea of forming a Nordic defensive alliance is fixed in these gentlemen's minds. Is it possible that they are inspired by Tanner ** and hence Berlin?

We argued. I gave my reasons, telling Ström how matters stood and reminding him of Lenin's teachings in 1915-1916, of our joint work. But I am not sure I succeeded in convincing him. Still, my arguments will reach Hansson, and that is important.

The Mission, Stockholm, July 20

[...] The talks with Britain on mutual assistance, which started in Moscow as far back as April, have still produced no results. When it came to formulating reciprocal obligations, the Soviet government realised that Paris and London did not wish to bind themselves by allied commitments to the Soviet Union. This transpired above all when the British and French declined to offer guarantees for the defence of countries bordering on the Soviet Union—Finland, Latvia and Estonia—that is, precisely the limitrophes opening the road to the Soviet Union for the aggressor. It follows that there is a decision to involve Finland in war. Will Sweden manage to stay neutral?

My task is to put in a lot of hard work. .

The behaviour of Britain and France at so crucial a juncture suggests that a double game may be on and that the spirit of Munich has yet to be overcome in these countries. The political atmosphere is becoming harder and harder to breathe. There are increasingly clear signs of war preparations against us. Finland is entirely under the influence of Berlin, and the Tannerists are paving the way for Hitler like Franco did in Spain. All this is disguised with talk about "self-defence" and attempts to preserve peace. But I cannot help recalling the summer of

* Prime Minister of Finland. — *Ed.*

** Finance.

1914 in Berlin, when a world conflagration was creeping up I sensed it as something inevitable and terrible, doing so instinctively rather than as a result of logical thinking.

I was far from world politics at the time and followed it theoretically, without interpreting individual facts, which I could neither understand nor link together. Added to a sensation of approaching war now is consideration of the facts, conversations, information. War is in the offing. There will be a war. Many are those who sense and realise this. It will be a war between two worlds: those of capitalism and imperialism and of Soviet power and communism.

But I have inexhaustible confidence in our victory, victory for communism. Our enemies already stand doomed by history. We shall win this war. I couldn't say so to anybody, for nobody would understand why I am so unshakably, instinctively confident. In this case too, it is not logic that gives me this feeling but my worldview. And this infuses me with fresh vigour and firmness. [...]

August 8

The summer remains exceptionally fine as to weather but the international situation is still fraught with danger. I am worried about Finland and the interest which the Swedes are not alone to take in it. Pro-Nazis are fomenting chauvinism with strong support from the Social Democrats.

The Germans are carrying on skilful propaganda based on two propositions: one, the existence of a spiritual and cultural affinity between Germany and the Finns, ties through industry and banking, and two, the benefits of still closer ties with Germany, represented as the antithesis of the dangers involved in being a neighbour of the Soviet Union. "It is historically dangerous for Finland to maintain contacts with its Eastern neighbour, whom the Finnish people can expect nothing from but all sorts of troubles, including the forfeiture of sovereignty." Ideas of this kind recur in speeches and press reports, and Finnish anti-Soviet circles use them to mislead compatriots in town and countryside. They recall the wrongs done to the Finnish people by tsarist Russia and its encroachments on their rights so as to "prove" more easily that Finland only has one enemy, its mighty neighbour in the East.

Similar propaganda allegedly in defence of Finnish interests gets into the Swedish press. I have already protested against this in a conversation with Söderblom, head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry. But he dodged the issue, saying that the Swedish press did not specify who was endangering Finland's independence and that it meant Germany. After that conversation, press comments became more restrained and veiled but propaganda for Finnish chauvinism is the same as before. This makes me nervous and angry.

Why Germany is carrying on aggressively chauvinist propaganda in Finland is understandable. It is preparing a bridgehead against us, and those silly Finns believe the Germans, allowing themselves to be trapped because they do not realise that the lot of Spain and Czechoslovakia is also in store for Finland.

What surprises me particularly, however, is the interest taken in Finland by the United States. The flow of people arriving in Helsingfors from the United States has increased this summer. The city hosted an American singers' club known for its reactionary views. Are the Americans trying to put the Finns at odds with Hitler and the Germans or to take Finland into account as a bridgehead for the democratic powers? Roosevelt and Cordell Hull* believe war is not far off.

And what about the visit to Finland by Morgenthau, the American financier, who went there on the pretext of thanking "this little nation" for its scrupulous payments on the US government's earlier war loans? Why pay such a visit now? Is it because a deal is sought with Finnish financiers for the future, with due regard to the proximity of a new war?

Notwithstanding all that propaganda and the fomenting of Finnish chauvinism, the Finnish people have still not given in to war hysteria. People arriving from Finland affirm that the popular thinking is that it is Poland and not Finland that is threatened by Germany. As for the Eastern neighbour, this was an old, historical problem. But the "democratic" powers would see that no harm was done to the Finns.

Anders Hackzell * has assured the public that its fears of war were exaggerated. The talks with the Soviet Union had not been broken off.

But Kajander does not believe a trilateral Soviet-Anglo-French pact is feasible. He also takes a pessimistic view of the Soviet-Finnish talks. The delay makes for a growing lack of confidence in the possibility of avoiding war, and the Swedes, or Sandler and the Socialist right to be specific, praise the Finns for their rejection of the Soviet offer of guaranteeing the defence of Finland in the event of a German attack. The Swedes say that if the Finns were to accept it, their assurances about staying neutral could no longer be taken seriously, and this would withdraw them from the neutrals' bloc. Sweden would certainly not relish such a thing.

August 19

The Nazis are working hard to brainwash Finland. Their press is nauseating. It is preparing a bridgehead for them against the Soviet Union and goes out of its way to flatter the Finns, reminding them of the policy of Russification under tsarist rule and of Russia's crimes against Finnish independence. Finland's own Nazis are at pains to make the Finns believe that although the "Eastern neighbour" has a new name, USSR, it is still the "barbarian" it was before the revolution because it has imposed atheism, destroyed the family and abolished the "sacred right" to private property.

That is how they are spreading lies and calumnies about the Soviet Union as they advocate pro-Germanism and extol the order and "justice" established in the Third Reich.

The Germans are clearly readying Finland for a strike against us. Would Sweden be able to stay neutral if this happened?

War is coming, and I sense its inevitability more clearly with every passing day. The Social Democratic Cabinet here is inert. It is playing a waiting game....

August 20

Erkko (the Finnish Foreign Minister) and the right Social Democrats try to reassure Finnish public opinion, saying that there will be no war or that it will bypass Finland if a conflict breaks out between the big powers. The issue was Poland, not Finland.

Tanner has made a speech to reassure the Finns. "War will not affect us." This is revealing. Tanner obeys London. I wonder what is afoot at Downing Street. It is obvious that nobody needs Finland itself. That country is only important as a bridgehead against the Soviet Union. In the impending world war, the important thing will be whether this brid-

* Finnish Foreign Minister in 1932-1936 —Ed.

gehead is controlled by the great powers of Western Europe or Nazi Germany.

August 24

An event of tremendous moment One that is likely to reverse the whole world situation at once and unexpectedly. I can imagine how bewildered London and Paris are.... A bold step by Moscow The imperialists had never thought we would show such resolve or take such accurate account of the state of world affairs.

Yesterday, August 23, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow. Ribbentrop flew in from Berlin. Preparations for this highly important event were entirely overlooked by the intelligence services of the great powers of the West and their pushing journalists The treaty upsets all the plans of London and Paris

It was only this morning that I myself learnt this important news from the Swedish press On coming to my office, I began with the press as usual "Treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany" Signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop. I did not drop the paper in dismay, and indeed, the news did not surprise me particularly It is a most correct step on our part, a logical conclusion drawn from the situation in the world today. The talks with Britain did not lead to what Moscow had reason to expect The talks on a military convention with the British made no headway whatever Meanwhile Germany is all set to attack We are in the presence of a double game of the imperialist powers A scheme conceived by them long ago is ready for realisation The impact of a German attack would have to be sustained in full measure by the Soviet Union, with the imperialists' kindly connivance. Britain and France would merely look on, the former from its isles and the latter from behind the trenches of the Maginot Line.. This was how they had calculated it The treaty with Germany has upset these imperialist plans, and even if it fails to eliminate the threat of German attack, it will at least gain us time

No sooner had my colleagues left than I was asked to call at the Foreign Ministry

"They earnestly request you to call here immediately"

Boheman* greeted me by asking half in jest "So the Soviet Union is going to join the neutrals' group, is it? That would be splendid but is unlikely You and Hitler—why, it's a farce, not a reality! .»

"In any case," I replied, "the treaty will delay war, and that is a big gain in itself"

Boheman appreciated our arguments He said that Finland approved of this "friendly" agreement between Berlin and Moscow It would benefit Finland and might deliver it from war

Boheman considers this argument of the Finns naive They should first try to understand the motives behind Moscow's and Berlin's diplomatic move Indeed, the treaty might make things worse and hasten a world war.

"The Swedes," Boheman added, "can't understand your policy. They think that behind the published treaty there is something else that is still concealed from everybody else."

"The treaty with Berlin will expose the Western powers' incomprehensible hesitation over signing a pact on mutual assistance and cooperation with the Soviet Union."

This argument struck home.

* Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry (Deputy Foreign Minister).—Ed.

"But that means you are now joining the ranks of aggressors? Poland is threatened with the fate of Czechoslovakia...."

"On the contrary, the treaty with Berlin makes aggression difficult by handicapping Germany. After all, we aren't renouncing our policy of strengthening peace. We are curbing the aggressor through this agreement...."

URGENT TRIP TO MOSCOW

Stockholm, November 2

Back from Moscow. Moscow was like a dream—I flew there and back in less than three days. I telephoned Molotov and waited for hours. All that Moscow has left in my memory is the time I spent waiting for telephone calls or for Molotov to receive me. The talks with the Finns are making poor headway. "No headway, to be precise," one of Molotov's secretaries told me.

The atmosphere in the Kremlin is one of concern but not alarm. People there write and dictate and check and hurry down the corridors, carrying papers, but they do not talk to each other. And all faces are a closed book.

I sat waiting to be called to Molotov. The waiting lasted hours. The answer I got from secretaries returning from his office was a laconic "No, he's still busy, please wait."

And wait I did. I waited and began feeling nervous. Such an atmosphere is indicative. It suggests that there is a serious decision or something similar in the making. I recall the October days of 1917. The issue at that time was a revolution in our country but now it is the dimensions of a nascent struggle.

I am concerned about Finland and the Nordic countries. This concern of mine seems to me to be really a matter of secondary importance as I sit in the Kremlin waiting to be received by Molotov. Still, if we could solve this problem now by coming peacefully to terms with the Finns, this would undoubtedly benefit us and put off a world conflagration.

My impatience mounted from hour to hour as I waited for a conversation with Molotov but he still kept me waiting.

Finally a secretary opened the door of Molotov's office. "Please come in," he said. "Vyacheslav Mikhailovich will now see you."

Molotov began with a question.

"You've come here to put in a word for your Finns, haven't you?"

I: "I've come to inform you by word of mouth how foreign opinion reacts to our abortive talks with Finland. It is easier to submit an objective and complete report this way. I have a feeling that Moscow doesn't realise what a Soviet-Finnish armed conflict would bring in its train."

Molotov: "The Scandinavians have satisfied themselves in the case of Poland that we make no allowances for the Nazis."

I: "All the progressive forces of Europe and not just the Scandinavians would be on Finland's side."

Molotov: "Is it the British and French imperialists you respectfully call 'progressive forces'? We know of their plotting, and it seems that those Swedes of yours are scared stiff. Would they be able to stick to their proclaimed neutrality? We doubt it."

I hastened to give Molotov all the information that Prime Minister Hansson had asked me to convey to Moscow.

Molotov listened impatiently, challenging my report and saying again and again that the Scandinavians had been cowed by Hitler and wanted to stand up for the Finns but were afraid of us. He added that Swedish Ambassador Winter had tried to fulfil an assignment of the Swedish government by interceding with us for the Finns. ("But we took a firm

stand against all such attempts by the Scandinavians to meddle in affairs that don't concern them.")

I tried to point out to Molotov clearly if briefly the inevitable consequences that a war would have. I said that not only the Scandinavians but other countries as well would stand up for Finland.

Molotov interrupted me.

"Do you mean once again 'progressive forces' among the British and French imperialists? We've taken all that into account."

I tried to give facts showing the mood of the left in Europe and the United States. I mentioned the Swedes' determination to keep neutral. The Swedes themselves were afraid of the German Nazis, I said. It would be a different matter if Britain and France were to stand up for Finland. Washington, too, was interested in Finland's fate.

Molotov resolutely dismissed my information. He pointedly repeated several times that it was completely impossible to come to terms with the Finns. He listed the main provisions of the proposed treaty with Finland, which were aimed at safeguarding our borders and at compensating the Finns for a shift of the frontier northwards without encroaching on Finland's territorial integrity.

"What the Soviet Union proposes to the Finns is logically sound, as their own delegates admit. Our demands are most reasonable and modest. But the Finns refuse to reach agreement. Their invariable answer to anything is, 'No, we cannot accept.' They ignore all arguments. The Helsingfors government has decided the matter beforehand in the sense that 'war against the Soviet Union is inevitable'. It may well be that the bourgeois-capitalist powers are egging it on to take that reckless step, as you say. Or it may be Hitler who is doing so in revenge for the rebuff we administered to him in Byelorussia. Whoever it is who is inspiring them at the moment, it is now clear to us after our meetings with the Finnish delegates and particularly that fellow, Tanner, that the Finns are going to reject a peaceful settlement of the border dispute with us.

"We've been left no choice," Molotov added firmly, "but to make them see their mistake and accept our proposals, which they keep on obstinately and recklessly rejecting at the peace talks."

Molotov repeated several times that the Finnish delegation had been given a very cordial reception in Moscow. But the Finns stood pat.

"The chief opponent of a peace agreement with us is that scheming Social Democrat, Tanner. Paasikivi is a wily old man but he would behave more reasonably hadn't it been for Tanner. The talks haven't been broken off just yet. The Finnish delegation is expected to come back in a few days with an answer from the Finnish government itself to our new concessions. But we will go no further."

I realised that my arguments were discounted and that, more importantly, war could become inevitable.

"Your task," Molotov told me in parting, "is to discourage the Scandinavians from coming into war. Let them stick to their favourite neutrality. That would make it one front less against us."

I replied that I was ready to work on the task. But I thought as I left the Kremlin that the task could be accomplished only if the war with the Finns did not drag out. Every effort must be made at least to cut that inevitable war short. That would eliminate a Swedish front.

Although it was only two days since my arrival in Moscow, I received an order from Molotov to fly back to Sweden at 6 a.m. I had no chance to see Stalin. It's a pity [...]

I left in a state of dejection.

ANXIOUS ATMOSPHERE IN SWEDEN

Stockholm, November 4

On returning from Moscow, I realised how charged the atmosphere here in Sweden is. The campaign against the Soviet Union is disgustingly slanderous.

Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet is construed as pressure on Finland.

The Swedish press repeats the Finns' arguments mentioned to me by Molotov. It presents our proposals to Finland aimed at safeguarding peace as a threat by a great power to encroach on the territorial integrity of a sovereign if small country. The covert efforts being made to set the Swedish press against us enrage me. I am going to call at the office of *Social-Demokraten* and then at the Foreign Ministry today. I will talk to Boheman, he is better and more decent than Sandler. Rumour has it, however, that Sandler has resigned.

The talks with the Finns in Moscow were resumed after my departure.

November 5

The Finnish delegation has left Moscow without reaching agreement with us on anything. A rupture? Or have they gone back "to receive new instructions from their government", as they say?

Saltsjöbaden, November 26

I fled to the countryside for two days. I could no longer stand that disgusting croaking from everywhere: "Moscow is provoking Finland. There will be a war."

People who are sympathetic to us or simply dread war, saying that it would block trade, rush to my office to ask *me* to reassure them, to tell them that there will be no war between the Soviet Union and Finland after all. Occasionally I cannot help telling them what I think: "War is inevitable. Why, it's the Finnish Nazis who are provoking the Finnish people to fight us. They want to create an 'incident' that would offer Hitler a pretext for marching on the Soviet Union with the alleged aim of defending the Finns. As for the Swedish press, it is adding to the Finns' confidence in being on the right path. Let those who want no war bring their influence to bear on the Finns rather than pester me with their arguments and advice."

They go away dissatisfied.

The Swedish press, even *Dagens Nyheter*, is fully slanderous. The Finns have rejected the terms offered by the Soviet Union. Tension on both sides—Moscow and Helsingfors—is at its height. Here in Sweden, it is creating an atmosphere charged with anxiety such as I have never witnessed before.

The Swedish press, even *Dagens Nyheter*, is foully slanderous. The protests I lodge with the Foreign Ministry over the press no longer produce any effect although Hansson assured me the other day that while the political situation was full of anxiety, the Swedish government would not depart from its traditionally neutral position. He told the Finns as much. But French Minister Maugrat said to me, "There's a smell of powder. War between you and the Finns is inevitable." His words had a ring of satisfaction that I could not understand. Or were they meant as a reproach to the Swedes for their inaction in "big politics"?

I am completely worn out with that interminable explaining of why we demand shifting the frontier from Leningrad.

Yesterday I received a delegation of Peace and Freedom, a pacifist women's organisation. Quoting Stalin's words "We don't want anybody's territory", they asked me why the Soviet Union was now demanding that Finland should cede part of its territory. This ran counter to all principles of international law. It was aggression like any other, a variety of aggression, which the Soviet delegation led by Litvinov had condemned so brilliantly in the League of Nations.

I reminded the pacifists that as members of Peace and Freedom, they had actively helped Republican Spain against Franco and his masters, Hitler and Mussolini. The Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the world, wanted to safeguard its borders against fascists and imperialists. We had once already gone through armed intervention and defeated it and would not allow it to come again. This was why we offered an accord on a new frontier with Finland. It was in the interest of peace for all. But the Finnish Nazis, taking their cue from Berlin or some other capitalist power, refused to come peacefully to terms with us. What did it go to show? There was no need to put pressure upon us. Ours was a socialist state that did not seek war. But the capitalists needed war and were provoking Finland so as to turn it into a bridgehead and attack the Soviet Union. We had offered the Finns a mutual assistance pact as a safeguard against aggression from Hitler. What had the Finns answered? What had they decided? They had refused to join in such a pact with us. That went to show that Finnish Nazi politicians had gone far in cultivating friendship with Hitler.

Nor was that all. The Soviet state had built no fortifications on the Finnish border. But what had the Finns done? They had built the Mannerheim Line according to German plans. Did my visitors see that as evidence of the Finns' love of peace?

The delegation was led by Sandler's wife. We had a heated discussion. "You've come here to ask me talk Moscow into 'sparing' the Finns and giving up its demand for what you say is 'impossible'. But let me tell you in the name of peace and freedom that you should bring your influence to bear on the Finns. They are ready to make common cause with Hitler against us, against the Soviet state."

Towards the end I got worked up—so much so that I fled from the delegates to the dining-room and drank a glass of cold water.

It was necessary to say good-bye in keeping with the customs of "polite society."

But those bourgeois dames, those pseudo-pacifists, tried my patience too much. And that was why I fled from my current work and problems to Saltsjöbaden.

THE WINTER WAR OF 1939

Seven Shots

On the night that I spent so peacefully in Saltsjöbaden, the Finnish war against us broke out, a war remembered by everybody as the Winter War. It began with "seven shots" near the small frontier community of Maipola. They cracked in the stillness of night on our border with Finland.

I feel anxious, very anxious indeed. The Finns virtually broke off relations with us when, after months-long talks, they left Moscow in mid-November, for their delegation never came back. The treaty to safeguard peace between us and Finland was never signed. And now that incident near Maipola... The Finnish fascists want Sweden to follow suit to please Germany. But this must not be allowed to happen, it must be headed off. I must accomplish Moscow's assignment. There shall be no Swedish front against us. I am going to act...

December 1

I went to see the Minister of Social and Internal Affairs, Möller. There was no sign of his habitual friendliness, and he looked gloomy and worried. He immediately began speaking of the Maipola incident, repeating the slanderous allegation of the press: "The shots came from the Soviet and not the Finnish side."

I made up my mind to refute that allegation right away. [...]

We found Per Albin Hansson engrossed in work with a secretary. He rose to meet us

I asked to be excused for disturbing him and told him what I wanted to see him about.

"You mustn't let the Finns draw you, that is, Sweden, into this war," I said.

"But why did you turn down Sweden's offer of mediation if you wanted no war with Finland?" he asked.

I replied that I had no instructions on that score but presumed that my government had misgivings about the objectivity of that mediation. The tenor of the Swedish press throughout November had been so hostile to us that Moscow regarded the Swedish stand as neither objective nor neutral. The Swedes should disprove that, should help my government realise that the cabinet under Per Albin Hansson would never take orders from Hitler. The Finnish people and the German-Finnish Nazis inciting the Finns to war were different things.

The Prime Minister agreed that Germany had a stake in extending the area of war. "As for Sweden's policy," he added, "you needn't worry—we are neutral by tradition. But right now both you and we will have to work to prevent the military incident from turning into a regular war." He said that already there were casualties.

He also told me that Finland wanted the dispute over Maipola to be discussed at the League of Nations and that the Finns had asked the League for protection. I do not like this at all, for I fear that the Scandinavians are going to back the Finns there at the League.

I returned home sunk in gloomy thought. It seemed to me that the whole of Stockholm was wrapped in an impenetrable fog, with everybody in the city foreboding trouble and full of distrust for us.

Mannerheim is rumoured to have exhorted the Finnish government to prefer treaty to war, fearing that forces would be unequal in the event of war. A former tsarist general, he said he knew the Russian soldier and as regards the Soviet Army, it was as unpredictable as the Russian army of the past. The Finns were short of tanks and military equipment generally. They would have to fight against heavy odds unless, of course, they got effective aid from without.

Terrible, dark days of December 1939. The Germans are working to rouse the Swedish Nazis to greater activity. The city is full of rumours. Some are afraid of us and are looking to Germany for salvation. Others affirm that Germany will give Finland to us to secure more booty after the war. . The Swedes are apprehensive, and the Swedish Nazis play on this "Sweden's long-standing enemy is the neighbour in the East," they allege. "After Finland, Moscow would claim Sweden."

There is fighting on the Karelian Isthmus. Our troops are advancing on Vyborg. The press mentions place names familiar to me from childhood: Kyzelz, Poltekelle including Kuusanhovikuza, my grandfather's farmstead where there is a house with white columns. It was in those parts that I spent my early youth... And all that is to be razed by Nazi shells now?... It hurts. I hate this war...

December 7

There was a total blackout in Stockholm. I do not think I will ever forget those nights, those angry shouts of "Bolshevik aggressors out" that rang out from the dark. A mob of hoodlums tried to make its way to the Embassy building but police cordoned off the street at both ends. The mob raged but was gradually dispersed by police.

The street became deserted but the Embassy staff decided to introduce night duty.

Next morning I rang up the Minister of Internal Affairs to thank him for protecting the Embassy and dispersing the hoodlums. He answered that I could sleep peacefully because "the Hansson government keeps a watchful eye on public order and will provide no pretext for incidents that would make an already heated atmosphere still worse".

Hostile mobs did not disturb us any more whereas in Paris and London they have smashed the windows of our embassies.

Every morning I feel purely physical pain as I look through the press. I know that in store for me are column after column of vicious, shameless slander against us, articles inspired by the most rabid Nazism and giving vent to all the hatred for the Soviet Union felt by the ruling classes of Sweden, those monopolists associated with the financial magnates of all capitalist countries. It is not only frankly pro-Nazi papers that are engaged in a smear campaign against us. Vying with them is the whole Swedish, Danish and Norwegian press. Not only Social Democratic papers, but, more serious still, even Göteborg *Handels Tidningen* a solid and popular daily of the commercial and financial world known for its anti-Hitler trend, have joined in the chorus of slanderers.

TASS transmits all these hostile comments to Moscow in the form of condensed dispatches, which distorts the picture.

Sweden has no interest in entering the war in defence of the Finns. Hansson and even the King favour neutrality. This is more advantageous to Sweden.

I talk time and again to the new TASS correspondent, arguing with him and spelling out the actual situation for him. It is worth telling him what's what. London exerts an annoying influence that sets the tone for the Göteborg paper. The British have become zealous defenders of Finland and while waging war against Hitler, they seem to forget that this war of the Finns against us was started at Nazi instigation to please Hitler. Now why do Britain and France abet the Finnish Nazis?

December 8

The Finnish government has asked the League of Nations to examine the Maipola incident.

The governments of the Scandinavian countries have got together in Oslo, probably in order to agree a common stand at Geneva on Maipola.

December 10

The Finnish parliament has asked all nations for support, alleging that Finland has fallen victim to aggression. This accusation plays into the hands of monopolists in all countries.

I recall the civil war years but currently my perception of everything is keener. Besides, our global enemies' hatred is more virulent and boundless. Isn't this because in these past years we have become stronger, achieved unity and cohesion and grown intellectually and materially? Our state is no longer called the RSFSR but the USSR.

Our treaty with Kuusinen, that is, the Communists and other Finns sympathetic to the Soviet Union and opposing war is logical for us but utterly incomprehensible here in Sweden and, indeed, in other countries. Kuusinen is popular among Finland's Communists but has no backing among the people.

Dr. Wickman, an anti-fascist editorialist of the Liberal *Dagens Nyheter* who has commented on our country in a friendly vein, called on me to ask. "What's that treaty with Kuusinen? And what is the Terijoki government?" ("Terijoki" is a scornful description of the Kuusinen government used here)

December 13

There is a change of Cabinet in Finland as well. Prime Minister Kajander has been dropped. Sweden interprets this as a result of pressure from Moscow. But the choice of Ryti, a banker, as Prime Minister shows that the change of Cabinet has been prompted by other reasons. Banker Ryti is linked with the financial world of the capitalist powers and not just with Berlin, and to fight a war, a country admittedly needs three things: money, money and more money.

Ryti is Tanner's man, which bodes no good. It is rumoured that the premiership was to have gone to Paasikivi but Tanner had him rejected as being too "objective" towards the Soviet Union. Paasikivi is clever enough not to realise the utter folly of the Finnish Nazis' military gamble. Besides, he is no Nazi. Ryti, too, is said to have little liking for Hitler and to maintain strong ties with Britain and the United States. But currently the political watershed is less distinct than during the 1914-1918 war. Ryti's pro-British orientation does not prevent him from fulfilling Berlin's assignment. Be that as it may, all the information available to me and our Military Attaché suggests that Ryti is not inclined to seek peace with Moscow. He is going to obey the Social Democratic right, or Tanner * to be exact. But this new Finnish government under Ryti and Tanner is described as "peaceful", which indicates clearly enough that the war is unpopular in the country.

December 18

Our withdrawal from the League of Nations has given rise to an at once furious and triumphant hue and cry among our enemies in all capitalist countries. The French and British write that the Soviet Union did not step out of its own accord but was expelled from the League. This uproar is drowning the rumble of the Finnish war. It is an incredible uproar. The Paris press fears that the Soviet Union will now finalise its closer ties with Germany and that the hordes of Hitler and the Bolsheviks will march on the Western powers to wipe out the whole of high-standard culture built up by humanity over thousands of years.

THE SWEDES PUT OUT FEELERS

December 24

The dinner at a villa in Saltsjöbaden to which Karl Gerhard invited me and the Möllers was by no means "intimately festive". It was a dinner planned beforehand for a diplomatic purpose...

After dinner, Möller took my arm as I was entering the drawing-room.

"I must talk to you seriously, Comrade Alexandra," he said... (He did not say "Mme. Kollontai", and this implied that the false merriment was over and the time had come for an intimately businesslike conversation.)

* Finnish Foreign Minister.—Ed.

We sat down at some distance from the others Möller was the first to speak. He began by saying that "this" could not go on much longer.

"The war on the Karelian Isthmus must be ended not only in the interests of the Russians and Finns but for Sweden's sake. The Finns are containing the Russian offensive *for the moment*. But if Moscow begins winning (which is inevitable), it will be harder and harder for the Swedes to stay neutral. The Finnish troops have already shown that they can fight efficiently and—let me add—heroically although your troops are no worse. But we Swedes consider that there has been enough bloodshed and it's time to end that ugly mutual extermination. It is necessary to sign a peace."

"What do the Finns say?" I asked.

"Let me tell you very confidentially that Helsinki is looking forward to our mediation."

This is big news.

"The Finns want peace," said Möller. "Mannerheim is pessimistic. The Finnish government, or Tanner to be precise, has sounder me out unofficially. But what will Moscow say if Stockholm again offers to mediate? The moment is suitable now. Please clear the matter up as early as possible, Comrade Alexandra. The situation is fluid, and it's a question of hours, not days [...]"

Early in January there were recurrent rumours about the Finns holding talks with Germany through the German Ambassador to Helsinki, Blücher. This made me nervous and angry. Is it possible that our people will prefer Berlin as mediator? Yet the very act of mediating peace would bind the Swedes and draw them closer to the Soviet Union.

Moscow stints me of information and instructions. I am doing what I can on my own responsibility. We must induce the Swedes to offer mediation and prod the Finns. But time presses. The frosts persist, and meanwhile our men are dying in Finland's forests and swamps. Also dying—in the interest of financial magnates—are Finns, the very same Finnish workers and *torpparis* (landless peasants) whom I used to write about so much, calling on them to rise with us Russian revolutionaries against tsarism and their own, Finnish industrial and financial magnates.

The world war is latent. The French have entrenched themselves along their Maginot Line. Meanwhile there is Daladier in Paris seeking a compromise with Hitler. Chamberlain stepped carefully with the Finns, but the new British government under Chamberlain and Halifax promises the Finns support in the form of ammunition. The Swedes provide military supplies cautiously for the time being because Hansson counts on a possible peace. But the recruitment of Swedish volunteers and their dispatch to the Finnish front are continuing. The Swedish Nazis are getting more and more brazen. Military journals carry articles by Swedish specialists who argue that with "a little help" from the Swedes, fighting on the Karelian Isthmus would soon end in victory for the Finns.

Pro-German Swedish army officers speak very unfavourably of our Army in the Field. Colonel Willy Klein is particularly insolent in his hostile criticism of our military operations. He even gives figures and lists certain Swedish troop units which he says would rapidly bring the Winter War to a close.

The situation is tense and grave. This whole waiting is an ordeal. When will the Finns start talking peace at last?

But here is the latest story: America has promised Finland to step in and offered its mediation. That Günther* is a spineless fellow, a co-

* Swedish Foreign Minister —Ed.

ward. He is sure to miss the opportunity of getting Finland out of the war....

I called on Prime Minister Hansson himself and his wife in Alsten to have "a cup of coffee". "We must act"—this was the gist of my conversation with the Prime Minister. But I must choose my words carefully, for Moscow has not answered whether it would accept Swedish mediation.

Hansson believes that in view of the latest advances of the Soviet troops and a direct threat to the Mannerheim Line, the Finnish government is ready to sue for peace. But the Swedes would undertake mediation only after being assured that Moscow would not reject it. "Military sentiment is on the rise in Sweden," Hasson added. "It is becoming more and more difficult to keep within the bounds of humanitarian aid to Finland."

SWEDISH MEDIATION

January 24

Formal peace talks have begun today. The period of feelers is over. The Finns have formally asked the Swedish government to mediate. They want peace. Gunther told me so officially, asking for an early answer from Moscow about whether we accepted Swedish mediation and what we were going to answer to the Finns' call for peace talks.

I am still in a state of agitation. Yet what we have is merely an offer of peace talks. And I know that talks break down easily. But Günther was elated. Well, it is still a first step towards restoring peace. [...]

January 24

[...] Günther came in hurriedly. He asked to be excused for making me wait because he could not break off an international telephone conversation.

"On the other hand," he said, "I can give you some good news: the Finnish government has formally asked us to mediate a peace. Minister Kollontai, what will Moscow's answer be? Can we be certain that Moscow will accept our offer?"

"Moscow will accept your mediation," I answered on an impulse.

"If so, there is not a minute to lose, for the Finns are waiting for your answer. I've just spoken to Helsingfors."

I promised to send an inquiry to Moscow right away.

"So the Finns are suing formally for peace, is that it?" I asked Günther to make sure.

He said yes.

I left the Ministry building with a sense of victory. But it is night now, and all my doubts have come back to beset me. Wasn't I too optimistic in answering Günther? Didn't my message to Molotov sound too confident of the Finns' readiness for peace at all costs? They are in an awfully tight spot now—there can be no doubt about this. We have broken through the Mannerheim Line, and Vyborg is threatened. But there are those persistent rumours about Anglo-French troops planning to land in Northern Norway and asking Sweden for permission to transit to Finland... The Finns may take heart, hoping for help from Britain and France. What are the Swedes going to answer to the "great powers'" request for transit? I wish Moscow answered favourably as soon as possible, saying that it would accept Swedish mediation, for if it did the question of transit would no longer arise.

January 26

The campaign has been going on for two months now and resistance is tough, all countries helping Finland in various ways. Morally they are all against us—both Berlin and Paris. [...]

The news from the front is unfavourable. Our advance has slowed down. The Finns may take fresh heart and refuse to budge. A new unit of Swedish volunteers has been sent to the front to reinforce the Finns. [...]

MEETING WITH TANNER**February 4**

We have the Finns' answer but Moscow does not find it satisfactory. Why do they say nothing about the port of Hanko?

What is to be done next? Hella Wuolijoki is still here in Stockholm. She is Tanner's envoy. I called her to discuss the matter. We decided to invite Tanner himself to Stockholm for a meeting with me. Two urgent messages went out: one from Wuolijoki to Tanner in Helsinki and the other from me to Moscow, in which I asked for permission to meet with Tanner.

February 5

Tanner has arrived in Stockholm. I am going to the Grand Hotel to meet him in Wuolijoki's room. I recall him since the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen in 1910, and of course, afterwards I met him in Helsinki in 1917 and 1918.

I am calm. Our position is so clear and right. I will begin my conversation with Tanner in such a way as if we proceeded from a proposition approved by our governments and calling for an end to the war, the only task left being to outline the main provisions of the coming peace treaty.

February 5 (Second Entry)

Immediately after recognising the earnest desire of both governments to end bloodshed and seek peace, we moved on to a discussion of the main point which makes it difficult to outline the principles of a peace treaty, namely, the area of Hanko port. Tanner said that "personally" he considered it possible to cede to the Soviet Union in place of Hanko one of the islands lying in the Gulf of Finland, near the Karelian Isthmus. But he stressed that that was no official offer from his government as yet but merely an idea that had occurred to him as he cast about for what Finland could offer the Soviet Union to safeguard the security of the Gulf of Finland and the approaches to Leningrad. "Personally" he believed that in exchange for ceding an island in the Gulf of Finland to us (he did not mention Yserä, the island mentioned during the Moscow talks), the Finns would settle for our ceding to them the wooded areas of Repola and Polajärvi in Karelia.

Tanner earnestly assured me for a long time that the Finns were pursuing an independent policy, fulfilling no assignments of either Berlin or the Western powers. He was plainly eager to make that point.

I promised to immediately convey his proposal to Moscow.

"With a reservation to the effect," said Tanner, "that for the moment this is my personal proposal to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Joseph Stalin. For his personal consideration."

I left feeling that we would come to terms.

February 6

This morning I received Moscow's answer to Tanner's proposal, which I had forwarded to Comrade Stalin in exact terms yesterday. The answer was disheartening: "Regret to say your proposal cannot serve as basis for peace negotiations."

With help from Wuolijoki, I again met with Tanner at the Grand Hotel today. But this time the meeting was more official. Tanner was drily restrained and reproached me for failing to comply with his request by turning directly to Stalin.

"He wouldn't have answered like that, wouldn't have cut us off without making any concrete proposal of his own that would allow our discussion of the principles of peace to go on."

I argued with Tanner, saying that the answer did not sound like a refusal and had a sharper ring as worded in the translation. Indeed, the word "regret" indicated sincerity and softened the whole text.

Tanner jotted down his answer, which also began with "regret" and went on to say: "but Finland can go no further in its proposals".

I asked Tanner why he did not mention the island which the Finns had been prepared to cede to us in the Gulf of Finland. He deflected my question.

We agreed to effect all further contacts exclusively through Günther, for Wuolijoki was going back to Finland. We parted on an official note, without expressing any hopes or wishes. [...]

February 26

These are decisive days charged with tension. Events of paramount significance have become tightly intertwined in a tangle of problems. Whether we, the Soviet Union succeed in ending Finnish aggression or whether hostile forces win the upper hand and bring about a further expansion of the area of war instead of peace will depend on how these problems are solved....

My sentiments and my forecast of what the outcome of the peace talks will be change many times every day. Days and nights are dominated by growing anxiety. What will come in the wake of this war born of the shots at Maipola? Fighting goes on from battle to bloody battle. Their outcome is uncertain and transitory.

Winter refuses to give in. There are many common graves of Finnish and Soviet soldiers in Finland's dark forests. Those long black nights in deserted thick forests, with ravens circling over the dead and wounded, are terrible. Wherever have those flocks of ominously cawing birds of prey come from to Finland's snow-covered forests, which are usually still in winter?

The Finns are holding out although the map makes it easy enough to see where the frontline has caved in, indicating their retreat. Their positions were stronger in December and even as recently as January. What are the Finns hoping for? Why are they dragging their feet over a firm and clear answer to our proposal for peace talks? Tanner and Ryti keep on resorting to evasions and delays. They have complained to the Swedes, saying that Moscow's proposals were "imprecise" and made it hard to understand whether they were final. But on Wednesday, February 23, when Moscow proposed a final basis for peace talks there was an outcry from Helsinki: "Moscow's terms are incredibly tough".... They are stalling again, putting forward amendments to the Soviet proposal....

Hitler is playing a double game. He has in his pocket the August treaty with the Soviet Union, which he is in no hurry to break. Let the Finns lay themselves out to his glory. He promises the Finns help, trying to satisfy the Swedish government that the best way to proceed is

for Bofors to deliver heavy artillery straight to the Karelian front and adding that the Swedes would settle the bill with Berlin after the war.

But Hitler in Berlin has been outdone by Daladier in Paris and the ruling clique in London. They must have nosed out the news of peace preparations and have therefore raised an awful hullabaloo in defence of the "poor Finns". It is plain that they want to drag out Finnish aggression and to exploit the Finns' Karelian adventure for the Western powers' political ends. Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry Erik Boheman told me yesterday that the French and British Ambassadors had openly stepped up their activity in Stockholm and Helsinki alike. It is considered certain that a French expeditionary corps has already been formed and that Norway is inclined to authorise a landing of Anglo-French troops in the port of Narvik. Paris and London are bitter about the Swedes' behaviour and call them Hitler's flunkys, apparently because they have got wind of the talks.

Boheman has described an urgent meeting of the Ministers of the three Scandinavian countries to be held in Copenhagen as an indication of the Scandinavians' firm resolve to stay neutral and keep out of the world war....

Nor is that all. There is another piece of big news today that is important to Sweden. The Foreign Affairs Commission of parliament has approved a decision by the Council of Ministers to refuse Anglo-French troops passage through Swedish territory. All through February, Stockholm, Paris, London and, in fact, the whole of Europe were worried about and preoccupied with this matter. What would have allowing the Western powers' troops to cross to Finland meant? It would have been tantamount to declaring war on Germany. The French exerted pressure, and the Churchill/Halifax Cabinet tried to talk the Swedes into accepting but Prime Minister Hansson of Sweden is a man with a strong will.

"We will never abandon neutrality for as long as I live."

This attitude of Hansson's is in our interest. The other day I again had a "cup of coffee" with his wife at their little home in Alsten. During the conversation he gave me the reason for the delays on the Finn's part and the procrastination over talks with us to undeniable pressure put on Helsinki by Paris and London.

"Tanner is naive, to put it mildly," he said. "He takes the Western powers' promise of help at its face value but these powers themselves are afraid of Hitler and aren't going to render the Finns any effective assistance."

CONVERSATION WITH TANNER

February 27, Morning

An important event is expected today: the Swedish government is to advise France and Britain of its refusal to allow Anglo-French troops passage through Swedish territory. This decision is no news any longer, the King has endorsed it, and parliament and the Cabinet have approved it, but no formal refusal of Daladier's and Churchill's request that the expeditionary corps be allowed to pass has yet been transmitted to both Paris and London.

Now that the Finnish government has our firm peace terms, it would be particularly important for the Swedish government to refuse the Western powers' request. I will be glad to see the last of today....

February 27, Evening

A telephone call from Günther's secretariat broke off my morning notes. The Minister asked me to call on him immediately at the Foreign Ministry.

"Your Excellency," I said to Günther.

"Mme Kollontai, your personal address to Tanner has had its effect. He has arrived in Stockholm and would like to begin by seeing you. He will tell you everything. They are ready to accept Moscow's proposal but Finns will be Finns even at the last moment which may prove fatal to them: they want to advance a further condition."

"Where is their answer?"

"You will learn everything from Tanner himself. He insists on an immediate meeting with you. Söderblom will tell you where and how you can meet with Tanner. As for us, we'll see you after your meeting with the Finnish Foreign Minister."

Söderblom led the way to his office, where he told me that the meeting with Tanner was to take place in an hour in the apartment of Mrs. Stahl, a lawyer, on Valhallavägen. He added that the meeting was to be "highly confidential" in compliance with Tanner's own request.

Valhallavägen is a stone's throw from our mission, and so I will walk unnoticed to Mrs. Stahl's.

[...] I thought about the front and our soldiers as I wandered about the empty apartment belonging to a stranger.... But would I be able to come to terms with Tanner and bring about peace? I had been so naive as to imagine that Moscow had only to offer the Finns peace for a Finnish delegation to arrive in Moscow a few days later to negotiate peace....

My thoughts were interrupted by a ring of the bell. I let Tanner in.

"I hope there's nobody else here?" he asked, taking off his coat.

I said no.

We crossed to the study of our hostess. On one side by the window there was a table covered with a green plush cloth, with paper, ink and pencils upon it.

We sat down facing each other. Tanner nervously shifted the pencils around, saying nothing. I spoke first.

"I understand that you wanted to talk to me personally but there is nothing I can add to what I conveyed to you through Günther yesterday."

"Yes," Tanner began, "you said that the personal, friendly advice you were offering me was to accept Moscow's proposal unconditionally. Does that mean that even at verbal talks Moscow would refuse to make a single generous concession? A basis for talks without hope of some concessions is unacceptable to us."

I interrupted him.

"If that's how it is, what did you want to discuss with me? Moscow's first proposal to the Finnish government was more advantageous to you but you didn't accept anything and missed your chance. If you turn down this proposal as well, my government may advance still tougher conditions. Moscow doesn't believe in your sincerity. I hear all sorts of stories unfavourable to you," I added, unable to check myself.

Tanner was annoyed.

"So what does Moscow want of Finland after all?" he said. "We are ceding the Karclian Isthmus and giving you Hanko and the islands.... Where do Vyborg and Sortavala come in? Vyborg is no booty, you've taken it.... What do you need Vyborg for? There is no strategic rationale for claiming it, whereas the Finnish people consider Vyborg a relic of history. To give up that old fortress to you who don't need it whereas it is near and dear to every Finn would mean dealing a blow to our prestige, to every Finn's pride.... Our people would never forgive those who were to sign such a treaty."

"Where do prestige and pride come in?" I replied calmly. "Why talk like that, Mr. Minister? It's peace and nothing but peace that the Finnish people need. It must be bought by giving up Vyborg. We had bet-

ter get down to business and look into Moscow's terms, that is, the basis for talks, point by point."

In the end it turned out that Vyborg was the stumbling block. Tanner began once again arguing with me excitedly and vehemently, saying that Vyborg could not be ceded to us.

"Unless you accept Moscow's terms this very day, the war will go on and you will lose Vyborg anyway. The point at issue is something more important, your sovereignty. Moscow doesn't encroach upon it but who knows how the world war will end?"

"You are threatening us!" Tanner flared up. "We'll succeed in defending our country, and as for our sovereignty, remember that the world will stand up for it."

He sprang up and began pacing the room in excitement.

I gave up my official tone to try a "lyrical" approach.

"Do you really think, Mr. Minister, that I don't understand you or don't know how hard it is for you, a son of your proud country, to have to cede Vyborg?.."

I reminded him of my years-long link with Finland and the fact that the tsarist police had persecuted me for defending Finland. I even mentioned my grandfather, a Finnish peasant, and his Kuusanhovi farmstead where I had spent my childhood and early youth.

"You had asked me to come here today," I went on, "in order to hear my friendly advice. I say it again: tell Moscow immediately that you accept its terms unconditionally, and go to Moscow. Peace, peace is what all workers, peasants and torpparis want. It's up to you to extend the area of war or bring about peace... How can you hesitate?"

"Wouldn't Moscow make some more new conditions during the talks there?" Tanner asked.

I answered that that would depend on an honest and truthful policy on Finland's part.

March 1

I saw Günther after Tanner, so that Günther knew about our conversation. To my surprise, Günther supported the Finnish government's suggestion that Vyborg and Sortavala be included among its categorical conditions for peace talks. He said that the Swedes were at one with the Finns on this issue, for they saw no strategic reason for demanding these concessions from Finland. Vyborg was a relic of history for the Swedes as well. That fortress had for many centuries defended the Swedish people against invasion by barbarians from the East, by Pechenegs, Tartars, Russians and even Finns, who were still barbarians at the time.

I objected firmly, exhorting Günther not to back the Finns on this point. Vyborg was of strategic importance in terms of approaches to our frontiers and the defence of Leningrad. Moscow would not give up its claim to the city although we had only put it forward later on. I advised the Swedes against trying to uphold a hopeless condition, for it could result in nothing but further delays.

Günther stuck to his opinion, however, saying that he would manage to find a formula acceptable to Moscow. He confirmed the news that the Prime Minister himself had informed Tanner of the refusal to allow the Western powers' expeditionary corps transit through Sweden. However, he said nothing about Tanner's proposal for forming a Nordic defensive alliance I got word of it afterwards but not from Günther.

I went from Günther to his deputy, Erik Boheman, who usually gives me news of general significance. Boheman told me important news. Our proposal as a basis for peace talks had also been sent simultaneously to Maisky in London who was instructed to pass it on to Halifax and requ-

est him to hand it to the Finns. But Halifax had refused. According to information received by the Swedes from London, Maisky had said angrily that the British Cabinet was missing a rare occasion to win the confidence of the Soviet Union and that its refusal would further aggravate the already strained relations between London and Moscow.

Boheman confirmed the rumour that Paris and London are stepping up their activity, exerting pressure by means of telegrams, telephone calls and visits to the Prime Minister by the French and British Ambassadors. Our talks with the Finns had greatly disturbed the ruling circles in France and Britain, and both capitals were doing all they could to prevent the signing of a peace. The British and French Ambassadors dropped in at the Finnish State Bank to see Ryti at the most unexpected hours, a fact which drew attention in Helsinki and bred apprehension and rumours. The Finns were used to the Germans' activity but what had made the British and French stir themselves? What good or evil would come of it?

Going around Stockholm, too, are all sort of sensational stories coming apparently from the West. It is certain, however, that the Paris press is unabashedly running down the Swedes and that Daladier promises the Finns to hasten the dispatch of armed aid. As for the Swedes, it has been made clear to them that unless they allow Anglo-French troops passage, they will land in a Norwegian port and move up to the Swedish border ready for combat. [...]

March 4

French pressure exceeds all limits. The French have informed the Finns of the strength of the force they plan to send to the Finnish front. They promise bombers and other military aircraft, assuring the Finns that aid will arrive by the end of March provided they refrain from signing a treaty with the Soviet Union. Daladier has sent the King in Stockholm a personal letter said to have moved the Crown Prince so much (from what I am told) that he tried to influence the King and the Swedish government. But Hansson is as firm as a granite rock, and the Cabinet's decision to refuse Anglo-French troops passage stand. London is furious with the Swedes.

According to Günther, Tanner had asked the Western powers whether they would help the Finns if talks in Moscow broke down. The answer had been that the Finns should stop the talks with the Soviet Union and certainly refuse to go to Moscow. As regards the expeditionary corps, Paris affirmed that it would be sent to Northern Norway in a few days.

Under the influence of the Swedish position and out of fear of the Germans, the Finns have not formally asked Paris and London as yet for military aid under Paragraph 16 of the League of Nations Covenant. The initiative of aid has so far come from the French and British themselves. But now they demand a formal request from the Finnish government, except that the German Ambassador to Helsingfors, Blücher, has as many connections as the British or French if not more and is hitting back. The Americans are stirring for their part, offering to mediate between Helsinki and Moscow while at the same time promising relief supplies.

March 5

Britain and France have stepped up their pressure and set a firm deadline for the Finns to ask the Western powers for armed aid. The deadline will expire tonight.

The Finns are panic-stricken. They must choose one of two decisions by

either agreeing to talks in Moscow or asking the Western powers for help. The former decision would assure the exhausted Finnish people peace. The latter would drag out the war (and threaten new troubles from Berlin). What embarrasses the Finns is that the dispatch of the expeditionary corps to the Finnish front is highly uncertain, that there are few chances of crossing the icebound Gulf of Bothnia by late March and that, most importantly, French reports continuously give varying figures of the strength of the corps although Daladier has promised to regard the Finnish front as his own "great front" against Germany and the Soviet Union (as an enemy). Nor has the chief obstacle—the Swedes' ban on transit—been removed.

The British mention a large force but expect to land it in Norwegian ports whereas the Norwegians have not yet authorised that, according to Günther.

Günther is pressuring the Finns, threatening to refuse them Swedish mediation if they continue vacillating.

An important event: the Finnish government has finally accepted Moscow's peace proposals. The word "unconditionally" has been left out of the Finnish text. Tanner—incidentally, he is not a member of the delegation appointed by the Finnish government to hold talks in Moscow—has asked Günther to find out, first, when the Finns are expected in Moscow, and second, whether an armistice will be announced.

FINNISH VACILLATION

March 9

I was aroused by the telephone. I thought it was Günther calling but it turned out to be the Interior Minister, Möller.

The Prime Minister asked me to call on him at 10 a. m. at the Ministry. I had to hurry because it was half past nine.

Hansson looked cheerless and preoccupied when we met.

"How was it that Gunther did not inform the Finnish government the exact frontier on which your government insists? Moscow says that frontier was listed among the conditions for peace talks. During the very first meetings between the two sides, on March 8th, the Finns realised that (Moscow is presenting Finland with most onerous conditions) it was a question of entirely new areas and that, had it known this, the Finnish government might have refrained from sending its delegation to Moscow." Hansson added that Sweden found itself in an idiotic situation because it had failed to convey all of Moscow's conditions to the Finns. "Delegation members in Moscow were outraged and demanded to be recalled immediately to Helsinki to reach agreement with their government. The Finns were persuaded to stay but the atmosphere at the talks is tense and disagreeable. How did it come that neither you nor Günther told the Finns anything about the frontier demanded by Moscow?"

The question took me unawares. Moscow had not notified me of any new conditions. To gain time, I asked Hansson what frontier he meant, whether the one north of Vyborg and including the city or the eastern frontier around Sortavala.

He replied that the Soviet Union was demanding new areas and that it was an "unheard-of thing" to make new demands just when the talks started (since there was already an accepted basis for these talks). He stressed that to delay the signing of a peace was dangerous for both sides.

The Prime Minister also told me of another preoccupation of his. The French and British had again stepped up their pressure on the Swedes

over the issue of transit. The day before, Paris and London had formally approached the Swedish government to insist on authorising the expedition corps to pass through Sweden. They, had also made it clear, doing so informally but very pointedly, that a Swedish refusal would entail repressive measures in trade and finance, to which the Swedish economy was very sensitive.

Some members of the coalition government (conservatives, needless to say) had declared at a Cabinet meeting for a revision of the decision on transit but Hansson had refuted all their arguments.

Hansson's information allowed me enough time to discuss an answer to the question about the new frontier proposed to the Finns by my government. [...]

March 12

[...] Will this torture really come to an end today, so that I can live as an ordinary person, without having to bear this responsibility for the lives of our soldiers and for the proper fulfilment of the task set by the Soviet Union? Everyone wants the two sides in Moscow to make haste about signing a peace. The Finns' front is a complete shambles, and we are pressing them hard everywhere. But we must hurry because the Western powers' threats are not just idle talk. What Hitler wants is precisely to embroil us with Britain and France.

March 13

Last night, at 2 a. m. Swedish time, a peace treaty was signed. Daldier and Halifax have lost their game.

The mood at the mission is triumphant. All of Moscow's demands on the Finns have been met but the Swedish press is reserved and devotes much space to reports from Helsinki, where the news of peace on Moscow's terms is causing a murmur of discontent.

I sent a congratulatory message to Stalin and Molotov and received from them a reply congratulating me and acknowledging my role "in carrying the matter through to a favourable end".

What now? This is not the end of our wars—it is merely a minor stage in the epoch of battles between socialist revolutions and a predatory capitalist world.... I am not overjoyed. I merely feel emptied now that I have accomplished my task.

THE WINTER WAR

With this issue **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS** finishes the publication of documents on Soviet-Finnish relations in 1939-1940 from the Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR. All documents are published for the first time.

No. 17. A PERSONAL NOTE FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV TO THE ENVOY OF FINLAND TO THE USSR YRJÖ-KOSKINEN

November 29, 1939

Mr Envoy,

It follows from official information that attacks of Finnish military units on Soviet forces continue, and that they continue not only on the Karelian Isthmus but in other sectors of the Soviet-Finnish border as well.

The Soviet Government cannot tolerate such a situation any longer.

In view of the prevailing situation, for which the Government of Finland is wholly and entirely responsible, the Government of the USSR can no longer maintain normal relations with Finland and has to recall its political and economic representatives from Finland.

Please, accept, Mr Envoy, my assurances of perfect respect.

V. MOLOTOV
People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs of the USSR

FPA of the USSR, t. 06, r. 1, l. 18, f. 188, p. 26.

No. 18. FROM THE DIARY OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. P. POTEMKIN

November 29, 1939

I handed the Envoy Molotov's note about recalling our political and economic representatives from Finland. Having read the note the Envoy asked, "Is this a break?" I replied in the affirmative. Then the Envoy told me that he had received a note from the Finnish Government at about 4 p. m. today, announcing its consent to the proposal of the Government of the USSR concerning the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the borderline. To my question, why the Envoy had not passed that note on to us, Yrjö-Koskinen explained that along with the note, he had received an injunction from Helsinki—to wait for additional instructions which were to be sent to him later today by coded telegram.

At that point in the conversation I was informed by my secretariat that the counsellor of the Finnish mission, Solanko, was asking the Envoy to communicate with him by telephone at once. Yrjö-Koskinen approached the telephone and, having exchanged a few words with the counsellor, told me that the promised coded telegram from Helsinki had already arrived and that he ordered it to be deciphered immediately.

The Envoy asked me whether we would find it possible to receive from him later today the note which had come from the Finnish Government. I replied that, in my opinion, Molotov's note handed to the Envoy covered whatever issues there had been between the Soviet Government and the present Government of Finland.

Continued from **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS** No. 8, 1989.

Compiled by Irina Morozova, Second Secretary, Historical Diplomacy Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Galina Takhnenko, First Secretary, Historical Diplomacy Department.

Yrjö-Koskinen asked when he was supposed to leave the USSR. I replied that he should consult his own Government on this score. We, for our part, had instructed our staff in Helsinki to leave it immediately.

FPA of the USSR, t. 0135, l. 22, r. 145, f. 4, pp. 18-19.

No. 19. FROM THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO THE USSR, SCHULENBURG

November 30, 1939

[] Schulenburg says he had a call from Berlin earlier today to the effect that the world press was full of rumours about events on the Soviet-Finnish border, about Soviet forces having crossed the frontier and Soviet aircraft bombing Finland. The Ambassador asks to be informed about the activities of the Soviet Government.

Molotov replies that we have not found it possible to come to terms with the present Government of Finland and we see that we won't get anywhere. Whatever promises it has given been broken right away. The Government of Finland has all along been seeking to cheat us. You cannot rule out the possibility of Finland having a different government, one friendly towards the Soviet Union as well as towards Germany. That government will not be Soviet, but one of a democratic republic. Nobody is going to set up Soviets over there, but we hope it will be a government we can come to terms with so as to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The US Government is trying to interfere in the matter, by offering its mediation. But I have already said that we won't get anywhere with the present Government.

Should a government just referred to be created, the Government of the Soviet Union would, for its part, meet it half-way. The Soviet Government would be ready to consider transferring part of the territory of Soviet Karelia to Finland.

The Soviet Government has no intention of restricting the external and internal independence of Finland. On the other hand, the Soviet Government will try every means to ensure the security of Leningrad.

Concluding his information, Molotov declares that the Soviet Government regrets to have found it impossible for the issue of Leningrad's security to be solved by peaceful means. Schulenburg asks whether Soviet forces have crossed the frontier. Yes, they have, Molotov replies. Schulenburg wonders whether the Air Force is involved. Molotov answers in the affirmative.

Molotov adds that if Sweden and Norway move against the USSR, they will be sure to suffer. It seems to us, Molotov says, that the steps we have taken in respect of Finland will damp Sweden's and Norway's sympathy for England, and that will be good for the USSR and Germany.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06, l. 1, r. 1, f. 4, pp. 75-77.

No. 20. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE ENVOY OF SWEDEN TO THE USSR, V. VINTER

December 4, 1939

The Envoy, having arrived in the company of his secretary, says that, on instructions from his Government, he has come to make a statement on behalf of Finland.

The Envoy has declared the following: ever inspired by a desire to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict which has arisen between Finland and the Soviet Union, and also determined to submit fresh positive proposals so as to achieve agreement between the USSR and Finland, the Finnish Government wishes to ask the Soviet Government whether the latter is willing to enter into negotiations on the above-mentioned objectives.

The Envoy hands Molotov a personal note containing a summary of the statement he has just made.

Having accepted the note, Comrade Molotov says to the Envoy that, as the latter must know, the Soviet Union does not recognise the so-called Finnish Government which was in Helsinki and has now left it for some place. The Soviet Union has broken off diplomatic relations with that "government" and recalled its Minister who had been accredited to it.

The Soviet Government recognises only the Government of democratic Finland, headed by Kuusinen.

The Envoy must also know that the USSR has concluded a treaty with that Government. The Soviet Union does not consider itself to be in a state of war with Finland. It has no claims to Finnish territory. The Soviet Government has reached agreement with the Finnish Government about ceding considerable territory to Finland in exchange for the territories being turned over to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has pledged to pay 420 million marks for the islands and peninsulas ceded to it as well as for the railway equipment transferred to it on the territory of the Karelian Isthmus ceded by Finland.

"We consider," Molotov says, "that this determines our attitude to the persons who call themselves the government of Finland, but are not that in reality."

In these circumstances, there is no ground for discussing the matter referred to in the Envoy's statement.

"Now, as to the Soviet Union's relations with Sweden," Molotov continues, "these are in no way affected by our relations with Finland."

Vinter says that he can add nothing to his statement and that he will immediately pass Molotov's reply on to the Swedish Government.

The Envoy then refers to the mandate for the protection of Finland's interests in the USSR, which he has received from the Finnish Government and had so stated in the note he has handed to Lozovsky. Should he wait for an answer or can Molotov answer him right now?

Molotov replies that he can answer immediately. The Soviet Union has recognised the People's Government of Finland. So how, in these circumstances, can a Swedish Envoy represent Finland, if he speaks on behalf of the so-called Finnish Government? The Swedish mission could represent Finland only if it acted on behalf of the People's Government of Finland, recognised by the Soviet Union. In the present circumstances, the question posed in the Envoy's note to Lozovsky is pointless.

Vinter declares that he will transmit what Molotov has told him to his Government.

The Envoy goes on to say that he has received differing reports from his Government about the departure of the Finnish mission from the USSR and asks how long the formalities involved in the departure of the Finnish mission from the USSR will take to complete. He has information that the German steamship by which the staff of the Soviet mission has left Finland must already have arrived in Tallinn.

Molotov replies to the Envoy that the Soviet Government will raise no obstacles in the way of the Finnish mission's departure from the USSR once informed of the safe arrival of the staff of the Soviet Helsinki mission in Tallinn.

The Envoy says that he will convey Molotov's reply to his Government and to the Finnish Minister in Stockholm.

Winding up, Molotov remarks that the transmission of his reply to the Finnish Envoy in Stockholm is a point of no concern to the Soviet Government, it is Sweden's business.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06, l. 1, r. 1, l. 4, pp. 88-90.

No. 21. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE ENVOY OF SWEDEN TO THE USSR, ASSARSSON

February 20, 1940

The Envoy, having arrived together with the counsellor of the mission, Euler, handed Cde. Molotov copies of his credentials and his predecessor Vinter's letters of recall.

Thereupon, the Envoy, having noted that Britain and France wanted to spread the war to the territory of the Northern countries, declared that Sweden stuck to its positions of neutrality. At the same time, the Swedish Government, admitting that Finland has to make concessions essential for ensuring the security of the frontiers of the USSR, presumes the need for such concessions to have already been appreciated by the Finnish Government. What remains to be done is to find the ground for the resumption of negotiations between Finland and the USSR. If the Government of the USSR has any proposals to make, the Swedish Government is willing to pass them on to Helsinki.

Replying to Assarsson, Cde Molotov welcomes the decision about neutrality, taken by the Swedish Government in spite of pressure from Britain and France, but deems it abnormal for the Swedes to be involved in combat operations against the Red Army. This is all the more abnormal since there are no issues in dispute between the USSR and Sweden. On finding the Envoy to have been informed of Cde. Kollontai's discussions

with Hansson and Günter and of Cde. Molotov's conversation with Vinter on February 11*, Cde. Molotov declared the following:

The Finnish Government has struck up an extremely hostile posture in respect of the USSR. Under pressure from the Anglo-French bloc, it did not accept, when it could, a peaceful accord with the USSR, not affecting the independence of Finland, as it, apparently, counted on the "unassailability" of the Mannerheim Line which, however, has turned out to be a poor defence against Soviet forces. But it is high time the Finns saw that it is not serious to count on things of that kind and that there is no sense in dragging out the hostilities.

Now that the Soviet Government has become convinced that Finland has been prepared by other Powers as a bridgehead for an attack on the USSR and blood has flowed, the USSR finds insufficient the minimal proposals which satisfied it before the outbreak of hostilities.

The USSR has a treaty, based on confidence and friendship, with the People's Government of Finland. As to the ground to speak of irrespective of the People's Government, the matter must be put differently. Now, with combat operations in progress, the USSR cannot limit itself to part of the Karelian Isthmus. The point now is to have all of the Karelian Isthmus, including Vyborg and the territories lying immediately north of Lake Ladoga. The Soviet proposals keep as valid as ever the question of a base in Hanko, as it was put originally. However, the USSR is willing, besides, to consider the issue of security guarantees for the Gulf of Finland by the instrumentality of an agreement to be concluded between the USSR, Finland, and Estonia. Taking into account Sweden's interest with regard to the Gulf of Bothnia and the Aland Islands (especially, the Northern Aland Islands), the Government of the USSR could help Sweden in this matter and reach agreement with her on the subject on terms acceptable to Sweden.

Some of the areas occupied by the Red Army north of Lake Ladoga could be exchanged for other parts of Finland's territory essential to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government would not object to Petsamo being returned to Finland. The matter can be put this way if things are not dragged out and get even worse because of the policy of the Finnish Government recklessly dragging out the war. However Finland may count on foreign support, that won't stop the USSR. The USSR will defend the security of Leningrad under all circumstances, regardless of how any Great Power will react to it or of whether any other country may like it or not.

Replying to Assarsson's question about the possibility of the Soviet proposals being transmitted to Helsinki, Cde. Molotov says that he is just bringing them to the knowledge of the Government of Sweden and does not deem it expedient to relay them to the Finnish Government until it is quite clear to the Government of Sweden that the Finnish Government agrees to accept the Soviet proposals as the basis for agreement with the USSR.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06, r. 2, l. 25, f. 318, pp. 22-24.

No. 22. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE ENVOY OF SWEDEN TO THE USSR, ASSARSSON

March 4, 1940

The Envoy declares that the USSR has scored a military victory and Sweden, a diplomatic one: the Finns are yielding ground in everything except the question of Vyborg and Sortavala.

"Those are no victories," Molotov remarks, "There can be no concessions on the part of the USSR on the question of Vyborg, Vyborg Bay and Sortavala."

According to information received from Kollontai the Swedish Government asked for the sounding to be continued "Only out of respect for the peace-loving policy of the Swedish Government", Molotov says, "can I wait for a few days more so that the Swedish Government could bring off its mediation." Further on, if the war drags on, the conditions laid down by the Soviet Union can only be yet tougher. If the Finns remain obstinate, in spite of everything, the USSR will have to give up its present line in favour of a final accord with the Finnish People's Government of Kuusinen.

Assarsson says that his Government wishes an early end to the Soviet-Finnish conflict as it does not want Sweden to turn into a springboard for a major war and does not want to spoil its good relations with the USSR. He, Assarsson, will immediately telegraph to Stockholm to say that the USSR insists on having Vyborg and Sortavala as towns essential for the defence of Leningrad. But he does not doubt that the Finns will put difficulties in the way. The Swedish Government has information, Assars-

* V. Vinter's farewell visit to V. M. Molotov.

son adds, that Finland has asked Britain and France for help, which they have promised her. The British Government has already asked Sweden for transit through her territory, but Sweden has refused.

Molotov points out that Britain and France will hardly risk using force in this matter because that would be too dangerous for them.

FPA of the USSR, s. 06, l. 2, sh. 25, f. 318, p. 32.

NO. 23. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE ENVOY OF SWEDEN TO THE USSR, ASSARSSON

March 5, 1940

The Envoy, having arrived in company of the counsellor of the mission, Euler, declared the following:

The Finnish Government, also desirous, on its part of ending the hostilities and restoring peace, presumes it possible, to this end, to consider the proposal made by the Soviet Government as the starting point and accepts it in principle. The scope of the proposal and some points require to be clarified and specified. These issues can be settled during negotiations. The Finnish Government expects the Soviet Government to announce when and where it proposes to start the negotiations. At the same time, the Finnish Government offers to conclude an armistice on the basis of the status quo while the negotiations will be going on.

Having heard what the Envoy had to say and accepted the aide memoire containing the statement just made, Molotov points out that it is not clear to him whether the Finns have accepted all the Soviet proposals, including the proposals about Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay and Sortavala.

Assarsson replies that all of the Soviet Government's conditions have been accepted without reservation. These have not been enumerated in full to save telegraph time. The Swedish Government and the Envoy himself guarantee that all the Soviet proposals have been accepted by the Finns in their totality. Then he says that the telegram he has received says that the Swedish Government proposes ending the hostilities at 11 a. m. Soviet time, tomorrow. The Swedish Government is positive that if the Government of the USSR accepts this offer, the Finnish side will act accordingly.

Molotov replies to the Envoy that he can tentatively say the following: 1) it must be clearly stated which particular proposals are accepted by the Finns, and 2) it is doubtful that the military authorities and the Soviet Government would accept the offer of an armistice based on status quo without Vyborg, Vyborg Bay and Sortavala being evacuated by the Finnish forces.

Molotov says that he will inform the Soviet Government about the Envoy's communication and will give him a reply after the matter has been considered by the Government. Molotov adds that he welcomes this first step of the Finnish Government taken with the mediation of the Swedish Government and the Swedish Envoy personally.

The audience began at 22 35 and lasted 45 minutes.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06, l. 2, r. 25, f. 318, pp. 33-34.

AIDE MEMOIRE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND

March 5, 1940

The Finnish Government, likewise desirous, for its part, of ending the hostilities and restoring peace, deems it possible, to this end, to consider the proposal [made by the Soviet Government—Ed] the starting point and accepts it in principle. The scope of the proposal and some points would require to be clarified and specified, but these questions can be settled in the course of the negotiations. The Finnish Government expects the Soviet Government to inform it when and where it wants the negotiations started. At the same time, the Finnish Government offers to conclude an armistice on the basis of the status quo while the negotiations will be going on.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06, l. 02, r. 25, f. 318, p. 35.

NO. 24. AIDE MEMOIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR

March 5, 1940 *

In view of the fact that the Finnish Government, according to a communication from the Swedish Government, has accepted all the proposals of the USSR, comprising

* Handed by V. M. Molotov to Assarsson at 2:15 a. m. on March 6.

the transfer of the entire Karelian Isthmus, including the city of Vyborg, Vyborg Bay, and the northern shore of Lake Ladoga, with the town of Sortavala, to the Soviet Union without compensation, as well as the proposal regarding the Hanko Peninsula and adjacent islands,—the Government of the USSR agrees to enter into negotiations with the Finnish Government for concluding a peace treaty and ending the hostilities.

The Government of the USSR is proposing Moscow as the venue for the negotiations and expecting the delegation of the Finnish Government to arrive here.

FPA of the USSR, I. 06, I. 2, r. 25, I. 318, p. 37.

No. 25. TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE ENVOY OF SWEDEN TO THE USSR, ASSARSSON

March 7, 1940

The Envoy, having arrived together with the counsellor of the mission, Euler, declares the following.

A Finnish delegation is due in Moscow by a Soviet plane from Stockholm in the afternoon of March 7 to discuss the necessary details of restoring peace between the Governments of the USSR and Finland.

As the Envoy already stated yesterday, all the Soviet demands have been accepted, in principle, by the Finns.

Cde. Molotov asks Assarsson about the composition of the delegation.

The Envoy replies that the delegation will consist of 5 men, but personally they are not known. The only thing that is known is that it comprises "different persons", as the Envoy put it.

The Envoy then goes on to make the following statement on behalf of his Government.

The Swedish Government asks the Government of the USSR to agree to an armistice as from 11 a.m., Moscow time, today, i. e., after the departure of the Finnish delegation. The Swedish Government believes it necessary for the negotiations to proceed in an atmosphere created by the cessation of hostilities, i. e., in a good atmosphere. The Swedish Government cannot fail to insist on its most eager desire for this request to be granted as it is prompted only the desire to favour agreement and at the same time by considerations of humanity. This suggestion cannot, of course, weaken the position of the Government of the USSR.

The Envoy hands Cde Molotov a verbal note containing his Government's statement.

On accepting the note, Cde Molotov replies to the Envoy that agreement can easily be reached if the Finns accept the Soviet proposal. Why stop the fighting if one cannot rule out the possibility of having to resume them over a difference? Once the accord has been signed, the hostilities will cease.

The Envoy says he assumes the responsibility for telegraphing to Stockholm that an armistice is impossible today but it will be achieved by 11 a.m. on March 8. The Envoy asks for his Government's request to be accepted. He says that the Red Army, having breached the Mannerheim line, demonstrated its might, while neither the Germans, nor the French could do anything to clear the fortified lines on the Western Front. The Soviet Union has accomplished what it wanted for ensuring the security of Leningrad. The consent of the USSR to an armistice would be a benign act and would show to the whole world that the USSR is not an aggressor-nation. Sweden, on her part, has done everything not to be involved in the war and to contribute towards restoring peace in this part of Europe.

Cde. Molotov replies that it is premature and impossible to pledge to stop hostilities tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

Cde Molotov notes the positive significance of the actions of the Swedish Government and Assarsson personally for the cause of peace and expresses his gratitude to the Envoy and to the Government he represents.

Having thanked Cde. Molotov, the Envoy replies that he is still eagerly waiting for the Soviet Government's response to the Swedish proposal.

On taking his leave, the Envoy asks whether anybody will welcome the Finns to Moscow.

Cde. Molotov replies that the Finns, as a foreign delegation, will be welcomed by the Chief of Protocol.

The Envoy asks how the Finns can have telegraph communication through the Swedish mission, perhaps?

Cde Molotov replies that it is up to the Finns to decide where to turn to for communication. Technical facilities will be provided for them by the Soviet side.

Cde Molotov asks whether the Finns will have the press report the delegation's departure for Moscow.

The Envoy replies that, he presumes, there will be no press coverage.
The audience lasted from 24 : 00 March 6 to 00 . 30 a m. March 7.

FPA of the USSR, I. 06, I. 2, r. 25, f. 318, pp. 41-43.

No. 26. TRANSCRIPT OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE FINNISH DELEGATION

March 8, 1940

At the opening, Ryti reads out the following declaration of the Finnish Government in Russian:

"Let me say a few words by way of introduction, on our part, to these negotiations.

"We have assembled in order to make peace which would put an end to the conflict that has been going on between Finland and the Soviet Union for over three months. The proposal drawn up by the Soviet Union contains the major framework and conditions of peace. The Finnish Government has found it possible to consider the proposal of the Soviet Union to be the starting point for negotiations and to approve it in principle. We are earnestly striving for friendly relationship based on mutual confidence to be created between our countries, providing safeguards also for a brisk commodity exchange and economic relations to develop and prosper for mutual good and mutual benefit. But we cannot fail to say that from the standpoint of these purposes, which are, in our opinion, very useful for both countries, the stated conditions and framework are very hard for us. History has always given its greatest approval to statesmen who have been able to use their power and potency with foresight and moderation which made for a quick recovery from the wounds that may have been inflicted and for creating, to the good of the peoples, a durable state of things with justice recognized by all as its sound foundation. Conversely, peace through violence has often brought with it lasting instability, confusion and misfortune.

The Soviet Union, naturally, has no ground, under any circumstances, to fear any attack whatsoever from Finland. But we understand that the Soviet Union, as a Great Power active in world politics, deems it necessary, in consequence of its status and for reasons of its own security, to take into account and realize certain strategic requirements. We, on our part, also very well understand that since so great a nation as the Soviet Union is and will always be Finland's neighbour, good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union appear to be a goal we should all work for. This is politically indispensable for Finland and if this goal is achieved, it can be of great economic benefit as well. But, in our opinion, it is of interest and benefit to the Soviet Union, too, to have on this side a neighbour that can be pleased with his life and be in good political as well as economic relations with the Soviet Union. But, as I said, the conditions offered to Finland by the Soviet Union are, in our judgement, very hard and would leave a deep wound in the heart of the Finnish people along with having a most unfavourable impact on Finland's economic life. As we cannot see that they, in all respects, would actually be indispensable for meeting the strategic requirements of the Soviet Union, we make bold to hope and presume that the Soviet Union will fairly and favourably take into account the viewpoints we shall state and that efforts will be made, in an atmosphere of goodwill and concord, to find a solution that, while equitably meeting the strategic requirements of the Soviet Union, would, at the same time, contribute towards achieving a result that would be satisfactory from the standpoint of the living conditions of the Finnish people and State and would create the requisites for establishment of durable good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, without leaving a needless sense of profound bitterness in the hearts of our people."

In reply to the declaration of the Finnish Government, Molotov made the following statement: The USSR did not want to start any hostilities, and for nearly two months of negotiations with Finland it had hoped for the Finnish Government's positive response to our proposals as regards assuring the security of the USSR, and especially, Leningrad. But nothing came out of it, through no fault of ours. The Soviet Government saw it as a show of animosity by the Government of Finland against the USSR. After the start of combat operations, we found that animosity in respect of the USSR was there and that it was very great. It has since been established with certainty that Finland has offered her territory as a bridgehead for an attack on the USSR by third imperialist countries. That is just what brought matters to a head and now that blood has been shed, through no fault of ours, we hold the demands we are making at this point to be minimal. The question now is not only one of ensuring the security of Leningrad, but also that of ensuring the security of Murmansk and the Murmansk Railway. Accordingly, the Soviet Government has put forward some wishes which must be

accepted in full or else no agreement will be achieved at all. These wishes boil down to the following:

- 1) The Finnish Government shall cede the whole of the Karelian Isthmus, including Vyborg and Vyborg Bay, to the Soviet Union;
- 2) also the entire shore-line of Lake Ladoga, comprising the town of Sortavala;
- 3) It shall let the Hanko Peninsula and adjacent islands to the USSR on a long-term lease for the establishment of Soviet naval bases to safeguard the Gulf of Finland against all contingencies and misfortunes, which, in our judgement, must be of interest to Finland as well;
- 4) the border in the area of Kuolajarvi shall be moved 130-150 km away from the Murmansk Railway,
- 5) The Sredniy and Rybachiy Peninsulas shall in their entirety pass to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union may let Finland keep the Petsamo region and bay, as having been turned over to Finland before.

If these proposals are acceptable to the Finnish Government, the Soviet Government is willing to sign a cease-fire agreement, for no verbal declarations of the Finnish Government are trustworthy.

We know, Molotov declared, that Finland had and still has plans to seize Leningrad. But we look upon these plans with irony and do not believe a scheme like this to be serious. However, we cannot fail to take these plans into account.

We would like to have, Molotov says, a precise and clear answer whether or not the Finnish Government agrees to the proposals put forward by the Soviet Government.

Paasikivi considers it a misunderstanding to claim that Finland has been hostile towards the USSR. Finland wanted no war, Paasikivi declared. He went on to say that the present Government, as soon as it was organised, made its proposal through Sweden for peace negotiations, and had the Soviet Government have agreed to these negotiations at the beginning of December, a peace treaty could have been concluded even at that point. I don't know how to prove it to you, Paasikivi goes on, but no other Powers have been involved in Finland's confrontation with the USSR. Of course, Finland received material assistance, but all materials have been bought in the U.S. and other countries. I would very much like to convince Molotov that Finland does not need Leningrad and that Molotov's statement to that effect is evidently a product of misunderstanding. The Finnish Government appreciates the necessity of Leningrad's security and is prepared to meet the Soviet proposals half-way, but the Finnish Government would ask for the economic and other interests of Finland not to be hurt too much. As to the proposals of the Soviet Government, the delegation of Finland would like to see them in detail.

Molotov showed the delegation what the Soviet Union's proposals amounted to on the map.

It was Ryti who spoke after the demonstration of the map.

Concluding, Ryti asked whether the Soviet Government had any more conditions to lay down.

Molotov pointed out the provisions of the 1920 Treaty regarding the Petsamo region (about having no military bases there), the right of transit for the USSR to Norway, as under the 1920 Treaty, the right of transit to Sweden with the construction of the Kandalaksha-Kemijarvi Railway in the direction of Kujala.

Ryti asked whether they might take the map along to study the Soviet Government's proposals.

Molotov replied that they might.

Thereupon, Ryti once more argued that the conditions laid down by the Soviet Union were very hard.

The reply came from Zhdanov and Molotov. It was in the spirit of the statement Molotov had made after Ryti had read out his declaration.

The session was adjourned till March 10.

FPA of the USSR, I. 06, I. 2, r. 25, I. 319, pp. 1-6.

No. 27. TRANSCRIPT OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE FINNISH DELEGATION

March 10, 1940

Ryti: Let me read out a statement of the essence of differences between the proposals we have received through the Swedish Government and those which have been put forward just now.

Paasikivi: (Reads out the differences.)

Cde Molotov, I will reply to your statement.

Ryti (Makes an addition to what has been read out) We have pointed out still earlier on that Finland has all along earnestly desired to establish peace and avoid getting involved in the conflict going on in Europe now. Finland would like to end the war as soon as possible since there is nothing at all to guarantee that the present conflict in Europe will not suck Finland into the whirlpool of current events. Therefore, the Finns are ready even today to sign a peace treaty based on proposals we have received through the Swedish Government. We are in a position to state that Molotov has communicated his demands, but we have not received the points just made before for reasons beyond our knowledge. We are prepared to let the section of the Hanko Peninsula, earlier referred to, on a lease. As regards the Karelian Isthmus, the Finns are now ready to cede the said sector. Stalin himself had disclosed that the line that the military quarters wanted drawn passed far south of the line suggested during the negotiations. As to Vyborg, we must say that this city is of no strategic importance to the USSR. To Finland, this city is one of tremendous cultural, historical and economic importance. As you know, there is a canal that falls into the Bay outside Vyborg and if that city were in the hands of another State, that would be a great inconvenience. This city is an export outlet for adjacent regions. I heard all kinds of suggestions that the Red Army desired to occupy Vyborg as an object of some ambition, but I think that the Red Army does not need that ambition as it has already shown its power, force. (he goes on to extoll the Red Army and the performance of its commanders) Since Vyborg has no strategic importance in other respects, we wish this city to remain ours.

We found no suggestion about the transfer of Vyborg Bay from the previous statements transmitted to us. We learned of this proposal only from Molotov. As to the northern coast of Lake Ladoga and the town of Sortavala, we are prepared to cede these territories, but we wish to establish a somewhat different border so as to have it pass along the watershed. At this juncture, we are prepared to accept all the proposals, save the said reservations. We have brought all the demands stated by you to the knowledge of the Finnish Government.

Cde Molotov (pointing to a red line on the map). What does this red line mean? Paasikivi says that this line represents their interpretation of Peter's line.

Cde Molotov. There has been no corner like this. Right now I don't have the original map relating to that period, where Peter's line was shown.

Paasikivi. We had the treatise before us, whereby we have drawn this boundary.

Molotov. But, as you see, there is a difference. Perhaps, there may have been some amendments during Peter's reign and, perhaps, you know something we don't, do you?

Now, I am going to reply on the subject of the statement you have read out, and, first of all, I want to say that this statement does not correspond to the actual state of things. I'll take up point by point. First, when you speak of Hanko, you proceed from the conversation with Stalin in the autumn of 1939. But we have warned you that we are laying down new conditions since there have been combat operations and blood has been spilled. We have enough evidence of the animosity of the Finnish Government's policy towards the USSR. I have more than once sent messages to Mr. Assarsson and Madame Kollontai regarding our conditions which had nothing in common with the demands made in the autumn negotiations. The conditions as they stand at present in respect of Hanko call for the entire Hanko Peninsula to be leased out along with adjacent islands and with the creation of a 5 mile zone in the south and the east and of a 3 mile zone in the north and the west. This demand corresponds to the relevant point of the treaty with the People's Government of Finland. You must be familiar with that treaty. You had no reason to speak of the autumn negotiations and the demands then made since we have not mentioned the autumn talks at all at the present time. When we spoke about the peninsula, we just repeated the relevant clause of the treaty with the People's Government.

The second point you have made does not tally with the facts either. In your interpretation, Peter's line concerns only the northern part of the territory passing into our possession. Now, we have pointed out in our proposals that we must take over Vyborg and Vyborg Bay, the entire Karelian Isthmus, the northern coast of Lake Ladoga and the town of Sortavala. We said that the new frontier would pass approximately by Peter's line and you have been informed of it.

Now for the area of Kuolajarvi. The statement you have made does not correspond to the facts set forth in our statement. I have personally conducted all negotiations and I have myself communicated with Madame Kollontai and Mr. Assarsson. Since we do not claim the Petsamo region, we say that in exchange there must be some redrawing of the boundary line. We don't lay any claim to any other regions, but we do imperatively insist on having the territory in the area of Kuolajarvi. The main objective we pursue by these statements is the security of Leningrad. We know about Finland's ambition to disrupt the Murmansk Railway, and we consider it indispensable to have the frontier moved back to ensure the security of this line. I maintain that the statement about the pullout of all our forces from all the regions does not correspond to reality at all. I said we would pull our forces out of some regions, including the Petsamo area. So none of the points made in your statement correspond to reality. If the conditions we have laid down are unacceptable to you, our negotiations cannot be continued.

If these negotiations drag on, I cannot be sure at all, let me say it again, that the demands we have now presented will not be increased. For, indeed, we have a treaty with the People's Government and under that treaty we shall keep the line as it is indicated on the map. As to Mr. Ryti's argument that Finland may be drawn into the war, I must say that we are not afraid of that at all. If you are threatening us now, what kind of an independent policy is that?

If the proposed terms do not suit you, we can only regret it.

Ryti: We regret very much that messages from the USSR have been passed on to us through some many persons that we have a great misunderstanding as a result of it. We have received none of the statements in writing.

Cde. Molotov: Neither have we, on our part, received any questions about anything being not clear in our proposals. We have not been asked how Peter's line must be understood.

Ryti: We did not know what you had told Mr. Assarsson but here is the paper we received only yesterday.

Cde. Molotov: We said orally that the frontier passed approximately along Peter's line.

Ryti: Since these conditions have been presented to us in the form of an ultimatum, we had no time to make any inquiries. We relied on the accuracy of the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the communication about the evacuation of the territory by the troops has been made orally.

Cde. Molotov: Mr. Assarsson informed me that our proposals had been accepted. Then I passed on a written text. Since not everything was clear, I handed over definite proposals.

Paasikivi: But our Government has received no written communication.

Cde. Molotov: But all that has been stated orally.

Nothing was then said about Petsamo and the northern areas, while here all the points are listed.

Ryti: I see even from this communication that you are taking over everything except the territory north of Lake Ladoga.

Cde. Molotov: Why, then, do you accept Peter's line only for the northern region?

Paasikivi: The canal is very important for us, but you cut it off by your frontier. Why are you demanding this economic bit? Why do you want to inflict such a wound on Finland?

Cde. Molotov: I hold this issue is not negotiable, and we say that the demands which have been laid down have been the basis for the delegation's arrival here and for the opening of peace negotiations.

In respect of the Petsamo region, we raise the questions of transit and naval bases approximately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1920 treaty. This requires further clarification. We consider it desirable for a railway to be constructed for communication with Sweden. This could be negotiated in more detail. We see this as a basic condition, too. We have no more proposals. We are not going to demand that any representatives of ours should sit on the Finnish Government. The only point of interest to us is the security of Leningrad and the Murmansk Railway. We consider these demands to be minimal, although we know that the Finnish Government's policy is hostile towards us.

Paasikivi: One point to clear up regarding the question of the railway. Is that our railway?

Cde. Molotov: Yes, yes. It is yours. We are laying down no demands with regard to the issue of the foreign and domestic policy of the Finnish Government.

Paasikivi: Here you refer to the surrender of the isthmus without any compensation?

Cde. Molotov: That's right. There will be no compensation in this case.

Paasikivi: But what about private property, small private enterprises?

Cde. Molotov: We cannot compensate for private property. Since the war has already started and it is going on, we have heavy losses and it is clear that we cannot speak of any compensation. We have said so before.

Ryti: In view of the fact that the present conditions differ from those under which we have been empowered to conduct negotiations, we, having communicated the new proposals to the Finnish Government, shall now be waiting for appropriate powers.

This brought the discussion to an end.

FPA of the USSR, I. 06, i. 2, r. 25, I. 515, pp. 9—18.

No. 28. TRANSCRIPT OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE FINNISH DELEGATION

March 11, 1940

The discussion began with a statement by Ryti reiterating the Finnish delegation's readiness to conclude, even the day before, a treaty under the terms communicated to the delegations through the Swedish Government. Having received the new proposals,

the delegation has contacted its Government, and now has new instructions to continue the negotiations. In respect of the Hanko Island, the Finnish Government declares that it accepts the new proposals with the proviso that the island shall be leased on appropriate terms at a suitable price.

Molotov replies that he would like to add something on the subject of Hanko. Since there was no opportunity before of quoting some telegrams, now the Finnish delegation can see the text of the telegram sent on February 23, which clearly referred to the demands made in respect of the Hanko island. This telegram was brought to the knowledge of the Finnish Government even before receiving the latter's consent to the proposals we have advanced. The telegram spoke of the lease of the entire island of Hanko and the adjacent islands. This communication has been transmitted by Kolontai and the Finnish delegation must have it. Yet another telegram explaining our demands was sent on March 5. This telegram had been sent before the delegation left for Moscow for the negotiations. The delegation's present assertion about the novelty of the proposal concerning the Hanko island region does not conform to facts and reality.

Ryti replies that the delegation has never claimed that Molotov has not informed it about the Soviet Government's demand, but the delegation itself has received no written explanations of proposals regarding the Hanko island.

Molotov repeats that the Finnish delegation has not asked for any clarification of the proposals brought before it.

With regard to Vyborg, Ryti stated that Peter's line had been drawn out of purely strategic considerations, this form being of great inconvenience to Finland. Therefore, the Finnish delegation desires a compromise solution that would be consistent with the economic and ethnic characteristics of the territories concerned. The regions Ryti indicated on the map contain, he said, large natural resources, used by Finland, and if there are no strategic considerations in respect of this locality, the delegation would like to see a different frontier established.

Molotov replies that our proposals brought before the Finnish Government were minimal seeing that the hostilities were already in progress.

Ryti asks about the possibility of the frontier being so drawn as to change it in places by exchanging territories.

Molotov asks for the desired changes to be shown on the map.

Having shown the way they would like to have the frontier changed, Ryti raises the issue of the canal and asks for a corridor to be allowed to pass alongside the canal on the understanding that inconveniences involved could be offset by building bridges and passages.

Molotov replies that the creation of such corridors has never ended well and has always produced friction between contracting states and led to a bad finish, so that the idea of establishing a corridor at the point indicated by the delegation would only give rise to frictions and misunderstanding between States and would create fertile ground for troubles and disputes. In respect of the said changes of the frontier, Cde. Molotov promises to talk it over with the members of the delegation but he doubts that there could be any changes made since the demands have been minimal.

Cde. Molotov asks whether there are any other suggestions about changes regarding other points of the proposals.

Ryti shows the territory in the Kuolajarvi area on the map which the Finnish Government is ready to surrender now.

Cde. Molotov again points out that the demands we have presented are minimal and were designed to create security for the Murmansk Railway. No Great Power in the position of such a Great Power as the Soviet Union would have done what the USSR is doing now. No big Power would have given back the territory already occupied by her forces, while the USSR, having only one warm-water port, is giving back to such a small country as Finland, the port of Petsamo, already occupied by Soviet forces, which has the same conditions as the warm-water port of Murmansk.

Ryti replies that he appreciates very much the concession made by the Soviet Government in respect of Petsamo, and the Finnish delegation is grateful for it. But since the territory of Finland is small as it is, can't she have some compensation somewhere else?

Cde. Molotov replies that the original terms of compensation for territories were laid down in entirely different circumstances and that now, that hostilities have begun, the conditions are quite different. Any other Power in the position of the Soviet Union, far from offering any compensation, would have demanded the territory of all Finland and great indemnities, besides. The Soviet State respects small nations and the only goal it pursues is that of ensuring the security of the railway leading to the only warm-water port on the territory of the USSR.

Ryti says that the areas marked on the map as passing to the USSR are very important for the small Finnish State, and the delegation asks, if possible, for the request made by the Finns to be considered, if possible, and since agreement on basic points has been achieved, can't we have a cease-fire now?

Cde. Molotov replies that combat operations can be stopped only simultaneously with

the signing of the peace treaty, questions of secondary importance cannot be resolved separately now

Thereupon, the commission fixes the tentative schedule for the treaty to be formalized

Concluding the discussion, Cde Molotov remarks that he appreciates very much the co-operation and initiative of the Swedish Government in respect of these negotiations. Cde Molotov notes the contribution of Günter, the Ambassador of Sweden in Moscow, Assarsson, and Cde Kollontai. Cde Molotov also points out that no ill meaning must be read into the technical abnormalities which have taken place in the negotiations through the Swedish Government

Ryti replies that he agrees with Cde Molotov's opinion and he also highly appreciates the co-operation and initiative of the Swedish Government in the given conflict

That brings the discussion to a close

FPA of the USSR, t. 06, i. 2, r. 25, f. 315, pp. 22-25.

No. 29. TRANSCRIPT OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE FINNISH DELEGATION

March 12, 1940

The discussion opens with an examination of the draft peace treaty. Ryti inquires about the three border changes the Finnish delegation has asked for

Molotov replies that the matter has been considered and that the Soviet Government has declined these proposals. Molotov adds that the present negotiations have been going on for too long and that the leading members of the Soviet Government now feel that we may be wrong in returning the Petsamo area to Finland. There is on the contrary, a growing feeling that the USSR must demand the transfer of the Petsamo area to it. This feeling is particularly strong among the military

Then Ryti raises the question not of territorial concessions in the process of delimitation of the boundary line, but of preventing this delimitation from creating any misunderstandings due to homesteads, houses or settlements being divided by the border

Molotov replies that this will not happen and that it is a matter of quite secondary importance. Similar issues were resolved in the delimitation of the frontiers with Lithuania and Germany, where one could actually see how the commissions, expressly created for resolving these issues, work. It will not be much of a difference to move the frontier a kilometre or two back in such a case. Molotov proposes leaving all such issues of secondary importance to these commissions which have practically demonstrated their full ability to resolve all the above-mentioned issues of secondary importance without bringing them up before the Government

Ryti draws attention to the fact that the schedule established by the draft cannot physically be met because of the technical difficulties, and the Finnish delegation would like to make certain amendments. Meanwhile, the Finnish delegation desires that the hostilities should be ended now, even though the peace treaty has not yet been signed

Molotov rejects the proposal altogether and maintains that the ending of the hostilities and the conclusion of a peace treaty are inseparable

Zhdanov supports Molotov's statement and says that the conclusion of such an agreement will not be understood by the population of the USSR and the masses might think that the Government is engaged in some shady dealings behind the people's back

Ryti argues that it is physically impossible for the peace treaty to be concluded immediately since it must take some time to ratify

Molotov agrees that the ratification must take some time to accomplish but the peace treaty can be signed right now once the delegation has presented its plenipotentiary mandates which it must have. But in no way must the issue of concluding the peace treaty be detached from that of ending the combat operations

Paasikivi assures him that the treaty that will be signed by the delegation in Moscow will be ratified by the Sejm in Helsinki

Then the Finnish delegation brings up the eventual form of rule on the Hanko island and the relationship between the Finnish population and the authorities accredited on the island

Molotov replies that the Hanko island is going to be a naval base and that there can in no way be any division of authority there. Such division has always led and will lead to frictions and strained relations in the area of the competence of these authorities. The Soviet Government, Molotov remarks, would welcome very much the Finnish Government's consent to sell the Hanko island to the Soviet Union and would consider this to be the best solution. If, however, our proposal does not suit the Finnish Government, we must come to terms about creating bases on the island according to the proposals made by the Soviet Government.

Ryti asks about the status of the population in the area of the naval bases to be thus created

Molotov replies that there will be military rule on the island. The island's population will itself have to settle the matters of interest to it with the actual authorities on the island

As to the compensation for the property passing to the USSR, the Soviet Government holds that the compensation must be made by the Finnish Government

All the proposals put forward by the Soviet Government are due to the war that has begun, and on account of which we have heavy casualties, and so the Soviet Government considers the demands now laid down to be minimal. War has its own laws and consequences, therefore, should we have reached agreement on other terms, those on which treaties have been concluded with Latvia and Estonia, the demands would have been entirely different. But at the present moment, we have casualties and losses for which we demand no indemnities, either material or territorial. The Soviet Government confirms once more by renting the Hanko island that this territory is the property of Finland. Clearly, no other Power in our position would have made the proposals that the Soviet Government is now making

Ryti raises the question regarding Finland's troops, real and movable property which may be taken along by the Finnish population of the ceded territory, and other minor issues

Molotov stresses again that the main question now is that of concluding a peace treaty and speeding up the signing of a peace agreement. All the other economic and technical issues can be resolved later on just as were those involved in the departure of the population from the territories which had earlier been occupied by Germany and passed into the possession of the USSR

All the issues connected with the transfer of territories and the transfer of the real and movable property of the evacuated population were resolved by mixed commissions

This closed the discussion of the questions relating to the peace treaty, and the commission proceeded to consider the draft protocol

The floor was given to General Valden. At his request, some amendments were made, in accordance with the entire commission's opinion, in the draft protocol proposed by the Soviet delegation

This brought the afternoon reception of the Finnish delegation to a close.

FPA of the USSR, f. 06, l. 2, r. 25, f. 318, pp. 75-78.

No. 30. TRANSCRIPT OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE FINNISH DELEGATION

March 12, 1940

Complaining of a headache caused by a bad draft treaty, Ryti asks for the floor to be given to General Valden. The latter makes a number of comments regarding the schedule for the withdrawal of the troops that cannot physically fulfil the conditions laid down. The Finnish delegation explains that the conditions stipulated in the treaty cannot be fulfilled because of the absence of transportation facilities and lines of communication which are in a bad shape now. To dissuade the Soviet Government from believing that the Finnish Government is sabotaging the provisions of the treaty, the Finnish delegation offers to reschedule the implementation of the relevant provisions of the protocol

The Soviet delegation finds it possible to meet the Finnish delegation's request for rescheduling

The Finnish delegation proceeds to the issue of prisoners of war and holds that there is no need to draw up a special treaty but simply to exchange the prisoners of war as soon as possible after the end of the hostilities.

Molotov points out that there are foreign nationals in the Finnish forces, and the Soviet Government cannot, of course, treat the foreign prisoners of war and the Finnish nationals identically. A certain agreement may be reached in respect of the inmates of Finnish prisons, notably, Antikainen and the friends of Kuusinen. The Soviet Government finds it possible to achieve certain agreement on the matter. However, the Soviet Government cannot regard foreign prisoners of war as common POWs.

Ryti replies that he is not familiar with the case of Antikainen but he thinks that there will be no obstacle in the way of settling the issue touched on by Molotov, and that it can be resolved in co-operation with the President and Minister of Justice of Finland.

The Finnish delegation then refers to the issue of the property that may be taken along by the Finnish population when evacuated from the territories surrendered to the USSR.

Molotov replies that the matter requires an appropriate agreement based, approximately, on the same conditions as the treaty on the repatriation of German nationals. The Soviet Government will not object at all in respect of the property of an average worker or an average Finnish citizen, but if the Finnish delegation interprets the matter in a broader sense, we shall need time to look into the issue involved.

Then the Finnish delegation touches on the issue of the lease of the Hanko island, the Finns asking for a higher leasing price. The Soviet delegation finds it possible to increase the rent to 8 million Finnish marks; mutual agreement on this point of the treaty is then reached.

Since Ryti has been claiming in the course of the negotiations that Finland's policy has always been independent and has never been hostile towards the Soviet Union, Molotov points out that it is still very strange that in actual fact Finland's policy coincides with that of the Powers hostile towards the Soviet Union. Besides, Ryti himself has only recently referred to the possibility of Finland being drawn into the whirlpool of war, which can create a threat to the Soviet Union. Now, the policy of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has no aggressive objectives at all and we have never had any desire to seize anything on Finnish territory. Our overriding priority is to assure the security of the city of Leningrad and also of the only warmwater port and the railway leading to it. Although the Soviet Government feels a certain ill-will towards itself on the part of the Finnish Government, we still think, Molotov says, that the treaty, now about to be concluded, will strengthen and improve relations between both States. At the present moment, it is just for the sake of our country's security that we are insisting so much on the fulfilment of the conditions listed in the treaty.

The commission then passes over to considering the issue of building a railway to connect Sweden and the Soviet Union. The Finnish delegation plumps for extending the building time, arguing that it is physically impossible to meet the established schedule and that there is a shortage of construction materials. In spite of all kinds of suggestions made by the Soviet delegation with regard to technical and material assistance, the Finnish delegation still does not agree with the specific treatment of the issue of railway construction, and this clause of the treaty is somewhat reworded.

The Finnish delegation brings up some technical and economic issues of secondary importance, but by mutual consent of both delegations, they are left to special commissions.

This brings the discussion of the draft Peace Treaty and protocol to a close.

After a short break, during which the Russian texts of the peace treaty and protocol were printed, the commission proceeds to the agreed peace treaty and protocol and the maps appended thereto.

[] All the documents were signed by all the members of both commissions on March 13, 1940.

FPA of the USSR, I. 06, I. 2, r. 25, I. 318, pp. 79-82

No. 31. EXTRACT FROM THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, V. M. MOLOTOV, WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY TO THE USSR, SCHULENBURG

March 26, 1940

[] Schulenburg says that Ribbentrop has instructed him to ask Molotov to brief him on the course of the peace negotiations with the Finns, since there is a lot of speculation on the subject. Günler, for example, claims that it is the USSR that has taken the initiative in opening these negotiations.

The Swedish press has reported that the first step was taken on January 29, and as early as February 23, Chamberlaine openly hinted that Britain had been asked for mediation.

Ribbentrop wishes to know whether there has been any Swedish pressure. As to the desire of the Finns to enter into negotiations it is known both to Ribbentrop and Schulenburg. Besides, Ribbentrop wants to know whether there has been any reference to the return of Petsamo to Finland and to the fortification of the Åland Islands.

Molotov replies to the ambassador that he has neither read nor heard anywhere about Günler's statement that the initiative has supposedly been taken by the USSR. We viewed the offers of peace negotiations with restraint. The fact of the matter is this: the Swedes passed to Kollontai the request of the Finns to begin peace negotiations and tell them the conditions on which the USSR is willing to make peace. The Swedes, in their part, asked it to meet their request and agree to peace negotiations.

(Continued on page 119)

The UN in the Cold War Years

Alexei ROSHCIN

WAS THE COLD WAR INEVITABLE?

THE COLD WAR, brought on by an extreme worsening of East-West relations in the postwar period, seriously poisoned the international atmosphere for years to come and repeatedly posed a grave threat to peace, especially in 1947-1953. The events that occurred in those years had a strong impact on relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and between socialist and capitalist countries generally.

Many in the West associate that period with definite persons playing a dominant role in the world politics in those years. André Fontaine, a French historian, has described the cold war as basically a duel between Truman and Stalin. This opinion certainly oversimplifies historical developments of the time although the worst stage of the cold war fell on Stalin's last years and Truman's term in office.

Sessions of the UN General Assembly showed what that period was like. I attended six of them, from the Second to the Seventh, which coincided with the initial and most acute phase of the cold war. They reflected a highly tense and dangerous international situation and were an arena of bitter controversy between representatives of Western and socialist countries. As a result, the UN made no real progress towards solving the problems under discussion and found itself in a state of complete stagnation.

THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY LEADERSHIP

DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1947 AND 1948), the post of Foreign Minister was held by Molotov. Vyshinsky, who succeeded him, held that post during the subsequent four sessions (Fourth to Seventh). Molotov treated the UN with reserve, considering it a broad propaganda forum which could not really solve postwar problems. In those years he attended only one General Assembly session, and even that once he must have done so because the session coincided with a third meeting of Foreign Ministers (in New York) discussing the problem of postwar treaties with Germany's former European allies. Normally Molotov relegated work at the UN to his First Deputy.

Molotov lacked a number of important qualities needed for diplomatic work at world level. Specifically, he was not flexible enough on issues of no immediate importance to the Soviet Union. At the San Francisco Conference (1945), he took an uncompromising stand against Argentina's participation in the Conference whereas all other delegations were for it. I could list many other facts of a similar nature. His tough approach

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and behaviour were also due to his having definite instructions which he faithfully followed, never risking any departure from them in either form or substance. Had our country had a more flexible leader, our diplomats would unquestionably have shown greater flexibility on the world scene.

Molotov's replacement by Vyshinsky went almost unnoticed. Molotov just stopped coming from the Kremlin to the Foreign Ministry on Kuznetsky Most. One of the outward reasons for relieving him of the post of Foreign Minister was that his wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, was exiled from Moscow for alleged contacts with the Israeli Embassy. But she was in all probability used as a pawn in a political game in the uppermost echelon of power.

Prior to his appointment as Minister, Vyshinsky served for years in the department of justice. He stuck to his public-prosecutor manner even as a diplomat. That style was anything but helpful in normalising or at least softening relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

Vyshinsky, unlike Molotov, took a keen interest in the activity of the UN. He had a predilection for the Organisation's forums and made long speeches at General Assembly sessions. Most of his speeches were published in our central press. One day an elderly Ivanovo weaver who was much taller than Vyshinsky patted him on the shoulder in my presence and said "Good man, you make so many speeches that we never get time to read them all."

Vyshinsky spent a lot of time on preparing his speeches for plenary meetings of the General Assembly as well as for committee sittings. Those were polemical speeches full of diatribes and denunciations. Some of them indulged in personalities. For instance, Vyshinsky compared Carlos Romulo, a noted Philippine politician, to an "empty barrel that makes a loud but useless noise when rolling". Speaking of the French delegate Yvon Delbos, who invariably backed the US position, Vyshinsky quipped: "'Let's go,' said the parrot when the cat started dragging it out of the cage."

Vyshinsky's speeches always attracted the attention of delegates, the press and the public. All the seats reserved for delegates, guests and reporters would be taken by the time he appeared on the rostrum. Everybody wanted to hear his scathing, sarcastic criticism of Western countries and leaders. The uncommon expressions used by him were the object of discussion and condemnation. Someone challenged him to a duel but nothing came of it.

Vyshinsky's diplomacy did not help dissipate cold war clouds to normalise the international situation. Nor did his accusations help neutralise politicians who might have adopted a more favourable position on the Soviet Union and its policy and proposals had his approach been different. At a GA session, Vyshinsky's speech in the general debate contained such attacks on the Western powers that he received instructions from Moscow to speak again in a more conciliatory and constructive spirit. The instructions served as a serious admonition, with the result that his speeches showed greater restraint for some time.

Assessing Vyshinsky's activity and diplomacy in retrospect, I consider that in the context of the cold war and constant attacks on the Soviet Union from Western politicians and commentators we needed a particularly measured, circumspect and discriminating approach to representatives of the Western powers in working out and settling postwar problems.

Vyshinsky called me to his office every day occasionally several times a day to discuss various matters when I was deputy head and then head of the Department of UN Affairs. It was difficult to work with him. He never trusted his aides and was extremely irritable and restless. One day

when we were taking a walk on the grounds of the Soviet villa near New York, he suddenly pulled up my right pant leg apparently to make sure I had no weapon for an attempt on his life. Every year he seized on various occasions, especially dinners in the presence of many delegation members, to tell how reactionary landowners had allegedly plotted to kill him during his trip to Central Asia after the revolution. He affirmed that "local progressives" had helped him uncover the conspiracy. He embellished his story on every further occasion.

I think Vyshinsky did all that to add importance to his person. Besides, he may have been haunted by fear, being aware of his direct complicity in Stalin's policy of repression which had also resulted in destroying many diplomats. But we realised the complexity and difficulty of the period and did our best to hold out against its vicissitudes.

When draft directives for the Soviet delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly came up for discussion (1951), I attended as head of the Department of UN Affairs the Politburo meeting that was to approve the directives. Stalin was absent. The meeting was chaired by Malenkov. Sitting at the long table were Molotov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev and Bulganin, with Beria, Voroshilov and other Politburo members facing them. Beria was particularly active in the debate. He asked many questions about the draft, interrupting others, made criticisms, and so on. Bulganin and Khrushchev took no part. The latter sat drawing something on a sheet of paper. Directives were always approved without major amendments because they were drafted with Stalin's knowledge.

After Stalin's death, the Foreign Ministry was again placed under Molotov while Vyshinsky was assigned to the UN as Permanent Representative of the USSR. He died in that post in 1954. In the last minutes of his life, he was dictating a speech to be delivered to the Security Council. A cerebral haemorrhage killed him on the spot just when the stenographer was waiting for him to utter the next sentence.

GA SESSIONS

DEBATES AT THE EARLY SESSIONS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY mirrored the antagonism existing at the time between East and West. Western delegations did not seek to settle differences but to fan them to the proportions of a cold war threatening to grow into an armed conflict. The US monopoly on the atomic weapon played an important part in this.

Notwithstanding the polemical character of our delegates' UN speeches, the efforts of the Soviet side were aimed at maintaining and strengthening international peace and security, settling disputes by peaceful means and contributing to the development of colonial and non-self-governing countries in favour of independence and of satisfying their national and social aspirations.

Along with this, the Soviet Union worked for the consolidation of the UN on the principle of unfailing respect for the Organisation's Charter.

Of the six GA sessions held in those years, three (the Second, Fourth and Fifth) took place near New York; plenary meetings were called in Flushing Meadows and committee meetings, at Lake Success. Two sessions—the Third and Sixth—deliberated in Paris's Palais de Chaillot. The Third Session (1948) met there because presidential elections were due in the United States and the Americans feared that the session might affect the campaign. As for the Sixth Session (1951-1952), Paris was chosen as the venue because the UN's own building in New York was not completed in time contrary to expectations and both the French and the Organisation found it advisable to hold the session in Paris. Lastly, the Seventh Session (1952-1953) took place in the new UN building

(central New York). Ever since then, GA sessions have only been convened at the Organisation's New York headquarters.

It rises in Manhattan, on a lot donated to the UN by the family of Nelson Rockefeller. When, in 1947, I first saw the lot I was disappointed, for it was taken up by junk yards and surrounded by grimy smokestacks. A less attractive site for the UN would have been hard to imagine.

The headquarters cost 68 million dollars to build, the United States granting a 65 million dollar loan. It comprises three sections. One of them is the 38-story Secretariat building shaped like a matchbox. Adjoining it is the square domed building of the General Assembly, with rooms for other UN organs and the main GA committees, a delegates' lounge, a restaurant and bars. The third building, four stories high, houses the UN Library. A neat garden displays statues presented by UN members, including Yevgeni Vuchetich's "Beat Swords into Plowshares". The nearby smokestacks have been painted white and red. All in all, the new UN headquarters has a bright look outside and is convenient inside.

It was quite a problem for Soviet delegates to travel to New York in those years. As a rule, we went to Prague and changed trains there to go on to Paris. From Paris we would travel via London to Portsmouth and in later years to Le Havre to board the *Queen Mary* or *Queen Elizabeth*. The voyage to New York took six days, and the whole trip lasted 10 days. It was easier to travel only as far as Paris, of course, but our route lay through Prague just the same. Beginning with the 10th GA Session (1955), we used planes of European airlines to fly to New York, with landings in Scotland and Newfoundland (Gander airport), and thus saved a considerable amount of time. As a rule, we took a lot of baggage with us: numerous files, typewriters, and so on. It was not easy. Usually we left for a session in a tense mood, well knowing that there were hard verbal battles, hectic days and sleepless nights ahead. Participation in sessions was made even more difficult by protracted, exhausting night meetings of the delegation. We did not relax until we were on our way back home.

Most of the delegates used to put up at the Glen Cove, L.I., villa of the USSR Mission to the UN. Substitute members of the delegation, advisers and experts would be lodged nearby. In 1950, we were offered lodgings in a house rented for the delegation on the small island of Morgan near Glen Cove. One day a strong wind sprang up, and the islet found itself cut off for 48 hours, with ourselves taking a forced rest.

We usually worked in our residence near Glen Cove. This was both convenient and agreeable. Glen Cove was a pleasant town of mostly one-story houses. Trade was brisk, and the town thrived on it.

In 1947-1953, the UN was different from what it is today. The majority of delegations were made up of whites. At present most delegates come from Asia, Africa and Latin America. The UN membership changed little in composition in the first decade of its activity. The Organisation only admitted nine states in those years, including two European countries (Sweden and Iceland) and seven Asian ones (Afghanistan, Thailand, Pakistan, Yemen, Burma, Israel and Indonesia). Further admissions were virtually frozen until 1955, when the 10th General Assembly Session was held. This was because during the cold war the Western powers opposed the admission of socialist countries. The Soviet Union countered by holding up approval of Security Council recommendations for the admission to the UN of countries in the West's political orbit. The problem of removing obstacles was settled at the 10th GA Session, which admitted 16 states.*

* Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka (Ceylon).

At every GA Session, the Soviet Union did its best to propose steps towards strengthening international peace and furthering cooperation between states. There is no need to describe them, for this has been done many times and, besides, there are relevant UN documents. However, I would like to cite some of the Soviet proposals and to mention the more noteworthy phases of their discussion and the heated debates that unfolded at the UN as well as the general atmosphere in the Organisation in that period.

At the Second GA Session (1947), the Soviet Union proposed "Measures Against Propaganda and Fomenting a New War". The resolution was passed unanimously. While differing substantially from the original Soviet draft, it condemned propaganda endangering peace and urged all governments to adopt measures against such propaganda. The Soviet proposal, its discussion by the Assembly and the approval of a constructive recommendation constituted one of the few positive actions taken by the UN in those years.

Vyshinsky, joining in the general debate at the Second Session, attacked the Western powers, mentioning their delegates by name as "warmongers" and describing John Foster Dulles as "No. 1". The reaction of the Western delegates and the American press was markedly negative and further soured our already strained relations with the major Western countries.

At the Third and Fourth GA Sessions (1948 and 1949), the Soviet Union failed to win approval for its proposals to ban the atomic weapons, cut the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council and take steps to prevent war preparations. The Western delegations accentuated humanitarian issues.

On December 10, 1948 the Third GA Session (Paris) solemnly approved a Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifying a wide range of rights which all nations should strive to guarantee. The Declaration imposed on countries a moral obligation to respect the right of all to equality without any discrimination whatever, their right to life, freedom and personal immunity, to work and equal pay for work of equal value, to rest and recreation, social security, education, participation in the cultural life of society, and many other rights. The socialist countries proposed some provisions concerning social and economic rights and the struggle against colonialism but the proposals were voted down by the Western delegations. The Declaration was approved by 48 votes with eight abstentions (Soviet Union, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa).

Giving an explanation of vote, Vyshinsky said that the Declaration did not provide for people's equality irrespective of race, language or religion, did not recognise the rights of colonial and dependent peoples, did not envisage struggle against fascism and left out major social and economic rights of the individual.

Although the Declaration does not include these important provisions, it plays a positive role even today in the struggle of peoples for human rights.

On the basis of a US-British draft, the Fourth Session of the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the protection of human rights, freedom of information and travel between countries, restraint in using the right of veto in the Security Council, and other issues.

Five days after the opening of the Fourth GA Session (autumn 1949), there occurred an event of world significance. On September 25, TASS reported that the Soviet Union had discovered the secret of atomic arms and had them at its disposal. The report was based on the explosion of an atom bomb carried out in a desert region of Kazakhstan. The news made a tremendous impression on the Assembly. It came a shock to many,

for the United States had been confident that its atomic monopoly would last for years and could be amply used in international affairs. Shortly before the event, General Groves, head of the Manhattan atomic project, had claimed that the Soviet Union would be unable to make an atom bomb sooner than in 20 years' time. His forecast and others like it proved false. Four years after the Americans' atomic test blast in Alamogordo, New Mexico, the Soviet Union carried out a similar blast, thereby stripping the United States of its atomic monopoly.

That day I noticed unusual excitement in the lobby as I came out of the room where the Fifth Committee was meeting. A group of newsmen asked me to comment on the TASS report. The report came as a surprise to me, and so I merely remarked that the atomic monopoly of the United States was over. The newsmen were not satisfied. They looked up Vyshinsky and repeated their request. The head of the Soviet delegation told them that the Soviet Union was going to make extensive use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the harnessing of Siberian rivers to the irrigation of arid areas in Soviet Central Asia.

One's memory retains many insignificant episodes for a long time. During an interval, I stepped into the delegates' lounge. The GA Session Chairman, Carlos Rómulo of the Philippines, walked up to me, put his arm around my shoulder and crossed the lounge with me as if we had been friends. Although I had known him since the San Francisco Conference, his gesture made me feel uncomfortable. Why should Rómulo, a pro-Western man, show friendliness towards a Soviet delegate? Afterwards, I came to the conclusion as I thought about the episode that he had wanted to indicate somehow that he was well disposed towards the Soviet Union and did not grudge us that epithet, "empty barrel", which Vyshinsky had bestowed upon him in 1947. But that as it may, I resented the Philippine delegate's show of friendly sentiments. The gesture was unnatural and uncalled for in the tense situation of the time.

Thinking today of my reaction to that gesture, I am surprised at the hostility with which we treated the rest of the world in those years, at the extent to which we were isolated from it. All of that was undoubtedly due to the situation at home and to the style of our diplomacy, a reflection of the atmosphere prevailing among the leadership at the time.

At the Fifth GA Session (1950), the Soviet Union made a special effort to help ease international tensions, wind down the cold war and normalise relations between socialist and capitalist countries on the principle of peaceful coexistence. To this end it submitted a draft declaration on steps to remove the threat of a new war and to strengthen world peace and security. The draft called for a ban on war propaganda and for an unqualified prohibition of atomic weapons. It suggested that the five great powers should sign a pact to strengthen peace and reduce their armies and armaments by one-third between 1950 and 1954 and that further reductions be discussed at subsequent GA sessions before long.

The Western powers took a negative stand on the Soviet proposal, which was essentially conciliatory, did not attack any country and called for international cooperation for peace and security.

The Soviet draft declaration was rejected after discussion. The Assembly passed a resolution tabled by the United States and six other delegations under the title "Peace Requires Action". The resolution repeated some provisions of the UN Charter. It stressed the need for control and inspection as a means of regulating all the armaments and armed forces of nations.

At the Sixth GA Session (Paris, 1951), the Soviet delegation submitted a proposal for "Measures Against the Threat of a New World War and for the Consolidation of Peace and Friendship Among Nations". It was a most timely proposal meeting the exigencies of a complicated and

tense international situation. It gave expression to the concern felt in the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and a number of neutral states over the formation of the North Atlantic military alliance, which greatly aggravated the international situation, as well as over the arms race, which was increasing the war menace. With a view to easing tensions, the Soviet Union proposed to begin by ending the Korea war and to discuss the problem of disarmament at a world conference. Our initiative in favour of a peace pact to be concluded by the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and China was designed to bring about better relations between the Big Five. It was expressive of a desire to end the cold war and normalise the international situation.

Predictably, the Soviet initiative was rejected by a "mechanical majority". Instead of it the General Assembly passed a procedural resolution on relegating the proposal for the prohibition of the atomic weapons and for cuts in armaments and armed forces to the UN Disarmament Commission, which used to torpedo all constructive ideas in those years. What the move amounted to was that under pressure from the Western powers the GA had avoided adopting effective decisions on pressing problems of strengthening world peace and security, normalising the international situation and putting an end to war.

I remember an incident that occurred during that Session. Speaking in the general debate, Vyshinsky levelled devastating criticism at the Western powers by declaring that they had no real intention of bringing about reductions in armaments and a ban on atomic weapons. Carried away by his own rhetoric, he digressed from the prepared text and attacked US Secretary of State Dean Acheson by saying: "After I had read Acheson's speech circulated to the delegates the day before, I couldn't get to sleep all night because I was splitting my sides with laughter even though I'm not easily amused."

Those words were widely exploited by anti-Sovietists, who played them up in the press as they waged a fierce campaign against our country. Huge posters put up all over Paris portrayed Vyshinsky laughing wickedly at the West's proposals.

Moscow resented that reaction. It instructed Vyshinsky to speak in the general debate once again and to criticise the Western powers in moderate terms.

The Seventh GA Session (autumn 1952-spring 1953) sat in a particularly complicated and tense atmosphere due to the overall state of international affairs and a purge among American citizens serving in the UN Secretariat. The purpose of the purge was to expose "un-American activity". It was staged on the initiative of the notorious Senator Joseph McCarthy, who was very active at the time. In violation of elementary standards and with the connivance of the then Secretary-General of the UN, FBI agents were allowed to question American employees right at the Organisation's headquarters. Every now and then, the Secretariat received summonses from the agents. The purge resulted in the dismissal of a number of American citizens working in the UN Secretariat under permanent contracts. This unlawful action was unprecedented in UN history and was widely condemned.

We did much in that period to have our citizens assigned to the Secretariat. The Soviet side insisted that the job quota granted to it by the Secretariat be commensurate with the Soviet contribution to the Organisation's budget. The hitch was, however, that in those years we were not in a position to fill the posts allocated to us with professionally eligible people who spoke foreign languages.

PAASIKIVI

Max JAKOBSON

IN THE STUDY of international affairs, failure receives more attention than success. The drama of crises and conflicts fascinates us; we believe we can learn something useful by finding out what went wrong. Peace and harmony attract less interest. The relations between Finland and the Soviet Union are a case in point. Such a long time has passed since there was even a ripple of trouble between the two countries that "stability and predictability" is taken for granted.

Yet this serene state of Finnish-Soviet relations was not something foreordained. At the end of hostilities nearly 45 years ago the predominant view was that mutual suspicion and ideological differences would remain insuperable obstacles to a peaceful evolution. No one foresaw that Finnish-Soviet relations would actually turn into a success story in post-war Europe. This seems to me a case worth studying. Can we learn something useful from an analysis of how and why things went right?

Juho Kusti Paasikivi played a key role, as prime minister in 1944-1946 and as president in 1946-1956, during the crucial formative period of Finnish-Soviet relations. His published diaries—voluminous shorthand notes—were approved by Paasikivi himself before his death in 1956. The two massive volumes now available to us represent what he wanted posterity to know about his thinking during those years. They are more than a diary—a political testament.¹

The diary begins in June 1944, at the moment when a powerful Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus had broken through the Finnish defenses along the road to Viipuri. A Finnish request to resume the peace talks that had failed three months earlier was met by a Soviet demand for surrender. At the same time Germany offered military assistance on condition that Finland commit herself not to make a separate peace. The Finnish government faced an agonizing choice. To surrender was to risk German retaliation; to accept German aid was to tie the country to a fight to the bitter end. The dilemma was resolved by President Risto Ryti who gave the pledge required by the Germans in the form of a personal letter addressed to Hitler. By thus deliberately exceeding his constitutional authority he avoided committing the Finnish government. The modern weapons received from Germany helped to stiffen Finnish resistance. By the middle of July the Soviet offensive came to a halt before it had reached the 1940 border, and Soviet troops were being transferred to the all-important race to Berlin. Finland was, after all, a secondary front.

The time gained by Finland was of decisive value. Germany, hard pressed on two fronts, could no longer retaliate effectively. In the beginning of August Ryti resigned and was replaced by Marshal Mannerheim. The new president informed Hitler that he did not regard Ryti's pledge

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as binding. Stalin on his part no longer insisted on surrender. On September 19, 1944 an Armistice Agreement was finally signed in Moscow. This outcome showed once again that in a conflict between a great power with many different interests and commitments and a small nation with the single goal of survival, the balance of forces cannot be calculated by simple arithmetic.

REORIENTATION OF FINNISH POLICY

PAASIKIVI followed all this from the sidelines. He was not consulted, and his diary reveals that he was deeply hurt. But this was a blessing in disguise: he remained untainted by any association with the wartime regime. When the guns fell silent, Paasikivi was predestined to leadership. Mannerheim as president had no choice but to appoint him the prime minister of a broad coalition government charged with the task of carrying out a fundamental reorientation of Finnish policy.

Thus, paradoxically, this task was directed by two old men seemed to personify the past: Mannerheim the former czarist general, and Paasikivi the retired banker who in the 1930s had been chairman of the Conservative party, both uncompromising opponents of Socialism. But both knew Russia and the Russian language, both had grown up in a period when the Finnish people had lived in harmony within the orbit of Russian power. They represented a continuity reaching back beyond the tragedy of the war and the ideological confrontation that had preceded it.

Finland was indeed one of the very few states in Europe where the continuity of political life was preserved through the second world war. Still today, the Constitution of 1919 is in force, virtually unchanged.

Mannerheim's role was vitally important in the transition from war to peace. His personal authority ensured national unity at the critical moment in September 1944, when the armed forces had to withdraw behind the border agreed upon in the armistice talks and then turn against their former comrades in arms, the German army in Lapland—still a formidable force of 200 000 men. In April 1946 the 79-year-old marshal retired, and Paasikivi was virtually unanimously elected president for the remainder of Mannerheim's term. In 1950 he was reelected, at the age of 80, for a full term of six years.

As president, Paasikivi was a philosopher-statesman in the 19th century tradition. His knowledge of history was profound. He admired Bismarck whose sayings he often quoted in his diary. The mechanics of modern politics were alien to him. On the eve of the 1950 presidential election he noted that his opponent, Urho Kekkonen, had conducted an American-style campaign around the country, adding "The most important quality of a president is not his ability to make speeches and propaganda, but wisdom and experience."

Paasikivi himself had brought to his office a lifetime's experience of dealing with the problem of reconciling Finnish national aspirations with Russian interests. He had begun his political career in the early years of the century, at the time when the autonomy of Finland was facing the challenge of czarist repression. He had then joined the group of conservative politicians who had been convinced that the essential national interests of the Finnish people could best be preserved through an accommodation with the strategic interests of the Russian empire. This conviction never left him.

In 1920 Paasikivi was chosen to negotiate the first peace treaty between independent Finland and the Soviet Union, and he was successful in obtaining Soviet recognition of Finland's historic frontiers. In October 1939 he led the Finnish delegation that faced Stalin's demands, and after

the Winter War he served as Finland's minister to Moscow, where he gained the respect of the Soviet government as a man who, in spite of his opposition to Communism, sought conciliation between his country and the Soviet Union.

With the approach of the German-Soviet clash Paasikivi found himself increasingly out of tune with the spirit prevailing in Helsinki, and he resigned a few weeks before Finland once again was embroiled in war with the Soviet Union. Throughout the war years he stayed out of office.

Although the outcome of the war had in effect confirmed Finland's existence as an independent state, her security had to be rebuilt on new foundations. The balance of power in Europe had changed fundamentally. Germany was in ruins. The Western powers were allied with the Soviet Union; neither their interests nor their influence extended to the Eastern shores of the Baltic. Indeed, American policy at the end of the second world war was to warn Finland not to expect Western support against the Soviet Union. The experiences of the preceding years had also shown that Scandinavian cooperation, important as it was in other respects, could not assure Finland's security.

THE PAASIKIVI LINE

IN THIS SITUATION Paasikivi offered a concept of Finnish-Soviet relations that not only was tailored to fit the prevailing strategic realities but also was designed to restore the faith of the Finnish people in an independent future. He had always argued that the Russian interest in Finland was primarily strategic and defensive. This, according to Paasikivi, was a "legitimate Soviet interest", a subtle phrase designed to assure the USSR that its need for security would be satisfied, while at the same time serving notice that Finland would not yield to demands going beyond the "legitimate"—ideological demands for instance. By convincing the Soviet government that Finland in no circumstances would turn against the Soviet Union, Paasikivi believed the Finnish people could secure their own independence and way of life. He thus undertook a double task of persuasion: first, to make Moscow trust an independent Finland, second, to make the Finnish people bend themselves to the facts of power and work together to achieve the first objective.

And the Finnish people did work hard, in those first years after the end of the war, to convince the Soviet government that Finland could be trusted to keep her word. Fulfilment of the terms of the Armistice Agreement (later the Peace Treaty of 1947) was given priority over all other tasks. The Germans were driven out of Lapland in a military campaign that lasted till April 1945. The goods demanded by the Soviet Union as a war indemnity were delivered punctually on schedule. Finland is probably the only country in modern history that has voluntarily paid its war reparations in full. Another unique achievement was the resettlement of the 400 000 Karelians, one tenth of Finland's total population, who voluntarily had left their homes in the territory ceded to the Soviet Union and moved west of the new border. This process removed a potentially explosive issue from the Finnish-Soviet agenda.

Some of the less tangible consequences of the war caused Paasikivi a great deal of anguish. One of these was the Soviet demand that those responsible for the policy that had led to Finland's joining Germany in 1941 be brought to trial and punished. Paasikivi himself had criticized that policy which he considered misguided and had insisted that the politicians and officials prominently identified with it step aside. But when it became clear that the Soviet government considered a war guilt trial a test of the sincerity of the reorientation of Finnish policy, Paasikivi

gave in. Under a special retroactive law, eight men held responsible for Finland's wartime policy were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to ten years. Among them were former president Risto Ryti and the former chairman of the Social Democratic party Vaino Tanner.

RETURN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

ANOTHER FEATURE of postwar reorientation was the re-emergence of the Finnish Communist party as a significant factor in political life. In 1930 the party had been declared illegal and membership of it treason: it was a time of Finnish McCarthyism. In the last parliamentary elections in which it had been permitted to participate the Communist party had won 23 seats out of 200. Its underground activities during the 1930s and the war years had made little impact on the course of events or opinion in Finland. But when it surfaced in September 1944, as was required by the Armistice Agreement, its leaders could claim to have been vindicated by the outcome of the war and demand a leading role in carrying out the necessary change of policy.

Paasikivi was reluctant at first to admit the communists into his government. He doubted that they would genuinely cooperate with the other political parties within the existing system. But he was finally persuaded by the argument that it was better to make the Communist party share responsibility for the difficult decision which had to be taken than to leave them in hostile opposition.

Paasikivi's government thus became a broad left-center coalition similar to those that emerged in several other European countries at the end of the war. One of the first decisions of Paasikivi's government in the autumn of 1944 was to hold Parliamentary elections in March 1945, which was considered the earliest practicable date. The last elections had been held in July 1949, the composition of Parliament was obviously out of date. Paasikivi was anxious to make sure that the elections would reflect popular support for his policy of reorientation.

On the eve of polling he made a radio speech in which he urged voters to elect "new faces". This was considered an attempt to help the People's Democratic League, an alliance between the Communist party and a small Socialist splinter group. It did win almost a quarter—49—of the seats in Parliament, as many as the centrist Agrarian party and one less than the Social Democratic party. These three parties formed the new government with Paasikivi as Prime Minister. The result was generally judged to mean a significant shift to the left in Finnish politics.

In retrospect, however, the real significance of the 1945 elections seems different. It was above all a manifestation of the fundamental stability in Finnish politics.

The fact that Finland was the first country in wartime Europe to hold parliamentary elections was significant in itself. A month earlier, the Big Three—Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin—had met at Yalta and talked a great deal about elections: but elections in Poland, not in Finland. The Polish question became one of the central issues dividing the wartime allies, while Finland was hardly mentioned at Yalta.

The decision to resume the normal electoral process interrupted by the war was taken as a matter of course by the Finns themselves. It was not dictated by the Big Three. Poland represents a sharp contrast. Liberal parliamentary democracy had no roots there.

RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

THE NORMALIZATION of political life as a consequence of the 1945 elections is reflected in Paasikivi's diaries. Shortly after taking over the

presidency in April 1946, he wrote under the heading "My Policy" a number of points to serve as guidelines for the future. The first was "Firm and sincere friendship with the Soviet Union". This meant that "the foreign policy of Finland must not lead to a conflict with the Soviet Union." The second point was: "The restoration of Finland's international sovereignty." And he went on: "No interference in Finland's internal affairs must be permitted. Finland's internal policy is determined by Parliament... the legal rights of the citizens must be maintained."

Formally, Finland's sovereignty was restored by the Peace Treaty signed in February 1947. The preceding Peace Conference in Paris had been a disappointment to the Finnish people. The plea of the Finnish delegation for a reduction of the war indemnity and alleviation of the territorial losses had been ignored by the Allied governments. Worse, the Soviet delegation had reacted angrily to what it considered a Finnish attempt to enlist Western support against the Soviet Union. The Finns were told that the only way of gaining relief from the burdens of the Peace Treaty was to deal directly with Moscow. In fact, less than two years later, on the eve of the parliamentary elections held in Finland in July 1948, the Soviet government unilaterally announced a reduction of the Finnish war indemnity.

The effect of the Peace Conference was to reinforce one of the basic principles of Paasikivi's policy, which was to avoid any speculation with differences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Finland could not gain by playing one side against the other. A striking formulation of this view was once given by Urho Kekkonen, who was one of Paasikivi's closest collaborators in the postwar years and his successor as President. In a speech he made as early as 1943 Kekkonen pointed out that as a member of an anti-Soviet Western alliance, Finland would always be in the position of an outpost which in the event of a conflict would be the first to be overrun, yet powerless to affect decisions on peace and war. His conclusion was that Finland's security had to be based on relations of mutual trust with the Soviet Union.

Finland obtained her peace treaty at the last moment before the Grand Alliance began to come apart. In July 1947 the Marshall Plan divided Europe. Paasikivi was at first inclined to accept the American offer of economic aid. But when it became clear that this would be considered in Moscow an unfriendly act, he changed his mind. He himself drafted the public statement explaining why Finland had decided to decline. It said the decision had been made on the grounds that the Marshall Plan had become "subject of controversy between the Great Powers". This phrase was to occur again and again in Finnish policy statements. In the West, Paasikivi's belief that Finland could maintain her independence by satisfying the needs of Soviet security met with increasing skepticism. The Cold War was rapidly changing perceptions of the nature of Soviet policy. The Soviet Union was considered an aggressive, expansionist power which, far from being in need of security itself, was bent upon imposing Communist rule throughout Europe.

STALIN'S LETTER

ON FEBRUARY 23, 1948, President Paasikivi received a personal letter from Generalissimus Stalin. Finland, Stalin pointed out, was the only one of the European neighbors of the Soviet Union with which it had not yet made a defense agreement against a recurrence of German aggression. He wished to know whether Finland were prepared to conclude with the Soviet Union a treaty of mutual assistance similar to the treaties the Soviet Union had shortly earlier concluded with Hungary and Romania.

When Stalin's letter to Paasikivi was made public a few days later, it became immediately linked in the minds of Western observers with the Communist coup d'état in Prague. The two events were regarded as a concerted advance of international Communism upon the remnants of Western democracy in the Soviet sphere of influence.

Stalin's stated purpose of creating a defense against future German aggression was dismissed as an obvious pretext. Germany, divided, occupied and disarmed, was in ruins: what was there to fear? The real purpose of the proposed treaty with Finland, it was believed, was to provide a legal excuse for establishing military bases or moving troops into Finland, not in order to repel a German aggression but to destroy Finnish democracy. It was taken for granted that the Finns had no choice but to submit. Stalin's letter was regarded not as a proposal for negotiations but as a command to be obeyed.

In Helsinki Stalin's letter was read in a different light. The Soviet wish for a defense pact with Finland had a long history. It had been discussed for the first time in the secret Soviet-Finnish talks in 1938-1939. During the war the Soviet government had asked the British as early as 1942 to give advance approval of its plan to conclude a mutual defense treaty with Finland. After the war, the first initiative for such an agreement had come from the Finnish side. Already in the beginning of 1945 Marshal Mannerheim had suggested talks on the subject. As a former Russian general he understood how things looked from the other side. He believed that Finland's independence could be strengthened if it could be shown that the Finnish defense forces were prepared to serve the defensive needs of the Soviet Union. Moscow did not respond at the time, presumably because Finland's status had not yet been confirmed by a peace treaty, but in the autumn of 1947 it made its first approach to Paasikivi.

To Paasikivi, the idea of a treaty with the Soviet Union was not unacceptable in itself. Indeed, the logic of his own policy impelled him to agree to an arrangement that would satisfy the "legitimate security interests" of the Soviet Union. But the models offered by Stalin he found wholly unacceptable. The Soviet treaties with Hungary and Romania imposed on the parties an unlimited obligation to political consultations in time of peace and automatic mutual assistance in the event of war. Such a treaty would have made Finland an ally of the Soviet in any and all conflicts between East and West.

An overwhelming majority of the Finnish people were opposed to an alliance with the Soviet Union—or with any other major power. For if there is one dominant theme in Finland's foreign policy, it is the desire to avoid being drawn into the conflicts and controversies between more powerful nations. Paasikivi thus had to try to persuade Stalin to be content with an arrangement that, while satisfying Soviet security requirements, would enable Finland to stay outside the two opposing military alliances which were taking shape in Europe.

The Finnish president moved with deliberation. Before making public Stalin's letter he informed the government and the chairmen of the parliamentary groups. This took five days. On February 27 he sent Stalin a brief acknowledgement pointing out that in Finland a treaty with a foreign power needed parliamentary approval and therefore the representatives of the people had to be consulted. On March 5 he received the written views of the parliamentary groups. It took him another four days to appoint a delegation for the negotiations with the Soviet Union. On March 9 he replied to Stalin suggesting that the negotiations be held in Moscow. Another nine days passed before the instructions to the Finnish negotiators had been drawn up and approved by the president. On March 20 most members of the delegation travelled to Moscow by train, and its

head, Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala, left four days later by plane. On March 25, more than a month after receipt of Stalin's letter, the first meeting between representatives of Finland and the Soviet Union took place in Moscow.

The timetable of the Finnish preparations was eloquent in itself. It was an assertion of Finnish independence and a demonstration of the democratic process. The Finnish people were being reassured: their interests were not going to be signed away by frightened men in hasty and secret deals. The President himself stayed in the capital so as not to commit his prestige in advance. Parliament was fully consulted, not only before the negotiations but also at each subsequent stage. As Paasikivi put it, it was better to fail to reach an agreement in Moscow than to sign a treaty that would be rejected by Parliament.

The elaborate process of consultations fully displayed the strong opposition that existed in Finland to any kind of a defense treaty. Of the three parties represented in the coalition government then in power, only the communists were prepared to support the kind of treaty Stalin had proposed, the Social Democrats and the Agrarian party both declared their opposition to a treaty containing military clauses that might involve the country in international conflicts. Opinion among the opposition parties was against even entering negotiations with Moscow.

As the Finnish delegation left Helsinki, rumors of an impending Communist attempt to seize power began to circulate. The stage seemed to be set for a double squeeze—external pressure combined with internal subversion—to put an end to the independence of Finland.

After all the alarms and anxieties the encounter in Moscow was an anticlimax. The Soviet leaders readily agreed to set aside the models suggested in Stalin's letter and asked the Finns to put forward their own suggestions. The Finnish draft was then accepted as basis for negotiations, and the final text conformed in all essentials to Paasikivi's concept of Finland's role as Russia's neighbor.

A UNIQUE TREATY

AN EPISODE at the Kremlin banquet celebrating the signing of the treaty on April 6, 1948, revealed the sense of relief felt by the Finnish negotiators. Stalin as host spoke of the compromise reached in the talks. "What compromise?" interrupted one of the Finns. "The treaty was dictated by Paasikivi." After a moment of stunned silence, Stalin burst out laughing. The Finn who spoke was Urho Kekkonen.

The Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is unique among the scores of security arrangements made between the big powers and smaller states in the period after the second world war. Its first article states that "should either Finland, or the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland, become the object of military aggression on the part of Germany or any power allied with Germany, Finland will, true to its duty as a sovereign state, fight to repel aggression". Finnish forces would be acting only within the limits of Finland's own boundaries. The Soviet Union would extend to Finland assistance "if necessary" and "as mutually agreed between the parties"; this meant, as interpreted by the Finnish Parliament, that any agreement on military assistance or military cooperation with the Soviet Union would constitute an independent treaty which would have to be judged on its merits with regard to possible parliamentary approval.

Commenting on the treaty in a broadcast speech to the Finnish people on April 9, 1948, Paasikivi pointed out that the first article really was a statement of the obvious: it described what in any case would happen in the event of an attack against Finland. The obligation to hold consul-

tations between the two parties was narrowed down to cases where a threat of the kind of military aggression described in the first article had been found to exist. And according to Paasikivi, both countries had to agree that there was such a threat.

The treaty thus lacked the essential characteristics of a treaty of alliance, such as regular consultations in time of peace and automatic mutual assistance in case of war. It had been drafted, as was stated in the preamble, "taking into account Finland's desire to stay outside the conflicts of interests between the great powers"—that is, Finland's neutrality. Accordingly, Paasikivi was able to state in his commentary that "Finland had in principle the right to stay neutral in a war between other states".

At the time Finland's aspirations to neutrality were still severely handicapped. As the President himself put it, the lease of the Porkkala military base held by the Soviet Union by virtue of the Peace Treaty, as well as its right of free transit through Finnish territory to and from Porkkala, "lent Finnish neutrality a colour of its own which did not quite fit the handbooks of international law". But as a clue to future policies the neutrality clause in the preamble of the treaty had a vital importance.

Why did the Soviet government so readily accept the Finnish draft for the treaty? One explanation that suggests itself is that, once again, the time gained by Paasikivi's slow tempo had strengthened the Finnish position. In the four weeks that had elapsed between Stalin's letter and the beginning of the talks in Moscow the world had changed. The Western powers, shocked into action by the events in Czechoslovakia, had taken a long step toward organizing their common defense. NATO was being conceived. In the North, Norway was about to abandon its traditional neutrality; even in Sweden defense measures were intensified. At the same time, though this was not then known to outsiders, Stalin's quarrel with Tito was coming to a head.

But there could be a simpler explanation. The Finnish-Soviet treaty resembled closely the proposals made by the Soviet government exactly ten years earlier. It represented a long-term objective of the Soviet Union. After the experiences of the Winter War Stalin probably did not expect to get more out of Finland in 1948 than what he had proposed in 1938. He knew well that anything beyond what was finally agreed would have met with strong resistance. On the eve of the departure of the Finnish delegation from Moscow, Molotov anxiously inquired whether he could be sure that the treaty as signed would actually be ratified by the Finnish Parliament.

The treaty was ratified on April 28, by 157 votes against 11, with 30 absent, but the debate preceding the vote clearly revealed the reluctance and misgivings of many members. It also echoed the internal tension then prevailing in Finland. The rumors of a Communist plan to seize power had prompted the President to order preventive measures. Later research has revealed that the Finnish Communist party at the time was far from being the formidable force its opponents believed it to be. Its leadership was divided between those who were inclined to act within the parliamentary system and the adherents of conspiratorial methods.

What mattered in 1948, however, was that Paasikivi acted on the assumption that the communists planned to seize power. They were, after all, committed to the overthrow of the existing system. In May, the Communist Minister of the Interior received a vote of low confidence in Parliament and was dismissed by the President. In July, the Communist party suffered a heavy defeat in parliamentary elections and was left out of the government. It was to stay in opposition for eighteen years, until Paasikivi's successor, Urho Kekkonen, once again referred to the need to

"integrate" the communists into the Finnish system by admitting them into the government.

DARK THOUGHTS

THE EVENTS of 1948 provided dramatic proof of the validity of Paasikivi's policy concept. He had been able to demonstrate in practice that the "legitimate security interests" of the Soviet Union could be satisfied by Finland without ideological concessions in domestic politics.

Such a conclusion did not, however, immediately appear selfevident. Kekkonen, among others, criticized Paasikivi's decision to leave the communists outside of the government, and as a result the Party of the Centre would not join it either. The communists mounted an angry campaign against the President, and this was echoed by Soviet newspapers. In the pages of his diary he carried on a running debate with himself. "If my policy is not enough for the Russians," he wrote, "they have no alternative but to govern this country by bayonets and terror." But "if the Russians follow a fair-play policy with regard to Finland, their interests will be best served." He struggled to keep a clear course in the cross currents of the Cold War, but from time to time the old statesman was plagued by dark thoughts. In January 1950 he confessed that throughout the previous year he had feared "the Soviets might use force against us", but a few months later he dismissed this as unlikely, at least in peace time. In case of war in Europe, Paasikivi wrote, "we will keep our agreements, but the Soviet Union might not". From time to time he warned his cabinet not to neglect the armed forces. He emphasized that "the better we ourselves are able to carry out our obligations under the treaty with the Soviet Union, the better chance we have to keep things under our own control and avoid letting foreign forces into the country . . . everyone must understand that we would not submit without a fight."

After the 1950s presidential election tension subsided. Paasikivi made up with Kekkonen and appointed him Prime Minister of a coalition between the social democrats and the agrarians. Paasikivi was even prepared to admit communists to "less sensitive posts" but this was rejected by the social democrats. Trade talks with the Soviet Union were resumed, and the first five-year agreement was quickly completed. But the official Soviet attitude to Paasikivi remained cool.

The first signal of a change was received from Moscow in September 1954. This was the announcement that Paasikivi had been awarded the Lenin Order. He was clearly gratified, but did not expect any substantive change in the position of the Soviet Union. He was at that moment deeply concerned about the implications for Finland of the Soviet proposal for a European security conference. Its purpose, according to the Soviet demarche, was to create a European security system within which Germany could be unified.

The invitation had been sent to all European states as well as to the United States and Canada, but it became immediately clear that the West would reject the Soviet proposal. The world watched with interest which side Finland would take. The Finnish reply was positive: Yes, Finland was in favor of a European security system and would be happy to join a conference of the states invited by Moscow. What was not said but implied was that Finland would join only if all those invited would accept. Since this condition was not fulfilled, Finland did not send a delegation to the Moscow Conference which, as it turned out, was the first formal step toward the creation of the Warsaw Pact.

Another crucial test for Finland was the German issue. The West claimed that the government of the Federal Republic of Germany was the sole legitimate representative of the German people as a whole, while the

Soviet Union insisted that there existed two separate sovereign German states. To recognize the Federal Republic was to accept the Western claim; to recognize two German states was to side with the Soviet Union and risk economic retaliation from the West. The dilemma was solved by Finland in a manner that probably has no precedent in the history of international relations. Finland recognized neither the Federal Republic nor the Democratic Republic. Instead of diplomatic relations she maintained trade missions in both and through these conducted business equally with East Germany and West Germany. Neither side was happy with this arrangement, but both accepted it. For the West, the important thing was that Finland refused to recognize the East German state; the East Germans on their part made the most of the fact that Finland accorded both German states equal treatment.

RETURN OF PORKKALA

BY SUCH EVASIVE MANOEUVERS the Finnish government succeeded in staying uncommitted in a divided Europe. But Finland was not yet recognized as a neutral country, nor did President Paasikivi use that word to define Finland's position. The Soviet base at Porkkala "cast its shadow over Finnish independence". In the West, the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of 1948 was not accepted at face value, and in Finland, too, suspicions with regard to Soviet intentions ran deep.

At Paasikivi's insistence, the duration of the treaty had been limited to ten years. This meant it was to expire two years after the end of Paasikivi's term of office, and as the moment of his retirement drew closer, the aged President used to meditate, as his diary reveals, about what his successor might do about the treaty. Should it be extended as it was or should an attempt be made to amend it?

Unexpectedly, Paasikivi himself was confronted with that question. In the late summer of 1955, six months before the Finnish presidential election was due, Paasikivi received an offer from Moscow: the Soviet government was prepared to return to Finland the Porkkala base, if Finland in turn extended the validity of the 1948 treaty for another twenty years. Paasikivi did not hesitate to accept. In September 1955 he went to Moscow himself to attend the signing of the agreement to cancel the lease and to extend the treaty. This, his seventh trip to the Soviet capital in the course of sixteen years, was the first one, as he himself put it, from which he returned satisfied.

The return of Porkkala had, of course, wider implications. It was designed to back up a Soviet demand that the United States, too, give up its bases in foreign countries. Yet in the West, the return of Porkkala was dismissed as a cheap gesture. In the nuclear age the base was of course quite irrelevant to the defense of Leningrad. By giving it up the Soviet Union had given up nothing of value in terms of the global balance of power.

For Finland, however, the departure of the Soviet forces from Porkkala in January 1956 was an event of profound significance. By abandoning the base the Soviet government showed that it had come to trust Finland to keep her end of the bargain struck in 1948 and no longer felt the need of keeping its watch at Porkkala. The concession lent powerful support to Paasikivi's thesis that Soviet policy with regard to Finland was defensive and that the line he had taken was the best way of securing Finnish independence.

Stalin had argued in 1939 that the Finnish border north of Leningrad had to be moved further away because the city was "within the range of modern artillery". This made no sense in the age of ballistic missiles. The Finnish leaders in the Moscow talks in September 1955

raised the matter of the Karelians. The answer was a blank no. A revision of the frontiers established as a result of the second world war could be a dangerous precedent. The territorial issue was not raised again. In the course of time Karelia has become sublimated in the minds of the Finnish people into a cultural concept. There is today no irridentist feeling in Finland. Possession of territory has ceased to be the valued prize for which nations have spilt so much blood.

The elimination of the Soviet base not only stabilized Finnish-Soviet relations but also transformed Finland's international position. There was an obvious parallel between Soviet actions in Austria and in Finland in 1955. So long as the Finnish government could not claim full control of its territory it had not been in the position of asking other states to respect its neutrality in the event of war. The removal of the Soviet base opened a way to international recognition of Finnish neutrality. It was logical, therefore, that the XXth Congress of the Soviet Communist party in February 1956, a month after the evacuation of Porkkala, was the first occasion on which Finland was called a neutral state in an official Soviet statement.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

WHAT THEN can we learn from a study of the evolution of the Finnish-Soviet relations in Paasikivi's time?

In the Western debate the Finnish case has been used as a dual-purpose example, like a traffic signal blinking red in one direction and green in another warning West European nations not to go too far in their relations with the Soviet Union, while encouraging East European nations to become more independent of the Soviet Union. My own view is that any attempt to apply the Finnish experience to other countries is bound to lead astray. The situation of each nation must be considered individually, against the background of its own unique experiences and circumstances. But it may be useful to try to identify some of the elements which made it possible for Finnish-Soviet relations to evolve in a mutually satisfactory way and examine their conceptual relevance for the present time.

The first such element was the fact that Finland was not forced to surrender. In Finland, military restraint yielded political benefits.

Another element which in my view was essential for the development of a stable relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union was the primacy of national over ideological interests. Finland as the weaker party had an obvious selfinterest in insisting that ideological questions must be kept off the Finnish-Soviet agenda. On the Soviet side, a dualism between the interests of the state and the interest of the party from time to time made itself felt, and it would be an oversimplification to say that Finnish-Soviet relations over the last decades have been completely "deideologized". But in all essential respects ideological considerations have taken second place.

A third element in Finnish-Soviet relations which clearly has a wider relevance is the concept of common security. When Paasikivi explained to his countrymen that Finland could achieve security only together with the Soviet Union, not against it, he anticipated by almost forty years the central idea of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security chaired by the late Olof Palme of Sweden. By giving up its military base in Porkkala the Soviet government took an important step in the same direction: reliance on a political relationship based on mutual trust was given precedence over physical control by military means.

Looking back on Paasikivi's time at the helm of Finnish policy, it can be argued that Finland in 1944 had no real alternatives to what became

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IS THE "CASE OF RAOUL WALLENBERG" CLOSED?

The name of Raoul Wallenberg, who went missing at the very end of World War II, did not become widely known in our country until recently. Not everything is clear to this day either about the arrest in 1945 of the Swedish diplomat, who heroically saved thousands of people from death in Nazi prisons in Hungary, or about his last days.

In October 1989, Raoul Wallenberg's stepsister Nina Lagergren and stepbrother Guy von Dardel visited Moscow together with Per Anger, Chairman of the Raoul Wallenberg Association, and Sonja Sonnenfeldt, its Secretary.

Following are the texts of records of the conversations which the Swedish visitors had at the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

CONVERSATION

Between Valentin Nikiforov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vladimir Pirozhkov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Security Committee, Raoul Wallenberg's relatives and the leadership of the Raoul Wallenberg Association

October 16, 1989

On instructions from the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the USSR State Security Committee, V. Nikiforov and V. Pirozhkov received Raoul Wallenberg's stepsister Nina Lagergren and stepbrother Guy von Dardel as well as the Chairman of the Raoul Wallenberg Association, Per Anger, and its Secretary, Sonja Sonnenfeldt.

During the conversation that took place, the Soviet participants emphasised that the Soviet leadership and Soviet people extended their deepest sympathy to Raoul Wallenberg's relatives over the tragic fate which that outstanding Swedish diplomat had met. The exploit accomplished by him to save people in the war years was admired in the Soviet Union. His noble activity had won universal recognition and respect in our country.

The invitation for the Swedish representatives to arrive in Moscow for a conversation had been prompted by the need to set out the Soviet view of Wallenberg's fate and to put at the visitors' disposal evidence likely to arouse their interest.

As for what had happened to the Swedish diplomat, it was stated in the most explicit terms that, regrettably, the Soviet side could tell nothing new concerning the circumstances of Wallenberg's arrest or the reason for it. A cruel war had been on at the time, with millions losing their lives in its maelstrom or disappearing without leaving a trace. However, it had been established as far back as 1957 that Raoul Wallenberg, like many thousands of both Soviet and foreign citizens, had fallen victim to the illegal practices rife in the years of Stalinist rule.

Repeated attempts to ascertain the reason for Wallenberg's imprisonment had unfortunately produced no results. The Soviet side believes, the

relevant documents and other records were destroyed by the agency controlled by Beria, Abakumov and others of that ilk. It was common knowledge that these men had been punished according to their deserts by being shot for their crimes. The only evidence of Raoul Wallenberg's death that had been discovered was a report by Dr. A. Smoltsov, chief of the medical service in Lubyanka prison; the report said that the Swedish diplomat had died on July 17, 1947, presumably of an infarction.

On September 22, 1989, officers of the USSR State Security Committee discovered in the Committee's archives some documents and personal effects that are believed to belong to Raoul Wallenberg.

Thus the earlier explanation offered to the Swedish side on various levels and in various periods after February 1957 stood, nor could the Soviet side add anything to it with the best will in the world.

Much as everyone lamented it, Raoul Wallenberg was no more; he had died long ago, and this must be reckoned with for all that it was distressing. His memory, the memory of his noble work, would always remain in the hearts and minds of all progressive people.

The Swedes were handed a copy (and shown the original) of Dr. Smoltsov's report; a copy of the registration card made out in prisoner Raoul Wallenberg's name in the Inner Prison of the USSR People's Commissariat of State Security on February 6, 1945; two identity cards—Nos. 1369 and 064641—in his name, and money (US dollars, Swiss francs, Swedish kronor, Hungarian pengös, Bulgarian leva, Reichs mark) and objects believed to have belonged to him (two food rations cards, two notebooks, a powder-case).

The *Swedish interlocutors* said that they appreciated the invitation to come to Moscow for a meeting with representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the State Security Committee.

While noting what they saw as an obvious change in the attitude of the Soviet authorities and Soviet public opinion to the inquiry into the "Wallenberg case", they affirmed, nonetheless, that neither the explanation offered them nor the documents and personal belongings turned over to them were any proof at all that Wallenberg had died in 1947. After accepting very coolly and rather distrustfully the documents and objects handed over, they began citing "witnesses'" testimony, saying that it indirectly "confirmed" the claim that the Soviet authorities had still kept Wallenberg in various prisons in the fifties, seventies and even "about 1980".

To make their point, they presented a list of "witnesses" with a brief exposition of their testimony to the effect that Wallenberg was living after 1947. Thereupon they asked for comment.

The *Soviet side* told them that it was very difficult if possible at all to check the testimony on its merits, since some of the witnesses on the list were dead. Still, an effort would be made to check what could be checked, and the Swedish representatives would be answered accordingly.

In conclusion the *Swedes* pointed out that the conversation had proceeded in a "most friendly atmosphere".

October 20, 1989

As agreed, V. Nikiforov and V. Pirozhkov received Raoul Wallenberg's relatives and the representatives of the Raoul Wallenberg Association for a final conversation.

V. *Nikiforov* noted that the Soviet side, which strove to help as best it could in ascertaining Raoul Wallenberg's fate and proceeded in compliance with the wishes of his relatives and the Association's leadership, had for several days after the first conversation studied some of the testimony cited by the Swedes. It had checked the list of "witnesses"

handed to the Soviet representatives on October 16, 1989. The work done had led to the conclusion that the data presented by the Swedish side were indirect and could not serve as proof of the claim that Wallenberg had been kept in Soviet prisons after 1947.

The testimony of Claudio de Mohr, Menachim Melzer, Emil Brugger and those others who were no more should be dismissed out of hand, for it was impossible to verify the facts given by them.

There was every reason to describe as untenable the assertion made by Professor Nonna Svartz of Sweden, who claimed with reference to a conversation with Alexander Myasnikov, a Soviet scientist, that Raoul Wallenberg had been confined in a mental clinic. Her claim was disproved by a record of the conversations which Myasnikov had had with her on July 6, 1965, and with the then Ambassador of Sweden to the USSR, Gunnar Jarring, on May 11, 1965. Present here was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Georgi Farafonov (ret.), who had served as a councillor in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Department of Scandinavian Countries. He had recorded Myasnikov's conversation with Svartz and could give exhaustive answers to questions about the Soviet scientist's "utterances". We were handing copies of those conversations to the Swedish side.

V. Pirozhkov dwelt at length on the results of three days of work done by State Security officers to check the testimony set out in the Swedish list. He stressed that the officers, realising the need for an objective and the fullest possible restoration of all the facts relating to Wallenberg's fate, had talked to some of the Soviet citizens mentioned in the list.

They had talked to, among others, Y. Butova, a surgeon in Vladimir prison from 1946 to 1978. In an explanatory note a copy of which would be made available to the Swedish side, Butova stated that she had first heard of Raoul Wallenberg in 1988, from Soviet Ambassador in Luxembourg A. Avdeyev, who had made inquiries about Wallenberg's fate. Never throughout her surgical practice had she come across any name resembling Wallenberg's.

The officers had also talked to L. Sukhacheva, a doctor in Vladimir prison from 1953 to 1983. She said that never since she took the job had any prisoner by the name of Wallenberg consulted her.

The list mentioned some other staff members of Vladimir prison. It had been established that Captain Nikolayev had served at that prison since 1959, was deputy chief of that prison, had been pensioned off on account of ill health in 1973 with the rank of lieutenant-colonel and had died in 1988. As for Gulyayev, he had served on the prison staff in the 1953-1962 period with the rank of sergeant. In 1962, he had left Vladimir, and his place of residence at the moment had not yet been established.

With reference to Anna Bilder's testimony about her father Jan Kaplan having seen Wallenberg in Butyrki prison in 1975, we were giving the Swedish side copies of explanatory notes written by Kaplan (convicted twice for speculation and once for currency blackmarketing) and his wife Budovskaya in 1979 and saying that Kaplan had never met or heard of any prisoner of the name of Raoul Wallenberg.

It followed that the check-up had confirmed the absence of any information indicating that Wallenberg was living after 1947.

V. Nikiforov mentioned the East-West talks on exchanging Colonel Stig Wennerström which the list said were held from 1965 to 1971. He noted that the Swedish exposition of the basis for the talks and the claim that the two sides had discussed the possibility of exchanging Wennerström for Wallenberg were very vague and unclear and that the Swedish side must further specify the evidence if the latter was to be checked.

In the light of the foregoing, any unbiased person would come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union sincerely wanted to help Wallenberg's relatives ascertain the circumstances surrounding his fate. The Soviet side had invited its Swedish interlocutors to Moscow to this end, turned over the Swedish diplomat's papers and personal belongings to them and promptly checked the list of "witnesses" presented by the Swedes during the first conversation, on October 16, 1989. The guests' claim that Wallenberg was living and was kept in a Soviet prison under a false name could not be confirmed, as the documents made available by the Soviet side indicated.

Hence the Soviet side could not agree with what Nina Lagergren had said in the Soviet *Vremya* programme telecast on October 19, 1989. From what she had affirmed, the combined testimony of various "witnesses" invited the conclusion that Wallenberg was living. Yet not a single "witness's" testimony had passed the test of an impartial check-up. The Soviet side called on the Swedes to believe in the sincerity of its efforts towards establishing the truth about Wallenberg's fate. It was ready to go on studying most carefully witnesses' testimony and other evidence should the Swedish side ask for their examination.

The *Swedish interlocutors* expressed gratitude for the information on the results of the verification of the list. They said they were impressed with the openness and sincerity which the Soviet side had shown during the conversations, seen by them as the beginning of a dialogue aimed at ascertaining Wallenberg's fate.

They pointed out that they did not want to be accused of bias but could not accept the Soviet account of the Swedish diplomat's fate, for they considered that neither Smoltsov's report nor Wallenberg's papers and personal belongings constituted legally authentic proof of his death on July 17, 1947. They would like to check the "Vladimir prison version" by themselves, acquaint themselves with the prisoners' registration card index and question witnesses in Vladimir. With this aim in view, Guy von Dardel and Sonja Sonnenfeldt were ready to stay in the Soviet Union for a few more days.

V. Nikiforov said that the Soviet side supported the proposal and was willing to help make the trip.

In conclusion, the *Swedes* again expressed gratitude for the invitation to come for talks to Moscow, the attention they were given, in particular by the Soviet media, and the atmosphere of mutual respect, benevolence and sincerity. Putting it on record that the two sides still differed, they said they would continue their inquiry into the case.

CONVERSATION

Between Yevgeni Rymko, Deputy Head, Second European Department
of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guy von Dardel
and Sonja Sonnenfeldt

October 25, 1989

Y. Rymko received Raoul Wallenberg's stepbrother Guy von Dardel and the Secretary of the Raoul Wallenberg Association, Sonja Sonnenfeldt, at their request.

The *Swedes* told him about their visit to Vladimir prison on October 23, 1989, stressing that they had been received very well by the chief of that institution, V. Gorshkov, and his colleagues. Making the reservation that they had not aimed to achieve any big results during so brief a stay in Vladimir, they voiced satisfaction at having been enabled to photo-

graph the registration cards of some of the "witnesses" in the "Wallenberg case" who had served time in that prison.

However, they had found the registration cards of some prisoners mentioned in the Swedish side's list of "witnesses" missing from the prison's card index. Besides, they had encountered difficulties in trying to ascertain the names of the "witnesses'" cellmates, for the cells had been renumbered more than once over the past years.

The Swedes said that they had asked the authorities of Vladimir prison to make inquiries about former Swedish inmates bearing the name of Wallenberg or similar names, such as, say, Fallenberg or Vandenberg, and had been promised help.

In this connection, von Dardel said that he would like to go to Vladimir for roughly a week to continue studying the prison card index and that he planned to do so together with Professor Marvin Makinen, a Chicago resident who had been imprisoned in Vladimir, as far as the Swedes knew. What they wanted to see primarily was a list of the registration cards as well as, if possible, the files on the persons whom they needed and who had served time in that institution.

Commenting on the copy of the report submitted by Smoltsov, the former chief of the medical service in Lubyanka prison, the Swedish interlocutors called into question the circumstance that both signatures on the document belonged to one and the same person (Smoltsov), and said that, generally speaking, the report was no proof of Wallenberg's death. They added that they would like to acquaint themselves if they might with other documents kept in the same file as Smoltsov's report.

The *Soviet representative* expressed his opinion of the assertions questioning the authenticity of Smoltsov's report.

In conformity with the instructions given him, he passed to the Swedes copies of the documents concerning the "Wallenberg case".

The Swedes thanked their Soviet interlocutor and said they hoped the search for new documents would be continued, possibly by a joint West-Soviet group which could comprise, apart from Guy von Dardel and Sonja Sonnenfeldt, Cronid Lubarski (publisher, Munich, FRG), Yuri Louri (professor of law, Gely, Ontario, Canada), and Marvin Makinen (professor of biochemistry, Chicago, USA) on the Western side and Academician Andrei Sakharov along with others on the Soviet side.

In reply to von Dardel's proposal for forming a joint working group that would concern itself with the "Wallenberg case", the *Soviet representative* said that, as the Soviet side had stated earlier, it would carefully study new relevant evidence which the Swedes might supply.

In conclusion, the Swedes brought up the issue of the expenses of their stay in the Soviet Union and showed a hotel bill for 37,000 kronor. Saying that they did not consider the matter decisive for them, they asked whether the problem could be settled in a way more favourable to them when they came to Moscow again.

The *Soviet representative* answered that the Swedish group had been staying in Moscow as guests of the Swedish Ambassador.

NEW YEAR'S PRIORITIES

THIS ISSUE of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS carries a review of Soviet foreign policy and diplomatic performance in the four and a half years of reform.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR lays its cards on the table from the concepts of high politics to the size of its staff and budget. It reveals that the national foreign service staff comes up to just about 3,700 and that the department budget, covering all relevant expenses at home and abroad, is 212 million rubles (that of the US State Department for the current fiscal year is \$2.3 billion).

Foreign policy has some obvious achievements to its credit. There has been a dramatic change of mood in favour of demilitarised East-West relations. Concern for social and economic advance has been increasingly dominating national priorities as basic to the security of all and everyone THE NEW YORK TIMES and CBS opinion polls this autumn made quite a stir by revealing that only one per cent of the Americans presume the possibility of war to be the most important problem facing the USA. We, too, have little left of the "any-price-but-no-war" incantation once heard over and over again both from the high podia and pensioners' "Hyde Park corners" of Moscow.

There are a good many cheers for diplomacy, both at home and abroad. This is heartening, of course, provided they don't make us forget that this year has no easier problems in store for us.

A top-ranking military commander has reproached diplomats by saying that if we settle for just one more reduction of armed strength, nobody will sit down at the negotiating table with us any longer. Military power is essential, there is no denying that. But so is a sense of proportion. When Nikita Khrushchev bragged that we had started turning out missiles like hot dogs on a flow-line, the Western response in kind was that Russia had rather start turning out sausages like missiles on a flow-line.

We had many things bungled through munitions production. So much so that we now have to resolve a difficult equation of national security with anything but missiles and tanks as the main elements. The strain and stress in the economy have been compounded by things which figured little in national and world politics until yesterday—the danger to the environment, rational use of natural resources, terrorism, drug smuggling, proliferation of chemical weapons. Taken together, they make up what one may call the "fourth basket" in East-West relations. There are, besides, the increasingly dramatic and destructive ethnic conflicts and massive emigration processes both in the North and in the South.

Against this backdrop, traditional disarmament talks, even so far-reaching an agreement as the halving of strategic offensive arms, if it is arrived at, no longer look like the cornerstone of stability and security.

The USA and other Western partners seem to be willing to cooperate. I could recall my recent meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the FRG, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in Frankfurt-on-the-Main. Today,

he said, few in the West argue about whether or not it pays to support the Gorbachev reforms. Everyone must take these reforms seriously. Naturally, Genscher said, Russia and other countries must themselves resolve the problems of their regeneration "But if the Western nations refuse to cooperate, that will be against their own best interests."

Why so much preoccupation with our home affairs? What is it that has inflamed George Bush, François Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher with such a passion for our reform process? These are questions we have to make out. It seems to me that the point is this, above all. They are talking about the "decline of socialism" and for that reason they are willing to help forward the programme of reform. Our view is that we had no true socialism as yet and that only now are we beginning to approach it. And if the reform process begets democracy, openness and other attributes of a normal civilised state, why can't we work together, abiding by common human values?

In 1990 we shall have to meet the challenge of rather novel relations with our allies and friends. Poland, Hungary, the GDR have shown that, with a good historical framework available for building a new type of society, its supreme architects turned out to be little prepared for the job. Apart from everything else, the absence of a smoothly-operating mechanism of replacement of top executives is a glaring built-in flaw of the system. Yet that is something that civilisation cannot do without.

A lot of re-thinking has to be done. Let me quote from a conversation I have recently had with one of the ideologues of "Solidarity", now shaping the foreign policy philosophy of the new government of Poland. "First," he said, "Poland will stay committed to the Warsaw Treaty, proceeding from the principle of separating the sphere of security in the region (to which the government agrees), from the sphere of influence (meaning the influence of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Treaty zone—to which the government does not agree). Second, the Warsaw Treaty must not any longer be used as a police force for interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Third, relations within the Warsaw Treaty system must be built between governments, not between party leadership."

Like it or not, this is the reality of our relations, in this case, with Poland.

Problems galore. Some of them are already in the works, others just emerging. They all constitute the agenda for Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy in 1990 and in the years ahead. The burden of resolving them lies squarely on all Soviet peoples, all the republics, notably, on Russia; she will live up to it, and so will the rest of them.

BORIS PYADYSHEV

SOVIET CULTURE IN THE WORLD

IT SEEMS THAT the Iron Curtain is falling apart. This is putting a visible imprint on the development of culture and art in country, on international contacts in this sphere. What must the international being of our culture be like if we want to join the world community fully and organically, want its cultural currents to reach us, want our culture to begin living a full life? What is the "right" proportion between politics, ideology and culture? What are the early results (positive or negative) of our new international cultural policy?

These questions were discussed at the Guest Club of *International Affairs* by

Chinghiz Aitmatov, writer, Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the Development of Culture, Language, Ethnic and Internationalist Traditions and the Protection of the Historic Heritage;

Oleg Chernyshev, Deputy Chairman of the above mentioned commission;

Nikolai Gubenko, Minister of Culture of the USSR;

Yuri Khilchevsky, Deputy Minister of Culture of the USSR;

Vladimir Lazarev, writer, member of the Editorial Board of *Nashe Naslediye*, (Our Heritage) journal of the Soviet Fund of Culture;

Nikolai Petrov, pianist,

Igor Vinogradov, literary critic, an assistant professor at the Gorky Literary Institute;

Galina Volchek, Chief Producer at the Sovremennik Theatre.

HOW SHALL WE ENTER THE WORLD "HOUSE OF CULTURE"?

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS When speaking of universal values, of one integral and interdependent world, we turn more often than not to economics, social processes, ecology and even the evolution of ideologies. But haven't we forgotten the main thing, humanity's unquestionably common culture and its values as the bedrock of all progress by nations and societies towards closer cooperation? This is a most thankful theme indeed, for we can both discuss it in purely philosophical terms and look into such particulars as our international cultural exchanges.

Gubenko. I think the problem consists primarily in the fact that the roots of many of our economic and social troubles lie in a cultural and moral decline. Everybody realises that culture is a vital necessity but not as much as social protection, food or health care. But people whose cherished aspiration is food and sleep are no better than animals. Don't we have enough evidence and proof of this today? People may forget in time all about the Caribbean crisis, about the efforts made by Kennedy to bring it to a peaceful close. They may forget all about Pompidou's efforts but the generations that enjoy treasures of world culture at the Kennedy and Pompidou centres will for ever associate their names with those centres of knowledge and culture.

What do I mean? Culture will have to subsist on the residual principle until the USSR Supreme Soviet, the government, the leadership of our

state impose a moral tax upon themselves in favour of culture, until culture gains a privileged status in their hearts.

Khilchevsky. I welcome the initiative taken by *International Affairs* to discuss the state of our international contacts, the problems they pose and the prospects they hold out. I welcome it all the more because such a discussion is long overdue.

I've read somewhere that the 21st century will be a century of humanitarians. While agreeing in principle, I wish to note just the same that the state of our culture is conditioned to a very great extent by its socio-economic context. I have no doubt that we must look at the problem of culture more broadly.

I'm probably at an advantage in this respect. Just a year ago when I served at UNESCO, I watched our international cultural exchanges in practice, from without so to speak. Now that I serve at the Ministry of Culture, I'm participating in their realisation from within, as it were. I wish to stress right away that our cultural presence in the world is welcomed today. There is tremendous respect for our cultural potential. The flow of invitations for tours by Soviet cultural workers is growing.

International Affairs. But we aren't talking about a shortage of invitations—our theme is different.

Khilchevsky. Of course, it's a question of how well we can respond. Interest in our culture is primarily interest in perestroika. But let us take a broader look at the concept of perestroika. Let us speak of a restructuring of international relations in Europe. On this continent, culture can really play a unique vanguard role, since culture is a sphere in which it's easier to begin joining efforts to do something concrete.

I'm not the only one to think so. In November 1989, French Minister of Culture Jack Lang met with his colleagues and cultural figures from West European and some East European countries, including the Soviet Union, to try to outline a framework for possible international cooperation, a future common European "Home of Culture" if you will. The logic of the idea is perfectly clear and convincing: a common European home can hardly be built in the absence of a similar home of culture.

Those who set out to build this "cultural project" will have to cope with numerous problems which I'm sure will be mentioned here. But let me point to what I see as the main obstacle: the fact that we still lack a functioning mechanism for normal international cooperation in culture and art. This is the chief trouble. We've gotten away from the old command-and-pressure style used by the apparatus but have yet to arrive at a new style meeting today's requirements. Something of a pause has set in, and it breeds problems.

Chernyshev. It isn't just that we lack a new mechanism—we even have no idea of what it should be like. The point is that the whole controversy over our cultural problems is still nothing but diagnosing. It's neither treatment nor a restructuring. Democratisation and glasnost merely give us a chance to state our troubles as loudly as possible and to try and find out what sort of people we are, after all. We've now seen ourselves as in a mirror, and when this happened we gasped. It hurts, and it is frightening. Incidentally, we gasped almost in unison. The disease affects us all, you see.

What's the point at issue here? It isn't the "problem of cultural exchanges" (which is certainly very important, too) but the answer to such difficult questions as: What's happened to our culture? Where did it fail? How shall we restore and build up our culture?

I will take the liberty of being a pessimist and saying that we cannot expect our "cultural perestroika" to produce any results until we answer these questions fully and honestly. I, for one, don't think we will see in the next five years even a blueprint of the temple of our culture

to be rebuilt. Little has been done generally in the perestroika years, and many hurdles to cultural progress have yet to be removed. Active treatment first aggravates the patient's condition, and it's only afterwards that it begins improving.

We are speaking here of culture in its political context, meaning the idea of building a common European home. But let us see the relationship between culture and politics in our country. When we saw the draft plan and budget for 1990, we discovered a paradox: the plan didn't provide for any spending whatever on culture. This must have been due to our technocratic thinking, which doesn't bode well for culture and generally abounds in paradoxes.

Here's another paradox. It would seem that our parliament is doing its job but its effort is somehow assuming a mechanical character. We select a bill at random and discuss it without knowing what the next, follow-up bill is going to be. This muddle is disheartening. Some go as far as to say that there's a sort of cunning logic in it, that what we have here is stratagems of some kind. This was my own impression at first, too, but subsequently I realised that we are in the presence of ordinary bungling, to put it bluntly. However, this is even more dangerous than subtly conceived administrative intrigues. After all, when somebody does something bad deliberately, you can influence him once you've grasped his logic. But the phenomenon I've referred to is spontaneous and therefore terrifying. We are talking about a law on property but have a poor idea of how our state will be organised economically. We're talking about taxation but have yet to pass a law on copyright.

Petrov. What about the Berne Convention? And then there are the Vienna accords signed by us, aren't there?

Chernyshev. You see, the Berne Convention is still too far removed from our practical affairs. Besides, we sign international agreements with the best of intentions but after that it all comes to nothing. When I was in France, people at the Council of Europe said to me: "You know, you aren't the first Soviet guest here. Your people come here often and when leaving, they take with them suitcases packed with various Council documents. But afterwards we hear nothing of them. We send invitations but nobody responds. Some sort of secret activity goes on that claims both our time and our resources—in addition to those batches of documents. But what about results?"

This is why I still can't grasp the system of "running" our culture. It must be because there just isn't any such system. The underlying idea must be that everything will somehow take care of itself. We don't know what mechanism of "controlling" cultural exchanges we should strive for. Nevertheless, we are vigorously marking time, hoping that some little path may be trodden somehow some time and that the march of history will help us. But will it? We've gained an awful lot of experience in this respect. We are told time and again that we are on the brink of the abyss yet we've long been right on the bottom. We ought to try and scramble out but we are told to keep marching. Where to? How?

We need to search for footholds, of course. Mention was made here of the Vienna accords and other documents of a similar nature. Fine. They offer us guidelines and are an external factor that is making—and I hope will make—us change. I think our "cultural crisis" will soon compel us to adopt uncommon, nontraditional decisions. How well are we prepared for that? I don't know. But we must prepare for it. Those international documents will help us.

Lazarev. "There's no mechanism," we are told. I won't question that because it's probably true. But must we now hypnotise ourselves by its conspicuous absence? After all, there is just everyday work, and then we have social institutions which have already taken shape and shouldn't be

underestimated. Take the Fund of Culture, for one. It's important that this institution of ours has many analogues in the world. Not long ago we had an important meeting in Leningrad. For five days, the Soviet Fund of Culture carried on a dialogue with the cultural foundations of the Rockefellers, Thyssen, Krupp, Gulbekian and others. But see what we have. Our political consciousness, which still dominates our cultural contacts, has made a curious volteface. Whereas earlier we were inflated with great-power arrogance, currently we are behaving like an orphan (which is just as disgraceful). For some unaccountable reason, we expect everybody to like us and help us by lending hard currency. But why? This is something to think about.

I'm afraid we and the West are again using different languages. Westerners are reasonable and businesslike—they suggest doing together what everybody would stand to gain from. But we are as artless as children, for we ask them to lend us money for this, that and the other, for, say, the rebuilding of small towns on Lake Ladoga. But why should they? A spokesman for the Volkswagen Foundation wanted to know just that. "Why do the Russians want us to invest money in the rebuilding of their cities?" he asked. "They are *their* cities, aren't they?"

We ought to consider the logic of our partners. Do you know what Volkswagen suggested? "Libraries?" Its man said to me. "Excellent! Here's our offer: we would get in touch with the Library of the USSR Academy of Sciences (where many valuable books were destroyed by a fire), work with old German books and compensate for them by helping to reequip the library." A representative of the Thyssen Foundation suggested forming a team of writers and literary critics to prepare a collection of essays on the reciprocal influence of Russian and German literature. Such is our partners' approach, nor do I think we should ignore it.

Incidentally, the stock of the Dresden District Library removed by us after the war is still in our country. It isn't being used and is decaying, to say nothing of cataloguing the books. And here's another striking fact: Adolf Hitler's library lies piled up on the floor of a church in Uzkoye, (outskirts of Moscow) here in our country. Both libraries are being destroyed by humidity. Nobody has ever looked over, let alone indexed the books in them. We simply don't know anything about those books. Nobody seems to care.

In these circumstances, what if we return those books to Germany in exchange for at least part of our cultural heritage much of which is scattered all over German territory? If it were to turn out that we can't exchange Hitler's library, we should try to sell it. After all, this would be better than just letting the books rot. Such an approach would be perfectly reasonable—at least it wouldn't make us look like orphans but would be based on the principles of mutual benefit and respect.

Of course, there is more to this problem than the fate of a library, for it involves a good deal of politics. And this is precisely why I'm making my suggestions here in the editorial offices of *International Affairs*. We need hard currency for our cultural renaissance, don't we?

Khilchevsky. We've come to a very important moral and political problem. It's true that we have many valuable works of art, rarities removed from Europe in the wake of World War II. We keep them in museums, collections and funds. But we can't show them to the public because they both are and aren't ours. We would only have to include them in an exhibition for some European countries to demand in accordance with relevant international conventions, on a perfectly legitimate basis, that we should restore to them all that we've removed. In short, we're in the position of a dog in the manger, for we can neither make these values ours for good nor give them back.

Now, really, why not give those things back to their owners? Such a move would be applauded in the world and would have its effect on the destiny of our Russian national heritage abroad. To take such a step of principle, we need a political decision of principle. Well, why can there be no such decision? We all know that the best policy is an honest policy. I stand for honesty.

Lazarev. I fully agree with you. But here is what's worrying me. We say "morality" and "spiritual culture" and try to rescue libraries that are falling into decay. But how do our pragmatic administrators react to our weeping "by the rivers of Babylon"? Oh, yes, they have problems "more serious" than ours. But it appears that those "pragmatists" are more shortsighted and less practical than anybody else, for they don't realise that libraries aren't just fine bindings but information. They are the basis for the information society that is still a problematic future for us while in other countries it's a reality. With libraries falling into ruin (they are in a frightful state), our future is perishing too, and so is our hope of re-joining the world community. That's the trouble!

Gubenko. In this context we are faced with the general problem of libraries as a fundamental national value, as the nation's brain. Without them we can't retain a memory of events, can't hand down cultural traditions, can't give the people access to knowledge. We need a state policy that would restore a civilised attitude to libraries. I mean not only the provision and maintenance of facilities but a considerable increase in appropriations, including allocations in hard currency, for the purchase of foreign literature, the training of personnel at the foremost universities at home and abroad, proper remuneration for librarians. It is necessary to allow scientific libraries greater independence in acquiring books and solving personnel problems. In short, we need simply an honest attitude to the nation's heritage and dignity.

Volchek. It all comes down to the attitude towards culture, to our interpretation of the concept itself. Regrettably, people at the top, too, look on art as just an activity providing entertainment, that is, treat it scornfully or patronisingly. The latest case in point was Nikolai Gubenko's appointment as Minister of Culture of the USSR by the Supreme Soviet. I was hurt because not one of our MPs asked the new minister a single question. They did put questions to others but not to him. They must have said to themselves that it wasn't necessary because the post was being taken over at long last by an actor and not a chemist or weaver—an actor they know and like—so why ask him any questions? And they voted for him. Let there be no mistake: what worried me wasn't the absence of any objections (Heavens, no!) but their lack of interest in the problem.

International Affairs. But if we were to recall the tough debate on Zakharov's nomination as Minister of Culture, and his resounding defeat, we would hardly have reason to say our MPs had less than enough interest in cultural problems.

Volchek. Be that as it may, I wish to point out that without the necessary interest our well-known verse that "we are in the lead on the planet in ballet as well" would cease to be true.

Chernyshev. All that is true, of course. But our theme isn't sports, in which the main thing is to capture first place. The problem that led off our discussion is how we are to become a component of the world community, of world culture. We must think about joining the Council of Europe, a goal that is unattainable for the time being. Ours is far from being an open society. One reason for this is our secretiveness. As for other reasons, well, there are things we just can't show to foreigners because they would laugh at us if we did.

And so the likeliest sphere of cooperation between us and the Council

of Europe is cultural ties. Afterwards they could help us open the road to Europe. The Council has a lot of conventions of a humanitarian nature that we could join. But Europeans have a strict rule: to join any one of those conventions, it isn't enough to want it because you must also put in concrete work. Those that they admit into their inner circle must not just be willing to enter it—they must be ready to work as hard as anyone else, and that's the point.

Are we eligible? I've got official data saying that every year one per cent of the architectural monuments registered in our country fall into ruin. It is estimated that fifteen years hence, nothing will be left of half of them. How can we take this sort of thing to Europe? Besides, the Europeans are well informed of our plans, such as the plan for the "development of the North", that is, for the construction of a chain of hydro-electric stations on northern rivers, which would mean flooding huge areas and destroying many unique monuments. They also know that very many of our sights won't survive the rigours of this winter. So what are we to take to Europe? Surely not just "romantic ruins"? Europe is very partial and serious towards our country. Further, we've signed the Vienna accords. It's very easy to verify how far we comply with them. What will Europeans think of us when they've done it?

TALENT AND BUREAUCRATS: WHO WILL WIN!

Petrov. I still think it isn't enough to merely register our problems, the decline in our culture, its downright disastrous plight. We should apparently try to detect the origins of this chronic trouble.

The thing is that besides the problem of funding art, there is the notorious problem of its management. We have every reason to put it regretfully on record that in this period of declared (but far from effected) decentralisation, the whole system of state "management of culture" has completely and definitively discredited itself. In the new situation, all those state committees in charge of the circus, sports, concerts, and so on, have become obvious roadblocks to culture rather than its accelerators. And I must point out that much of this blocking has a criminal background. Of course, when somebody whose mission is to block and ban unexpectedly goes liberal, we must realise because we aren't children, are we, that he isn't prompted by love of humanity but by his own material interests.

Let me specify. Goskontsert, which I had to deal with for some 30 years, revealed not only an unwillingness to perform its functions but elementary professional incompetence. Its activity merely injures our art. Indeed, what are the fruits of that activity? Why, there will soon be nobody in our country whom the agency could work with. Here are some statistics. We've lost twenty musicians this year alone. Alexander Palei has "fled", and so have Rannop, the Estonian pianist, Stanislav Bunin and Valentin Kozhin. The same goes for Valentin Zhuk. It's a tragedy. The irreplaceable treasury of our culture is dwindling before our eyes. Working on contracts abroad are performers like Oleg Krysa, Alexander Slobodyanik, Oleg Kagan, Vladimir Viardo, Natalia Gutman, Valery Klimov. What's going on? Whom that wretched Goskontsert going to manage in the end? It is staffed by 150 to 180 bureaucrats but what about musicians? Why, our best musicians have long been living in the West. And who is left in Russia? You can count them on your fingers, those men of spirit: Temirkanov, Pletnev, Spivakov, Krainev—who else is there?

I'm not trying to work up passions. I'm merely giving some facts. Why do they leave? For the simple reason that they are sick of trying to breach a wall with their heads, of living in bondage, with their lives in

art depending on the smiles they give their boss and the "souvenirs" they bring for him in their Aeroflot bags. I've stopped working with Goskontsert because it's too much for me.

Here's an example of "administrative skill". I recently made a trip to San Diego, USA, to join in an international festival of amazing variety, for there were music and an exhibition of Faberge's works and the Lenin-grad Ballet and Georgian song and dance companies—everything! But I went there almost illegally. Two days before I was to fly to the States, Goskontsert Director Panchenko notified me in an official letter that he refused to make arrangements for my trip. Luckily enough, Yuri Mikhailovich (Deputy Minister of Culture Khilchevsky—*Tr.*) helped me with the passport, and as for the ticket, I booked it myself. Does this mean that Goskontsert had nothing to do with the whole business? Well, it depends on how you look at it.

The lady on the Goskontsert staff who was responsible for our participation in that overseas festival went to San Diego as, yes, a guest of the Mayor. She listened to music and strolled around the city, and meanwhile there was not a soul in Moscow responsible for our participation in the event. Yet there were lots of problems with tickets and visas and baggage (which has a way of getting lost), the replacement of performers, and so on. Those poor Americans tried in vain to get somebody on the phone in Moscow. There was nobody here they could talk to because just then the lady I've mentioned was having a good time in San Diego. Now what is one to make of that?

And now for another scene from the same theatre of the absurd. It was enacted elsewhere. The president of the country's association of impresarios was puzzled. "What's going on, Nikolai?" he asked me. "I offered Goskontsert a lot of money for a Bolshoi tour but nobody answered for a long time. And then a local impostor turned up and struck a bargain with Goskontsert and the Bolshoi for one-third of the amount offered by me. What does that mean, Nikolai?"

There was nothing I could answer. The whole thing would have made sense if the "impostor" had offered, say, 30,000 dollars against 10,000 offered by the association, for business is business. But there was no such thing. And so the rhetorical question arises: to whose advantage?

Gubenko. It's a rhetorical question, all right, because we can't help suspecting that the difference, 20,000 conventional dollars, was pocketed by those who authorised the bargain.

Petrov. Bravo, you're very shrewd.

Gubenko. Come, come I'm disarmingly artless, really. I know how people I like and respect were compelled to beat their heads, as you did against that wall, being pressed to it, and to begin settling all those financial matters in what is called a "decent" manner or, in other words, to pledge to share their royalties with various bureaucrats.

Petrov. That's exactly why outstanding performers leave the country. They're fed up with living by such "laws", with paying for "services" under the counter.

Khilchevsky. By way of filling orders for convertible currency, so to speak.

Petrov. Precisely. But the situation is hopeless because you can curse Goskontsert as much as you like—its bureaucrats will still hold their own behind a barricade of instructions, decisions and circulars. The result is that bureaucrats are seen as people enforcing the law, and they skilfully take advantage of this. A knowledgeable newcomer has only to disturb the bureaucratic peace reigning in Goskontsert to be promptly shackled with ancient paragraphs and have the People's Control Committee turned upon him, the end result being that the bureaucrats get away.

I'm speaking of Oleg Smolensky. Foreigners were delighted when he was appointed to Goskontsert. They said they could talk to its head without an "interpreter" for the first time ever. But see what happened. People's controllers began calling on him every week, harassing him through checkups and trying to detect "abuses". A victimisation campaign was mounted in the press. It was more than the man could stand, and so he quit.

Volchek. I'm sure the problem goes beyond the personal qualities of individual bureaucrats. Its main source is those obsolete, perfectly barbarous decisions and instructions, for they set the tone. One might think their express purpose was to humiliate talented people.

I mean people enjoying widespread respect in the world if not among bureaucrats. One day I saw Richter step into the accounts department of Goskontsert and pile the bookkeeper's desk with paid bills he had brought in an attaché case. He was just back from a tour. The bookkeeper went carefully through all those figures, wetting her fingers with saliva. "Now what is this, Svyatoslav Teofilovich?" she said in the end. "Your bills show a shortage of ten shillings (or was it pfennigs?)" And she gave him a stern look. I said to myself that if she were to demand that he make up for the "shortage" tenfold I would kill her with the attaché case. But she took pity. "All right, now, you'll pay it back after your next tour." Yet demands of that sort are an ordinary occurrence.

Lazarev. We are talking about money here. Of course, there are different ways to earn and spend it. See what's going on in Tolstoy's Yasnaya Polyana, that Mecca of world culture. You know that our government has decided to save that seat of culture. The Tula Regional Party Committee and the RSFSR Ministry of Culture have invested several million roubles in the construction of tourist facilities in Yasnaya Polyana. But what are those facilities to be like? An excursion centre—a tall building of concrete and glass—is to go up a few hundred metres from the famous turrets of the gateway to the count's estate. Besides, architect Kesler has so planned everything that the peasants' log cabins surrounding the estate will be modernised and rented for a time (for hard currency, needless to say) to Western millionaires wishing to get an idea of the atmosphere of Tolstoyan Russia. How do you like that?

Nor is that all. Our barbarous provincialism is ruining Yasnaya Polyana, that pride of world culture, because all decisions are made by the local authorities, the local architect, and so on, and so forth. When we heard about all the disgraceful things happening there, we went to see Ilya Vladimirovich Tolstoy, the writer's grandson, head of chair at Moscow University. We told him everything and persuaded him to help. He said he was willing to give up everything and go to Tula become Director of Yasnaya Polyana. We also called at the RSFSR government headquarters, where the matter was settled, or so we thought because we were promised that Tolstoy would be appointed Director.

Subsequently, however, Ilya Tolstoy was invited to the office of the First Deputy Minister of Culture of the RSFSR who said to him: "You know, we've decided after consulting together that we can offer you the post of Deputy Director in charge of research. As for the post of Director, it will be entrusted to an official of the Tula Regional Party Committee. That appointee has since been happily in charge of Yasnaya Polyana, doing as he is told, for he was installed to do just that.

This is truly frustrating. Indeed, how are we to make the authorities realise that a great legacy must be treated sparingly, that it mustn't be ruined or damaged. How are we to make them realise that it's a value we have to do with?

Volchek. There are many cases of a similar nature. But let us admit that the problem of those contracts for convertible currency has a real

basis. Those who go on tour abroad are positively humiliated, for they are compelled to subsist on a niggardly travelling allowance. That's why they are ashamed of taking their meals in common, why they feed on hamburgers and canned food brought from home and why they accept various clandestine deals. Nothing will help here—neither the abolition of Goskontsert nor the appointment of a new minister of culture. It's all an outgrowth of those outdated, callous laws. Replacing a bureaucrat at the top would make no difference.

Khilchevsky. Speaking of laws, I wish to inform you that we've received a bill on progressive taxation drafted by the Finance Ministry. The draft contains provisions and calculations based on instructions dating from the twenties and thirties. We stated our objections and presented our proposals three months ago but have had no reply or reaction so far. In other words, it still isn't clear how it all will end. I'm saying this by way of comment, so to speak.

Gubenko. What is beyond me is why we can't adopt the normal tax system in use all over the world.

Khilchevsky. It can be done but first we must cast off the fetters of existing instructions and unjustified "quitrent". A point to be borne in mind is that Goskontsert has its problems: after all, it must turn over 60 per cent of all receipts to the Treasury. Besides, we have no hard currency to spare, nor can we expect a rain of gold. During my recent trip to Britain, I found myself in a funny situation when I met with Sir Richard Francis, General Director of the British Council. The British Council has a budget of roughly 500 million dollars to be spent on publicity, prizes and promotion of British culture abroad. Where does that money come from? Forty per cent of it is made up of government subsidies, another 40 per cent is provided by tax-free donations from firms and private persons, and 20 per cent is earned by the Council itself, which publishes books, posters, booklets and what not.

I felt awkward about answering Sir Richard's question concerning our expenditures. I deflected it. But I will answer it here. Every year we are allocated under the budget 10 to 12 million rubles for all international exchanges plus 1,500,000 dollars for the invitation of foreign guests, who get their royalties in hard currency. You will see that comparing the figures is out of the question.

I suppose it would be unrealistic to expect the government to allocate more than what we get today. It follows that we must learn to make money, to do business, and this is something we can't do yet. Since we are on the premises of *International Affairs*, I would like to say something about the role of Soviet embassies. The point is that, by decision of the top leadership, the Foreign Ministry is coordinator of all activities aimed at furthering cultural exchanges with foreign countries. The embassies must help the Ministry as its main agents abroad. They do a lot and deserve credit for it but, on the other hand, our ambassadors occasionally take an uncritical approach to offers from foreign managers. As a result, they may suggest, say, sending the Bolshoi company to put up two performances. Imagine how much money that would lose us. We can't accept every offer from partners without giving it a second thought. We need to count our money.

Here's a revealing example of this nature. The Mayor of San Diego told me that the city had spent six million dollars on the festival mentioned here, and that it planned to earn 50 million. Americans know how to go about it, as you see. But we have yet to learn it.

Gubenko. It is still beyond me why we can't adopt the international tax system. Wouldn't the state benefit from it?

Generally speaking, we'll never be able to lead our culture out of crisis without changing the artist's standing in society. As for money

problems, we can't solve them either now or later until we have a law on intellectual property. I see the only way out in exempting artists from all exactions. If we can't give them anything, let us at least stop taking anything away from them. We must make it an ordinary, routine practice for any group, performer, theatre or art critic whose effort is in demand to join on their own in coproduction, to go on tour, to engage in interchanges, to publish their works, because those of our people who are made to pay higher taxes here than over there leave the country. The Conservatoire is badly short of teachers already. We must grant the greatest possible freedom of entrepreneurship to groups and individual performers, must allow them to do deals and pay the state tax at world rates.

Is there a danger of our art groups wanting to perform in the West only? No, because every serious artist hopes that his effort is useful to his country. I believe contracts plus the application of proper quotas can become an effective enough regulator of the activity of performers both at home and abroad. As for one's internal regulator, it is only one's conscience.

International Affairs. The Vienna accords that were mentioned here say that the states participating in the European process "will facilitate and encourage direct personal contacts in the field of culture, on both an individual and a collective basis, as well as contacts between cultural institutions, associations of creative and performing artists and other organizations in order to increase the opportunities for their citizens to acquaint themselves directly with the creative work in and from other participating States." And further:

"They [these states—*Ed.*] will encourage cooperation between and joint artistic endeavours of persons from different participating States who are engaged in cultural activities." Is it hard to draw practical conclusions from that?

Petrov. We are all equally handicapped by incompetence at state level, by an unwillingness to alter anything, by corruption, bribe-taking, arm-chair worship, and so on. Those are all bureaucratic distortions. One might wonder what all that has to do with artists. But a prime cause of all our troubles is that artists are compelled to deal with bureaucrats, who are empowered to represent both the state and society.

I think art and our country are suffering from one and the same fundamental problem, that of property, because it's unsolved. We may condemn the horrors of private property and hence hired labour as much as we like but the fact is that, more than anywhere else, this kind of labour is used in our country. We're hired labourers all of us—workers, collective farmers and intellectuals alike. We've been hired by the state and are controlled by bureaucrats. I think this is where the roots of the evil lie.

We who have intellectual property still don't enjoy the rights of full-fledged owners of it. Is there a way out? I suggest establishing something of an association of owners of intellectual property that would group journalists, writers, architects, artists, actors, chess players (why not?) and others. The logic of the idea is simple. since we are hit by a common trouble, we must join efforts in searching for a remedy.

I'm of the opinion that we need a very serious coordinating centre to take care of guest performances, count the money and protect performers. It is wrong to send two essentially identical groups, two Bolshoi Ballet companies, to a foreign country or city for guest performances lasting two or three weeks.

Khilchevsky. We call for a decentralisation of international cultural exchanges. This is excellent because it holds a big promise. During a recent tour of some of our republics, I was amazed to discover quite a

treasure of tradition there, talented people, highly interesting art groups. But how poorly we know them! As for the outside world, it doesn't know them at all. Small wonder those who went on tour abroad from Moscow and Leningrad until recently were mostly the same people. In short, there are immense opportunities, and it's fortunate that we've begun using them. As a result, our cultural exchanges have more than doubled over the past three or four years.

There are also problems, however. This cooperation is growing primarily between us and Western countries and hence at the expense of developing and socialist countries. These countries justly feel hurt. "Since you obviously want to earn hard currency," they say to us, "let us agree on making all payments in hard currency." This is one of the problems. Another problem is the lack of any coordination when it comes to deciding on a guest performance in a city by two groups of one and the same genre. The result is that either group comes off the loser, and besides, it tells on their art.

In short, we need only decentralisation (within reasonable bounds, I would add) but an increasing coordination of exchanges, or we risk losing much, disgracing ourselves and devaluating our great art. By the way, people abroad have long been aware of this possible devaluation of our culture and drawn appropriate conclusions.

Thus we simply can't do without a coordinated policy of "exporting culture." Otherwise we had better sign fewer contracts to avoid failure in the future. I wish to say again that I'm not the only one to think so. In November 1989, there was a meeting of managers from Western and socialist countries. What we were told there was this: "We need competent and reliable managers in the Soviet Union. Please establish in your country an association of all managers in charge of international cultural exchanges. It would enable us, first, to keep the price of Soviet art high, and second, to see that those exchanges meet high standards." The latter point means that in the world of business there occasionally turn up small sharks who take advantage of our inexperience to arrange a deal with us and make money, after which they drop out of sight. And in the event of failure, there is nobody we can call to account. Big corporations marvel at this lack of squeamishness on our part. Since the business involved is very serious, it must be done by serious people on the most serious basis.

Gubenko. Of course, we need a reasonable policy of coordinating exchanges. It is beyond question that every republic, region or city must pursue its own cultural policy and carry out its own programmes both bilateral and external ones. But I think it's for the Union centre to ensure that the process of granting cultural autonomy to republics and regions goes on painlessly.

I think the following tasks call for centralised effort. One, training and refresher training of personnel. Two, providing social protection for people active in culture by proposing appropriate measures to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the government, in particular measures for the protection of copyright and, in a broader sense, intellectual property, as well as legislation on pensions taking account of the peculiarities of cultural work and artistic activity. Three, solving material and technical problems. Four, maintaining international ties at Union level. No republic can sponsor guest performances by, say, La Scala, or international actions like the Chaikovsky Competition or the Chekhov Theatre Festival. I need hardly add that in the event of a republic adopting *khozraschet*, culture may be affected unless subsidised out of a Union fund. The Ministry of Culture sees one of its missions in preventing any cuts in cultural expenditures and in searching for ways to increase them.

CULTURE FOR IDEOLOGY OR THE OTHER WAY ROUND?

International Affairs. We've repeatedly put two concepts—culture and politics—side by side. Also, we often hear phrases like “culture and ideology” or “culture and morality”. I suppose this should be seen as just a necessary concession to the habitual presentation of the problem. On the other hand, these common phrases arouse protests, for culture isn't something secondary but the source of politics, ideology and economics alike.

Chernyshev. Clarifying this matter is certainly overdue. What is culture? It is the purpose of human progress, and whether man's occupation is economics, politics or something else is immaterial. What is ideology? The ideas safeguarding culture and the means by which man draws on culture. As for how you exercise your right to advance to culture, self-education, self-development, self-realisation, it's a question to be answered by politics, meaning politics based on universal humanist principles. But the main thing I wish to stress is that culture is an end in itself if you will, the spiritual sphere in which man realises himself. In the past, it was the other way round with us. We saw ideology as the end and everything else as the means. And we know what this hierarchy of values produced. But no matter how we arrange them, these two examples show that culture is the groundwork on which man's whole world—the world of his emotions, ideas and activities—is built. It is no accident that we come up recurrently against the problem of realising the meaning of our culture through socio-economic practice. What do I mean? Here is just one example. Let us say we decide to obtain several billion roubles in foreign exchange from the Treasury to buy imported articles. Would that make any difference? In fact none because those articles wouldn't become part of our culture—we would use them or wear them out, and they would drop out of our material world without leaving a trace. Yet we could try a different tack by reverting to a sound principle current among inventors, which consists in turning weakness into strength. What makes us strong? Our intellectual discoveries and resources (foreign countries still draw for their development and resources (foreign countries still draw for their development on discoveries made by us in the twenties and thirties) Our vulnerable spot is lagging technology. Why not draw up projects based on our ideas and aimed at using our materials and why not put these ideas into practice by using foreign technology?

Of course, it's important to create our own technological culture in the process but we shouldn't forget that the West and we virtually represent different civilisations today, and so it would be absurd to talk about their competing. Basically, our two systems can't compete because the “games we are playing are different”. We have only to take a sober look at ourselves to discover that we have a political culture, a legal culture, a worldview and everyday lives of our own.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is only by recognising the distinctions between our systems that we can find common ground for sustained contacts. In any case, I regard this approach as more fruitful than a mechanical imitation of achievements of the other civilisation.

Gubenko. Leaving on one side criticism of the past, when culture and art were demoted to the rank of an orderly performing “cultural services for the population”, we can now rejoice cautiously because ideology has come to regard cultural rehabilitation as a condition for the country's spiritual renaissance, as one of the pillars on which the value of individual man must rest. But every beginning requires a continuation.

What is the best way to proceed? We can't do without working out principles for legislation on culture that would ensure legal protection

for monuments, museum exhibits, books, library stocks, the very basis culture, primarily cultural workers. The law should safeguard culture against accidental destruction.

Chernyshev. It would be hard to question that. Still, I would correlate those two concepts in a different way, for "protecting" or "defending" culture isn't all that ideology must do for culture. There's a need for more, a need to "culturalise" every single sphere of our lives, to educate people to strive for culture. By the way, I have a pet idea about this. I mean design. Yes, because the working of culture is as mysterious as that of Providence. Culture reaches people through diverse channels which may include a well-considered material environment moulding people's tastes and requirements. When I was in France I realised the vast importance of precisely this kind of material environment, one in keeping with every canon of design. A person whose environment is full of fine and useful objects not only lives in this environment but is inspired by the ideas that animated the makers of those objects. It is rightly said that you cannot penetrate into culture but can only draw on it for inspiration. Otherwise culture would be like the painted bedsheet with a hole through which marketplace photographers had their customers put their heads to become a "skilful horseman" or an "elegant cavalier".

But here's an entirely different example. We know from the Supreme Soviet that our trade is short of 12 billion rubles' worth consumer goods whereas it has such goods worth hundreds of millions piled up in warehouses because nobody will buy them. In other words, the shortage is one of culture, not goods. I would spell this out by adding that if we were to regard culture as merely the totality of artistic values or a network of cultural institutions, we would overlook and miss the problem. And as a consequence, we would go on contemplating a huge mass of useless metal instead of fine machines and rotting heaps of deformed leather instead of comfortable footwear. The connection is direct. It follows that the more culture ideology introduces into the world, the more progressive it is. Culture is a criterion of "ideological maturity".

Vinogradov. All that is true but, if so, what about your previous proposition about two different civilisations? You've just said that there can be no competition between them because they are capitalist and we are socialist. But personally I can't accept those definitions of the two systems because they sound too anachronistic. Indeed, I feel that when we say "socialist pluralism" or "socialist society", we're merely trying to reideologise our thinking.

Volchek. May I put in a comment? Perhaps I don't interpret "socialist pluralism" as I should or as it's interpreted by those who first formulated the concept. Even so, I regard the relations that have become established between the state and, say, the theatre as the right kind of relations. True, I don't know how long they will last. As for the rest, let audiences decide what they accept and what they don't. I think the notion that there is a difference between the public and the people is outdated.

In short, I see the current pluralism as a situation where every creative or ordinary individual has his identity and doesn't have to make himself up in a way to please somebody.

Vinogradov. I mean something different, nonetheless. I'm convinced that there will be no normal cultural contacts, no "cultural blood transfusion", until the social structures of the two systems come to correlate. Let me therefore be categorical and say that the problem of cultural interaction can only be solved by thoroughly reshaping our whole society. Without this culture will be unable to breathe normally.

How do I visualise this reshaping? I'll answer briefly in two points, without beating about the bush. One point is creation of a law-governed state and formation of a civil society in which the most diverse ideologi-

cal and intellectual trends have an equal right to exist on a competitive basis. This is the main political and legal condition for normal cultural progress.

The other point is establishment of a free, market-type economy in that society. It's only in that case that our state would be able to perform with regard to culture the function which the state has in all civilised countries. Thereby a situation would be created where 40 per cent of the funds for cultural development would come from the Treasury, with industrial and other firms—collectively-owned, cooperative, private, and so on—providing the rest, or 60 per cent. Only then would society be self-supporting, with culture having more funds for its development than the mere pittance it now gets from the state. Generally speaking, culture can't do without enlightened patronage in the form of donations from firms, organisations, foundations, private persons. And this means that we need a reasonable tax policy that would be effective in the conditions of a free market.

Cde Chernyshev, you say you see no programme or idea that can be used for restoring culture. I can understand that because you're surrounded by concepts like that of "socialist society" already mentioned here. But then there exist other models evolved by prominent economists who have serious ideas making it possible to switch our economy onto a new track. True, there is no serious discussion of those programmes but there will be none for as long as we go on talking dually, they have capitalism and we, socialism.

Lazarev. The command system's force of inertia is plainly enormous. It's also clear that a law-governed state and a free, normal economy can't be brought about overnight. But surely those who are up in arms against spiritual poverty are helping restore common sense on Earth. Nikolai Gubenko has become Minister of Culture of the USSR who can talk to intellectuals in their own language at long last. This isn't a bad start, is it?

Vinogradov. The euphoria occasionally generated in our country by new appointments reminds me of the period of the Khrushchev "thaw" that was when author Valentin Ovechkin came to the conclusion that incompetent collective farm chairmen were to blame for the decline in our countryside. You had only to replace them for things to go well. But what we know today is that a depersonalising system can discourage any enthusiast. I think much the same may happen to Gubenko: either a bureaucratic milieu will exhaust his patience and he'll quit in a couple of years or he will be made to quit. Let us be realists.

Lazarev. But let us also be dialecticians. We know that in the past the office Minister of Culture in our country was held by a weaver, a chemist and an economist. They all met the chief requirement of the time—they showed a "class instinct" and an "ability for political thinking". Let me give an example. One day the economist who held the post was acquainting himself with the Yasnaya Polyana Museum (that was just a few months ago). Before leaving, he warned the staff against forgetting when they showed visitors around that Lev Tolstoy had been a landed proprietor. The man who served that valuable warning is still "taking care" of culture although his armchair is republican in size now. But then the republic is Russia.

What am I driving at? Culture, like the Ministry of Culture, stands to lose if controlled by bureaucrats mending their ways, by professional chiefs. It now needs new people free from the birthmarks of barracks socialism. It needs people having an identity, intellectuals, or what Dal, our lexicographer, called people who can do their own thinking. This is an axiom, isn't it? Culture is the property of cultured people, and there's no other way.

Chernyshev. This was, incidentally, what we were prompted by when our Commission for the Development of Culture adopted a series of specific decisions on what steps we should take without delay. It occurred to us to assemble all our stars of culture and ask them how they visualised our cultural renaissance, how we should win back our place in world culture. But they form the upper echelon of cultural workers, so to speak. There is also another echelon. We need to rouse all local cultural forces to action and call an all-Union cultural assembly. We must see to it that the assembly works out concrete, workable recommendations. They are of vital importance because if the Lenin Library is falling into decay, it's easy to imagine what goes on 100 to 200 kilometres from it.

Those recommendations certainly couldn't come from one person, no matter how wise. They should be a fruit of "consulting the whole land", as we used to say in olden days. Our Commission has asked both local entities and the foremost cultural centres of the country to send in their ideas and suggestions, to write what they think should be done specifically. We're already getting material, which is very vastly varied and contains forceful, profound ideas. By the way, we've received most interesting proposals from our musicians signed by Irina Arkhipova. We are going to seek help from those who send us such proposals—we plan to work with them both at the assembly and after it.

Aitmatov. I fully agree with those who consider that ideology has had its day. They are quite right. Ideological dogma isn't an end in itself. The important thing is people's interest, the good of man, of society and humanity. We will therefore have to take a broader look at things and reappraise the processes under way in our country. Why, it is so important that we are getting rid at long last of a sense of self-sufficiency, ceasing to perceive our country as a very special realm that for some reason must serve everyone as a model of the world to come. The important lesson we should draw from our experience is that when life suggests that society renew itself, it's absurd and criminal to stand in the way (as we had been preparing to do all the time). In short, all those sentiments are disappearing understandably from our thinking. We are shedding our messianic complex as we learn to carry on a civilised dialogue with other countries.

I think individual man must be given priority under any system regardless of whether or not it's welcome. However, the individual should not be set apart from the system. It is necessary to insist on their influencing each other. Whatever the system under which the individual is active, he can always influence, at least slightly, both positive and negative processes going on in society. Let us remember this. Every system needs people who do their own thinking. What we call pluralism is normal coexistence, dialogue between people holding differing views. It should have a beneficial effect on the historic evolution of our country. And every one of us should find a place for himself in this evolution.

NAJIBULLAH, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Boris PYADYSHEV

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN has entered its twelfth winter, a winter of anxiety as well as of hope that the long-running disaster will come to an end.

I recently visited Kabul

The sky is blue and sunny there these winter days and the limpid mountain air is full of permanent tension. The atmosphere in the presidential palace, to which I made my way in a car, zigzagging as in a slalom race between tanks, armoured personnel carriers, patrols, was calm and steady. Only occasionally did something like the sound of a blast or the roar of aircraft intrude from beyond the carefully curtained windows.

The President, who was wearing a semimilitary khaki shirt, greeted me in Eastern fashion by putting his arms around my shoulders and touching my cheek twice with his. And then he said in Russian: "Welcome, Boris Dmitrievich" (The first meeting lasted for over 3 hours)

It was my second visit to the palace. I first found myself there in the King's days, in the spring of 1973, when I accompanied our then president on his official visit to Kabul. I sat near the edge of a massive, richly inlaid table. Nikolai Podgorny and King Zahir Shah sat in the middle, with cabinet ministers and other officials flanking them on the left and right. The talks went swimmingly, nor could relations between our countries have been better.

But the flywheel of events whose logic and trend threatened to involve us in Afghanistan's internal affairs had begun to turn. However, that involvement was not entirely inevitable. There was a chance to keep out provided that we foresaw the impending changes and the morass that they could land us in.

An anti-royal coup was to have taken place precisely during the Soviet president's stay in Kabul. Of course, plans for it were made beforehand, without any knowledge of the time of the visit. The coup had to be put off, and the King was overthrown a few months later. Daoud took over but he was not fated to rule long. The April Revolution, accomplished a few years after, made us direct parties to internal processes in a country which is our neighbour, sure enough, but is an independent, sovereign state nonetheless. This circumstance must have been dismissed as immaterial by the ideologues of misconceived internationalism, which once in a while transformed in the minds and deeds of our one-time leaders into something closely resembling export of revolution.

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HOW THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW WAS TAKEN

"WHERE SHALL WE BEGIN?" Najibullah asked.

"Could we begin from the beginning? From the day that the possibility of withdrawing our troops first came up between the Moscow and Kabul leaderships?"

"All right. We arrived in Moscow in October 1985. You had a new political situation in your country, perestroika. In charge of the talks were Mikhail Gorbachev on the Soviet side and Babrak Karmal on the Afghan side. I didn't belong to the top leadership at the time and found myself three or four seats away from the middle of the table. At a certain moment, Mikhail Gorbachev said: 'We must think together about withdrawing the Soviet force from Afghanistan.' The response of the Afghan side to that suggestion was mainly negative. Karmal's darkish face darkened still more 'If you were to pull out now,' he said, 'next time you would have to move in a million troops.' He put it just like that."

The President raised to his lips a quaintly worked square cup with green tea and took a sip.

"I didn't say anything right away, didn't voice my opinion. But when, during the interval, we came out of the conference hall I told my colleagues that Karmal was wrong and that his statement shouldn't be taken for the position of the whole Afghan leadership."

Sitting at the negotiating table was a man who was watching closely to see the reaction of our Afghan friends, to guess from the look on their faces and from their gestures what was going on in their minds. He noticed that Najib (that was the President's name at the time) was perhaps the only one to acquiesce in the proposed step. It was obvious that Najib himself felt that a settlement would be impossible for as long there were foreign troops on Afghan soil.

"I reasoned this way," the President reminisced, speaking of that dramatic day. "After the April 1985 Plenum, the new Soviet leadership initiated a great policy of renewal. But who could believe in the Soviet Union's sincerity as long as its troops were in Afghanistan? The Soviet Union and Afghanistan could fight the war for a long time because they had a sufficient potential for that but what for? After all, nearly the whole world was against the war, and the UN General Assembly voted against us year after year. Everybody was saying that Afghanistan was occupied. More importantly, the Afghan people were sympathetic to the counter-revolution whatever we might say. A real revolutionary can fight to the last cartridge but he must think about the people first and foremost."

In the spring of 1986, Najib was elected General Secretary of the PDPA CC and then President of the Republic. From then on, he was in a position to work to ensure that the policy of national reconciliation conceived by him became state policy. This policy was something more than a turning point in the destiny of Afghanistan. Its wisdom and humane character had an echo in Central America, Cambodia, Africa and wherever else regional conflicts were still raging.

Easier said than done. Among the Afghan leaders of the time, far from everybody found the policy of national reconciliation acceptable. The President showed me the minutes of a meeting of the top leadership. Many speakers were sceptical. They wondered how the country could hold its ground without Soviet troops. Some asked their opinion to be put on record so as to be able to say "I warned you" in the event of failure.

In those days, Najibullah said as he recalled Lenin that the important thing was to have a clear vision of the ultimate goal no matter how dim it looked at the moment. He spoke of the need to be prepared for the worst outcome. There had always been victories and reverses in history.

The People's Party of Iran (Tudeh) had been routed three times but it lived on. Nor was the PDPA secure from defeat. But with Afghanistan still there, the party would revive. The LCST (limited contingent of Soviet troops) must be withdrawn no matter what. There would be no progress unless this was done.

All of that was logical.

Najibullah proceeded step by step in convincing his colleagues of the advantages of the policy of national reconciliation. They were getting used to the idea of withdrawal but that was as far as it went, for no date had yet been proposed for the evacuation of the LCST.

This was done at a meeting between the Soviet and Afghan leaderships in Moscow in December 1986.

"It was my first visit in my new capacity. I told the Soviet comrades about the policy of national reconciliation, about its gains and the difficulties it encountered. I spoke frankly, in particular about the attitude to the idea of Soviet withdrawal.

"Mikhail Gorbachev said on that occasion that the Soviet force would pull out of Afghan territory within eighteen months to two years."

Talks were launched in Geneva with a view to producing a package of agreements on Afghan settlement. Mikhail Gorbachev and President Najibullah agreed to meet on April 7, 1988, in Tashkent to come to terms on their fundamental position on the issue of signing accords in Geneva.

Najibullah flew to Tashkent, having a mandate from the PDPA CC Political Bureau meeting held the day before to endorse the proposed accords. At the eleventh hour, however, word came that not all members of the Afghan delegation to Geneva were in favour of the accords. This created a further dramatic situation. The President rang up the delegation from Tashkent to discuss the matter. The discussion bore scant fruit, for developments were evoking too emotional a response at the Geneva end of the line. A tense night passed. There came another conversation. Passions subsided somewhat, and predictably, it was common sense and realistic appreciation of the need for international accords that won the upper hand.

EAST IS EAST

DON'T LET US dismiss offhand the wise British poet's observation: "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet."

People in our country and elsewhere say, mostly for effect, that that is all a thing of the past. But it is not, for East is still East. And it is as hard to understand and adapt to as in Kipling's days.

In December 1979, we moved troops into a country that is our neighbour geographically but was several light-years away in terms of way of life, tradition, elementary development level. We invaded others' lives without knowing them, having no idea of how divided that state was because of the many tribes inhabiting it, because of distinctions in religious convictions, of hostility between the two wings of the PDPA.

"When I was a boy of seven," Najibullah told me, "I went to a distant village to see my old aunt. Before greeting me by touching my hand, she wrapped her hand in the hem of her veil. The Koran forbids Afghan women to touch men, even relatives under age. This is unchangeable. Nothing can alter those laws and customs."

Prior to December 1979, there were only eight garrisons in Afghanistan's 30 provinces. The troops had to stay in barracks, and even the bazaar was off limits. The unexpected appearance of a soldier at the threshold of a house was invariably taken for a sign of something out of the ordinary.

And then came the LCST. The country reacted very sharply. The opposition forces had been less than 30,000 strong until then and were

armed with primitive weapons, including British bore guns, and Kalashnikov automatic rifles of Chinese make. But their strength grew fast to between 270,000 and 280,000 men equipped with up-to-date arms.

President Najibullah confirmed that the Taraki and Amin leaderships had repeatedly asked Moscow to send troops against the opposition forces. Could they have done without help? The President is sure they could had the Afghan leadership of the time not hung on so grimly to ideological dogma that led to disaster. Those leaders had proceeded from the fallacious assumption that all backward countries, Afghanistan included, had reached the stage of national democratic revolution irrespective of objective conditions.

"I think we are only just approaching that stage. Theoretical mistakes entailed a chain of practical ones, and the process of power monopolising by the PDPA set in. A struggle began literally against all. In the end we found ourselves all alone as a weak party torn by factional squabbling and by a process of isolation from the people. Hence the requests for aid. As a result, the PDPA and the Soviet army came to be opposed to the people and the Afghan national movement

"Our troubles snowballed. We lost confidence in ourselves and forgot how to act on our own. Not one of our armed units went into action without Soviet support. The Afghan army didn't exist as an efficient force. Neither we nor you saw to making it efficient."

Much of what happened in that period smacks of a theatre of the absurd. To begin with, consider the irresponsibility and conceit of our leader of the time, who decided to move troops into Afghanistan on the advice of three or four courtiers from his immediate entourage.

The President spoke reproachfully of many Afghans in positions of authority who throughout those years preferred to hide behind the backs of Soviet advisers. The damage done was enormous. Many Afghans, including members of the leadership, left everything in the hands of Soviet representatives to concentrate on factional activity and a struggle for power. "The Soviet comrades," they said, "are going to build communism in Afghanistan, and we are going to live under it." "Was that a parody of common sense?" the President commented. "No, because that was exactly how they reasoned and acted." That reproach can be just as rightfully addressed to us. Besides the several thousand military advisers, we have sent to Afghanistan a host of other people. There was a large group of party workers. Mentioned among them was one who had been dismissed from a high-ranking position in a neighbouring Soviet Central Asian republic and was well-versed in the corrupt practices of its former leadership. At the Kabul Polytechnical there was even a Soviet adviser on water-plumbing. They marched in crowds from one ministerial office to another getting into each other's way and "snarling at each other like a pack of dogs" as one of our former ambassadors to Kabul put it, unable to keep his temper down.

Today the President recalls that with a humorous touch, but the humour seems to have a bitter edge to it.

"The Council of Ministers gathers for a session", he reminisces. "We sit down around the table. Each Minister has brought a Soviet adviser with him. As the conference goes on the debate gets higher and the advisers move closer to the table, while the Afghans move away, and finally the Soviet are left to quarrel among themselves."

It was the advisers who often wrote the texts of high-placed Afghan officials' interviews and newspaper articles. You can imagine how Najibullah himself—a brilliant orator, a man of great refinement, I would say, a poet of political debate—must have winced at those stodgy writings.

THE TEST

ON MAY 15, 1988, the Geneva accords came into force, and half the LCST pulled out of Afghanistan in three months. Another six months later, not one of our soldiers was left on Afghan soil.

That was when many Afghans found themselves face to face with a brutal reality, the need to choose between life and death. It would be life if they succeeded in overcoming complacency and reliance on others' military strength, in forgetting their quarrels and building an efficient army. And it would be death if they failed.

In either case the ultimate responsibility would fall on President Najibullah of Afghanistan.

He knew that after February 15, the Kabul government would have to confront the opposition all alone, being at a military disadvantage. The more than 100,000-strong 40th Army had left. The defences of the republic lay bared. The opposition's armed forces had overwhelming numerical superiority in the early days. There was no such thing as a real government army. What many tried to foresee was not whether the Najibullah government would fall but how many weeks or days it would last. The President was told, in particular by some of his associates, that he had signed his death sentence by signing the Geneva accords.

"Just before the Soviet pullout began," the President said, "Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladimir Kryuchkov called at my house. It was a warm meeting which my wife Fatana and our three daughters needed badly. My interlocutors suggested delicately that my wife and daughters should leave for a safe place in the Soviet Union while fighting went on and live there until the worst was over."

Fatana's answer was firm "We won't leave home for any other place but will stay together right here. I will get a tommygun and shoot if necessary. We're going to win together or die together."

An aside: that proud and courageous young woman is of royal blood. She is descended from King Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan, who in 1921 concluded a treaty with the RSFSR. One thing more: one of her paternal relatives, Gailani, heads the Alliance of Three, an opposition group fighting the government under President Najibullah.

The worst did not happen. The Najibullah government did not fall. Indeed, it is gaining in vitality. Najibullah refuted many forecasts and political appraisals. Those who misread the evidence are still wondering what helps today's regime retain its structure and hold its territory.

The President's courage and wisdom win people's hearts. While factional passions flare up now and then in the Afghan leadership, there is now more unity in it than ever before. The efficiency and patriotism of the army have been growing in fighting at Jalalabad, Khost, Kabul.

The difficulties are enormous. Now as in the past, the Soviet Union is the main supplier of shells, bombs and other items of ammunition. They are delivered along an only land route, the Khairaton-Kabul Highway, and by air. There is no other solution for the time being. The other side is amply supplied with arms by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt. Arms convoys keep on arriving from Iran and China.

"The Geneva agreements," Najibullah said, "could have helped in bringing about an early end to bloodshed had all governments shown an equal sense of responsibility for compliance with their commitments on the principle 'treaties must be fulfilled', and had they respected their own signatures to the documents concerned." He had said so once again in a message sent to Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush during their December meeting. President Najibullah voiced disquiet at the manifest intention of the other side to bury the Geneva agreements. He believes that this disquiet should be shared by the guarantor states as well as by

the UN. Military confrontation in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal had not eased as expected. On the contrary, the escalation of extremist military operations as a result of efforts by some foreign countries had risen to a higher level. There was an increase in the number of foreign advisers and mercenaries fighting on the extremists' side. Foreign advisers were trying to paralyse what was a growing objective trend toward reconciliation. Extremists linked with foreign secret services and the drug barons delivered rocket strikes against cities from launchers operated by foreign mercenaries.

These are all incontrovertible facts. But there is also the fact that the Republic of Afghanistan has demonstrated in practice its ability to defend its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The policy of national reconciliation bears fruit. The President spoke about the activity of Foreign Minister Wakil and the efforts of Afghan diplomacy generally, about expanding useful contacts with the outside world. The programme for an Afghan settlement meets with increasing response.

The President listed the key provisions of the comprehensive plan put forward recently to call a halt to the killing of Afghans by Afghans.

"We are in favour of peace talks between all the political forces of the country without exception, of convening an all-Afghanistan peace conference that would adopt a decision on setting up a governing council and on a six-month ceasefire. The council would proceed to form a broad-based coalition government and appoint a commission to draft a new constitution and regulations on the holding of a general election to be approved by the *Loya Jirga*. The leadership of the republic is agreeable to the elections being monitored by an international commission if necessary. It also declares for an international conference on Afghanistan involving all the sides concerned and for proclaiming Afghanistan a neutral, non-aligned and demilitarised state. This plan not only meets the interests of Afghanistan but takes account of the interests of all the countries having a relation to the Afghan problem.

Some leaders claim—according to what the Foreign Minister of a neighbour of Afghanistan, for one, has told me—that an international conference cannot be called because the leaders of opposition alignments refuse to negotiate with the Kabul government.

"Is that true?" I asked the President. "Do spokesmen for the opposition really refuse to discuss anything with you, to maintain contacts at least privately if not publicly?"

The answer I got was detailed. The President named many members of the Peshawar Seven, the field commanders with whom a dialogue has been going on, often of a fairly positive nature. Two-thirds of the field commanders refuse to fight the government whereas earlier all of them fought it. The Soviet withdrawal gave rise to a predictable phenomenon. It generated in the opposition camp, once held together by the struggle against an alien force, such sharp contradictions that nothing is likely to help eliminate them.

What about the ex-king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah?

On November 30, Eduard Shevardnadze met with him in Rome. Kabul perceived the meeting as an indication that the ex-king might play a positive role in putting an end to bloodshed in the country by helping bring about a dialogue between all the political forces of the country, the PDPA included, in the interest of forming a genuine coalition government on a broad basis.

LEADER OF THE AFGHANS

NAJIBULLAH IS BY NO MEANS of humble origin. He is a member of the Pathan tribe which has traditionally exercised power in Paktia,

an Afghan province bordering on Pakistan. Many of his ancestors played an important part in Afghan politics. Najibullah has inherited national pride and patriotism from his father, who served as Consul in Peshawar and maintained contacts with Pathan tribal chiefs on the King's instructions. Recalling his past, the President mentioned compatriots who, like him, had been concerned about the fate of Afghanistan, the poorest country in the region, with the overwhelming majority of its population living in poverty. Their roads parted afterwards.

Ahmad Shah Masood, once a schoolmate of Najibullah at Kabul's Habibiya Lyceum, saw the future of his country in a society resting on stronger Islamic foundations. It is from this position that he is now carrying on an armed struggle against the government as leader of the opposition's largest military grouping.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a graduate of Kabul University like Najibullah, has gone still further. He has carried the fundamentalist dogmas of Islam to fanatical extremes. Blindly uncompromising, he makes his Islamic Party of Afghanistan fight not only Kabul but other opposition groups, seen by him as not loyal enough to Islam. Bloody skirmishes with Masood's Islamic Society of Afghanistan occur time and again, with hundreds of rank and file mojaheddin and field commanders losing their lives in them.

Najibullah proposes to these and other opposition leaders interaction and cooperation within a broad-based coalition. He points out that power could be shared after all because the PDPA lays no claim to monopoly rule. The paramount task was to end bloodshed and establish peace on Afghan soil.

Najibullah is the Afghans' leader. Why do the enemies of Kabul insist on his relinquishing his post? Why do they say this is the only way to advance to a compromise? Because they are fearful of the President's political prestige, of his personal leverage. Their reasoning is that Najibullah's departure from the scene would greatly weaken the whole structure of renewal. There is no political figure of national stature to take his place.

The President's political qualities are matched by his personality, traits which cannot but appeal to people. Before he was elected to his present post, he lived with his family in a small three-room apartment. He knows and respects the customs of tribes and peoples and looks on Afghan tradition and culture with pride. And he is versed in the Koran.

Najibullah may be said to perceive as broadly as befits a reformer not only Afghan problems but developments in other countries, in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe.

"The Soviet Union's new political thinking," he said, "is a real revolution of our times. It should be admitted that capitalism is ahead of socialism in many respects. We all used to advance slogans and theorise instead of coming up with initiatives. You can't feed people on slogans. Lenin said: 'All power to the Soviets.' That's the only truth. The party, no matter how strong, can't accomplish anything without the people. It should really be the guiding and leading force but instead it often became a bureaucratic force."

"The situation in some countries was like a boiling cauldron with the lid on. Hadn't Mikhail Gorbachev launched perestroika, a terrible explosion would have been inevitable. When the idea of new political thinking was put forward, not everybody realised that Afghanistan was an important component of that process. We who hailed the perestroika approach were often described as almost traitors. But now everybody sees that perestroika has opened up new prospects for many countries, with Afghanistan as one of them."

Najibullah is prompted by the people's aspirations. I would even say

that he proceeds like an Afghan nationalist although some would object to the term because it has long had a negative connotation. Yet originally a "nationalist" was one who championed the cause of his nation, doing so not blindly or fanatically but in a way to serve his people's interests. Surely this applies to the President.

Not long ago, President Najibullah and Eduard Shevardnadze had a telephone conversation that was amazing in content. With fighting going on in many parts of Afghanistan, the President unfolded a whole programme for the peaceful rehabilitation of his country's economy and for more extensive Afghan-Soviet economic relations on a mutually beneficial basis, not in the form of aid from the Soviet Union.

The President said that the threat of a collapse in Afghanistan was over and the time had come to end the stupor in economic ties. For instance, Afghanistan could resume deliveries of natural gas or the working of heavy spar at Herat, not far from the Soviet border. The two countries could discuss building a meat-packing plant whose output would go to the Soviet Union.

Eduard Shevardnadze voiced approval for all these suggestions. The interlocutors agreed to entrust the agencies concerned with making plans.

"Since then," the President said, "the Afghan Council of Ministers has formulated a sizable package of proposals. We've discussed them with the Soviet Ambassador. Most of them are worth being put into effect. But the main thing is to safeguard the normal operation of facilities. In any case, it's important to take a first step showing that our relations are moving to a new plane, that of reciprocity.

"That would mean a lot to us Afghans. I believe it would also be welcomed by Soviet people. After all, we realise that you are compelled to help Afghanistan at a time when you have lots of problems of your own. You distribute, say, sugar on coupons yet tens of thousands of tons of it are stored in Khayraton to be delivered to Afghanistan. We would like to reciprocate Soviet generosity, if only to some little extent."

I understandably asked Najibullah what further efforts could be made to secure the release of our prisoners of war.

"We've been using all channels, including diplomatic ones," the President replied. "Nor do we decline the good offices which other countries and international organisations can offer us. On several occasions already, we've released from jail people sentenced by courts. We did so hoping for reciprocity. Here is the latest case. When the Deputy Chairman of the European Parliament's Commission for Human Rights was on visit here, we turned over to him three men we had pardoned."

"We made that goodwill gesture unilaterally and are willing to continue our efforts in all directions so as to bring about the release of Soviet prisoners of war. I also use my personal contacts, in particular confidential talks. I can tell you that this has already produced some concrete results."

"It is fair to ask. How far is the other side willing to cooperate? How willing is it to be reasonable, to take a reasonable approach? Do you know why I say 'reasonable approach'? Because one day they demanded 40,000 prisoners in exchange for the Soviet prisoners of war. Yet on taking stock, so to speak, we established that we had 2,404 prisoners, or 2,500 to use a round figure. In short, we aren't indifferent to the sentiments of the families of the Soviet prisoners of war still in the military opposition's hands. We will do all in our power."

●

PRESIDENT NAJIBULLAH can already be entered in the annals of history as the first Afghan leader under whom foreign troops withdrew

from his country by the terms of international accords, without bloodshed and with everybody drawing a sigh of relief.

Alien soldiers, even if asked to help, can never be a source of joy when they appear near your house. Still less do foreign troops fit in with the atmosphere of a country like Afghanistan, where all that is alien is rejected by both past history—a long succession of liberation wars—and present-day reality, which barely stands out from medieval history and a past resting on Islamic principles and traditions.

So how about our further policy towards that country? I would say that if we want our foreign policy perestroika to really serve our national interests, it must relieve us as much as possible of ideologised military commitments to foreign countries far and near, commitments that put a heavy burden on Russia.

But Afghanistan is a special case. The bonds linking us with it are too strong for us to shove the Afghan burden off without more ado. Heavy as it may be, we have no moral right, dear compatriots, to refuse the Afghan people further support.

The day I flew into Kabul, 18 rockets were fired at the city. And the day I left as we passengers stood waiting not far from the plane we were to board, a rocket dug into the mountain overlooking the airport. The plane sped along the runway, took off and veered to the left, away from the mountain ahead. All the way to our border in the north, we saw nothing below but mountain ridges, snow-covered peaks, lifeless rocks. That is what the typical Afghan landscape is like.

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Vladimir PETROVSKY

THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION is entering the post-confrontation age, the age of the establishment of a new international order, one based on mutual understanding and co-creation. This can be said without exaggeration. One highly authoritative proof is the resolution on the strengthening of international peace, security and international cooperation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which was passed by a consensus last November at the plenary meeting of the 44th session of the General Assembly at the initiative of the USSR and the USA.

The world community perceived it as veritable sensation, as a historic event. Indeed, the Soviet-American initiative is a landmark. Its importance lies in the fact that this was the first time in the 44-year history of the UN that the Soviet Union and the United States acted jointly on a highly important political matter. An act of this kind is a sign of the departure of the cold war from the UN and of the end to the UN rostrum being used for propaganda purposes. The stereotype according to which one side rejects the other's proposals offhand is going. It is not fortuitous that numerous other documents, among them two important international humanitarian conventions—on the rights of the child and on the fight against the hiring of mercenaries—were also adopted by a consensus at this session. Thus a workable prospect is opening up to enable the UN to engage in its foremost business of consolidating the system of international peace, security and cooperation, as is defined in its charter.

THE JOINT RESOLUTION pursues the goal of mobilising the efforts of UN member states in enhancing the organisation's role in the interdependent world and making it more effective. Of key importance is the appeal to augment practical efforts in ensuring peace and security in all aspects through cooperation. In other words, the UN member states declared unequivocally for security in the new world being ensured on a multifaceted, comprehensive basis and only through political means, i. e., by way of consultations and cooperation within the UN framework, in all its bodies without exception.

Proof of the timeliness of the introduction of such approaches in the UN was the extremely broad-based support rendered to the Soviet-American initiative, its co-authors consisting of another 41 states representing East, West, North and South.

This action is the result of a reassessment, from the standpoint of new thinking, of the long and difficult path which has been traversed by the world community in the postwar period. It is fully in accordance with the logic of current developments and Soviet-American and international relations, especially in the sphere of security and disarmament.

It is new political thinking that paved the way to the INF Treaty—the first agreement in history on the scrapping of two classes of nuclear weapons under strict international control. With the conclusion of this agreement the endeavour of disarmament was shifted to a practical dimension for the first time. The results of the Malta meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the USA make it possible to hope that the main provisions of a treaty on a 50-per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons will be agreed upon by as early as the next stage of their dialogue, in the latter half of June. Then, in the months to come, it could be prepared for signing. This year should also become the year of the attainment of accords at the Vienna talks on a reduction of conventional arms and armed forces. The UN is stepping up its efforts to ensure international security and disarmament.

The initiative of the Soviet Union to set up a comprehensive system of international security (CSIS) which was advanced conjointly with the other socialist countries three and a half years ago can be considered the point of departure for the application of new thinking in UN affairs. It was a synthesis of all the new elements that had appeared in socio-political thought in the nuclear-space age. In parallel with the UN discussion, the comprehensive security concept was specified and developed by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in his addresses to the UN in 1987 and 1988. In them he declared for the building of a new world with the emphasis on the authority and possibilities of the UN, which should be strengthened. In other words, the Soviet leader raised the issue of of the revitalisation of the UN.

The democratic, searching dialogue under way on CSIS has become a common endeavour of the entire international community over the past few years. Positive changes have taken place in the diplomacy of the USA in the UN with the arrival of the Bush administration, and initiatives and reciprocal actions have been stepped up in the area of elaborating joint accords. Thus, it has been possible to introduce a new direction, the "fifth basket"—transnational problems—into the Soviet-American dialogue. Consultations on UN activity began with the arrival of US Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton in Moscow in July 1989, and they have already become commonplace. A direct signal to the elaboration of a joint draft was given at the meeting in Washington last September between Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker. They agreed to take joint efforts to heighten the effectiveness of the UN. A mighty additional impetus was imparted to this effort in Wyoming.

In this fashion, the Soviet-American resolution on the strengthening of international peace, security and international cooperation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organisation was drafted on the basis of the joint efforts of the two great powers. It was their joint contribution to the consolidation of the UN and, therefore, their joint success. The latter is unprecedented since in the past all the USSR and the USA did in the UN was seek to outdo each other in wars of words. The initiative opens a new chapter in the annals of UN activities, and it is important that the USSR and the USA and all other states write it in co-authorship in the spirit of true partnership.

At the same time it can be said quite definitively that the Soviet CSIS initiative reached the initial goal which we set—to unfold above all broad democratic dialogue on the ways and principles for shaping a comprehensive security system in order to enhance the UN's role and

ultimately bring this dialogue to a common denominator. Which was done in a little over three years. If we take into account the fact that the cold war lasted over 40 years, this time span is marginal.

As a result, the UN today is going through a period of its renaissance. This point is made by all the member states and by the UN Secretary General. It can be said without false modesty that the rebirth of the UN is linked to a considerable extent with new political thinking of the USSR and with our practical moves in the international arena. This is just as correct as the fact that this rebirth would be impossible without the constructive contribution of the United States and all the other permanent members of the Security Council. Nor can one fail to underscore the important role here which has been played by the Non-Aligned Movement.

If we compare the CSIS proposal of the socialist countries to the resolution that has been adopted, differences immediately come to the fore in the wording. However, their essence and main provisions coincide on the whole. What point was at issue in our initiative? Above all, it was the need for states to pool efforts to shape an all-embracing security system. The need to strengthen a system of peace and security was also stated in the resolution. We had a tenet of a comprehensive approach. Now another expression has been found—a “multifaceted approach”, which is probably more precise. In other words, the essence remains unchanged, but the language is that which suits all the UN member states.

DURING THE DEBATES it proved possible to pinpoint areas of accord, and today they are entirely explicit. There are three of them: consolidation of the main UN bodies, enhancement of the system of UN peace-keeping operations; and a greater role for international law and the setting in motion of the International Court. The UN today is becoming what it should have been in the concept of its creators, i. e., a centre for coordinating actions by states on the basis of a balance of interests, not a place for fruitless ideologised debates leading the world nowhere.

Today such a centre is more necessary than ever before. The world is changing so rapidly that dangerous turns appear at times. Therefore, the globe cannot do without the UN, without its multilateral diplomacy and its collective experience. Some politicians, incidentally, argue, and not without justification, that during the cold war they had an easier time because even though the world was balancing on the brink of a “hot” war, it seemed, paradoxical as it may appear, more stable. Today the changes are particularly striking in Eastern and Central Europe, and tomorrow they may take place in any region, as it is not only in Berlin that the walls may begin to crumble. We need to think of the future. The resolution that has been approved is aimed precisely at this.

The Soviet Union and the United States, and all the UN member states for that matter, have comprehended the full acuity and importance of this turning point. Therefore, they declared for any changes in the world to take place within the framework of stability, without the danger of “rocking the boat”, of the established international ties being upset. They have reached the consensus that definite respect for the principles contained in the UN Charter should be the guarantor and orientation for this. That is, we must strictly follow the path which was verified as a result of a careful weighing of the balance of interests of all the countries working on the compilation of the charter when they indeed cooperated—in the years of the fight against a real, common threat—fascism.

Today no one doubts any longer that the time of world confrontation,

of cold war, has come to an end. The grand process of a thaw in normal human relations in international affairs has begun. Humanity is entering a new and stable peaceful period in which there should be no place even for the state of cold peace. It is here that the UN can and should at long last play, effectively, the role which was originally assigned to it.

The cold war did enormous damage to humanity. People became so accustomed to its state and image that some associated the end of the period of confrontation all but with the end of the world. In the United States there even appeared the theory of endism, i. e., the cessation of all common forms of living activity of society. Its adherents allege that the world is entering an "age of universal decay"—the end of history, philosophy, ideology, art, etc. The now fashionable American political scientist F. Fukuyama states that a global social hibernation is coming and that life will be boring.

It is hard to agree with such ideas. We think that, quite the contrary, everything is only beginning—truly life-giving, full-fledged (not declining or smacking of the decay of a possible rapid death tomorrow) history in which peace will be a permanent rather than a temporal state. It will come to be characterised by a fundamentally new quality—not merely the absence of periodically erupting wars and conflicts but growing socio-economic progress and broad development of the network of free and productive ties not only and not so much among states as among people.

This will not at all be a boring history, it will be a living, creative history of the immediate future. Instead of enmity and differences, statesmen and politicians of different countries will at long last be able to engage in a common difficult and much needed endeavour—the construction of a new world. It should be built on a qualitatively different foundation—not on the basis of military, including nuclear, deterrence, but on the basis of law-governed, transparent and verifiable restraint drawing on the authority and possibilities of the UN.

Nor can one fail to object to the contentions of those who are nostalgic about the cold war, alleging that it, which was characterised by ideological battles, was interesting and even exciting at times. As a direct participant in these clashes I can say authoritatively that from a professional, diplomatic standpoint, there was nothing interesting about them. They did not require particular brainpower, will or strength. All one needed was to formally carry out instructions or, from time to time, to come up with clever responses to an intelligent opponent.

Now the creative period that is starting, a period of cooperation and co-development, is precisely a veritable intellectual challenge to politicians and diplomats. Finding a common language, and especially a common denominator for resolving the highly acute problems facing humanity is an extremely complicated endeavour, one which cannot be compared to the simplistic schemes of relations in the cold war era. It requires intensive efforts and creative initiative on the part of the participants. And the ultimate goal—qualitatively changing the entire picture of the world on the basis of cooperation—cannot be compared to the once-dominant egoistic interests of individual countries and blocs.

The road to this goal is a long and difficult one, as it is always hard to adapt to new realities, approaches and thinking. And it is not all that easy to do away with inertia and the onus of the past, as they are too great and will still draw the world community backward. All this is graphically evident on the example of our domestic reforms, let alone international ones!


A GREAT DEAL HERE will continue to depend on our relations with the United States, on how rapidly they develop and how effective

they are. The way they are being structured of late is encouraging. A quite definite impression is being created that the USA is serious about cooperating with us and intends to comply with the accords reached and to proceed to new, more significant ones. The resolution that has been passed is one graphic illustration.

It would be fundamentally incorrect to regard it as some "classified" accord between the USSR and the USA which involves only their interests. It is not out of the realm of possibility that this apprehension can arise in a number of UN member countries. Many of them still remember all too well the times when the actions of Moscow and Washington, for example during the period of detente, were geared solely along bilateral lines.

Today things are completely different. The very fact that this resolution was tabled (even though it was somewhat unexpected for many) indicates that the USSR and the USA have scuttled this approach. Thus, another reason the joint action is important is that it symbolises the start of a qualitatively new stage in the activity of the USSR and the USA in the UN, a stage of parallel constructivism: now they are not counterpoising but blending Soviet-American dialogue into international dialogue.

It is also of no small importance that the resolution was tabled and unanimously supported in the UN on the eve of the Soviet-American summit off the shores of Malta. Obviously, it made its contribution to creating a favourable international background for a successful meeting. The Malta summit reaffirmed the need, and, most importantly, the possibility for coordinating the interests of states and made it possible to hold a frank and constructive exchange of views on virtually all international problems. We believe that the resolution will unquestionably promote the spread of the new positive impetus that was imparted at the top level to the activity of the UN and will contribute to the organisation's prestige and possibilities.



THE 44TH SESSION of the UN General Assembly is important in that the decisions taken at it are bringing back and enriching the true meaning of such universal categories as peace and security, disarmament, resolution of conflicts, human rights, and social justice. Such new notions as freedom of choice, economic consensus, and ecological rebirth are also coming into wide usage. All these categories directly affect the security level and the living standards of nations in our world. The logic of reason patently emerged victorious over the logic of national egoism at the session. There was a broader sphere of accord among states with regard to the central problems of the survival of humanity.

The session reaffirmed the stable international consensus pertaining to the aims of disarmament such as full elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, speedy elimination of chemical weapons, and reduction of conventional weapons. The realisation of the need for openness as one of the key components of new thinking and of trust, especially in the sphere of security, rose to a new height.

In order to affirm openness as a norm of military security, the Soviet Union took an unprecedented step—at a press conference on the results of the session on December 15, 1989, it made public for the first time the official figure regarding the Soviet military presence abroad. At present there are 627,500 servicemen there. It is to be hoped that this move will help everyone assess the actual picture and will promote the phased elimination of foreign presence on a global scale. By stating this figure,

THE SOFIA ECOFORUM: MUCH WORK AHEAD

THERE IS NO LONGER ANY NEED to argue that European security has a sizeable ecological dimension. That is why—in accordance with the Vienna Final Document—the states involved in the European process met for an environmental protection conference, the Sofia Ecoforum, in the Bulgarian capital from October 16 to November 3, 1989, to review past and present efforts in the field of averting and limiting the cross-border effects of industrial accidents, the handling of potentially dangerous chemical substances, and pollution of cross-border waterways and international lakes. It also studied possible further measures and cooperation, including better exchange of information.

What are the concrete results of the Sofia Ecoforum? The document it adopted recommends that the European Economic Commission should draw up an international convention, a code of practice and other relevant legal documents on preventing and limiting the cross-border effects of industrial accidents; that there should be international exchanges of information and coordination of efforts for the purpose of reaching closer agreements on the handling of potentially dangerous chemical substances; that the Economic Commission for Europe should draft a framework convention on the protection and use of cross-border waterways and international lakes; and that these recommendations should be implemented as soon as possible, considering that the results are to be assessed by the next session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which is to be held in Helsinki in 1992.

So the tasks have been formulated, and there is no reason to doubt that the signatories will try to fulfil them. But there is no doubt that the success of their joint efforts will depend primarily on how radically we shall be able to renew and restructure our thinking. Indeed, there is the need for a revolution in human minds. The article below, contributed by a prominent Soviet scientist and Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nature Conservation, deals with these problems.

NEW THINKING AS A NEW APPROACH TO NATURE

Nikolai VORONTSOV

FOR A VERY LONG TIME philosophical thinking in this and many other countries was dominated by the anthropocentric view that man is the centre of the Universe, "Nature's crowning achievement" (a view originating in many of the world religions, like Judaism and Christianity). This historically-rooted anthropocentrism was expressed at various levels of the human world outlook, from individual perception to government policy. Indeed, that was also the view of science as a whole: man was always placed at the summit of the "pyramid" of organic life. Over the long centuries, this view came to be accepted by all.

The anthropocentric approach is still with us. One need merely recall the recent slogans which were so neatly ingrained in our own mind: "Everything for man, everything for the sake of man, everything for the benefit of man!" But what is the meaning of "everything"? What are

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he limits to this "everything"? And for the sake of what man: only you and I, or you and I, and also our children and grandchildren? Will the coming generations have the same rights to living nature? What do we, generally speaking, have, and what are the resources that we can dispose of for our own "benefit"? Mankind is quite naturally and inevitably faced with these questions because of the long domination of anthropocentrism.

Once we have taken the biospheric approach, we begin to sense the need for new relations between human civilisation and Nature, but the way for this "insight" was paved earlier on. "Biosphere" is a term coined back in the 19th century by the Austrian scientist Eduard Suess, but it was in the late 1920s that the doctrine of the biosphere was coherently set forth by Vladimir Vernadsky, an outstanding compatriot of ours (whose lectures on the biosphere at the Sorbonne were first published in France and somewhat later in the USSR). The fact, incidentally, that we take pride in this first-ever is not an expression of misconceived patriotism, but an awareness of the great contribution made to world science by that Russian scientist which puts us under a great obligation.

Mankind entirely depends on the biosphere, and that is why it is altogether wrong to say "man and the biosphere", a point repeatedly made by my teacher Nikolai Timofeyev-Resovsky; it would be more correct to say, "the biosphere and mankind". We can keep changing living Nature, but its resources are far from boundless, they are strictly limited. In the past we used to criticise Thomas Malthus and Malthusianism in an off-hand manner. This doctrine does, indeed, deserve to be criticised, but Malthus himself, an outstanding demographer and thinker, had many sound ideas, among them the idea that natural resources were limited and finite.

Living Nature—a latter-day *peau de chagrin*—has been shrinking before our very eyes at a catastrophic speed, and the implication is that *we shall have to adopt the biospheric thinking in place of the anthropocentric thinking*. This is no simple matter, and it is even hard to appreciate, right away, its great complexity. It is the same as the remoulding—and a very painful remoulding!—of the social consciousness which it suffered when civilisation went over from Ptolemy's geocentric system to the heliocentric system of Copernicus. Even today there could be victims falling along this hard way, men of the stature of Giordano Bruno, and that is quite natural because we—both individuals and social classes—shall have to do a very great deal of rethinking. The mentality of the technocrats, which will be found in all the countries of the world, will have to be reshaped, just as the mentality of many people who appear to be influenced by the best sentiments but are in fact doing tremendous damage to mankind for the sake of short-lived, here-and-now advantages. Indeed, that is where we find the greatest social and political collisions. However, the reappraisal of global thinking as a whole and of its priorities is inescapable.

Most people know that life on the Earth originated 3,800 million years ago, while the Earth's crust appeared 100 million years earlier. These 100 million years between the formation of the Earth's crust and the origination of life on it, is no more than an instant on the time scale of the Earth's existence, while for the rest of the time—3.8 billion years—life has been inseparable from the history and destiny of the planet. Life has not simply had an influence on the face of the Earth; it has shaped it in many ways, so that the bulk of our resources have come down to us as something of a legacy from earlier biospheres. These seemingly inert "material resources" are the products of terrestrial life, and I am sure most of us remember the school lesson at which we learned that oil

consists of the remains of once-living organisms. The same applies to coal and peat.

However, far from everyone is aware that iron ore is made up of the products of the vital activity of living beings: iron bacteria or ferromanganese bacteria. The Krivoi Rog basin, the Kursk magnetic anomaly, the famous Mount Kiruna in Sweden, and our Magnitka in Chelyabinsk Region are all the products of the "work" by iron bacteria in earlier biospheres. Indeed, we know of very few fossil minerals which do not owe their existence to long-extinct organisms. It is perhaps common salt, potassium salt and nuclear fuel that are not of biogenic origin. (Nuclear fuel, incidentally, is still far from being our "daily bread", and on the scale of the world power-generation industry it is still no more than a light garnish and very much a thing of the future.) We have received all the rest, metaphorically speaking, from the hands of our ancestors, of our biological predecessors on the Earth.

I used the words "daily bread" in quotes, but that is not quite right if we bear in mind the substratum on which our daily bread is grown. I mean the black earth, chernozem soils. How old are they? The famous chernozems in the south of Russia and in the Ukraine, for instance, originated in the middle Pleistocene period, which means, roughly, 250,000-400,000 years ago. That is what our chernozems are, that is where our menu, our daily food comes from! It is taking the superficial view to assume that our daily bread "has grown today", in actual fact, it "has been growing" for that many years.

Now let us see how many years the chernozems have been in use (against the background of their ancient origins). With the exception of the periods in which they lay derelict (for reasons of various historical collisions, like the Tartar-Mongol invasion), the South Russian chernozems have been in solid use since no earlier than the mid-18th century. A mere 250 years. They have been in somewhat longer use in Moldavia, which was formerly known as Bessarabia, but all the same that is not much on the scale of thousands of years. Let us note that these are mighty chernozems a metre thick, and they are the ones we have already lost in many places: we have "eaten them up" or simply squandered away.

We have been losing our most fertile chernozem soils not only through wind erosion, as we habitually (or conveniently) tend to assume. When industrial plants eject a ton of sulphur onto a square kilometre of farmland every year, the properties of the soil will be substantially degraded, to put it mildly. It is assumed in the West that such soils are no longer fit for use. Now let us see where our chief producers of noxious waste are concentrated. It turns out that they are located on the world's mightiest chernozem soils: Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, the entire Donbass, and Mariupol. Indeed, the very names of these cities are associated in our minds with industry. The best soils in the world are buried under refuse dumps, slag heaps and similar other tail-end storages. How is that? We shall be trying to introduce new and more progressive methods of soil cultivation, ploughing across slopes, using the very gentlest of hardware, limiting the amounts of chemicals going into the soil, and so on, while poison will continue to be showered from above, whether we like it or not? And what do we stand to lose? We stand to lose—not to consume, but simply to lose!—a heritage that is 250,000-400,000 years old.

Take our Nonchernozem Area, the modest podzol. Its fertility is far from remarkable, but it has fed and continues to feed many people. This podzol began to take shape when the last glacier disappeared roughly 16,000-18,000 years ago, but these modest and less-than-rich soils are still older than the most ancient civilisations. Consider this for the sake

of comparison: 17,000 years is the age of the drawings by paleolithic man on the walls of Cave Lascaux in France, and 15,000 years is the age of the Altamira drawings in Spain... People still lived in caves when the humus of today's soil in the Nonchernozem Area began to build up.

It has long since been driven home to us that the Earth's mineral resources are depletable and nonrenewable. But let us take that which many believe to this day to be immense. What age is the air we breathe? Has anyone ever thought about this? We are, perhaps, doing so for the first time just now, when we have begun to speak of the ozone. Scientists have established that the ozone layer originated in the middle Paleozoic period, i. e., roughly 400,000-350,000 million years ago. Only with the emergence of ozone were the conditions created for life to crawl out of the water and onto dry land. We say that life originated 3.8 billion years ago, and what was it doing all that time until the middle of the Paleozoic period? It was hiding down in the water from the excessive solar radiation. We, mankind, could not have originated without the ozone filter. The destruction of the ozone layer is entirely an "achievement" of the past few years, and here we have no one but ourselves to blame. Incidentally, modern oxygen, i. e., the molecules we inhale today, began to form 2,000-3,000 years ago. Roughly speaking, we are now enjoying the legacy handed down to us from the time of Ancient Rome.

It is common knowledge that oxygen has always been expended in oxidation processes. But how do things stand with the photosynthetic processes of carbon dioxide accumulation and deoxidation nowadays, in the presence of the mighty technogenic and chemical pressure on Nature, and the sharply increased consumption of oxygen in the burning of fuel? One hectare of urban parkland tends to reduce its photosynthesising activity by a factor of four because of its contamination (mainly with lead), as compared with a hectare of clean parkland or forest. Roughly speaking, the same green area in Leningrad and in Peterhof is far from the same thing in terms of the volume of purified oxygen. Do we all understand this? I am afraid we do not. For some reason we seem to think that it is quite enough to have a hectare with a planting of tiny saplings in place of a hectare of felled trees. That is regarded as being sufficient for paying our debts to the biosphere. But is it right to compare the photosynthesising activity of a fully mature stand of trees and a sprinkling of saplings?

Oxygen has a twofold origin, it is the result of the vital activity of green plants on land, on the one hand, and of the phytoplankton of the World Ocean, on the other. While the biomass (i. e., the sum-total of organisms) on land is greater than the biomass of marine organisms, phytoplankton has a very high rate of turnover, i. e., of bioproductivity. Besides, it appears to be truly inexhaustible, but the trouble is that a film of oil is now spreading across the ocean at a disastrous speed. As a result, first, phytoplankton has here and there simply been destroyed and, second, even if it has managed to survive, the oxygen it produces has no outlet into the atmosphere and is wasted on oxidation processes in the water.

It is true that for the time being we do not feel any lack of oxygen, but only "for the time being". We shall be confronted with an oxygen shortage as well if we do not duly assess our place in biospheric processes and will go on disrupting them.

In short, it is high time for us to take a fresh look at our forests: not only from the angle of the timber they yield, but also of their purifying and photosynthesising capacity. Up to now, man has taken much too narrow a view of his "green friend", whether from the standpoint of forest use on the national scale or the everyday attitude to the "nasty" poplar under the window with its irritating flying fluff. If we were able

to take all things into consideration, we would have a different sense of the "usefulness" or "uselessness" of this or that natural object. Such a biospheric approach could, perhaps, make us even now reappraise the whole practice of reafforestation: after all, we have up to now laid emphasis on the species which yield timber, but we could very well have both timber (if somewhat worse and cheaper) and "free" oxygen. In Sweden, for instance, the asp is not at all regarded as a weedy tree; it is specially planted, and not only as the source of raw material for the famous Swedish matches, but also as a species which takes a short time to restore itself. It is true that their asp is of a different, specially bred triploid species, but are we forbidden to have it as well?

I have cited these examples to illustrate the different value systems. Once we have given up the anthropocentric slogan "everything for the benefit of man", we shall hardly find anything in nature that is of little value, that is useless, and that does not pay. Everything is necessary and everything is useful.

LET US GO BACK to square one, to thinking.

The technocratic approach has been dominant for long years in our country, as it has throughout the world. It originated as a variant in the development of anthropocentric thinking. It seemed that man would become even stronger and would have an even better life if he were equipped with a vast array of machines, great amounts of energy, and so on. This ideology originated mainly in Germany and then in the United States at the beginning of the century. Let us look at the canvases of German artists in the 1910s-1920s: stacks belching smoke, great heaps of coal, and other industrial landscapes. And what about our own placards of that period, our ecstasies over the smoke stacks, which nowadays no longer delight anyone, and which clearly spoil the scenery in the very heart of Moscow?

What is technocracy's point of departure? Here is a classical example of its approach to economics. Take the ores of Krivoi Rog, and the Donetsk coal basin nearby. Ore and coal are a very happy combination. Everything is close at hand, the transport arm is short, and it stands to logic that a metallurgical combine should be built at Krivoi Rog, and then also at Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, and so on. Everything is convenient: even the railway wagons are not run back empty: iron ore up there, coal down here. This is a textbook example of the successful location of production sites. There is no gainsaying that it is clever and rational. But then it "suddenly" turns out that there are 1.3 million tons of noxious emissions in Krivoi Rog every year, and that the entire district is on the threshold of an ecological disaster. A large area of land has been degraded, and not only that which is under the spoil heaps, but also that which has been ruined by vast quantities of pollutants.

The Urals-Kuznetsk complex—the ores of Magnitogorsk and the coals of Kuzbass—was built during the first five-year plan period on the same principle. Or, say, the Vorkuta-Cherepovets complex. We find the same approach almost everywhere, but the trouble is that it never seems to occur to anyone to ask: what is the ecological capacity of the region? (I myself never tire of stressing the importance of this concept.) What is more, life goes on and we now have to consider the socio-ecological capacity of this or that locality, because this question ever more frequently arises: how much can man really stand? We now no longer discuss the whole of Nature itself, but ever more frequently that part of it which is man.

How have we tried to solve these difficult problems? Take the most alarming situation in Bashkiria, of which even our technocrats have be-

me aware. But how have they tried to combat it? They began by trying to fragment the one problem of the region's ecology into several parts, if that will make it simpler to solve. They have proposed separate efforts to solve the problem of Salavat, the problem of Ishimbai, the problem of Blagoveshchensk near Ufa, and so on. But it turns out that while the situation appears to be tolerable in each concrete locality, the people have continued to riot. Why?

We at the USSR State Committee for Nature Conservation have been receiving a mass of letters from citizens, letters which are a cry for our help. We received 5,000 letters in 1989 alone, and there is a clear trend for the number to grow. And the fact is that if we superimpose the geography of this alarming mail on the ecological map—the two will coincide. One could not have expected anything else. People see and feel the surroundings in which they live. They are no longer convinced by the figures of investments for improving the environment in this or that city, especially since the amounts always fall short of needs, and the available investments into environmental protection and the building of purification facilities are not being used up. Western economists had a good reason for this formula of theirs: small appropriations—money down the drain. They do not yield any results and merely create a semblance of action. We adopted the technocratic approach after the others did, and we were confronted with its wastefulness after they were. But the result is there for everyone to see.

It is not right, of course, to reduce the entire problem of anthropogenic influence on Nature to pollution alone, because the influence is, alas, much too diverse.

It is perfectly obvious to us, biologists, that the stability of ecosystems is directly connected with (and is even determined by) the variety of species. The larger the number of species, the more stable is the ecosystem. The rain forest, for instance, is an exceptionally stable ecosystem precisely because of its great diversity: the biocenosis of the rain forest consists of thousands of species. Let us compare two pictures: the illustrations in the children's story of Mowgli, with lianas entwining the ruins of a temple—in something like a hundred years the jungle had quite covered up what used to be a human settlement. And the other picture: a cross-country vehicle once made its way across the tundra, and its tracks are still visible 20 years later, and that in the best case, i. e., if no thermal karst scars have appeared. Let us translate the latter situation into the language of ecology: the biocenosis of the tundra is extremely vulnerable and unstable because it consists of a small number of species.

Is it always a good thing for biocenosis to consist of the largest possible number of species? After all, if one reasons from the habitual—anthropocentric—standpoint, it stands to reason that the more there is, the thicker it is on the ground, and the more productive it is, the better for man. A large harvest could be reaped, for instance. But that is the superficial, shortsighted, human view, which it is altogether wrong to adopt as a reference point. Whenever this view gains the upper hand, we have a Pyrrhic victory, and our Lake Baikal offers an example (and a very eloquent one at that).

Baikal is unrivalled in its species mix, but it is, in fact, a "poor" one. To be more precise, it is strong and rich just because it has a relatively small number of species, roughly 2240, which is not much at all. It is what is known as an oligotrophic body of water (the Greek *oligo-* means few, and *-trophos*, nourishing), that is, it is a body of water with low productivity. But it is these 2240 species of animals and plants that make Baikal what it is, and that make it so valuable. They purify Baikal from all the admixtures brought in by the 336 rivers and rivulets

which flow into the lake. They filter, consume, and digest immense quantities of suspensions, slime and dead organisms, producing a unique lake containing about 20 per cent of the world's fresh water stock and over 80 per cent of the fresh water stock of the Soviet Union. That is what makes Baikal an asset not only for our country, but for the globe as a whole.

The purity of the Baikal waters is an entirely biogenic process, and if one ponders this fact, one will come to see why Siberia's best scientists—M. A. Lavrentyev, A. A. Trofimuk, M. M. Kozhov, and G. I. Galazy—were so vehemently opposed to the construction of the Baikal pulp-and-paper combine, and the Selenga cardboard combine. Science was not heeded, or rather, an ear was lent to those of its "representatives" who toadied to the authorities. As a result, the country was plunged into losses running to billions of rubles. So what, technocrats said, if minute bits of lignin get into the water? After all, it's not acid, not petrol, not phenol (although the effluence turned out to contain dozens of noxious compounds). That is quite true, but additional organic elements—remarkable feed for micro-organisms—make their way into Baikal, so raising its bioproductivity, and that spells disaster. Baikal, an oligotrophic lake, could be turned into a eutrophic lake, i. e. a flowering body of water. And what is that? Well, it could be a pond. A pond is, of course, a good thing and is useful in its own way. But Baikal must never be turned into a pond, for then we would stand to lose this unique lake.

Similar processes are, incidentally, in evidence at the Bratsk and Ust-Ilim water reservoirs on the Angara River. Dams have been built and stands of forest inundated on the Angara, whose waters once used to be purely itself. What are the results? First, the content of organic elements in the water has increased; second, the water in the reservoirs has begun to warm up. That is all one needs for eutrophication, even if there is no additional intake of phosphorus and nitrogen. These waters once used to abound in grayling and sig of the salmon species, but these species are now giving way to pike and perch, and the prospect is that they will be populated entirely by crucian. Are we then to hold on to our anthropocentric notions? They do suggest, after all, that the "best" and most useful body of water is the pond, muddied and swarming with frogs and duckweed. From that standpoint, Baikal should altogether be regarded as a quirk of Nature.

I must note at this point that we owe much—both of the good and of the bad—to history. I mentioned earlier an outstanding achievement of Russian science, Vernadsky's conception of the biosphere, but this should not make us forget about another unique asset of ours, notably, the approaches to the protection of remarkable monuments of Nature like Baikal. After all, we must also recall that our country has the priority in creating a scientific system of nature reserves. A great contribution to elaborating the idea of specially protected territories was made by the founder of soil science V. V. Dokuchayev, the botanists I. K. Pachosky and I. P. Borodin, and the naturalist F. E. Falz-Fein (the founder of Askania-Nova). In the early years of this century, we were among the first countries in the world to set up nature reserves, among them Moritzsala in Latvia (1911), Lagodekhi in Georgia (1912), Barguzin on the Baikal, and Kedrovaya Pad (cedar hollow) in the Far East (1916).

In 1919, Lenin signed decrees to establish the Astrakhan reserve, and in 1920, the Ilmen reserve in the Southern Urals. A Committee on Nature Reserves was set up, and it was headed by P. G. Smidovich, an associate of Lenin's. He and his closest assistant, V. N. Makarov, started a discussion of projects to set up a network of reserves and invited outstanding specialists to take part, among them such prominent scientists as A. P. Semyonov-Tyanshansky, G. A. Kozhevnikov, S. I. Ognev,

A. N. Formozov, and V. N. Sukachev. In the 1920s and 1930, Soviet ecology was developing up to an exceptionally high standard.

In 1948, however, Lysenko's high-handed and criminal campaign led to the rout of the whole of our biology, including ecology. In 1951, the entire reservation system in the country was destroyed, and the reserves were dismantled under the impact of Lysenko's ideology ("Who do we want to protect nature from? From Soviet man?"). Meanwhile, in the 1950s there was evidence of a very important change of reference points in the consciousness of the world, for it was becoming clear that mankind's prosperity is not determined by the tons of smelted steel or the barrels of extracted oil, but by something else, in particular, a sound environment.

WE ALL AGREE BY NOW, I hope, that the biosphere is an "empire", one and indivisible, so that state borders should have nothing to do with ecology. It is not worth even talking about preserving the biosphere without international cooperation. One can, of course, preserve separate, "museum" pieces of it, but it is a whole organism, which means that no part of it can be healthy unless the whole is healthy.

That is why all countries should be concerned about its resources, including those which are of global importance even if they are within the ambit of individual states. Such, for instance, are the rain forests, which, in effect, belong to the planet, to the biosphere, and not to individual countries like India, Burma (Myanmar), Vietnam, Brazil and Zaire. But we must also try to understand Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and the countries of Tropical Africa and Southeast Asia which are forced to use these forests because they are their raw materials, and they live by "utilising" them. What then is to be done? No one has a ready-made answer, and I have none either, but I think that we who live on this globe must sooner or later realise that the so-called less developed countries must receive from the world community as a whole some sort of compensation for that which they are preserving, for instance, for the tropical rain forests, which are a common world resource.

Many industrialised countries essentially live at the expense of the tropical forests, at the expense of the photosynthesis proceeding in other countries, but it does not occur to them to ponder the fact. The developed countries pollute the environment, consume the oxygen, produce carbon dioxide and similar other things—but, in contrast to many other resources, receive the oxygen free of charge. But why should that be so? After all, they have to pay for their oil, their coal and other resources, and for the use of the territory of another state.

It would be no more than fair to set up a world fund made up of contributions by oxygen-consuming states so that the oxygen-producing states would find that they were making a profit, instead of a loss, on its production. It would then be just as profitable to "sell" oxygen as to sell timber. Otherwise the owners of the tropics will simply find themselves in a set of conditions in which they will have to destroy this invaluable world resource. Not all the countries may possibly have to make proportional payments of such a "tax". Well, say, our country could be released from a part of the payments because it, too, produces oxygen on its territory (provided, of course, that we shall take care to preserve our forest zone).

However, I have to admit that this idea is no more than a future reference point. We are not yet able just now to come close to such a mutual settlement of accounts, if only because there is a need for complex studies, for information which we now lack, and for a lot of very

fine computing. There is a need for large-scale research to know exactly who produces and consumes what and how much, and similar things. But now is the time to start thinking about this problem and discussing it.

There is a problem, however, which cannot be deferred until tomorrow, for we are worried just now about the tremendous danger of cross-border pollution transfer. In our Northern Hemisphere the transfer is mainly from West to East, which means that we are getting more of the stuff from our neighbours. But we, too, have an influence on other countries, for it has now transpired that the emissions of the Norilsk metallurgical combine reach Canada. But on the whole the picture is as follows: our Baltic area receives large quantities both of acid rains and solid precipitations from the Scandinavian countries, and Byelorussia, from Central Europe. Can these problems be solved without a system of bilateral treaties?

I recently visited Hungary, where we signed a bilateral environmental protection agreement. It is a pleasure to note that the Hungarians gave us our due with respect to our observance of the agreement on the Tisza, a river which has its source in the Carpathian area and then goes on through various whimsical loops, crossing and recrossing the state border again and again. The Hungarians have recognised that we have kept to our part of the Tisza agreement without fail, and it is a recognition that it is a great pleasure to hear. But at this point I found myself thinking that we were much too ready to rejoice in foreign policy over local phenomena and to take a purely regional approach. However, the fact is that regional and bilateral frameworks already objectively tend to become too small and narrow.

Take the Danube Convention, which is undoubtedly what might be called a "positive fact". It is also satisfying that there is to be a meeting of the Black Sea countries with the participation of Bulgaria, Romania, the USSR and Turkey. But the problems of the Black Sea cannot be solved without the problems of the Danube, and its pollution does not depend on the countries round the Black Sea alone, but also on Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the FRG, Yugoslavia, and Austria, which are not formally ranked among the Black Sea countries, but which, in effect, exert an influence on the Black Sea as well—indirectly, via the Danube. What we need is a Danube-Black Sea convention, and not a separate convention on the Danube and another on the Black Sea.

Within the memory of my generation alone, the level of hydrogen sulphate in the Black Sea has risen from a depth of 200 metres up to 80-70 metres; 70-75 per cent of all the industrial and other dirty effluence from which the Black Sea suffers comes from the Danube, and less than 30 per cent, from the Dnieper and the Don. We find that we, too, are guilty towards the Black Sea, for many problems are linked to the Seversky Donets and the Dnieper. These problems were sharply aggravated after Chernobyl, because radionuclides sink down and settle on the silts of the Dnieper water reservoirs. But how can we make our ministries unilaterally reduce their injection of waste into the Dnieper, the Dniester and the Don at a tremendous cost when it is quite obvious to those who release our dirty effluence that the bulk of the "slops" comes from the Danube? This means that we shall be unable to solve this problem in our country unless it is also solved in the Danubian countries. In other words, there is a need for an international agreement.

Here is another example. The Mediterranean countries are due to meet on Majorca in the summer of 1990, and Turkey will be the only Black Sea country to attend this meeting. However, our Black Sea is essentially a bay of the Mediterranean. How can one hope, one may well ask, to solve the problems of the "big" sea, while ignoring the problems of the "small" sea? After all, it will not take too long for the hydrogen

sulphate layer to spill over the Bosphorus threshold. Besides, is it right to forget that our navy cannot help using the Mediterranean? And the problems of its pollution also depend, in particular, on the Danubian countries, which have no outlet to the sea.

That is the way one thing clings to another in a universal connection.

We are now concluding a large number of bilateral agreements, and like any other mutual understanding they cannot but be a source of satisfaction. But I myself am worried by the fact that in some cases these understandings are not specific, i. e., the "high contracting parties", having reached a similar view of the problems, record the fact and declare a number of agreed propositions. Still, each of the two countries, after all, will always have some problems that are undoubtedly common and proper to them alone, and so are of specific interest to them. In this context, I recall my meeting with Mr Giorgio Ruffolo, Italy's Minister of the Environment. (I see that many of the ideas we expressed in the course of our conversation seem to have been elaborated in the course of Gorbachev's visit to Italy as on cooperation in environment protection).

At first, our Italian colleagues failed to see any specific ecological problems that made our two countries kin. Italy is the historical, cultural, and geographical centre of the Mediterranean. But where does it end? After all, the concept of "Mediterranean flora and fauna" includes our own Crimea, and the whole of our Transcaucasia, and the South Caspian area, and even the mountains in the south of Central Asia. And if Italy, while being the centre of the Mediterranean flora and fauna, seeks to preserve the corresponding genetic stock, this problem can be successfully solved only in the whole of the Mediterranean region, including our own territories which have just been listed.

Another specific problem is that of "their" Venetian lagoon and its comparison with our delta of the Danube, the Volga or the Neva inlet. Do not all these evidently present some common problems?

The third problem which suggests itself for joint consideration is that of the small mountain rivers. But they are "small" only in our own context, for ours is a large country, and for us all the Italian rivers may appear to be small, although the Italians may take a different view. In Italy there are a great many rivers, like the Tibre, which flow down from the mountains and empty into the sea, but which are very short indeed by our own yardstick: a couple of hundred kilometres. Along the banks of these "small" rivers are located industrial plants emptying their waste into these rivers, which means also into the sea. We, too, have such Italian-type rivers which flow from the Caucasus into the Black Sea, and the biggest of them is the Rioni. The principles for purifying and protecting these short mountain streams have been worked out in Italy much better than they have in our country, and this is the specific interest, therefore, that we could have in Italian experience.

Let us note that I have specially turned to the experience of Italy as a country with which ours appears to have very little in common, and with which we do not even have any common borders, but this example gives a more visual picture of how much neighbouring countries may have in common—the specifically common! Specific problems, incidentally, were also in the focus when the Soviet-Swiss bilateral agreement was in preparation. It was signed on November 24, 1989 and provides for the protection of Arctic-Alpine ecosystems—the tundra, the Caucasus, Tien Shan, the Altai and the Swiss Alps as well as mountain lake ecosystems such as the Geneva Lake, Bodensee, Lago Maggiore in Switzerland and Lake Baikal, Sevan, Issyk-Kul, Teletskoye in the Soviet Union. Along with this there are plans for cooperation in protecting the air and waters.

Specific kinship may relate not only to what could be called "biogenic" problems, but also, for instance, to problems in the management

and location of the productive forces. The FRG, incidentally, has some highly interesting experience in the management of the economy in its interaction with the environment. Just how similar the problems are in the Ruhr and in the Donetsk basin does not, I think, require any demonstration, the only difference being that the FRG, in contrast to us, has come much closer to solving its problems in the Ruhr basin, where, recent reports say, the air and water are becoming cleaner. The pollution of the North Sea and the Baltic Sea also presents similar problems. The FRG has gained much experience in ecological education and propaganda. Suffice it to say that special literature is being published in the FRG for various strata of the population: children, housewives, managers, etc.

We find, therefore, that the ecological interdependence of states in densely populated and industrialised Europe is most glaring. For modern Europe, ecological problems are becoming as important as disarmament problems. Concern for the proper state of the ecology, for human health, for pure air and water are increasingly becoming a common cause for all the European countries. Countries in the region have been invigorating their cooperation in these problems both on a multilateral and a bilateral basis. More and more spheres of activity in individual countries are becoming the objects of regulation in international law. People are uniting to tackle ecological problems, whose supranational character makes people work closely together and helps to build a common European home. An important role in coordinating such cooperation belongs, in the first place, to the Economic Commission for Europe, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.

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HOW WOULD WE DEFINE our ecological policy? It will above all rest on science, and science is by its very nature international. For us, glasnost implies ecological glasnost, which in our country, regrettably, still lags behind political glasnost.

Indeed, if we have already managed to agree on mutual control over disarmament, if military controllers have been paying visits to testing grounds and other installations of the opposed military blocs, *why should we not take the way of mutual ecological control?* We put forward such a proposal at the above-mentioned Sofia Ecoforum, and our proposal drew the interest of delegations from many countries. We could propose, for a start, mutual inspections of the biospheric reservations from 1990 on, and of ordinary reserves and national parks from 1991 on, so as to advance to mutual ecological control of all the objects from 1992 on. Such control would heighten mutual trust and promote the use of new, ecologically clean technologies.

The first few steps have already been taken towards ecological glasnost as well. The first national report on the state of the natural environment in the USSR has been drawn up for 1988.

What then is our order of priorities? Our point of departure is the following: mankind is a part of the biosphere; the biosphere knows no borders; we must abandon the technocratic thinking and recognise the priority of ecology over the economy; we must introduce the concept of a territory's ecological capacity as a condition for ecological security. This concept should, of course, be elaborated in real terms, all the way to the relevant formulas, depending on the territories and their ecosystems.

Foreign-Policy Making in Washington

Hedrick SMITH

THE OTHER FOREIGN POLICY GAME: END RUNS AND BACK CHANNELS

AS REVELATIONS of President Reagan's secret arms deals with Iran and of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's diversion of Iranian funds to Nicaraguan *contras* burst upon the country in November 1986, the public reacted with dismay. How could this policy cabal have happened? How could Secretary of State Shultz be so ignorant and uninvolved? How could Defense Secretary Weinberger be so opposed and distant? What murky figures were running American foreign policy? Had the system run amok?

Three months later, former Senator John Tower, head of President Reagan's special review board, called the Iran-*contra* operation "an aberration."

In one sense Tower was correct. The Iran-*contra* conspirators, as some later said, regarded themselves as above the law or the normal channels of decision. As a covert operation in fund-raising, cowboy diplomacy, gunrunning dummy businesses, and conniving with foreign arms dealers to conceal Reagan's policies and to escape congressional law and accountability, it was an aberration for the American system.

Reagan pushed the NSC staff into covert operations, using it as his personal CIA. That raised echoes of Nixon's "plumbers"—an extralegal investigative staff unit subsidized by taxpayers but unknown to Congress. The deviation from the norm lay in the monumental deception of Reagan's declaring one policy toward Iran and following the opposite; his administration's defiance of a congressional ban on funding and arming the Nicaraguan *contras*, and the conspiracy to cover up policy through phony scenarios, false testimony, and shredding incriminating documents.

But in another sense Tower was wrong. As an example in how foreign policy can be made in secret by a small clique, short-circuiting the normal process of decision making, the Iran-*contra* affair was not an aberration. It was a case study in the "other foreign policy game"—the opposite of tribal warfare—the game of end runs and back-channels.

Part of the shock to the public of the Iran-*contra* operation was that it boldly stripped away the institutional formalities of cabinet government and exposed the great power of the national security staff. But there were precedents in Reagan's presidency for bypassing the regular policy apparatus, policy-making in secret by a small cabal, keeping most of government in the dark—not to mention Congress and the public.

At least two years before the Iran-*contra* operation began, Reagan had used his vest-pocket State Department—a small group of national security aides—to hatch one of his most important policy initiatives. In

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that vital sense, the Iranian operation was not unique. There is a parallel between the way it was run and the way Reagan generated his Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) in 1983.

SDI was hatched in conspiratorial urgency by the NSC staff and sprung on other top policymakers too late for serious debate. Like the Iran-*contra* operation, SDI was kept secret from internal critics for fear their resistance would kill it. Indeed, several high-ranking advisers were so taken aback by Reagan's utopian notions that they tried to stop him from giving his famous Star Wars speech. But just as Reagan intended, they were too late. Stealth enabled Reagan to proclaim policy suddenly before dissent could coalesce and then to force skeptical advisers into line.

Actually, the genealogy of Oliver North's rambunctious staff activism can be traced back to the Lone Ranger diplomacy of Henry Kissinger. There were conscious parallels between Kissinger's operations and those of Reagan's aides. Kissinger was a role model for Bud McFarlane, a principal architect of both Star Wars and Reagan's Iranian operation. McFarlane had worked on Kissinger's staff from 1973 to 1975, and he nursed a driving ambition to prove himself a new Kissinger by forging some stunning stroke of policy and by Kissinger-style personal diplomacy.

Well-publicized clashes between secretaries of State and Defense in several administrations obscure the fact that in the past quarter century, secretaries of State have lost less power to rivals in the Pentagon than to ambitious national security advisers. Since President Kennedy, national security advisers have moved into the terrain of the secretary of State and sometimes usurped his role as chief architect and manager of foreign policy, even as chief diplomat.

THE PRIMACY OF THE NSC STAFF

SOMEWHAT DISINGENUOUSLY, given his aggressive activism as national security adviser, Henry Kissinger wrote later that the president should make the secretary of State his principal foreign policy adviser and restrict his national security adviser to a coordinating role.

The power dynamic is natural enough. Presidents see their staffs, domestic or foreign policy, as extensions of themselves, whereas they look at cabinet secretaries and departments as sometimes difficult allies or even liabilities and nuisances. Proximity is one key reason. Top White House staffers orbit constantly around a president; cabinet secretaries have their own orbit. The senior White House staff, including the national security adviser, live with the President. They are constantly in and out of the Oval Office or on the phone with the president. They know his views, feel his triumphs, share his frustrations, read his moods, sense when to make a pitch and when to leave him alone.

The national security staff, as part of the White House apparatus, is more alert to the president's political interests than is the State Department—more sensitive to his itch for political theater. National security aides are more prone than are career diplomats to think of the domestic payoff of a foreign policy spectacular (summitry, a hostage release) or to weigh the domestic downside of a policy line (arms for moderate Arab states).

Presidents from Kennedy to Reagan have felt State Department careerists were too prone to treat foreign countries as their clients. Presidents get impatient with State's resistance to radical change, its stress on patient diplomacy, accommodation, and pursuit of long-term interests. From a presidential point of view, State is too nonpolitical and too frequently the bearer of bad news. Presidents resent the expertise of career diplomats when they challenge the presidential view of reality. As George Shultz learned with Reagan on Iran, the naysaying of diplomacy

is a necessary check on presidential impulses, but it makes a secretary of State unpopular at the White House.

In the game of bureaucratic warfare, the national security staff has great advantages over the State Department. Proximity gives it constant contact with the president, presence in almost all high-level meetings, the chance to put in the last word with the boss.

Modern technology has robbed the State Department—and the Pentagon—of important advantages in the power game. The two departments used to have exclusive global communications networks to American embassies or forces abroad. But in recent years, the White House has gained the technical capability to bypass State or Defense electronically. Its Situation Room has links to a worldwide network that lets the president get in touch with any leader in any country instantaneously. His national security staff can read the incoming electronic mail from around the globe and contact any embassy or CIA operation without ever informing State or CIA headquarters, as Oliver North often did. That means the White House can step into any issue at any time in any place.

Finally, the urge of modern Presidents to engage in personal diplomacy—summit meetings, personal visits, and a flow of private correspondence with kings and prime ministers everywhere—has enlarged the domain of national security advisers and pushed them into operational activism. They leave State the routine diplomacy, but they pull the most urgent business into the White House.

What is remarkable—and significant—is that the national security job vaulted back to preeminence under Bill Clark, who had no experience in foreign affairs except one year as number two to Alexander Haig at the State Department.

Within a few months he became the most influential foreign policy figure in Reagan's entourage. Clark engineered Haig's ouster and brought in Shultz. He pushed Reagan to center stage on foreign policy and encouraged Reagan's hard line. Later, leaving Shultz in ignorance, he prodded Reagan to make his strategic defense proposal. In 1983, Clark sent U. N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick to Central America to craft a more aggressive regional policy. Then with Weinberger, he persuaded the president to approve a huge American show of force in Central America, again with Shultz in the dark. Although State coveted the role of managing arms negotiations, Clark drew that function to himself and even toyed with setting up his own diplomatic back channel to the Kremlin.

Clark's activism demonstrated that power gravitates to the center of the administration. Even an admitted amateur such as Clark is quickly tempted to exercise broad authority in the president's name, consulting whom he will and ignoring others.

SDI: SHORT-CIRCUITING THE SYSTEM

PRESIDENT REAGAN UNVEILED his Strategic Defense Initiative on March 23, 1983—intending it as a radical departure from the doctrine of nuclear deterrence by which this country had been defended since World War II. SDI marked a far more momentous shift of policy than many issues which were thrashed out for months and years in the National Security Council. Yet not a single NSC meeting was called to discuss SDI before Reagan unveiled it.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, though they had urged more research on defenses, were so shocked at what Reagan and his staff had done with their ideas that their chairman, General John W. Vessey, recommended that Reagan not give his famous Star Wars speech. Three military Chiefs told me they were stunned by how fast Reagan moved and how he had

overstated their ideas. They had expected a serious study before the president announced a shift in policy. Secretary Shultz fearing repercussions among NATO allies, also tried in vain to stop the speech, as did Richard Perle, then the Pentagon's top civilian thinker on arms issues. But suggestions to delay were brushed aside by the president and National Security Adviser Clark.

On July 31, 1979, during a visit to the North American Defense Command, near Colorado Springs, Colorado, in the end of an all-day tour, Reagan and a domestic policy aide, Martin Anderson, were briefed on America's early-warning radar system by General James Hill, the Norad commander. Obviously thinking ahead, Reagan turned to the dilemma of a president once a Soviet attack was launched. "The policy options he would have would be to press the button or do nothing," Reagan said starkly: "They're both bad. We should have something in the way of defending ourselves against nuclear missiles."

Within weeks, Anderson drafted a ten-page memo proposing that Reagan, as a candidate, come out for developing a "protective missile defense system." Reagan liked the concept but his top political handlers, John Sears and Michael Deaver, vetoed the proposal as political suicide, fearing such talk would add to jitters that Reagan was a warmonger.

After his election, Reagan was lobbied on strategic defenses by Edward Teller, a nuclear physicist who helped develop the U. S. hydrogen bomb, and by some of Reagan's "Kitchen Cabinet" and millionaire conservative financial backers (among them, Joseph Coors, the brewery owner, and Karl R. Bendelsen, a former Army undersecretary and later chairman of the Champion International Corporation).

What really put strategic defenses on Reagan's agenda was the House vote in December 1982 blocking funds for the MX missile. That vote stymied Reagan and, according to aides, drove home to him how difficult it would be to get funds to continue a major buildup of offensive land-based missiles.

Politically, diplomatically, and militarily, Reagan needed a bold stroke to escape his stalemate and put life back into his foreign policy game. Clark saw that and favored doing something on defense, but he lacked specific knowledge. Within the NSC apparatus, Bud McFarlane became Reagan's idea man, and he put together the pieces on defense operating secretly.

Back in January 1983, McFarlane watched in dismay as Reagan's defense consensus crumbled—beset by opposition in Congress, torn by internal disagreements on the MX missile among the Joint Chiefs, under fire from the nuclear freeze movement and the Catholic bishops' berating the immorality of nuclear deterrence. Actually, the administration was pushing ahead with Trident submarines and their new eight-warhead missiles, with new Stealth strategic bombers and modernized cruise missiles. But Reagan talked incessantly about trailing Moscow in land-based ballistics missiles, as if no other weapons system mattered.

McFarlane feared the United States could not match two new Soviet ICBMs (the single-warhead SS-25 and the ten-warhead SS-24) because both were mobile missiles and Moscow had such vast territory for hiding them. "The traditional concept of offensive deterrence was becoming less stable," McFarlane believed, "so defense was conceptually an answer"—offering some protection for America's vulnerable deterrent forces. Moreover, McFarlane reasoned that the Russians feared a technological race with the United States on defenses. Finally and "most compelling," he later told me, SDI offered "something which would leverage the Russians" to make concessions in arms negotiations.

But it is an axiom of the foreign policy game that every major weapon system requires endorsement from the top military hierarchy. McFarlane

worked "back channels" to fish for Pentagon support. Through Rear Admiral John Poindexter, then number three on the national security staff, MsFarlane found a willing ally in Admiral James Watkins, chief of naval operations.

On February 11, 1983, Reagan met with the five uniformed Chiefs in the Roosevelt Room. Secretary Weinberger, still bent on the offensive buildup, told the president the Chiefs had another idea. "We have not studied this," Weinberger cautioned. "It's not something I can endorse at this time."

The session followed the McFarlane-Clark script. It began with a look at trends in the arms race. Then General John W. Vessey, as chairman, laid out Watkins's logic, telling Reagan the Chiefs felt the time had come to take another look at defense.

The Chiefs did not make clear whether they were talking about a defense against all nuclear weapons or just ballistics missiles, whether they had in mind a defense of cities or silos, a limited defense, or a total national shield. Nor did they specify whether they were talking about building a land-based defense, permissible under the 1972 ABM Treaty, or a space-based defense, forbidden by the treaty. Nor did they examine cost, time-frame, or specific programs. Significantly, the Chiefs were not proposing an end to the doctrine of deterrence, but supplementing it with defenses.

"Well," the president concluded, "I would like very much to pursue this. I think we need to hear further from you on whether we shouldn't reorient our priorities and put a lot more effort behind this."

The Chiefs left expecting that there would be more study and more talk with the President before a new policy was set.

THE POWER COCOON

PRESIDENT REAGAN was exhilarated by his meeting with the Joint Chiefs and eager to declare a brand new national strategy. The Joint Chiefs had talked of research to check possibilities for combining strategic defense with the existing strategy of deterrence through offensive nuclear weapons. But the president transformed that idea into a grand vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world. His national security aides found him suddenly talking about a utopian plan to "render nuclear weapons obsolete." Evidently drawing on his talks with Dr. Teller, as well as the tentative ideas of the Joint Chiefs, Reagan conveyed to his national security aides a desire to proclaim a radical shift of doctrine away from nuclear deterrence which had protected the country and its NATO allies for four decades.

Star Wars was developed secretly within a tiny power cocoon. To protect it from internal critics, Clark ordered McFarlane to have the NSC staff develop the idea on a "close-hold" basis—that is, in secret, without informing other agencies. Thus, with the Joint Chiefs unaware, McFarlane and three NSC staff aides, John Poindexter, Air Force Colonel Bob Linhard, and Ray Pollock, a civilian arms specialist, began developing options.

By mid-March, strategic defense had become a crash project. Clark and Deaver felt the president needed an upbeat defense speech to revive congressional support for his military buildup. Regular White House speechwriters began to draft a major address; on his computer, McFarlane secretly wrote the "annex" to his speech—the surprise on SDI. The White House staff was kept in the dark. No contact was made with the Joint Chiefs or civilian arms experts at the Pentagon or the State Department.

Eventually, McFarlane felt he could not proceed without scientific advice. On Saturday, March 19, just five days before Reagan's scheduled

speech, he called in Dr. George "Jay" Keyworth, the president's science adviser, and asked broadly whether Keyworth could support stepped-up research on strategic defenses.

"Bud," he said, "there are so many considerations we have not thought through here. They go from technical feasibility to implications for the Atlantic Alliance, to implications for arms control, to what the Soviets are doing in these areas, to what the reactions will be in the scientific community."

The NSC's Bob Linhard also warned against exaggeration. Linhard argued that it was impossible to declare an immediate change in strategic doctrine—the defensive weapons were not at hand, and reliance on defense alone would cut the heart out of NATO's war strategy, embodied in War Plan MC 14/3, which required offensive American nuclear weapons to protect Europe.

Despite the cautions of his advisers, Reagan hewed to his line about rendering nuclear missiles obsolete. In private, McFarlane tried to talk Reagan out of this utopian view, but McFarlane later defended it as "a license he [Reagan] takes"—acceptable hyperbole for a political leader.

About twenty-four hours before Reagan's scheduled speech, Richard DeLauer, the Pentagon's top-ranking scientist with the title of Defense Undersecretary for Research and Engineering, saw Reagan's speech and exploded in disbelief at Reagan's grandiose dream.

"That's nonsense," DeLauer told Keyworth, "That can't be so."

DeLauer concluded that Reagan and other top policymakers did not understand what they were proposing. Reagan and Weinberger, for example, talked about a "nonnuclear defense," but they included Teller's pet X-ray laser, which was powered by a nuclear bomb. Weinberger, shown Reagan's speech two days before delivery, did not seem to understand the concept well.

General Vessey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, urged Weinberger to try to stop the defense portion of the speech and to undertake further study of strategic defense. The Joint Chiefs were uneasy with Reagan's promise of a nuclear-weapons-free world. "We had not suggested that," Vessey said. "We're not going to wish away nuclear power, fusion or fission, whether for weapons or for heat."

Drafts of Reagan's speech caused similar shock waves among the Pentagon's top civilian hierarchy. Weinberger and such top aides as Richard Perle and Ronald Lehman were in Portugal for a NATO meeting when a speech draft was first cabled to them two days before delivery. Some reportedly threatened to quit because they had been bypassed on such an overarching defense issue.

Shultz was even more explosive on seeing his "eyes only" copy just forty-eight hours ahead of time. I was told he was livid at being blindsided by the NSC's Clark and McFarlane. Twice he met with the president and strongly opposed Reagan's giving the speech, according to one official who was present. Shultz worried that shifting to a defensive doctrine would have a shattering effect on the Atlantic Alliance, because the Allies had depended for four decades on the American nuclear umbrella and the offensive nuclear standoff between Moscow and Washington. Now Reagan was moving away from that whole concept of Western security—without consulting the Allies.

Shultz also feared that Reagan's new tack would be provocative to the Soviets. If the United States were to get a strategic defense ahead of Moscow, it could theoretically launch an offensive first strike against the Soviet Union and then ward off a Soviet reprisal with a defensive system. Shultz pressed McFarlane to insert some reassurance for Moscow: an acknowledgment by Reagan that if defensive systems were "paired

with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that."

Perle, Keyworth, some of the Joint Chiefs, and the NSC's strategic specialists warned that Reagan was promising too much: a defense against *all* nuclear weapons—ballistics missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range bombers. Senior Reagan aides admitted that in the chaotic haste several major issues did not get well examined: Whether strategic defenses could be tested and developed without violating the 1972 ABM Treaty, whether the X-ray laser would violate the treaty banning nuclear weapons in space, what the cost would be, how long the research effort would take, whether the United States would give up all its ballistics missiles or keep some, and how to manage the transition from nuclear deterrence to strategic defense.

In the short run, Reagan got his way but he paid a price for haste. SDI's research was funded, though always at levels substantially below Reagan's requests. The real political risk to Reagan from the conspiratorial policy game was that SDI has still not gotten firm bipartisan support to insure its implementation. Broader consensus building offered a better chance to achieve the necessary support. It is impossible to bypass the political checks and balances over the long run.

Moreover, the short-circuit, NSC style of policy game put high premium on Reagan's judgment and the quality of advice given him by a very small staff. That method not only cut against the grain of Reagan's much-advertised preference for collegial decision making, but it handed great power to a small staff inclined to bow to Reagan's impulses and to filter out dissent. That pattern set Reagan up for his more disastrous plunge into clandestine arms deals with Iran.

GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT

WITH THE WHITE HOUSE CONSPIRACY to sell arms to Iran and secretly fund the Nicaraguan *contras*, the national security staff became a government within the government. The Rambo exploits of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and Bud McFarlane's flight to Tehran were light-years from the gray bureaucratic task of shifting options that was originally conceived for the NSC staff. Gone was the role of neutral policy referee. Reagan made his NSC staff a free-lance CIA, to conceal his policies and escape accountability from an objecting Congress and to circumvent all but a tiny fragment of his own administration. National Security Adviser John Poindexter usurped the president's authority (if Reagan and Poindexter are to be believed), approving the diversion of Iranian profits to the *contras* and then keeping that secret from the president.

The Iran-*contra* operation is the most stunning case of the surreptitious accumulation of staff power in recent presidencies. It carried the long-term trend of growing national-security-staff power beyond anything previously attempted. On the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan's NSC staff became the entrepreneur of policy. But in the Iran-*contra* operation, the NSC staff added three critical aspects of power: the power of decision, the power of operational action, and the power of curbing dissent through tight secrecy and deception.

As Senator Sam Nunn observed, the NSC staff had mounted "an internal coup." The normal rules of the foreign policy game were suspended. Poindexter, McFarlane, and North went behind the backs of cabinet officers and normal chains of command. They gave secret instructions to U. S. ambassadors and flashed messages to CIA station chiefs; they commandeered planes and gave bogus stories to other government agencies to cover their real actions; they privatized foreign policy,

and their commercial operatives knew more about Reagan's policy than the president or members of his cabinet.

After Congress cut off aid to the *contras*, Reagan partisans raised \$1.7 million for the *contras* from private donors and illegally channeled funds to North through a tax-exempt foundation. Reagan, who posed for pictures with big donors, claimed he thought their money was going for television ads, not weaponry.

The NSC staff exploited the power of information to control policy. It used the time-tested practice of bureaucrats in the power game: secrecy, keeping other policymakers in the dark. At the congressional hearings, Poindexter and North invoked the need to protect hostage lives, the Iranian channel, their clandestine agents, the covert operation itself, as the reasons for "compartmenting" information of their operation and deceiving others. But clearly one overriding imperative—especially for practicing secrecy and deception against other top officials—was control of policy. Poindexter's blunt rationale: "I simply didn't want any outside interference."

Moreover, the NSC staff dissembled to the president, Congress, members of the cabinet, other agencies, and other governments. When congressional intelligence committees pressed in 1985 to know what aid North was giving to the *contras*, the NSC responded with outright lies, as North later admitted.

Inevitably, the lies turned inward. The main plotters misled and lied to each other.

Casey lied to congressional intelligence committees, pretending ignorance about operations he had helped organize; Poindexter tore up the December 5, 1985, order signed by Reagan for an arms-for-hostage deal, supposedly to protect the president from political damage. North and his secretary, Fawn Hall, shredded an eighteen-inch thick stack of documents to cover up North's Iran and *contra* operations.

In sum, the Iran-*contra* operation was the epitome of the backdoor foreign policy game. The NSC staff became the vehicle for unilateral policy-making, avoiding checks and balances inside the administration as well as the constitutional authority of Congress. "People [in the administration] turned to covert action because they thought they could not get congressional support for overt activities," Bud McFarlane explained, "But they were not forced to think systematically about the fatal risks they were running."

The impulse to turn to a clandestine power game came from Reagan himself. The Iranian arms deals and the White House fundraising and gunrunning to the Nicaraguan *contras* were not two separate policies that happened to merge in midstream through the ingenuity of Colonel North. They were parallel elements of the same foreign policy game undertaken by a president blocked by Congress, frustrated by divisions in his inner circle, and determined to override all objections in pursuit of his goals.

Nor was this a deal foisted on Reagan from below. When other advisers favored scrapping the operation in December 1985, the president argued to keep going. Reagan feared reprisals against the hostages if the Iranian channel were broken off. Also as Don Regan told investigators, the president was worried that he would look powerless and inept, with hostages still held in Beirut. Meeting his inner circle on December 7, 1985, Reagan brushed aside objections—including questions of legality—raised by Shultz and Weinberger against the arms traffic with Iran. "The American people will never forgive me," Reagan declared, "if I fail to get these hostages out, over this legal question."

TUNNEL VISION: THE HUBRIS OF LANDSLIDE

THERE IS A SPECIAL POLITICAL CHEMISTRY at work in the White House of an enormously popular second-term president. The pattern is familiar among landslide winners who get in trouble in their second term. After Reagan's forty-nine-state victory, his partisans urged: "Let Reagan be Reagan." The president, stymied on domestic policy, and passionate about his foreign crusades, pursued his instincts and bucked at restraints.

Presidential overconfidence gets reinforced by a zealous, loyal staff, feeling their champion invincible and hooked on the hothouse narcotic of power in the White House. Reagan's staff tried to give the president what he wanted. His daily anxieties and impulses became their catechism, their commands. Reagan's NSC staff may have been more susceptible to this virus that most, for it was heavily peopled by military staff officers conditioned to salute the commander in chief and charge the next bunker.

"We Americans have built our President into a sort of demigod," John Eisenhower observed, recalling his father's White House. "The trend seems to be for staff officers to consider themselves powers in their own right. The staff sometimes takes the President more seriously than the Great Man himself."

In short, tunnel vision is an occupational hazard at the White House. In 1985-86, the aggressiveness and tunnel vision of Reagan's NSC staff was fueled not only by Reagan's heady election triumph and by his obsession with the hostages and pursuing the *contra* war. It was also fed by the siege atmosphere at the White House, caused by terrorist bombings, airliner hijackings, and the seizure of the *Achille Lauro* cruise ship. The Reagan team was bent on breaking out of the diplomatic defensive, and it mounted what a congressional report called "the cabal of zealots."

Tunnel vision left the Reagan team vulnerable on the Iran-*contra* affair—without a plan for political damage control to shield the president, other than the belated firing of North and Poindexter's resignation. Those actions did not spare the president from public outrage. The scandal came as a cold shower to the public, because the plot was operated—not by the CIA—but right in the White House, under the president's orders.

The real shocker was the monumental deception of Reagan's engaging in the Iranian operation at all. Having savaged Jimmy Carter in 1980 for allowing Iran to hold American diplomats hostage for fifteen months, Reagan torpedoed his own credibility. He violated his pledge never to make "concessions to terrorists."

The operation exposed the traps inherent in the backdoor-policy game. The Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Iran-*contra* operation and the president's Special Review Board, headed by former Senator John Tower, documented a trail of folly—a scenario of American innocents abroad, gulled by crafty Iranians ever demanding a higher price and stalling on American demands.

The two arms deals carried out through Israel in the fall of 1985 were of such dubious legality (possibly violating the Export Control Act), that CIA Deputy Director John McMahon pressed for President Reagan to sign a retroactive order in early December to try to legitimize them. Later, on January 17, 1986, as he ordered further Iranian arms deals, Reagan specifically directed the CIA not to notify Congress, although "timely" notification was required by law.

In the whole affair, Reagan comes across as eager to move and impatient with legalities and with warring among his advisers. On three occasions, December 5, 1985, January 6, 1986, and January 17, 1986, Reagan signed findings—or orders—approving the Iranian arms deals

and did not inform Shultz and Weinberger, though he had almost immediate opportunities each time to inform them. Like his NSC staff, Reagan was content to leave these two major dissenters in the dark and give ample leeway to the NSC staff to fill the policy vacuum. Obviously, the president knew that Casey and his NSC staff were pushing policy where he wanted to go.

THE POWER OF THE SECRECY LOOP

FINALLY, the policy leverage of North and his NSC bosses is a lesson in the power of the secrecy loop—the power of classified information. To be involved in a “close-hold” covert operation is to take on an extra mystique of authority with bureaucratic peers. People in the know are assumed by other officials to have authority for what they are doing. The NSC staff, especially North, worked that angle to the hilt.

Clandestine operations are compartmented and officials regularly accept being shut out of sensitive information if they are not central players. If others know more, that alone is a badge of authority. The mentality of the covert operators is that protecting the operation is the highest need—above the law and other obligations. In the Reagan administration, moreover, paranoia about Congress caused some officials to avoid asking about things they might later be compelled to tell Congress.

“Agency people, and I would say here from the director on down, actively shunned information,” CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates told the Senate Intelligence Committee in 1987. “We didn’t want to know how the *contras* were being funded, in part, because we were concerned it would get us involved in crossing the line imposed by the law. And so we actively discouraged people from telling us things.” That instinct went for the State Department and the Pentagon, too; it gave North carte blanche.

Secrecy becomes an important pretext for shutting out policy dissenters. By their nature, covert operations cause sharp disagreements (to wit, Shultz and Weinberger on the Iranian operation). So, advocates of covert operations use the fear of leaks as a justification for freezing out internal critics and maintaining their own exclusive channel to the president. That was Poindexter’s mind-set and his favorite litany.

Shultz claimed he was crippled by secrecy. In the congressional hearings, Illinois Congressman Henry Hyde asked Shultz why he had never tried to stop the Iranian deals by threatening to resign. Shultz replied that he had never had the right information at the right time. Indeed, during the eighteen months of the Iranian operation, Reagan met only four times with his full national security circle on that issue: Each time, Shultz said, he had left with the impression that he and Weinberger had succeeded in halting the operation, only to discover long afterward that it was still going.

Repeatedly, cabinet officials learned more from outsiders than from colleagues or simply stumbled onto information. Weinberger discovered that—on NSC staff orders—the Pentagon’s electronic intelligence arm, the National Security Agency, cut him off the list for some Iranian intelligence. Infuriated, he ordered an aide to “remind the agency for whom they were working.”

The presidency—not only Reagan’s presidency but future presidencies—paid a steep price for the deliberate duplicity of Reagan’s NSC staff and its contempt for the rule of law.

The congressional investigating committee placed ultimate responsibility with Reagan despite his claim of ignorance about the diversion of Iranian funds to the *contras*. The committee’s majority judgment said, “The President created or at least tolerated an environment where those

who did not know of the diversion believed with certainty that they were carrying out the President's policies."

Congressional criticism of Reagan framed a basic maxim of the power game: The gravest risk a president takes in clandestinely using his NSC staff to make and carry out policy is that this policy cannot survive wider scrutiny and win sustained political support, either from Congress or the public. That risk is magnified when the policies override acts of Congress or run counter to the administration's declared policy. Reagan took that risk on the Iran-*contra* operation, bypassing Congress and internal dissenters, because he did not want to be deterred from his policy goals. Reagan played the backdoor game because, like Poindexter, he "didn't want any outside interference." And the crashing collapse of his policy and his credibility was inevitable when his deceit was exposed.

ANOTHER REAGAN PATTERN: SHORT-CIRCUIT

HOWEVER SERIOUS the political fallout from the Iran-*contra* affair, top strategists and politicians felt that Reagan raised an even graver danger with his radical, pell-mell decisions at the Iceland summit meeting in October 1986. In his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan once again showed a penchant for short-circuit decision making, working with a small group and leaving key advisers in the dark. As on SDI and the Iranian operation, Reagan's Iceland tactics betrayed his go-for-broke impulse; his tendency to improvise crucial policy on the spot, bypassing normal channels of advice that protect presidents on major decisions.

The alarm was touched off by Reagan's unexpected and unprepared proposal to abolish all offensive ballistics missiles in ten years, a shocking shift from Reagan's own offensive weapons buildup. It was a sudden, on-the-spot modification of a much looser notion that Reagan had raised in a letter to Gorbachev in July 1986. The new version promised in a decade to sweep away the deterrent force that had protected the Western Alliance since World War II, without studying the cost of replacement weapons and of building up conventional armies to protect the West.

The Iceland gambit represented Reagan's old pattern of endrun foreign policy-making. This time it was quite clearly the president's option, not just his staff's. Once again Poindexter was at his elbow, but this time in league with Shultz and without Weinberger or the military. Any president has the prerogative to launch policy initiatives. But nuclear issues touch so many interests, not only American but also West European and Japanese, that major changes of nuclear policy require much more advance discussion than most normal political issues. At Reykjavik, Reagan ignored long-standing custom—just as he had when he announced the SDI program.

What these episodes show is a president zigzagging between orderly process and sudden policy lurches, between burying issues with paralyzing debate—as on SALT II—and giving them quick, premature birth—as on SDI.

At Reykjavik Reagan broke some time-tested rules of the foreign policy game by improvising a major departure on the spot. He blamed the summit's failure on Gorbachev's demands for strictly limiting strategic defenses to "laboratory research." Actually, Gorbachev was more sweeping than Reagan; he proposed banning all offensive strategic systems—bombers and cruise missiles, as well as ballistics missiles. Also, some Reagan advisers felt Gorbachev saved Reagan, at home and with Western allies, by not accepting the ten-year "zero BM" plan.

Because arms control is so intricate and affects such vital matters, it is a well-tested axiom of the foreign policy game that no major arms

proposal should be put forward in face-to-face summit sessions without being well studied in advance so that its ramifications are well understood. The price of mistakes is enormously high.

Proposing a ban on ballistics missiles—*zero BM*, in arms-control shorthand—without actually having to implement the idea is a clever ploy. In early 1986, Reagan needed a gambit to match Gorbachev's call for a halt to nuclear testing and for the elimination of all strategic weapons by the year 2000. Pentagon hawks, such as Fred Ikle and Richard Perle, pushed zero BM as an American response, because it cut the heart of the Soviet nuclear arsenal (ninety percent of Soviet nuclear warheads are on ballistics missiles), but it left us with a big advantage in nuclear bombers and cruise missiles.

Zero BM was injected into Reagan's policy stream in late May 1986, when Soviet arms negotiators in Geneva began making significant concessions. Reagan wanted a deal with Gorbachev; he also felt, as one top aide told me, that he had only two years left and "needed to take steps to make sure that SDI survives this administration." Gorbachev was trying to stop SDI, pressing for American guarantees not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for fifteen years—i. e., no deployment of SDI during that period.

After meetings with Shultz, Weinberger, and Poindexter, and reactions from a dozen other top officials, Reagan bought zero BM. He put it in a July 25 letter to Gorbachev, coupled with a promise not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for seven and a half years, provided that after that period, either side could deploy strategic defenses. Reagan's aides said the zero-BM idea was intended to meet Gorbachev's worry that Reagan wanted a strategic defense in order to mount a first strike against Moscow—to hit first with ballistics missiles and then block a Soviet reprisal with SDI. By offering to give up American ballistics missiles, Reagan felt he was showing Gorbachev that was not his intention.

What is crucially important is that the zero-BM proposal in Reagan's letter to Gorbachev was deliberately vague. Reagan did not promise to get rid of ballistics missiles or set any time frame for eliminating them. Reagan's letter, according to officials who read it, only required that the side which first wanted to deploy strategic defenses had to *produce a plan* on how to get rid of ballistics missiles, but there was *no actual commitment to get rid of them*. Between the lines, that meant Reagan's SDI could be deployed and ballistics missiles could remain. That was the American safety catch. Still, Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Ken Adelman, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ridiculed zero BM meaningless because it was so vague and as unacceptable to Moscow.

GOING FOR BROKE — REYKJAVIK

AT THE ICELAND SUMMIT, zero BM surfaced again—but in dramatically different form. The differences were crucial and they were not reviewed by the same range of officials as in the summer—testimony to Reagan's bent for short-circuit decisions and "going for broke."

At Reykjavik, Gorbachev surprised Reagan and company by unveiling a full-fledged arms package and making major concessions. At his first session with Reagan on Saturday morning, October 11, Gorbachev proposed complete elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, a fifty-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons in five years, a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years, and restriction of SDI to "research and testing in laboratories." That night, American and Soviet teams reached surprising agreement on much of

what Gorbachev had proposed but there was deadlock on SDI and the ABM Treaty.

The issues came to a head Sunday afternoon when Shultz met Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. With Shultz were Paul Nitze, his veteran arms adviser; Max Kampelman, chief American negotiator in Geneva; NSC chief John Poindexter; the Pentagon's Richard Perle; and Colonel Robert Linhard, NSC staff expert on strategic nuclear planning and arms control. But there was no representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or of the Arms Control Agency.

Shultz told Shevardnadze that the Americans had an idea for breaking the impasse, and he read from the Perle-Linhard paper. It reaffirmed what had been negotiated the night before—that both sides would “adhere” to the ABM treaty for five years while cutting their strategic offensive arsenals by fifty percent, and then—the new part—they would adhere to the treaty for a second five years, provided that all remaining ballistics missiles were eliminated (Zero BM). Both sides would then be free to deploy strategic defenses.

Gorbachev countered with his more sweeping proposal, to eliminate bombers and cruise missiles, too. The summit broke up, stuck not only on offensive arms but also on the Soviet demand for restricting SDI to “laboratory” research and testing. Over time Zero BM was allowed to languish—a stillborn stepchild of haste.

Instead Reagan and Gorbachev agreed, in December 1987, to eliminate medium- and short-range nuclear missiles—a much more modest idea, originally broached by Reagan in 1982.

On Zero BM, as on SDI and the Iranian affair, vital national policy was made from the top down, bypassing the more careful thoughtful and sometimes deadlocked policy game. Normally policy develops from the bottom up, a range of officials prudently examining the options, winnowing out bad ideas, gauging the consequences of better ones. The president taps every important branch of expertise, giving top policy advisers time to think things through and lay their case before him. But Reagan liked going for utopian policies with a popular ring—bypassing long internal debate—and then advertising his ideas so widely that they became hard to reverse or revise. Once Reagan proclaimed his programs, they became a touchstone of loyalty, inhibiting internal debate of pros and cons. At times, his decision-making style was more that of a king than of a late-twentieth-century president.

No foreign policy is possible to sustain without a broad political partnership. The backdoor, end-run foreign policy game cuts against the grain of democracy, because it requires more deceit and subterfuge than our political system will tolerate—especially when covert policy directly contradicts the stated public policy.

Milestones of the "Year of Europe"

Yuri DERYABIN

THE DYNAMICS of the present-day international process are certainly impressive. European politics has again been set in motion and is constantly renewing itself. Without the importance of the breakthroughs in other areas being understated, 1989 was rightly dubbed the "year of Europe". This is also largely the result of the Soviet perestroika, which has made it possible to raise the sights of Soviet foreign policy in the approach to European affairs.

Europe is the area of our most energetic interaction with our Warsaw Treaty allies. The line of direct contact with the West passes through here. The processes which greatly determine the political situation in the world are shaped here. All this imposes a special responsibility for a correct choice of foreign policy orientations and priorities, realistic initiatives and steps, and the ability to act in the spirit of new thinking.

The series of European visits by the Soviet leadership, the raising of the Helsinki process to a new qualitative level, and the opening of additional channels of dialogue and convergence with Western Europe are making it possible to draw a number of conclusions and generalisations which attest to the advent of a sweeping historical renewal of Europe and to realistic progress towards a peaceful period.

In the past we used to say that Europeans were tired of confrontation, of the exhausting rivalry, now it is obvious how new energetic forces are awakening on the continent which are linking its future with the commonality of Europe's future, with the European idea, with cooperation in the context of safeguards for the freedom of a social choice and security.

Prerequisites for leaving behind forever war as a form of resolving social disputes are being provided through a realisation of Europe's interdependence, integrity and stability. Today the continent as a whole is embracing positions where results in policy are reached through mutual concessions, compromises and strict consideration for realities.

Today the West is exhibiting a growing readiness for joint and parallel advance in European affairs, and the enhancing trust in the Soviet perestroika can indubitably be seen in this. This hardly means, of course, that different opinions do not exist in the West. Their range is rather broad; however, the predominant line is nonetheless espoused by forces that view the restructuring drive as a unique chance for Europe and the rest of the world. Herein lies the foundation for realistic prospects in Europe.

THE ROUTES OF EUROPEAN DIALOGUE

THE PAST YEAR was marked by more intensive and widescale Soviet bilateral political contacts with the West European countries

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than ever before. The routes of European dialogue at the summit level crossed London, Bonn, Paris, Strasbourg, Helsinki, Rome and the Vatican. In Moscow General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met with representatives of more than ten West European states. USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had an eventful calendar in Europe. Aside from regular, wellnigh daily contacts with officials from the foreign policy departments of the socialist countries, he had over 50 meetings with colleagues from Western Europe.

It goes without saying that while the European visits of 1989 had a common denominator, they were not identical; they also reflected the specifics of the policies of countries and of our relations with them.

It was not for nothing that the cycle of meetings with leaders of West European countries was opened by the visit to *Great Britain*, in April. The very nature and theme of the Soviet-British dialogue launched back in December 1984 graphically reflect the newness in principle of East-West relations and the striving to correctly understand the intentions and policies of each of them in the overall interests of the international community and of the formation of a peaceful period in the history of world civilisation.

The meeting with Margaret Thatcher in April, just like the next, fifth, meeting in September in Moscow, reaffirmed the fact that the British leadership, reflecting as it does the prevailing public sentiments, is steadily taking a realistic stand in assessing the policy of perestroika and is displaying a readiness to cooperate with us in many important areas in Europe and the rest of the world. This covers prohibition of chemical weapons, the building of a common European home, and settlement of regional conflicts.

However, there is still a great deal that divides us, both conceptually and in practical terms. While lowering the curtain on the Cold War, the British prime minister is in no hurry to reconsider her attitude to nuclear weapons, the material basis of that far from best period in European history. Underlying British concerns is a deep-going doubt regarding the world's capacity to ensure security through political means. Such an approach can be debunked only by the realities of life, and in their historical perspective we believe that they will debunk time after time the staking on nuclear weapons as a guarantor of peace.

We are hardly claiming, of course, that the principle of "all or nothing" be followed in the dialogue with London on this problem. If the British cannot fully give up nuclear weapons today, the Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate with Great Britain in security matters on the basis of recognition of the concept of minimal nuclear deterrence. Of course, this is a transitional state and it does not do away with the strategic task of shaping a nuclear-free world.

The visit to the *Federal Republic of Germany*, in June, was a turning point in Soviet-West German relations. Relations with this, the leading military and economic power in Western Europe had been sour for a long time. However, as positive trends in Europe and the world as a whole stepped up, the need to take a new look at this state of affairs, overcome the stagnation in Soviet-West German relations and bring them in line with the task of revamping international relations became increasingly obvious. The idea of opening a new chapter in the annals of relations between the USSR and the FRG received a broad consensus among West Germans.

The new quality of Soviet-West German relations was manifested in the signed Joint Statement, which updated East-West relations. For the first time two major European states belonging to different systems and different alliances jointly mapped out the goals of their policies on the

basis of a philosophical analysis of the changes apace in the world. Among the priorities they outlined was the shaping of a common European consciousness, the affirmation of the idea of European uniqueness and commonality, and the elaboration of European structures and the creation of a common European home on their basis.

The Joint Statement cogently carries on the line of the Moscow Treaty of 1970. It reaffirms adherence to the postwar structure and the principle of inviolability of borders. Clearly, this is instrumental to ensuring stability in Europe.

Not everything, of course, is going smoothly in Soviet-West German relations. Revanchist sallies, appeals for a review of the borders in Europe, and pressure against the GDR are making themselves felt. The theme of "reunification of Germany" is being whipped up again, by official Bonn as well. What can be said here? The current situation in Central Europe is a result of history itself and the logic of wartime and postwar development. Attempts to call it into question are a futile and dangerous exercise.

In the past our cooperation with the FRG was frequently complicated by the question of West Berlin. Today many contentious elements have been removed, and a search for solutions is being conducted where they are still to be found. We are in favour of a tranquil situation around West Berlin and for its involvement in Soviet-West German ties, for its involvement in European and broader international intercourse. With the realisation, of course, that the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 be strictly complied with.

During the visit to *France*, in July, the sides, developing the solid traditions of Franco-Soviet ties which were revitalised after 1985, the sides discovered new considerable possibilities for Franco-Soviet dialogue—one of the key elements of our relations with Europe as a community and of the enhancing of European and world politics. The meeting with President François Mitterrand (December 1989, Kiev) was in the same key.

What is particularly important is that the talks with François Mitterrand and the exchanges of views at other levels showed that both countries have largely parallel views of the future of Europe. The French president reaffirmed his receptivity to the ideas of the common European home, referring, among other things, to its practical construction and what he called its "furnishing" on the road of cooperation and cocreation within the Helsinki process. Interaction is also being established in the search for solutions to regional seats of tension. A joint Statement on Lebanon, which generated broad repercussions, was coordinated.

A direct, frank and wide-ranging talk was held with French intellectuals at a meeting in the Sorbonne. The French intelligentsia sensitively mirrors the sentiments in the country and in Europe; it vacillates on some points and manifests typically French skepticism, but on the whole is sympathetic to the renewal processes in the USSR. It was also supportive of our idea to apply the intellectual forces of the Soviet Union and France to advance new thinking in Europe and the international arena. We will have to fully revitalise and carry on the long-standing traditions of contacts and creative exchange.

As for the differences with Paris, they were to be found, as was case in London, above all in the issue of the role of nuclear weapons, although they were affected by French specifics. France upholds its specific position in the Atlantic Alliance and the "exclusively political" purpose of its nuclear potential. Attaching particular importance to its nuclear "deterrence forces", the French are still unprepared to become involved in the talks on this type of weaponry.

A new facet in the development of the political philosophy which is paving the way to the future for Europe appeared as a result of the *Soviet-Finnish summit* in Helsinki, in October. General Secretary Gorbachev and Finnish President Mauno Koivisto signed the declaration *The New Thinking in Action*. The document is original in many respects. It is an unusual one for the relations between our two countries if they are viewed through the prism of recent years. It is also original for European affairs, judging by the benchmarks of a fragmented Europe. Lastly, it is a document which sets out in bold relief the role of the so-called small countries of Europe in strengthening fresh approaches to security and cooperation on the continent.

The Soviet Union is a major Eurasian state which possesses nuclear weapons, and a member of one of the European military alliances, and Finland is a neutral North European state which has rejected nuclear weapons and both stated their resolve to act from the single platform of the new thinking and, most importantly, to work for the inculcation in European and international practice of the principle of freedom of a socio-political choice, non-use of force, and the primacy of international law. Other countries are called upon to do the same.

The visit to Finland conclusively put an end to talk of the notorious "Finlandisation", talk insulting to that country's policy. It is not fortuitous that when referring to the experience of the Soviet-Finnish partnership, people are speaking more and more frequently today of the "Finlandisation" of Western Europe in the positive sense.

The Soviet attitude to the striving of the Finns to pursue a policy of neutrality was totally clarified as well. General Secretary Gorbachev stated definitively that the Soviet Union unquestionably recognises the neutral status of Finland and will continue to honour it in full measure. And this despite the fact that the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1948, with which a turnabout in our relations is linked, is fully in force. Being in accord with the realities of our times, the treaty makes it possible to fully and equitably act today and over the long term in the interests of the two nations and those of Europe and the rest of the world.

The new assessment of the "winter war" of 1939-1940, an assessment which differs from our previous black-and-white schemes, has helped improve the political and moral atmosphere of Soviet-Finnish relations and enhance trust between our two peoples. General Secretary Gorbachev's words to the effect that the responsibility for the tragedy of those years is borne by the leadership of both states and that neither Moscow nor Helsinki displayed due understanding of each other's concerns at that critical moment in history were appropriate and timely. The main thing, however, was that both countries were able to draw the only correct conclusions and embark upon the path of good-neighbourliness and friendship.

The culmination of the Soviet leader's European trips in 1989 was the visit to *Italy* in November-December. The first top-level visit to Italy in the history of Soviet-Italian ties was perceived as proof of the recognition of Rome's important place in Europe and of the fact that the relations between the USSR and Italy is an efficient factor and a big value in the political dialogue which now embraces both Europe and the world.

The talks in Rome showed that the Italian vision of the future of the European continent is consonant with our idea of a common European home. Regarding Europe more as a political notion than a geographical one, Italians are for a Europe without borders, a Europe that would unite the specifics and traditions of each nation. The scepticism voiced by the Italian leadership over the "nuclear deterrence" factor, the weighed and sober approach to the plans to modernise tactical nuclear wea-

pons, and the growing diplomatic activity in matters of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons make this country one of our promising interlocutors in the search for a solution to disarmament problems.

A country which holds a key position in the Mediterranean, Italy is very sensitive to the Mediterranean factor in European affairs, which is yet to be embodied in large scale and effective actions. The talk on this topic that was held in Rome, a topic of relevance to the Soviet Union, too, is encouraging. Possibilities for further mutual search are also found in the idea to convene a large scope conference on the Mediterranean on the lines of the Helsinki one (Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was the first to put forward such idea some time back), and in the set of new proposals made by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Rome. There are ever more similarities in our countries' stands on such a burning issues of the world politics as the regional problems and conflicts.

One of the major innovations of Soviet policy was the establishment of direct dialogue between the Kremlin and the *Vatican*, which was fostered by the positive reaction of the Roman Catholic Church to perestroika and the constructive and humanistic elements in its stand on the most crucial problems of the day. The exchange of messages between General Secretary Gorbachev and Pope John Paul II also prepared the ground for the personal meeting between the Soviet leader and the head of one of the most influential churches in the world, and, over the long term, to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Vatican.

European problems and the rapid changes taking place on the continent were, naturally, on the agenda of the Soviet-American Summit near the shores of Malta. Questions had been asked on the eve of the meeting to the effect that there might be some decisions concerning Europe's interests which would be taken at the summit bypassing the Europeans. The Gorbachev-Bush meeting reaffirmed that the American and European directions are of equal value in our foreign policy priorities. Another thing reaffirmed there was that the problems of Europe should only be settled with the participation of the Europeans. And with that of the USA with whom Western Europe has bonds of partnership and with whom we and all Europe cooperate within the Helsinki process, doing so with circumspection and consideration, not affecting the stability in Europe.

In concluding the theme of the European visits of 1989, I would like to single out one more element. We are increasingly getting away from the formalism and ritualism that characterised summits just a few years ago. Today's meetings are intensive work and businesslike communication between leaders with an eye to philosophical conceptual platforms as much as to practical results. Suffice it to say that over 100 agreements and protocols covering a wide range of cooperation spheres were signed during the visits. They promote bilateral ties, broaden the framework of European cooperation and yield palpable benefit for the overhaul of Soviet society.

THE NEW QUALITY OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS

THE EUROPEAN PROCESS is still the main channel of dialogue and convergence between Eastern and Western Europe and a catalyst and synthesizer of the ideas of the new thinking on the continent.

Fourteen and a half years ago the Helsinki conference of leaders of 33 European states, the USA and Canada breathed, without exaggeration, new life into the old idea of the unification of the continent. The Final Act was ahead of its time in terms of its spirit and bold innova-

tive approaches. The layers of mistrust and prejudice which the sprouts of new relations in Europe had to break through proved too strong. For this reason the path of Helsinki has had its ups and downs. At one time some people were even talking about the crisis of the European process and its all but inevitable collapse.

Nevertheless, the process has stood firm; what is more, it has begun to gain momentum. In our rapidly changing world the Final Act has kind of caught up with the times. The European process has acquired a new lease on life, and possibilities have appeared for developing and drawing on the entire Helsinki potential more fully.

The *Vienna meeting* of representatives of the member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which concluded in January 1989 was the biggest positive step in postwar Europe since Helsinki. It brought the European process to a qualitatively new level in all parameters and reaffirmed the workability of progress from division to commonality on the continent.

It is a generally accepted fact that without the perestroika apace in the USSR, without fresh approaches to domestic and international affairs, Vienna would not have been such a success. The Vienna meeting affirmed still more the changing identity of the USSR as a bearer of humanistic principles and ideas and buttressed international trust in the depth and irreversibility of the processes of democratisation and glasnost. It is likewise obvious that implementation of the Vienna accords in all areas is also to the benefit of our domestic affairs, as it nourishes our restructuring effort.

The decision, unprecedented in the Helsinki process and in European history for that matter, to launch *talks between the 23 states of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on conventional armed forces in Europe*, a decision that moreover was taken against the background of the USSR's unilateral decision to reduce its armed forces, provides an opportunity to materialise our perestroika approaches to the military aspects of security and affirm the principles of defensive sufficiency and reduce military outlays. The talks which are now in progress at Vienna give cause for hope that specific and wide-ranging results are attainable as early as next year.

The accord on *talks among 35 states on further confidence-building and security measures in Europe* as a continuation of the Stockholm Conference of 1984-1986, whose results are already justifying themselves (among other things, the new notion in international practice of on-site inspections derives from Stockholm) was of principled importance. The talks of the 23 and of the 35 which are closely intertwined, are substantially consolidating the military-political dimension of the Helsinki process and making it possible to consider and take interconnected measures towards practical disarmament and confidence-building in Europe.

A real breakthrough has been made in the *humanitarian area*. The Helsinki process has begun to address itself more and more towards the individual and the defence of universal values. The accords reached in Vienna on human rights and people-to-people contacts and in the spheres of culture, education and information are in step with our line for humanising international relations and creating a socialist rule-of-law state. This also applies to that concept of the human dimension of the European process which was adopted in Vienna and to the creation on its basis of a bilateral and multilateral mechanism of cooperation, consultations and information exchange that accords with our stated course for broadening Soviet involvement in international control mechanisms.

The especially sensitive sphere of inter-state cooperation—the right of citizens to the spread of information and access to it—was discussed comprehensively for the first time in London at the CSCE *Information Forum* held in April and May. The Soviet Union advanced at this forum an innovative philosophy and programme of concrete actions. We not only expounded our concept of the social role of the mass media as a part of a civil society regulated by the norms of a law-governed state; we also advanced the idea of turning the European continent into a space of openness and proposed brand new forms of cooperation among states in the information sphere. We stated that we intend to continue domestically pursuing a line for a repeal of restrictive and prohibitive measures in this sphere.

Alongside the ideas of our counterparts at the London forum there took shape an impressive package of proposals comprising a good system of orientations for further advance in the European informational sphere and for improving the information situation in individual countries.

The decision to hold a Moscow Humanitarian meeting was recognition of the reality of the changes taking place in the USSR. Despite the fact that many Western countries, above all the USA and Great Britain, were opposed to this until the last minute, an accord was reached to hold in Moscow in autumn 1991 a humanitarian forum as the third and conclusive stage of the *Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE*.

May-June 1989 saw the first stage, in Paris, of this conference, which continued the line mapped out in Vienna for a turnabout of the very difficult humanitarian rights problem from confrontation to constructive practical interaction. The initiative of such a long-term goal as the establishment of an integral legal space on the continent was consonant with the notions of our counterparts. For the first time in the Helsinki process, it proved possible to formulate a joint proposal by two leading powers of East and West—the USSR and France, an important symptom of the emergence of a trend towards repudiation of the bloc approach that used to dominate when initiatives were advanced within the CSCE framework. By and large, a solid bank of proposals and ideas was created at the Paris conference, and business platform was built for subsequent humanitarian forums in Copenhagen, in June 1990, and in Moscow.

The link between domestic and foreign policy is pointedly and graphically manifest in our fulfilment of the commitments we took in keeping with the Final Document of the Vienna meeting. While working to see that the Vienna and other international commitments are strictly observed by all states, we ourselves should comply with them in full. This is how whether we practice what we preach is verified. The further perception of the Soviet Union's image in the world will largely hinge on this.

Our current readiness to accept the highest international standards, whether in human rights or in any other sphere, and to strictly follow them and to bring in line with them our domestic legislation, administrative rights and practice accords above all with the requirements for revitalising all facets of Soviet society. This is the most important point.

Implementation of the Vienna accords is one of the important everyday concerns of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mechanism of parliamentary supervision is actively involved in this as well. In September the International Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet made a point of critically considering these matters.

An important step was the USSR Supreme Soviet's approval at first

reading of the draft legislature on Soviet citizens' entry in an exit from the USSR, on the press and other information media.

Despite the fact that a great deal has been done to comply with the Vienna accords, we still have room for improvement; there are a number of unresolved matters and even shortcomings. The pace of legislative work does not always accord with the dynamics of perestroika and democratisation. We are also encountering a reluctance to take account of the USSR's international legal and political commitments. There have been delays in passing laws on public associations, and on freedom of conscience and religious organisations.

The initial concept of the Helsinki process and its very philosophy obtain from the need for parallel balanced progress in all areas. The decision of the Vienna meeting to hold a *Conference on Environmental Protection* in Sofia, in October-November 1989, and a *Conference on Economic Cooperation*, in Bonn, in March-April 1990, are geared to narrowing the gap with the most advanced fields of European cooperation—military-political and humanitarian-legal.

Although a final document was not adopted in Sofia (the Romanians had difficulties in matters of legal defence of non-governmental organisations and citizens in the ecological sphere), this forum exhibited a general striving for more decisive actions aimed at preventing an ecological threat to the continent. Support was voiced for the idea of elaborating general European conventions, including on limiting pollution of cross-border waters and international lakes, on overcoming the aftermath of industrial disasters, and on using dangerous chemical substances. The importance was stressed of bringing national environmental legislation in line with international standards. It can thus be stated that a good impetus was imparted to the ecological dimension of the Helsinki process.

RESERVES OF CONVERGENCE WITH WESTERN EUROPE

THE BUILDING of a common European home is impossible without constantly deepening and enriching the dialogue between the East and the West of the continent. We are constantly exploring additional possibilities for the purpose. We have taken a new, now open-eyed look at the processes of political and economic integration in Western Europe. Even now we sense the benefit—mutual benefit, of course—that can be yielded by the partnership that is taking place, for example, with the *European Communities* (EC), official relations with which were established in August 1988.

The political dialogue with the Twelve that was launched in the January 1989 meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and Fernández Ordóñez, Chairman of the EC Council and Foreign Minister of Spain, has become well established. Consultations on political cooperation with the EC Three which were held in Moscow and Paris, were productive. The meetings between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the foreign ministers of the 12 EC countries in New York last September and in Brussels last December was a new stage in the development of the political dialogue.

Gaining momentum, the dialogue with the EC as an authoritative political entity in international affairs is gradually switching from a simple exchange of views to a search for possible areas of applying efforts for resolving a number of key international problems, which is especially important. The most important area of cooperation is Europe, enhancement of the Helsinki process, settlement of regional conflicts (the Twelve are very active here), and global problems such as ecology, and the fight against hunger and poverty.

Trade and economic ties with the EC are gradually taking shape. The agreement on trade and on trade and economic cooperation that was signed in December, accords with the needs of both sides and with the spirit of the times, and is a document that is broad and innovative in terms of character, structure and thematical range, and is a practical contribution to gradual formation of a European economic space.

General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Strasbourg in July 1989 also initiated dialogue with so representative an organisation as the *Council of Europe* which unites 23 countries, i. e., virtually all the states of Western Europe. It can be said that the Strasbourg visit was also a visit to Europe.

Ties with the Council of Europe are rapidly gaining momentum both along parliamentary and governmental lines. A group of deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet took part, for the first time, in a session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with "special guest" status, and a joint working group of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs---Secretariat of the Council of Europe for Development of Contacts and Cooperation on the inter-governmental level was formed and is functioning energetically. Prospects have appeared for Soviet accession to a number of conventions in culture, education, ecology, television and radio broadcasting, law, and in the specialised institutions of the Council of Europe.

Also in the range of our attention is the European Convention on Human Rights, which, however, is still closed to the non-members of the Council of Europe. In terms of its orientation and content this important international legal document fits well into the framework of our current approaches to human rights and international cooperation in this sphere. Incidentally, the Vienna accords of the CSCE go farther than the European convention in some respects.

In short, our first contacts are not merely encouraging, they are impelling us today to think towards the longer term. We are becoming convinced of something else, too, namely, that the Council of Europe has amassed a large bank of ideas and legal norms, including those on human rights, of European and world importance, and that structures which are the prototype of common European ones are functioning. In other words, there are ready-made elements for the construction of a common European home. The Council of Europe, for that matter, can become one of the supports of such a home and the venue of joint elaboration of European initiatives.

The contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliamentary organisations of Western Europe are substantially broadening their range and imparting a fresh quality to our European policy. Aside from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe these are regular and wide-ranging ties with the European Parliament of the twelve EC countries, the Assembly of the West European Alliance, and the North Atlantic Assembly, which unites the parliamentarians of the NATO states, the Nordic Council (a body of cooperation of the North European countries) At the Paris forum we tabled proposals to galvanise the efforts of the parliaments of the CSCE countries in humanitarian cooperation. Generally speaking, the point at issue is deepening the parliamentary dimension of the European political dialogue, and, over the longer term, establishing a common European parliamentary structure.

TOWARDS "HELSINKI II"

TODAY THE PENDULUM of political relations has swung far away from confrontation. The essentially optimistic conviction that the situation of all-out rivalry and mutual distrust that determined the past

does not accord with the future is beginning to strengthen. The aspiration of convergence and cooperation in overcoming the dogged disunity and closedness of the Cold War times is gaining momentum in the light of the emerging European commonality.

The idea of a *new all-European summit* is maturing which would discuss collectively Europe's future and formation of the European commonality in the 21st century. More than that, the Helsinki II idea proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev is already in operation and becomes a tangible factor of combining efforts for a search of common approaches to the European development.

Now we think that such a summit could be held earlier than 1992 as was the original proposal, as early as 1990. European developments are gaining momentum, sometimes even getting ahead of forecasts. I mean the developments in Europe's East, including those of the recent months. The situation in the continent's West is not hard-set, either. As life boils in change it poses more and more questions, more and more challenges which often cannot be put off: in the areas of disarmament, ecology and economy. Solutions can be found only through joint considerations by all who are party to Europe's destinies, and within a common understanding that the processes underway in both parts of the continent are in definite interrelationship, influence each other and jointly mould a new face of Europe.

So what other milieu is as apt for discussing all problems of Europe's past and present as the Helsinki process which has already proved itself a uniting channel for a constructive East-West dialogue and, probably, the most democratic institution of state-to-state communication? And who else is the best to do it but the new generation of leaders which renews itself literally as we watch it?

Naturally, solutions are to be looked for from the firm ground of the Final Act and its ten principles, applying the Helsinki potential to the new conditions in Europe and to the dynamics of its new development. In other words, it is a dialectical matter of marrying dynamics and stability.

Life itself has determined the orientations of Europe. Progress on this path has begun. Now it has to become more confident.

The Europe of the future is impossible without *materialisation of all ten principles of relations among states* that were enshrined in the Helsinki document. But these principles also need to be deepened and applied equally. It is obvious to us, for example, that *the principle of non-use of force must be universal*, without any deviations, both between blocs and within them and against neutral states. The efficacy of the principle of non-use of force would also be buttressed by the elaboration of effective mechanisms of peaceful settlement of disputes with the involvement of a third party. We are prepared for this.

Or take a principle so important for Europe as *inviolability of borders*. We view its universal nature as lying in the fact that all the participants in the European process pledged to refrain from any direct or indirect actions pursuing the aim of violating a state's territorial integrity, political independence or unity. It is in everyone's interests to preserve stability in Europe; conversely, time-serving politicking and attempts to profit from domestic complications run counter to these interests. There are too many urgent issues to be light-minded in politics and try to revive questions that have been removed from the agenda by the entire postwar development of Europe.

Today it is not enough to recognise conceptually the *principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency*. We need to switch to a practical revamping of the armed forces of both alliances on its basis. The accords at the Vienna talks which we are proposing that the leaders of

states sign should lead to this. It would be important to synchronise discussions of new confidence-building measures with progress in conventional armed forces.

A final repudiation of confrontation and ideological battles in human rights and other humanitarian affairs is needed. This would be promoted by an improvement in the mechanism of cooperation within the framework of the human dimension of the Helsinki process that, if necessary, would not exclude the formation of constantly functioning institutions.

The Moscow Humanitarian Conference in 1991 is to crown a series of three conferences on the human dimension. We hope that the businesslike mood that was inaugurated in Paris is retained in Copenhagen. The Soviet Union will do all in its power to see that fresh approaches to human rights and basic freedoms and humanitarian cooperation as a whole are formalised at the Moscow Conference.

It is quite realistic to set about the formation of a *common juridical space* on the basis of a Europe of law-governed states, proceeding from a comparative study of the statutes existing in different countries to a European legislation, to the elaboration of the fundamentals of a rule-of-law state common for the continent, and to the unconditional affirmation of the primacy of international law. The legislative bodies of the CSCE participants could become actively involved in this.

As the climate of trust strengthens, the creation of a verification mechanism can become a key area of European juridical development. A system of international commitments cannot function reliably without the mutual confidence that these commitments are being complied with. The above fully applies to the humanitarian sphere as well.

On the agenda is the establishment of a *European information space*, the removal of any unwarranted limitations on the freedom to receive, produce and circulate information, and broad use of advanced technology in all forms of information, including satellite and cable television.

Work to *shape the ecological coordinates of European cooperation*, which today is virtually no less significant than disarmament, is vitally important. It would be worthwhile to coordinate the principles or criteria for such cooperation on the continent. We feel that European countries could advance an initiative for the speedy elaboration of an ecological control system and the measures needed for the purpose. The already accumulated experience of control in the disarmament sphere could be of use here.

Lastly, decisive progress in the *economic area* is imperative. Large-scale original East-West projects should be elaborated. The Soviet Union has ideas on this score. Our counterparts are sure to have some as well. It is appropriate to discuss them at the Conference on Economic Cooperation slated to be held in Bonn.

Utilisation of the possibilities offered by the integrational processes which have taken shape and are developing in both parts of the continent is called upon to consolidate East-West economic interaction. Our premise here, too, is that these processes can become a factor that would unite rather than disunite Europe. Relations between them should not be those of rivalry, of erecting barriers, and of self-isolation in "fortresses", but adaptation to each other and cooperation. It is important that these patterns of ties blend in with the logic of the formation of a common European economic space with an eye to shaping an integral economic complex on the continent.

We speak of the possibility of building a common European home with our feet on the ground of the realities as they are. It concerns the military political alliances of NATO and WTO. Their presence is a part of the European stability and a kind of balancing factor of secu-

rity. They seem to remain so in the foreseeable future, although a Europe of no blocs is our long-term goal. The main thing is to discard the inertia of bloc-wise thinking and bloc-wise approach to security as we understand it on the threshold of the 21st century.

That is why we speak of *transforming the military political alliances* and of the need to shift emphasis from their military content to the political one. A true evaluation of the threat each holds for the other makes it possible to advance to the forefront the elaboration within each alliance of common approaches to today's and tomorrow's challenges and, accordingly, of a common denominator for a dialogue between the alliances. Such new quality of the alliances would determine their new role in Europe, which would be that of support to positive processes on the continent and of a channel for adaptation in place of confrontation of West with East. They would cease being a factor of military stability and turn into a factor of political stability.

While reflecting on the progress toward a future Europe one cannot but mention the role of the *neutral and non-aligned countries* in this process. They, after all, comprise one-third of the European community.

The policy of neutrality, which was in its time regarded solely as non-participation in war, has now become a constructive peacetime institution, and is designed to preserve and strengthen peace. What is particularly important, more and more neutral states are giving priority to external political means of ensuring national security—not through isolation but, on the contrary, by becoming actively involved in the search for paths toward European and world security.

It is our conviction that the role played by countries that cogently adhere to the policy of neutrality and non-alignment, which has already proved itself as a constructive and balancing factor and as a political and moral category in a Europe divided into blocs and alliances, will also enhance in the search for roads to a Europe that is united and free of blocs.

The European process with its democratic nature that is unique for the practice of international relations provides unprecedented possibilities for the self-expression of nations and for the truly equitable participation in this process of all states, large, medium-sized and small, members of alliances or not.

The future common European home will be the result of the pooled efforts and cooperation of absolutely all European states and all the regions of the continent.

AT THE MEDITERRANEAN CROSSROADS

Valentin ALEXANDROV

The diplomatic and political dictionaries that will be coming out soon are bound to have under the letter "M" entries devoted to the summit between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President George Bush off the coast of Malta.

Generally speaking, there are many such associations in international relations: Brest, Yalta, Helsinki, Reykjavik. They are linked with events which have determined the world situation for a long time to come. There are small towns on this list, such as Rapallo and Rambouillet, and there are places that you can hardly find on the map. Now the venue of a summit between the leaders of the two superpowers is connected with the name of an insular republic in the Mediterranean Sea.

Under the circumstances, there has been a flurry of interest in Malta. It is only natural to want to know a bit more about the socio-political environment in which the top-level talks were held. We believe that the course of non-alignment and neutrality which this country pursues and its orientation for peaceful economic and cultural cooperation with East, West, North and South alike helped create a good political climate for the Soviet-American summit, the consequences of which are important for everyone.

HOWEVER, Malta's past and present have their own value, and they are not solely of applied importance. The history of our official ties is almost 300 years old. They were established by Peter the Great, developed by Catherine the Great and greatly enhanced by her son Pavel, who received the title of Grand Master of the Maltese Order.

The shadow of British colonial power which fell on Malta as a result of the victory of Admiral Horatio Nelson over Napoleon's fleet halted for a long time the formation of these relations. However, since the British flag was lowered from the flagstaff of Valletta Fortress a quarter of a century ago, cooperation was provided with fresh prospects for growth.

Today fishing and lumber boats are built here for the Soviet Union, and orders for the Soviet light industry are filled. Soviet freighters and tankers are frequent guests in the elongated, fjord-like Grand Harbour. Seven Aeroflot's transcontinental routes have stops in Malta.

What are the people of this country like? What are their living and working conditions and what can their experience provide?

Many people in their childhood conjured up romantic notions of the island of Malta, or rather a group of five islands, in the Mediterranean Sea. The islands themselves are pictured as inaccessible granite or basalt cliffs splashed by high waves. Towering somewhere on slopes are medieval castles with flags adorned with the Maltese Cross. Cannon are pointed towards the sea, and warships stand on the roadstead.

Present-day reality differs greatly from this widespread notion. The islands are rocky, but the cliffs are of soft goldcoloured lime. Small

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sailboats and motorboats do a quadrille on the mostly calm waves of the blue sea, and fancy giant passenger ships are tied tightly to moorings.

Although Valletta Fortress bristles with guns, they were fearsome only for people at best in the 19th century, while today preschoolers climb over them as everywhere else where the weapons of the past have become museum exhibits.

To make a test of sea water, it is enough to carefully look at the smallest quantity of it, if it reflects the main properties of the ocean. To me, Malta is such a drop, which has absorbed many facets of our civilisation. Phoenecians, Romans, Saracens, Crusaders, Italians, French, British, Tunisians and Lybians—so much intertwined here before an independent ethnos—the Maltese people—formed on this tiny piece of land.

Much in Malta is Mediterranean—the climate, vegetation, architecture. But the people is an independent entity, with its reserved and kindly character and solid values of family, hard work, traditions, religions and others which comprise its balanced tenor. Its speech is an astonishing blend of two linguistic principles: one is from the Semitic group and the other from the Iaphetic languages, and the grammar and vocabulary are an intertwining of modern Arabic and Italian and are so intricate that neither Arab neighbours from the South nor Italians from the North can make out what the 340,000 inhabitants of the insular state are talking about.

Situated over an area less than the size of Moscow, are several towns with plants, wharfs, repair docks and workshops. Nearby are villages, gardens and grazing land, ports, airstrips, beaches, ruins and palaces, and even an uninhabited desert.

In the political arena, there are four parties, two of which alternate in office. In the international sphere, the Republic of Malta is a country with its own opinion and an active participant in the N+N movement, where the Maltese have also managed to accentuate their originality by becoming a rare member of the world community which has proclaimed non-alignment and neutrality its credo.

PERESTROIKA AND ITS FRIENDS

IN OUR CONTACTS with people from other countries, a new, brief, password of sorts appeared not too long ago. In the most different situations—from presentations to a minister to talks with a boatman—one can hear: "Are you from Russia? Perestroika—Gorbachev!" This is always said with affection, and often with a smile.

What is this perception of our country linked with? After all, you are talking to people from different walks of life, of different levels of knowledge, and political views. Evidently, there are many reasons: the lessening of tensions, elimination of armed conflagrations, the scrapping of missiles, and so on. But this does not seem to be everything. People have also begun to perceive us benevolently through the system of subconscious feelings. Our attempts through interlocutors to find the key to the enigma yielded an unexpected answer: fear always came from you, they would reply, but now there is a smile, "socialism with a smiling face—this is great!"

Shortly before my trip to the island last September at the invitation of the Communist Party of Malta, I met, in Moscow, the leader of the Maltese Communists, Central Committee General Secretary Antony Vassallo. Our talk touched upon many topics, but what I found most revealing was one of them, which attested to the universality of social interests and ideas which unite people from totally different countries.

We talked about the passions that were running high in some parts of the USSR regarding the Soviet-German treaties of 1939. It turned out

that the guest from Malta not only was well familiar with the problem but also had at his command information which the layman is not privy to but which requires delving into special literature.

Antony Vassallo presented to us one of the books he had taken along with him as an example of the literature published in the West on the topic of the start of the Second World War. This was a work by the British historian Christopher Simpson. The host of interesting documents contained in it led the reader to the definitive conclusion of the political short-sightedness of the Soviet leadership, which had not realised the danger of allied ties with Hitler. Following the persistent stereotypes of most Western researchers, the author, together with exposing Stalin and his associates, cast a pall of suspicion on the principled foundations of Soviet policy.

"The question is of interest to everyone," Antony Vassallo said, and people in Malta are also disputing whether secret protocols to the treaties had been signed or not. We have to get to the truth. We need to come out in the press. And we are not finding Soviet books with fresh materials and new documents."

Regrettably, this is just how things stand. On the most acute problems we usually do not open our mouths until the events pass, and only later, in hindsight, put out publications. This was the case last summer, too. A book of relevant documents appeared in the USSR not by August 23, i. e., the 50th anniversary of the first of the series of Soviet-German treaties, but only by November, i. e., with a substantial lag behind public interest. And if in far-off Malta inquisitive people were sensing a lack of argumentation in Moscow's stand, then you can imagine the shortfall of information in the areas that were in the epicentre of the polemics, for example, in the Baltic republics and Moldavia.

Thus, without even leaving the confines of my home town, I received the first fact for reflection from contacts with a representative of the insular republic.

The headquarters of the Communist Party is located in the centre of Valletta in small Melita Street. It is hard to park here. The narrow streets haven't widened an inch over the past few centuries, and the buildings look at one another like polished showcases, so a passer-by sometimes finds himself as if between the leaves of a mirror.

What to do about the auto crunch? There are 120,000 of cars here, or one car per three people. The parking difficulty dictates the fashions—even the fanciest cars are small. The most popular are miniature and unassuming, such as, the Skoda, to the honour of Czechoslovak designers. Nothing goes wrong with this car, we were told by our interlocutors, and it can squeeze into a space that only a baby carriage can fit into.

The party headquarters as if personifies the logic of male housekeeping: all the space is taken up by books, folders, recording equipment, artifacts from different countries and a host of other objects whose purpose is substantiated remembrance. However, there is no sense of museum quiet here; these things are instead perceived as proof of problems that still have to be resolved.

Next to the offices is a small hall for meetings, sittings and discussions. The chairs have plane-tables for taking notes. There is a projector. In winter people gather here to listen and debate. In the hot season public life has a different pace, confining itself to the measures which the mandatory calendar dictates.

The party issues the newspaper *Zminijietna*, which comes out in two languages—three pages in Maltese and the last, in English. The World Marxist Review is issued four times a year in Maltese; it includes publications of the journal of the same name which is put out in Prague.

The democratism of the bourgeois world is not enough for these pu-

blications to reach the retail network, which is controlled by adherents of other parties. The publications of the Communist Party are circulated by activists themselves.

The status of the Communist Party in society is proof of the political pluralism as, probably, is the activity of any other non-ruling party. The Maltese Communists' organisation is rather young, judging by the time the party was officially registered. The republic itself marked the 25th anniversary of its independence in October 1989, the party is five years younger. Thus far it may be difficult to talk about its being a mass party, but it is quite correct to speak about its being recognised as a full-fledged component of civil society.

However, the Communist Party was not recognised overnight in the system of political pluralism. Under the colonial regime, our hosts recalled, everyone who propagated Marxism was under surveillance, and hence ostracised. There was a vacuum around people who were branded "Communists". In shops people turned their backs on them, and their children were pushed out of schools. The political terror made itself felt somewhat later as well. As soon as an election campaign began, Vassallo said, their home would turn into a besieged fortress. At night people would bang on the door and shout outside the windows. "Get out of here! Go to your Russians!" In neighbouring homes there was no reaction. No one would turn on the light, no shutter would open. It was as if the street had died out. The police would be in no hurry to respond to our calls. Even if they did come, it was only by the time the thugs dispersed. "What were they trying to achieve?"

"They wanted us to give up everything, repudiate our views and, still better, run away from here," Vassallo replied. "This would have been proof for them not only of the weakness of Marxism but also of the power of the conservatives from the Nationalist Party. Such a turnabout, you see, would have frightened some people and given the right-wingers more votes at the elections. So we had to fight for recognition. With the consolidation of our stands pluralism became stronger, and this is a gain for the whole of society".

The intertwining and proximity of different outlooks sometimes create intricate combinations not only in the political structure but also in everyday life. One example is the family of Lourens Borda, one of our "guardians" during our stay in Malta. He is a member of the Communist Party leadership. His older brother is the Speaker of Parliament and a prominent figure in the Nationalist Party, his younger brother works in the police and so cannot be a member of a party, his wife is a figure in the Labour Party, and his parents have always supported the Labourites.

When asked how he got on in such a multi-party community Lourens answered simply: "When we meet we don't talk about politics; our father has strictly ordered us not to argue about any political issues at home—for that they should find a different time and place."

That's pluralism of life for you. We then exchanged views. Here, somewhere in Moscow's Maryina Roshcha neighbourhood even brothers or friends in the same party today argue themselves hoarse not just about anything, but about politics, whether at a New Year's party or a birthday get-together. Once friends and I argued until four in the morning, differing in our assessments of the ethnic groups of the Crimea, which none of us belonged to.

Pluralism of party views is shifted here to developments in state life, too, up to and including national holidays. Thus, the 25th anniversary of the republic's independence, which was officially celebrated last September, was not supported by the biggest opposition party—the Labourites.

"What independence are you talking about?" representatives of the Labour leadership explained their stand. "The Nationalist Party that was in power in 1964 proclaimed sovereignty purely formally, while the country remained under the authority of the British crown, and foreign troops were deployed on a base here. This is occupation, not independence. Only our Labour government, by having the base dismantled, in 1979, and proclaiming a republic, ensured real independence. This is the date we mark."

It should be said that most ordinary people considered it unnecessary for them to ascertain where the historical truth was here and where political ambitions were; they enjoyed taking part in the festive parades, processions, concerts and exhibitions, and descended upon the centre of the capital and on the embankments to enjoy the firework displays.

Differing in their assessment of the importance of the different stages of the country's history, the leaders of the Nationalist and Labour parties have acted in accordance with pluralist views. five national holidays were declared in the country, the priority of each of them rising depending on who is in power at the moment. The electors do not protest against the multiple interpretation of history, and this is only understandable, as a few days of rest do not encroach upon anyone's interests.

TOURIST MECCA

MALTA CAN WELL BE CALLED a tourist Mecca, although this comparison requires clarification. For extensive pilgrimages it has the ancient capital of Mdina, the very name of which (in Arabic it means "city") also captures forever memory of the bygone domination of the caliphate, and links with Medina, the second most important shrine in the Moslem world.

The country is flooded by tourists, their yearly number reaching 750,000—two tourists per indigenous resident. They are everywhere—not only on the beaches and in the museums, but also in the business and trade part of the capital, in the port and villages, and they even wander about the desert hills of the uninhabited island of Comino.

Each of them stays an average of two weeks and spends 150 lire, i. e., about 400 dollars, which on the whole yields one-fifth of the gross national product. Consequently, tourism is a major area of the economy. And people take a serious attitude to it, everyone calculating where to invest money and how to make best use of the available assets.

The stake is made not only on hotel service but also on accommodation in private homes. Each of these two sectors can provide shelter for more than 20,000 people simultaneously. However, hotels are more expensive, so many tourists prefer private homes and flats. And food there is much cheaper than in restaurants, for that matter.

Of course, the development of "home" service of tourists definitely presupposes ample supplies of food to the cities. What is more, tourists do not want to spend long hours in front of the stove. The great diversity of oven-ready foods—frozen fish and meat dishes, down to dumplings—helps solve this problem. Powdered soup and tinned fillets are a permanent fixture at domestic hotels. For this reason we, for example, would have to substantially broaden the line-up of products to enable this type of tourism to take hold in our country.

There is one curious detail in the hotel business. The authorities have involved in this sector of the economy the possibilities of conversion, i. e., the use of a military installation for civilian purposes. Take, for example, the fashionable Holiday Inn situated in the former British barracks near

Valletta Fortress. By all indications, the British put up this facility figuring that their garrison would be here forever. The overplanned barracks incorporated a set of all hotel services, complete with a swimming pool, sauna, musical bar and casino.

The presence of a large number of Britons—up to 60 per cent of all the visitors—is not only proof of the pursuit of a change of scenery, which they have long regarded as a part of their habitual way of life. This is also a derivative of the policy of many government cabinets of Great Britain.

Forced to grant Malta initially truncated autonomy and semi-independence, and then full independence, and to remove the military base from here, London preserved solid economic positions and cultural and simply human ties on the islands. The owners of many residential and business dwellings permanently live in Britain and come here once or twice a year. For some Britons it is a long-standing tradition to spend all or part of their vacations and holidays in Malta. For the subjects of Her Majesty everything is just as familiar here as in the British Isles, only a bit cheaper due to the still existing difference in wage level. So up to half a million Britons, chiefly from the "middle class", come here every year.

For official London as well, it is of no small importance to preserve British presence in the former colony. The long-standing principle of "leave to stay" is fully manifest here. Britain was supposed to leave its former possessions, and it did so. An end was put to colonialism. However, preservation of solid ties with the insular republic is in Britain's interests: economic (trade and direct investments), cultural (an education received in Britain is considered the most prestigious in Malta), and humanitarian. Thus, some islands are tied to others by far more solid systems of tethering than the mooring ropes on the piers of Valletta.

At the festivities marking the 25th anniversary of Malta's independence the republic's achievements scored over the years of independent development were discussed in detail. Mention was also made of the struggle for independence. Everything looked as if the struggle had been waged against some monster of colonialism that had remained in the distant past and was not burdening at all current relations between the republic and Great Britain. What was said was also confirmed by the participation in the celebrations of the Duke of Edinburgh, the husband of the Queen of England, who together with other guests seemed to be sharing the hosts' joy over the anniversary of liberation from British rule.

What is this? Mimicry or wisdom? The ability to adapt to what has happened, or the capacity to take a reciprocal step an instant before the inevitable and turn defeat into a general victory? Is this not the staunchness of the nominal royal power which, as it may seem, has outlived its time? Is this not the solidness of the Commonwealth, when several dozen sovereign states display conscious concern for the preservation of close trade, financial and intellectual ties with the former mother country?

After all, not all of them are comparable with Malta in number of square kilometres and thousands of residents. There are also such giants as India, Pakistan, Canada and Australia. They can be at odds with one another, they can be swept by fierce civil conflicts—this in effect does not seem to affect London. However, for all the political, economic and religious conflicts, they have a sufficient amount of common interests which ensures the preservation of the nucleus of invisible but solid ties.

At one of the festive events in the Maltese capital one could observe how reverently yet with a sense of their own dignity the country's officials treat the Queen's husband. The hall was bedecked with the por-

traits of the grandees of the Maltese Order and the monarchs of the British Empire. Also here was the state flag: a red-white sheet, and in the upper corner, by the flagstaff—a cross framed by the inscription "For Gallantry". This is an image of the British combat decoration, which was awarded to Malta for its contribution to the struggle of the anti-Hitler coalition against fascism.

WHY THERE IS NO RACKET HERE!

AFTER ALL THE TALK about the crimes committed by racketeers in Moscow, after the reports of the USSR Ministry of the Interior and the Leningrad-based TV show "600 Seconds" about raids, seizures, arrests and shooting with all types of privately owned guns, the impression is created that hordes of thieving extortionists are on the loose wherever there are private enterprise and petty tradesmen. Here, in Malta, there are 1,500 small businesses—one per 100 of the gainfully-employed population. It would seem that an underworld should be the most natural thing.

However, there hasn't been a racket here since as far as people can remember, although, generally speaking, some shops are quite comparable to Moscow cooperatives in the number of goods and sales. True, we are not talking about the goods' quality and diversity. However, for all the abundance of potential objectives for extortion, nobody's life is made miserable by the racket. Why? I often put this question to my interlocutors. Some looked at me with disdain, but most eagerly shared their considerations on this score.

The first and most important thing is the inviolability of private property. It is protected by the full force of the law. Encroachments on property are severely punishable by law and unambivalently considered a great evil. And if the country is small to boot, a criminal cannot find protectors.

"Isn't property in your country protected by law?" people asked me. I had to answer somewhat evasively: it depends on what kind of property. If it's the state's property, then the law functions strictly; but if it's private property, the law is more lax. Even the special law-enforcement agency, the Department for Fighting Embezzlement of Socialist Property, is engaged in the protection of public property, overlooking crimes against private citizens.

"What do you want then?" they asked me after this explanation. "If you have several gradations of punishment for the same criminal sin of theft, you are letting potential criminals know that the state cannot be robbed, but private citizens may in effect be, even though this is not permitted. Your legislation encourages gangsterism, for you have created a zone of reduced responsibility if you are punishing a criminal not for what he has stolen but for whom he has stolen it from."

Indeed, why do we have such legislation? Perhaps in the past, when the Revolution had just been accomplished and there still were exploiter classes, it was not considered shameful to expropriate an expropriator even in the form of ordinary robbery. Today, however, the situation is different. Liability for encroachments on property should be different, too; it should be equally severe, no matter whom the property belongs to—the state, a collective farm or the private sector.

HOW NESTS ARE WOVEN

IN KEEPING WITH LONG-STANDING TRADITION, a bride and a bride-groom must build a house or buy a flat before they get married. They often arrange for the wedding to take place a year and a half later.

Why so long? Housing has to be built. And young people work hard on any job, even at two.

All occupations in Malta are prestigious and respectable, whether you're a waiter, wash dishes, or work in a factory, workshop or store. The main thing is to earn money fast in order to create your hearth and home. Parents help out, but young people must earn the bulk of it themselves.

This money is bolstered by a credit, which enables the young couple to acquire housing—a basic standard. This is a home or flat with three bedrooms and two bathrooms, a men's and a women's. There may be other rooms depending on the earnings, but no less. This is approximately 150 sq m of overall space. In family homes there should be at least a tiny indoor garden with two or three trees.

The average wage at a factory or workshop where unmarried girls are employed is 38 lire a week, or 40, together with bonuses and other incentives; this amounts to 180 lire a month, or about 2,000 lire (over 5,000 dollars) a year.

The groom should have higher earnings. During the period preceding the wedding, the parents usually provide for the young peoples' upkeep. By the time they are married the newlyweds should have accumulated not less than 5,000 lire.

In buildings more than three storeys high ferro-concrete—monolithic construction of the foundation of the building—is widely used. The thickness of the walls, frames and roofing is much greater than the average, perhaps with due consideration for seismicity. In any event, it seems that what is being built is not housing but production premises or an institution that is expected to stand for centuries.

Family-type buildings are put up chiefly from local stone. Panels are delivered of approximately the same format as the slag-concrete ones in our country. The slabs are put through a calibrating machine and evened out, which improves work quality. The cost of a basic home is 10,000 lire, 5,000 of which the newlyweds must pay immediately. The remaining 5,000 they receive as a bank credit with the permission of a special department headed by a parliamentary secretary. A minimal 2 per cent annual interest rate for 25 years is imposed on the credit. Newlyweds are issued land plots, but not on the coast, of course, where land is very expensive.

Much is done by the would-be residents themselves—the wiring, facing and additional decorating. Couples compete in a way to see who builds and fits their home the best. Housing construction is a great incentive to work. First you need to earn 5,000, then you have to do something yourself to make the home better and more comfortable; what is more, this gives one fine skills in construction and household work. It is evidently for this reason that Maltese are constantly renovating and improving their homes.

MALTESE AND THEIR VALUES

MALTESE ARE A RESERVED PEOPLE, living up to the canons of their Catholic civilisation. One of the values of society is the family. In the evening entire families go to embankments. Here they socialise, exchange news, and discuss various problems. Evening life begins after sunset—at 7 or 8 o'clock, and continues until 10 or 11. Children of all ages are with their parents.

Divorce is prohibited by the Church. However, the strictness of the Church has not halted the penetration of the divorce virus here either. People have begun living together in "illegitimate" families, extramaritally, and there are even statistics to the effect. Others, in order to

divorce, go to Italy or Britain. There their divorce is registered. After this they may remarry, but not in church, only in a civil ceremony. A sort of second-rate family ensues.

Children leave their parents' nest right after they start their own families. They marry early—at 18. As a rule, the woman does not work or works until the first child is born. The husband is the main, and more often than not, the only breadwinner in the family. This maintains the patriarchal structure in society.

Since one-third of the population draws its income from a well-developed tourist industry, this probably accounts for the people's politeness, benevolence and hospitality. The following is one small example. In a porcelain shop the owners, expressing in their own way their concern for the safe-keeping of the fragile items, had a sign reading: "We break—we cry, you break—you pay." No one is insulted, but this puts everyone on his guard.

Motivation to acquire a clientele, as well as a lifestyle with close ties with family and friends creates an atmosphere of reserve and a striving to show respectability and therefore tranquillity and a sober way of life. Not only drunks, even people who have had a few drinks cannot be seen in the streets, although nothing, neither wine nor hard liquor, is prohibited.

The experience of bilingualism in Malta is interesting. We have already dealt with the Maltese language above. However, aside from it, virtually the entire population knows English, which is the language of international communication. No one introduces it by force today. Simply, the Maltese realise that in communicating with others you can't get by with your native tongue—you will be left isolated. So English is in use, even though the process of Maltesation has narrowed the sphere of its application.

The influence of the Church is felt everywhere. There are many churches—one per 300 of the population. The pealing of bells can be heard in any point of the city. The archbishop or papal nuncio are invariably greeted with applause. People run over to kiss their hand and receive if only in passing a blessing for themselves or their children. Clergymen bestow their blessings not importunately but benevolently. The parish priest is both a shepherd of souls and keeper of morality, and a sort of commissar and even a secular authority to a certain extent. Each year the priest visits all the houses of the parish and blesses them, and speaks to and blesses the people.

The value system of the community life that has been preserved includes the tradition of "open-doors days", which here refers not to educational institutions during the admissions period but to the sphere of ordinary people-to-people contacts. As a rule, it is the custom to go visiting during the Christmas and other holidays. The host informs friends when he will be having open doors for guests. They drop by without prior notification. The hosts offer simple appetizers, light wines and beer. What is this? Proof of prosperity and leisure time and the absence of scarce goods? Or recognition of the values of simple human communication, when lively conversation, a smile and a handshake are more important than fancy parties. When you see such communication in other cities and countries you sense a need for such contact at home.

EACH PERIOD MAKES ITS IMPRINT on perception of life abroad. At one time we were separated from the rest of the world by the Iron Curtain, looking from behind which we were surprised to see that there were people there, too. People there were just as surprised to see that Soviets were not pithecanthropi. Then the curtain was removed and con-

tacts broadened, but things, did not go beyond inquisitiveness. The dominant feeling was that the systems were not dovetailing. They were one way, we were another, and we would never get together.

We don't know how long things would have continued this way if our world-outlook had not started changing together with the restructuring of the political system of Soviet society. And today we have sensed that all of us are part of a single whole—a great and diverse world.

Today, foreign experience has become for us part of our own and universal experience. Cognising this, we are broadening our own possibilities a little, too. I think that we would do well to apply in our life the good qualities of life from the island of Malta.

When I was flying to Malta I thought that even the main island, after which the country is named, could easily be walked around on foot, as it is only 17 by 24 km. When I was returning, however, I realised that space here is not associated with simple measures of length. It includes the time of previous epochs and therefore should probably have completely different dimensions.

Today the history of the republic has been enriched with another milestone. One can only imagine how all-knowing guides are lecturing crowds of excited tourists in Republic Street or in Barrakka Garden about how the distinguished guests of both powers were in this place, that they approached the palace from this side, and the church from that side. There is nothing bad about this, as remembrance of big events lives on in small things, too.

During the Soviet-American talks on ships just off the coast of Malta, a meeting of representatives of the European public advocating peace and cooperation was held in the nation's capital. Perhaps this was pure coincidence, but a pattern is manifest in it, too. After all, there are countries whom destiny has made bridges of trust between opposing states, blocks and systems. Austria, Finland and Switzerland are examples. Each of them is at the juncture of some interests.

Were Malta to be added to this small number on a lengthy or permanent basis, this would not be surprising. After all, it is a country at the juncture of North and South, an area of blocs and non-alignment. Its N+N status is respected by everyone. During the Second World War it was called an unsinkable aircraft carrier. However, it can also be a stable haven of hopes, in which many have a vital interest.

On the islands themselves, a course has been definitively set for peace with distant and close neighbours. Beyond the bounds of the islands a big stake has been placed on the good prospects that have manifested themselves under the impact of the Soviet-American summit held here.

ON THE EMERALD ISLE

Gennadi URANOV

THE FIRST-EVER SOVIET-IRISH SUMMIT took place at the Shannon International Airport on the Atlantic coast of the Republic of Ireland on April 2, 1989. The talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Charles Haughey marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of Soviet-Irish relations and outlined the areas of substantive action for promoting the dialogue between the two countries. The idea was to make it workable and effective in every aspect of bilateral relations.

The atmosphere of the meeting and its far-reaching effect, even though it was a brief meeting were tangible evidence of the notable headway in relations between the USSR and Ireland in recent years and, in their turn, reflected positive shifts in world affairs. This is all the more remarkable since the Soviet-Irish component of European realities has been in the shadow, as it were, or, one may say, on the European sidelines, for many years, notably, after the Second World War.

Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Ireland are about the "youngest" in Europe, just a little over fifteen years old. The very fact of their opening in 1973—with the process of detente in full swing in Europe and, indeed, in the world—was yet another specific manifestation of that process. Besides, it meant overcoming both European and still wider and involved historical complications and their particular and at times rather negative projection on the development of bilateral links and contacts. Yet it should be noted that Russia, both before and after the October Revolution has shown profound interest in, and sincere sympathy for, Ireland, her courageous and talented people and her trying history.

The Irish people's struggle over the centuries for their national dignity and independence has forged such qualities as persistence in achieving their ends, national pride, an ability to brave the hardest tests of reality, seek and find bold sometimes quite unexpected solutions. The rich mental values the Irish people stand by have found their striking expression in their distinctive culture which has made a fitting contribution towards advancing modern civilisation.

It is likewise worth recalling that the Irish people's heroic and stout battle for their freedom, for deliverance from colonial dependence, and for the rebirth of their statehood always attracted the close attention of our country's democratic opinion. V. I. Lenin's works, concerning "the Irish question" in one way or another and carrying forward Marx's and Engels' searching analysis of the subject, added much to revolutionary theory.

The peoples of the two nations displayed profound mutual solidarity in the most dramatic periods of their history and at the turning points

of the struggle for their national regeneration and liberation. The emergency session of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, meeting in Dublin on November 1, 1918, passed a resolution in support of Soviet Russia. And in February, 1919, the leaders of the Irish labour movement, T. Johnson and K. O'Shannon pointed out in a report to the Irish TUC and the Labour Party that the Soviet Government of Russia is the best and most unselfish friend of Ireland.¹ It is likewise a matter of record that even before the independence of Ireland was officially proclaimed in December, 1921, Soviet and Irish representatives had been discussing the possibilities for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, mutual recognition and cooperation. This document had been drafted and agreed upon. However, because of a number of domestic political and international factors, the Irish representatives did not receive the powers at the time for carrying on the negotiations and signing the document.

Subsequently, the mood that prevailed rather often was one of mutual ignorance and mistrust. It was generally compounded by Ireland staying out of the Second World War—she maintained her status of a militarily neutral state. That accounted, in particular, for the reserve and restraint that the Soviet Government exercised for a long time during the cold war in respect of Ireland's admission to the UN. Later on, however, multi-lateral diplomacy was instrumental in bringing our two countries into contact which led to their respective Foreign Ministers signing a document at the 1973 UN General Assembly session about establishing diplomatic relations between them at ambassador level.

The facts show that in spite of great distances, especially by the standards of bygone times and the differences of historical destinies, links between the two countries had existed for a long time, if mostly sporadic and, one might say, only at leadership level. True, at some points they seemed to be drawing closer to each other and friendship and cooperation between their peoples looked like becoming a reality. But that did not happen. Of course, there has never been any confrontation, let alone armed confrontation, between our peoples.

These specifics of relationship prevented the two countries from coming into sufficiently close contact with one another. I would even say that the relationship was one of certain estrangement and mutual ignorance. Hence a lot of unjustified Irish prejudice and the Soviet people's poor idea of Ireland. Right until quite recent times, for instance, there had been far more knowledge in our country about the developments in Northern Ireland than about the tenor of life, troubles and expectations in the Republic of Ireland. Some of my friends, having learned about my forthcoming departure for Dublin, told me to be careful as there was an involved situation there, with people shooting and getting killed. They, just like many others in our country, had simply confused Dublin with Belfast and the situation in the Republic of Ireland with that of Northern Ireland which forms part of Great Britain.

SO I GOT DOWN TO MY JOB in the Irish Republic in November, 1986. That was the period when the process of reshaping and revolutionary revitalising of Soviet society had already become quite tangible and started to have a positive effect on the international situation.

Yet one could not describe Soviet-Irish relations as active and as responding to the spirit of the times, particularly in the conditions of the latter half of the 1980s. Proceeding from the meaning of the reform process which involved Soviet diplomacy, too, it was logical to believe that the wind of good change in the world must not bypass relations between Moscow and Dublin either and that, consequently, one could

and must seek and find the ways of promoting and extending wide-ranging cooperation between the two countries.

The subsequent years confirmed that the changeability of the Irish weather did not in any way affect the stable improvement of the climate of mutual confidence which was gaining ground in the relationship between the two countries against the favourable background of the overall improvement of the situation in Europe, in the world and, notably, in relations between the USSR and the US. One could not fail to sense that the fog of mistrust of our country was progressively lifting and that this process, besides, moved both horizontally—from the capital all the way into the Irish hinterland, and, I would say, vertically. Positive interest in the USSR, which had previously been common only to the country's left forces, began to grow in official and political circles as well, in youth, women's, and trade union organisations and among businessmen and schoolchildren, scientists and farmers, teachers and engineers and even among the clergy, in short, practically in all the sections and social strata of Irish society.

I have heard quite often both before and after coming to Ireland that anti-Soviet and anti-Socialist feeling had for many years been fostered by the most influential Catholic church for various reasons, including ideological considerations. But the celebrations of the 1000th anniversary of Russian christianisation in 1988, which became one of the momentous events of the period of reform, prompted the clergy all over the world (naturally, in Ireland, too) to take a new look at the foreign and domestic policy of Soviet society going through a process of renewal. There was a significant episode: at a reception in Dublin a local Catholic hierarch approached me and asked, "Why don't you invite us, the prelates, to the Soviet Embassy?" I replied that even if we had not, it was easy to put things right now, but would he come at our invitation? My interlocutor, just as some other Irish clergymen, did arrive for the Embassy reception marking the anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7.

The revolutionary process of change in the USSR and the effect it had on our foreign policy induced most of the Irish to reconsider their standard approach to what they used to call "Red Russia" and allowed the Irish leadership, businessmen, and a growing body of public opinion to transform their guarded attitude not only into sound interest in this process but also into an active desire to develop mutually useful relations with it.

The reserve and occasionally inimical reactions against the Soviet way of life, which had been not infrequent until quite recently, are vanishing right before your eyes. A new, predominantly well-wishing and constructive atmosphere is building up around Soviet people working or just coming to Ireland. Indeed, the overall relationship between our two countries has become markedly warmer and closer. The traditional Irish interest in a cultural association with us has started to spread to the economic area, scientific and technological cooperation and political contacts. Today, the Irish not only stop short of translating the words "perestroika" and "glasnost" into English but more and more often spell the Russian words in their Latin characters even in the course of internal political discussions, scientific papers and even in parliamentary debates.

It is indicative that when the Tipperary County Peace Convent awarded its annual prize to Mikhail Gorbachev in January, 1989, and found him "the Man of the Year" for his efforts for peace and the prosperity of humanity, that decision earned nation-wide approval.

Good changes in the Irish moods made the Ireland-USSR Society more active and inspired more invitations to Soviet people to take part in

most diverse activities, in scale and character, on Irish territory. The Irish media have been showing appreciably greater interest in Soviet topics, and there has been a swelling stream of letters and all kinds of messages from the Irish to the Soviet Embassy and other Soviet institutions in Ireland, all expressing a desire to learn more about the USSR and to promote friendship between the two nations.

The tragic aftermath of the earthquake in Armenia in December, 1988, evoked an unprecedented outburst of compassion and sympathy for the USSR. The Irish demonstrated that feeling in most diverse forms—from telephone calls and visits to the Embassy to sign the book of condolences to providing large cash and other material assistance. Over a million and a half Irish pounds were raised. The Irish showed solidarity and lent medical assistance in connection with the railway disaster in Bashkiria.

What is one likely to think about in analysing the present state of, and prospects for Soviet-Irish relations? First of all, one realises that for all the distinctions between the ways of life and policies of our two countries, they have many things in common, proceeding from general European and common human values and the interest that is common to the two nations in ensuring peace and security and promoting broad and effective international cooperation.

Yet another point one is bound to think about is that with more knowledge gained about each other, our peoples will, beyond doubt, discover much that can make their communication more beneficial and mutually useful, actually conducive towards the cultural, intellectual and material progress of both countries. That is why the Embassy considers it to be a point of its major concern at the present juncture in Soviet-Irish relations to help the Soviet people learn more about Ireland, and the Irish, more about the USSR. This is particularly important if only because there are many things that we are learning about each other for the first time, as it were, because our official mutual recognition is of quite recent origin, yet that is the starting point in promoting mutual confidence, understanding and friendly cooperation. It is very good that practical steps have been taken by both sides in this direction. A correspondent of *The Irish Times*, one of the leading Irish newspapers, has been accredited in Moscow since 1987. A decision of principle has been taken about the opening of a Novosti office in Dublin.

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IRELAND, A SMALL NATION IN THE FAR WEST OF EUROPE, lives its own inimitable life, though, naturally, much of her reality does reflect in its own way the things that are common to the contemporary international community. She is an inseparable element of the Western world, its general politics and its ideological, social and economic standards. Like any other nation, Ireland and her people have quite a few accomplishments and achievements to their credit, but at the same time she has to overcome serious difficulties and grapple with political, economic, social and other problems on a national and smaller scale. Many of these problems have been inherited from the country's colonial past, while others have arisen from the complexities of the international order, notably, from the country's involvement in the processes of West-European integration.

Ireland's foreign debt is big, particularly if compared with her gross national product. The share of foreign trade in her economic balance is invariably growing and so is the need for foreign investment to help modernise her economy. The natural population growth is "eaten up" by the annual emigration of 30,000-40,000 Irishmen, above all, young people, going abroad in search of work. There are very dramatic social

problems, like a shortage of resources for education, medical service, the pensions scheme and for the solution of other issues.

One of Ireland's deepest-seated problems for decades has been the aftermath of the country's 1921 break-up when Ireland had six northern counties alienated from her and incorporated in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The North Irish or Ulster problem has since been one of the most complicated not only in the political life of Ireland herself but also in her relations with Great Britain. It sometimes produces difficulties on a larger international scale, too, quite often coming up for debate within the framework of the European Communities, too. The Irishmen in their overwhelming majority have been speaking out for a peaceful political resolution of this tragedy and for terrorism, extremism, division on religious grounds, and military occupation to give way to common sense and realism.

Ireland's fortunes have not shaped up the simple way, and even at this point she is living through what is by no means a simple period from most diverse points of view. There are recurrent hectic debates both in parliament between members of the five national parties represented there and within these parties themselves, trade unions and other organisations. There are, besides, mammoth street demonstrations and strikes at factories and offices. In short, so small a nation as Ireland has so many big and difficult problems to deal with, the ways to resolve them are sometimes controversial and the situation in the country is complex. And still the stout struggle of the inhabitants of the Emerald Isle for survival bears fruit. The Republic is well established in its unmatched place in the world community

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IT WAS FOR YEARS a custom for the foreign policy of the USSR to consider cooperation to be useful only with a relatively small number of states, regarding only the biggest of them as its worthy partners. That applied, notably, to the economic, scientific and technological areas. What was left out of account was that even the largest Western states, possessing extensive financial, scientific, technological, manpower and other resources and potentialities, have always considered it a paying proposition for themselves, within the established framework of the international division of labour, to work together with small nations in those areas of their economy, technology and science where they are in the forefront for a variety of reasons.

In this context, one should note, in particular, that small nations have to wage a hard battle for survival in the face of stiff capitalist competition. This is a difficult thing to do, but it makes them seek and find such reserves as eventually assure them the requisite stability and competitive power as well.

Ireland, as a small nation, is well familiar with that. The Irishmen have exhibited enviable perseverance, intelligence and initiative for decades in constantly and not ineffectively overcoming recurrent difficulties and hardships, many of which have been predetermined by the country's colonial past and division. With a foreign debt exceeding her GNP, Ireland has been finding ways of attracting ever growing foreign investment in her economy, making headway both in modernising her industry and infrastructure and expanding and strengthening the ties with the world market. Ireland's membership of the EEC since 1973 and, still earlier on, of other international organisations and associations (as GATT, IMF, IBRD, and OECD) and her growing activity in building up her exports and external economic links in general are factors of no mean importance to her.

Ireland's political and economic potential, dwarfed by that of the Big Powers, compels her government and business community to make a close examination and learn to apply what are sometimes rather involved rules of the game in the international community and make full use of the potentialities they contain for the protection of the national interests and the achievement of the goals of vital concern to the nation. It is not by chance, therefore, that the Irishmen should have been the first to produce and give effect to the ideas of free economic zones (as the creation of the Shannon zone on what was actually a wilderness), duty-free shops in large airports and similar innovations which have earned common recognition. Some companies operating on the territory of Ireland represent appreciable accomplishments of world business by the daring option they have chosen to follow and by the scale and success of their performance. The world's largest leasing concern, Guinness Pete Aviation is a case in point.

If you take *Izvestia* of May 16, 1989, you will find an advertisement page in it devoted to the operations of this concern which has its headquarters in the Shannon free economic zone. The figures it contains are impressive: the concern has ordered 819 new aircraft worth a total of \$30 billion. Even at this point, the company has a large fleet of aircraft chartered by 64 air companies of 32 nations. But these figures will sound yet more impressive if you bear in mind that the firm came into existence just a little over 10 years ago with a fixed capital investment of only \$50,000! And that the concern has a staff, including management, of under 180!

High competence, a business-like approach and a knack of thoroughly analysing the world market situation and boldly looking ahead have combined to make it possible for the GPA to capture a leading position in the world in the purchase and leasing of airliners and transport aircraft. The GPA has been fast building up its assets, turnover and income. In the space of five years, its net profit (after the payment of taxes exceeding the profit by 6.5 times, as a rule!) has increased nearly 9-fold from \$12.8 million in 1984 to \$101.3 million in 1988.

The management of the company has shown interest in establishing contact with our Aeroflot and the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The first negotiations have already taken place and it is to be hoped that they will lead to mutually advantageous cooperation which can effectively contribute towards resolving our national economic problems as well.

The Irishmen are cleverly matching their strategic option with well-considered tactics based on a searching scientific analysis of present-day realities, attracting large numbers of practical workers and research centres of universities and a number of other organisations. A widely practised system of sounding public opinion on political and other nodal problems of Irish and international activities has also become an effective instrument of finding the most adequate solutions. Irish pragmatism in organising the academic and scientific processes in university and other higher education and in the promotion of managerism has earned international recognition. It is not by chance that thousands of foreign students should be studying at the universities of Dublin, Cork and Galway. These institutions maintain scientifically and practically effective links with the universities of most of the world's advanced nations.

SO WHAT IS SPECIFIC about the present state of Soviet-Irish relations? Can one claim that their potential has already been brought into play in full? Attempting an answer to the first question prompts me to state some considerations which go beyond, perhaps, the framework of

purely bilateral relations. The point is that in the context of the current process of reshaping the Soviet diplomatic service, it is becoming a matter of paramount importance to mobilise the human factor so as to have the competence, vision, resourcefulness and consistency of every diplomat—from attaché to ambassador—enable them to become not just exponents or champions of the interests of our foreign policy but its makers and generators of new ideas and bold solutions.

It is my firm conviction that the vigorous activity of the Soviet foreign service, with a view to bringing our country's foreign and domestic policy priorities into closer association, is a potent instrument of speeding up the process of reform in every area of Soviet life. But one thing that is absolutely necessary to do to achieve it is to ensure that no diplomatist finds himself not more than an official and that, on the contrary, each of them acts on behalf of this process. It will do us good to reshape our vision of the experience to hand and the prospect ahead in relations with small nations as well.

The reform process going on in the USSR, which is most directly affecting the operation of Soviet diplomacy, greatly enhances the role of the factors which make it possible to seek and discover opportunities for socialism to be woven in a fuller and more diversified way than ever before into the planet-wide context and, accordingly, using more of the world's positive experience in resolving our own national problems. I think that Soviet official representatives and Soviet institutions abroad can do much more than ever before in the study of this experience. But to do so it is necessary to take a new look at the goals, methods and means of their day-to-day activities.

The revolutionary essence of the reform process must be matched by no ordinary ideas and initiatives, solutions and actions. One thing that is very important in this respect, in my view, is a real switch from routine and "pure" politics and diplomacy to constant, purposeful and competent work on such questions and aspects of the international relations of the USSR as are particularly relevant for realising both our foreign and domestic policy objectives, including those essential to the national economy. A special responsibility of embassies in this respect is to lose no time in identifying such issues and problems and to concentrate the efforts of all the Soviet foreign service institutions in working on them with good effect.

On a larger plane, there is also the subject of specific aspects of the work of small embassies. I think their staff is by no means always appropriate to the "smallness" of the host country and the scale of its relationship with the USSR. There is, apparently, something to think about in this respect, too. But the qualitative aspect of the matter is also important. It is no secret that the staff of any embassy comprises strong, average and weak workers. And if in a big embassy there happens to be, say, one weak person for every ten or at the most one for every five, which is not so terrible after all, if undesirable, a weak official in every two or three in a small embassy would make for little comfort. Now that our diplomacy is switching over to a full-scale effort "all along the line", such a state of things becomes intolerable and downright prejudicial. And so we have to put paid to it. This, I think, must be one of the serious and pressing preoccupations in the personnel policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There are problems of material and technical facilities to ensure the proper operation of our small embassies, which are closely bound up with these issues. I am afraid that the principle which is still applied in their respect has hardly become an object of reform in the Soviet diplomatic service. Incidentally, there are still many outdated things having no direct connection with the potentialities created by present-day

realities as regards the organisation of monitoring the efficiency both of individual work and its performance and of the work of the ambassadors and embassies. More of openness and democratic and friendly comparison of the performance of different categories of embassies and well-organised monitoring of their work could do inestimable service in this respect.

Taking up more specific issues of Soviet-Irish cooperation, I would like to underline, first of all, that our Irish partners, just as our Western partners in general, highly appreciate it when our relations with them have a business-like and productive character, when they are free from bureaucratic trickery, verbal exercises and paper work, from a waste of energy, time and hard currency. For instance, the new stage in economic relations between our countries requires a new mode of approach to it. Our partners quite often and, apparently, rightly voice their surprise when some of the accords reached take too long to materialise or do not materialise at all, and when many Soviet organisations, invoking the problems of the reform policy, renounce the agreed actions or transactions and when the Irishmen sometimes find it rather difficult to obtain the necessary and by no means secret information about their Soviet partners, new elements in the organisations of Soviet external economic relations, names, addresses, etc.

There is an urgent need for change and even radical reshaping of the work of the mixed intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific and technological cooperation and of its working groups in order to make their performance more effective. There have to be some concrete moves to end a situation where commodity exchange between the USSR and Ireland in recent years has markedly went dwindling. However, much depends in this sense on whether or not we will be able to restructure it in keeping with modern requirements to meet the challenge of the times and the actual needs of both countries. The Embassy and entire Soviet staff in Ireland are now making an appreciably greater effort in this direction than they did just two or three years ago.

Economic, scientific and technological contacts between the USSR and Ireland may be said to be still in the opening stages. They are not great in terms of proportion for the time being, and fragmentary and sporadic in a number of cases. For a few years mutual trade has been marking time at about 50 million rubles a year. Ireland imports Soviet oil, a certain amount of coal, timber, Belarus tractors, VAZ motor vehicles, and some other commodities. We are traditionally buying coca-cola extract, a certain amount of agricultural produce and textiles. At the present time both sides concur in the view that although the potential of bilateral economic links has been explored, it is still far from being used in full, and the mechanism of using them needs to be improved. This subject has already become one of the principal aspects of the dialogue between Moscow and Dublin, especially after the Soviet-Irish summit meeting.

The task now is, as we, who work in Ireland, believe, to make this dialogue as substantive and as productive as possible. There is enough ground for doing so. There is the political will of both sides to extend and broaden economic cooperation, there are objective opportunities to make it mutually beneficial and there is some experience in making such practical moves which demonstrate a feasible opportunity of modernising the structure and qualitatively reshaping economic, scientific and technological links between the USSR and Ireland. The point is, first of all, to make these links incorporate exchanges in the most promising areas such as advanced industry and high-efficiency farming, effective areas of servicing which definitely dovetail with scientific progress and most advanced technologies as well as forward-looking trends in mentality and work.

There is some initial experience, furthermore, in promoting such a modern form of cooperation as joint ventures. In this sense we must note the already operating firms with the participation of our Aeroflot—there is the widely known duty-free shop in Sheremetyevo, which has already won an international prize, real cooperation in peat processing and a number of other areas (the investigation and exploitation of ocean bioresources, Ireland's involvement in the international Phobos space project, an exchange of scientists under an agreement between the Academies of Sciences of the two countries, etc.). There is a prospect for building up financial links which is particularly interesting because the currencies of both countries are not exactly convertible for the time being, although Ireland is well ahead of the USSR in achieving such convertibility.

Contacts on wide-ranging economic subjects have appreciably intensified in the very recent period. The joint effort of the two countries in exploring and exploiting bioresources, notably the fish stocks of the seas and oceans, can well become an important integrated area of cooperation before long. Some practical steps in this direction are already being taken. Negotiations are in progress to conclude a treaty for such cooperation to be based on. This process involves Soviet and Irish government departments and agencies and a number of specialised organisations and firms of both countries. It is now not only up to Moscow and Dublin, but also up to Archangel, Leningrad and other cities to do their part in promoting it.

There is a knot of purely scientific, technical, commercial as well as economic, monetary, financial and political questions to deal with. The latter occasionally go beyond the framework of national jurisdiction—the Irishmen, for example, have to look back over their shoulder upon the general policy of the European community in matters of fishing and the use of maritime economic zones. But cooperation along these lines is promising and mutually advantageous.

Some joint ventures undertaken in air traffic respond to the interests of both nations, too. The Air Rianta Co. already has a ramified network of cooperation with Aeroflot. A modern hangar has been built in Shannon for the painting and other servicing of big Soviet airliners. Undertakings of this kind enable Aeroflot to save hard currency and petrol. Neither does the Irish side stand to lose anything. At this point, Guinness Pete Aviation and the Irish public air company Air Lingus favour cooperation with the USSR on mutually beneficial terms. As a result of such cooperation the Soviet side can obtain additional technical facilities, new hotels, innovations in flying staff training, and additional chances to improve air passenger service, including that of domestic lines.

It is important already at this point to see that the differences in the system of external economic links of the two countries no longer obstruct cooperation between them and that, on the contrary, it acquires dependably operating forms and mechanisms and become an integrated living organism. It is this objective that our Embassy and other Soviet institutions in Ireland and the economic council they have set up under the Ambassador's auspices, are striving to achieve in a variety of ways, including a coordinating effort. But that is not so simple to do, considering the small number of Soviet staff in Ireland, still less so since, frankly speaking, we clearly have a shortage of very essential practical information about other countries (at least those who are similar to Ireland as regards the specific relationship with the USSR), and have yet to analyse the positive and negative experience of the present stage of the development of Soviet external economic links.

For example, we sometimes fail to understand why some commodities, essential to our country, which could be purchased in Ireland at prices that are no higher than elsewhere, but with an obvious advantage, say,

because of cheaper freight charges, should be purchased at about the same prices in countries far more distant from the USSR than Ireland. Is it a case of giving preference to some old, long-established connections, even though they no longer respond to the potentialities and requirements of the times by their cost parameters? Isn't it high time such connections were revised? One is likely to make such a conclusion, notably, on account of some manifestly unconvincing replies from the centre to our bewildered inquiries. In short, the area of the economy, science and technology is a fertile ground for both sides to exert their efforts in promoting efficient and promising cooperation to mutual benefit.

Much of what has already become customary and quite well working in relations between the USSR and other Western nations is so far absent or little manifest in our relations with Ireland. This is supposed to be due to the fact that official Soviet-Irish relations are of recent origin. I refer, in particular, to a set of political document characteristic of the USSR relations with a number of other countries, as well as the fairly broad contractual base for bilateral cooperation, the presence of a solid mechanism of such cooperation and, not the least, the traditions of intergovernmental and other bilateral links and contacts which have a history of decades and, perhaps, centuries, behind it.

However, there is every reason to believe that the Soviet-Irish dialogue will continue to be promoted with due regard for the wealth of international experience both countries have and will enable them to do it faster and better than ever before. Optimism has good ground to stand on, since the volume of scientific, cultural and sporting links between our countries and public exchanges between them have substantially increased in recent years. An Ireland-USSR parliamentary group was created in 1988 and a cultural agreement has been drafted and is ready to be signed; and regular annual consultations between the foreign offices of the two countries at deputy foreign minister level are becoming a standing practice.

THE MEASURE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING and the zone of similarity and identity of positions on the burning problems of modern times are large enough and, above all, tend to expand in the political dialogue of the two countries. This applies also to their views on the problems of ensuring peace and security in the fullest sense of the term and to their concepts of moving towards disarmament, nuclear disarmament above all, and towards preventing the militarisation of space and resolving the problems of environmental protection and development.

Our two countries have much in common in their modes of approach to the activities of the UN, in which the status of Ireland, as a militarily neutral nation outside of NATO, enables her to play an effective part in the search of political solutions to dramatic regional conflicts; and also in our assessments of apartheid. Both countries have been actively involved in the European process, in its political, economic and humanitarian dimensions. As noted earlier on, there has been a positive response in Ireland to the process of reform under way in the USSR and its international repercussions.

While the new mode of political thinking is making its way to the primacy of common human values in the life of the contemporary international community, that of deideologising of intergovernmental relations, their humanisation, the failure of the concepts and methods of force, dictatorial practices and confrontation, the Soviet-Irish dialogue has every ground for being transposed into a qualitatively new dimension and for it to include an ever wider range of topics and produce solutions for an ever more fruitful balance of interests. Take, for example, the subject

of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It was most forcefully articulated at the Shannon talks and is becoming, perhaps, one of the support threads in the fabric of negotiations and consultations between the two countries. It is to be hoped that the idea of building a common European home and creating a common legal framework in Europe and within the CSCE will give a good impulse to the joint participation of both countries in the search for practical ways of achieving these objectives.

In short, there are new dependable guideposts and good prerequisites for the spirit of cooperation that determines the character of the present-day links between the USSR and Ireland to materialise in new and far more significant joint undertakings and accomplishments, in extending the communication and cooperation of our peoples, in the enhancement of our countries' mutual contribution towards revitalising the international situation and advancing modern civilisation.

The Soviet Embassy in ancient Dublin, the city that was one thousand years old in 1988, is striving to keep pace with everything new that is characteristic of the period of regeneration and reconstruction of Soviet society. We are striving to use the forces and potentialities of our rather small staff in contributing towards resolving the overriding objective of Soviet diplomacy—that of assuring the best possible external conditions for the national reform effort.

¹ M. O'Riordan. *The Connolly Column*. Politizdat Publishers, 1987, p. 241 (Russ. ed.).

NEW THINKING AS A NEW APPROACH TO NATURE

(Continued from page 42)

Our ecological and political conception is based on the assumption that while ecological problems in the modern world call for political and economic solutions, we must constantly bear in mind the unity of the biosphere and the unity of Europe as our common homeland.

The interstate solution of ecological problems in Europe will be important not for it alone. This approach can and must also offer a model for the solution of ecological problems on other continents with other cultures, other traditions, and another economy.

PACIFISM YESTERDAY AND TODAY

Grigori LOKSHIN

NOW THAT A REVOLUTIONARY PERESTROIKA is going on and we are casting off the fetters of dogmatism and preconception, the time has come to look afresh at pacifism, a concept which would seem to have long been familiar to all. Our analysts and those of us who join in public discussions on the subject occasionally express opposed views. Some vehemently refute and reject pacifism, others defend it as a pillar of contemporary civilisation, seeing in it the antithesis of outdated militarist thinking, a concentrated expression of the idea of a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The majority, however, prefer to commend—albeit somewhat condescendingly—pacifists active “over there” while at the same time taking a stand against anyone among us who holds pacifist views.

OUR ENCYCLOPEDIAS DEFINE PACIFISM as ‘an anti-war movement which sees the principal means of preventing war in condemning its immoral character’ (*Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia*, Vol. 19, p. 291). According to the same source, pacifism in periods of revolutionary upsurge diverted the masses from antiwar struggle against imperialism, and Lenin described the pacifists’ abstract advocacy of peace as “one of the means of duping the working class”.¹

Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia stresses that during both world wars, pacifism “played mainly a negative role”, and in present day conditions it “remains unscientific” (p. 253) from the point of view of the theory of war.

Without stopping to assess the adequacy of these views to the facts of history past and present, I wish to begin by pointing to their twofold approach, for they concern both a set of concepts or just a moral principle, and a social movement involving adherents of this principle. Both are apparently true, since pacifism is, after all, a motivation of behaviour, something of a catechism of the individual seeking to assume responsibility for both himself and humanity.

The ideal of a life without war, with international relations based on universally recognised moral standards and justice, goes back to hoary antiquity. Humanity’s most cherished dream found expression in the biblical exhortation to people to “beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruninghooks”. Outstanding thinkers of all times and nations emphatically condemned war and made various plans for everlasting peace. Their voices rang convincingly enough but those were isolated voices.

Pacifists declared peace to be the highest value, the normal, natural condition of man and society. The minimum envisaged by the pacifist ideal was the individual’s refusal to participate personally in war or in

preparations for its. Nowadays pacifist thinkers of the past are accused, as it were, of seeing the principal means of averting war in condemning its immorality. Yet this is not so very little even from the standpoint of our times. Indeed, what else could they have done? Granted, their ideas were Utopian but surely this does not detract from the significance of their contribution to the common treasury of the humanist and moral values of our civilisation.

The early pacifist organisations sprang up in Britain and the United States at the beginning of the last century, shortly after the Napoleonic wars, and in 1831 Brussels hosted the first pacifist congress. In 1869, the International Congress of Friends of Peace took place in Paris, with Victor Hugo playing a prominent role in its convocation. On his motion it passed a resolution calling for the dissolution of all armies and the settlement of disputes between states by negotiation or arbitration.

The attitude of the founders of Marxism to the pacifists was never simple. Marxism countered the pacifists' moral and ethical approach with its own scientific analysis of the social class nature of the origin of war and of ways of ensuring peace. Theorists of scientific socialism considered that none but a socialist reorganisation of society would end wars for all time. They regarded struggle for peace as part of the "general struggle for the emancipation of the working classes".²

Pacifism, which opposes all use of force as a means of resolving contradictions in life, was naturally incompatible at the time with the revolutionary élan of Marxism. The frequent controversies that arose between them grew occasionally into a bitter political struggle. What brought on the most scathing criticism was attempts by many pacifists, particularly those motivated by religious sentiments, to apply their principles to relations between social groups or classes or, in other words, to substitute social or class peace for peace among nations. Another source of differences was the pacifists' denial of the distinction between imperialist wars, or wars of conquest, and just wars, or wars of liberation.

Meanwhile, with the outbreak of World War I and above all after the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin revised his stand on pacifism. The Bolsheviks participated most actively along with pacifist-minded centrist and other anti-war forces in the Zimmerwald and Kiental socialist conferences (1915 and 1916) and helped draft their anti-war resolutions and manifestos. Lenin underlined that socialist internationalists, who realised that there was no prospect of a way out of the war other than a revolution, could not stay indifferent to the demand of the masses for peace.³

It would be wrong to lump together tactical differences and even sharp differences of principle over specific aspects of revolutionary practice and conceptual views on war and peace. In the very first legislative act of the Soviet state, the Decree on Peace, Lenin called war a crime against mankind.

"You and I," he wrote to Chicherin before the Genoa Conference, "fought against pacifism as a programme for the revolutionary proletarian party. That much is clear. But who has ever denied the use of pacifists by that party to soften up the enemy, the bourgeoisie?"⁴ Present-day opponents of the anti-war movement readily seize on these words to represent the pacifists as "obedient clients of Moscow".

Actually it was a question of something entirely different at the time, of a tactical guideline of young Soviet diplomacy and, in a broader sense, of the principle of peaceful coexistence. Today's peace movement has nothing to do with that.

In the civil war years and, indeed, immediately after it, we rarely mentioned pacifism, doing so, moreover, rather disparagingly. The later stereotyped concept of pacifism that still survives in mass consciousness

took shape when, in the 1930s, the struggle against the war menace came again to the fore in connection with the fascist takeover in Germany. Many pacifists fought alongside active anti-fascists, making common cause with all patriots and progressives in the Resistance, the guerilla movement, and so on.

Psychologically and under the influence of party policy guidelines of the time, however, people identified pacifism for a long time to come with the policy of "non-interference", of "appeasing the aggressor", with "Chamberlain's umbrella", the Munich Deal, and so forth. Our press and theoretical literature associated pacifism with a passively negative, contemplative position on war, a position seen by many as helpless and plainly incapable of deterring Nazism from its aggressive ambitions.

An explicitly and strongly negative attitude to pacifism was also prompted by the Theses for the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (1928), "On Measures for Struggle Against the Danger of Imperialist Wars". Calling on the Communists of all countries to subordinate all their work to "the central task of winning over the masses and of organising and training them for struggle against imperialist war", the Theses stressed the need for "merciless exposure" and struggle against "pacifist deceivers".

Making a rather serious distinction between the pacifisms of the time—the official (government) pacifism of the Second International, the "radical" or "revolutionary" pacifism of the left-wing Socialists, and lastly, semi-religious pacifism—the Theses noted that "attempts are being made to transform pacifism into a means of distracting the masses from an active struggle against war preparations by imperialist countries".

By criticising all pacifists as uncompromisingly and indiscriminately as that, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern did considerable damage to the struggle against the impending war menace. The fallacy of its approach came out shortly afterwards. But while the Seventh Congress (1935) largely remedied the situation, efforts to establish a united front of the peace forces before World War II proved fruitless.

Regrettably, sectarian misconceptions of pacifism struck deep root. Years after the war, pacifism was still represented in our country as something erroneous and negative, an experience from which we must draw proper lessons so as never to repeat it. The First Congress of Peace Supporters (Paris, April 1949) stated: "Our will for peace must not translate into inactive pacifism. We will reveal the danger of war to those who do not see it. We will give means of defending peace to those who want to do so together with us."⁵

IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1980s, the proportions and power of the world-wide movement against the sharply increased threat of nuclear disaster grew immensely. Western media began commenting on the "syndrome of pacifism", the real threat posed by the movement to militarist "modernisation" plans, the "anti-nuclear allergy" said to affects a large body of opinion in all countries and continents. Anti-war, anti-nuclear actions in the West owed their vast scale to the involvement of a multitude of diverse groups, organisations and alignments sharing pacifism's fundamental moral and ethical creed.

The pacifism of the 1980s is reminiscent but remotely of that of the 1930s as stamped on our minds. Serious changes have occurred not so much in the ideological foundations and moral creed of pacifism but in pacifist activity in defence of peace. The principle is in fact the same as ever but its application is entirely different now.

The experience of World War II, the movement of solidarity with Vietnam, actions in support of Chile and Nicaragua and against the

apartheid regime in southern Africa as well as numerous other facts show that today's pacifists, remaining opposed in principle to violence, are championing the right of peoples to national independence and freedom. Many of them play a notable role in rendering moral and material support to peoples in struggle.

Pacifist views are still largely idealistic but they often combine in the worldview of mass democratic movements with radical social ideas and humanist principles, which lends pacifism militancy, dynamism and a magnetic quality that attracts above all youth.

Pacifism today is neither contemplative nor given to pacifying sermons. Typical of it are an active position, direct involvement in mass actions, sharp criticism of militarist policy and ideology. More and more often, pacifism prefers dynamism, militancy and determined action to passivity. Nowadays its adherents join in peace demonstrations and marches, mount pickets outside missile bases, collect signatures to petitions, call hunger strikes and keep peace vigils. They urge compatriots not to show resignation but to firmly resist militarist forces through civil disobedience actions and non-violent campaigns. So where does the "meek", "toothless" and heaven knows what other kind of pacifism come in?

Contemporary pacifism is primarily an anti-nuclear movement categorically rejecting nuclear arms, preparations for nuclear war and whatever has to do with them. Whereas in the past pacifists regarded non-violent opposition as the only morally correct approach, today the overwhelming majority of them tend to see as an immoral approach non-resistance to the evils inherent in the threat of nuclear disaster.

The pacifist wing of today's anti-war movement in developed capitalist countries varies greatly in composition. Nevertheless, there are some basic trends in it. Bearing in mind the highly conventional classification of pacifism offered by the Theses for the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, we may now list five key trends in it (which are just as conventional, for actually the dividing lines between them are very changeable or non-existent): Christian anti-militarism (or traditional religious pacifism), the Alternative Movement, the pacifism of the scientific and technological community, party political pacifism, and liberal-conservative pacifism.

Christian anti-militarism. The substantial changes which the position of the church hierarchy and the mass of believers underwent at the turn of the 1980s differed in origin but their overall result was that actions by peace forces brought in large sections of the public, reinvigorated numerous traditional pacifist organisations and gave rise to hundreds of new groups and alignments. The direct involvement of both the top leadership of the church and the majority of believers in the anti-war movement became its most remarkable feature.

The Netherlands is a case in point. In the early 1980s, the Inter-Church Peace Council that was established there with funds contributed by the main church communities took a leading place in the anti-war movement. A similar role is being played by the Protestant churches of West Germany, the British Council of Churches, which has created its own section in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (the Christian CND), the National Council of Churches and United Church of Christ in the United States, and many others.

Greatly important was the stance of the Catholic Church. The March 1983 message from 400 Catholic bishops of the United States had a widespread international impact. Hennesy, a Jesuitic historian, wrote that for 200 years past, not one pastoral message had made such a stir in the United States, nor had any document given rise to such controversy between the Catholic hierarchy and the government.

Paul Johns, the British priest who in 1986 was elected President of

the CND, made the following comment: "I am convinced that the European peace movement, however one may wish to explain it in secular or political terms, is an instrument of God's purposes with a mission to force peace upon the decision-makers from below and to begin to purge society of the moral corruption which devotion to the nuclear deterrent has brought upon us." It would be hard even for atheists to take exception to this view on the peace movement.

The **Alternative Movement** is generally associated with the Greens in West Germany and elsewhere but does not encompass them alone. The name applies rather to the anti-war activity of feminist, environmentalist and many other "new social movements". The main driving force behind them is young people and a sizable part of pacifist-minded women's movements. The radicalism typical of the youth revolts of the late 1960s is particularly pronounced in this wing of the movement. Nor is it accidental that this group of pacifists is occasionally called anarcho-pacifist.

But the Alternative Movement has turned out to be far more viable than all earlier trends involving "young rebels". It owes its appeal above all else to the "moral renunciation" of wealth, power, a career and other values of bourgeois society. Its supporters describe it as a movement against existing state power institutions, parties, universities, and so on, which they believe to be inherently incapable of stopping the arms race.

Their militant anti-militarism goes hand in hand with radical democratic demands and with sharp criticism of capitalism generally. Active anti-nuclear, anti-missile protest and solidarity with the peoples fighting against reactionary regimes in various countries are necessary components of the theory and practice of diverse alternative groups.

The **pacifism of the scientific and creative intellectuals** is one of the strongest factors in today's anti-war movement, which is characterised by an unprecedented involvement of the scientific community. Generally speaking, many see the ideological creed of the whole of contemporary pacifism in the famous Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955, which expressed for the first time the idea of the necessity for new political thinking. Nearly all participants in the peace movement hailed Jonathan Shell's **The Fate of the Earth** as a kind of Bible. The book, published in 1982, gripped the imagination of millions in the West by opening their eyes to the effects of nuclear missile war long before a scientific concept of the "nuclear winter" was formed.⁶

High prestige was won by Physicians against Nuclear War, a movement awarded the Nobel Prize for peace. Scientific research into the environmental, biological and other effects of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race is widely commented on. Public opinion in many countries actively supports teachers' movements for "education in the spirit of peace", professional alignments such as engineers for peace, journalists for peace, sportsmen for peace.

A powerful influx of new intellectual forces is playing a visible part in consolidating anti-war movements, raising foreign policy debates to a new plane and giving the public greater access to objective information. Coupled with the traditional humanist trend among creative people, this is leading to a distinctive new "peace culture" that now extends to practically all intellectual activities.

Party political pacifism is represented by diverse, mostly left-wing parties: the Socialists and Social Democrats, many Communist and other parties. Relations between them and the mass anti-war movement, as in Western Europe, have been developing amid numerous elements of disagreement. The substantial changes that had occurred in the attitude of left-wing and liberal parties by the mid-eighties, with many of them adopting a favourable position on the anti-war movement, are very im-

portant from the practical point of view for the growth of the peace movement. These changes included the fairly explicit anti-missile and anti-nuclear stand taken by the British Labour Party, the SPD, the Social Democrats of Scandinavian countries, the Socialists of Belgium (Flemish wing), the Netherlands and Greece.

The role of the Socialist International in the struggle for disarmament and peace has increased appreciably. The involvement of many noted Social Democrats and their parties in the antiwar movement has added tangibly to its ability to influence government policy.

The growing participation of trade unions influenced by the Social Democrats in anti-war actions is very important for the further expansion of the anti-war movement. This is particularly noticeable in Britain, West Germany, Italy, Denmark and Finland as well as in Canada and, to a lesser extent, in the United States. Important changes in the anti-war movement prompted by the evolution of the Labour Party are in evidence in Australia and New Zealand. Closer union between the working class movement and the movement against war is a powerful source of the latter's growing strength and efficiency.

Liberal-conservative pacifism may be said to apply to the "peace party" first mentioned by Lenin, who meant those among the rulers of bourgeois society who tended to seek peaceful solutions to problems and to do business with socialist countries. The upturn in the anti-war movement of the people in the 1980s played its part by, among other things, encouraging realistic-minded forces in the top echelons of power to act. In the United States as well in Western Europe, in parliaments, conservative parties, big business and governments there are sizable forces rejecting the neo-conservatives' bellicose line for various reasons. After all, even profit-making is becoming illusory against the background of the threat of a world nuclear holocaust. This explains the unprecedented commitment of so-called civilian diplomats in, say, the United States, where most of them come from the middle and higher-than-middle sections of quite well-to-do Americans.

Some leaders of this wing form what may be called the elite of the pacifist movement. It is often this group that advances new concepts and initiatives whose realisation leads to serious changes in military political strategy. Their actions generally receive wide publicity and inspire many other anti-war groups. The very logic of this kind of activity often results in their moving closer to larger and more radical organisations and movements and cooperating with them in some actions.

Indicative in this respect is the emergence of a whole group of former senior military officials of NATO countries, who have formed Generals for Peace and Disarmament, an international movement enjoying influence if numerically small for the time being. Many former high-ranking members of US administrations and other Western governments may be put in the same category. They come out in favour of accords with the Soviet Union and in support of our perestroika. Many of them are cooperating with associations of UN supporters as well as with the Federalist, Quakers' and other movements.

This diversity of trends and shades makes difficult an explicit assessment or broad generalisation of contemporary pacifism. Still, today's slogans, demands, opinions and utterances of all those whom we had traditionally classed as belonging to the pacifist wing of the peace movement show on close scrutiny that as far as fundamental issues of war and peace are concerned, there exist no particular distinctions now between them and those participants in the anti-war movement who do not consider themselves pacifists.

At the same time, it is easy enough to register a similarity between them on concepts like the unacceptability and absurdity of military solu-

tions to state-to-state problems and contradictions, the primacy of universal values and international law, the connection between politics and morality, freedom of choice, disarmament and an end to military confrontation, pressing environmental and other global problems, the role of the humanitarian and cultural factors in the political process, the undoing of the "enemy image", the demilitarisation of social consciousness, and so forth. The list of coincidences providing a platform for a broad consensus and a basis for the coalition of the forces of peace and reason in the making could go on.

SOME TIME IN THE EARLY 1980s, at the height of the anti-war movement in the West, there were many articles and statements about the allegedly insurmountable hostility between Marxism and pacifism and the impossibility for Communists and pacifists to cooperate in the anti-war movement. In 1983, I contributed to *Vek XX i Mir* (The 20th Century and the World), the Soviet Peace Committee monthly, an article headed "Communists and Pacifists". It described the Communists as the most consistent pacifists if viewed from the standpoint of Lenin's postulate: an "end to wars, peace among the nations, the cessation of pillaging and violence—such is our ideal".⁷ Nobody in our country espied any heresy in the article at the time. A year later, People's Deputy of the USSR Ales Adamovich, the Byelorussian author, quoted the above passage in his book *Nothing More Important* (see pp. 118 and 120, in Russian). Afterwards he told me that when the book was being printed in Minsk, it was those lines that were taken out. Somebody must have felt that it was wrong and humiliating to equate the concepts of Communist and pacifist.

Things have come a long way since then. But somehow we still talk in a slightly derogatory tone about what we call "pacifist illusions", nor do we hesitate to add the strange and restrictive definition "bourgeois" to the term "pacifism", as if "socialist" pacifism did not or could not exist. But is this right? Do such definitions apply at all to pacifism, which reflects the lofty idea of human survival?

In terms of the effort to eliminate the threat of world nuclear war, all distinctions between Communists and pacifists are immaterial strategically as well as in practice. Today we fully and sincerely share the moral motivation of the pacifists' anti-nuclear protest.

We demand that war as a means of settling disputes be banished from contemporary society for all time. It is now clear to anyone how very conventional and artificial such definitions as "liberation war" or "just war" are with reference to nuclear missile war.

Pacifism is said to be as unscientific as ever from the point of view of theoretical concepts of war. But then many of our purportedly scientific notions of the past seem down-right absurd today. For instance, we desisted long ago from repeating the thesis that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism is there. And we have stopped emphasising that nothing but socialism's victory throughout the world will end all wars. This has given way to the realisation of the priority of universal over class, national and other interests.

I believe, however, that there is a dividing line which it is difficult psychologically for both pacifists and us to cross. It is the traditional, typically pacifist perception of the war menace, militarism and the arms race as abstract evils, pacifism's stubborn refusal to find out who is right and who is wrong and where the threat to peace really comes from.

Somehow unwittingly, we monopolised long ago the truth concerning this matter. Years-long rosy propaganda which made us confident of our country being always and absolutely right in whatever it undertook on

the international scene, accomplished its task. We actually convinced ourselves of this and tried hard to convince others. We treated all who agreed that the threat came solely from the United States and NATO as opponents of the pacifists, as the "consistently anti-imperialist vanguard" of the peace movement.

We must admit now that this approach caused considerable damage to the peace movement. It created difficulties for many of our partners in international democratic organisations and undermined to a degree public confidence in us. The result was a preposterous asymmetry. The peace movements in socialist countries denounced the "warmongers" in the West, doing so with some reason while at the same time defending the foreign policy of their countries, understandably seen by them as exempt from all criticism. Our supporters in the West often took what we said at its face value and stood up just as uncritically for every move, however doubtful, of the countries of "existing socialism". This led to a credibility crisis which many of them are now wrestling with. We cannot really help them until we finally give up our own dogmatic criteria and our appraisals of those "who are not with us" and some of whom are even against us.

Experience has shown that to establish who is to blame is a controversial and rather fruitless business. It is unnecessary and useless to seek comfort in mutual recriminations. Surely it is always better to look ahead, not back. Credit for the most fruitful initiatives is due to the physicians and scientists who in appealing to world opinion proceeded from universal interests, without suggesting that anyone should make a choice in support of anyone else. Humanity found itself on the brink of the precipice, and we all really have no time any more to find out who is to blame.

THE PROBLEM OF RESPONSIBILITY is but one item on the list of potential differences with various pacifists over this or that phenomenon or problem. Active in the anti-war movement for a long time now have been the Federalists, or those who are certain that the threat to peace cannot be removed as long as it is dealt with by sovereign states. What they propose instead is either a world government, a world constituent assembly or an assembly of citizens of the world. The idea seems Utopian or at least premature at first sight. It does not combine very well with every people's right to choose their own path of development. In everyday practice, however, these distinctions have fortunately never stood in the way of cooperation with the Federalists in common actions benefiting peace.

As for the position of many pacifists, especially young people, on compulsory military service, it is an entirely different matter. In some West European countries, particularly in small and neutral ones as well as elsewhere, pacifists have won or are seeking a right to alternative civilian service instead of the obligatory call-up where it exists. This right has already been guaranteed by legislation in Poland and Hungary and is under discussion in other socialist countries. In the Soviet Union too, the question is raised by some autonomous organisations. It is anything but simple and gives rise to much controversy.

Answering a group of French pacifists in 1930, Romain Rolland wrote: "A refusal to serve in the armed forces prompted by moral convictions should have a social and not an individualistic or anarchist basis."⁸ Non-participation in any activity relating to war is the simplest and most accessible way to oppose militarism. But such an approach will not always hold water morally or ethically. After all, somebody must serve in the armed forces anyway since these exist no matter what. It

follows that conscientious objectors virtually pay (in the form of tax or in some other form) those who are willing to serve instead of the "God's chosen". Nowadays, the principle of pacifism calls for vigorous social and political peace-making effort rather than retirement into one's shell. Incidentally, this is what is done by many of those in the West who refuse to serve in the armed forces.

We appreciated the attitude of those in the United States who burnt their call-up papers during the Vietnam war. But in our country, even the theoretical possibility of introducing alternative civil service in lieu of the call-up meets objections among the military as well as civilians.

In the light of new political thinking and with due regard to the realities of the nuclear age, however, the logical decline in the prestige of military service, no matter how hard we or "they" try to lend it a romantic aura, is part of the general process of demilitarising mass consciousness and society. There is no getting away from this. Indeed, how can anyone combine in one concept two mutually exclusive approaches: the absolute inadmissibility of war and the old imperative of preparedness for war or for the use of force? This is an insoluble contradiction.

Hence reciprocal limitation of armies and armaments to the level of reasonable defence sufficiency by all countries is no longer Utopia but a realistic imperative. Even now we are unilaterally reducing armed forces and armaments and converting military industry to civilian production. So why persist in ignoring reality by putting the emphasis on an "honourable duty" which nobody questioned until recently? After all, we have ample experience of alternative service (such as was envisaged, for example, by Lenin's 1919 decree) and need it badly. Such a system would not violate the principle of the indivisibility of rights and duties.

Of course, the trouble is that today's world is far from a serene Utopia. The West is regrettably in no hurry to follow our example in the sphere of disarmament and to rid us of the problem of safeguarding our security. And so our boys will apparently have to serve in the army for a long time to come. However, this is not our choice, and therefore we ought not to reject the idea of alternative civilian service out of hand. Every idea is good when it comes at the right time.

Many other "distinctions", which we used to trot out in carefully drawing a line between ourselves and those "naive" pacifists, turn out to be non-existent when looked into without bias. Take, for instance, the problems of trade in arms or education in the spirit of peace.

New forms and mechanisms of popular democratic control over the activity of the foreign and defence ministries are coming into their own in our lives along with perestroika and glasnost. There are fewer and fewer closed areas and forbidden subjects, and this naturally lends a new quality to the social movement for peace. Until recently, the movement may be said to have voluntarily ceded to the military and diplomats the monopoly right to define the very meaning of the concept of our national security or the real national interests of our people and state in a particular region. But now these problems are coming to the fore in the unfolding dialogue between society and the state, between the individual and society.

Taking root in mass consciousness in both the Soviet Union and many other countries is the realisation that purely military measures for national and universal security are giving in to more urgent priorities: economic, ecological and even humanitarian.

This objective process going on in society cannot be shouted down or stopped because it reflects on the honour of the regiment. People have begun to treat the armed forces and service in them without the military patriotic trepidation which many of us were accustomed to. They now take a much more sober, serious and responsible stand, that is, a stand

fit for a normal democratic, civilised state. I think it would be a big mistake to resist this trend in our public life or to fall back on the lable of "bourgeois pacifism".

Reporting to the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet last October, Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, rightly stressed that a "foreign policy can be effective only if the values and principles upheld by it are also inherent in the home policy of the state".¹ Our public opinion, including many teachers' and parents', is concerned with good reason that our stores are overstocked with toy weapons. To say so is not to show anything like creeping pacifism but to express alarm over growing violence and crime in our society.

The whole system of so-called military patriotic education at school, which gradually drifted away from humanist and moral principles fairly long ago and became primitive, elementary military training, is open to question now. This, too, causes legitimate concern among many parents, who justly consider it more important that schools should educate pupils to love their country, to do good, to strive for culture—in short, to become real patriots who can also show firmness in using a tommygun if necessary.

IT IS A USELESS and vain job to reject pacifism in our days. Is not it better just to grasp the existing gap between the ideal and everyday realities?

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 162.

² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. Two, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 18.

³ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 292.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 45, pp. 474-475.

⁵ First World Congress of Peace Supporters, Paris-Prague, April 20-25, 1949, Records Moscow, 1950, p. 25 (in Russian).

⁶ See Jonathan Shell, *The Fate of the Earth*, New York, 1982.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 293.

⁸ Romain Rolland, *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 183 (in Russian).

⁹ *Pravda*, October 24, 1989 (in Russian).

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(Continued from page 31)

the USSR reaffirmed that its ultimate goal is not to have a single Soviet soldier abroad.

The USSR seems to have shown an example that *action* should be the main concern of the UN today. The Soviet Union has acted here in the spirit of the Soviet-American resolution and the Malta accords between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Bush.

We intend to analyse carefully all the resolutions passed and recommendations made at the 44th session of the UN General Assembly and use them as international standards in the perestroika processes within the country and as a guideline for actions in the international arena.

STRIKES: "OVER HERE" AND "OVER THERE"

Stal YERSHOV

PUBLIC OPINION and virtually the entire body of social science researchers in the socialist countries were caught unawares by the appearance on the political scene of the strike struggle, once a virtually unknown and now an essentially permanent phenomenon. The harsh realities of life have relentlessly dispelled the myth Soviet science and propaganda had been building up for decades that social development in the socialist countries is at root free of conflict, being based on a law-governed uniformity objectively predetermined by socialism which makes the society ever more homogeneous socially, a society solidly cemented by the peoples' common interests and unbreakable friendship.

However, as we shed our ideological blinkers, we see ever more clearly that the movement of the human community as a whole along the way of social progress must necessarily be subject to common law-governed uniformities. These manifest themselves in any country in one form or another, irrespective of the nature of its state system, which, it turns out, does not at all rule out the existence in the society of opposite and even contending social forces which are guided in their political behaviour not just by different or unidentical interests, but often even antagonistic interests. It has turned out that socialism is not at all immune from such situations.

It would appear to be useful, therefore, to sort out our own problems by taking an unbiased look at the state of affairs under capitalism and at the way similar problems are tackled over there. Let us try, for instance, to present a realistic picture of the strike movement, the trends in its development and their causes. Let us see how the trade unions manage to tackle social tension at enterprises. It is also interesting to know what the companies themselves do for this purpose.

MANY MAJOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS in any country are rooted deep in labour relations in production. In the past, Soviet analysis of this phenomenon under capitalism was extremely one-sided, being mainly designed for a stereotype invention of a set of arguments to show the steady exacerbation of irreconcilable class contradictions and to substantiate the idea of an imminent outcome (known to us alone) of what was regarded as an inexorable process. All these arguments were dated within the framework of the various stages of the general crisis of capitalism, while the crisis itself was seen as the most important and effective condition for the advance of the world revolutionary process in breadth and depth. This purely theoretical construction appeared to Soviet researchers to be especially convincing against the background of the "outstanding successes of developed socialism".

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Having surrounded ourselves with distorting ideological mirrors, we naturally had a distorted perception of the surrounding world. We regarded the structural transformations of the capitalist economy mainly as a growth of disproportions and a sharpening of sectoral crises; the privatisation of enterprises and industries mainly as a means for the enrichment of the monopolies, and the transnationalisation of production as evidence of the ever deeper unevenness of economic development in the citadels of imperialism, etc.

There was an especially thorough—and usually, I myself think, deliberate—distortion of everything relating to the condition of the working people and their class struggle. The data on wages and working conditions in the capitalist countries, social security, democratic rights and freedoms, and the causes, character and scale of the strike movement were prepared from the “required” angle. As a result, unemployment had a tendency only to grow, and wages only to fall, higher education and medical assistance were declared to be unattainable because of their steadily growing cost, compromise solutions of economic problems by some trade unions (with the participation of company management) were regarded as conciliation with capital, while such trade unions were scornfully dismissed as reformist. Strikes for higher per-hour wages were presented as action against the arbitrary moves of state-monopoly circles, and demonstrations calling for a demilitarisation of industry were seen as nothing but condemnation by the popular masses of the reactionary aggressive foreign policy of imperialist governments. The list could go on and on.

Meanwhile, under pressure from the working people's long and bitter struggle, and also because of the need to have a tranquil social hinterland, the bourgeoisie was forced to put in place a system for the relatively peaceful settlement of labour disputes and other differences with the working class. There is every indication that the legal mechanism which has taken shape everywhere for clarifying relations between the contingents of opposed classes has, on the whole, proved to be sufficiently effective. In one way or another, it helps to find mutually acceptable ways out of what seem to be dead-end situations, although this now and again involves material and other losses on both sides. However, it is only fair to say that while this mechanism is to some extent democratic, it is ultimately designed to avert any open class conflicts and even to invalidate the working people's legal right to strike, something that one can, generally speaking, understand considering the large scale of the losses inflicted by strikes on the society, of which we, too, are now aware.

Our social science let itself be carried away by the working out of scholastic conceptions about the looming world socialist revolution, and, in effect, virtually ignored the need to study Western experience in regulating labour relations. This “principled” approach was fuelled by the false conviction that if it is admissible to borrow anything from capitalism at all, it should be confined to science and technology. It was claimed that socialism was by its very nature far superior in the social sphere, where it had an absolute consensus among the people tirelessly working to implement an unimpeachable general line.

The critical economic, social and political situation which has now taken shape in our country clamours for a rejection of this kind of ideological strutting. We must start learning, and there is no time for any limbering-up.

But that is only one part of the problem before us. It is equally important to get an insight into the character of the strike movement in the capitalist world. The tense expectation of imminent revolutionary change on the other side of the class barricades, a mentality we have

inherited from the early post-October years, may have waned a bit, but it still continued to "work" as a consolation factor up until quite recently. Indeed, many of our purely internal, and literally home-grown, economic difficulties and political troubles were, in a sense, written off at the expense of external circumstances arising from the hostile encirclement, as the official doctrine had it. The Soviet people pinned their hopes for a better future on the elimination of this hostile encirclement, something that was to occur as a result of relevant action by the international proletariat. Their optimism was stimulated by claims about the growing intensity of the class battles. In short, for a long time we believed that this might happen any moment.

But capitalism continued to undergo cardinal changes, and these did not run along the lines we predicted. It simultaneously became perfectly obvious that the main sources of all our troubles did not lie "over there" but "over here", and that we were faced with the prospect of tackling the snowballing economic problems not with the aid of a friendly proletariat in the capitalist countries, but with the participation of the once-so-hated monopolies, which we are now so eagerly inviting to come "over here".

A SET OF STATISTICAL INDICATORS is used in the capitalist countries to describe the scale and dynamics of the strike movement, with three basic ones being used for various recalculations and for international comparisons: the number of strikes, the number of strikers, and the working time (days) lost. While there is, on the whole, a direct dependence between these indicators, they do not always move in the same direction. Thus, a lesser number of major strikes in one year may involve a larger number of working people than in the year before, and vice versa. Or again, there may be many strikes in a given year, but if they are short, little working time will be lost.

The criteria for statistical records of strikes differ markedly from country to country. In Canada, for instance, strikes not involving any loss of working time over 10 days, are not included in the count. In the United States, only strikes involving more than 1,000 workers and a stoppage for more than one shift have been included since 1981. Japanese statistics does not regard as strikes cases in which the stoppage lasted less than half a working day. Political action is regarded as strike action and is regularly counted only in Italy. It is no exaggeration to say that virtually every country has its own national rules or nuances of strike statistics.

These discrepancies have taken shape under the impact of a great many factors in the course of history. It would hardly be right to attribute these exclusively to the ill intent of the bourgeoisie or an urge to deliberately minimise the scale of the class struggle, if only because, out of sheer common sense, the ruling circles of the capitalist countries have always wanted to have a full picture of the slightest shifts in the mood of the working masses. Visual evidence of this comes from the open and regular publication of the numerous public opinion polls in the West whose results are not always pleasant for the ruling circles.

Strike statistics are recorded in all the capitalist and most of the less developed countries. About 90 of them make the relevant data (with an indication of national counting criteria) available to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva. Among the regular publications of strike statistics in the ILO's *Year Book of Labour Statistics*, there are none from the socialist countries, although they have been long and active participants in the work of the ILO, which, let us note, is a part of the UN structure. Incidentally, in contrast to some other socialist

countries, the Soviet Union does not figure even in the tables on industrial accidents, the cost of living index, and unemployment. It is hard to convince oneself that this kind of, let us say, delicacy helps to enhance our prestige in the world as a great power.

An analysis of ILO statistics suggests this conclusion: over the past 15-20 years, the long-term trend towards a growth in the number of strikers (and of the other two indicators mentioned above) in the zone of industrial capitalism kept waning and has, finally, altered direction. A reverse movement has begun: the lessening scale of the strike movement is a reality of the present stage of the class struggle in the capitalist world.

It is a complicated and intermittent process, and no adequate picture of it can be obtained from a mere comparison of annual data, for one year is very much unlike another. Grouping by years will yield a truer picture. In this case, it turns out that in the five years from 1978 to 1982, strikes involved 79.9 million people in the seven leading capitalist countries, and in the following five years, from 1983 to 1987, 39.6 million, i. e., less than one-half.

In all these countries, with the exception of the FRG, where the strike movement has always been on a very low level, the number of strikers was substantially reduced: down to less than one-half in Britain, and down to almost one-third in Japan (Table 1).

Table 1

Number of Strikers in the Leading Capitalist Countries
(thousands)

	1978-1982		1983-1987	
	Total	Average per year	Total	Average per year
USA	4,207	841	2,316	463
Canada	2,089	418	1,745	349
Britain	10,099	2,020	4,436	887
France	2,970	594	2,535	507
FRG	902	180	979	196
Italy	57,546	11,509	26,923	5,385
Japan	2,136	427	721	144

Calculated from *Year Book of Labour Statistics*, ILO, Geneva, 1988, p. 1048-1054.

The trend will be found to be similar from a comparison of the number of working days lost through strikes in these seven countries. From 1978 to 1982, it came to 293.4 million, and from 1983 to 1987, to 162.8 million, i. e., it was down by nearly 45 per cent. This indicator was lower in all the countries, with the exception of the FRG, and in Japan, France and Italy it was down by roughly 60 per cent (Table 2).

Several additional indicators have been worked out in some countries for a deeper analysis of the impact of the strike movement on economic development. Thus, official US statistics regularly computes the working time lost through strikes as a share of the total time worked in the country. This indicator is, as a rule, never more than one per cent. The 1.4 per cent in 1946 was an exception. For the 1978-1982 period, this indicator averaged 0.08 per cent a year, and from 1983 to 1987, only one-half of that (0.04 per cent).

Moreover, until 1981 US statistics determined the part of wage workers involved in strikes, and it turns out that it was a very small

Table 2

**Number of Working Days Lost Through Strikes
in the Leading Capitalist Countries
(thousands)**

	1978-1982		1983-1987	
	Total	Average per year	Total	Average per year
USA	90,996	18,199	49,456	9,891
Canada	38,875	7,775	22,532	4,506
Britain	60,422	12,084	42,757	8,551
France	10,468	2,094	4,445	889
FRG	4,965	993	5,754	1,151
Italy	83,254	16,651	36,215	7,243
Japan	4,381	876	1,633	327

Calculated from. *Ibid.*

one. Percentage-wise, this looks as follows: 6.9 per cent in 1950, 3.0 per cent in 1960, 4.7 per cent in 1970, and 1.5 per cent in 1981.¹

These data warrant the assertion that the notion, once widely accepted in our scientific and, especially, in our propaganda writings, about the broad involvement of the US working class in the strike movement does not square with the facts, to put it mildly. This conclusion is applicable to all the other developed capitalist countries.

FOR LONG YEARS, Soviet social science regarded the strike movement as some kind of "self-propelled spiral", claiming that its resilient action was subject to the law of a steady sharpening of the class struggle as it overcame the tenacious resistance of the bourgeois forces hostile to the working people. Frankly speaking, this traditional approach to the study of the strike movement was not scientific, but propagandist. Just about every strike had to be not so much an attempt of this or that contingent of the working people to win better living conditions from their employer, as a manifestation of the insuperable urge of the exploited mass to solve a problem of a higher order: to limit the arbitrary acts of the monopolies and to throw off the oppression of state-monopoly capital.

Any political and social activity by the working people (and strikes are no exception) results from the interaction of a great many diverse factors and circumstances, both subjective and objective. The current interests by which people are motivated are variable, being a derivative of their social condition and economic wellbeing, which is, besides, mediated by their individual and mass consciousness. The correlation of individual, group and class aspirations is far from being the same at every stage of social development, let alone under the current scientific and technical revolution.

The marked sectoral differences of scale are a specific feature of the strike movement: in some sectors of the economy the working people's strike activity is traditionally high, and in others, low. So, the very structure of a country's economy is a crucial element in determining the intensity of strike struggles. The largest number of strikes usually take place in industry, followed by transport and building, with the services way behind, despite the fact that from 40 to 70 per cent and

even more of those working for a wage in the various countries are now concentrated in the services. In Italy, for instance, of the total number of strikers in 1987, 53.7 per cent were in industry, and only 23.2 per cent in the services.

The trades structure of wage-labour has had an even greater effect on the scope of the strike struggle. To this very day, most of the strikes are initiated by shopfloor workers, while workers by brain and especially those of them within the category of so-called technologically oriented specialists, either join the strikers subsequently or, and this more often, do not take any part in strikes at all. They also refrain from joining trade unions.

The structural changes in the economy of the capitalist countries and the consequent and profound qualitative transformations in the wage-labour army have substantially narrowed down both the mass social base of the trade unions and the strike struggle they lead. One of the superficial effects of this process is the trend for the working people's strike activity to decline. There are also the noticeable thinning of trade union ranks everywhere, the decline in their prestige, and even splits in trade unions, which have had to regroup, while markedly moving their political and social orientation to the "right". A concrete example comes from the self-dissolution in 1989 of SOHYO, one of the leading trade union centres in Japan, which had taken an active class position, and its merger with the trade union of workers at private-sector enterprises, which has issued a no-strike pledge.

It is hard to prognosticate developments, but it is already safe to assume—with some reservations—that as the workforce flows from the sectors of material production into the services, and as the high-skilled workers constitute an ever larger share of wage-labour (and these processes are on the rise), the scale of the strike movement will diminish, all other conditions, of course, being equal.

Among the latter are the problems of the working people's economic and social condition, on which the trade unions invariably concentrate their main efforts; jobs and wages above all.

Purely material demands are the main factor behind the strikes in all the capitalist countries. Take the well-known "spring offensives" which were carried on in Japan until recently. Higher wages were the main objective of these massive seasonal campaigns by the trade unions. We find a similar picture in other countries. In Britain, for instance, nearly 40 per cent of all strikes from March 1988 to March 1989 were staged to back up demands for higher wages.²

One can well understand all this, since with the rise in general educational and skill standards in the working class its notions of the quality of life and of living standards have been growing very much faster than the employers' readiness to satisfy their wants. There are, of course, also the effects of inflation, which tends to reduce the purchasing power of workers and employees, despite the fact that it has noticeably slowed down in the past two or three years.

However, it would be wrong to leave the impression that capitalist company managements have taken a "last-ditch stand" and have flatly refused to consider the matter of raising wages for their workforce. It is in the self-seeking interests of the capitalists to maintain effective demand among the population at a level allowing the smooth sale of the goods they produce. If labour productivity has grown, and so also the volume of goods to be marketed, the money in the hands of the mass of consumers—who also happen to be the working people—must also increase, for otherwise there is bound to be a crisis of overproduction, with all the inevitable consequences, including lower profits.

It goes without saying that the interests of every individual

employer are not always identical with those of the whole class of capitalists, but the resolution of this contradiction is, oddly enough at first sight, promoted by the trade unions. By forcing "their own" company to raise wages, they normalise, in defiance of the will of the company owners, the process of the reproduction of a section of the national workforce, and so also—and to the same extent—the reproduction of capital as a whole.

Guaranteed employment, another problem, has likewise never been tackled on its own, but always in the course of intense union-company struggles, especially today, when capitalism has effectively switched to the use of mainly intensive methods of economic development and labour-saving hardware and technology. Besides, whenever the question of jobs is raised, the employers at once take a tough common stand in their negotiations with the trade unions, which is because, apparently, it is not so much the individual employer or even the "aggregate capitalist" as the bourgeois state itself that has to absorb the main losses from unemployment, for it is the one that pays the unemployment benefits and collects less revenues in the form of taxes. Meanwhile, for private business some reduction in paid-up demand as a result of growing unemployment is compensated by the increase in the total number of jobs, whose holders have a purchasing power that may not grow all that noticeably, but does not cut across labour productivity growth either.

It would appear that in such a situation the number of strikes against unemployment should grow, but that is not so. In Britain, for instance, where, despite a small reduction in the reserve wage-labour army, it still made up 6.6 per cent of the total workforce in 1989, only about one strike in ten is staged for jobs.

The fact is that the trade unions in the capitalist countries are now fighting not against unemployment, but for a solution to the employment problem as a whole. In other words, a radical shift in the strategy of the trade union movement has occurred in this sector of the class confrontation, and it has entailed corresponding changes in tactics. Most trade unions now campaign with programmes of constructive demands, containing far-reaching measures, such as curbs on the TNCs' export of productive capital to cheap-labour countries; protection of the national economy against foreign imports; improvement of the systems of general education and retraining of manpower; larger appropriations for environmental protection (which also helps to create new workplaces); retirement on pension at a lower age, etc.

One will easily see that that the trade unions demand can be implemented only with the participation of the state, and only through the enactment of legislation. And this is a different—higher—level in the interaction between the two sides. Whom then are the workers to strike against? Can a strike, say, at the enterprises of Imperial Chemical Industries help the British working people get parliament to pass an ecological appropriations act? There is obviously no direct connection in evidence in this case.

There has also been a change in the unions' tactical line in bargaining for the conclusion of collective contracts with individual companies, in the course of which the unions are ever more frequently involved in decision-making on matters like the structure of investments and the installation of new hardware and technology.

It is still too early to judge whether the trade unions' new strategy is more productive. Their attention continues to be centred on the problem of employment, because, for all practical purposes, it continues to be an acute one. In the 10 years from 1979 to 1988 (according to the latest ILO figures), unemployment increased in the seven leading

capitalist countries from a total of 13.4 million to 20.2 million, i. e., by 44 per cent.³ Meanwhile, and this is an equally serious matter, the number of wage workers as a percentage of the economically active population of working age has gone up only in the United States and Canada, whereas it has gone down in the five other major countries.⁴ These are alarming trends, even if one takes into account the absorption of a large mass of working people by the "underground economy" (on which there are no statistics). These trends show that young people coming on the labour market for the first time, together with the jobless, are faced with tremendous difficulties in finding employment.

For a full picture, one has to consider yet another factor operating for a slowdown of the strike movement: anti-strike legislation. It has been most glaringly and systematically enacted in Britain, where a series of parliamentary acts passed in the early 1980s present a formidable impediment to the staging of strikes by trade unions. Let us note that this truly antidemocratic initiative did not come from the ruling Conservative party as a cause, but as an effect of the general weakening of trade union positions in the country. One should think that things will come right once the trade unions have surmounted their present state of crisis. However, one cannot but reflect on the fact that such a blatant infringement of trade union rights did not prevent the British trade unions from massively voting for Margaret Thatcher and her party in all the three previous parliamentary elections.

ONE COULD SAY that the beginnings of the strike movement coincided with the rise of capitalism itself. At those initial stages, the bourgeoisie made short shrift of the strikers in the most brutal manner. The workers responded by forming trade unions in the course of bitter struggles and forced their class adversary to adopt special laws introducing some kind of order into labour relations. Such laws now exist in all civilised countries and they have been markedly improved. But they are far from identical, because they are a reflection of the level to which the law-consciousness of the population has risen, the national traditions, and the strength of the working class. But there are also some identical principles constituting the conceptual basis for settling the continually recurring disputes, differences and conflicts.

The right of the working people to strike is the most important element of this basis of labour relations, and it is written into the legislation of all the capitalist countries in one form or another. An international-law platform has also taken shape. It is most fully expressed in the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of December 16, 1966. The Soviet Union has also adhered to the covenant—much later, it is true—thereby pledging itself to ensure the right to strike, provided it is exercised in accordance with national laws (Art. 8, para 1). While the ILO has not officially insisted on the unconditional recognition of the right to strike, it has regarded it as an effective rule.

The idea of the need to give the working people the right to strike has been so generally accepted that even the Social Encyclical of Pope John Paul II (1981) proclaimed the legality of this measure, provided strikes are not allowed in socially important services (public health, for instance).

For all the basic significance of strike legislation, it should, nevertheless, be regarded not as something independent, but as an integral part of the so-called triad of trade union rights: (1) the working people's right freely—without requiring the consent of the authorities—

to set up their own "associations", i. e., political and trade union organisations; (2) the right to conclude collective contracts with employers and to have recourse to judicial protection in the event of the employer's breach of the labour contract he has signed; and (3) the right to strike.

Public opinion regards this "triad" not just as an indissoluble unity of trade union rights, but as an integral element of the entire system of man's civil rights.

The process of bargaining out collective contracts (or their renewal within three, two or, more rarely, one year) is the main field in which labour disputes are settled according to established practice. Strikes are an "extreme measure" only when seen from the way in which they are staged, for, despite their gravity and menace, they have an ancillary and subordinate role to play. While the threat of a work stoppage is always invisibly present in the bargaining between two juridical persons—the trade union and the employer—(who cannot, of course, be a member of the trade union, as this would produce the absurd situation of bargaining being conducted within the trade union itself). Let us note this important detail: the announcement of a strike by the trade union leadership (which is subject to approval at a general meeting of its members by secret ballot) is usually allowed by the law only in the period of collective bargaining. Moreover, the collective contract in many cases includes the trade union's commitment not to resort to strikes throughout the contract period. However, life is much more complicated than any laws, understandings or established traditions.

Many strikes in the capitalist countries spring from a phenomenon which may be called formal democracy. The model for settling grievances on the basis of collective contracts described above is being constantly disrupted as a result of intentional restrictions on its operation by various government decrees (such as "ceilings" on wages under the pretext of combating inflation), and also by the acts of employers who skilfully sidestep the laws.

It is worth mentioning that bourgeois science and propaganda have always taken a stand against the strike movement. The press in the capitalist countries is still full of items whose authors try very hard to prove that any strikes are "inadvisable", "obsolete" and even "harmful". There are demands for a revision of the right to strike laws, for the government's greater legal powers to intervene in labour conflicts, and even for greater trade union responsibility, including complete compensation for material losses inflicted on employers by work stoppages.

One will easily imagine that the employers themselves are not too happy over the strikes. They have a fairly wide range of instruments to counteract these, from the taking out of a court injunction declaring a strike illegal, with the imposition on the unions of various fines and other sanctions like the freezing of their bank accounts and sequestration of their assets, all the way to the sacking of strikers and their harassment in league with the authorities.

But at the present stage of the STR, and with the formation of a qualitatively new technical and organisational mode of production based on automation, the capitalist companies' social policy is being re-routed: the coercion of working people to uninterrupted labour, which does not always justify itself, is increasingly giving way to efforts to win their voluntary consent. Why? First, even a short-term stoppage of expensive equipment means excessively large losses. Second, issuing threats against the working class, which is in the mass ever more educated and high-skilled, is no longer acceptable, and is thus ineffective. Third, it has turned out that the "human factor" now secures up to 80 per cent of the

increase in aggregate labour productivity, and for that reason needs to be treated with respect.

Under the pressure of these circumstances (in the first place), there has developed what is known as the new philosophy of management, but it could, I think, be more precisely called a "philosophy of mutual survival", since it is designed to match to the utmost the interests of the labour force and of the enterprise owners. This is to be done by democratising production, a programme which includes, among other things, the establishment of autonomous, self-managing work teams with the right to organise their own labour; the formation of "quality circles" and similar other informal groups whose object is to seek ways of making work more efficient, measures to make the working people's material wellbeing depend to a greater extent on the final results of the activity of the enterprise and of the company as a whole through the sale of shares and a system of profit distribution.

Capitalist company practices show that all these scenarios for "participation" and "involvement" of the labour force in the management of production and company affairs (even when these are limited by the very logic of private property) can yield positive results for both sides, because they create favourable conditions for the fuller self-expression of the workers' creative potential and visualise the connection between the quantity and quality of their labour effort and the compensation they receive. Need one say that this kind of situation also "operates" as an effective factor in neutralising strike activity?

THE STRIKE MOVEMENT should not be regarded in isolation from the political, economic and social situation taking shape at this or that historical stage in each country. The revolutionary perestroika ideology which has been taking shape in the Soviet Union in the course of acute clashes with the relapses of the administrative-command system is working out its own approaches to this major phenomenon of social life. But for all our national specifics, taking account of the positive experience of others will do no harm, and a study of it must be got under way as soon as possible, for of negative experience we now have just about all the knowledge we need.

¹ Calculated from. *Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics*, Washington D. C., September 1987, pp 68-69

² *Employment Gazette*, June 1989, p. S43

³ Calculated from *Year Book of Labour Statistics*, ILO, Geneva, 1988, pp 626-639, *Employment Gazette*, London, June 1989, p S36-S37.

⁴ *Monthly Labor Review*, February 1989, p. 101.

THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

**Alexei BOGATUROV,
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IN SPITE OF A CERTAIN PROGRESS in the Soviet-American dialogue on global and European problems, the Asia-Pacific region still holds a secondary place in the relations between the two countries. This is partly due to conceptual differences in their approach to the problem of building stability and confidence in the region.

The Soviet Union, which stresses the connection between the global and regional aspects of detente, comes out for applying to the APR the experience of reaching mutually acceptable solutions in favour of detente gained in Europe and in bilateral Soviet-American relations and for the implementation of global accords with due regard to regional peculiarities.

As for the United States, it considers that trends towards detente cannot extend to East Asia and the Pacific until regional conflicts and disputes are settled. What we have in effect is that Washington, seeing its positions with some reason as sufficiently strong and stable, insists on preserving the status quo in the APR, thereby rejecting a regional dialogue with the Soviet Union and seeking to retain its dominant influence in the region while keeping Soviet influence to the minimum.

Both positions are logical, each in its own way. At the same time, it is hard to overlook the essential similarity of the approach of many Pacific countries to that of the United States.

The situation in the APR being what it really is (with the United States commanding powerful political, economic and military means of pressure whereas the Soviet Union has no such means), it would obviously be reasonable to use what is objectively valuable in the US position without renouncing, however, the idea of advancing to the ultimate goal, which is to strengthen security in the region at both the upper, or global, and the lower, or regional, level.

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THERE ARE APPRECIABLE PREREQUISITES for this approach. Of course, the spectrum of Soviet-American relations encompasses fairly many global problems. We mean control over strategic and tactical nuclear weapons based in the APR, regulation of naval activity in the World Ocean, a democratic restructuring of international economic relations, steady provision of the economy with energy sources and raw materials, environmental protection at regional level.

Along with these there are many interconnected, typically Asia-Pacific problems which can hardly be solved in a satisfactory manner without a

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constructive Soviet-American dialogue or a substantial narrowing of the gap between the two powers' points of view. The primary task in this instance is to prevent an uncontrolled evolution in Korea and Cambodia, normalise relations with Japan, draw the Soviet Union into economic cooperation in the Pacific on regional lines and guarantee the security of sea and air traffic. One has only to list these problems to realise the importance of a constructive dialogue on them between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Soviet Union is aware, as its leadership has underlined more than once, that without US participation the problem of Pacific security and cooperation cannot be solved in a way satisfying all. Yet so far, Washington has regrettably ignored virtually all Soviet initiatives in the APR, traditionally regarded as a key area of Soviet-American confrontation.

We and the Americans differ on many points concerning the military political situation in the region. The Soviet Union is concerned about the growing arms race, as it has indicated not only by repeated and varied proposals for arms reductions in the region but by practical steps to this end. In 1984, it desisted from building up land-based nuclear weapons in the east of the country, and ever since 1986 it has refrained from increasing its carrier aircraft fleet; the Soviet force temporarily stationed in Mongolia is being cut by 75 per cent and the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Asian part of the country, by 200,000 men and officers. During Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China in May 1989, the two sides decided to reduce their respective forces along their common border to the minimum corresponding to normal good-neighbour relations. Under the INF Treaty, Soviet nuclear missiles of the two classes involved are to be eliminated before the summer of 1991. General of the Army Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, estimates that from 1984 to 1989, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was reduced by 57 ships.

As for the United States, it is widely held there that the Soviet Union has naval superiority in the Pacific. Besides, that country shows a complete unwillingness to start a constructive dialogue on arms cuts in the APR that would pave the way for ending what it perceives as an asymmetry upsetting the balance of power in the region. The United States is believed to have no interest at all in talks with the Soviet Union on Pacific security, for Washington is satisfied with the positions it has won there.

Meanwhile, an analysis of the trend of development in the APR warrants the conclusion that it is an increasingly difficult task for the United States—one that, worse still, is becoming increasingly costly—to maintain its leading position in the region due primarily to the discrepancy between its military and economic role. As a consequence of sticking for 40 years to the principle of "detering communism" in the APR, the United States, which spends about 50 billion dollars a year on keeping a 330,000-strong force in the region, has a 140 billion dollar trade imbalance, with Pacific countries accounting for about 70 per cent of it. On top of this, the US Federal budget deficit in 1988 amounted to 150 billion dollars, its growth being largely due to an unprecedented military budget a considerable part of which was earmarked for increased military activity in the APR. The countries which the United States helps in strengthening their defences are virtually the ones that are accused of aggravating the problem of a chronic imbalance in US foreign trade.

To quote Jerry Sanders, an American politologist, "the mounting costs of the carriers and battleships required for the pretensions of seapower supremacy will almost surely help to guarantee continuing U.S. economic decline. Similarly, Asia will not be made more secure by the presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops in Seoul and Manila. The attempts

to maintain these imperial outposts will only serve as a magnet for anti-American feeling, isolating the United States from regional politics and popular aspirations."¹

There are both economic and political grounds for such fears. Soviet policy in the region has led to a notable lowering of tension and confrontation. May 1989 witnessed the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations, and in February 1989, our country completed the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. Also that year, the Vietnamese force was pulled out of Cambodia, a development making the search for ways to a settlement of the conflict easier. The situation in the region was further defused in a measure by Soviet moves to carry forward relations with ASEAN countries, Japan and Australia and establish economic contacts with South Korea—in addition to the steps towards arms cuts mentioned earlier. All this has considerably restricted Washington's possibilities of using the "threat" from the Soviet Union and Vietnam as an excuse for its military presence in the region.

The United States is increasingly aware of the aspiration of many APR countries to loosen the grip of US military tutelage. Washington is up against anti-American feeling in South Korea, against a movement opposing the preservation of US bases in the Philippines after 1991, against anti-nuclear sentiment in the majority of countries in the region. In December 1987, the ASEAN countries took a negative stand on US pressure in favour of including in the declaration on the summit of the ASEAN Six a demand that countries in the region should support the idea of extending the agreement on the US bases in the Philippines. What the ASEAN countries did instead was to agree "in principle" to the creation in Southeast Asia of a nuclear-weapons-free zone by analogy with the one existing in the South Pacific since 1985. In June 1988, the Philippine Senate resolved to ban nuclear arms imports to the country.²

APR realities are confronting the Bush administration with big problems. It can hardly see a mere extrapolation from Reagan's policy of isolating the Soviet Union in the region—a policy keeping military spending on a high level and involving an unfavourable balance of foreign trade and a budget deficit—as an attractive prospect. There is probably a case for expecting the United States to try to abandon its twofold role as a military colossus and a debtor because it must realise the direct dependence between a mounting military effort and an external debt coupled with an internal one. How this will come about is hard to say at the moment but it is safe to presume that Washington's policy will tend increasingly to recognise the structure of a region where geostrategic considerations are going to gradually give way to geoeconomic ones.

The Soviet Union has apparently far from used up all the opportunities of bringing the United States into a serious dialogue on regional security and arms reductions. After all, even during preparations for Helsinki, the prospective participants were unable to discuss things seriously until the Soviet Union proposed an agenda of interest and benefit to both itself and its partners. Many Soviet proposals which seem acceptable to all are regarded in the United States as giving the Soviet Union a unilateral advantage. This is why in Asia as in Europe, where a mutually acceptable agenda was arrived at, it is probably necessary to offer the US side a package taking account of both Soviet and American interests and priorities.

A beginning could be made by analysing the military doctrines and national interests of both sides in the region in terms of estimating their adequacy and compatibility as well as of comparing them in the overall context of Soviet-American relations. The Soviet Union ought to formu-

late its military doctrine in the APR more precisely and to make a balanced package proposal accordingly. American expert analysis of the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union to date could bring out the latter's shortcomings and possibly suggest a modification in the interests of both sides. Equally important to us is the US concept of control over armaments in the APR.

SETTLING TODAY'S CONFLICTS is a major security problem in the APR, one requiring Soviet-American cooperation. To cite an example, it is hard without overcoming mutual distrust to expect positive changes in regard to a settlement on the Korean Peninsula, where the situation is probably ripe for more vigorous discussion by the Soviet Union and United States.

Both powers have an obvious stake in averting any destabilising incidents in the area of the demarcation line. The dialogue that has started between North and South Korea, while positive in itself, objectively makes for a mounting trend towards intra-Korean contacts, something which is adding, in view of the distrust and hostility persisting in Seoul and Pyongyang, to the likelihood of the rise of differences, friction and controversy. Hence the special importance of encouraging both sides to show restraint and greater flexibility in order to prevent all these generally inevitable contradictions from growing into a bigger dispute and becoming an obstacle to the dialogue under way.

It is important to note that the Soviet Union and United States are coming to realise that neither the South nor the North are unanimous in their approach to a settlement and that the leaderships of the two parts of the country are responsible in comparable measure for the tension still there. This movement in favour of meeting each other half-way is in evidence at the level of the scientific community, experts and public opinion in the Soviet Union and United States. As for the official attitudes of the two powers, they have yet to undergo tangible changes, whereas it would apparently make sense to proceed to an informal Soviet-American discussion of practical aspects of the Korean problem.

It could be aimed at, for example, evolving and formulating a common conception of the role of the great powers, their responsibility for stability on the peninsula and the admissible bounds of their actions involving those aspects of the situation on which Soviet-American mutual understanding is still lacking or demonstrably inadequate. More specifically, it would be important to take a step towards an understanding on an agreed winding down of Soviet arms sales to the DPRK and of US military activity in South Korea. These steps would be inadequate, however, as a means of achieving greater stability on the peninsula unless coupled with some form of direct non-aggression agreement between North and South, one providing for a phased withdrawal of US troops but also containing effective international safeguards against any attempt at a forcible alteration of the social, economic and political system in either part of the country. The Soviet Union and United States could therefore mediate the organisation of direct talks between Seoul and Pyongyang and the formulation of a general concept of them provided, of course, that both Korean sides were willing to cooperate. In any case, it is clear that the issue of normalising the situation around Korea can hardly be taken up realistically unless both parts of the country establish and fully develop economic, cultural, humanitarian and other relations with the world around. Furthering Soviet-South Korean contacts is therefore as important as promoting dialogue between the DPRK and the United States as well as other industrialised countries.

We also see this approach as the road to normalising the situation

around Cambodia. In grappling with this problem, it is important for the Soviet Union to find common ground not only with China but with the United States as well. US Vice-President Dan Quayle's visit to South-east Asia, in particular the Thai-Cambodian border area, in May 1989 showed that the Bush administration is closely following the evolution of the Cambodian problem. The readiness of the Soviet Union and China to contribute to a fair and reasonable settlement of the problem, confirmed during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing in May 1989, offers Washington a real opportunity to play a positive role in the settlement of the conflict. Any attempt to prevent this against the background of the constructive changes that have come about in the situation in and around Cambodia would be counter-productive for US policy towards Southeast Asia and America's relations with the Soviet Union and China.

The key aspect of a settlement today is the issue of outside support for the warring Khmer parties to the conflict. Whereas the withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers means at least a substantial reduction in military backing for the Heng Samrin leadership, the United States still refuses to stop aiding the Sonn San and Sihanouk groupings.

This enables China to a degree to keep fairly many moot points regarding an end to support for the "Red Khmer". Yet it would be reasonable to settle the issue of foreign aid for the parties to the Cambodian conflict on both a bilateral basis (between the Soviet Union and the United States) and a trilateral one (with Chinese participation). The experience of the Afghan settlement is proof that the issue of foreign aid and guarantees is decisive for the evolution of the situation after legal agreements formally recognised by all parties have been reached.

To prevent insufficient understanding between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, which may grow objectively in step with the current fairly rapid progress towards closer Soviet-Chinese relations and as a result of the Soviet Union's inevitable dissociation from involvement in the Indochina conflict in any form, it is important to help Hanoi establish more constructive relations with the United States and China.

In this connection, it should be borne in mind that Vietnam's participation in normal exchanges with Pacific countries, including ASEAN members, would largely improve the situation in the region and that the Soviet Union's positive influence on this process could lessen the distrust of developing countries for Soviet policy. This, in turn, would make it easier for the region to respond properly to Soviet initiatives and would contribute to the creation of a more favourable political and psychological climate for Soviet participation in economic life in the region.

A matter of special importance today is to overcome the hostile, suspicious attitude to Soviet policy in East Asia, to get rid of the stereotyped notion of the "threat" and "communist danger" to Pacific countries said to emanate from the Soviet Union. By proclaiming new political thinking on a non-confrontational basis, the Soviet Union has in fact taken a step towards desisting from effort to build up its influence by bringing its military power to bear. However, this does not abolish the task of extending our participation in the region's economy, of our joining in reasonably advanced and diversified relations of interdependence with all Pacific countries, which alone can be a real guarantee of universal commitment to military political stability. What hampers the establishment of such relations, however, is not only our obvious economic lag but the difficulty of cultivating relations with those countries in the region that distrust statements about its purely peaceful aspirations made by the Soviet Union, whose interests have traditionally been associated with a bid to win strategic bridgeheads rather than with a search for economic partners.

TAKING ACCOUNT of the US factor as we shape our policy in the APR is almost of key importance now both for objective reasons and because we have a greater interest than ever in regional stability. This applies primarily to areas where the dynamic in earlier years was low and where a more active Soviet "peace offensive" is objectively leading to a change in the character of the balance of influence. First among them is the sphere of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Today, when the trend towards progress in them is so obvious, it is important to concentrate on giving them forms in keeping with realities. The Soviet-Chinese rapprochement is unquestionably seen with disquiet by the United States and Japan as well as by Vietnam and developing countries in the region. And while those who believe in the possibility of the Soviet Union and China re-establishing their powerful political and ideological alliance are few, they are there nonetheless. Whether this remains the opinion of a minority or comes to exert greater influence on the US leadership will largely depend on the forms, pace and lines as well as, needless to say, the ideological foundations of Soviet-Chinese cooperation.

It is in point to stress that the method of unilateral or agreed declarations of intent by the parties to this cooperation shows increasing signs of moral obsolescence even though it has not yet outlived its usefulness. Criticism of the Soviet Union (which we try to dismiss as immaterial) over insufficient perseverance in taking practical steps to apply the principles of new political thinking proclaimed by us may intensify.

The time has apparently come when our intentions must be confirmed by real actions and not just by statements on the part of politicians. Now that Chinese-American relations are in a complicated state, it might be useful to extend to the American side—by agreement with China—an invitation to join in trilateral Soviet-Chinese-American economic, scientific and technological cooperation, in talks on guaranteeing the security of maritime traffic, in evolving a common conception of the task of bridging the cultural and worldview gap between countries representing Eastern and Western civilisation. It would probably be right to set a course for an objectively logical advance to trilateral semi-official and official consultations on a regional political settlement.

Lastly, specific evidence of the Soviet Union's effort to avoid an excessive tilt towards China could play a positive role in terms of America's perception of Soviet policy. Just what could furnish the most effective proof of this nature—whether Soviet-Vietnamese summit talks in Hanoi or a meeting with the US President in Vladivostok that would mark its final and complete "opening"—lies, of course, with those who put policy into practice.

We believe this kind of "compensatory diplomacy" could become in the years ahead an inalienable principle of Soviet policy, replacing the logic of breakthroughs in individual sectors of foreign relations (say, those with China, Japan or South Korea), which may undermine the existing balance and breed distrust.

From this point of view, much will depend on our relations with Japan, the chief Asian ally of the United States. Currently there is good reason to hope that the Soviet-Japanese summit to be held in Tokyo in the second half of 1991 will spur the development of relations between the two countries. At the same time, in a situation where Tokyo is not very keen on economic contacts with the Soviet Union and, what is more, insists on its territorial claims, early and far-reaching progress in our economic relations with Japan seems unlikely.

It would probably be wise for us in the years ahead to place hopes for economic ties which we traditionally associate with partnership with Japan on partnership with South Korea. This could help in a

measure in solving economic problems, if without eliminating the political problem of a radical lessening of Japanese hostility, virtually the main source of anti-Soviet feeling in the region.

It follows that solid guarantees of universal commitment to regional stability can hardly be provided in isolation from better Soviet-Japanese relations even if we were to reconcile ourselves to the loss of early prospects for economic cooperation with Tokyo.

In principle, the United States could project the positive impact of the developing Soviet-American dialogue into Japanese-Soviet relations. Besides, it is obvious that in the long term the Soviet Union and United States have many parallel if not coinciding interests as regards achieving regional stability in anticipation of a possible buildup of an independent military role by Tokyo.

Tactically, however, the situation is more complex, above all because, since the advent of the Bush administration, the United States has been more outspoken in supporting Japan's territorial claims. Nevertheless, for all its complexity, the situation does not at all rule out the possibility of Soviet-American consultations on problems relating to Japan. Preparations for them could be made both in the hope of Japanese participation and in its absence, for it is clear that Tokyo would be worried about any Soviet-American consultations of this nature and would try to block them.

Discussion could probably concern such matters as comparing and exchanging data on the size of ground forces, aircraft and other armaments along the Soviet-Japanese border in the area of Hokkaido, the Kuriles and Sakhalin. It would be advisable to try to work out a common conception of conditions and possibilities for an agreed freeze on military construction, including modernisation of existing facilities and armaments on both sides of the border. Also, it might be advisable for the commands of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East and the US forces in Japan to enter into direct contacts by, say, establishing a hot line, acquainting each other with various types of military equipment or inviting observers on a reciprocal basis to war games held in the region.

US participation in such talks could not only spur the dialogue on regional security problems but prompt the American side to take a more reasoned stand on the allegation about a military threat to Japan from the Soviet Union. The result could be a more realistic balance of US military political and economic interests in furthering relations with Tokyo, and this in turn would discourage Japan from seeking economic concessions from Washington by exploiting the US side's overestimation of the importance of strategic partnership with Tokyo.

THE UNITED STATES has so far laid plans for the economic integration of Pacific countries without regard to the possibility of Soviet participation in it, a participation which we think would benefit all countries in the region.

Meanwhile, economic modernisation of the Soviet Far East in the broad sense of the phrase implies neither a mere increase in the quantitative indices of production nor just a restructuring. It is a question of creating on the Pacific coast of a sphere of really vital Soviet interests, meaning primarily and chiefly economic interests. This would induce the Soviet Union to seek cooperation with Pacific countries in the most advanced forms, such as could make it a major positive factor for Pacific development trends.

It is important to remember that to draw the Soviet Far East into Pacific production and consumption systems means actually drawing the

whole Soviet Union into cooperation. And this could offer additional opportunities to expand the Pacific market and intensify international cooperation.

We wish to re-emphasise a fact already noted in our press, namely, that the present programme for the economic advancement of the Soviet Far East is inadequate in this sense. Specifically, the country can hardly limit itself to the buildup of export production envisaged by the programme.

The Soviet Union needs to adopt effective forms of cooperation, to draw up a new long-range plan for the modernisation of the Far Eastern economic complex in order to provide a supporting infrastructure and partly a social base for full-scale Soviet participation in the "Pacific pool". This base will have to be set up virtually anew. The measures for the development of joint ventures, special economic zones, various forms of cooperation and specialisation, compensatory projects, all of which are still under discussion, are unlikely to yield the necessary strategic results. They can only help in solving particular problems.

Still, even these problems are important. In particular, joint enterprise is a real way to developing facilities for the comprehensive processing of raw materials extracted in the Soviet Far East. Special economic zones would serve to develop the region, especially its coastal area. Another important asset of joint ventures is that they are an excellent means of developing small and medium-size plants for the utilisation of various reserves, including wastes. Decades-long gigantomania caused enormous losses. Real current advantages were missed due to a few giant projects that claimed the country's main resources and took a lot of time to carry out.

It is highly important, however, to look ahead, to foresee the future, which promises the adoption of forms of cooperation in the Pacific that are entirely new to our economy. In view of the geographical location and special function of the Soviet Far East as a Pacific contact zone, consideration should be given to the possibility and advisability of this Soviet region participating directly in the Pacific economic process as a component of the APR.

Cooperation with American firms is possible on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis. The scope of the processes that can take place on the Pacific coast of the Soviet Union presupposes concentration on a similar scale of the financial, technological and organisational potential of participants. The positions held by the United States enable it to join in these processes in various forms. Differing interests, financial possibilities, technological levels, sales opportunities and much else are a natural basis on which firms of various countries could set up consortiums and multinational joint ventures. The agreement on economic and cultural cooperation between Magadan Region and Alaska is the only achievement of this kind for the time being.

Cooperation in construction is probably one of the more attractive and fruitful forms in the early stages of cooperation. We have mentioned the special importance of construction in the Soviet Far East now and in the future. The competence and capabilities of American construction firms are common knowledge. It would also be desirable to bring in Japanese equipment and technology as well as labour from other countries in order to carry forward civil engineering and develop Far Eastern industrial and tourist areas at a fast pace.

Such trends in the future advancement of the Soviet Far East would also help improve the military political situation throughout the APR and hence with regard to the Soviet Union as well. Integrating the Soviet Union's Pacific areas into the APR would greatly ease tensions in the

region. This alone would help in ensuring national security through less effort.

AS FAR AS the outlook in the region is concerned, constructive Soviet-American cooperation on regional problems is more likely in situations where the Soviet Union and the United States hold comparably solid positions, as in Indochina and Korea, respectively. Much will depend on the flexibility and efficiency of Soviet policy, which today is equal to influencing more noticeably than before the attitude of public opinion and legislators to the policy of the US administration. We could use a wide range of measures, from respect for human rights to steps confirming our allegiance to accords.

At the same time, there is an undeniable need for sustained effort to invigorate discussion on any possible approach to the task of improving the situation in the region. The Soviet Union has repeatedly set out its conception of the causes of tension and of how it can be lessened. Our opponents interpret the evolution of the situation in their own way.

Every Pacific country could apparently present its own vision of how to bring about regional stability on the principle of equal security.

Formation of national concepts of strengthening peace and confidence in the region and their discussion on a bilateral or multilateral basis could open the road to agreeing positions which largely contradict each other today. And however arduous the path to a compromise might be, the result would be a real dialogue, whose absence is one of the main sources of the mutual suspiciousness persisting in the region.

At the threshold of the 1990s, we finally brought ourselves to admit that the Soviet Union and United States have not only non-coinciding but also parallel and similar interests in the APR. We believe now is the time to move from putting this fact on record to practical steps. This lends special relevance to Soviet-American consultations on problems of the Asia-Pacific region. Their absence is a drag on the dynamic of the Soviet Union's Pacific policy.

¹ Jerry W Sanders, "America in the Pacific Century", *World Policy Journal*, Winter 1988/1989, p. 76.

² *The New York Times*, October 13, 1988.

On the request of Mr. Charles William Maynes the fee for his article "Doing Away with the Cold War" published in the June 1989 issue of "International Affairs" has been remitted to the aid fund for the children victims of the railway disaster in Bashkirta.

EASTERN EUROPE—HEADING TOWARDS RENEWAL

FOLLOWING THE START OF THE PERESTROIKA in the Soviet Union, the East European countries have begun, one after another, to shed the Stalinist administrative-command model of socialism and to seek new ways and methods for renewing their political structures. For a long time Europe has had no such profound and extensive changes which, basically usher in a new epoch in the history of the continent.

The dramatic developments under way throughout Eastern Europe did not take place all of a sudden: they are the effect of the long-dormant stagnation phenomena whose removal required new approaches. And that is precisely what the members of the old leadership were incapable of working out.

Some politicians and politologists ask these questions: are we not witnessing a decline of socialism as a system on the eve of the coming century, following its triumphal march throughout the 20th century? What effect will further developments in this region have on the balance of forces in Europe and in the world. What will be the Soviet Union's view of further radical changes in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe? What effect may these changes have on allied relations within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance? There is, of course, also the question of the West's attitude to everything that is happening in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union's approach to the dynamic processes in Eastern Europe is based on the solid principles of freedom of choice for the peoples and their right to decide their own future. Our point of departure is that every people has the right to decide its own future independently, including the choice of system and ways, pace and methods of its evolution.

Our principled attitude to the socialist countries of Europe has not changed: they are not only our allies, but also our friends and our neighbours. We seek in every way to ensure progress and stability, i.e., stability in these countries of the East European region, stability of the entire continent, and inviolability of the postwar borders of all the states existing in Europe.

We proceed from the conviction that the need for changes in the socialist countries was objectively prepared by the course of historical development itself, that they are aimed for the better and are a continuation and component part of the democratic renewal, a process begun by the Soviet perestroika. For all the diversity of the processes in the socialist countries, they have some common features which indicate that these processes are quite logical, for they signify an urge to repudiate the authoritarian bureaucratic system and to shape a truly democratic and selfgoverning social organism.

What could be said about this common denominator of the development in the socialist countries? An analysis of the current in-depth changes shows that they are based on a common urge to accelerate the renovation of socialism, of its political system, economic foundation and spiritual sphere. The socialist idea is viable because it is multifaceted, since each country and each party have their own ways of tackling the

problems before them in the light of the level of economic and social development, traditions and way of life.

Let us recall that Bulgaria was one of the first to announce that it was taking the way of perestroika and renewal as the Soviet Union had done, but the loudly captioned strategic conceptions that were worked out proved to be out of touch with the demands of life and came down to feverish reorganisations and personnel transfers, without going all the way to profound transformations in the basis and the superstructure.

The November 1989 Plenary Meeting of the BCP Central Committee made it possible to start working out such decisions. Petur Mladenov says that the party is striving for authentic socialism, of which the emancipation and uplift of the individual is the sole touchstone. The basis for this should be provided by a revival of the Bulgarian Blagoyev-Dimitrov tradition of the united democratic and popular front, within whose framework efforts are to be made to bring the people broadly together in joint action for the socialist option. In this unity of action, there will be a place for all the classes, strata, groups and organisations of the Bulgarian society.

The BCP is working to involve all the social forces and movements taking a stand for socialism in drafting a programme of renewal and perestroika.

There is now a broad discussion in the East European countries of the balance between planning and market elements in the economy. The share of the existing private sector can be expected to increase, especially in trading, public catering and the services; more favourable conditions will be created for the functioning of cooperatives and local craft industries, and for the emergence of small private enterprises enjoying equal opportunities with those available to state enterprises.

In short, the range in Eastern Europe is vast, from the confidence that the perestroika can be implemented within the framework of socialism to the broad admission of private capital. What are the ideas that tend to emerge in this context? Indeed, capitalism can teach us a lot, and it has turned out to be more viable than the founders of scientific communism had assumed. But those who advocate purely market relations say nothing about their duality. Free market and competition stimulate the development of production and restrict the monopoly of the state, which leads to stagnation, but at the same time prevent the exercise of public control over the measure of labour and the standard of consumption, increasing social differentiation and, accordingly, social tensions in the society.

Much has been said in the West recently about support for the "historic transformations" in Eastern Europe, a readiness to extend aid, etc. But for the time being caution prevails. Some rescue measures have, of course, been taken: credits have been earmarked, offers have been made to train tens of thousands of East Europeans, etc. But the West Europeans are naturally in no hurry to share their resources more widely at the expense of their own economy. However that may be, it is clear that the East European countries will mainly have to muster their internal potentialities for their own development.

What is to happen to the Marxist-Leninist parties is a central issue in the restructuring process under way in Eastern Europe. Failure of the former leaders to match words with deeds weakened considerably the parties' authority in the society. For instance, one of the first steps taken in the course of the changes in the GDR was the deletion of Article 1 of the GDR Constitution concerning the leading role of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party. The right to be vanguard in the country must now be won by the party and backed up with practical action: such

was the answer given by the decisions of the December Extraordinary Congress of the SUPG, which renamed the party.

In Czechoslovakia, the article on the Communist Party's leading role in the society has also been deleted from the Constitution, together with the article which made state policy in culture, upbringing and education directly dependent on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The basis now is constituted by scientific cognition, patriotism, humanism and democracy.

The renovated leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia decided that, for the sake of the party's future, it had to give up its monopoly on power and to turn the party into an active political force promoting public dialogue and the creation of a pluralist democracy.

Earlier on, the fraternal parties ceased to be ruling parties in Poland and Hungary, and new political forces came on the scene, among them both those who support the socialist idea and those who seek other ways of social development.

We find, therefore, that the Communists in Eastern Europe are faced with what is no simple situation. Henceforth they will have to carry on a hard struggle to win authority and the right to play an active role in their country not by enacting decrees, but by carrying on persevering practical work. This is no simple task, and on how well it is fulfilled will depend the future not only of the Marxist-Leninist parties in this part of Europe, but of the entire world communist movement. The difficulties are also being compounded by the fact that extremists seek to capitalise on the mass mistakes and crimes committed in the past by the former leadership of these parties and aim to remove the parties from the political arena, fanning an atmosphere of intolerance with respect to the Communists.

Change in the socialist countries is an uneven process, and each country has its own peculiarities. The following aphorism has already been coined: "What happened in the USSR took Poland 10 years, the GDR—10 months, and Czechoslovakia—10 days."

A favourable background for further change in Czechoslovakia was created by the recognition by the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union that the dispatch of troops by the allied states to that country in 1968 amounted to intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign Czechoslovakia. In its statement, the Soviet government agreed with the view taken by the presidium of the CPCz Central Committee and the government of Czechoslovakia that the entry of the armies of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia in 1968 was not justified, and that the decision to do so was erroneous in the light of all the facts that have now come to light.

The Czechoslovak government emphasised in its statement that it was prepared to join all the countries involved in the dispatch of troops to Czechoslovakia in setting up a group of historians for an all-round discussion of all the circumstances of the 1968 events, and here one can hardly confine oneself to assertions concerning the acts of the "Brezhnev clique". Let us not forget about the unprecedented arms race in that period, the sharp East-West confrontation, and the most acute ideological struggle. But it is clear that the Soviet leadership of that period failed to make use of all the political methods at its disposal with respect to the processes in Czechoslovakia, which by the summer of 1968 had become most exacerbated (not without intervention on either side).

Developments in the GDR have once again revived the almost dormant talk of German reunification. The thrust of many commentaries on this subject is that the establishment of a united Germany would produce considerable changes in the balance of forces in the international arena and would be a destabilising element in Europe. That is why there was

much doubt over the 10-point "phased unification plan" put forward by FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the core of which is the extension of large-scale economic aid to the GDR by Bonn in exchange for its abandonment of its socialist choice.

One could see this as an expression of the West's underestimation of the GDR's potential and its capacity to solve its problems on its own. The reforms in the GDR are aimed not at any reunification of Germany, but at the shaping of relations of close cooperation between the two German states within the framework of the process in which a common European home is to be built.

But if one is to consider a confederation of the two German states with the triumph of democratisation and freedom in the GDR, why not consider, as a first phase, a confederation between the GDR and West Berlin?

There was grave concern in the GDR at the prospect of the country being "sold out" (to call a spade a spade) because of the destabilisation of its internal market. The mass trips by GDR citizens to West Berlin and the FRG led to the cornering of GDR currency at plunderous black-market prices, and its transfer back to the country in large volumes. The effects of this were very soon felt by all the citizens of the republic, where shop counters grew empty. No wonder the measures to introduce law and order in the country were supported not only by the SUPG, but also by the New Forum, the Church and a section of the opposition.

Now about the objectives of the changes in the socialist countries. The main one is still the need to work out approaches to the question of what kind of socialism we seek. Hardly anyone just now is capable of giving a clear-cut answer to the question of how far it is possible to go towards a free market if the socialist structures are not to turn into their opposites. The planning system can be rapidly destroyed, but will the unrestrained market mechanisms help to bring about a real improvement in living standards while preserving the social gains? The whole point is to advance towards a new and higher quality of the society oriented towards man, oriented towards human needs, requirements and interests in actual fact, and not just in words and declarations.

In international terms, the changes in Eastern Europe must become a component part of the movement towards a better world, towards realising the idea of creating a European home and building a solid bridge between East and West. This was emphasised at a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty leaders in Moscow on December 4, 1989, which presented detailed information on the Soviet-US summit in Malta.

Great attention was given at the Malta summit to the situation in Eastern Europe, and here it is necessary to emphasise that it was treated in the context of the turning-point character of the entire present situation in the world, and especially in the European region. The changes under way in the region show that the globe is moving into a qualitatively new epoch, the epoch of the end of the cold war.

A chance has now appeared to overcome the negative aspects of the postwar order in the world. In this context, any manifestations of instability, whether inside the East European countries or in international relations on the continent, are fraught with grave consequences. That is why there is an ever more obvious need to consolidate the positive changes within the framework of the Helsinki process and to make the movement towards a new Europe more reliable and predictable.

POLAND IN THE 1950s

Yuri BERNOV

IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE clear in current events in Poland. Deep social and political crisis interfered with the country's normal life for a number of years. During the June 1989 parliamentary elections the Polish United Workers' Party lost its leading role in the country, that brought to power a coalitionary government which started seeking the ways for the stabilisation of situation in the country. The Soviet Union respects, as it has repeatedly stressed, the Polish people's freedom of choice, their aspiration to lead the country out of the crisis without any prompting from outside and to build a strong, prosperous state according to their own recipes. But Poland is our neighbour, and so we cannot be indifferent to the future of Soviet-Polish relations. Therefore we look with opened eyes to all that could interfere with Soviet-Polish cooperation. A declaration of the new Polish government that it stays true to allies' relationship, that it is eager to promote Soviet-Polish ties in all spheres gives reason to believe that these relations will be normal and friendly with fewer declarations and greater realism and confidence. In building such relations, we should obviously not ignore our historical experience but should take account of all that was sound in it and concentrate on today's problems. This is why I hope the following notes on postwar Poland will arouse interest as something more than evidence derived from archives.

THE FIRST FIVE YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II saw the rise and consolidation of people's democracies, there developing very special relations between them and our country. The new situation confronted our embassies with new tasks. We needed people who could help fraternal parties in socialist construction. It was therefore decided to reinforce our embassies with people having experience of party work and economic management. As a result, Yuri Andropov and Nikolai Firyubin were appointed counsellors of the embassies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, respectively. A year later, both became ambassadors there.

A group of party officials, including this writer, was enrolled in the Foreign Ministry's Higher Diplomatic School, which offered special training for work in people's democracies. A graduate of a law institute and the Moscow Party School, I set out with a will to study Poland, the Polish language and fundamentals of diplomatic theory and practice. On graduating from the school, I was recommended for work in the Polish Sector of the CPSU CC Foreign Policy Commission. But shortly

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afterwards the Commission was liquidated, and its functions were taken over by the newly-established International Department. I was assigned to the Foreign Ministry but all vacancies earmarked for Higher Diplomatic School graduates had already been filled.

Fortunately, the post of vice-consul in Szczecin fell vacant, and I gladly accepted the offer to assume it. On my way to Szczecin I stopped over at the Embassy in Warsaw as required by custom and was received by Ambassador Arkady Sobolev, an experienced diplomat of note. Prior to service in Poland, he had held the diplomatic posts of Secretary-General of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Counsellor of the Embassy in Great Britain, Assistant Secretary-General of the UN and head of a number of Foreign Ministry departments, and had also served as a member of the Ministry Collegium. He gave me a detailed description of the situation in Poland and the tasks awaiting me in Szczecin.

I left for Szczecin on the following day. The Consulate was situated in an outlying district of fine mansions that had belonged to German aristocrats and Wehrmacht officers before the war. The district showed no traces of the war, probably because there were no industrial plants there. I understood that the mansion housing our Consulate had been owned by a big industrialist of Berlin. He had built it and fitted out specially for his mistress.

The Consul, who was newly appointed too, and I set about familiarising ourselves with the consular district. One day when we were walking along the streets of Poznan, we saw passers-by take off their hats and bow to us. Could it be that they greeted us so courteously because they knew we were Soviet? We turned out to be wrong on this. The point is that we were both wearing identical long black overcoats and black hats and white silk scarves, or the kind of outfit which the Foreign Ministry supplied to its officials about to go abroad. It emerged, however, that in Poland none but priests dressed like that and this explained why we were mistaken for them. We had to part with our misleading outfit and buy new coats and hats, which was anything but easy in those days.

Much of the Consulate's time was taken up, as in the case of other Soviet consulates in Poland, with registering and issuing papers to Soviet citizens who found themselves abroad for one reason or another. Many of them were Byelorussians and Ukrainians from the western regions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. During the economic crisis of the early 1930s, they had emigrated from bourgeois Poland to Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries in search of employment. On selling all they had and abandoning their homes, they had left on Soviet passports together with their families in an attempt to get back to their native country, Soviet Byelorussia or the Soviet Ukraine, by way of Poland as early as possible. I say "in an attempt" because this category of our citizens came up against various difficulties, nearly all of them being treated with distrust and looked upon as almost spies. Those who had no close relatives in the Soviet Union were denied entry.

We consular officials registered applications from those citizens, commending them on their desire to return home. But it took Moscow one, two or more years to consider their requests. We had to help applicants find a job and to ask the Polish authorities to provide them with housing. The emigrants never complained although they encountered great financial and other difficulties. They worked hard to prove that they were willing to go through any hardships if only they could return to their homeland as soon as possible.

Nor was it easy to take care of Soviet citizens whom the Germans had transported to Germany during the war for use at forced labour. They included many women who had married Poles and settled in Poland. The Soviet law in force at the time prohibited marriages with foreigners, and

this bred serious conflicts, for children were entered in their mother's passport under her maiden name. The Polish husband was not allowed to go to the Soviet Union with his wife and children to see her parents, and he refused to allow her to go with the children without him because he feared she might never come back or could be prevented from doing so. The Consulate was powerless to help in this, and we heard many unpleasant words from both Poles and our own female citizens.

To unite somehow Soviet citizens living permanently in Szczecin, we enlisted the assistance of the authorities to organise a club in a stylish mansion. There we acquainted our citizens and their families with life in the Soviet Union, screened documentaries and feature films, held photography exhibitions, gave talks. We devoted a lot of time to teaching Russian, for many of the women spoke it poorly, having had no practice. Incidentally, this did not apply to the Ukrainians and Byelorussians who had lived in Latin America for over twenty years: both the older generation and young people spoke their mother tongue fluently.

The staff had few truly diplomatic duties. There were only two other foreign consulates in Szczecin, the Consulate-General of the CSSR and the Finnish Consulate. But in those days Soviet diplomats were discouraged from maintaining any contacts with foreigners other than purely business relations. Whenever we needed a meeting with a foreign representative, we had to ask the Embassy for permission.

One day the Czechoslovak Consul-General told me by telephone that he would like to invite staff members of our Consulate to dinner on December 12. I promised to convey the invitation to the Consul. On being told about it, the latter rang up the Embassy. The Ambassador was out, and his deputy who answered the telephone recommended the Consul to refrain from visiting the Czechoslovak Consulate-General. It could not be helped. I called back to tell the Consul-General that unfortunately we could not accept his invitation because the Consul had an appointment elsewhere that day. The Consul-General was upset and said he could put off the dinner but would hate to do so because December 12 was the anniversary of the signing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and he had expected to mark so memorable a date with his Soviet colleagues. I promised to draw the Consul's attention to that.

Our Consul rang up the Embassy again but the same counsellor answered after hearing all arguments: "It's you who have been invited as Consul and must assume full responsibility for the decision you make." After prolonged hesitation, the Consul decided on our going to the Czechoslovaks for dinner but without our wives. On arriving at the Consulate-General, we saw that the host and his wife were puzzled and disconcerted because they had looked forward to our coming with our wives and had put a lot of effort into preparing for a friendly dinner. As a result, the atmosphere at dinner was stiff. On our way home we realised that we had hurt our colleague's feelings due to the absurdly rigorous rules of our diplomatic protocol of the time.

In January 1953, the Embassy in Poland was taken over by Georgi Popov, a noted party official who after the death of Alexander Shcherbakov had headed the Moscow City and Regional Party Organisations until 1949 while at the same time serving as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet (mayor of the city.—*Tr.*) and a CPSU CC secretary. Being a Stalin protégé and enjoying the General Secretary's unqualified support, Popov went too far by setting off the Moscow Party Organisation and himself against the CPSU Central Committee, thereby incurring the displeasure of key party officials. Stalin relieved him of all his posts and appointed him Chairman of the Committee on Urban Development and subsequently manager of a plant in Kuibyshev.

In Poland Popov told us that before the 19th Party Congress he had been summoned to Stalin in Moscow. The latter had given him a hard look and asked: "Well, have you come to your senses? I'm told exile has done you good." Stalin suggested that Popov take over the Kuibyshev Regional Party Organisation. Georgi Malenkov, who sat in on the meeting, backed the idea but asked Stalin to consider appointing Popov ambassador to Warsaw. Stalin agreed.

Popov's diplomatic appointment caused concern both in the Foreign Ministry and among many Soviet diplomats in Poland, for he was known as a rude, tactless man who hardly listened to people, let alone heeding their opinion. In other words, he was what we now describe as a confirmed advocate of the command style of work.

A few days after Popov's arrival in Warsaw, his aide rang up to tell me that his chief wanted to see me. I had no idea what the reason could be and guessed in vain at it. The Consul was worried because the Ambassador wanted to see me and not him.

On arriving in Warsaw, I hurried to the Embassy and was unexpectedly greeted by a smiling Ambassador, who hugged me as he might have an old acquaintance and began asking questions about the situation in Poland and my impressions. What he was plainly interested in above all else was what I thought of the diplomats on the Embassy and Consulate staffs. I answered evasively, saying that I did not know them well enough because I had arrived in the country a mere six months before and worked far from Warsaw. In conclusion he invited me to lunch with him in his apartment.

I am still wondering what made him receive me so warmly contrary to his habit. Why, we had only met twice before, and on both occasions he had given me a good dressing down and even threatened to take away my party card. Had he forgotten? Or did he mistake me for somebody else?

Afterwards I often accompanied Popov on his trips to various regions, took part in his meetings with our Polish friends and watched him work at the Embassy. Appointing him Ambassador to Poland was hardly right in view of his character and working methods. He was the first Soviet party leader to be entrusted with so demanding a mission, and I felt that he did not even appreciate the significance of the role assigned to him in Poland. He saw himself as a commissar with the Polish government and the party Central Committee or perhaps as a "viceroy" rather than as a diplomat. Here are some facts showing this.

One day in spring when I was in Warsaw, Popov took me on an outing. As we drove down the highway he saw a tractor ploughing a field. He told the chauffeur to stop, got out, picked up a stick and measured the depth of the furrow. And then he uttered a curse and said: "Why, I've told Bierut that the furrow must be 25 centimetres deep but this is only 15 centimetres deep. Well, I'll give them a piece of my mind when I get back to Warsaw." "But why should you, Georgi Mikhailovich?" I said. "I'm sure our Polish friends know how they should plough and how deep the furrow should be." He cut me short, saying that I knew nothing about it. "If the Poles go on like this they will be left without grain and will have to ask us for it while we've got enough freeloaders as it is."

Popov neglected his diplomatic duties. He avoided contacts with ambassadors, including even those of socialist countries. He did not consider himself bound by diplomatic protocol and stayed away from receptions given by ambassadors, sending an aide in his stead.

During a reception at our Embassy on the 36th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Iranian Ambassador walked up to Popov. "Mr. Ambassador," he said, "you show no respect for my country and

me. You didn't attend a reception at our Embassy on the occasion of our national holiday, nor did you offer an explanation. Yet I respect your great country, our good neighbour, and have therefore come to this reception."

Popov was occasionally tactless even with Polish leaders. During a conversation with Boleslaw Bierut, he listed what he saw as mistakes and miscalculations of the Polish leadership and said to Bierut jokingly that had Bierut done as poorly in Moscow, he would have been denied even the job of a district party secretary in Moscow Region. After that Bierut called up Khrushchev and told him that since he wasn't good enough to serve even as a district secretary, he was going to ask the PUWP CC Political Bureau to relieve him of the duties of First Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

On serving a mere nine months as Ambassador, Popov was recalled and appointed manager of an aircraft instrument plant in Vladimir. And that was the end of his diplomatic career.

LATE IN 1953, I was appointed Soviet Consul in Cracow. That post was considered very important at the time. One-time capital of the Polish Kingdom remarkable for its history and its unique cultural and architectural monuments, Cracow was second to none but Warsaw as a city.

In the early fifties, Cracow began transforming itself into a major industrial centre in step with the construction of the huge Nowa Huta iron and steel works. One of my new duties was to devote special attention to the project, for it was being carried out with Soviet aid. A large group of Soviet specialists arrived in Cracow with their families. We cooperated with the works management and the Polish authorities in providing the specialists with housing, food, medical service and facilities for leisure spending.

The works were short of workers, and it occurred to us to offer jobs to the Gipsies—Soviet citizens—living in the vicinity of Cracow. There were several families there. During the war, the Germans had transported them from the Soviet Union to the Oswiecim death camp but had not had time to destroy them. After liberation the Gipsies settled in Poland. They were issued with Soviet passports by our consulates but refused to return to the Soviet Union. Their behaviour and way of life often compelled the Cracow militia to ask the Consulate to take proper steps.

By agreement with the authorities and the works management, we invited the Gipsies to the Consulate and had a frank, outspoken discussion with them. We offered them work at the works, saying that the management would provide them with well-appointed apartments complete with furniture. They consulted together and accepted. Afterwards I often went to Nowa Huta to see them and ask them how they were getting along. Our Polish friends told us that the Gipsies worked fairly well.

One day in spring the General Director of Nowa Huta, works A. Czechowicz, rang me up at the Consulate and asked me to come over to him. When we met in his office he suggested that we should go to see how the Gipsies were doing. The look on his face indicated that something unusual had happened. We found the Gipsies' houses empty. The tenants had left it for an unknown destination, taking with them whatever they could break, tear or screw off, including door-handles, locks and faucets. My attempt to help the works meet the shortage of labour and to accustom the Gipsies to a settled life had miscarried.

A memorable cultural event in Cracow was the celebration of the hundredth birthday of Ludwik Solski, a noted Polish actor who continued performing at the Slowacki Theatre in spite of this advanced age.

The Jagellonian University conferred a doctorate h. c. upon Solski and presented him with a diploma, a gown and a mortarboard as testimonials of his membership of the university's academic staff. The ceremony was followed by a big reception at which congratulatory speeches were made by representatives of the Polish government, party officials and cultural figures. I was one of the speakers. After my speech Solski raised his glass to "cosmopolitanism in art". I was slightly taken aback, to be frank. "Pay no heed to the old man's words," Boleslaw Drobner, once a well-known politician, said to me. "He can't tell cosmopolitanism from internationalism."

A few days later, Drobner called at the Consulate, saying that he would like to get to know the new Soviet Consul better. He turned out to be an interesting interlocutor. Prior to the founding of the PUWP, he had been a leader of the Polish Socialist Party in bourgeois Poland, and I realised that he still adhered to his social democratic views. When, in 1939, Soviet troops moved into Lvov, he was arrested by the NKVD and exiled to Siberia, where he served five years in high-security camps.

In April 1945, Drobner was called to the camp commandant. Without offering an explanation, the commandant had him treated to a tasty meal, supplied with oversize suit and overcoat and a hat and sent to Moscow, with an NKVD man escorting him. Upon arrival in Moscow, he was taken straight to the Kremlin and into a room where Polish leaders sat waiting, with Boleslaw Bierut and Edward Osóbka-Morawski at their head. Minutes later Stalin came in, followed by other Soviet leaders and officials. Thus Drobner found himself present at the signing of the first Soviet-Polish treaty of friendship and cooperation. He showed me a photograph of the ceremony, with himself standing not far from Stalin.

In mid-1954, Nikolai Mikhailov, long-time First Secretary of the Kom-somol CC, was assigned to Poland as a new ambassador. In the very first months of his stay in Poland, he arrived in Cracow with his wife. It was during the period of "thaw", and Mikhailov was very like the maker of the "thaw", Khrushchev—he was brimming over with new ideas.

One day when we were driving back to Warsaw from Katowice, it unexpectedly occurred to him to recommend the Poles to use the surplus heat generated by thermal power stations and other plants for building hothouses to grow vegetables all the year long in order to supply miners and steelworkers with vitamins. Right there in the car he told me to prepare a proposal by Monday (the day was Saturday) for discussion with the Polish leadership. The proposal had to contain concrete economic calculations. I asked to stop the car, saying that to do that job, I needed to return to Katowice and consult with knowledgeable Polish representatives. "Oh, well, forget it," Mikhailov replied with a resentful gesture.

His working methods differed from those of his predecessor. He harnessed embassy diplomats and us consuls to various initiatives and tasks, which we were compelled to work on hurriedly, without regard to our country's possibilities. One of the assignments was a critical memorandum for Moscow on the functioning of the Soviet Ministry of Culture and on proposals for the promotion of cultural relations with Poland. After we, including Mikhailov himself, had done a lot of work, a relevant memorandum went to Moscow. But Mikhailov was soon appointed Minister of Culture. One day Embassy diplomats who met in the office of the Chargé d'Affaires decided to call up Mikhailov and ask him what was being done about the memorandum. Mikhailov replied without hesitation that the proposals we had sent had not been drafted carefully enough and so the Ministry had no way of putting them into practice.

In citing these examples, I only wish to illustrate Mikhailov's style of work without minimising in the least his performance as Ambassador.

He was very sociable and knew how to establish contacts with both our Polish friends and foreign diplomats.

True, his wife, Raisa Timofeyevna, was largely a liability. She often accompanied him on his tours of the country, visiting factories and agricultural cooperatives along with him and joining in discussions between her husband and Polish friends. I was in on a meeting between Mikhailov and the First Secretary of the Cracow Provincial Committee of the PUWP. Most of the questions were asked by the Ambassador's wife. She wanted to know, for instance, when an end would be put to the omnipotence of the Catholic Church in Cracow, why agriculture was still not being run on a cooperative basis, and so forth. Frankly speaking, I was surprised because the Ambassador did not try to break off that spate of tactless questions. Meanwhile serious difficulties were piling up in Poland. The need for more consistent and far-reaching changes in the party's economic and social policies came out in the course of fulfilling the six-year plan. The situation necessitated a radical improvement in the people's living and cultural standards.

It was in that difficult period that Panteleimon Ponomarenko became Soviet Ambassador in Poland. He made an in-depth analysis of the situation in the country and established ties based on mutual confidence with CC Political Bureau members of the PUWP and leaders of other parties. Relations between him and Boleslaw Bierut assumed a particularly warm, friendly character. The new Ambassador made a special effort to study current problems and submit proposals to the Soviet leadership. And I must say that nearly all his recommendations found support in Moscow. The Poles appreciated the Embassy's constructive efforts and were satisfied because their requests received attention.

Ponomarenko saw to it that the Embassy staff worked efficiently and in a coordinated manner. Early in 1956, he invited me to Warsaw and told me that he had asked Moscow to appoint me First Counsellor of the Embassy, that is, his deputy. (The staff included no minister-counsellor at the time.)

And so I began to serve in Warsaw. I was familiar with the staff because I had often visited the capital before as a member of the United Party Committee. As I have pointed out, the situation was complicated due to serious internal and international events and demanded that I should join immediately in active effort.

The 20th CPSU Congress had a strong impact on developments in Poland. The exposure of the personality cult, the condemnation of mass repression, which had also hit many thousands of Poles on Soviet soil in the war years, and the rehabilitation of the Communist Party of Poland dissolved in 1938 on groundless charges and resulting in the liquidation of the whole party leadership by the NKVD had their effect on the PUWP and Polish society. Many old Communists, talking with Soviet diplomats, made no secret of their bewilderment or the doubts they had about the correctness of the chosen path. Revisionists in the party, pretending to be fighting for democracy against manifestations of the personality cult, assailed socialism's positions in Poland in an attempt to undermine the confidence of large sections of the population, primarily the working class, in the party.

IN MARCH 1956, Boleslaw Bierut died. The Sixth Plenary Meeting of the PUWP CC was faced with the problem of choosing a new leader of the party. These events further complicated the situation, which the reactionary circles supported from abroad were trying to use. In Moscow it became known that some members of the Polish CC planned to elect

First Secretary of the PUWP CC Roman Zambrowski, whom Moscow did not see as enjoying prestige among the majority of party members.

The PUWP CC invited Khrushchev to its Sixth Plenary Meeting who headed the delegation to Bierut's funeral. Addressing the meeting, he voiced doubt about the advisability of electing Zambrowski to so important a post. His remarks evoked a vociferously negative response from Zambrowski's "right-wing" backers. But most CC members declared for electing Edward Ochab, the then Second Secretary of the CC. His election was a compromise. Subsequently we saw that the new party leadership was unable to work out a consistent action programme. This led to a serious inner political crisis that was made worse by the dogmatism of some leading party members and government officials and by their indecision over pressing socio-economic problems.

On the night of June 21, the Ambassador called me up to tell with reference to news he had from Soviet specialists working at the Cygielski railroad car plant in Poznan that there were serious events afoot which might grow into anti-government actions. He asked me to go there at once. I arrived in Poznan when anarchy was already rife in the city. A demonstration by workers rightly demanding a pay adjustment and a higher living standard had attracted hoodlums and extremists. Taking advantage of the Poles' national sentiments, they shouted anti-socialist slogans and goaded townspeople into launching illegal actions. Troops were called in. Clashes resulted in loss of life.

The tragic events in Poznan were a first attempt by reactionaries to provoke Polish workers into actively opposing the government.

The healthy section of the party realised that to bring the situation under control, it was necessary to evolve a clear and consistent political concept. To end the crisis, the party needed to carry out a serious ideological struggle against revisionism and dogmatism and to curb home reaction.

An important step in this direction was taken by the Seventh Plenum of the PUWP CC (July 1956), which evaluated the domestic political and economic situation and formulated the party's tasks in removing shortcomings and mistakes in party and government work. The meeting repealed the charges levelled by the Third CC Plenum (1949) against Wladyslaw Gomulka, Sychalski and Zenon Kliszko.

The party "right", which proved unable to take over at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and regarded Ochab as a passing choice, cast about for a leader who could dissociate Poland from the Soviet Union. At that time, many believed Wladyslaw Gomulka to be the right man for this. He had a serious grievance against the Soviet Union (or so they thought) because Stalin had had him relieved of all his posts and arrested on a charge of right-wing nationalist deviation.

Polish reaction supported this trend of development at the first stage, planning to effect a counter-revolutionary coup and restore Poland as a bourgeois state at the second stage.

The situation in Poland, especially the anti-Soviet bias betrayed by certain Polish leaders, understandably caused concern in Moscow. It might well be that, with Gomulka at the head of the PUWP, the party's policy line would be revised and serious personal changes would take place in the upper echelons of the power structure. Nor could we rule out the possibility of Poland withdrawing from the Warsaw Treaty and losing its socialist achievements.

The Eighth Plenary Meeting of the PUWP CC, which was to elect Gomulka First Secretary of the Central Committee, was set for October 19, 1956. The day before, our Embassy gave a reception on the occasion of the arrival of a delegation of the Moscow Komsomol organisation led by Sergei Pavlov. The guests were leaders of the Polish youth movement,

which was experiencing a serious crisis at the time. There was a heated debate on the role of youth in a society building socialism. Our Ambassador, Panteleimon Ponomarenko, called us to his office during the reception to tell us that a party and government delegation led by Khrushchev was due to arrive in Warsaw the day after and that we must "round off" the reception.

The Ambassador asked me to call with him on CC Political Bureau members Konstantin Rokossovsky, Zenon Nowak and Franciszek Jozviak and some other CC members with whom we had established comradely relations. Our meeting lasted nearly all night. The Poles told us that they had had a preliminary discussion on the new party leadership to be headed by Gomulka. Nearly all of them pointed out that Gomulka's wisdom, vast experience, loyalty to party principles and uncommon capacity for organisation made him eligible for the post of leader of the party provided, of course, that he was relieved of pressure from the "right".

At 4 a.m. Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev flew in with a group of army officers. Early in the morning we drove to the airport to meet Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and senior officials of the CPSU CC. Members of the PUWP CC Political Bureau as well as Gomulka, who did not yet belong to the leadership, arrived at the airport for their part.

On alighting from the plane, Khrushchev made a remark at the expense of the Polish leadership in the brusque manner typical of him. "What is this, now?" he said. "Must we in the Soviet Union hear the news of a planned change of leadership in your party and country from the Voice of America and BBC?" He walked up to Marshal Konev and asked him about the situation. On being told that Soviet troops stationed in Poland were moving in the direction of Warsaw, he suggested starting the talks.

The Poles proposed beginning the talks at 10 a.m. because they needed time to inform other CC members of the arrival of the Soviet delegation and to arrange for an adjournment of the plenary meeting. Our delegation had no objection. From what we heard afterwards, some members of the PUWP CC were outraged by the arrival of the delegation. They demanded opening the plenary meeting and electing a new leader before the talks with our delegation started. But most CC members declared for putting off the meeting and holding the talks first. I must note that on getting word on the Soviet troops movement some radical-minded Polish military officials, including Air Force Commander General Frey-Bielecki and Acting Naval Commander Rear-Admiral Wiśniewski, ordered their forces to open fire on Soviet troops if necessary. One of the alternatives discussed was that the Soviet delegation in the event of Soviet troops entering Warsaw, should be arrested and held hostage.

Tension in the capital was stepped up by the Warsaw City Committee of the PUWP under First Secretary Staszewski. Workers' units began forming at industrial plants, and efforts were made to provoke anti-socialist demonstrations and rallies in the city. The City Committee also sent emissars to other cities. The Chief Board of the Polish Youth League led by PUWP CC member Jaworska did its bit as an instigator.

THE POLISH SIDE was represented at the talks by members of the Political Bureau and CC Secretary as well as by Gomulka, who was still not a member of the leadership. Our country was represented by all those who had arrived from Moscow plus the Ambassador Ponomarenko.

Jan Dzierzhinsky, the son of Felix Dzerzhinsky, and I did the interpreting.

The talks began on a rather sharp note. Khrushchev gave the Soviet Union's opinion of the events in Poland that had led to an acute political crisis in party and country and to an intensification of anti-Soviet sentiments "fuelled by irresponsible utterances" on the part of certain leaders and a section of the mass media.

Gomulka, who spoke fairly convincingly, assured the Soviet leaders that the PUWP was strong enough to be able to overcome pressure from reactionary and anti-Soviet forces and lead the country out of the political and economic crisis. The party, he said, would firmly take a stand for Poland's unity with the socialist camp and defeat all attempts to foment distrust for the Soviet Union. At the same time, Gomulka pointed out that there were some economic problems in Polish-Soviet relations and that the Polish side would therefore like to discuss them in detail with the Soviet comrades in the near future so as to remove all impediments that had arisen in relations between the two countries. His remarks were backed by the majority of the Polish participants in the talks.

Khrushchev promptly invited a Polish party and government delegation led by Gomulka to arrive in Moscow in November 1956 in order to discuss all problems whose solution would help develop our bilateral relations on a mutually beneficial basis.

On returning to the Embassy, Ponomarenko and I found Konev with his tunic off. He sat calmly drinking tea. On seeing us he said: "How fortunate that everything came to an end so fast and so peacefully. I was glad to call off the operation. Our troops are returning to their stations."

The Eighth Plenary Meeting of the PUWP CC was convened after the Soviet delegation had left. Gomulka, who presented a report on the domestic situation and proposed steps to end the crisis, was elected First Secretary of the CC.

Following the meeting, on October 24, Gomulka addressed a rally in Warsaw that drew 400,000 participants. The rally demonstrated its support for the new party leadership.

True, the staff of the Soviet Embassy was destined to remember the results of the rally for a long time to come. After the rally, a crowd tens of thousands strong marched to the Soviet Embassy and surrounded it, waving white-red flags and shouting anti-Soviet slogans. On instructions from the Ambassador, I rang up Deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski and the militia chief, General Ryszard Dobieszak, and demanded that steps be taken to safeguard the security of the Embassy. (The demand was also prompted by the fact that the day before a mob had broken into the Soviet Consulate in Szczecin and set fire to it. Luckily enough, not one of the members of the staff or their families was hurt, for they locked themselves up in the basement, which had served as an air-raid shelter during the war.) The Warsaw authorities are entitled to credit for the prompt action they took. The Embassy soon found itself in a ring of armoured personnel carriers and motor-cyclists. The mob trying to break in was dispersed.

After the Eighth PUWP CC Plenum, opportunists spearheaded their attacks against the leaderships of the party's provincial committees, mostly their first secretaries. Labelling many of these as "Stalinists", "dogmatists" and "conservatives", they incited party members and non-party people to demand the removal of party officials who had gone through revolutionary battles and came out firmly for socialist construction in Poland. Nor were they unsuccessful. Most provincial and city committee secretaries were replaced in favour of people who had little experience or were picked at random.

The situation was particularly preoccupying in the youth movement. It was decided to dissolve the Polish Youth League. There sprang up all

sorts of groups and organisations whose aims had nothing to do with socialist ideas. Some of the organisations that had existed in pre-war, bourgeois Poland were revived. The newspapers *Sztandar Młodych* and *Po Prostu* called for the ideological disarmament of youth. They did their utmost to alienate young people from the party and make them adopt an anti-socialist stance.

A general election was set for January 1957. The election campaign unfolded amid sharp political struggles. The new Polish leadership, being aware of the role which the Catholic Church was going to play in the campaign, cast about for ways to normalise relations between state and Church, which had deteriorated with the arrest of Cardinal Wyszyński in 1952. On instructions from Gomulka, spokesmen for the PUWP CC and the government met with Wyszyński in the Komańcie Monastery, where he was confined. The talks resulted in the Cardinal returning to Warsaw in late October 1956 to resume his duties. Under a protocol signed by the Polish Episcopate and the government, the two sides committed themselves to work for normalised relations between the Church and the people's state.

The party's electoral victory was assessed realistically by the new Polish leadership. Gomulka knew well that the broad support given him by various sections of Polish society could prove temporary. He repeatedly stressed in public that the enemies of socialism merely pretended to back the decisions of the PUWP CC while actually concentrating on preparations for the so-called second stage, which they expected to open the road to power for them.

The PUWP CC's activity in that period was aimed—in the face of resistance from certain people in the party and the media—at strengthening the unity of party and state as well as at furthering Polish-Soviet relations. In March, the two countries signed a treaty in Moscow on the demarcation of the frontier between them in the area adjoining the Baltic Sea. Talks between government delegations in Warsaw ended in signing a treaty on the legal status of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Poland. I took part in the talks as an expert.

On November 15, a Polish party and government delegation led by Władysław Gomulka and Józef Cyrankiewicz arrived in Moscow. Ambassador Ponomarenko flew to Moscow to join in the talks between the Polish delegation and a delegation of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government. The talks, which lasted three days, were described by Gomulka as a new chapter in the history of Polish-Soviet relations.

Evaluating the situation in Poland at the time, the Soviet Embassy noted with satisfaction that in a relatively short time (1957-1958), the Polish leadership had succeeded in stabilising the political and economic situation in the country and in carrying forward all-round mutually beneficial cooperation between our countries and parties.

We knew, however, that Polish reaction in general and the party's political opponents in particular had not laid down their arms and still hoped that a "second stage" would set in with help from without and culminate in the elimination of the PUWP as the nation's leader and in the seizure of power.

There were further serious trials ahead for the Polish People's Republic.

ANNUAL REPORT BY THE RSFSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR THE NINTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS (1920—1921)*

Chapter One

THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS ON PEACE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

THE END OF LAST YEAR saw the final defeat of armed intervention on the territory of European Russia. The crushing blow struck by the Red Army, which drove Wrangel out of the Crimea, marked a turnabout in the history of the international relations of the Soviet Republic. The impression made by this brilliant victory of Soviet arms was tremendous and its effect on the international situation of Soviet Russia, deep-going and lasting. The early period after Wrangel's defeat was particularly propitious for the development of Russia's international relations. In 1920, we concluded peace treaties with the Baltic states and Finland and a trade agreement with Sweden, and in the period after Wrangel's defeat, our treaty relations expanded considerably.

BRITAIN

THE RUSSO-BRITISH TALKS on a trade agreement, virtually broken off almost completely in the autumn months, made rapid progress from late 1920 on. To spur the talks, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on November 9 sent a note to Lord Curzon to point to interminable procrastination over the matter on the part of Britain and call for a forthright and speedy answer to the question whether the British government was prepared immediately to resume the negotiations on a trade agreement. The People's Commissariat stated in its note that it presumed a trade agreement would be followed immediately or accompanied by talks on concluding a peace and re-establishing normal relations at a conference of Russian and British delegates.

On that very day, Lloyd George said at the annual dinner given by the Lord Mayor of London that political prospects in Europe were improving, that the world unquestionably needed peaceful relations and that an end should be put to misunderstandings in Eastern Europe. While describing the Bolshevik doctrine as folly, he added, none the less, that in the event of the Bolshevik government in Russia falling, total anarchy might set in for a long time. The British government was therefore seeking to ensure peace in Eastern Europe in the given situation.

Two days later, November 11, the British Trade Secretary, Sir Robert Horne, spoke in an address delivered at Oxford of the need for Russia and Britain to exchange commodities and for giving Russia access to world markets in the interest of all Europe. On November 18, Lloyd George told the House of Commons that the cabinet had worked out the

* Abridged.

principles of an agreement with Russia; all that remained was to settle some details, and the cabinet expected the draft agreement to be presented to the Russian delegation the following week. On November 29, the British government formally handed Cde. Krasin a draft trade agreement, and on December 24, the King said in his speech at the closing session of the Parliament that he hoped for the early conclusion of an agreement with Russia.

In a radio message dated December 4, the People's Commissariat called Lord Curzon's attention to distinctions between the British draft and the principles of an agreement adopted earlier.

During a meeting on December 22 which Cde. Krasin had with Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Sir Robert Horne, the participants discussed the main points of difference over the draft. Lloyd George agreed to the Caucasus being left out of the list of countries regarding which a special mention was made of the obligation of Russia to refrain from hostile activity and propaganda against the interests of the British Empire and its system. He also agreed to an enumeration of countries where Britain should refrain especially from hostile actions against Soviet Russia. The British government agreed, furthermore, to the leaving out of the statement that this obligation extended to private persons. Nevertheless, the British conception still differed greatly from the principles which Britain itself had adopted earlier and which found an expression in the exchange of notes on June 30 and July 7, 1920.

Cde. Krasin was called to a conference in Moscow to discuss the situation. On December 31, the People's Commissariat, reaffirming its readiness to conclude an agreement on the principles adopted earlier, told the British government that Russia was by no means obliged to accept without objection any interpretation which the British government might please to put on theses agreed earlier. Lord Curzon replied on January 7 with a controversial note recapitulating in a most biased fashion the history of Russian-British negotiations and advancing arguments in favour of the new demands contained in the British draft agreement. However, he also expressed a willingness to take account of any geographic definition of the territories concerning which the Soviet government might demand recognition of its special interests. He expressed hope that Cde. Krasin would be empowered to sign such an agreement upon his return to London. On January 9, the People's Commissariat replied with a further note disputing Lord Curzon's assertions and pointing out that a definition of the reciprocal interests of Russia and Britain could be arrived at solely through political talks at the conference envisaged by the June-July accord and confirmed by Russian notes on November 9 and December 4.

During the discussion held in Moscow, the Soviet government specified the amendments to be introduced, in its opinion, into the British draft. On February 4, the People's Commissariat conveyed these amendments to Lord Curzon in a note. The purpose of the amendments was a more precise definition of Britain's obligations in regard to the security requirements of the Soviet Republic; the treaty itself was expected to remain effective only if the inviolability of Russian gold and other commodities in Britain was recognised judicially; an element to be excluded among others was a new provision advanced by the British government for a general recognition in the future of all the debts contracted by previous Russian governments.

On March 5, Cde. Krasin arrived in London, and on March 16 he and Sir Robert Horne signed a trade agreement. Instead of the Asian countries listed in the British draft and expressly binding Russia to refrain from any hostile actions against British interests, the agreement only mentioned India and the independent state of Afghanistan. It committed

Britain similarly in respect of countries formerly part of the Russian Empire and now independent. In case the inviolability of Russian gold and commodities in Britain is infringed by a court judgement, the Russian government may immediately terminate the agreement. The Soviet government recognised in principle its obligation to pay compensation in the future to private persons who shall have delivered goods or provided services to Russia. Generally, however, all claims of the two sides or their citizens relating to the obligations assumed by the government of the other side shall be settled under a future general peace treaty.

Sir Robert Horne, as well as signing the agreement, handed Cde. Krasin a letter containing a whole number of charges against the Soviet government over its agents' anti-British propaganda in Asia and demanding an end to any further activity of this nature. The People's Commissariat instructed Cde. Krasin to state to the British government that the signing of the agreement is a turning point in Russo-British relations and that there is no reason to go into an examination of accusations relating to a period when the Soviet government had not yet assumed its present obligations to Britain. On March 23, Lloyd George, answering a question in the House of Commons, said that the conclusion of the agreement recognised the Soviet government as a government existing de facto.

ITALY AND FRANCE

FROM LATE 1919 ONWARDS, the Italian government repeatedly assured us of its willingness to enter into trading relations with us and to receive a Soviet delegation in Rome. Nevertheless, action on these statements was delayed again and again. Cde. Vorovsky, originally chosen for head of our mission and already approved by the Italian government, had on account of a protracted illness to be replaced by another representative but the Italian government persistently turned down the candidacies of Cdes. Litvinov and Berzin, ignoring our inquiries for a big time or responding to them evasively.

In October, demonstrations in favour of peace with Russia took place all over Italy, and just then Foreign Minister Sforza told the Italian Socialists that the government was agreeable to receiving a Russian trade delegation. In the same period, however, he actually left our relevant inquiries unanswered. Late in November, when the defeat of Wrangel came out, Rome sent a diplomatic agent, Depretis, to Revel with instructions to arrange with Russian representative for a trip to Italy by a Russian trade delegation. Seeing that Cde. Berzin's candidacy had been rejected, the Russian government on January 7 named Cde. Vorovsky; it met Sforza's demand that Vorovsky should be accompanied by no more than eight aides, and made their names known to Mr. Depretis. In a message dated February 1, the People's Commissariat reminded Sforza of the absence of an answer to its communication, and on February 5 Mr. Depretis wrote a letter to Cde. Litvinov in Revel to advise him of the approval of the delegation led by Cde. Vorovsky. The delegation was delayed in Riga because the Italian Embassy in Berlin had made no steps to obtain German transit visas for it, and on February 27 the People's Commissariat was compelled to send Sforza another telegram.

On March 14, Cde. Vorovsky arrived in Rome, the Italian authorities immediately betraying an unfriendly attitude by demanding to inspect his baggage. Notwithstanding his protests, they actually examined it on March 20. The following day, Cde. Vorovsky refused in protest to meet Minister Sforza by appointment. On March 21, Mr. Sforza advised Cde. Vorovsky in a note dated March 20 that Customs had been instructed to handle his baggage with due regard to the privileges normally accorded to diplomats.

The situation, which is favourable for us, had a certain effect on the French attitude to Russia. In a note on the issue of resuming relations with Soviet Russia, which the French government sent to the British government on November 25, purely economic terms were set, namely, recognition of the debts by the Russian government, the French government considering it necessary, however, to reckon with the grave economic situation of Russia and to grant our country easy terms and participate in its economic rehabilitation. The note said nothing about any political conditions. On the same day, November 25, Foreign Minister Leagues told the parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs that the French government allowed French manufacturers and businessmen to enter into trading ties with the Russians.

On November 17, a formal statement by the French Foreign Ministry pointed out that there was no law in France prohibiting trade or financial relations with Russia but that the government could not be held responsible for deals with Russia or Russian citizens by French merchants or manufacturers. On December 6, when he had received the text of the draft trade agreement with Russia supplied by the British government for his information, Leagues said that while the French government allowed private persons to do business with Russia, it was not going to join in such relations, for the question of French recognition of the Soviet government could not be raised until after the latter had recognised the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments. Just then France was busy winding up its venture with Wrangel. On December 8, *l'Humanité* disclosed on the strength of documentary evidence the French government's intention to transfer Wrangel's military equipment to Poland. On December 10, Leagues stated in the Commission for Foreign Affairs that the French government was withdrawing support from Wrangel's army following his defeat. On December 14, the French government decreed the creation of a commission under the Foreign Ministry to supervise the liquidation of the Russian funds put down to Wrangel's account.

Meanwhile, the French fleet in the Black Sea actually continued blockading the Russian and Ukrainian coasts. On December 18, the People's Commissariat sent Leagues a protest note over an attack on the Russian S/S *Zeinab* mounted by a French destroyer in November, when it shelled and set fire to the steamship, whereupon the shipmaster and seamen were transported to Constantinople. Early in January, the Russian S/S *Printsip*, which was to have been delivered to Russia, sailed from the Georgian port of Poti to Constantinople with help from the French fleet. On January 9, French destroyers attacked the *Elpidifor*, a Russian vessel, without warning and for no obvious reason. On January 12, the People's Commissariat lodged a further protest with the French government over its continuing acts of violence in the Black Sea. According to White Guard press reports, a whole number of Russian warships which Wrangel evacuated to Constantinople were seized by the French. On February 26, *Novoye Slovo* reported the seizure by the French of the *Volya*, *Georgi Pobedonosets* and *Almaz*, the destroyers *Bespechny*, *Silny* and *Yarky*, the gunboats *Strizh* and *Grozny*, the supply ship *Kronstadt*, icebreakers and three submarines. The formal explanation offered by the French government was that it wanted to meet in that way part of its expenditures for Wrangel's army. In April, the White Guard press reported that during the evacuation of the Crimea, France had seized Russian and military property worth 3,032,144 pounds sterling at the prewar rate.

French Socialists in the parliament and French workers at meetings insisted on making peace with Russia. Answering a question by Cde. Cachin on January 7, the Foreign Minister said that (1) the outlays in

which the events in Russia had entailed France ran into millions and not billions; (2) no blockade was being applied to Russia; (3) private persons were free to enter into trading relations with Russia at their peril, without the government being responsible; (4) the French government had no intention of recognising Soviet power until the latter provided guarantees of its readiness to harmonise its activity with standards of international law and met the obligations of previous Russian governments vis-à-vis foreign governments and private citizens; (5) the Wrangel government had gone out of existence; (6) the French government was hostile to any policy of aggression against the Soviet government and would assist none but countries which might have to defend their territory and freedom against attack from the Bolshevik government.

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE BALKANS

THE TALKS ON CONCLUDING A TRADE AGREEMENT between Russia and Germany were resumed in the same period. However, the German government preferred to wait until the British government set an example. On January 12, a general meeting of the German-Russian Society for the Advancement of Trade with Russia resolved to send a delegation to Moscow in order to ascertain the possibility of resuming trade. On January 19, Independent Socialists moved in the Reichstag for the resumption of diplomatic and trading relations with Russia. On January 22, however, Foreign Minister Simons stated in the Reichstag that relations with Russia could not be reestablished until full satisfaction was offered for the assassination of the German Ambassador to Moscow, Count Mirbach, in 1918. This statement did not apply to the resumption of de facto relations and trade between Germany and Russia. A preliminary agreement was concluded during the stay in Moscow of Cde. Kopp, the Russian representative in Berlin, and Schlesinger, Director of the German Central Directorate for Prisoners of War, but afterwards the talks continued in Berlin, where Cde. Scheinman was sent to this end. On May 6, the latter and German government delegates signed a provisional agreement on resuming trade relations and appointing missions to Russia and Germany on a reciprocal basis as well as an additional agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees. They also exchanged notes on normalising courier service between Russia and Germany and Russian transit courier service via Germany.

The agreement of May 6 does not constitute a complete legal restoration of diplomatic relations between Russia and Germany broken off in October 1918. The range of activity of the existing delegations of both countries in charge of prisoners of war was extended to entrust them with protecting the interests of their countries' citizens. Attached to the delegations were trade missions responsible for the promotion of economic relations between the two countries. The RSFSR Mission in Germany was recognised as the only agency representing the Russian state in that country.

Relations with Hungary were restricted to talks on exchanging prisoners of war and on taking hostages to counter certain acts of white terror in Hungary. On November 12, the People's Commissariat wrote to the Hungarian Foreign Minister to remind him of the fact the fate of Hungarian officers taken prisoner in Russia would depend on the outcome of the trial of former Hungarian people's commissars. On January 4, the Hungarian Foreign Minister advised the Russian government in a radio message that it had appointed Dr. Jungerth its delegate to negotiate with Soviet Russia the exchange of Hungarian Communists for the Hungarian army officers taken hostage in Russia. The ensuing talks made slow progress and lasted until late July.

Throughout that period, a complex diplomatic game went on over Little Entente countries. An attempt was made to alter the original character of the alignment by bringing Romania and even Poland into it. In the early period of its existence, 1920, the Little Entente tended to strengthen the positions of Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia against the dictatorship of French diplomacy, which was flirting very noticeably at the time with Hapsburg and clerical reaction, toying with plans to restore in the form of an alliance a combination of states corresponding to the one-time Hapsburg monarchy. The more the hopelessness of this policy came to light, the more French diplomacy built up its ties with Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia; on the other hand, these two countries maintained very close contacts with Italian diplomacy, which was struggling to break free from the much too burdensome influence of French diplomacy. In short, the year 1921 witnessed a gradual strengthening of French influence in Central Europe, in particular Czecho-Slovakia. The latter's attitude to Soviet Russia became visibly less favourable when, after the fall of 1920, moderate Socialists stepped out of the Czecho-Slovak government. However, the government maintained the independence of its Russian policy, refusing to be drawn into interventionist alliances against us. Even so, ties between the Czecho-Slovak government and counter-revolutionary elements, especially Socialist Revolutionaries, were strong all the time.

After Wrangel's defeat, the reactionary press in Czecho-Slovakia persisted in opposing the establishment of trading relations with us, yet that was precisely when the Czecho-Slovak government began talking about the necessity for regular trade with us.

By late 1920, work on repatriating Russian prisoners of war from Czecho-Slovakia was almost finished. An idea that gradually took root at the same time was that of the need to replace both delegations in charge of prisoners of war in Moscow and Prague by trade delegations. In the meantime, the Soviet government's prestige, very high after Wrangel's defeat, began declining noticeably in the early months of 1921 under the impact of stories about economic dislocation in Russia. This new sentiment, one less favourable for us, made itself felt also in the Czecho-Slovak press, which is generally rather typical as a press reflecting the attitude of the West European man in the street toward us. With the earlier hostility between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary lessening, the Little Entente began losing the character of an alliance directed against Hungary's bid to reassert itself as a great power. This made the task of French diplomacy easier. In April there came lively talks with Czecho-Slovakia on the technical aspect of the trade representation to come, which was established by exchanging notes.

SCANDINAVIA AND THE BALTIC REGION

THE SAME PERIOD OF REVIVING RELATIONS with all countries led to the realisation of a preliminary Russo-Swedish trade agreement, until then a dead letter.

In our relations with Estonia, the Tsentosoyuz mission was replaced in the same period by a regular political mission. On December 11, the Estonian government proposed establishing regular diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries. On December 30, Estonia asked the Russian government to deny a rumour about its allegedly aggressive intentions. A formal communiqué released by the People's Commissariat on January 3 stated for everyone to know that there were no facts whatever to support the rumour about Estonia's alleged plans for aggression against Russia.

Various episodes of our fight against Wrangel had a very strong impact on our relations with Latvia. Prior to his defeat, the Russian government had serious reasons to complain of the Latvian government's favourable attitude to the White Guards.

Fortunately, Wrangel's defeat eliminated this sore subject. Early in November, direct railroad service was opened between Riga and Moscow. And at the end of that month, the Russian government paid Latvia four million gold rubles in advance of the treaty deadline. On November 15, agreement was reached on repatriating the prisoners of war of both sides.

Between Russia and Lithuania, too, talks were held on a number of practical issues arising from treaties. Late in January, a Lithuanian delegation left Kovno for Moscow to assist in implementing the peace treaty more effectively.

The peace treaty between Russia and Finland, signed in Yuriev on October 14, was not ratified by the Finnish Diet until December 1, and on December 11 it was approved by the President of the Republic of Finland. As early as December 24, Russian and Finnish railroads were linked up and a large syndicate was established in Finland for trade with Russia. The ratification instruments were exchanged in Moscow on January 1; the act marked the definitive coming of the peace treaty into force. On January 4, trade representatives conferred in Vyborg about resuming trade with Russia. A similar conference was held in Helsingfors on January 14.

POLAND

IN RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND POLAND, the defeat of Wrangel coincided with the interval between the signing of the preliminary Riga Treaty on October 12 and the beginning of plenary sittings of the peace conference on concluding a final treaty. The Polish military authorities tried to aid Wrangel by organising in violation of the peace treaty a new campaign by Petlyura and Balakhovich against the Soviet republics. In the area where the Polish army was stationed, they even allotted a special, so-called administrative, territory to the troops and authorities of the Petlyura group. The very withdrawal of Polish troops to the state frontier slowed down and failed to take place within the fixed time limits; the continuing occupation of parts of the Ukraine by Polish troops facilitated Petlyura's operations.

The Soviet troops' simultaneous victories over Petlyura on the western front and over Wrangel in the Crimea upset those plans. At meetings on November 13 and 14, Cde Ioffe and Mr. Dabski reached agreement; on November 14, they signed a protocol ending the conflict. The deadline for the withdrawal of Polish troops was set definitively and with the utmost accuracy. On November 17, a peace conference held its first plenary session, thereby beginning its deliberations. As for further control over the implementation of the armistice treaty and for the settlement of questions arising in the process, there was already a Mixed Military Conciliating Commission working in Minsk.

Finally, late on March 18, a peace treaty was signed in Riga between Russia and the Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland, on the other. The treaty provides for reciprocal guarantees of non-interference and binds the signatories to refrain from supporting armed intervention either directly or indirectly. Russia and the Ukraine are committed to restore to Poland the cultural values removed from that country on orders from the tsarist authorities after the first partition of Poland in 1772, the treaty allowing for the replacement of the values by equivalents. State

property connected with the territory of either country shall not be divided. Poland's share of the gold fund is set at 30 million gold rubles in view of the recognised participation of Poland in the economic life of the former Russian Empire. Railroad property to be restored to Poland totals the equivalent of 29 million rubles. The property of physical and juridical persons shall be re-evacuated inasmuch as it will virtually find itself under the charge of both sides. Accounts involving funds and assets shall be settled; in the case of deposits and securities, Polish citizens and institutions shall be recognised to possess the rights which earlier were recognised to belong to their Russian counterparts. Free transit on a reciprocal basis shall be allowed pending the conclusion of a trade treaty. Diplomatic relations shall be established immediately after ratification of the treaty. The ratification instruments were exchanged after that, within the time limit stipulated by the treaty, in Minsk on April 30. Thereupon the Polish-Russian-Ukrainian Military Conciliating Commission held its final session on May 2.

PERSIA

IN THE FALL OF 1920, the RSFSR and Persia established regular diplomatic relations.

The situation inside Persia at the time was described as 'British dictatorship', which began when, in 1918, British troops occupied Persia following the withdrawal of the Russian occupation corps under Baratov. The British, exploiting their position, made ever further demands on the Persian government. Moshir ed-Douleh was opposed to the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, and the first step which he took on becoming Prime Minister was to suspend all operations connected with the treaty pending ratification by the Majlis.

On November 1, the Moshir ed-Douleh cabinet was succeeded by an Anglophile cabinet under Sepahdar, who yielded to a British ultimatum. An Extraordinary Supreme Council of cabinet ministers, princes, members of the Shah's family, the top clergy and representatives of the various estates, which was convened in Tehran, refused to assume responsibility for the solution of a problem affecting the interests of the whole nation and pointed out the need for the early convocation of the Majlis. Besides, the Supreme Council suggested that the government should do its best to maintain neutrality as it waited for the outcome of the negotiations going on in Moscow.

The favourable course of the Moscow talks on concluding a treaty enabled us to name a plenipotentiary of the RSFSR to Persia. Cdc. Karakhan, Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, advised the Persian government of this in a note on November 28 addressed to the Ambassador Extraordinary of Persia in the RSFSR. The post was assigned to Cdc. Rotstein.

That was when the external and internal situation of Persia changed radically. On December 13, Churchill announced in the House of Commons that Britain was going to evacuate its troops from Persia in the spring of 1921. The Sepahdar government resigned on January 23, 1921. The formation of a new cabinet was entrusted to Sepahdar himself. The opening of the Majlis, set for February 2, failed to take place. In that situation, a coup d'état was accomplished in Tehran that brought Seyid Ziya ed-Din Teba Tebai to power. On February 25, a new cabinet was formed under Ziya ed-Din, who issued a declaration announcing the abrogation of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 and outlined an extensive plan for internal reform. At the same time (February 26), a Russo-Persian Treaty was signed in Moscow; it solemnly declared Russia's irrevoc-

cable renunciation of the forcible policy towards Persia which had been pursued by the imperialist governments of Russia overthrown by the will of the workers and peasants. The Russian government proclaimed its refusal to participate in any measures whatever tending to weaken or infringe on the sovereignty of Persia, and declared all the conventions and agreements concluded by the former government of Russia with third powers to the detriment of Persia to be null and void.

The two sides granted each other the right of goods transit through their territories to third countries.

The treaty provides for the conclusion of a trade agreement as well as consular and post-and-telegraph conventions between the RSFSR and Persia.

AFGHANISTAN

THE QUESTION OF CONCLUDING A TREATY of friendship with Afghanistan has been playing the chief role in our relations with that country over the past year.

A treaty was drafted and approved in its original form in Kabul on September 13, 1920, of which our Plenipotentiary, Cde. Surits, advised the Afghan Foreign Minister in a note under the same date while the latter reciprocated in a counter note dated Sumbula 24, 1299 (September 16, 1920), and expressing joy and satisfaction at the approval of the treaty.

On the initiative of our Mission, both sides regarded that part of the treaty concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations as binding already.

Under the treaty, both countries committed themselves to respect the independence of Bukhara and Khiva no matter what government was established there. During the revolutionary struggle in Bukhara, however, Kabul's local agents failed to maintain proper neutrality.

Worthy of note among the major issues settled with our mediation in the same period is the recognition by the Kabul government of the Revolutionary Bukharan Government (note dated Aqrab 5, or October 26).

In November 1920, the Foreign Minister sent the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs a note dated Qaus 9, 1299 (that is, November 29, 1920) in which he insisted on an early approval of the treaty by Russia and stated that the two countries' policies had basically been agreed. "The Government of the Emir sees real proof of this in the fact that Russia commits itself to protect and safeguard the full independence of Bukhara and Khiva."

In January 1921, the British took resolute steps to wreck the Russo-Afghan Treaty by opposing it with a project of their own.

A situation was created where the small Anglophile groups of Kabul merchants linked economically with India campaigned in favour of close relations with Britain, an activity in which the British Mission in Kabul could support and guide them. On the other hand, advocates of an Afghan national policy, faced with the rout of coreligionist border tribes, tended increasingly to embrace the idea of close cooperation with Soviet Russia. It was under the impact of these two contradictory, warring trends that the foreign policy of Afghanistan, a policy characterised by vacillation, took shape in the early months of 1921. In February, the talks with Britain were broken off for a time.

February 28, 1921, saw the signing in Moscow of a somewhat modified version of the Russo-Afghan Agreement of September 13, 1920, and shortly afterwards, the agreement was ratified.

CHINA AND MONGOLIA

IN THE FAR EAST as elsewhere, the object of our policy is to bring about the closest possible relations of friendship between the Russian Republic of working people and the peoples of the East on the principles of full and unqualified recognition of their political sovereignty and economic independence and of rendering them assistance in the independent advancement of their economic and political life. The largest Far Eastern country is huge China, now being rent by interminable strife between omnipotent governors-general or even alliances of the governors-general of various parts of the country. The real authority of the Peking government outside the capital is negligible, and financially the government is dependent to a considerable extent on aid from the Entente powers. As for the southern democratic government under Sun Yatsen, it wields real power in a relatively small area outside Canton Province. Pressure put by the Entente powers on the Peking government has so far prevented the Chinese state from entering into friendly relations with Russia, in keeping with both the wishes of the working people of Russia and the aspirations of large sections of Chinese society, including the Chinese bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. In our relations with China, late 1920 and early 1921 were taken up with preliminary steps preparing the ground for final decisions.

The four conditions for resuming relations proposed by the Chinese government, if amended in certain respects, could serve as the starting point for a final agreement on re-establishing relations. That was the end of the early preparatory period preceding the negotiations still going on between the Russian and Chinese governments.

In our relations with Mongolia, that period was likewise preparatory in character and preceded decisive events which unfolded this summer. Baron Ungern von Sternberg, a former Kolchakite and one of Ataman Semyonov's main supporters, a man backed by the Japanese and committed to a programme for reactionary Pan-Mongolianism under Japanese hegemony as an instrument of combating Bolshevism, may be said to have turned Mongolia into his principality. This state of affairs became established in the spring of 1921: Ungern succeeded in capturing Urga on February 4, 1921. The previous period had been one of struggle between Ungern and the Chinese troops which were occupying Mongolia and whose brutalities greatly intensified the Mongolian people's hatred for them making it easier for Ungern afterwards to seize power.

Under the influence of these facts, a delegation of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in October 1920 asked the Russian government on behalf of the Mongolian working people and their noted leaders headed by the Khutukhtu for aid in freeing the country from the White Guards as well as in restoring Mongolia to normal statehood on the basis of full autonomy. The Russian government promised the delegation armed aid in liquidating the White bands in Mongolia and in mediating between Mongolia and China in favour of reestablishing the autonomy of the Mongolian people.

In that period, realising that China was completely unable to liquidate the White bands and that Mongolia was going to rack and ruin, members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and their supporters set out to train on the territory of the Russian Republic for the coming struggle to liberate Mongolia and win it a free, autonomous political existence.

Thus that period in our Far Eastern relations was preparatory and witnessed the formation of forces and relations which afterwards expressed themselves partly in a determined fight against the enemy and partly in early, perfectly definite talks with the Far Eastern powers.

THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC

THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC has been linked with the RSFSR by close friendship ever since that republic came into existence.

When, late in October 1920, a unification conference of delegates from all the Russian regions of the Far East met in Chita, just freed from the bands of Ataman Semyonov, the event, which took place on the initiative of the Verkhneudinsk government and was a result of effort by a delegation of the People's Assembly of the Maritime Territory, evoked a ready response among us. In a telegram dated October 26, 1920, the Soviet government expressed its friendly attitude to the unification of all the parts of the Far Eastern Republic around the former Verkhneudinsk government, with Chita as its capital.

The RSFSR was the first state to recognise the political independence of the FER and to establish the closest economic ties with it.

On November 30, we signed a railroad convention with the FER under which the one-time Trans-Baikal Railroad, managed until a few months ago on the basis of a provisional agreement with the RSFSR, became the undivided property of the FER.

The financial question plays a very serious role in our relations with the FER. At a time when the FER found itself in a testing situation, Russia came to its aid by granting it several cash loans, which by the terms agreed are to be repaid by supplying products of the extractive industry, including coal and tungsten. Currently our mutual financial relations are being laid down in a treaty that is being put into final form and should be signed by both sides in the near future.

Firmly adhering in its actions and principles to recognition of and respect for the full independence of the FER, the RSFSR on December 15 signed a treaty with it on the concrete and exact state frontiers between the two republics, leaving the Trans-Baikal and Amur regions, the Maritime Territory and North Sakhalin to the FER.

Still, foreign powers find it impossible to reconcile themselves to the tranquil existence of the FER; they make all sorts of attempts at interference in its destiny and even encroach openly on its independence and territorial integrity. This circumstance occasionally forced us to protest in common with the FER, a state friendly to us, all the more since such activity by foreign countries is in fact directed against us through the FER.

This was the meaning of our protest notes to France, Britain and Italy on July 1, 1921, against the Merkulov venture in the Maritime Territory and of our notes to all governments dated July 19 and November 3, 1921, in connection with the Washington Conference.

AMERICA

THROUGHOUT THE CLOSING PERIOD of President Wilson's term in office, the policy of the United States of America was uncompromisingly and thoroughly hostile to the Soviet government. Just before relinquishing his powers, President Wilson saw to the deportation of Cde. Martens, who had stayed in America for about two years as an officially unrecognised representative of the RSFSR maintaining, however, relations with American institutions and firms on its behalf. Following the inauguration of President Harding, the All-Union Central Executive Committee on May 20 directed to the US Congress and President Harding a formal proposal for resuming trade relations. There was no direct reply but on March 26 the US Consul in Revel handed the Russian representative, Cde. Litvinov, the text of a decision of the US government to the effect that relations with the Soviet Republic could not be resumed until it restored private property and the principles of a bourgeois system.

Chapter Two

IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES AND THE FAMINE

BRITAIN AND THE FAMINE

THE FAVOURABLE SITUATION which arose in the international relations of the Russian Republic late in 1920 led to the conclusion of a series of treaties that strengthened our international positions. By then, however, rumours about a badly dislocated economy in Russia had given the enemies of Soviet power new hope. An enormous conspiracy against us, aimed at provoking simultaneous revolts in big cities and guerrilla movements in the countryside, virtually translated in February into the Kronstadt Mutiny, put down shortly afterwards.

Outside our country there began a most aggressive campaign of calumnies and false rumours designed to defeat the Russian government's efforts towards improving its international relations. Thus the conclusion of a number of treaties by it coincided with a new attempt to undermine its international standing. Further progress in the republic's international relations was hampered by shameless agitation and a campaign of lies in all countries by the enemies of the Russian Republic. Nevertheless, the summer months of 1921 were relatively propitious for the promotion of economic ties between Russia and Western countries. Preliminary talks were held on loans and the further development of our economic ties until the news of a vast famine in the Russian Republic, first reported in July, threw the state back in this respect.

On April 7, Russia and Britain opened post-and-telegraph service between the two countries; on the same day, the Council of People's Commissars decided to adopt a series of measures for the implementation of the treaty. On May 6, the Australian government authorised goods exports also to Russia. On May 12, a London court of appeal ruled that the gold owned by the Soviet government in Britain should not be subject to sequestration, for Britain had recognised the Soviet government *de facto*.

It was in early July that the news of an unprecedented famine that hit vast areas of the Russian Republic spread unexpectedly all over the world. Large sections of the people in all countries sought under the strong impression of the news to help the millions of famine-stricken Russian workers and peasants, in particular by exerting pressure on their governments. At the same time, all the enemies of Soviet power reared their heads everywhere, putting the blame for the famine on our republic and trying to make all governments and the general public believe that Soviet power was bound to fall.

On July 20, public figures and representatives of the Soviet government met for the first time, whereupon the membership list of the All-Russia committee on famine relief, set up in cooperation with public figures, and regulations on its functioning were submitted to the ARCEC Presidium for approval. On July 21, the latter issued a decree formalising the existence of the Committee. The bourgeois press in all countries seized on the Committee, which grouped diverse elements, among them Constitutional Democrats, stating more or less frankly that it regarded the Committee as a new government which would succeed Soviet power.

Whereas in July, when word came of the immensity of the disaster in Russia, the notion that Soviet power would soon fall spread far and wide, in August a turnabout occurred, with the press plainly tending to use famine relief for closer economic relations with Soviet power.

On August 12, the Supreme Council of the Entente powers conferred on the famine in Russia and decided to set up an *ad hoc* commission.

On August 15, Red Cross societies and diverse philanthropic organisations as well as representatives of some governments held a conference in Geneva. It elected Nansen High Commissioner for Russian Relief.

The middle of August was favourable for our international relations. One of the most rabid French imperialists, Poincaré, declared in the press for the resumption of Franco-Russian relations. On August 16, Lloyd George, speaking in the Parliament on the famine in Russia, frankly tied famine relief to the prospects for economic rapprochement with Russia and to the bid of British business circles to unfold their activity in Russia. While describing as a diabolic plan the attempt to use the famine for making the Russian government recognise the debts, Lloyd George added there and then that this was the only way to create the atmosphere of confidence which business needed.

The signing of an agreement with the American Relief Administration put the cause of relief aid on a completely real basis for the first time, and as early as a few days after it there began the shipment of food supplies for Russia. Three simultaneous agreements signed with Nansen on August 27 included both provisions for the actual organisation of famine relief under the direction of an Executive Committee representing Nansen and the Soviet government and a plan for a loan from other governments intended to organise large-scale relief for adults. The loan was expected to amount to 10 million pounds sterling. Had it materialised, the cause of famine relief would have immediately been put on a solid basis and millions would have been spared suffering and hunger. However, Nansen was given a cold reception on returning to Britain, and was attacked even more strongly afterwards by various enemies of the Soviet government all over Europe.

The international commission appointed by the Supreme Council to take charge of famine relief for Russia was placed under Noulens, French Ambassador in Russia in 1917 and 1918, who had always pursued the most uncompromising, bellicose policy against Soviet power and operated in 1918 as initiator and leader of a system of conspiracy and provocation engineered by Entente agents in Russia. His very appointment was a programme in itself and implied the triumph of trends hostile to us. In a note addressed to Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on September 7 exposed Noulens's proposal as completely unacceptable. When, on September 18, it was informed of the intention of the Noulens commission to call a new conference involving all governments, including some of those that had been absent before, with the obvious aim of putting even stronger pressure on the Russian government, the People's Commissariat sent a second note on the latter's behalf to Britain, France, Italy and Belgium pointing out that the proposed invitation of other countries would not make the Noulens plan any more acceptable.

On October 7 and 8, the international commission for Russian famine relief set up by the great powers met again in Brussels, this time as an enlarged body. The resolutions passed by it called for private philanthropic relief. As for granting government credits, the commission made this conditional on sending a fact-finding commission to Russia. Also, it made relief and the granting of credits for the overall economic rehabilitation of Russia and the organisation of exports to Russia conditional on the Russian government recognising its debts and other obligations and providing guarantees on future credits.

These decisions of the Brussels Conference, viewed against the background of earlier statements by British cabinet ministers and of numerous comments in the Western press, showed that the cancellation of the loans granted to the former Russian government was the main

obstacle to the realisation of serious plans for economic cooperation between the Russian Republic and capitalist countries.

Recognition of the debts of the tsarist regime followed from the current policy of the Russian government, which is aimed at cooperating with capitalist countries in the economic sphere, tackling the economic rehabilitation of Russia as a priority task and using Western capital to this end. However, the Russian government does not visualise recognition of the tsars' debts as an isolated step or recognition of a principle but as a concession involving a whole number of measures to be adopted by other powers and forming part of a system of agreements with other countries on economic aid to Russia in their own interest and on commercial principles, and on a final reconciliation between them and Soviet Russia, including full legal recognition of the latter. The significance of this step should be lasting and will only come out in full measure gradually, in the course of further diplomatic effort. The Soviet government took this step in the form of a note to the Entente powers and the United States on October 28. The note links a basic willingness to recognise the debts to a proposal for an international conference to consider all the claims of both sides and settle definitively differences between Russia and other powers. The debts recognised in the note are the prewar debts of tsarist governments, for as far as recognition of other categories of debts of the Russian government is concerned, there are much more serious objections to it.

On November 1, the British government answered by asking what the Russian government's position on recognising other categories of debts was. On November 19, the Russian government replied that the issues involved in this and in the general problem of the economic rehabilitation of Russia and the world were so complex and so closely interlocked that none but an international conference could settle them in one way or another.

France did not answer the Russian government directly but on November 9 the French government sent a long communication on the matter to the British government. The communication demanded that the Russian government should recognise all categories of debts, meaning even debts owed to private persons as a result of the nationalisation of movable and immovable property in Russia. At the same time, the French government went much further by making a number of suggestions in favour of creating in Russia representative bodies of the whole people, respecting private property, renouncing Bolshevik propaganda in other countries and interference in their internal affairs.

THE BALKANS

BULGARIA WAS THE FIRST BALKAN COUNTRY to offer the Russian Republic opportunities for trading relations. On a mandate from Tsentosoyuz, a Bulgarian cooperative, Osvobozhdenie, purchased 600 carloads of grain on the free market and another 600 out of the stocks of a consortium liquidated by the government; the grain was shipped to Russia.

In relations between Russia and Romania, which were engaged in general talks on a proposed conference, the issue of navigation and fishing in the Dniester Lagoon unexpectedly assumed an acute character.

Going on simultaneously and continuously was a lively correspondence between Russia and the Ukraine, on the one hand, and Romania, on the other, about raids by bands crossing into Soviet territory, with the Romanian government making counter-charges of the Dniester being crossed by armed men to attack Romanian units. A meeting be-

tween Cde. Karakhan and Mr. Filaliti began on September 22. They conferred until October 25. Strictly speaking, their discussions were intended to specify the agenda of a future conference between Russia and the Ukraine, on the one hand, and Romania, on the other, the two sides proposing dissimilar agendas. The Russian delegate proposed examining all disputed issues between Russia and the Ukraine, on the one hand, and Romania, on the other, saying that peaceful, good-neighbour relations could not be established until a final settlement of all disputed issues. The Romanian delegate, however, flatly refused to put on the agenda of the forthcoming conference not only items concerning the destiny of Bessarabia but even the issue of the frontier between Romania and the Ukraine and the rights of ethnic minorities. At the same time, he insisted on the conference examining Romania's monetary claims vis-à-vis the Russian government, in particular the claim to the Romanian gold fund and other assets still in the hands of the Russian government. The Russian government found it impossible to the question of a reciprocal settlement out of the overall context of disputed issues and expressed a readiness to consider it only if all differences were put on the agenda.

Meanwhile, Romania became a military base for the Petlyura bands preparing to invade the Ukraine.

POLAND

THE IMPLEMENTATION of the peace treaty with Poland turned out to be an extremely difficult task. The very restoration of diplomatic relations, which should have taken place immediately after the treaty came into force, was unexpectedly delayed for a long time by the Polish side. The Polish government tried to substitute *de facto* indirect relations through Riga for reciprocal representation and used that channel for sending the Russian government notes on current business matters, as it did, for instance, on May 16 and July 8 in the case of persons having to choose citizenship. The Russian government rejected these attempts as a matter of principle, refusing to respond to those indirect approaches, for it considered that diplomatic relations could be established only through direct representation.

All efforts notwithstanding, the Russian Repatriation Commission in Warsaw was unable to put an end to the atrocities and barbarous treatment to which Russian prisoners of war and internees were subjected in Polish camps. Savage beating, back-breaking work, hunger, cold, abominable sanitary conditions, shootings on the slightest provocation or for no reason at all—such was the permanent lot of Russian prisoners of war in Poland. Members of the Russian delegation were long barred from entering the camps, but even after they had gained access, they were usually placed in a situation making it impossible for them to receive any complaints from the prisoners.

The Repatriation Commission in Moscow comes up all the time against the Poles' unwillingness to repatriate refugees from famine-stricken areas. Disease is rife among the huge mass of starving and ragged refugees pressing against the Polish border as they wait for permission to enter Poland. Nevertheless, the Polish authorities still let in very few of them, refusing to open a third border check-point and trying again and again to reduce the admission quota established at the two existing check-points.

Besides the repatriation of prisoners of war, both sides considered it necessary to expedite work on establishing the frontier. A mixed border commission held its first meeting in Minsk on May 2, yet as of now, or more than six months on, it is nowhere near finishing its work. The

Polish delegation tried all the time to secure an increase in Polish territory; contrary to the peace treaty, it sought to have the frontier shifted here and there 30 versts or more eastwards, and recurrent petty attempts to alter the frontier in favour of Poland in the course of drawing it on the site caused endless delays.

The main obstacle to the implementation of the peace treaty was a violation by the Polish side of Article 5, which binds the signatories to refrain from supporting organisations or groups hostile to the other side. Shortly after the signing of the Riga peace, Warsaw won importance as a command centre of the active Russian counterrevolution led by Savinkov and by Petlyura in the Ukraine. On April 11, the People's Commissariat was compelled to ask the Polish Foreign Minister to put an end to the formation of Russian counter-revolutionary bands on Polish soil. In a telegram sent to Polish Minister Witos on April 13, Cde Rakowsky, for his part, protested against Polish government support for Ukrainian rebel organisations. Polish Minister Sapieha, answering the People's Commissariat on April 19, rejected the accusations without giving any facts to the contrary; for his part, he charged the Soviet government with tolerating activity hostile to Poland, especially by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front.

Earnestly desiring to find a peaceful way out of the conflict, the Russian government placed high hopes on the agreed exchange of embassies. Pending the arrival of Mr. Filipowicz, it expected to prevail on the Polish government through personal explanations rather than through controversial notes to abandon its unambiguous position, namely, almost open and increasingly active support for the Savinkovites and Petlyurites. During his very first conversation with Mr. Filipowicz, Cde Chicherin pointed out that the Russian government could not unilaterally honour the obligations assumed by it, could not turn over its gold to Poland at a time when Poland was fighting a *de facto* war against Russia through White Guards. The Polish government, however, took the diplomatic offensive by sending the People's Commissariat a further note on August 20 full of counter-charges.

In the meantime, the French government, having fallen back on a definite policy of armed intervention, interfered behind the scenes in the Polish-Russian conflict by insisting in a secret note to Poland dated September 3 on open action against Russia. What the French government demanded specifically in its September 3 note was that Poland should deliver an ultimatum to the Russian government on a number of issues relating to the execution of the treaty.

On September 14, Mr. Tytus Filipowicz, who had returned to Moscow from a trip to Warsaw, presented a verbal note stating in what was still rather guarded terms that Poland saw the only way out of the situation in the Soviet government meeting a number of Polish demands, including the demand for the reevacuation of Polish property. On September 18, however, he went as far as to serve an ultimatum threatening to sever diplomatic relations unless the Polish demands listed by him in a three-point memorandum were met by October 1.

In a counter note dated September 22, the People's Commissariat rejected most emphatically the principle advanced in the Polish ultimatum and implying that the Riga Treaty was binding on one side only. On behalf of the Russian government, it put forward five counter-demands concerning the attitude of Poland to White Guard bands and conspirators and proposed shifting the deadline for the reciprocal satisfaction of demands to October 5. Immediately after that, the Russian government published a Red Book containing a collection of documents relating to the Polish-Russian conflict.

Peace supporters in Warsaw gained the upper hand, and the Polish

Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow answered us in a note on September 28, expressing satisfaction over the September 22 statement of the People's Commissariat about our readiness to meet the terms of the treaty. A Polish government memorandum dated September 30 continued the controversy over various disputed issues concerning the implementation of the treaty. In Warsaw, Mr. Skirmunt denied in a note on September 26 the existence of the French note of September 3 and put forward compromise proposals on the problem of White Guards. Finally, an intervention by the Polish author of the Riga Treaty, Mr. Dabski, led to a diplomatic act of vast importance almost equal in significance to the Riga Treaty. On September 30, Cde. Karakhan and Mr. Dabski reached an agreement which subsequently was carried forward through daily meetings from October 1 to 6, and was put into final shape in a protocol signed by them on October 7. The agreement specified the time limits within which both sides were to fulfil their obligations intended to end the conflict.

Another month passed, however, before the Polish side began really to carry out the Karakhan-Dabski agreement, and it was only on October 28 that the top leadership of the White Guard combat centre left Poland. Cde. Karakhan stated at the time that three days later, November 1, the Polish delegation would be paid the first instalment of the equivalent of rolling stock. On November 1, the Poles received the instalment. Nevertheless, the Russian and Polish delegations in Moscow engaged in a prolonged argument over the substance of the issue; it ended in two accords, reached on November 15 and 22.

Chapter Three

THE EAST IN THE PERIOD OF IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES

PERSIA

THE SUMMER and autumn in Persia saw a further evolution of the situation created by the Russo-Persian Treaty of February 26.

On April 13, in view of the withdrawal of British troops from Persia, Azeri troop units began evacuation for their part. On May 26, the RSFSR Revolutionary Military Council ordered the evacuation of Enzeli by our fleet.

On June 22 in Tehran, Persia and Afghanistan signed a Treaty of Friendship and Good Relations providing for the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, reciprocal neutrality in the event of war between one of the contracting parties and third states, and the arbitration of all disputes between the contracting parties.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Gilan was considered completed by June 13. In this connection the Persian Consul in Baku, Saedol Vezareh, handed the AzSSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Cde. Huseinov, a note on July 25 expressing his sincere joy over the consolidation of friendly relations between the RSFSR and AzSSR, on the one hand, and Persia, on the other. In a note on the same subject addressed to the Persian Ambassador Extraordinary to Moscow and dated July 29, Cde. Chicherin called his attention to a public statement by Cde. Narimanov, Chairman of the AzSSR Council of People's Commissars (in *Izvestia VTsIK*), to the effect that the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic had nothing to do with Eskhanollah Khan, which the Persian Ambassador answered on August 2 in a note expressing gratitude and pointing out that political non-interference in the internal affairs of Persia was in the interests of both Russia and its allies.

On September 28, Cde. Chicherin handed the Persian Ambassador a note proposing that negotiations be started in Moscow to draw up and conclude a Russo-Persian trade treaty; the Ambassador answered in a counter note that he had forwarded the wish expressed by Cde. Chicherin to the Persian government in Tehran.

On September 5, a note from the Persian Ambassador informed us that his government had donated 20,000 poods of rice and 40,000 poods of grain in famine relief aid for Russia.

On October 5, the Press Office under our Mission in Persia launched publication of *Izvestia*, a daily newspaper, in Russian and Persian.

On October 11, the Persian Ambassador advised Cde. Chicherin in a note that, in response to our representations, his government had granted its agreement to the appointment of our consuls to Tabriz, Mashhad and Enzeli.

AFGHANISTAN

THE PERIOD under review was one of intensive internal construction in Afghanistan. At its onset, that country was aware of being a state which had already entered into communication with the rest of the civilised world. It was striving to reorganise its legal system with sympathetic support from us and to dissociate definitively and completely with its earlier primitive and backward state, artificially cultivated in the period of vassalage.

The area of Afghanistan's international relations expanded. A representative of the Turkish government, Abdur Rahman Bey, arrived in Afghanistan via Russia (early March 1921). A few days later, Kabul received an Extraordinary Bukharan Mission led by Yusuf Zadeh. Preparations were made for an exchange of missions with Persia. Relations with British India being strained and legally uncertain, Russia served throughout that time as the only window on Europe for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan began drafting a treaty with the Bukharan Republic (June 1921), the two sides proposing their respective drafts (the Bukharan text was drawn up by Yusuf Zadeh, Plenipotentiary of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic in Afghanistan, and the Afghan draft, by Mahmud Tarzi, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan).

Throughout the summer months of 1921, Kabul was the scene of a struggle between court and social groupings that reached the highest pitch in July and August. That was when a British mission led by Sir Henry Dobbs advanced as a *sine qua non* for a treaty the finalisation of British control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan and demanded that Afghanistan should break relations with Russia. On August 7, 1921, Emir Amanullah Khan called a broadly representative meeting of all the Kabul members of the enlarged Legislative Council, delegates of the local Indian community, spokesmen for the clergy and members of the royal family.

As the result of an exhaustive discussion of both drafts, Russian and Afghan, which lasted four days, the Majlis on August 11, 1921, rejected the British proposal. On August 13, the Afghan government ratified the Afghan-Russian Treaty.

On August 29, the new Russian Plenipotentiary, Cde. Raskolnikov, who arrived in Kabul on July 16, began talks with the Afghan government on signing a consular and a post-and-telegraph convention as well as a trade treaty. The two conventions were signed on September 25.

As early as July 30, 1921, Cde. Raskolnikov assured the Foreign Minister in a note that, after the example of his predecessor, he was going to follow the tradition of "invariable loyalty and non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, of continuing to respect the

existing government of independent Afghanistan in accordance with the principle of the right of all nations to self-determination proclaimed by the RSFSR".

In reply to this, the Foreign Minister on September 1 made public assurances about Afghanistan desisting from anti-government propaganda inside the RSFSR and the Turkestan Republic.

Following the August 7 meeting, the talks with Britain were broken off for a time, and the press reported their transfer to London. But Sir Henry Dobbs stayed, and on October 16, or after ten months of effort, he succeeded in coming to terms with the Afghan government.

In conclusion of three years of vacillation, Britain recognised by treaty the de facto independence of Afghanistan and its unrestricted right to maintain foreign relations, a right recognised by the RSFSR as early as May 1919 (on May 27, its Worker-Peasant Government adopted a relevant Declaration).

Indicative of the solidity of relations and the community of interests between Afghanistan and the RSFSR was the valuable donation of 100,000 poods of grain to the Russian famine relief fund made by the Emir (on November 9).

THE BUKHARAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

THE OVERTHROW of the Emirate in Bukhara on September 2, 1920, was followed by the formation of a Provisional Revolutionary Committee, which assumed responsibility for the administration of the republic. The ARCEC "Red East" train, on which a considerable number of experienced political workers, mostly Moslems, led by Cde. Safarov arrived in Bukhara, did much to help the new republic organise its government bodies. The apparatus of our Mission in Bukhara, which had almost fallen apart, revived with the arrival of the Soviet Plenipotentiary, Cde. Kuibyshev, on September 12, and work began intensifying.

On October 5, 1920, the First All-Bukhara Kurultai (congress) met in session. It drew 1,858 delegates and was chiefly in the nature of an information and agitation action.

On October 25, Cde. Faizulla Khojaye, Chairman of the Council of Nazirs, sent Cde. Chicherin a declaration by the Bukharan government on the new government's desire to live in the closest possible friendship with all countries, above all with the Russian people, whom it hailed as vanguard fighters for the liberation of the peoples of the East. He asked in the interests of both friendly republics for an exchange of permanent diplomatic missions.

At a rally held by the Bukharan government on November 7 to mark the third anniversary of the October Revolution and attended by 20,000 people, the RSFSR Plenipotentiary, Cde. Kuibyshev, made a declaration on the independence of Bukhara, the aims and tasks of the Soviet republics, the renunciation of all the privileges which tsarist Russia had enjoyed in regard to Bukhara, and the transfer to Bukhara of all the lands seized by the autocracy, with all factories and other immovables.

On February 2, 1921, the Bukharan Revolutionary Council issued a decree on land. The decree declared all the land, water, forest and other natural resources of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic to be the people's property. The lands owned by the former emir's family, *waqf* lands, lands owned by officials or other proprietors were earmarked for distribution among working people according to labour quotas to be established, along with livestock and implements.

In Moscow on March 4, 1921, the RSFSR and the BPSR concluded a Treaty of Alliance and an Economic Agreement. In the preamble of the

treaty the RSFSR, declaring its renunciation of the colonial policy of the former, capitalist governments of Russia, signified its unqualified recognition of the full independence of the BPSR and relinquished all the rights in respect of Bukhara established by tsarism.

On June 16, an ad hoc commission headed by Cde. Sayidjanov arrived in Moscow from Bukhara to detail the Economic Agreement and the political treaty concluded between the RSFSR and the BPSR. On June 21, the commission got down to business in cooperation with representatives of the People's Commissariats of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs and under the chairmanship of Cde. Shlikhter, member of the PCFT Collegium.

On June 20, work was begun by a mixed commission on transferring part of the Amu Darya flotilla to the BPSR. On October 25, the two republics signed the agreement on the transfer drafted by the commission, it states that pending the creation in the BPSR and the Khivan PSR of an autonomous apparatus that would take charge of the flotilla, the three republics should set up a provisional international parity commission of three representatives—one from the RSFSR, one from the BPSR and one from the KPSR—on the understanding that administrative and technical control should be entrusted to the People's Commissariat of Railroads.

On October 16, it was announced that the BPSR Committee on State Relief had collected 100 million rubles in famine relief to the Volga region. Work had begun on purchasing and dispatching grain to the famine-stricken provinces.

JAPAN AND MONGOLIA

THE CURRENT PERIOD of Far Eastern relations began with the Vladivostok coup d'état. On May 21, 1921, the Japanese arrested the Russian units of the Vladivostok garrison on the pretext of checking the quantity of arms. Around the same time, they seized 298 fisheries in the Russian Maritime Territory. They built a radio station in De Castries, and in Sakhalin they proceeded to the uncontrolled removal of Russian wealth to Japan; also, they gradually prepared with help from Russian White Guards for a new coup d'état in Vladivostok. On May 26, the Japanese disarmed the Vladivostok militia force, openly helping the Semyonovites and Kappelites. The coup d'état stage with Japanese aid resulted in installing a Black-Hundred government under Merkulov backed by the Japanese military command. On May 30, the government of the Far Eastern Republic published in connection with the Vladivostok events a sharp protest note directed to the Japanese people and government. The note pointed out that by intervening, the Japanese command had violated the agreement of April 29, 1920, imposed on the former Vladivostok government by the Japanese themselves. On June 1, the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs sent for its part a protest note to the Entente powers.

Simultaneously with this, Ungern, the White Guard leader who was occupying Mongolia and maintained close contacts with Japan, sent his troops to the Far Eastern Republic and the Russian Soviet Republic.

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government, which on coming into being even while Ungern still ruled in Mongolia had formed a Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army on Russian territory, engaged in struggle against the White Guard invaders, doing so in close alliance with Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic.

Troops of Soviet Russia, the Far Eastern Republic and Red Mongolia jointly defeated Ungern and captured on July 7 the capital, Urga, where a Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government was formed. On July

12, the latter asked Soviet Russia not to withdraw its troops from Mongolia until the complete elimination of the external danger. On August 10, the Russian government consented.

On September 10, the Mongolian People's Government, bearing in mind the fact that Mongolia had been freed from White bands by joint efforts and taking account of a common stake in the establishment of peace and peaceful cooperation between the peoples of neighbouring countries—the Russians, Chinese and Mongolians—asked us to mediate the establishment of relations between Mongolia and China. The Mongolian government pointed out that the reason why it had chosen our government as intermediary was that Soviet Russia was the only country having no interest in the seizure of territories of neighbouring countries, a fact well known to the government of the Chinese Republic as well.

In a message sent to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Bodo, on September 14, the People's Commissariat replied that the Russian government and the whole of worker-peasant Russia hailed the liberation of Mongolia from the bloody Ungern tyranny and the formation of the People's Revolutionary Government. The RSFSR government, sharing the Mongolian government's conviction of the need to establish peaceful business relations between autonomous Mongolia and China, thanked the People's Revolutionary Government for its friendly sentiments and the trust shown by it, and expressed hope that the mediation between Mongolia and China already undertaken would be crowned with success on the stipulation that the Mongolian people should exercise their right to self-determination.

In October, the Mongolian People's Government and Khutukhtu Bogdo, the spiritual leader of the Mongolia people, sent a mission to Moscow to sign an agreement on peace and friendship between the peoples of Mongolia and Russia. The conference, which opened on October 25, ended in signing on November 5 a treaty on reciprocal recognition of a most favoured status for the citizens of both countries and the principles of trade.

On July 17, Japan proposed to the FER that they should engage in formal peace talks. After probings by both sides the FER government on August 17 acknowledged the need to send a delegation for talks, to be based on the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Territory. At the insistence of Japan, Dairen (Dalny) was chosen as the venue for the talks, which actually started there.

On September 8, the Japanese delegation raised certain objections, and as for a treaty on evacuation, it proposed making it the object of a special agreement.

On September 10, the two sides established that they differed completely on the issue of evacuating the Japanese force, and so no agreement was reached. The FER demand that the RSFSR should join in the talks remained an open question.

On September 26, the Dairen talks were resumed. The Japanese delegation insisted on its 17-point counterdraft, which would have enabled Japan fully to bring the FER under its de facto rule through peaceful penetration.

On October 24, a representative of the RSFSR, Cde. Markhlevski, left Moscow to join in the Dairen talks on special issues concerning Russia. On November 9, however, the Japanese delegation objected to his being admitted to Dairen before an agreement with the FER was signed. On November 17, the Japanese delegation returned the FER draft agreement on evacuation and advanced new counterdemands.

Finally, on November 21, the Japanese agreed to sign a treaty on the evacuation of the southern part of the Maritime Territory provided,

however, that the FER met their main demands. They stated that they were willing to admit the RSFSR representative solely as a private person.

Chapter Four

ORGANISATIONAL AND LEGAL MATTERS

ORGANISATIONAL MATTERS

THE EXTENSION OF THE AREA of foreign relations compounded the task of organising the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. It led to a considerable increase in the network of the Commissariat's missions abroad and the number of its representatives on the territory of the Republic as well as in the work of the Commissariat itself.

The necessity for the internal integration of all organising, administrative, financial and economic work became obvious enough. The functions of such an integrating echelon were assumed by the Administrative Department, which late in January 1921 took over from its predecessors, the departments in charge of administration and management, personnel, finance, visas and passports, diplomatic couriers.

In mid-February, the Administrative Department took charge of all administrative, organisational, economic and technical matters. At the same time, it started work on the temporary staffing of the central echelons of the People's Commissariat and of missions abroad. In view of the arrival of more and more foreign missions in Moscow, feverish efforts were made to repair and fit up mansions.

In March, the Commissariat put down its staff for regular food allowances by agreement with the Commissariat of Food Supply. This was all the more indispensable because the staff was badly overworked.

Late in April, the Commissariat set about forming a unit to guard the mansions let to foreign representatives and the buildings of the Commissariat itself.

Early in May, the Commissariat adopted new principles for the formation and assignment of staff for missions abroad. It is since then that it has really kept a register of the staff of its echelons inside the Republic and abroad.

Early in June, the Commissariat proceeded to establish a construction engineering office which succeeded in completely abolishing the contract method of repairing mansions.

In mid-June, the Commissariat set up an accounts office which worked out methods by which foreigners could pay for articles delivered to them by supply and distribution agencies and took charge of bookkeeping and accounting for payments made.

On June 6, the Council of People's Commissars approved new regulations on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The act put administrative and organising work in the Commissariat's central echelons on a regular basis.

On July 24, the Collegium of the People's Commissariat approved the central echelons' list of staff—a total of 1,309 employees, including 565 on the staff of the Administrative Department. Also, the staff of the garage, repair and construction office, mansions, stables, guards unit and other technical and auxiliary subdivisions had reached 1,000 by then.

On July 27, the Commissariat introduced a strict procedure of appointing, dismissing and transferring staff members of missions abroad and Representatives' Offices on the territory of the republic.

On August 24, the Labour and Defence Council decreed the establishment in Moscow of a Central Bureau for Services to Foreigners under the People's Commissariat. The decision was necessitated by the increased amount of work of this nature, which could no longer be done properly in the economic conditions of the time. The new office began functioning on September having united the old apparatus and the staff which had been carrying on that job.

Regulations approved by the Council of People's Commissars on June 6, 1921, assigned the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs the following functions:

(a) Diplomatic relations, negotiations and fulfilment of decisions of the Council of People's Commissars on the conclusion of treaties and agreements with foreign countries.

(b) Collecting various kinds of information on political and economic life in foreign countries and the provision of comprehensive information to the government on the basis of these data.

(c) Ensuring in the interests of Soviet power and all working people that the foreign press and the population groups concerned receive correct information on the state of the republic and on phenomena in its social and economic life.

(d) Protecting the external political and economic interests of the RSFSR as well as Soviet Russian citizens abroad, who must be assisted in every respect.

(e) Controlling the implementation of treaties concluded with foreign states; rendering assistance to the Soviet institutions concerned in exercising the rights established by these treaties as well as assisting the missions of foreign states in the RSFSR in having their legitimate requirements met.

Besides, the People's Commissariat was assigned the following functions:

(a) Issuing Russian passports to persons leaving the Republic; settling questions relating to foreigners' entry into and residence in the RSFSR.

(b) Rendering economic services to the staffs of foreign missions accredited to the Soviet government.

As of January 1, 1921, the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was composed of Cde. Georgi Chicherin, People's Commissar, Cde. Lev Karakhan, Deputy People's Commissar, and Cde. Maxim Litvinov, Member of the Collegium.

As of December 1, 1921, the Collegium was composed as follows:

Cde. Georgi Chicherin, People's Commissar, responsible in addition to general direction of the Commissariat, for the Political Department of Eastern Affairs and the Information Section;

Cde. Maxim Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissar responsible for the Political Department of Western Affairs and the Economic and Legal Department;

Cde. Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, Member of the Collegium responsible for all questions relating to outlying states;

Cde. Pavel Gorbunov, Member of the Collegium responsible for all organisational matters and Administrative Manager of the Commissariat.

According to regulations, the People's Commissariat has the following central echelons:

- (a) Political Department of Western Affairs
- (b) Political Department of Eastern Affairs
- (c) Economic and Legal Department
- (d) Press and Information Department

(e) Administrative Department

The following table illustrates the effectives of the departments and sections as of January 1 and December 1, 1921.

Departments and sections	Number of personnel	
	as of Jan. 1	as of Dec. 1
Collegium Secretariat	106	136
Political Dept. of Western Affairs	18	50
Political Dept. of Eastern Affairs	15	42
Press and Information Dept.	50	114
Economic and Legal Dept.	59	69
Administrative Dept. Secretariat	—	56
Visa and Passport Section	12	30
Diplomatic Couriers Section	54	88
Executive Section	15	35
Financial Section	20	36
Commandant's and Guards' Hq.	200	450
Transport	25	132
Works and Supplies Section	30	54
General Archives	5	9
Total	609	1,301

In addition to its central echelons, the People's Commissariat controls the foreign missions of the RSFSR and the Commissariat's representatives inside the Republic.

The increased amount of work in the central echelons of the Commissariat put an extraordinary strain on some members of the staff. The increase in the number of employees lags behind the growing amount of work, with overwork as a chronic phenomenon, which is particularly true of recent months. Senior officials work an average of 12 hours a day and technical personnel, eight hours.

In the period under review, Commissariat staff have participated in 697 meetings. The various departments and sections receive 880 visitors a day. Some officials receive up to 20 visitors.

The Commissariat handles an average of up to 1,000 documents a day. Except for the 28,000 incoming documents in the General Archives, it appears that the number of outgoing documents considerably exceeds that of incoming ones.

The amount of purely clerical work is exemplified by the fact that in the period under survey the Collegium Secretariat has produced 2,200,000 pages of text, or 7,500 pages a day.

The period under review has seen the Collegium Secretariat's Ciphering Section coding 16,585 messages and decoding 13,416. It follows that the section enciphers up to 50 messages and deciphers up to 30 messages a day.

As of January 1, 1921, the Telegraph Section under the People's

Commissariat had direct lines to Riga, Revel and Alexandrovsk. Direct lines have been established in the period under review to Helsingfors, Warsaw, Kovno, Tiflis, Batum, Chita, Irkutsk and Minsk. In the near future, the Commissariat is going to establish direct lines to Berlin and Angora.

From January 1 to December 1, the Telegraph Section received 9,087,000 words, or 98,000 messages. In the same period, it transmitted 1,265,000 words, or 82,000 messages.

In the period under survey, the People's Commissariat transmitted 3,200,000 words by radio (12,500 radiograms) and received 2,800,000 words (25,000 radiograms).

As of January 1, the Commissariat had 166 telephones and 150 numbers on the switchboard.

In the period under review, 1,441 files have been started in the current political archives of the Collegium Secretariat; 872 of the files concern Western countries, 299 have to do with Eastern countries, and the remaining 339 deal with other countries. In the same period, the current archives issued 1,650 items of information.

Between May 1 and December 1, the Diplomatic Couriers Section sent 860 pouches of diplomatic mail. The mail comprised 26,600 letters and 1,400 parcels.

In the same period, 603 pouches of mail containing 47,500 letters and 5,000 parcels arrived in Moscow from abroad.

In the period under review, the Works and Supplies Section received and distributed about 11,000 poods of food products, 7,800 poods of which was allotted to the Commissariat staff. Altogether 13,000 rations were distributed.

To supply the staffs of Soviet missions, the Commissariat allocated 600 poods of food products; 600 rations were supplied in all, at the rate of 62 rations per month.

To supply foreign bourgeois missions, the People's Commissariat allocated about 2,600 poods and distributed 1,500 rations.

By decision of the Labour and Defence Council, the Commissariat was allotted 3,363 rations under the state supply plan.

Besides, the Commissariat receives 650 rations for senior officials, 580 rations going to central echelons and 70, to local bodies on the territory of the Republic.

A vast amount of material supply work has been carried out in the period under review. Requirements for stationery and office appliances being considerable, it is particularly difficult to meet them (there are as many as 230 typewriters, not to mention other items). Moving the Commissariat into a new building necessitated enormous expenditures on equipment.

As of January 1, 1921, the Commissariat had 20 houses at its disposal. From January 1 to September 1, the Moscow Housing Commission made 23 houses more available, including the 90-apartment house at 5/15 Kuznetsky Most for the central echelons of the Commissariat.

The Central Bureau for Services to Foreigners was provided with 39 mansions by the Commandant's Headquarters.

The Commandant's Hq. has a 250-strong unit which guards mansions housing foreign missions and the buildings housing the central echelons of the Commissariat.

The Commissariat began setting up transportation facilities in the middle of May. By the time it set up stables, it had six horses. As of December 1, the stables had 20 dray and 15 saddle horses.

Work on setting up the garage began in July. As of December 1, there were eight passenger cars, two trucks and two motorcycles. The trucks were used for 700 hours and the cars, for 4,000 hours. The for-

mer carried 26,500 pounds of loads and the latter filed 3,000 conveyance orders.

Along with the garage, a workshop was set up for current repairs.

Between January 1 and December 1, the General Archives put in order and filed 28,276 documents and issued 702 items of information. In the period under review, it has provided scientifically processed material amounting to some 520 type-written pages.

On the request of Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, now a leading expert of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., his fee for the article in the November issue of "International Affairs" has been remitted to the aid fund for victims of the earthquake in Armenia.

International Affairs Laureates

ONE CANNOT KEEP ABREAST of the many events of last year and grasp immediately the deep meaning of some of them. Nevertheless, we believe that the 219 articles carried in *International Affairs* will help rivet readers' attention to the key, momentous processes taking place in the USSR and abroad. Articles have been contributed by presidents, prime ministers, ministers, bankers, industrialists, diplomats, writers, academicians and young researchers who have just joined the scientific community.

In keeping with the emerging tradition, we name the authors of the best materials published in *International Affairs* in 1989:

Alexei Arbatov, D. Sc. (Hist.) ("How Much Defence Is Sufficient?", No. 4);

participants in "Guest Club" ("Muscovites on Soviet Foreign Policy", No. 7); *

Jacques Delors, President of the Commission of the European Communities ("Europe on the Way to 1992", No. 11);

Tadao Morimoto, President of the Torei Research Institute, Japan ("Soviet Economy Could Benefit from Japanese Thrift", No. 11);

Boris Chaplin, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs ("Forty-Eight Hours of Risk", No. 4);

Igor Yanin, Deputy Head of the Research Department, Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee ("Returning to Simple Truths", No. 3).

With their contributions these laureate-authors supplement the picture of today's eventful international scene. Let us recall the main ideas contained in the prize-winning articles.

Alexei Arbatov's article initiated the heated debate on the military-political theme: "...[there is] the pressing task of going over from extensive (quantity) to intensive military programmes, of putting the emphasis on quality... With the acute deficit of information on our armed forces and military budget, it is very difficult to estimate the likely economic effect of the proposals I have set out. However, tentative calculations indicate that their implementation in the next five-year plan period could reduce our defence spending by 40 to 50 per cent, and this, most important, not weakening but strengthening the country's defence, to say nothing of other security aspects, both economic and political."

In our issue No. 7 Guest Club we gathered people from Baumansky District (the "International Affairs" editorial office is located there) to listen once again to what ordinary and not so ordinary Muscovites in the district are talking about. One of the participants was Afghan war veteran Vitaly Krikov: "In Afghanistan we trained for two months on mountainous terrain. Our first combat operation came in the fourth

* The contributors to Guest Club were: Mikhail Belousov, tool maker; Vladimir Bolotov, student; Anatoly Katalymov, assistant professor, Moscow Institute of Chemical Machine-Building; Olga Kokshanskaya, historian; Alexander Kraiko, People's Deputy of the USSR; Vitaly Krikov, Afghan war veteran; Rear-Admiral Vitaly Losikov; Alexander Nikonov, Deputy Chairman, Council Bureau, USSR Ecological Union; Victor Olenev-Hirschfeld, Coordinator, People-to-People Diplomacy Independent Inter-Institute Group; Vladimir Sokoiov, Pensioner; Timur Esadze, actor.

month of our stay there. Those operations are described variously now but there is little truth in what we hear or read. It wasn't only we who beat the enemy, but the other way round, too, and a sound thrashing it was. Just imagine a boy of eighteen who fired his tommygun a couple of times before taking the oath. He was faced with an enemy who had been fighting for five to eight years and had handled his weapon from childhood, with his own people and his native mountains around him. Many of our boys were killed. I think this is just the time to ask: What did they die for? But whom can we ask? Not Brezhnev, because he rests in a place of honour, in Red Square. It follows that there's nobody we can ask, or am I wrong?"

Jacques Delors is called the "king of the EEC", so it is important to know his views on economic cooperation in Europe, which are not always similar to ours: "President Mikhail Gorbachev wants Europe to become really a common home. I suggested that the 'Europes' which have been mentioned here get an opportunity to coexist in one settlement in which one house would be occupied by the Community. These houses should be friendly among themselves. But the building of such an edifice cannot be planned today."

The reflections of Tadao Morimoto will, perhaps, help us take a healthier and more optimistic view of ourselves and lessen the pall of pessimism that has engulfed us of late: "Why are you Russians forgetting that the Soviet Union is a mighty power? You have everything—no country can match you in natural resources. You had set up a powerful industry in a matter of decades by building innumerable factories and power plants. You should not forget this... That this potential is largely unused and so is neither feeding the country nor keeping it warm is another matter. This must be due to inefficient management and poor leadership. You need to realise it."

Boris Chaplin was the head of the dramatic Operation "Grom" to save the group of Soviet children seized by terrorists in Ordzhonikidze. Fortunately, the 48 hours of risk ended successfully: "It was obvious that the Israeli government was divided on what to do with the terrorists..."

"At 4:45 p. m. the following message came from Tel Aviv: 'At 3:15 p. m. (local time) a report was received through Anug to the effect that.. both planes together with the hijackers will leave late tonight..' Operation 'Grom' had come to a close."

Aside from all else, Igor Yanin's article is noteworthy in that it proves that in the environment of Party scientific thought there are many bright minds who take a deep and original approach to analysing our difficult reality of today: "The feeling of awe inspired in us by the vanguard of society is natural but Stalin's party was not Lenin's, was it? Stagnation was bound to affect the party as well, wasn't it? How could the party as a whole have been invariably right?"

The *International Affairs* Council and, I think, our readers, congratulate the laureates. Many thanks to all the other authors, in whose materials the events of 1989 were covered in an expert and lively way and the outlines of the major processes of the forthcoming period were traced.

STABILITY IN THE NUCLEAR WORLD

Sergei KORTUNOV

ON THE THRESHOLD of the unofficial Soviet-US summit at Malta the Bush administration was suffering from a kind of "Reykjavik syndrome". Many of its members were apprehensive that the Soviet side would again put forward some far-reaching proposal of propagandistic kind, like eliminate nuclear weaponry fully and immediately, which would be hard to decline without serious political losses.

These apprehensions, however, proved groundless. The Malta talks did not discuss a nuclear-free world; what they dealt with, in fact, was how to ensure a rapid advance towards the agreements under drafting, including those in the area of deep cuts of nuclear weapons. The summit adopted a "political decision" as they are called, to complete as early as this year the draft of the treaty on 50 per cent reductions in the strategic offensive weapons. As to more remote prospects of the USSR-USA strategic relationship, the summit has brought about no noticeable rapprochement of the two sides' stands. Still unresolved are their fundamental differences regarding the part the nuclear weapons play, and whether they can be eliminated in full.

Be that as it may, the willingness of the USSR and the USA to bypass propagandistic rhetorics and concentrate on practical steps towards radical reductions in nuclear stockpiles is the major point of coincidence in their approaches to the problem of security. The fact that this coincidence has come about is a reflection of the sides realising that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated fully and everywhere at one stroke. Nuclear disarmament is only part of a far broader, phased process involving drastic cuts in conventional armed forces and conventional armaments and their restructuring on the principles of non-offensive defence; the introduction of control mechanisms intended not only to ensure disarmament all along the line but to provide a kind of psychological ease in state-to-state relations, and lastly, radical changes in East-West relations generally, a gradual replacement of military instruments of maintaining peace by guarantees of political, economic, humanitarian and ecological security and their enshrinement in relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements.

This being so, we must admit whether we like it or not that for a possibly long time to come, humanity will unfortunately have to live in a nuclear world. Hence the problem today is not only to open as realistic a road as possible to the elimination of nuclear arms everywhere, not only to evolve and approve a philosophical concept as the basis for it, but to bring about reliable international security in the real world of today for all that we abhor nuclear weapons. In anticipation of the withdrawal of these weapons from national arsenals, we must create conditions precluding an unfavourable evolution of the international situation and the rise of a political crisis or conflict apt to grow into a nuclear war.

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The provision of such conditions is encompassed in a most general way by the concept of a durable strategic situation, that is, the maintenance of a definite degree of stability in the world strategic balance. This would discourage any power possessing nuclear weapons from planning to use them first in the hope of winning a nuclear war or to use them at all except in retaliation.

The present state of affairs is far from ideal, to be sure, seeing that the members of the nuclear club regard each other as potential aggressors whom they believe they keep from attacking by threatening to strike back or, in other words, by fear of retaliation. Yet this situation will be a basic world political reality as long as relations between nuclear powers are characterised by mutual distrust, suspicion and false notions of each other's intentions. It follows that guaranteeing strategic stability will remain a key task.

The problem of stability has many dimensions and facets and will therefore have to be solved comprehensively, with due regard to its multiple military and political aspects. The purpose of article is to touch on some of them.

THE POINT AT ISSUE

IT IS QUITE CLEAR that the Soviet Union and United States, militarily the strongest nations, are playing a prime role in the solution of the problem of building up strategic stability, which concerns the interests of every single nation in the world. Nor can there be any doubt that, in spite of distinctions in the conception of national goals and differences in the approach to international problems, strategic stability is an area in which the interests of the Soviet Union and United States coincide.

This is why, with the inception of the process of limiting strategic armaments, the issue of reinforcing strategic stability finds reflection in all major Soviet-American documents. On the other hand, it may be described as a dramatic reality of Soviet-US talks on military strategic issues that after coming to terms on the general principles of disarmament and of strengthening international security, the two countries often begin arguing over the interpretation of these principles.

The reason for this must obviously be that in many cases the two sides have very different ideas of the meaning of authentic formulations agreed at the price of reciprocal concessions and compromise. The concept of strategic stability is no exception from the general rule. Considered in isolation from concrete talks, it is nothing but an abstraction or good intention leaving much room for subjective opinions and arbitrary interpretations.

But if the Soviet Union and United States arrive at a common conception of what building up strategic stability means in practice, their talks on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons will become more meaningful as to setting the tasks they must accomplish and therefore more effective in safeguarding the security of both sides. After all, the ultimate value of any agreement in this sphere is determined not only by the extent to which arms are cut and controls established but by how far the threat of nuclear war is reduced.

To be sure, the problem of strategic stability has always been present in Soviet-US talks on steps to limit and reduce strategic armaments. But it has never been the subject of direct talks of the two countries. The time is ripe now for such a discussion, which is bound to be much more difficult than talks on quantitative cuts in nuclear weapons in view of their continuing modernisation. To be able to start it in good earnest, the two powers must first make a realistic appraisal of the war menace

and decide accordingly what strategic armaments and in what quantities each of them requires in order to keep strategic stability on a minimum level of confrontation with due regard to the evolution of the strategic balance between the two sides. Thereupon they could begin a joint discussion on what the pattern of their strategic forces should be like to meet the need for strategic stability to the maximum.

SOME HISTORY

THE CONCEPT of strategic stability was first used in American scientific publications in the late 1950s in an attempt to grasp the meaning of Soviet-US nuclear confrontation.

The attempt was not merely an intellectual exercise by American political scientists but a response to the US military political leadership's objective requirement for an assessment of a fundamentally new situation. The latter was a result of the United States losing strategic invulnerability and of the emergence in Soviet-US relations of a kind of nuclear interdependence that, while not amounting to parity in nuclear power, posed an equal threat to both sides.

That change in America's military strategic thinking was an unmistakable sign of some elements of realism brought into being there by new developments. This trend, surely, came on top of by then traditional stereotypes of American foreign policy thinking, attempts to use nuclear power for political ends at least indirectly and, as a consequence, a bid to retain military superiority at all costs. Thus from the outset the concept of strategic stability came to be viewed in the United States from the standpoint of military power and translated into such notions as "nuclear impasse", "extended deterrence", "balance of terror", "escalating domination", and so on. In the end, it was these ideas based on military power that prompted American specialists to virtually reduce the complex essence of strategic stability, which is far from purely military, to so-called "crisis stability", or to discussing the nature of actions to be undertaken by the sides in various cases of aggravation of political tension. Understandably, "stability of the arms race" became a key component of the American concept from the first. It not only does not preclude but in fact presupposes a further competition in building up and modernising nuclear capability.

But when the military strategic balance between the two powers took on a new quality with the attainment of nuclear parity (that is, a rough balance of nuclear power), the American military political leadership came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to bring a further strategic nuclear arms race under control by negotiating with the Soviet Union certain curbs on a stepped-up race in the more dangerous areas fraught with upsetting strategic stability.

That was when the Soviet Union and United States realised that given parity in strategic offensive forces, the acquisition of greater defence capability by one of the sides would be tantamount to gaining a potential for a preventive nuclear strike. This realisation was reflected in the 1972 ABM Treaty, which virtually legalised what we should now describe as a situation of "mutual nuclear deterrence" (or "mutual assured destruction").

Regrettably, in the subsequent period of strategic arms limitation talks, the American side sought to ensure that a future agreement with the Soviet Union would interpret strategic stability in a way meeting solely US interests, that is, safeguarding the United States against retaliation or at least limiting casualties to the minimum in the event of a hypothetical exchange of nuclear strikes. It wanted in point of fact

to involve us in a discussion of the nuclear war scenarios which began appearing in US official documents just then.

However, we refused to be drawn into any such discussion in our talks with the Americans. In public statements made in the 1970s and 1980s, we also rejected "limited", "protracted" and various other types of nuclear war. Nevertheless, our military construction followed to all intents and purposes the logic of military rivalry imposed by the other side. Thereby we allowed ourselves to be dragged into a race in strategic nuclear armaments which put an unjustified strain on our economy without increasing our security.

To judge by the build-up of Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the task set by the leadership was to preserve military strategic parity with the United States at all costs, meaning qualitative parity in SOWs and then rough parity in the capability of the two sides' strategic nuclear forces in diverse combat operations. To maintain parity and be able to inflict equal damage on the United States in a nuclear war, the Soviet Union introduced—from what available information suggests—numerous types and modifications of ballistic missiles which added little to its defence potential while at the same time provoking the other side to step up the arms race. The result was a vicious circle of action and reaction.

WHAT IS MEANT BY UNSUSTAINABLE DAMAGE

THERE IS A PRACTICALLY consensual realisation in today's world that the contemporary military balance is characterised by overarmament, especially in the nuclear field.

Indeed, it is only reasonable to admit that the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States greatly exceed all conceivable criteria of sufficiency needed for devastating retaliation in any circumstances, however unfavourable, and with any first-strike scenario on the part of the potential aggressor. Irrespective of the disastrous ecological aftermath of a nuclear war (the effect of a "nuclear winter"), any nuclear attack would be suicidal for the side mounting it.

In the face of all manifestly rational objections, however, the build-up and modernisation of nuclear armouries are going on at full speed.

This preposterous paradox can only be ascribed to the inertia of old thinking, a thinking dominated by prenuclear notions of nuclear weapons and making both sides rely excessively on quantitative factors for military power. In the case of the United States, it is influenced by the traditional stereotypes of thinking in terms of military power, and in the case of the Soviet Union there also tells the impact of stereotypes inherited from the period of World War II, which likewise expressed themselves in what was not always a justified build-up of conventional as well as nuclear armaments.

The dominance of these notions resulted in exaggerating the criteria of unsustainable damage in a nuclear war as a key element of any concept of strategic stability.

Surely, these criteria do not lend themselves to a precise definition. They are always subjective and very conventional, and militarists readily take advantage of this. Speaking of unsustainable damage, Robert McNamara meant the destruction of roughly 30 per cent of the population and 70 per cent of the industrial potential of the aggressor country. De Gaulle spoke of the destruction of four or five cities. For all the arbitrariness of both criteria, de Gaulle was apparently closer to the truth. Even a superficial knowledge of America's elementary inner political realities leaves no room for visualising a situation where that country would be willing to reconcile itself to the reduction of, say, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago to a radioactive desert. The

Americans would undoubtedly find such damage unsustainable. I am sure any serious Americanist would confirm this. However, the threshold of sustainable damage is probably lower still. Be that as it may, the very idea that, no matter how powerful an American nuclear strike against the Soviet Union might be, at least one Soviet bomber could make its way to, say, New York and drop its deadly load upon, it was enough in the mid-fifties to restrain the most hot-headed people in Washington. This is easy to explain from a purely human point of view, for no mother would ever agree to sacrifice if only one of her children in order to kill her worst enemy.

It follows that the United States could apparently be deterred by means of a far smaller nuclear force than we now have from attacking our country. From this point of view, military strategic parity differs little in terms of stability from the Soviet-US "nuclear interdependence" which shaped up in the early sixties.

This was what McNamara meant in speaking of the existence of Soviet-US nuclear parity during the Caribbean crisis (October 1962), when the United States had 5,000 warheads and the Soviet Union a mere 300, according to his estimate. In spite of America's 17:1 superiority in warheads, either side was equal to retaliating with shattering effect.

The situation during the Caribbean crisis showed that what is decisive for strategic stability is neither the quantitative balance of nuclear power nor even parity in destructive nuclear capability but the character of the military political thinking of leading statesmen and their awareness of the fatal effects of nuclear war.

For both the United States and any other country, war (including nuclear war) is an instrument of politics, not an end in itself. Where war ceases to be such an instrument, politics, however irrational, must reject it. Nuclear missiles, which are far more powerful than any other weapon humanity has ever known, necessarily alter the aggressor's traditional idea of the nature of a potential war in which nuclear weapons could be used, including his idea of the possibility of winning the war.

Even so, we should not underrate the confrontational thinking still common in certain US quarters. Nor should we underrate strategic illusions born of an overestimation of their strength coupled with reliance on the "advantages" of this or that war scenario, particularly the option of delivering a disarming first strike against the greatest possible number of Soviet military targets.

The effects of any possible use of nuclear weapons would be so terrible that the prospect reduces any scenario of an actual nuclear attack to strategic nonsense. Nevertheless, work on such scenarios goes on, and they are incorporated in operational plans. From the point of view of common sense, operational planning, that inner sanctum of the military Establishment, is becoming something of a wonderland where generals delight in innumerable alternatives of war games unfolding on the screens of computer terminals that accurately count delivery vehicles and warheads left intact in the wake of those games, a world of fancy where strategy is set against strategy and scenario battles with scenario. Luckily, this kind of war is only being fought in the minds of generals. And yet we must not forget that this psychological game lacking a rationale has a material basis of real nuclear armaments whose combat missions are set to fit existing nuclear war scenarios. The mechanism of "nuclear destruction" is ready for use and has a hair trigger.

These circumstances do not rule out, at least theoretically, the rise of crisis situations where common sense may fail when it comes to military political decision-making. In that case, a decisive role could be played by a distorted idea of the policy of the other side, subjective notions about the "expediency" of a first strike, ill-advised actions by the

military leadership and the most diverse unforeseen developments. The result would be the same: a pull at the nuclear trigger.

Thus the present strategic situation is far from stable. What is more, some instability will apparently be an inevitable concomitant of international relations until all nuclear weapons are withdrawn from national arsenals. The very nature of these weapons is such that their quantity will be "too large" irrespective of how little of it is actually left in the world. However, even with nuclear weapons still there, the level of instability can be limited to the minimum if steps are taken not only to settle disputes by peaceful means but to firmly keep events under control. I mean adopting appropriate unilateral or agreed international measures beforehand to reinforce strategic stability and enlisting the efforts of the Soviet Union, the United States and other nuclear powers to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war as far as possible.

This is apparently and primarily a question of political and not military decisions. For if Soviet-American relations as well as relations between nuclear powers generally are built on confidence and gradually lead to doing away with the "enemy image", there will be reason to expect that no crisis or conflict will ever grow into a nuclear collision. If, furthermore, an effective mechanism is set up to defuse conflicts, that is, to prevent them from degenerating into nuclear war, and if additional steps are taken to remove the danger of its breaking out as the result of an accident, miscalculation or provocation, then the risk of such a war will be minimal.

Let us examine the substance of the problem. Anyone who takes a sober view of the phenomenon of nuclear confrontation, dismissing whatever is prompted by ideology or emotions, is certain to come to the conclusion that lying at the basis of the existence of the mechanism of "assured mutual destruction", that nuclear machine of Doomsday, as well as at the basis of the continuing build-up and modernisation of nuclear armaments are primarily mutual distrust and misinterpretation of the political intentions of the other side. Many in the Soviet Union, for instance, are convinced that the United States is out to win military superiority so as to impose a Pax Americana at global level and deprive the Soviet Union of its present status in the world community. Many of our leaders and ordinary people believe that lingering deep down in the Americans' political consciousness is the idea that the Soviet state is illegal, being a creation of the Devil and not of God, and that an end will have to be put to its existence sooner or later. In turn, most Americans think the Soviet Union is committed to an ideology backed by military power and aimed at spreading communism all over the world through subversive activity and pressure based on force.

Either side proceeds from its estimate of the damage which the other side could inflict upon it rather than from the "adversary's" real intentions. This is an absurd situation indeed, for if it were extended to relations between people, life would become intolerable: every one of us would look on every passer-by as a potential robber, thug or murderer. Yet it is precisely such false notions that still dominate the thinking of a sizeable part of the military political leaderships of countries, whipping up the arms race.

Thus there is no doubt that political relations between states form the basis of stability, which is in effect a product of them. In the final analysis, the fact that armies have been equipped with nuclear weapons and the development of means of delivery which have led to the present situation are a product of political decisions.

On the other hand, political relations are not a quantity independent of the military sphere and the build-up of nuclear forces. Military policy

is ultimately a material reflection of real and not professed political intentions.

Strategic stability benefits from, for instance, the announcement of defensive military doctrines and a commitment to no first use of nuclear or other weapons. But there should be no discrepancy between doctrines and the realities of military build-up. The "no first use" doctrine should be matched by a pattern of nuclear forces which the other side would have no reason to interpret as a material basis for a strategic first strike prompting it to build an anti-missile shield which the former might mistake in turn for an indication of aggressive intent.

The function of a "non-provoking" nuclear defence potential should apparently be restricted—for as long as political distrust between states persists—to inflicting unsustainable (and not equal) damage by retaliation. An indisputable feature of the contemporary strategic situation is that to inflict such damage on the United States, the Soviet Union would only have to use a relatively small fraction of its strategic weapons.

It may be argued that the problem is to be able to deliver these weapons in retaliation, since a substantial part of the nuclear potential could be destroyed as the result of a first strike. This is true, except that the problem should be solved by increasing the survivability of the retaliatory potential and not by manufacturing more warheads and vehicles (which would merely offer the other side more targets).

STABILITY, PARITY, SUFFICIENCY

MANY POLITICIANS and scientists as well as military experts have been increasingly concerned of late about a crisis of concepts and doctrines of military strategic parity. It has become obvious that the new spiral of the nuclear arms race and the reproduction of the "balance of terror" on a higher technological level tend to shake strategic stability even though the sides retain their capability for the infliction of equal damage in a nuclear war. This alarming trend was noted in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress: "The present level of the balance of the nuclear potentials of the opposite sides is much too high. For the time being it ensures *equal danger* to each of them. But only for the time being. Continuation of the nuclear arms race will inevitably heighten this equal threat and may bring it to a point where even parity will cease to be a factor of military-political deterrence."

What this means in practical terms is, first of all, that counter-measures adopted by the Soviet Union to prevent military strategic parity from being upset and thus to ensure strategic stability and safeguard its own security turn out to be no longer sufficient. To reinforce strategic stability, it is now imperative for the Soviet Union and United States to act together.

This is not to say, however, that unilateral steps to strengthen stability have outlived their usefulness. They have not but the need now is for steps differing completely from those taken in the past. They must no longer be aimed at achieving military strategic parity at all costs, at having at one's disposal all the weaponry which the other side has (such an effort would bear as little fruit as, say, an attempt to compete with the United States in per capita crime rate), but at optimising military construction to ensure that quantitative or qualitative indicators of one's military potential are not seen as provoking nor make the other side fear for its security. Consistent application of the principle of reasonable sufficiency implies that the size and structure of strategic nuclear capability must be calculated for the likeliest trend of development and not the

"worst of all scenarios", that is, something incompatible with the acceptance of sufficiency. This, in turn, presupposes not only an estimate of the potential enemy's hypothetical possibilities but dialectical analysis and consideration of his real intentions and, more importantly, his interests.

In our military construction, the logic of reasonable sufficiency demands unqualified acceptance of and unfailing respect for a principle publicly proclaimed by us and saying that the Soviet nuclear potential accords with the task of averting nuclear war, that is, of retaliating but not of delivering a first strike.

To specify, this means orientating the development of SOWs to systems of low vulnerability and with a diminishing share of separately targeted multiple warheads. Accordingly, in the case of the land-based component of the strategic triad, heavy vulnerable systems equipped with multiple warheads—systems which the United States regards as a weapon that can only be used for a first strike—would gradually give way to light single-unit systems with roving launching. In the case of the sea-based component, the emphasis would be put on submarines making possible a rapid dispersal of SLBMs. These measures reducing the concentration of warheads on vehicles could heighten the survivability of retaliatory forces, a circumstance which, as well as strengthening and improving control, warning and communication systems, could not only become a lever of stabilising the strategic situation as a whole but restrain America's military build-up, including anti-missile defence.

A line intended to lay a durable material and technical groundwork for the prevention of nuclear war at lower material cost plus fruitful nuclear disarmament talks would obviously offer much greater opportunities to advance by effecting major reductions on a reciprocal basis to the elimination of all nuclear weapons and the prevention of war on a fundamentally different basis. As for the immediate future, such a line would create objective conditions for prevailing on the United States through talks to limit and reduce and subsequently to eliminate armaments whose performance makes them particularly dangerous as a factor undermining strategic stability.¹

In this context, the chief purpose of our efforts for nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future could be to bring into being together with the United States a SOW structure on greatly lowered quantitative levels that, with the ABM Treaty in force, would technically deprive both sides of a first-strike capability.²

THE FUTURE TREATY SHOULD SERVE STABILITY

GENERALLY SPEAKING, the two sides are already moving in this direction as they negotiate a treaty on a 50 per cent cut in SOWs.

However, the draft treaty in preparation at Geneva seems to have inherited two major shortcomings of the approach to the problem typical of the talks held in the seventies and early eighties. One of them is the mainly "arithmetical" character of reductions and limitations coupled with a bid to keep at all costs the most up-to-date armaments that are being or scheduled to be deployed under current military programmes, and the other is an aspiration to preserve as far as possible the present, anything but optimum structure of the sides' SOWs on lower quantitative levels.

This explains why, according to an opinion gaining ground in US political quarters, primarily in Congress, a SOW treaty as proposed at present would fail to reduce the nuclear menace and, what is more, could result in destabilising the strategic situation. One of the points being made is that the treaty would hardly affect the programmes which the

Soviet Union and United States are carrying out to modernise their strategic forces while the number of vehicles in their strategic arsenals would be sharply reduced in accordance with the agreed parameters of the treaty. Thereby the concentration of warheads on strategic vehicles would be on the increase, with the level of stability going down as a result, for vehicles are not only means of delivery but potential targets for the nuclear forces of the other side.

The strategic analysis of nuclear and space weapons under way in the United States does not appear to be a tactical ploy of the Bush administration calculated to delay talks. It rather reflects an emerging new approach to major cuts in SOWs. This approach will presumably be aimed more than before at bringing about qualitative changes in the Soviet-US strategic balance in favour of enhancing strategic stability and in preference to a mere quantitative reduction in the two powers' strategic armouries.

In these circumstances the Soviet Union ought apparently to amend together with the United States the parameters forming the basis of the future treaty on a 50 per cent cut in SOWs with due regard to the need to reinforce stability as well as to the long-term tasks of optimising military build-up and effecting nuclear disarmament. Such an approach would, among other things, create the objective prerequisites for moving to the next stage in nuclear disarmament.

This stage could consist mainly in reducing Soviet and American SOWs by, say, another 50 to 60 per cent. The two powers could eliminate all weapons systems which one of them considered dangerous, provoking, or constituting an assault capability. This stage in reducing SOWs would be directed still more towards a qualitative restructuring of Soviet and American SOWs, towards reducing their first-strike capability. In the context of these talks, working out a wide range of confidence-building measures in the area of SOWs would hold an important place. In this context, a new dimension would acquire the question of having other nuclear powers to join in the talks.

THE ROLE OF TALKS

IN VIEW OF the redundancy of present-day nuclear arsenals from the military point of view, certain unilateral moves can now be made with the aim of lowering the level of military confrontation and increasing strategic stability. On the other hand, going it alone at this stage in history is hardly possible. Both militarily and in terms of political psychology, it is by no means immaterial to us—in spite of new political thinking—how many warheads are targeted on Soviet strategic installations or what they are like.

This makes talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and subsequently between all nuclear powers a *sine qua non* of greater strategic stability. Such talks are needed as a means of ascertaining what weapons systems are seen by one of the sides as particularly dangerous so as to take joint steps to reduce them and then to eliminate them altogether, of blocking the more "destabilising" lines of military technological development and establishing rigid rules for modernising and replacing armaments; of introducing into bilateral and then multilateral military political relations new parameters of openness and control to make them predictable, for predictability is a major component of stability. They are also important morally and psychologically as an instrument of building mutual confidence and effacing the "enemy image".

More and more people are coming to recognise that quantitative reductions in nuclear armouries do not at all guarantee greater stability. If, for instance, reductions were to make an increasing part of the strate-

gic forces and control and communication posts of both sides or even of one of them more vulnerable, strategic stability would be undermined fast.

And since it is now a question of really far-reaching cuts in nuclear weapons (by 50 per cent and then on a larger scale), talks should concentrate on ascertaining the optimum structure of SOWs from the military point of view that the sides would keep. This would make it possible to determine the content of this or that stage of nuclear disarmament and to specify what further measures fostering confidence and cooperation the stage should be accompanied by.

The going will be hard. But no other road is likely to lead to greater international security, let alone to a nuclear-free world. The sooner the sides engage at Geneva in a serious discussion of strategic stability, the more fruitful it will be and the better chances the new SOW treaty will have, not merely of leading to a certain containment of the arms race, but of ensuring a decisive breakthrough towards a qualitatively new world where national security is based on the guaranteed absence of the threat of using nuclear military power and not on a guaranteed threat of its use.

The forthcoming Soviet-US summit next summer shall, hopefully, be a major step in this direction.

¹ Meaning systems like MX ICBMs, SLBMs, Trident 2, the B-2 heavy bomber, nuclear SLCMs and ALCMs

² This is a complex task, and to fulfil it, the sides must proceed at the very least to a gradual exclusion from the strategic nuclear balance of all strategic weapons whose capacity for a pre-emptive strike considerably exceeds their capacity for retaliation. This applies to, for instance, system with short in time flight (in particular SLBMs with a flat trajectory) characterised by high accuracy, great throw-weight and an unpredictable flight azimuth (as in the case of SLCMs). At the same time, an effort should be made to secure a ban on weapons intended to fight the retaliatory forces of the other side, including mobile-based ICBMs (such as B-2s armed with appropriate missiles) and limit anti-submarine weapons, to whose potentialities strategic stability would become sensitive in the event of drastic cuts in SOWs. Needless to say, the sides should renounce the development of wide-ranging ABM systems and new anti-satellite systems and scrap existing anti-satellite systems.

FOREIGN POLICY AND SCIENCE

ON NOVEMBER 24, 1989, a most interesting event—a meeting of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Scientific Council—took place in a period mansion on Moscow's Alexei Tolstoy Street. It brought together in the white marble hall, the scene of many an action by diplomacy past and present, a representative group of Soviet scientists associated with highly important lines of foreign policy. The meeting was chaired by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU CC Political Bureau and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The participants included leading Soviet authorities on science and technology. Following are the main points of the paper read by Eduard Shevardnadze and of the ensuing discussion.

Eduard Shevardnadze. I see the purpose of this meeting, the first in a series of contacts between diplomacy and science that are assuming a systematic character, in concentrating intellectual forces to the utmost at the peak of perestroika tensions at home and abroad to save the renewal processes begun in our country and to direct them toward rational, intelligent and relatively painless changes.

It is not a question of establishing a sort of scientific first-aid service at the disposal of foreign policy or a system of rapid intellectual response to problems encountered by diplomats. The task is to evolve a mode of cooperation between foreign policy and science or rather to ensure their confluence and interpenetration in our common interests.

What are these interests? Naturally, they are predetermined by the aims and tasks of perestroika, by the problem of its survival, progress and final triumph—a matter of overriding importance to us. I need hardly demonstrate that destroying or winding down perestroika would not augur well for science. Political stability in society is the best background for the normal development of fundamental and applied research in the context of the growing worldwide circulation, exchange and reciprocal enrichment of ideas. Throughout the past five years, foreign policy and diplomacy have been using all their assets and means to contribute to these processes. But they, for their part, need to operate in stable and predictable conditions. It has been noticed that any tension inside the country impinges most negatively on our external possibilities. This is one reason why diplomacy has a vital stake in an influx of fresh, uncommon ideas, in a solid foundation for its effort in a situation refusing to fit in with standards and notions unified for decades.

The interests of science and diplomacy are so closely intertwined today that I hardly like to uphold the necessity for alliance and cooperation between them. Nevertheless, let me give a few examples.

Peaceful use of space is a vast area in which numerous branches of knowledge can do research. But space is also a sphere arousing the interest and engaging the effort of foreign policy. Diplomacy is obliged to open the way to this common property of humanity for science, and it is

doing so. The agreement on joint space research signed with the United States is an indication of this. And the latest example is the Soviet-Canadian agreement on joint research in the Arctic just signed.

We thought and talked a lot about thermonuclear fusion that rockbed of the energy industry to come, but had it not been for the Geneva meeting, we could hardly have arrived at a conceptual design and set about putting it into effect.

Alliance between science and diplomacy is a decisive condition for the democratisation of policy, an indispensable component of equipment for breakthroughs in the sphere of foreign policy.

Indeed, foreign policy today comes into contact with a very wide range of ideas, phenomena, novelties. It must at the very least be able to distinguish between the present and the past, between what is progressive and what holds no promise of advance.

To this end diplomacy must not only know the contemporary state of the world but see the development trend of human thought, society, technology.

To put it plainly, diplomacy is under duty to be well familiar with them. The point is that without attaining a higher level of scientific knowledge, it will be unable to do its job competently. Nor can it dismiss the problem—as it used to do in the past—by resorting to the traditional formula, "Let science sort it out." Nowadays diplomacy, too, must see clear in problems like, say, alternative energy resources because these resources are now the object of negotiations and have begun to attract increased attention on the part of big politics.

Crisis situations in the planet's economy and environment, overpopulation, gene engineering and many other things are a standing item on the agenda of foreign policy.

This makes *education* the first level of links between diplomacy and science. Of course, what I mean is neither elementary schooling nor expert services but the formation of scientifically valid concepts of the nature and pace of changes in the life of man and humanity, primarily in the material sphere.

For a multitude of objective reasons which I will not go into here, we were compelled in the past to maintain rigorous rules of secrecy in our country. In what was a closed society, science became one of the closed zones. But this also resulted in cutting off channels for the flow of knowledge and ideas and in intellectually impoverishing the social atmosphere.

It is now very difficult in our country to obtain exhaustive information showing how far scientific and technological progress has gone and especially where the place of Soviet science is.

The media in Western countries regularly report technological breakthroughs. They have sections and programmes dealing with achievements in science and technology.

An American newspaper, for instance, may supply information on the manufacture of microprocessors almost as lavishly as reports on baseball or football. The turns in the struggle for markets of four-megabit chips are covered as important economic and political processes.

Staff members of our embassies know that such a chip can store 200 pages of text. They know of the high speed of up-to-date computers.

But they cannot integrate that knowledge into their political and economic analyses, for they have no comparative "domestic" data and realise that information of that nature would simply fail to evoke the right response at home.

This is not a diplomatic problem but a problem facing our society. Our mentality shows a considerable lag. Nor is this only because we are "lazy

and uninquisitive" but because we stick to obsolete scientific and technological categories.

Diplomacy has a poor knowledge of the contemporary language of science, to say nothing of the fact that it lacks an adequate idea of present-day technological realities. What do we know about, say, the cost of one watt derived from a solar cell, about the situation in the area of alternative sources of energy or the technology of desalting sea water?

Yet all this is important for the future development of countries and the world economy.

Informatics, genetics, today's science of materials are still exotic spheres for us in which we occasionally cannot tell fact from fancy.

I may be exaggerating but basically this picture is close enough to the actual state of affairs and therefore gives cause for concern. Obviously, we cannot carry on an up-to-date foreign policy without an up-to-date idea of the basis on which society exists.

I think science as well has an interest in raising the science-intensiveness of foreign policy.

Hence our first proposal is for science to help us shape the scientific orientation of members of our foreign policy service.

We realise how very busy scientists are. Still, we ask you to find a way to communicate with diplomats, to think over likely forms and suggest system approaches to this task. There could be joint meetings of the Academy of Sciences Presidium, the scientific councils of various institutes and the Ministry Collegium, joint discussions on key problems and current issues, "situational rooms", just "tea parties" without a pre-arranged agenda, participation by our officials in scientific brainstorming.

There is another level of cooperation with science, a *traditional one working out a position and deciding on our attitude to practical items on the international agenda.*

The USSR Academy of Sciences, academic institutes and a whole range of departmental research centres are full-fledged participants in the drafting of foreign policy decisions. They play a direct role in many sectors of international cooperation. I will return to this later on. At the moment I am speaking of the need to extend our informal contacts.

Let us take, for instance, the problem of incorporating our state in the world economic system. It has numerous aspects. Foreign policy requires the fullest possible knowledge of all factors having to do with the solution of this problem of strategic importance to our country.

We need permanent informal exchanges with science on all these indicators as well as theoretical and practical projects based on our real possibilities and interests.

We are already joining in a concrete discussion of the terms of our membership in international financial and economic organisations and institutions. Regrettably, we still lack a well-considered action programme, nor are we clear enough about the extent to which we are prepared for integration into the world economy in this or that form.

We must proceed without delay to evolve a concept of our participation in the international division of labour. Why not organise a series of meetings between scientists, economic executives and diplomats to this end?

We are willing to engage in a substantive discussion on possible forms of cooperation.

Numerous problems call for a combination of knowledge and intellect. Meanwhile there is no permanent dialogue between us and science on the whole spectrum of foreign policy issues.

Our lag is a further trouble. We generally work on things that belong to the past or at best on what must be done to meet present-day needs.

We do not blueprint likely solutions for future challenges that may come up, nor do we carry our quests beyond our positions of today.

This is even dangerous in a sense. Work on current tasks only, without any advance calculations, may lead to serious blunders and mistakes.

The mission of science is to help foreign policy see things in the right perspective, to supply it with forecasts, to warn us of problems that we may encounter on our way.

It is positively our duty to find a way out of our habitual time-trouble and put joint prognostication on a solid basis.

A third level of our interest in science is connected with *the need to develop the theoretical basis of foreign policy*.

This could be discussed at great length. I wish to illustrate by citing some specific examples.

We have formulated and put forward several propositions of principle. They are as follows:

- The unity and interdependence of the world.
- The priority of universal values.
- Freedom of choice.
- A balance of interests.

They require theoretical backup, scientific substantiation, an in-depth elaboration from the standpoint of political history.

New political thinking has as its aim attainment of a nuclear-free, non-violent, demilitarised world.

Science could greatly help foreign policy by proposing what I would describe as a working model of organising such a world, ways and means of maintaining universal security.

We must carry forward the concept of democratising and humanising international relations. It is still deficient in concrete substance.

We would certainly welcome it if science were to offer foreign policy other major conceptual ideas.

The recent period in the world and in our country has seen a rapid accumulation of questions each of which is tantamount to the classical "To be or not to be?". This question applies to existing socio-political, state and system structures, to an order propitious for perestroika. It applies to the world in its eternal dimensions. The questions are so serious that history may be said to have put no comparable questions to humanity since the October Revolution or World War II.

Can we answer them? Can we say explicitly what is going on? Unfortunately not. We must admit, however, that building up at the poles of scientific thought existing in the world is an intellectual potential that is trying to explain developments.

I will not name widely known Western politologists concerned with the problem. Nor will I list the institutions and corporations expending much energy and money on it. What I consider far more indicative is the work done by Francis Fukuyama, a young American politologist whom I met in Wyoming this fall. He was a member of the working group during our talks with Baker, and meanwhile passions ran high over his article "The End of History?"

Published in a quarterly with a relatively small circulation, the article made quite a stir and touched off a heated debate among numerous Western scientists and politicians. Notwithstanding the question mark in the title, which must be a concession to the need for scientific objectivity rather than an expression of doubt on the author's part, Fukuyama draws a perfectly definite conclusion about the "triumph of the West, of the Western *idea*", which "is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism". "What we may be witnessing," Fukuyama writes in a further passage, "is not just the end

of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history but... the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."

I do not see my object in arguing with the author, in demonstrating the indefensibility of that premise of his. I see it as merely an attempt to grasp and explain what is going on as well as to accomplish the equally important task of supplying Western political thought with new theoretical arguments in support of its practical actions.

The article was ignored by our scientists and commentators. There was no reaction from us. Do we really have nothing to say?

After all, the article touches upon the major issue of the historical destiny of socialism and its values.

I wish to add as a general statement that I and my colleagues experience a certain insufficiency or shortage of counterarguments free of the stamp of the "battle of ideas" as an end in itself and offering a serious scientific analysis of world trends and processes, drawing practical conclusions from it and making practical foreign policy recommendations.

This is precisely what we need, that is, something more than a mere record of current events, no matter how full or methodologically sound. We also need forecasts of what is likely to happen.

There is plenty of evidence that can be used for such an analysis, and what is more, it is extremely complex and dramatic and it is mounting at a stunning rate. Its tide has been particularly high in recent weeks. The advent of Solidarity to power in Poland, the formation of multi-party structures in Hungary and deep-going changes and renewal processes in Bulgaria were followed by fast-developing events in the German Democratic Republic and a new situation over the "German-German question".

As practical workers, we must stop to think what all that means to us here and to the socialist community, to the socialist world as a whole. How is it going to influence the situation in our country? How will West Germany's NATO allies behave? What promise do current events hold out for European integration plans?

The only thing we can affirm with complete certainty at the moment is that nobody wants anarchy or chaos, at least judging by what we hear. But there is a difference between statements, even perfectly sincere ones prompted by the best of intentions, and the release of irrational forces which occurs in history irrespective of the will of politicians every time large masses and numbers come into play.

I cannot help saying again that big politics are short of a scientific component. When, in the wake of the conclusion of the 1970 Moscow Treaty, the Federal Constitutional Court of the FRG, recognising the validity of the treaty, made a reservation by stating its vision of a future Germany within the 1937 boundaries of the Reich, our diplomats and scientists did not find that worthy of special attention. There was criticism, sure enough, but no scientifically sound proof of the illegitimacy of the claim made by creeping revanchism.

In today's context, however, that reservation emerges as an ideological rationale for revanchist aspirations.

This fact shows only too clearly that there are no trifles which either big politics or big science can afford to disregard.

It also illustrates the main thesis of this discussion: what we want is not scientific attendance for our official function nor pills for political headache but more science-intensive diplomatic "production" and a bigger policy-forming role for science.

The task of laying a solid scientific groundwork for Soviet foreign policy has been set by perestroika itself. How are we fulfilling it? What

shortcomings are there? What themes would we like our leading scientific forces to concentrate on?

Before giving generalising answers to these questions, I wish to repeat some fundamental suggestions.

First, scientists can and should become full-fledged co-authors of the foreign policy strategy of the state, of all its components from disarmament and security to ecology, human rights and culture.

As co-author and co-developer of foreign policy concepts and ideas, science can and should criticise and evaluate the effort of Soviet diplomacy. Besides, we need a scientific examination of our initiatives and proposed actions. However, it is not a question of criticisms alone, for we also need recommendations.

Second, close ties with science should help us improve professional skill and mould a new type of diplomat open to innovation and closed to dogmatism.

Third, cooperation with diplomacy can be of substantial benefit to science, especially by helping appreciate the contemporary requirements of international development and the tasks of our state in various foreign policy areas.

Now for a brief review of what the Ministry has accomplished. At a Collegium meeting last summer, we summed up the main results of the work done, and afterwards we submitted a survey of the Ministry's activity to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Ministry may be said to have formed an organisational structure for interaction with scientific institutions. It now has a Scientific Coordination Centre. Functioning in the majority of departments and directorates are scientific consultative councils which include researchers.

The Ministry has held a scientific-practical conference. Diplomats and scientists have met over sixty times in the past two years. Experts from scientific institutions participate frequently in working meetings at the Ministry that discuss our position at international talks.

Another form of cooperation is research into problems of interest to us. The relevant investigations—about 200 in all—are either supplied to us directly by institutes or carried out under special contracts, as has been customary of late.

Participation by scientists in talks of key importance as members of Soviet delegations has become an effective form of cooperation very useful to the Ministry. Scientific experts were included in nearly all our delegations to meetings held within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in particular the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces.

Joint participation by scientists and Foreign Ministry officials in international symposiums and conferences on current foreign political subjects is a relatively new sphere of cooperation between scientists and diplomats.

A whole number of promising ideas worked out and advanced by our scientists have been included in Soviet foreign policy initiatives. They were applied in practice in deciding on the position of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna Meeting of the participating states of the CSCE on such issues as the formation of a common European legal and economic area, the promotion of contacts between the Soviet Union and the Council of Europe, and so on. During our recent talks with the US Secretary of State, we used the results of research into American legal practice done by a Soviet institute under a contract with our Ministry. Scientific institutions of Union republics have begun contributing their share to cooperation between science and diplomacy. In preparing material for exchanges with representatives of the Vatican, we are drawing on re-

search carried out by the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law.

In 1988, the Ministry established a Directorate on International Scientific and Technological Cooperation. We have been cooperating with the USSR Academy of Sciences in setting up in Moscow a branch of the World Laboratory, whose declared aim is to conduct scientific research open to all countries and to use scientific achievements for peaceful purposes. The Foreign Ministry took part in organising the Baikal International Ecological Centre. A sphere of joint effort today is solution of so complex a problem as harnessing Soviet scientific organisations to projects encompassed by Eureka, the West European technological cooperation programme.

The Foreign Ministry is prepared to assist science in organising international cooperation in relatively novel fields like the acquisition and use of high-temperature superconductive materials, super-television equipment, information technology.

Our growing ties with science have not gone unnoticed in the West. A report prepared by John Hopkins University, USA, noted that thanks to a changed political atmosphere in the Soviet Union, Soviet scientists and diplomats showed greater readiness than ever for frank discussions on problems of contemporary international relations. As distinct from earlier decades, the political authorities invited specialists from the Academy of Sciences to join in debates on problems relating to official Soviet policy and asked them to propose new political alternatives.

Far be it from me to want this review to be seen as a festive account compiled according to standards of the recent past. Critical self-appraisal leaves no room for complacency. The main unpalatable conclusion we draw from it is that while there are noticeable advances in some areas, we have yet to establish permanent and effective contacts with science. This is chiefly our fault. Our echelons offer scientists no guidance on the relevance of this or that line of research. As a consequence, diplomats and researchers carry on their work along parallel lines, or lines that never meet.

There exists a sort of professional snobbery making diplomats insufficiently receptive to advice or criticism from science.

We see one of the big shortcomings in the fact that scientists are barred from participating in the drafting of conceptual foreign policy documents.

For all that our embassies show an increasing interest in cooperation with the scientific community at home and abroad, their overall performance in this respect is plainly inadequate.

Some embassies merely register the arrival of our scientists instead of enlisting their assistance in establishing closer ties with foreign scientists.

I believe we ought to concern ourselves more concretely with what I would call diplomaticising science by assigning scientists to some of our leading embassies. We should do this by examination, bringing in the most gifted competitors for "diplomatic degrees", so to say, young scientists included.

Generally speaking, we owe youth a big debt. We look to academic and departmental centres but not to universities, not to research done by them. Contact with young scientists is a vital necessity to us, and we will do our best to establish it.

We have vast opportunities for this. International scientific ties are an example. As a rule, they involve a select group—we constantly hear the same names and see the same faces. We could help extend this group by drawing new people, young scientists, into contacts.

Some of our foreign partners, especially in developing countries mak-

ing rapid progress, attach priority importance to agreements with us on scientific cooperation, which they give precedence even over trade agreements. Hence the exceptional importance of bilateral scientific ties. Our colleagues at the Academy of Sciences are probably well aware of this. In the case of the Ministry, however, ties of this nature are sporadic. One would think that this line is taken care of by the Scientific Coordination Centre, the Directorate on International Scientific and Technological Cooperation and territorial departments, yet bilateral ties in the area of science and technology lack proper substance.

Lastly, the Ministry and Academy should draw more vigorously on the scientific potentialities of Union republics. Talk about this has been going on for a long time but no decisive change has come about yet.

Self-criticism opens the door to criticism. I hope you do not misunderstand the general criticisms offered by us on the basis of past experience.

To be frank, our dissatisfaction with the state of affairs is not limited to the Foreign Ministry. I am not going to speak here of the manifest incompetence of certain of our scientific partners, of the deplorable fact that they are unskilled in analysis and prognostication. Nor am I going to focus attention at this point on propositions formulated in a sensational vein, on the aspiration to shake pillars or the ostentation of would-be independent thinking.

All that is more or less clear. What is much more serious is a plainly insufficient ability to perceive international processes with all their numerous facets and contradictions, the inadequacy of conceptual approaches coupled with clearly absolutist attempts to represent speculative constructions very far removed from reality as the ultimate truth. We are still deficient in multiplicity, in multidimensional forecasting of nascent events and trends, in assessments based on a broad and comprehensive analysis of any given situation.

A further major shortcoming which prevents science from joining actively in the policy-forming process is the obvious shortage of experts well versed in problems that we are interested in. What I meant, is among other things, regional geography, the study of big and small countries undergoing changes that are entirely at variance with our traditional notions of them, of their place, role and leverage in international affairs. We are also suffering from a bad shortage of specialists delving into the theory of international relations and studying the regularities and peculiar aspects of the processes unfolding in this sphere today. Politics and diplomacy are short of profound treatises on the ethnography, religion and ethnic psychology of other countries and peoples. There are very few scientists even in the military political sphere, a seemingly leading one, and they certainly cannot meet all the vastly varied requirements of practice without detriment to quality.

Perhaps the blame for this should be put on ourselves because we have a poor knowledge, if any, of our potential partners, do not encourage the training of young specialists nor assign scientific research to gifted young diplomats. Our own departmental higher school must apparently take much of the blame for this shortage. Be that as it may, our demand today exceeds offer, and we would like to know your opinion of how to close this gap.

I have already spoken about international scientific contacts and interchanges. They have gained in substance, and joint research is expanding visibly as a permanent practice. The foreign policy departments of many countries show a direct interest in joint projects of this kind.

Regrettably, little use is made of the opportunities offering in this sphere. What is put first fairly often is reasons of corporative rivalry rather than mutually beneficial cooperation.

Whereas scientists are drawn more and more into the practical work

(that of delegations, intergovernmental conferences and into other actions) the reverse process—participation by diplomats and representatives of ministries and state committees in scientific actions—is making much slower headway. The role of diplomats is particularly small in new sectors. The year 1989 has seen a series of international conferences on conversion (in the United States, West Germany, Italy and other countries) at which the West was represented by scientists and practical workers, including Bundestag members in the case of the FRG, whereas the Soviet Union sent only scientists and spokesmen for non-governmental organisations. Not only was the Foreign Ministry poorly informed of the work of those conferences, we even cannot obtain the necessary final documents.

Attempts by our Scientific Coordination Centre and some other divisions of the Foreign Ministry to take part somehow in joint scientific projects or at least routine international meetings of scientists on problems of interest to us are occasionally seen with jealousy and met with suspicion by the sponsors.

We see the reasons for this in something more than the demerits of the command system, recurrences or the fact that formerly most of the proposals and conclusions of scientists were ignored, as in the case of Afghanistan or problems of military cooperation with some developing countries.

There are also many purely subjective reasons. It is so much easier and less troublesome to provide "services" than to engage in anything larger than skirmishes.

We can hardly confine ourselves to calls for greater firmness of principle, greater independence of opinion, a more critical approach to things, greater collectivism. The trouble is that science has no independent status. And the task facing it is to shake off departmental fetters and adopt a position of its own, realising the advantages of cooperation with us. Nothing would be wrong with Academy of Sciences institutes or the research centres of government departments and universities differing in their outlook on foreign policy issues or with competition between schools of thought and clashes of opinion or approach becoming a routine matter. Controversy, debate and healthy competition are normal manifestations of a process whose main purpose is to establish the truth. Yet institutes persist in cooperating in the old way, exchanging theses and monographs to be reviewed and safeguarding each other against what they regard as unnecessary headaches.

I'd hope a further decentralisation of foreign political research will lead to a real multiplicity of approach to the solution of problems, one prompted by scientific and civil conviction and not imposed from above or generated by departmental interests.

Secrecy still stands in the way of more active participation by our scientists in work on foreign policy problems. The situation is downright intolerable in some cases. For instance, we discovered as we studied academic investigations into the problem of international arms deliveries that impressive scientific instruments fail for lack of relevant information. Researchers are denied data on the whole range of Soviet deliveries—data which are an elementary requisite for scientific analysis. Now how can anyone analyse international trade in arms without knowing the role and place of the Soviet Union in this activity?

The question is rhetorical but it calls for practical conclusions. There exist definite international standards which we must move closer to. There is the international practice of releasing appropriate information, and if we really want to know something about others, it is naturally our duty to tell something about ourselves. Nor should we conceal the actual state of affairs from ourselves.

Using the scientific potential of government departments is still hampered by an overly protective posture, and they often waste their energies, not on making an objective appraisal of events or working out proposals, but on defending or justifying decisions made in the past and narrow departmental interests. It would therefore be a good idea to think about ensuring that independent and objective evaluations are worked out and about setting up an extradepartmental scientific evaluation centre.

We are very keen on our scientists extending their ties with foreign colleagues. We would like them not only to attend international conferences but to deliver lectures at foreign universities on a regular basis and to engage in joint research there. By the same token, we should provide greater opportunities for foreign scientists to work in our scientific institutions and universities.

We must put our heads together to conceive and evolve a system of coordinating efforts in this field.

The problems of forms of cooperation are still unsolved. The chief problem as of now is the material basis of cooperation. With scientific institutions adopting a self-supporting and self-financing system, earlier mechanisms based on "telephone law" as well as on philanthropy stop functioning. Many institutes have already notified us that they are not going to supply us with gratuitous analyses any longer.

Well, we agree that ideas are the most expensive commodity and that one must not save on them.

Relations between diplomacy and science need to be placed on a sound economic basis. It is time to realise that foreign policy "production" is one of the most profitable spheres for such investments that the country has. Logically, appropriations for the drafting of disarmament projects and for work on other foreign policy problems of vital importance whose solution promises our economy enormous saving are as important as investments in other fields. We do not at all seek to monopolise state orders for research, let alone to invade the sphere of fundamental research. I have already said that our approach does not come down to emphasising the provision of applied services to diplomacy. Even so, we are entitled to participate in the formulation of state orders and make suggestions, and occasionally to offer advice.

With this aim in view, we would like to discuss with you the possibility of signing agreements on cooperation between the Foreign Ministry, on the one hand, and the Academy of Sciences, the State Committee on Education and departmental centres, on the other, which could provide for the main forms and channels of cooperation meeting each other half-way.

For our part, we are willing to respond favourably to any reasonable suggestions concerning incentives at the Ministry's disposal and of interest to scientists.

We would like to cooperate with science on the widest possible range of problems. To be sure, there are key problems to which we devote special attention. There is, for instance, the *concept of new political thinking*, which has largely become part of political practice and gained appreciable experience requiring theoretical assessment. There are also the problems of the relationship between universal and national interests, of deideologising state-to-state relations, politics and morality, of new dimensions of international security, as well as problems relating to other politico-philosophical categories.

I have mentioned the far-reaching changes effected in socialist community countries, the remaking of traditional state and geopolitical structure. We have a very big stake in an *analysis of these developments and in forecasts of their likely effects*.

We need scientific foundations on which the whole set of relations with socialist and friendly countries and countries close to us can be put on new principles. This applies to Eastern Europe and to what we call socialist-oriented countries.

Now is the time to grasp the new parameters of international security, that is, the military, political and economic effects of possible agreements on cutting Soviet and US strategic offensive weapons and substantially reducing troops and conventional armaments in Europe.

The problem of nuclear testing is as acute as ever. I would go as far as to say that it is gaining in acuteness. It is no longer in Nevada alone but in our own country, at Semipalatinsk, that the public mounts pickets and carries banners demanding an end to nuclear explosions. The voices of our nuclear physicists are clearly missing from that chorus. Testifying before the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs not so long ago, I voiced the idea of forming an Association of Nuclear Scientists that could express an agreed opinion on the issue and tell our people and the world what it thinks of the problem of nuclear tests.

We are very keen on intensified research into international law. Reality puts to us at every turn difficult questions which cannot be answered as yet. I do not want to hurt anybody's feelings but let me say that this is one of the most neglected lines of research as far as we know. For all that there are numerous scientific institutions active in this area, the results they achieve are modest. We often have no idea of what is going on and where. The Foreign Ministry is now forming its Coordinating Centre, which is intended to pool isolated efforts and direct them toward applying in practice the concept of the supremacy of international law and establishing a universal legal order.

We are not indifferent to science's vision of the future of the scientific and technological revolution, of the possibilities for building a system of ecological security or of the evolution of demographic processes—in other words, of trends likely to have a serious impact on the formation of world politics in the 21st century.

Historians have set about "closing gaps" in our relations with a number of countries. This effort, which is complicated throughout, must be carried deeper. There are problems over access to archives but we plan to solve them, to remove obstacles to research.

On a broad basis, we call the attention of scientists to the question of the cultural component of foreign policy and what is known as cultural diplomacy. We need cooperation with archaeological, ethnographic, geographic, demographic, cultural and art institutes and the USSR Academy of Arts.

I would add to the problems of international law and human rights that I have listed so little known a sphere as the law of peoples.

Please help us work out scientific principles for conversion. This is a direct duty of scientists in the military-industrial complex.

I wish to re-emphasise our great interest in public opinion studies and in sociological research into Soviet foreign policy problems. Although our possibilities are limited, we have taken some steps in this direction on our own and are doing research with the assistance of academic institutes. But this is not enough. We do not think it is enough merely to study public opinion, for we must also think about how to shape and use it. Overall, it is virgin soil which we cannot cultivate by ourselves.

The Ministry is ready to take a direct part in the drawing up by the USSR Academy of Sciences and other scientific centres of plans for research into international problems with due regard to our requirements some of which I have listed.

Lastly, I wish to make a suggestion which may not be quite proper but which you will excuse because it is prompted by bitter experience.

Scientists today are as politicised as anyone else, nor is this meeting likely to raise their already high political level. One has only to watch a televised debate in the Supreme Soviet to realise that many noted scientists have changed their jobs by becoming full-time MPs. This would have been fine if science proper could make normal progress without them.

Everybody is taken up with today's problems and wrestling feverishly with routine cares. Everybody is casting about for something, having no time to give thought to anything else. But what about guidelines for the future? Aren't we overlooking them as we work hard to win our daily political bread? There is no question but that we cannot survive without well-baked bread of this kind. But neither can we survive unless society and the state get proper scientific nourishment.

Every one of our conversations with partners is accompanied by questions they ask about the fortunes of perestroika. We would be very happy if the right answers were formulated not only in parliaments or at rallies but in institutes and laboratories, in factories and mines, in fields and farms. More than ever before, we all need to work calmly for our future.

This is a general suggestion. As for specific requests, we direct them to the whole of Soviet science, including university and departmental scientific centres, which command large forces and are doing research in such spheres of interest to us as climate and environment, power engineering, space, the World Ocean, demography, biotechnology, the human gene.

We are looking forward to counter-proposals from you, not only on possible areas of cooperation, but on more rational and effective forms of it, such as could lend ties between science and diplomacy a rich and vital content.

Yevgeny Velikhov, Vice-President, USSR Academy of Sciences, Academic Secretary, Academy's Section of Information Technology, Computer Engineering and Automation, People's Deputy of the USSR. First of all, we all know well how greatly cooperation between science and diplomacy has grown and how real it now is. Not only the Minister but the entire Ministry take a most positive stand on science, realising its problems and supporting it.

Speaking of an end to tests, I must note that what happened yesterday was quite unexpected but, on the other hand, typical enough of the Supreme Soviet. I mean the fact that the debate on environmental protection led to the political question of ending tests. The question was almost put to vote there and since there is no possibility of vetoing it after voting the Supreme Soviet, we almost voted for an end to testing. The blame for that must apparently be put on the Committee on International Affairs and our own Committee on Defence and State Security, which didn't discuss the matter. But the Foreign Ministry overlooked something for its part. You will recall that when Reagan was about to leave for Reykjavik to meet with Mikhail Gorbachev, he had a discussion with Congress, and Congress struck out five or six points approved by it earlier. It did so to allow the President freedom of manoeuvre at the talks. As for us, we almost imposed a limitation on ourselves in regard to tests right before the Gorbachev-Bush meeting. I felt that we had failed to make a very important provision.

We still use old methods, after all. I voted and even lobbied for the Supreme Soviet to direct an appeal to the US Congress in favour of ending tests. But the Americans didn't even answer us. Such appeals are a purely token measure that produce no results. We must now work out a concept. What are we doing? We are making arrangements with the Americans through Congress and through joint commissions.

As regards scientists, I believe every one of them has his point of view. It seems to me that we could discuss also a unilateral moratorium now that there is a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons and all those questions, but we should discuss them together with US commissions. And so I feel that we should step up our effort in this matter and work out a common point of view. We were greatly surprised when the Soviet Union unexpectedly agreed to continued talks on a 150 kiloton regime of testing, which is bound to delay things indefinitely, to create a deadlock. We should seek agreement through Congress, through our relations with Congress, and so on, through the channels of people's diplomacy, but don't let us mistake them for parliamentary or diplomatic channels.

Do we have a chance? I think we should work out a new concept with due regard to the situation in the country and the new international situation and proceed accordingly all along the line. Perhaps the administration will really shift position although I've so far registered no change of attitude to nuclear tests on the part of the Congressmen I met. Perhaps we should think not only about nuclear testing but about preparing in this connection for a further conference on non-proliferation, about the approach we should take to the issue of a nuclear-free world. It might be advisable for us to link nuclear tests to the entirely new situation not only over nuclear weapons but over nuclear power. Yesterday I met with a member of the Federal German Nuclear Society, who said that their paramount concern was the safety of our reactors and that they were therefore ready to help us. That is also what the US Energy Secretary tells us. And so we ought perhaps to revise our attitude even to the Baruch Plan, that is, to the idea of internationalising the whole nuclear cycle from mining uranium to burying waste. If we don't think this over now we will find ourselves in a very trying situation.

Our situation may become worse than America's from the point of view of burying waste materials. The last hope left to us is Novaya Zemlya. We are now holding talks on the Arctic. Apart from it, we will have no more uninhabited region left where any burying could be done. It seems to me that now is the time for us to consider the whole situation, bring about international talks and face up to difficulties. We might thus be able to get a new chance to make headway towards ending nuclear tests.

I fear that if the efforts made are isolated, with people's diplomacy doing one thing, Congress another and big diplomacy a third, we may either get nowhere or even achieve negative results. I believe we should go on eliminating all technical problems, as we did at Semipalatinsk and in Nevada, thereby proving the feasibility of seismic monitoring. That was a good result and we must carry it through to the end by demonstrating data transmission within a real timeframe. We are close to this and should press forward with our effort.

In this situation, I'm very grateful to the Foreign Ministry for its support on the issue of funding and verification. I'm sorry to say we have neither an agency responsible for this nor real funds, because the Defence Ministry understandably has no such funds, and the state commission for military-industrial technology has refused to allocate funds, with the result that technically verification is based on semi-voluntary effort. Occasionally we use chance means or draw on existing funds, as we did during the Black Sea and Semipalatinsk experiments. We need an entirely different situation, of course. Perhaps we should have an agency based on centres for the prevention of nuclear danger but we must have such an agency funded on a permanent basis because verification is a very serious matter.

In the light of the foregoing, I wish to state that right now there exists a certain contradiction between scientists in charge of verification and the Foreign and Defence Ministries. The point is that there is

something of a tendency now to include all verification problems in talks. I regard this as a dangerous trend. What can be done within the framework of verification talks, of formal agreements between governments, is welcome but there must also be an independent channel in the form of independent scientists engaged in verification. The reason in simple: experience has shown that verification is delayed for a very long time if approached on the basis of reciprocity and negotiation. When verification facilities are being set up, it isn't important at all that this be done on a reciprocal basis. We used a Soviet ship to check the possibility of detecting a warhead. Now imagine asking the Americans to do as much in their own ship simultaneously and symmetrically. Talks on that would have taken a decade whereas without them we carried out our experiment. This is why it seems to me that we should proceed with great circumspection and use both channels. So much for disarmament problems.

To be sure, there are lots of other problems we must deal with in deciding on how to proceed after a 50 per cent reduction. We will have to discuss them thoroughly. We must think about an alternative in view of an obvious slackening of interest in strategic defence while work on it is continuing just the same. There are quite a few interesting proposals that ought to be discussed. I think one of the biggest tasks is to back this effort materially. This is very important.

The economy is another problem facing us. The Foreign Ministry should adopt a more active posture on consolidating the forces involved in our foreign economic policy. We have no real policy to guide us on how to enter the world market, how to build up our export potential and what this potential is in our case. Let me give you some examples. Here is a very typical if minor one. We've begun winning the West German market for our electric ovens. But as they are on the list of consumer goods, we have decided to withdraw from that market. This commodity will only be sold at home. I don't think this decision is correct because to win a market is to achieve a lot. As for the money involved, we could earn it by selling products of an entirely different type.

Now that we have freedom, state property is as yet in the hands of different people, and ties with the outside world are assuming a most disorderly character. We need coordination on the Japanese model, which is unobtrusive and intelligent.

Now for another example. Small firms and small business can't cooperate with us because it would be awfully expensive for them. But there is a form. It has now been created in Montreal, where a Trade Centre has been established for just that purpose. It isn't like the Hammer centre in our country which provides hotel services but one where you can get quickly into touch with partners by means of up-to-date informatics. This is of tremendous importance to us both educationally and in terms of establishing ties because those of our industrial executives who can now enter into contact with Western partners, especially in connection with conversion, have no place where they can do so, where they can learn, where they can pick up contacts.

What do we have today? The Italian Ambassador says he's got 300 million that can be spent on setting up an Italy-USSR centre of that nature. Afterwards we would set up a Canada-USSR and then a USA-USSR centre. Moscow can't house so many centres. We need a single centre that would see to the maintenance of ties using up-to-date facilities. This would be no problem. We've opened various channels now and can discuss this, can switch to telefax lines and electronic mail and compress-video for teleconferences, to the right kind of communications. This centre should be enabled to settle all visa problems because in spite of all the tremendous improvements we now have, I, for one, waste a lot of time getting visas and booking tickets, which is terribly difficult now. That

would really enable us to establish business contacts, for otherwise huge expenditures would produce few results. The centre should have subsidiaries to receive all our plant managers both through the ministries concerned and directly. All our managers should know there exists such a centre and be able to establish ties. We do need such a single centre.

Of course, there is also the issue of policy, above all export policy. We should ascertain the sectors where we've got a potential. It is clear that we've got a potential in the aircraft industry for we have a market for our aircraft. There are some other sectors. We must expand them and invest in them. I'm sure we still invest less than enough in them. Nor do we count on the economic factor. I'm speaking of aircraft as an example—we have dozens of other sectors where we possess an export potential but are not developing it, are not working to win markets, the world market. Buying something is easy but winning a market is a very hard task.

The West has achieved a high standard of consumption and prosperity not only by investing capital but by spending a substantial amount of environmental "capital", by destroying much of its environment. As for us, we've destroyed it without achieving anything. And now we want to attain a comparable level of consumption and prosperity. Yet we've run out of our environmental capital. It follows that we need a different strategy, and this is highly important because we cannot go on destroying the environment. Currently we must find answers to several questions.

First of all, can we win a leading position on the environmental issue as well? At a conference in the Netherlands, three countries—the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan—evaded responsibility for the future of the planet, to put it mildly. I mean two points: global warming and CO₂, and hence the need to burn lesser quantities of organic fuels and preserve the ozone layer. As far as the problem of ozone is concerned, there is the Montreal Protocol but it will apparently have to be revised in favour of speedier destruction of all chemicals piercing holes in the ozone layer. I think we could adopt a more active position. This is inevitable for us. Discussion in the Supreme Soviet shows that there is a national consensus on giving environmental protection priority even over the economy. Our situation is worse than that of many other countries. It would be hard to name anything comparable to the Aral Sea disaster or some other things. But we've begun promoting new thinking even in military affairs. Our situation wasn't any clearer than the West's but still we took the initiative and the lead. I believe we could do as much regarding the environment. We must do it. This is one way of making socialism attractive. The developed world, the West, has begun to think in ecological terms. There is a material basis for that there. The main threat to power generation and the environment alike comes from developing countries and, to a considerable extent, from all of us here. If we say frankly that ours is not a very rich country and yet, all our economic difficulties notwithstanding, we give priority to environmental protection, it will mean a lot.

I would mention also that at this juncture we can advance the idea of using our rockets to launch American satellites. This is another example of problems requiring political solutions. American companies in Houston are willing to go along.

What can we offer the world at the threshold of the 21st century? A nuclear-free world that will not be easy to advance to. Besides, the concept itself requires continuous improvement. But it's an attractive concept, that of a non-violent world, an environmentally balanced world saved from ecological disaster. As for the economy, there is nothing particular we can offer. In the cultural sphere, we can make proposals in spite of all our huge problems. We must formulate our vision of the world in the 21st century from the point of view not only of its non-violent

character but of its essence. The 20th century is known as a "brave new world". You will recall that Aldous Huxley wrote a book about it and that its title became a slogan relating to a world where man is controlled by powerful organisations, a world run by scientific and technological progress, a world followed by humanity and leading to many catastrophes, such as we have experienced.

We must formulate what we think the 21st century should be like. I believe it is described as a world revolving around man, a world where cultural values of the past and culture combine harmoniously with new technology, communications, informatics, and so on; an intelligent world where the intelligentsia is no longer an intermediate section of society and where everybody is an intellectual to one degree or another; a world where everybody can look upon himself as part of humanity, for while it numbers five billion, this can be done thanks to present-day communications.

We've been doing something to this end. I strongly support what Eduard Shevardnadze said here about youth. A matter of no small importance in this respect is exchanges between schools and children. The beginning was modest but these physical exchanges increase tenfold a year. They have now reached proportions where funding is needed at state level rather than at the level of diverse non-governmental foundations. What is the meaning of these exchanges? They take the form of ties between children, of joint summer or family work, which now exists between the Soviet Union and United States. Last summer we had some 25 camps, including camps in such cities as Magnitogorsk or Surgut. Next year we can have as many as 250. By the year 2000, we could ensure that 100,000 to 200,000 children become friends, and then they would create a different culture.

Friends knowing each other well would be an element of global culture and openness. This is a perfectly attainable goal made more so by the fact that schools are in the lead today. They have established electronic communication lines through satellites between 26 schools in Moscow and New York. We are now working with UNESCO and UNICEF with support from the Foreign Ministry to develop a low-orbit satellite network which would enable every school in the world to use it by means of very inexpensive radio models. I see the formation of this global intellectual culture in a new intellectual century as a big goal.

Academician Yuri Ryzhov, Chairman, USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Science, Public Education, Culture and Upbringing. Science is bound to respond to the beneficial call made by the leadership of our foreign policy department. I support Eduard Shevardnadze's statement that we are trying to treat science like—well, like certain other social spheres, that is, to spend as little on it as possible. You may have watched on television last night an opera company performing in an arena built thousands of years ago. Last summer, *Aida* was staged in the same arena. The scenery was most impressive but it was just scenery. You can use scenery imitating pyramids but real pyramids are very expensive. We occasionally treat our science like scenery, trying to spend as little on it as possible. Nor is it a question of science alone. We are probably trying to spend as little as possible on our parliament, too, meaning the supply of scientific information—an attempt which may reduce even parliament to a kind of scenery for a show but not for real action.

This is just a brief preamble, and now for something more concrete. A new foreign policy line is making it possible to begin overcoming the years-long isolation of our science and education from the world university. A very important point was made today by stressing the need not only for scientific contacts but primarily for ties in the educational

sphere because unless we do something useful to it, there will soon be nobody for our Foreign Ministry or other departments to consult.

Changes in our foreign policy have enabled even so closed an educational establishment as the Moscow Aviation Institute, which had not had a single foreign student for 30 years, to invite leading foreign specialists in recent years. Nor do I mean specialists from universities, for there are also specialists from NASA and other entities as well as people from the entourage of the President now in office, that is, people associated with defence and the aerospace complex. However we realise that we need something more than contacts on the level of adults, and so we've been promoting contacts with students. We owe all this to the changes effected in our country of late. We are already training school-leavers—future Aviation Institute students—in British colleges. This is a further fruit of the initiative on the part of our foreign policy department, in particular of the fact that its fund was opened to us for two years on Eduard Shevardnadze's initiative and it helped.

I'm afraid conversion is interpreted simplistically by many. Of course, we need a sound concept of it. Regrettably, this is the second time I've gone through conversion and witnessed the losses due to a simplistic view of it but I think even small bricks may be useful in this case. Mention was made here of non-traditional and renewable sources of energy. Even so closed an establishment as the Moscow Aviation Institute has found partners in this field, the field of wind power and other renewable sources of energy, and moreover, those are partners employed in the space complex of other countries.

Here is a further concrete point. I think it is becoming obvious that there is no hope of equipping our educational sphere with national products, that is, electronic computers, personal ones included. We cannot fully meet the requirements of this essential sector with national products in the foreseeable or even the unforeseeable future. We are now in a position in the context of cooperation with the United States to reach agreement on a real step towards helping us with this educational problem. Contacts seem to have been established with Western Digital, and I wish to stress that, if this is confirmed, it will mean that we can expect to obtain roughly 1.5 billion dollars' worth of equipment which would enable us to take a decisive and not just a local step towards meeting the needs of equipping the educational sphere.

Eduard Shevardnadze was right to say that there are no particular sciences such as have a role to play in diplomacy, for all sciences have such a role today except, of course, that the development of the humanitarian sphere must be given priority. The Soviet Union has no national programmes in the humanitarian sphere, and I think this is a mistake. We have 16 or 17 national programmes but not one of them is related to this sphere. I believe both the Academy of Sciences and the State Committee should consider drawing up such programmes.

Academician Vladimir Matrosov, Director, Irkutsk Computer Centre, Siberian Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences. I would say that we've heard an excellent paper opening up promising vistas for joint research by the Academy of Sciences and the scientific institutions of the Foreign Ministry. I subscribe to every word in the paper.

I'm a mathematician specialising in the theory of stability and control. All my life I've been concerned with developing this theory and with applying it to various systems, especially large-scale, complex ones involving diverse subsystems. We have already laid a theoretical groundwork for this. We also have information technology to support these things. And so it is natural that my remarks will concern chiefly problems of mathematical modelling, of analysing stability at both international and national level and developing decision-making systems.

I hardly need point out here the relevance of the problem of stability, particularly internal stability, or its influence on international relations. Eduard Shevardnadze says that we need objective, scientifically valid evidence to deal with these things. We've therefore agreed a number of investigations with the Diplomatic Academy. Its representatives visited our Institute, subsequently I delivered a paper at the Academy, and in the end we held a joint seminar. The Diplomatic Academy has set up a scientific method centre which is functioning on a voluntary basis for the time being. As a result of reciprocal contacts, we have ascertained that what is needed primarily is a theory of international relations which would be suitable for modelling. Such a theory exists already abroad but we must adapt it to our thinking so as to make it workable for us.

A further problem is that of developing global models. But the level attained in this matter to date is such that little would come of just grappling with a global model. The need is for experts concerned with the economics, ecology, conversion and other fields to work on their models professionally and then to link them together. It is on this principle that we are now drawing up proposals for launching a programme for fundamental research into international and national stability and its programming so as to have in the end a back-up system for strategic decision-making. Let me add for comparison that an international scientific project for global security and risk control is in the making at the UN today. According to unofficial sources, five million dollars is to be spent on the project over a period of two years. We, too, should apparently set up such a research centre to coordinate these things at the Academy of Sciences. There should be a prognostication and analysis centre under the Academy Presidium. Oughtn't we to have within the framework of such a centre under the Academy or some institute a centre for international and national development problem studies? This kind of research is supported by many, including Academician Avduyevsky, Chairman of the Commission for Conversion. Some 20 to 30 institutes are engaged to some extent in investigations which could be coordinated. That's speaking of consolidating forces at the Academy of Sciences.

In conclusion, I'm going to respond to your call, Eduard Anisrovich, for counter-proposals by presenting one to you.

Vladimir Volkov, Director, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies. I would like to speak because events of the recent period have drastically brought to the fore at world level all that has to do with Eastern Europe, with the European socialist countries. It so happens that I represent the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies. This is the traditional name of an institute concerned with the general and cultural history of the socialist countries of Europe. I wish to thank the Foreign Ministry for the interest in science shown by it for the first time in the 35 years since I began working at the Academy. As regards our problems, they have lately found a most noteworthy reflection in the work of the Scientific Coordination Centre. We have already carried out initial measures and initial situational analyses which I hope have benefited both sides.

At present cooperation with the Foreign Ministry's central apparatus is making fair progress as far as I can say and is guaranteed organisationally. But there are other levels on which we should foster cooperation. I mean primarily embassies. The situation there apparently varies greatly from region to region. I understand that things are in better shape in the Western sector. As for our embassies in European socialist countries, I don't think our cooperation with them is adequate. Embassies often refuse to be interested in promoting such contacts. They look at things in their own way, and the view they take is often narrow. They don't help us sufficiently and behave occasionally either as officials bound

by protocol or as mentors. Yet there are useful things which they could learn from scientists.

We have accumulated a vast amount of knowledge that isn't drawn on. I mean concrete knowledge concerning those countries that cannot really be obtained anywhere else. Yet nobody shows interest in it. And this prompts me to make very specific proposals. I propose including in embassy lists of staff scientists to enable the Academy to send people abroad for, say two or three months to do fieldwork. I mean fieldworkers differing in age and line of research, nor do I think it would be advisable to send them for a longer period. First of all, that would help embassies establish ties with scholars in the foreign countries concerned. Second, it would be useful for contacts between scientists belonging to, say, informal councils or groups of various countries and representing diverse territorial departments. Third, it would help produce concrete projects.

By the way, there are very many problems requiring attention. After all, we know that the socialist community abounds in latent conflicts. Consider the Macedonian question, the Transylvanian problem, all the problems relating to Hungarian ethnic minorities, Polish-Czechoslovak friction, not to mention the German question. The Balkans are a match for any tangle of contradictions. Hence it would apparently be wrong to restrict fieldwork to socialist countries, for you can view the European socialist community from different angles according to whether you are in the United States or Europe, particularly West Germany. Then, there are the Balkans or Turkey.

Let us see, for instance, what is worrying the Balkan countries, such as Greece, at the moment. It is the completely unforeseen development of Turkey, where a population explosion is coupled with a technological breakthrough. Turkey has a population of nearly 60 million today, and that figure is expected to come close to 80 million ten years from now. The country is becoming a mid-level industrial state. It is following the same path of development as South Korea. Emerging to the south of our country is a giant neighbour with unforeseen geopolitical factors. This deeply troubles Balkan countries. Bulgaria reacts painfully to this reality, which is one reason for their latest moves over the Turkish minority there. They weren't accidental.

This situation invites another conclusion and suggests a practical recommendation. We are doing a poor job of studying the situation in Eastern Europe. New political forces and trends have surfaced now in those countries. Each of them has its foreign policy concepts. This autumn we again have, say, a revival in Poland of the idea of a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation, and besides, suggestions are being made for the establishment of a Central European confederation. These ideas go as far back as the twenties and thirties. To deal with that region, we need to know its history. We have no single centre framing policy towards the region although the West does have such centres. Besides, it is necessary to take account of the views of these countries themselves, and I believe a united centre of some sort should be set up within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty or in some other way to carry out relevant historical strategic studies.

It was said here that, self-supporting being the word, the Foreign Ministry would like to organise its contacts with science in a new way. I'm all for this approach but it should be guaranteed somehow by contract, that is, by a basic agreement to be signed between the Academy of Sciences and the Foreign Ministry. I avail myself of the presence of the heads of both entities to make this suggestion. Having such an agreement, we could carry cooperation further. Let me illustrate the need for a basic agreement. In 1988, the Foreign Ministry signed a treaty with its Czechoslovak counterpart. One of the treaty provisions is aimed at

publishing by 1995 an encyclopedia of the history of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. Our Institute will take care of the requisite research but we need subsidies. Yet when we said so we got nothing definite, with the result that no research has started yet.

Elgiz Pozdnyakov, chief researcher, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Our Foreign Minister's paper raises a whole number of important and pressing questions. As master of this fine mansion, he is entitled to ask questions that it is apparently our duty to answer. I represent the humanities here, meaning primarily political science, one bordering on diplomacy, world economy and international relations. Now how far is our science prepared to answer the questions put to us in the Minister's paper? I think this is a key issue. I fully agree that diplomats should be educated technologically as well, should know what thermonuclear reaction means and some other things besides. But a diplomat can hardly be called a diplomat unless he is versed conceptually in social evolution, that is, knows who we are, what we are like and where we are going. Otherwise foreign policy becomes mere reflection.

Is there such a concept? I strongly doubt it. Can we offer such a concept now? I doubt this too, because our social science today is essentially a replica of our society. The old is falling into ruin but the new has still not been created. This is just the trouble. We have no new concepts, no new categories, no new notions. Right now our Institute is conducting a seminar on the relationship between the formational and the civilisational approach. The seminar is bringing out any number of unanswered questions. Indeed, what is capitalism? Nobody has an answer ready for use. What is peaceful coexistence in present-day conditions? There is no answer. We will have to do a tremendous amount of work before we can offer answers to these questions.

Take the formational approach, for one. Let me offer some criticism although this may be improper. I recall the revolutionary proposition which Eduard Shevardnadze put forward at the scientific-practical conference in 1988. I mean his proposition that the struggle between the two systems is no longer the decisive trend of contemporary development. It was a revolutionary proposition in 1988 but events are unfolding so fast that it is becoming obsolete. Yesterday there was a meeting of the Academy of Sciences section of problems of world economy and international relations. It put these questions in very sharp terms. Basically, the majority was of the opinion that the concept of peaceful coexistence is old stuff now, a relic of yesteryear. This concept doesn't work any more because it flows from the formational approach. The formational approach is no good today and must give way to a civilisational approach except that we don't know exactly what such an approach means. In other words, one thing locks into another and pulls it along.

I see an important task here. Speaking of the role of science today, we must admit that we have few people concerned with these problems, and besides, they proceed severally. Some of the speakers here voiced the idea of concentration, of creating what physicists call a piercing effect. We need "Rand Corporation" of our own that would concentrate forces harnessed to the solution of concrete, general or indeterminate problems. Today this is being done in various parts of the Academy of Sciences and in other Soviet institutions.

The most unpleasant thing for us is that, in working on problems of socialism, communism, the formational or civilisational approach, we hurt everybody's feelings everywhere. We really have even no opportunity to state our views freely. I see people's deputies here. Why, they are up against the same problem in the Supreme Soviet. They have only to utter the phrase "private property" for hundreds of people to feel hurt. Isn't

that preposterous? We are talking about civil society, about creating our own civil society. But surely we can't talk about civil society and yet strip it of its essence, private property, which Marx described as the political foundation of civil freedoms. Hurting somebody's feelings is unavoidable but we must bear this in mind. It doesn't matter much if you hurt the feelings of someone who is lower in rank than you but hurting the feelings of someone higher up is a different matter, because, in that case you are likely to be called to account.

Vitaly Zhurkin, Corresponding Member, Acting Academic Secretary of the Section of Problems of World Economy and International Relations, and Director of the Institute of Europe, USSR Academy of Sciences. Our group of international institutes—they number nearly a dozen—have been cooperating with the Foreign Ministry for years, which means that we are in a more favourable position than others. The quality of this cooperation has undoubtedly improved in recent years, and I think this is recognised by everyone. Even so, I have a haunting feeling that we have not been doing enough because there are still untapped reserves.

I would like to comment briefly on conceptual work, which is a permanent component of cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and, say, the Institute of Europe, which I head. The shortcomings of the approach of science are typical in part of the Foreign Ministry as well. First among them is overcautiousness, a tendency we have not quite overcome yet. I agree that multiple approaches must be weighed in the course of discussion. But every now and again, multiplicity becomes with us a discussion on what is known. We are extremely cautious about analysing new phenomena which we have somehow canonised and are attached to.

To go back to an example cited here earlier. Our country advanced the idea of a nuclear-free world when, on January 15, 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev made his Statement. The move won us tremendous prestige. This is unquestionably the most important objective of our foreign policy. But many of our scientists are under the impression that we are perhaps going too far in advocating a nuclear-free world today, late in 1989. They consider that with our economy in its present state, our policy still in a period of transition, and so on, it isn't clear what the status of our country would be in a nuclear-free world. How nuclear weapons influence our position in Eastern and Central Europe or how far they ensure stability is another important question that I think must be taken into account. The situation in China hasn't quite settled yet. And this implies that the problem also has an Eastern aspect. In the event of nuclear weapons being destroyed fast, the conventional arms race could surge high, completely ruining both our country and the Western powers.

I'm speaking of just one alternative. It seems to me that we ought to explore such alternatives with greater determination, and I must say that we raised this question more than once. We all heaved a sigh of relief when Mikhail Gorbachev spoke at Strasbourg about minimum deterrence as a possible compromise—for what I believe would be a long period—between our idea of a nuclear-free world and the Western idea of deterrence. Of course, we are all in a state of inertia because four or five years ago we argued vehemently with many of our military experts and, indeed, many politicians who were against a nuclear-free world and said our country could not go to such an extreme. We've persuaded the other side but the political situation is changing continuously, and our conviction should not push us any further.

Now for another point. We are still shackled by many dogmas of the past. The theory of convergence is the most common and elementary instance. We denounced it. The phrase is still treated as bad language. Some are fearful of using it although there exist numerous theories of convergence and the most advanced of them, such as Galbraith's, don't

conflict greatly with our present-day views. Galbraith's theory says that all highly developed industrial societies are characterised by a market, market regulation, active government intervention in the economy, democracy, pluralism, and so on. In other words, it says what we mean when speaking of the oneness of our civilisation, with every branch of this civilisation and our socialism, now in process of renewal, contributing their share, so that each of them will certainly retain its identity in this situation.

A further shortcoming of science is its extreme sluggishness. We must admit that it is also typical of many Foreign Ministry officials. Some time in the past, we arrived at consensus on the inevitability of reforms in Eastern Europe. But we all believed quite sincerely that they would take 10 to 15 years and would come about gently, advancing at a leisurely pace. Yet what happened was explosions, first in Poland and Hungary and then in the GDR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. We may find ourselves in a similar situation in studying the problem of German reunification. An article in *The Sunday Times* said that the next few years would see the rise of Fourth Reich which would become the second superpower in the world while the Soviet Union would be gradually pushed into the background or would even disintegrate. The article is ruffianly to a degree, nor is there any serious evidence to support it. But we must study the questions involved whereas we—meaning scientists—show timidity. Naturally, this criticism also applies to myself.

I think our researchers and those of the Foreign Ministry should devote special attention as they cooperate, to a search for new forms. Some effort to this end is being made and has already produced appreciable results. Specifically, our Institute is cooperating with the Scientific Coordination Centre. We have set up a joint Centre for Mediterranean Studies. The Foreign Ministry was the driving force in this while we found ourselves on the sidelines even though afterwards we, too, joined in. The Centre seems to begin functioning.

Mention was made here of trainees. Our Institute has trainees in embassies. The system has begun functioning but to be able to send anybody abroad as a trainee, we have to prevail on the USSR Council of Ministers to allocate foreign exchange, which is extremely difficult, nor can the Foreign Ministry do it for us. We've secured some foreign exchange. Two members of our staff have gone abroad for three months—one of them is in France now and the other, in Britain. Yuli Kvitsinsky is willing to admit trainees to the Embassy in the FRG for two or three months, and this also goes for Boris Pankin in Sweden and Felix Bogdanov in Belgium. In other words, the system is beginning to function. Tasks are assigned by Vladimir Shustov of the Scientific Coordination Centre and by the Institute of Europe. We think it will be necessary to see some time next summer or autumn how the system works, to analyse it, to ascertain how effective it really is.

I believe the Foreign Ministry ought to help us in organising international cooperation in various forms, in recording it in major government documents. For instance, our Institute has signed an agreement with the German Foreign Policy Society in Bonn. The Society is the main research centre of its kind in West Germany, something like the American Council on Foreign Relations. It is a large organisation. The agreement was put down as one of the results of Chancellor Kohl's visit to the Soviet Union. The two sides held in a fairly short time a forum attended by 30 people from our country and some 50 West Germans. The President of the FRG sent a message of greetings, and the forum was addressed by Genscher, Dregger, Lamsdorf, Vogel and several cabinet ministers. The first work is ready and will be published in West Germany first and possibly in the Soviet Union afterwards.

My last comment is this. I am sure we need consistency in adopting new forms. The scientific-practical conference held by the Foreign Ministry in 1988 was quite a revelation and even an outlet, if you will, an opportunity to speak out on many sore subjects. I realise the difficulty of organising such major actions but still I think that if another such conference were to be held in 1990 or perhaps 1991 to sum up results and provide an incentive for the future, it would be very useful.

All that we are discussing here is closely linked with our inner political affairs as well. Personally I feel that our country, which is passing through a difficult period, is now faced with the imperative task of consolidating the forces of all perestroika supporters. I'm pointing this out because it is typical of many of us who clash over various petty issues and may be said to insist on their individual points of view that they do little to search for a common ground. I don't know how this front of perestroika supporters should be consolidated, that is, whether in the course of preparations for the 28th Party Congress, in connection with the work of the Supreme Soviet or in some other way. Personally I'm very much in favour of consolidation in the course of preparations for the congress and of the subsequent implementation of congress decisions. But it seems to me that the foreign policy section of a relevant platform should play a very big role in working out that platform because, first of all, it is in foreign policy that our country and its perestroika have made particularly noteworthy gains. Second, there is an all but universal foreign policy consensus in the Soviet Union. I regard this as a tremendous achievement of perestroika. It is the approach to foreign policy matters that could provide some common ground for the forces supporting perestroika.

Vladlen Martynov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of the Academy's Institute of World Economy and International Relations. The central issue is that we are living through a crucial period of transition. This is in evidence in both our country and other socialist community countries, Romania for one, and it imposes special obligations upon both science and all political organisations, which must grasp the meaning of this transitional period. Now while science participated in evolving new thinking, it did not play the chief role. It was the leadership and the Foreign Ministry that worked out new political thinking. True, researchers had a share in planning this approach but it was not science that achieved a breakthrough. Today, when new thinking has earned the Soviet Union high prestige in the world, in all countries, it needs to be carried forward. A turning point has come in this as well, primarily because we have fully not worked out our concepts. Our interpretation of contemporary capitalism is a case in point.

Even the Party Programme contains things copied from 70-year-old programmes. How can we conduct the dialogue if we describe capitalism as "dying", "parasitic", and so forth? It is perfectly clear that capitalist development followed a new direction from the 1929 crisis onwards and from 1932, when Roosevelt began implementing his New Deal and when the Social Democrats came to power in Sweden. Science has yet to make a proper appraisal of this, and so we cannot now talk about universal progress or a civilised approach without a reassessment and a real knowledge of what contemporary capitalism stands for and why it is now a factor for the progress of civilisation. We lag behind in this.

And what about socialism? The fact is that we persist in criticising the West and reject certain things being done there. Yet the focal problem for us today is to evolve a concept of contemporary socialism. We talk a lot about what Stalin's model of socialism led to. Scientists are already at one on this. But what is the new model of socialism to be like? What will its values be not only in the moral but primarily in the cultural sphere?

Lastly, how is scientific and technological progress to go on in our country? After all, the important thing is that, in spite of all our discussions and efforts, it is in this field that no revolution has come or can come about with culture and science in their present deplorable state.

It is a scandal that senior researchers do not earn enough to feed their families. As for youth, I am at a loss for words. You cannot imagine how hard it is to stop young researchers from quitting because gifted people are in high demand and may be lured away by anyone without your being able to stop them. Thank God we at the Institute have an outlet: we can occasionally send people abroad but, of course, this is a very small outlet. One day I brought together the cream of our staff to ask which of them had been to capitalist countries. They turned out to make up 60 per cent while the remaining 40 per cent said that they had never made business trips abroad although they are students of capitalism. There is not much the Institute can do in the way of trips abroad because it is allocated a mere 4,000 dollars a year and has to carry out all other exchanges on a currency-free basis. Of course, we have been doing a lot just the same, so that our ties are expanding fast. But even currency-free exchanges are threatened now, and we wonder how this can be remedied. We have spent 290,000 rubles on tickets alone, and now that tickets are going to cost 50 per cent more, we have no idea at all how we will manage. This is why I believe we need further cooperation on this with all and should realise that without progress in science and culture, our society as a whole cannot make headway, either.

A related problem is that of our attitude to the third world. Nowadays representatives of the third world criticise us openly. I am a member of the Council of the UN University, which represents mostly third world countries. Everybody on the Council says we have no clear policy toward the third world. This is a very big problem. Indeed, how is that backward world with its extremely acute problems going to take the road to civilisation? How can this be brought about? Is it possible that we are in for immense catastrophes because we are very few compared with the others, to paraphrase what Alexander Blok wrote? I am sure we need to devote greater attention to these problems.

Now for cooperation with the Foreign Ministry. Although we get few contracts from the Ministry, it emerges that over the past year we have prepared 41 information items for Deputy Ministers and one for the Minister. We have a stake in this cooperation. Our relations with the Foreign Ministry take the form of participation in practical work, and it is very important for us to know the Ministry's opinion of the information we provide and the proposals we make. But there is still little feedback. Nikolai Inozemtsev, one of the founders of the science of international relations, always stressed that it was a science interlinking many sciences, economics, politics, history and law plus diplomacy, which actually maintained international relations. We will be unable to go any further without generalising this work.

Speaking of conversion, I do not think we can discuss its problems at the moment because we lack concrete information and a concept. We have a group concerned with conversion and are participating in common with other institutes in working out these problems but there is no concept of conversion, is there? Some arms plants are made to turn out pans. We are wasting a potential which we could draw on to modernise the economy. On the other hand, we get no information from the military. A huge number of plants are manufacturing nothing today, being something of an emergency reserve. Nobody is talking about saving money on conversion. We are tackling the problem since late 1970 although we were banned at the time from holding a symposium with the Americans working on the same set of problems. Nevertheless, it is

clear that conversion itself requires funding, especially at the early stage. We must see to this openly, which means that scientists, economists and, above all, military experts must join efforts. This is the only way to get off to a start.

Boris Topornin, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of the Academy's Institute of State and Law. We who specialise in international affairs and law have plainly given in to a certain euphoria by imagining that everything is all right and there are no problems. And so we are concentrating on preparing a five-volume manual of international law. I wish to call attention to the fact that we need aid, support and initiative from the Foreign Ministry in cooperating on problems of our internal development. We know full well that our achievements on the international scene depend to a considerable extent on fruitful effort by our diplomacy but are restricted by the present state of our society. If these difficulties go on mounting, we are bound to lose in foreign political prestige, and what is more, too much emphasis on foreign policy may be interpreted as an attempt to get away from the solution of domestic problems. I will not touch on all problems, such as the theory of socialism or the theory of political development. I wish to dwell on problems arising from our international commitments.

First of all, we have assumed obligations under many documents, in particular documents of the Vienna Meeting. But it turns out that while we now have this document and internal legislation, there is still no mechanism to link the two systems together. We have no mechanism at all to register what we have accomplished in the area of international law, what should find a reflection in our internal legislation or what we should keep an eye on. The result is contradictions.

Second, we should see to bringing our legislation into line with our new commitments. We could proceed to draft new laws in addition to the ones that have been or are to be passed. I mean laws on entry and departure, freedom of conscience, freedom of travel and many other laws which we need if we are to fully meet our obligations—say, a law on the legal status of foreigners.

Also, we should write the primacy of international law into our Constitution and make it a principle. And, again, we must work out our own approach. There exist various decisions in the world: there is recognition of the universal principles of international law, recognition of standards of international law, as in the Constitution of the FRG, recognition of none but treaties signed between states, as is the case in, say, France. Obviously, we need to work out our approach in very great detail because we must realise what the primacy of international law means. It should obviously be a question of treaties on matters of principle that have been signed and have passed by the Supreme Soviet, and as for the rest, the Constitution should probably refuse to consider it binding on our standards.

One of the problems is the economic aspect of law, the problem of development. We have neglected it, and therefore we all encounter many difficulties. Over 1,000 joint ventures have been registered in our country to date but very few of them—from 200 to 300—are actually operating. There is no mechanism making the enterprises involved responsible to our side. Worse still, it cannot be provided just yet because we must first reform many aspects of our legislation, especially mortgage law.

The problem of a European legal area is one of those facing us today. We have already conferred with the Institute of Europe and plan to cooperate with the French. But this is still largely unexplored ground, and we must stop to think about the direction of our advance. On the issue of a European legal area, the best solution now is apparently to follow two lines: one, the environment, because we can work out common

standards and sign joint conventions, and two, economic legislation, which is needed if our systems are to move closer together and mediate out economic ties. We would therefore like to win support for this initiative.

Research into both international and European law is not seen as a priority today, yet while the problem of European law and cooperation with European organisations is very important to us, it is now the West that initiatives come from. What is more, Europarlament has invited us to cooperate with it in working out these problems and carrying out joint actions.

Alexei Yablokov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of the Academy's Koltsov Institute of Biology, People's Deputy of the USSR. I'm one of the scientists who have become politicians, as Eduard Shevardnadze put it. I was educated as a zoologist but am in our parliament now and have decided to devote my energies for a time to environmental protection. You may call me an ecopolitician or political ecologist—just as you like.

It is indicative that the Foreign Ministry and its leadership—meaning not only Eduard Shevardnadze but Vladimir Petrovsky and on all levels, as far as I know—are coming to face up to environmental problems. Appraising the situation, I would say that the Academy of Sciences is also trying to face up to environmental problems but that is as far as it goes. The Foreign Ministry has already turned to face them and has perhaps become a political leader with regard to our environmental problems. This prompts me to ask it to help us solve our internal problems.

It was repeatedly said here that we must solve domestic problems which limit our foreign policy activity. What is the world's reaction to the environmental situation in our country? Göteborg recently hosted an International Ecological Congress and a symposium which I attended. The symposium was devoted to the ecological challenge of Eastern Europe. The world sees the scandalous state of the environment in the Soviet Union as a challenge posed by us to the whole civilised world. We must understand this. Words alone won't help. We must use the understanding shown by the Foreign Ministry to make our other ministries do what they should have done long ago. Departmental monopoly is one of the main reasons for the ecological troubles of our country. It is necessary to work hard in this direction. But to coordinate this effort, we need a group responsible for the strategic planning of foreign and home policy. We must not only plan our foreign policy but know the trouble spots of our home policy.

Many speakers here rightly pointed out the need for consolidation. I fully agree with them. But if we put off consolidation until the Party Congress meets, we are bound to miss many things, just as we have now missed the problem of a Union treaty. Whereas six months ago we had no difficulty discussing a Union treaty or a Federation treaty, today we are up against enormous obstacles because now the issue is a confederation. This is what happens when you miss an opportunity. We can't wait until the congress is convened. We must by all means seek consolidation on every line.

I would ask you to pay greater heed to what is going on in the Supreme Soviet right now.

Science is often unprepared to help in solving political problems. For instance, we are all talking about global warming, the climate, and so on. Why did Bush take so evasive a stand on steps to curb various emissions? Because, scientifically speaking, it is not really quite clear whether the greenhouse effect is due solely to emissions of fossil origin. Two years ago, Corresponding Member Zavarzin published in our country a small article containing, however, ample factual data.

The article demonstrated that the greenhouse effect is due mainly to processes taking place in Northern Eurasia and somewhere along the US-Canadian border. Something seems to affect microbiological communities in the soil. Zavarzin estimates that the ploughing up of large tracts and the felling of forests do more to produce greenhouse gases than emissions of fossil fuels. The article appeared two years ago. But it is as if the Academy of Sciences had never seen it although it deals with a decisive problem of international politics. I mention it at every meeting but nothing happens. Sometimes we don't even know what our colleagues are doing. The article is worth calling a scientific conference.

The third world has begun criticising us, we were told here. The amount of resources and energy consumed per head of population in developed countries, including ours, doesn't apply to the whole world. What I mean is that if the amount of energy and resources (iron, manganese, and so on) that we all consume were to be extended to the population of the earth and hence to the third world, the planet couldn't sustain it. According to estimates, one Swede "equals" 200 inhabitants of the third world, one American is the "equivalent" of 70 and one Soviet citizen, that of some 20 people in the third world. How to solve the problem? We cannot say simply that all third world countries will consume more and more energy or produce more and more, because this is impossible in terms of global modelling. The only way out is to reduce energy and resources consumption in all developed countries while keeping up the high standard of production existing there. The Americans have shown that this can be done. We, however, don't even give serious thought to the problem and are naturally criticised for this by the third world.

Production of protein vitamin concentrates based on petroleum paraffins has reached a critical political level in our country. You know all about Kirishi and Angarsk—the strikes, new diseases, and so on. Concentrate production must be banned. But the Council of Ministers says we must produce those concentrates because we have sales treaties with Finland and Holland. We need information on these matters. Embassies should be asked to find out what other countries have done in this respect. I know that Sweden has banned production by legislative act and that Finland purchases the product from us. We had to ask the US Embassy, the Swedish Embassy in the Soviet Union, *Time* correspondents. They promptly supplied us with information. The result? Finland buys the product to feed cats and dogs while we put it out to feed our people.

We need prompt information. The West commands a large scientific potential. We could rapidly realise that potential through our embassies for the good of our people. We need a communications system, such as would enable the Supreme Soviet to get information from embassies without delay, without going through various levels or sending letters.

Academician Yuri Osipyan, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of the Academy's Institute of Solid-State Physics, People's Deputy of the USSR. There are certainly very many concrete problems which all of us here would like to discuss. Everyone of us has his sore subjects, and all who are engaged in a definite sphere are ready to discuss their problems at once. But still I would like to return to the theme of this meeting. I mean the strategic issue of the interaction of science and all of our foreign policy spheres. I see the main problem as that of a concept. There is no doubt that Soviet science now has every opportunity to accomplish this task. I don't think our science can "keep out" any longer, saying that this or that cannot be done because it is forbidden or inadmissible, or because there are no possibilities. If there is any overcautiousness it will be our fault. We

must stop "keeping out", I think we are in a position to concern ourselves unhampered with the social sciences in the same way as we have been doing in the case of the natural sciences. I believe the Academy of Sciences should set an example by getting to work to show what our researchers can do.

There are unquestionably numerous opportunities for cooperation between foreign policy and the humanities. But as a specialist in the natural sciences, I wish to call your attention to current scientific and technological problems. I suppose it is now very important for foreign policy workers to realise that in analysing world developments, it is necessary to move from particular theoretical questions to strategic evaluations of trends in the natural sciences which can not only demonstrate practical changes but bring about a complete turnabout. The Foreign Ministry—its central apparatus—can rely on our possibilities in this respect. In fact, there are some examples of how we are cooperating on the disarmament problem. I will not cite them here. But I would like to comment on the work of embassies.

The main scientific and technological line of work in embassies is still analysis of concrete things, collection and analysis of concrete information. An end must be put to this stage. Our embassies in all major countries should have people who can analyse scientific and technological information and enter into contact with the top section of the scientific community. We have already discussed this matter with the Ministry leadership. Both the Ministry and the Academy of Sciences have taken some concrete steps. In any case, we now have someone in the United States who can do that. But no turning point has yet been reached, and besides, there are technical difficulties. I therefore ask the Minister to see to it that people who find themselves involved in foreign policy activity get support.

We have discussed this with Yuli Kvitsinsky, for West Germany belongs to a sphere which calls for strategic analysis from the scientific and technological point of view.

There is also a further possibility. We have among our scientists experienced people who enjoy a good reputation in the world scientific community and can be leaned on for support. We who have been engaged in scientific activity for 30 years have our own ties, channels and colleagues who influence even the leaders of their countries. We are in a position to influence through them both public opinion and decision-making. And so I believe the leadership and apparatus of the Ministry should take this possibility into consideration. We must cooperate more closely and fruitfully.

As regards concrete forms of cooperation, I think they are worth discussing. We will evolve a permanent system so as to work together, so that you can have our analytical backing, turn over to us problems you think about, because the signing of any agreement should by all means be preceded by a long-term analysis. As it happens, science can produce such an analysis.

Academician Konstantin Frolov, Vice-President, USSR Academy of Sciences, People's Deputy of the USSR. I would like to offer some comments. Eduard Shevardnadze's paper is very critical with regard to science and the Academy of Sciences. This is something we all need.

But the paper contains no adequate criticism of our diplomatic service or our cooperation, or staffing. I believe we can make up for that when we hold a joint meeting of the Academy Presidium and the Foreign Ministry.

Second, the impression being created in our country and spreading beyond is that our science is half a century or a whole century behind the times. What science? In what field? And how is one to gauge the

lag? All of us here participate in major international congresses, symposiums, conferences. We recently held a big conference on what is known as non-linear phenomena. It was a question of the stability of systems, of trends in physics and other, natural sciences, and in society. Leading world scientists commended the Soviet participants' papers as the advanced ones. To the best of my knowledge, we have never looked like savages at any congress or symposium on the natural or technological sciences. I'm sure diplomats, participants and witnesses would be willing to bear me out.

The point at issue is something else. We lag behind others in putting scientific achievements into practice. But this has nothing to do with scientists. Yet attempts are made to present a negative picture by declaring that our science is 50 years behind the times.

That is completely wrong. But the phenomenon regrettably exists in our society. We must stop taking a negative view of scientists and the Academy of Sciences. Scientists are the only ones today who can lead the country out of the crisis affecting it.

A word about conversion and secrets. Currently the West is ready to cooperate actively with us, to talk with us, to study those of our achievements that really meet high standards, up to the point when it comes to setting up joint ventures or high technology. I have a feeling that it's now very important for us to continue discussion with due regard to the upcoming summit discussion.

Not long ago, I was in Chautauqua, USA, where I read a detailed paper on the history of space exploration in our country describing the development trend of our relations with the United States. I told my audience how we had worked on the Apollo-Soyuz project, how it all had gone on, how such things are blocked now and who is behind it. The blocking is being done by the US administration. I talked to people in Congress and discussed the matter with the NASA leadership and the US national foundation. As soon as you make a specific suggestions, the administrative bureaucracy virtually bans firms, scientists, people keen to cooperate with us from doing so, primarily in the ecological sphere (Corresponding Member Yablokov spoke of that here), in the sphere of atomic security, atomic reactors, on an equal footing. Americans are familiar with our achievements in technological diagnosis and other fields. But the administration discourages them from cooperation. Why do we stress all the time that we are carrying on perestroika at home, combating red tape and the command system in science and other fields yet don't urge the United States to revise its stance?

I get many telex requests for help in removing a control or lifting an embargo. Americans tell us that they want to cooperate with us in the light, food and textile industries. But it is more than American scientists can do to overcome curbs imposed by their own country.

Now for conversion. It is true that we have no scientific concept of it at the moment. We've set up a commission under Academician Avduyevsky, an experienced specialist in space exploration. The commission has begun working. Our efforts in the area of conversion are understandably being watched by the Americans and by Western strategists generally. The further we go in this activity, the easier it will be to come to terms on the problem of the curbs I've mentioned.

But as matters now stand, we can't simply say, "Down with all secrets!" Secrets—state, professional, economic and military—do exist. They are and always will be there. The point is, however, that we usually classify all that finds itself inside the walls of a defence plant. We buy an American machine, and it becomes secret for everybody. We give very many people access to secrets, which cease therefore to

be secrets. It's impossible to keep every trifle thing secret. However, the press occasionally reveals information and figures that should perhaps have been withheld. We apparently need to form a joint working group of our Commission on Conversion, the Foreign Ministry and our economists and to draw up a precise work plan for the current year. It would be wrong to say simply that we've so far been making missiles but will be making something else from tomorrow on.

Let me illustrate. One of the speakers mentioned the science of materials. We do lag behind the United States but what we lag in is the use of the results achieved by this science, not in the science itself. We can't make hockey sticks, ski poles, composite rackets but the rocket airframes we make are no worse than those of American make. When we will be able to use this technology in our country is another matter. Don't let us imagine that we have only to say so for a plant which makes rocket airframes or aircraft of composite materials to start overnight turning out any consumer goods. This kind of transition requires technology, cooperation with Western firms and a degree of trust.

Academician Igor Makarov, Chief Scientific Secretary, Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Our international policy and initiatives have made our country more open in every sphere, including scientific activity. But this openness is more like a one-way street. Foreign countries are using it considerably more than we. This raises a whole number of, say, information questions that require close, serious attention.

We lack up-to-date facilities and cannot even call up our foreign colleagues in time to get information we need. We cannot invite prominent specialists in the social, political, natural or other sciences to the Soviet Union because we can neither accommodate them properly nor provide them with the requisite facilities for work. Now is the time to revise the problem of publishing our works in foreign periodicals. We should take a close look at the activity of the All-Union Copyright Agency as well as at, say, the problem of making copies of scientific publications.

I also think our cooperation with the Foreign Ministry should be put on a more permanent and more substantial basis. Suggestions were made here for the Foreign Ministry's Collegium and Academy Presidium to hold joint conferences, and I believe we should sign an agreement on cooperation between these two entities in those fields of knowledge in which the Ministry needs it.

Going back to conversion, I wish to make a proposal or put a question if you will. We have quite satisfactory contacts with the American scientific community, our ties have expanded considerably, we have good agreements and meet frequently to discuss various important subjects. There is a growing awareness among influential American scientists and businessmen that a successful perestroika and an increase in our international influence are also of vital importance to the United States itself. They, too, are wondering about what was mentioned here: what if a new Reich emerges? Were this to happen it would raise questions about Silesia, Pomerania, the Sudetenland (I am using words uttered by American scientists). Our political initiatives are prompting the United States to decide to cut military spending in the next six years by at least 180 billion dollars. It seems to me that there is an opportunity now to use economic, scientific and technological ties with the States more extensively for stabilising our economic growth.

As far as I can say, the United States looks on the Soviet Union as an earnest of preventing political and economic destabilisation processes in Europe that would imperil the interests of other countries, including those of the United States. Lastly, the urgent global programmes that were mentioned here, such as those relating to environ-

mental protection, natural disasters and many more, could not be raised to the right level without the Soviet Union. And so I believe it would be realistic to propose cooperation with the United States on the same scale as the Marshall Plan in the case of the West, meaning a different plane, of course.

To work out concrete proposals, we should form two or three parallel groups of Soviet and American experts and work out specific projects. (I am not a politician and do not consider myself knowledgeable enough on this but I wish to state my opinion.) The experts would include representatives of our Academy of Sciences. We should set a schedule for the groups' work and evolve a concept regarding conversion in the United States and the political views on it current among American scientists and businessmen.

Yuri Sayamov, Deputy Chairman, Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat. Our Committee was set up in 1983 as a group of scientists keen to take part in work on pressing problems. In 1988, it was granted the status of an independent national non-governmental organisation having an apparatus and, more importantly because there had been no precedent, a research centre.

In addition to a traditional problem, disarmament, we now have environmental protection and security problems, energy and economic problems as well as the moral and ethical problems of global security. This last line, which arouses a particular interest, has already been the object of joint projects at the level of both the UN and UNESCO. Present here are any members of our Committee, and the list of those nominated as candidates for election to it at the Third All-Union Conference in March 1990 includes several diplomat-scientists.

Eduard Shevardnadze spoke here of the importance of having an extradepartmental scientific examination centre. We would like to offer our services. The Committee of Soviet Scientists would be prepared to function to the best of its ability as such an independent public examination centre doing research, in particular with foreign participation, and carrying out international research projects. Our foreign partners, including such major entities as the Carnegie and Rand corporations, the Ford, Rockefeller, Eisenhower and other foundations and the Federation of American Scientists, practically all the leading research centres in the West, are willing to help us in providing such a centre with ample opportunities for research.

Academician Gury Marchuk, President, USSR Academy of Sciences. I wish to answer some questions and touch on some problems. I stated my vision of problems in the paper I delivered to the conference held at the Foreign Ministry in 1988. I now note with satisfaction that our Council, a product of that conference, has begun functioning.

Eduard Shevardnadze's paper contains a useful proposal saying that we should translate cooperation between science and diplomacy into conferences and other meetings on specific themes and even joint meetings of the two entities. I fully subscribe to the idea and think we could devote the first meeting of that nature to a programme covering the biggest problems that have already been put. We heard about many of them here, many others were not stated but all of us here are their exponents. I therefore wish to make a concrete proposal. Now that there is a Scientific Council, many comrades want to put forward their problems or are already doing so here. Let us first pool our ideas. I don't mean departments but experts whose leaders are present here. Let every one of them write down his proposals, and let us examine them. I'm sure they will provide a basis for future agreements between us.

Speaking of the involvement of science, the whole international

experience of the recent period indicates that attention is focussed on global problems of the planet and on various disasters, including ecological ones. I think this is what we need to realise first and foremost. Now disasters are the effect and as for the cause, it may be a natural calamity or a nuclear war, anything that was mentioned here, or, say, major accidents that could assume global proportions.

I think the latest technologies are one of the new problems which we must work on and solve. We are not yet prepared to cooperate with the world in this field but have already reached a stage where we must do so. The only obstacle is that our economy has yet to draw on international achievement. If we make headway on this by pressing forward with the perestroika in our economic and political system we are now engaged in, I'm sure we will be able to deal with many problems on an equal footing with the West. We have already accomplished a great deal but we'll have to do much further work.

Our embassy staffs should include intelligent and serious people—mostly young men and women—who could shoulder the task. I'm somewhat disappointed that the embassies I've had contacts with do not make proper use of their potential. They mostly use their attachés and other staff members as technical personnel subbing for others by, say, meeting and seeing off people. Of course, this is also important but it takes up a lot of their time. They play no real role. I suppose this could be discussed specially.

We need a person of higher rank. I mean a counsellor assisted by one or two people relieved of any protocol functions and concerned with surveying and coordinating all projects. That would help get things done. We are ready to offer you maximum assistance on this in terms of personnel. I support the proposal for an extradepartmental scientific examination centre, which was called "strategic" here. Let us think about the best way to go about it, because all that is being done in our country today is either imaginative or unimaginative and unsupported by any social idea. Supreme Soviet commissions have effected a change but there seems to be a need for a further reciprocal organisational form. Our Council may become a centre with cells forming around it, which would be very correct.

I stand for an agreement between the Foreign Ministry and the Academy of Sciences. My colleagues spoke well about it here.

Our work will be effective provided there is a source we can draw on for funds. We've entered a period when we must earn money by doing research. The Foreign Ministry has led this off. I therefore suggest setting up this year, by way of experiment, a research fund, a fund of the Scientific Council, and ensure that the Academy of Sciences, the Committee on Science and Technology, the Foreign Ministry and other entities contribute to it. Let it be 500,000 roubles to begin with. It would be spent on our own research. We would put up money but would also earn it. The effect would increase tenfold as a result, as experiments you and we have already carried out indicate. I believe the Academy could plan to spend one million roubles a year in the next five-year period, that is, give money to the Scientific Council and earn money by solving concrete problems. It would mean self-development.

Very considerable alarm was expressed here over the absence of an ecological programme. We must carry out the proposals which Mikhail Gorbachev put forward at the United Nations. Those were far-reaching proposals for, first of all, global ecological monitoring. But there is no real progress for some reason even though UNESCO and UNEP take a positive stand. I think we need to show initiative on this point and should do so with great vigour.

Another proposal called for the establishment of international eco-

gical security centres, in particular in the Soviet Union and Europe. Perhaps we should show initiative by basing such a centre in our country. It would be a very good idea. As regards ecological programmes, we are still at the beginning. But we think we've already taken a big step by drawing up a programme and submitting it to the State Committee on Nature Conservation. The sectoral programmes now under revision are all to be patterned on this one. The Supreme Soviet seems to have allowed or is going to allow some more time for this.

I'm thinking of the third world. We generally refer to highly developed countries in discussing various problems but here's an avalanche of new problems of the new world bearing down upon us. We must be careful not to neglect contacts with India, which we are trying to preserve and extend. This also applies to our contacts with Brazil. Eduard Shevardnadze said that on a proposal from him, the Central Committee had decided on a trip to Brazil by a group of Academy scientists. Why, that is half a continent. I was struck by the fact that Brazil ranks third in world trade turnover after the United States and Japan. But it spends 80 per cent of its earnings on interest payment. However, there is an amazing process under way. The Academy of Sciences is going to play host to a large team of Brazilian scientists and public figures. They say that Brazil's trade turnover has undergone a drastic restructuring. Formerly 80 per cent of it was carried on with America. I was surprised to learn that currently America accounts for a mere 20 per cent, Europe for 45 per cent and Japan for the rest. Brazilians say they want to cooperate with us. That's a new tendency. We've been speaking of global problems and forecasts here. That is what our country should concern itself with, and I think the Academy can play a useful role in it.

Boris Grushin, Deputy Director, National Centre for Public Opinion Studies on Socio-Economic Problems under the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and State Committee on Labour and Wages. I would like to return as a sociologist and philosopher to the general formulation of the question of the possibilities—or the difficulty to be exact—of using the social sciences in the activity of the Foreign Ministry and, indeed, of other social institutions of our country interested in using the results of research in that sense.

First of all, the social subjects, organisations, groups and individuals now taking a real part in the deepening of the perestroika process have a big stake in scientific substantiation of their activity, specifically through authentic information on the processes going on in the country.

It is these social subjects and hence perestroika itself that are badly short of such social knowledge and such information. I mean the gap in scientific knowledge and scientific concepts, in particular at the level of empiric information about our society as a whole.

From the point of view of social science, we are still living in a rather dense forest abounding in unexplored areas and criss-crossed by mysterious paths and roads. This is also true of empiric information.

I wonder how many opinion polls are now conducted in our country. Every single day the press carries reports of surveys made by some agency, group and Heaven knows who else. I insist, however, that in nine cases out of ten or possibly still more often, we're presented with absolutely unreliable information if not outright misinformation on the real state of affairs and mass consciousness in society.

This raises a fundamental question: Why is it that, now as in the past, the supply of serious social information within the framework of scientific production is made difficult? I believe there are two circumstances which we mustn't and can't discount. One of them is that many

administrative structures, including some of the highest, I'm sorry to say, still have no interest in scientific information on our society. We can't shut our eyes to this. The Foreign Ministry is a noteworthy case in this respect. Someone said here that it had turned to science for the first time. I've been cooperating with the Ministry for at least two years now and can tell you that it turned to science long ago and has been trying to benefit from it. This is an obvious exception from a general rule. We daily witness administrative bodies at various levels completely ignore results of scientific research. True, they don't do so openly, for it is now profitable and fashionable to talk about reliance on science.

Let me tell you an amusing story showing how things really stand. We are doing fieldwork in line with a major Soviet-American project tentatively called "Television and Society". It has to do with research into public opinion. Everything necessary was done for one of the stages of that fieldwork to take place in Uzbekistan according to representative all-Union selection. Two American professors were to have gone to Uzbekistan. Three days before they were to fly there, we had a telephone call from the chairman of the Uzbek trade union concerned (for the project is sponsored by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions). He told us that no field-work would be allowed in the republic, especially fieldwork involving visits by American professors. And so nothing came of the whole plan. Please don't mistake this for a curious incident, because it may be classed as a perfectly normal occurrence in the activity of the national centre for public opinion studies.

It was rightly pointed out here that at the upper levels of our science, including sociology, philosophy and political science, we do quite well at international symposiums, conferences and so on. But then it isn't this thin top layer that "makes" science. This is done by the middle layer. Yet the situation is very tense in this respect.

What stands in science's way? I've come to the conclusion that there persist two circumstances. First, in the previous 50 to 70 years since the rise of our society, real social science was reduced to the minimum. I regret to say this is an objective fact. Social science was driven underground or forced onto the periphery of the process of producing social knowledge. Real social science had to give way to a phenomenon known as a quasi-science or "almost a science" and having all the outward attributes of a real science: academicians, corresponding members, doctors, social structures, habits, and so on. Everything made it look like a science but it was something entirely different, something designed to serve as a substitute for social science. Of course, the situation is changing now but the two main qualities of this quasi-science—lack of professionalism and lack of independent judgement—are still there.

It was said here that all bans had been lifted. That's a naive statement to make as far as social science is concerned. The problem isn't external bans but the inhibitions of people active in social science. They are as dependent as in the past and have as much difficulty expressing their independent views as formerly. The existence of an external censorship is a further handicap.

Anatoly Gromyko, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Director of the Academy's Institute of Africa. I believe one purpose of this meeting is to indicate ways and means of more effective application of the basic knowledge we Soviet social scientists possess. Today's world is highly complex and dynamic and is developing fast. The need for a deeper-going study of formations has already been mentioned here. I agree. It seems to me that the Academy of Sciences underestimates the function of social science.

Take the formational process as an example. Marx analysed capita-

lism. He didn't really analyse the socialist society to come even though he often mentioned it. Nor did Lenin make a detailed analysis of it. And so now we are in fact marking time. In any case, we don't make much progress in trying to grasp our times. I think the reason for this is the law of correspondence which we worshipped for a long time while at the same time forgetting another Marxian law, that of value, and this tells now.

We have yet to grasp in today's conditions the law of correspondence, which analyses production relations and productive forces, formations and the natural predetermination of movement. I believe mass consciousness, including political consciousness, still regards a formation as a society comparable to a sailing ship making headway. But it's making no headway. Why not if the formation is the hull and the productive forces the sails? Because the sails of any formation are filled by the wind of civilisation.

How wonderful it is that new political thinking, which is assuming global dimensions, shows this. And how long we ignored problems of civilisation, of culture and education, as we developed the productive forces! We must admit that the residual principle current in this sphere gradually bore sour fruit.

I'm speaking of the fundamental aspect of our knowledge of society because it has a direct relation to foreign policy. The concept of peaceful coexistence is a case in point. We set great store by it but in assessing the theoretical basis of our future policy in a creative spirit, we should consider, in my opinion, how far the theory of peaceful coexistence is going to help us take our bearings in today's world. Lenin spoke of peaceful cohabitation. He never used the phrase "peaceful coexistence". The latter phrase sounds too neutral, there is no life-giving warmth in it. We put a positive interpretation on the term but, even so, it will make things somewhat difficult for us in the nineties because the West isn't very receptive to it. Some of our theorists occasionally extend the principle of peaceful coexistence to the whole globe, making it also peaceful coexistence of capitalist countries. But while it may also be interpreted that way, we must realise that what's going on there is not peaceful coexistence: it is integrational and cooperation processes on a level no society has ever known before.

It would certainly be wrong to discard peaceful coexistence here and now because we need a measure of continuity. But my impression is that the term can't last long just the same. Its very meaning isn't clear enough. Lenin said: don't attack us, and we won't attack you. Let the American imperialists leave us alone, and we'll leave them alone, too. The situation is entirely different now.

Yelena Lukyanova, assistant professor, Chair of the State and Law, Law Faculty of Moscow University, winner of the Leninist Komsomol Prize for social science (1989). Three points without abstract considerations. What could we do? Consider the problem of human rights, which we've been studying for years and have held many dialogues and multilateral meetings to discuss. Speaking of the Americans—I was in Chautauqua—we've come to the conclusion that while we do discuss the problem with them, our lines of reasoning differ completely. We are following parallel courses. Our position on human rights until recently came down to declaring global rights, and we are only just beginning to back our declarations by creating global guarantees.

As for our negotiating partner, his attitude is entirely different. I mean guaranteeing human rights by solving various minor problems. We command a vast scientific potential and so could do the necessary research. But on what basis? Many speakers here stressed the need for research, for facilities, but we've got no funds, have we? We must proceed from

what we've got today. This also goes for the association of Soviet lawyers—its youth section—which is to be granted juridical person status in December or January and will be able to operate on the basis of people's diplomacy.

It's a question of moulding public opinion both at home and abroad. Look at Chautauqua. Two lawyers spoke at the University of Pittsburgh. It so happened that one of them was a member of government (I mean Yakovlev) and the other was me. We delivered two lectures at the university on Soviet law. The following day, we received a letter saying that students had written to the Dean of the Law School to ask him to introduce a comparative course on the American and Soviet legislative systems into the university curriculum. I call that a concrete result. It would be fine if everything were coordinated. I think such courses can be introduced. The only hurdle is the mechanism of getting permission for trips abroad—it's quite a complicated business. We've signed a lot of agreements. Moscow University alone could maintain numerous scientific contacts of this kind and offer lectures on its own and hence without spending foreign exchange. All that's needed is support and requests.

My third point concerns the primacy of international law. The very first task facing us today is to bring our internal law into line with international accords because international law is nothing but coordination of the will of states unlike internal law, which constitutes a precise legislative mechanism coupled with a coercive one. We can't speak of the primacy of international law as a principle until we've brought this mechanism into line with international agreements. Currently we can only treat it as a goal we must achieve.

Vladimir Chernega, Vice-Rector, Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Let me begin with the need to stop banning open discussion on any scientific theme. Much has already been done to this end but many sacred cows are still there. An example to illustrate. In view of the prospect of a German reunification and the economic crisis affecting the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the West is again discussing the idea of the "heart of Europe", and this in two versions. One of them is that a united Germany, a mighty power, would attract Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other small states. The other version is that countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria, being apprehensive of such a Germany, would form a federation which might be joined by Poland—out of fear for its western frontier. Now while we consider that Poland would thus be prompted to move closer to us, Western analysts think the reverse might occur.

Both ideas are open to question. The important thing is that the West is discussing likely trends of development very seriously. Judging by our scientific publications, the subject is still taboo for us.

In conclusion, a very delicate point that I will risk raising just the same. This is a meeting of the Scientific Council. Let us look at our age composition because we are speaking of an intellectual breakthrough into the future, aren't we? Those below forty years of age are very few here. The latest evidence is that novel, non-standard, original ideas are conceived mostly by people below thirty in the case of the natural sciences and below forty in the case of the social sciences. Each new generation is a new scientific subculture which is objectively closer to the future than the previous generation. There is no getting away from this fact.

Raimo Pullat, Director, Institute of History, Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences. I would like to comment very briefly on the problem of archives.

First of all, I'm very glad to note that science and diplomacy have succeeded in settling the problem of returning the Estonian archives. I therefore thank the Foreign Ministry, the Embassy in Bonn and what we Estonians call the Big Academy.

Second, I wish to draw your attention to the problem of searching for evidence in archives. It seems to me that since science wants to help diplomacy, that search should also be carried on in other countries in addition to our own in the new situation, which should help us evolve a new concept of the history of our country. Speaking of Estonia, I would say that our historians should work not only in German archives but in Britain's as well, to say nothing of Scandinavian archives.

I believe the Council would do well to discuss this matter at one of its meetings and decide on some sort of coordination. You say the Foreign Ministry is short of funds for such work. But we can say as much. And since we are both pretty poor at the moment, we've failed to carry out a certain action. You will recall that we got a letter from the Foreign Ministry asking us to send two or three scientists to the GDR and Sweden for research into problems of 1917. We selected candidates but afterwards it turned out that our Foreign Ministry had no money and that even Moscow couldn't fund the trips. I therefore ask you to give this concrete matter consideration in the future if possible.

Academician Yuri Kagan, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy. The usual question that has been put to us in recent time during meetings with a wide range of "advanced" scientists, scientific advisers to presidents or prime ministers, is what they can do to help our country and its perestroika. They want a concept. The issue isn't credits on favourable terms. Our foreign colleagues may be said to want us to formulate what they could pass on in one way or another to those in authority and policymakers.

On coming back from Italy, I heard that from people in Andreotti's immediate entourage. We were marking the 25th anniversary of the famous Institute of Theoretical Physics, with Andreotti as one of the guests. I, for one, don't know the exact answer because it calls for precise political ideas which we could convey to leaders making decisions.

We have attained a very high level in theoretical physics which enables us to control the situation. But the situation in experimental physics is disastrous. The technological gap between the Soviet Union and the West is widening, not narrowing. Soviet laboratories only use foreign instruments. This means, as I see it, that the situation in the country is going to be negative in this respect because our economic problems will prevent us from allocating a large amount of money or hard currency for research. At the moment we are in a position, I think, to send gifted young candidates of science to the foremost European centres to do what would be in effect fieldwork. Why do the Chinese do so? They want their postgraduate students to be able to meet requirements immediately after completing a postgraduate course. We don't do so because we lack a concept. I think we should evolve a concept without delay while the public attitude is favourable.

Southeast Asia. We keep saying that what's going on in Southeast Asia is a miracle. We could use our research potential to make progress and create a public opinion in Southeast Asia on the basis of this potential of ours. This is an anticipating method. We could use such opportunities until diplomacy took its bearings in the situation. What we now need in a sense is to ensure that new thinking which has arisen influences our general concept.

Alexei Kuzmin, General Designer, Vympel Central Research and Production Combine. I'm General Designer of a system of early warning against missile attack and of space monitoring. I may therefore be described as the first spokesman for the military-industrial complex at this meeting.

The interpenetration of science and diplomacy is certainly a welcome development. True, I would rather welcome penetration in one direction

because I think diplomatic methods in science shouldn't be welcomed, but eradicated in every way (they are much too developed in that sphere as it is). As for movement in the other direction, it should be welcomed in the case not only of the humanities but of technology as well.

I have no formal powers to speak for the military-industrial complex and will only give you my personal views. The majority of researchers (I must say that the scientific and technological potential of the institutions of this complex is very great in this sense) and development engineers generally subscribe to the new tasks and new thinking in the sphere of both defence and military policy that were discussed here. I know that there are many who disagree but I think they are wrong. We hail the aims—long-term aims—concerning a non-violent world that would also be nuclear-free, as a first step. We are well aware that it isn't enough to launch this slogan because we also need a phased policy charting the path of our advance to that world. The sector I represent is active in this respect and has put forward a package proposal on how we should advance. The package includes a proposal for organising, at once or gradually, international space monitoring and early warning systems as a step in that direction. There are quite a few other proposals. We've made them on our own initiative, not on instructions from anybody. This is typical enough of our sector.

Many speakers here pointed out the importance of contacts between the Foreign Ministry and science, associating science with the Academy of Sciences only. But science is also the concern of other departmental institutions. True, it would be hard for the Scientific Council or the Foreign Ministry's Scientific Coordination Centre to maintain contact with all these institutions because they are too many. It should therefore keep in touch with the agency supervising the scientific industrial and scientific and technological institutions active in this sphere. I mean the military industrial commission. I think more extensive ties can be established through the commission and its scientific and technological council with very many scientific institutions and even with individual scientists working there.

This forum was used for attempting a serious discussion of some problems but the five- or six-minute time limit only makes it possible to touch on them. There are technological, scientific, social, humanitarian and other problems among them. Evidently, they can't be discussed seriously before so serious an audience. I therefore suggest forming a number of sections within the Scientific Council to seriously study various problems and report the results to full meetings of the Council. I think this would make it possible to discuss problems more seriously.

Overall, I consider such contacts fruitful. More importantly, they are fruitful in terms of both conceiving new ideas and solving practical problems of the near and distant future.

Vladimir Zinchenko, Director, Institute of Man. I'm a member of a very small and strange tribe. One day Radio Moscow announced me, a psychologist, and men who catch snakes as "rare birds". Indeed, my profession is almost extinct, and this is in keeping with the awful state of our education and culture.

But the ice is beginning to shift, if slowly. We have launched two programmes this year. One of them is a Japanese programme concerning the limits of man's possibilities. It is an international programme for which the Japanese have put up 150 million dollars. The other programme, a Soviet one, is on, too. It is called "Man, Science, Society". The Academy of Sciences has allocated five million dollars, to be spent on both man and science.

We are beginning to grow weary from talk about things spiritual. Isn't it time we stopped? When are we going to begin *doing* something

about those problems? What makes the situation paradoxical is that we have an invaluable treasury of what is a great national moral philosophy. We've now begun to restore some of it. Why, we had buried a whole civilisation. Things came to a pass where an American psychologist delivered a lecture on voices of reason in Utrecht and where the "voices" turned out to be those of two Soviet scholars, Mikhail Bakhtin and Lev Vygotsky. Dozens of conferences are held to discuss the theory evolved by Bakhtin and Vygotsky but very few Soviet scholars get a chance to attend them.

We, that is, professionals, non-professionals and our government departments, make poor use of existing contacts with colleagues abroad, including Japan and the United States. I recall Lefevre, who has been living in California for 15 years and serves on a select psychological team. He has published two excellent books since he arrived there: *The Algebra of Conflict* and *The Algebra of Conscience*. He examines two moral systems. One of them was ours, a system under which the end justified the means. The other was the Western system, under which the end didn't justify the means. Our system sought confrontation while the other system strove for compromise. Lefevre gives an example: when Carter kissed Brezhnev in Vienna, we took that for a sign of weakness on Carter's part whereas it was merely an indication of tact.

A final point. Soviet people are tired of decisions. Let us realise at long last that there is a big difference between making decisions and solving problems. We are all tuned in to making decisions, now as in the past, and still imagine that once we've made a decision everything will be all right. With us, making a decision creates the illusion of action and as for solving a problem, we let it drift. Our diplomats, however, realise that better knowledge is a requisite for solving problems. Better knowledge is a great thing, and therefore some progress in this sense is much more important than dozens of decisions.

Marina Lebedeva, Cand. Sc. (Psychol.), senior researcher, Problem Laboratory, Moscow State Institute of International Relations. We need an interdisciplinary science. What we should study chiefly is not only history, economics and law in international relations (although we also need this kind of research) but processes, phenomena, and so on, taking place in international relations. I mean conflicts, talks, various diplomatic activities. Not all of this can be examined within the framework of one science or of three (meaning the sort of triumvirate that history, economics and law formed in the past). It requires a really interdisciplinary approach enlisting the assistance of the most diverse sciences, including philosophy, psychology, sociology, linguistics and hermeneutics. What is needed, however, is an integration of these sciences, not their totality. This is the road taken by world science.

Our science has rather rigid and unwieldy structures. It would be naive to expect to change things with one stroke but we must bring about changes, at least gradually. We could begin by introducing interdisciplinary sections into existing periodicals. The Americans publish periodicals devoted to conflict solving, negotiating and other matters. I know that it's hard to start a new periodical but I suppose adding a new section to existing periodicals is no problem. We need at least interdisciplinary groups in existing research institutions to deal with specific themes, such as, say, talks in today's Europe: their pattern, mechanisms, typology, prospects. In drafting foreign policy decisions, the Ministry could have such centres examine its draft, preferably on an alternative basis. For instance, a Ministry directorate about to propose a decision might want to know how valid it is from the scientific point of view or what positive and negative results its implementation is likely to produce. In turn,

scientific institutions and organisations could benefit from a kind of examination by diplomats.

Meeting of the Scientific Council of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

November 24, 1989

List of Participants

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I. BALEBANOV	Deputy Director, USSR AS Institute of Space Exploration
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A. BEKAREVICH	Deputy Director, USSR AS Institute of Latin America
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A. KISLOV	Director, Institute of Peace
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A. KOVALYOV	First Deputy Minister
E. OBMINSKY	Deputy Minister
V. PETROVSKY	Deputy Minister
V. KARPOV	Deputy Minister
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A VIEW FROM JAKARTA

Ali ALATAS

THE PRINCIPAL TENETS OF INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

THE FOREIGN POLICY of a country is inevitably shaped by a confluence of inter-related factors, both objective and subjective, e.g. the country's national interests as perceived within a given time-frame, its geo-political environment, its national history, and especially relevant to newly-independent nations, its particular process of growth into sovereign statehood. Thus, in the case of Indonesia, such factors as its strategic location bridging two continents and two oceans, its archipelagic configuration, its cultural diversity and socio-political complexion and its vast and still largely untapped natural and human resources cannot but have a decisive bearing on its outlook on the world.

Indonesia's foreign policy, as that of most of the other newly independent states of Asia and Africa, has also been greatly influenced by the struggle for national independence and the subsequent need to defend and to give substance to that independence through a process of nation-building and overall national development.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that one of the main forces welding Indonesia together and guiding it in its external relationships is *nationalism*. This nationalism was from the outset rooted in the struggle against colonialism and for national independence and identity. Hence, it came to be infused with a strong sense of *solidarity* with all struggles for freedom from colonial rule and against oppression and injustice anywhere. Indonesia's nationalism, therefore, never degenerated into narrow chauvinism or xenophobia and, in fact, tolerance towards other ways of life and other socio-political systems has always been one of its marked features.

This strong urge for freedom from any form of external domination or coercion almost naturally led Indonesia to adopt a basic principle

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which has been another constant characteristic of our foreign policy since the very first days of independence. I refer to the policy of *Non-Alignment*, or in our own phrase, the *independent and active foreign policy*.

When in 1950, at the end of the revolutionary war for independence the young Republic joined the international community of free nations, the cold war between West and East was already a fact of life. Indonesia found itself in a world divided into two polarised ideological blocs, both seemingly bent on each other's destruction. It was not a world situation conducive to the goal of peaceful development for which the nation longed after almost five years of armed struggle. Neither was it presented with much of a choice: to join one or the other of the two blocs would clearly run against its basic rejection of any oppressive great power entanglements. Even for pragmatic considerations, such a choice would certainly not serve the national interest, which then as now prescribes the need for Indonesia to seek the widest possible international cooperation in its efforts at rapid national development.

It was at this point in our history that the basic principles of our foreign policy found their first definition. In his speech before Indonesia's Council of People's Representatives (Parliament) in 1948, then Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta outlined the main elements of an independent and active foreign policy. *Independent*, in the sense of refraining from joining any of the contending ideological blocs in the world and free from their attendant military alliances, and *active*, in the sense of seeking to contribute, actively and positively, towards the attainment of lasting peace and justice in the world.

It should be stressed that this is not a "neutral" or "neutralist" policy, a passive policy of "equidistance" or one of always trying to steer the middle course on issues. Neither does it imply the wish to remove ourselves, in isolation or indifference, from world events and developments. It is a policy, however, that does insist on reserving the right freely to determine our own views and assessments with regard to international issues and to initiate or support those policies and measures which we believe would serve the cause of world peace best.

FROM INDEPENDENCE TO NON-ALIGNMENT

IT WAS ONLY SOME time afterwards that the term "Non-alignment" was coined to describe this particular type of foreign policy, as subsequently adopted by a large number of newly independent nations in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. Indonesia takes pride in having been one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, which was born in Beograd in 1961 and which now counts some 120 full members and observer-countries. As is known, Indonesia has also been one of the initiators of, and in fact host to, the historic Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in 1955, which *inter-alia* enunciated the *Dasa-Sila* or Ten Principles of inter-state relations and which is acknowledged to be the inspirational and conceptual precursor to Non-Alignment.

Yet another characteristic of Indonesia's foreign policy has always been its strong sense of *international responsibility*. Indeed, this can be seen to be flowing directly from the Preamble of our 1945 Constitution, which proclaims: "whereas independence is the inherent right of every nation, colonialism in this world must be eradicated as it is not in conformity with Humanity and Justice", and further enjoins the Government "...to contribute in implementing a world order based upon independence, abiding peace and justice...".

On the global level, Indonesia has endeavoured to fulfill this constitutional directive through its active membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as in a number of other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations outside the United Nations. It has staunchly supported the U.N. as the principal, collective instrument through which governments can resolve conflicts and achieve common security, peace and progress. We have consistently sought to strengthen the viability and efficacy of its various organs, both as forums for consultation and negotiation on global issues and for the democratisation of international relations. Yet another manifestation of this aspect of Indonesia's foreign policy is its active participation in a wide array of sub-regional, regional and interregional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference, the Group of 77, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and a large number of commodity arrangements and producers' associations.

PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

THE PRINCIPAL tenets of foreign policy as described above have endured the test of time and circumstance because they are felt to express the fundamental *Weltanschauung* of our people and to conform with the basic philosophy of our State, the *Panca Sila**, as well as the principles embodied in our 1945 Constitution. Consequently, continuity can be seen to be a marked feature in the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy over the past 44 years of its independent existence.

During these years, Indonesia, like many other newly independent countries, has had its share of internal political turmoil and economic upheaval, of external subversion and open threats against its territorial integrity and sovereignty. There have also been attempts, from the extreme left as well as from the extreme right, at forcefully imposing deviations from the national ideology and basic principles of foreign policy, the most serious having been the abortive *coup d'etat* perpetrated in 1965 by the so-called 30th September Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party. Hence, one of the first tasks of the New Order Government under the leadership of President Soeharto has been to effect a drastic redress of all past deviations and to ensure the pure and consistent application of the basic tenets and principles adopted at the very outset of our independence, i.e. those enshrined in the *Panca Sila*, the 1945 Constitution and the independent and active foreign policy.

It is on this basis that the Government has conducted its foreign policy up to this moment. It is a policy guided by a revitalised spirit of authenticity, a new realism and rationality in approach and vision, more closely attuned to the interests and needs of our people. This is *inter alia* reflected in Indonesia's relations with the states in its own region and the priority consideration given to regional peace, stability and cooperation. No less important is the stress being placed on "economic decolonisation" as a logical consequence of political emancipation, which is in tune with the economic development goals of the nation.

This means an external diplomacy geared towards the maximisation of cooperation and support, material as well as political, for our national development goals. In this effort, Indonesia will steadfastly abide

* The five pillars (principles) of the *Panca Sila* philosophy consist of: 1. Belief in God Almighty; 2. Just and civilised Humanity; 3. the Unity of Indonesia (Nationalism); 4. Democracy guided by the wisdom derived from deliberations and consensus amongst people's representatives; 5. Social Justice for the entire people of Indonesia.

by its Non-Aligned policy: it is willing to accept foreign assistance and cooperation from whatever source, provided no political strings are attached and no conditionalities are imposed that will prove to be too great a burden for the nation and for successive generations. It is also being realised that foreign assistance, while vitally important to accelerate the development process, can only supplement, never supplant, the national effort to develop. The choice as to the forms and modalities of development, as well as their success or failure, must remain the responsibility of the Indonesian people themselves.

It is clear that to attain this priority objective, peace and stability are absolutely essential, not only domestically but also in the international context. Thus, Indonesia's diplomacy has the task simultaneously to secure an international environment of relative peace and stability, an area of goodwill and mutual cooperation without which meaningful development may prove impossible. It is logical, that in the first instance our focus of attention is directed towards the countries in our immediate surroundings. This is reflected in Indonesia's policies with regard to ASEAN and in its unceasing efforts to contribute to a comprehensive, just and durable solution to the Cambodia conflict. But also in the global context, Indonesia's foreign policy consciously and actively strives towards the establishment of a new international order in which peace and equitable, prosperity can prevail.

In summary, Indonesia's foreign policy is dedicated to the building of a world order of true independence, lasting peace and social justice and seeks to achieve this through the development of relations of friendship and cooperation with all nations, irrespective of differences in political or social systems and based on the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit, non-interference and peaceful coexistence.

INDONESIA-USSR RELATIONS

FEBRUARY 3, 1990 marks the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since then, relations between our two countries and Governments have always been characterised by solid friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation, based on the abiding respect and understanding in which the two sides have held one another. The friendship and mutual sympathy between our two peoples, however, go back much further in time.

The principled support of the Soviet Union to our independence struggle and the fact that the USSR was among the first countries extending its diplomatic recognition to the new-born Republic early in 1950 are indelibly impressed in the minds of the Indonesian people. Neither can Indonesia forget the concrete political and material support extended by the USSR during one of the most critical periods in our nation's post-independence history, i.e. the national struggle to free our soil from the last vestiges of colonialism and to re-unite Irian Jaya (West Irian) into the territorial integrity of the Republic.

Between Indonesia and the U.S.S.R. there has always existed an identity or proximity of views and positions on a wide range of vital political and economic issues in contemporary international relations. The consistent solidarity and support rendered by the Soviet Union to peoples struggling to liberate themselves from colonial bondage or foreign occupation has earned it the respect and appreciation of all nations of the Third World. As one of the super powers of the world, the Soviet Union is equally held in high regard for its constructive initiatives in advancing general disarmament—especially nuclear disar-

mament—and common security and in removing the threat of nuclear holocaust. And in the face of the continuing polarization in international economic relations our two countries do concur on the urgent need to take effective measures in bridging the widening socio-economic gap between developed and developing countries and to reactivate the global North-South negotiations towards the establishment of a new international economic order based on justice, equal opportunity and genuine interdependence.

More recently, Indonesia has followed with great interest and appreciation the bold policies initiated and implemented by the Soviet Union, under the far-sighted leadership of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, to effect the economic restructuring and political renewal of all spheres of Soviet society, policies which are already having such a far-reaching and favourable impact on world developments and especially on developments in Europe. We have also been impressed by the new political thinking underlying Soviet foreign policy, based on the recognition of the primacy of universal human values, on democratisation, demilitarisation and de-ideologisation in inter-state relations.

This broad base of coincidence of views and the shared experience of mutual support and solidarity on issues over many years have helped our two countries to overcome the temporary "estrangement" which occurred in our bilateral cooperative relations in the past years. This phenomenon was initially—and quite erroneously—thought to have its cause in ideological differences or in the misperception as if Indonesia since 1966 had basically changed its foreign policy outlook. The reality, however, has been that at that point in time a divergence in our respective national priorities took place, with Indonesia having had to concentrate all its attention and effort to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a devastated national economy, after years of mismanagement and the political upheaval as earlier described. In this effort, massive foreign assistance was required, at the most concessional terms. Based on its own considerations of national priorities and pre-occupations, the Soviet Union at that time was not in a position to assist, except for its readiness to reschedule Indonesia's debts, for which we remain deeply appreciative. Thus, it can be seen that the temporary downturn in Indonesian-Soviet economic relations was not at all caused by any re-appraisal of the broader relationship but simply dictated by objective factors and requirements.

Now, twenty years have passed since Indonesia embarked on its first Five-Year Development Plan and the situation has undergone a fundamental change. Through concentrated effort and the mobilisation of all the productive and creative potentials of the Indonesian nation very encouraging progress has been achieved in our overall development, in the economic, political as well as in the social and cultural fields. Indonesia's GNP has increased manifold, self-sufficiency in food production has been attained, manufacturing and industrial capacity is expanding rapidly, non-oil product exports continue to soar, having already outstripped oil and gas export revenues, and national savings are increasing yearly reflecting the strong determination of our people to reach the point of take-off and to develop on the basis of self-reliant growth.

The recent institution of sweeping de-regulation and de-bureaucratisation policies and measures has opened the opportunity for active participation in the national development effort to ever larger segments of the society. More importantly, the equitable distribution of the fruits of development is constantly broadening in scope and in depth.

In social development, steady progress has been achieved in the fields of education, health, people's housing and social welfare. Cultu-

rally, there has been a resurgence of creativity and a flowering of artistic activity and expression in its multifaceted dimensions. And above all, there has been political stability, ideological concert and religious harmony.

Meanwhile, important changes are also taking place in the U.S.S.R. in the political, economic, social and intellectual spheres as part of the process of *perestroika* and renewal of Soviet society. These in turn will no doubt open up new opportunities for enlarged, mutually advantageous cooperation between our two countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

At the same time, the political complexion of our globe is undergoing rapid transformation, presenting greater opportunities as well as greater challenges to Mankind's constant search for a better and more peaceful world. A new climate of *detente* among states, especially among the major powers, has led to a visible relaxation of international tensions and a growing disposition towards dialogue and negotiation in the resolution of conflicts. Concurrently, some fundamental trends on the international economic scene are propelling the global economy towards ever greater interdependence and integration.

A NEW STAGE IN THE TWO COUNTRIES' COOPERATION

IT IS FOR THESE REASONS and against this backdrop that the State visit by President Soeharto to the U.S.S.R. in September last year assumed such historic and timely significance. Historic, not only for the fact that it was the first visit again by an Indonesian Head of State in a quarter century, but more so for the landmark decisions and agreements which resulted from the summit-level talks between President Soeharto and President Mikhail Gorbachev. In this sense, the visit can be regarded as having ushered in a new stage in the history of the relationship between our two countries and peoples.

The Statement signed by the two Leaders, on the Fundamentals of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Republic of Indonesia and U.S.S.R. sets out the basic principles upon which the two countries will endeavour to develop qualitatively new dimensions in their bilateral relations as well as in their inter-action in the various multilateral forums. Moreover, by casting their joint resolve to do so on the basis and within the framework of universally applicable values and norms of interstate relations, the two countries, while remaining faithful to their respective national ideologies and socio-political systems, also hope to contribute to the larger issues of peace, security and common prosperity, in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world at large.

In the light of the unfolding opportunities as presented by the new momentum for progress in their two countries and fully taking into account the significant implications of the present stage in world developments, the two sides have agreed to intensify their bilateral cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological and cultural fields, to expand their political dialogue, to broaden their inter-action in international forums and in the peaceful resolution of regional problems and conflicts.

In meeting their shared interest in developing mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation, as a major component of overall Indonesian-Soviet relations, a separate Protocol was signed between the two sides. In that document, which resulted from the first session of the recently established Joint Ministerial Commission, a concrete and wide-ranging program has been agreed upon aimed at expanding two-way trade and at enhancing economic cooperation, *inter-alia* through investments, joint venture projects and technical cooperation

schemes in various fields. In this context, both sides expressed their determination to improve the quality and scope of such cooperation and to search actively for new and innovative forms of cooperation.

The two Heads of State have expressed their confidence that as a result of their discussions and of the agreements reached in the course of that visit, a fresh impetus will be imparted towards the comprehensive development of the bilateral relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, on the basis of full respect for the independence and freedom of choice of each nation with regard to its national development and in compliance with the principles of sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual benefit.

Thus, at this 40th anniversary commemoration, Indonesia and the U.S.S.R. can look forward to a dynamic new stage in their bilateral relationship in the years and decades ahead.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF POLITICS

**Andrei ZAGORSKY,
Yuri KASHLEV**

NEW POLITICAL THINKING has brought about many changes in our lives and our language. We no longer object to many concepts which we regarded until recently as alien on account of their Western origin. And while it was not easy for us, we have arrived at the human dimension of politics, meaning not so much the concept itself but the complex problems covered by it: those of relations between the individual and the state, their reciprocal and not unilateral rights and duties, the place and role of the individual as the subject or object of politics.

We had to reappraise certain values (seen as indisputable until recently) in order to see the human factor for social development in a new light and look at our economy, policy and laws from the standpoint of man's real and not purported interests. We gradually moved from the years-long principle of "man for the state" to that of "the state for man".

We know very well that it will be long before quests and effort enable us to consistently put this principle into practice. No major transformation, especially one going deep ideologically, can be effected without a clash of interests. Be that as it may, the changes taking place in our country in the economic, political and legal spheres are ultimately aimed at humanising society. This is the purpose of building a law-governed state, which implies not only the separation of power and the supremacy of the law but the provision of legal and material guarantees dependably safeguarding the individual against bureaucratic arbitrariness.

The line of humanising politics has become an important part of Soviet international activity as well. For the first time ever, documents of the 27th CPSU Congress (1986) listed humanitarian issues on a par with the military, political, economic and other aspects of international security. These came to include more extensive international cooperation in ensuring the exercise of human rights, seeing to the reunion of families, fostering contacts between people, searching for new forms of cooperation in culture, the arts, science, education and medicine.

Our concepts of the place and role of the humanitarian aspect of international relations are steadily evolving. A mere four years ago, we

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persisted in claiming that whatever had to do with human rights was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the country concerned. But now we recognise that the extent to which human rights are respected determines the degree of confidence in a country at international level and hence the attitude to it in the military political sphere, trade, the economy and other fields.

It would be an overstatement to say that the rise of a human dimension in world politics is entirely a fruit of perestroika and new political thinking. It was at the dawn of world civilisation in general and European civilisation in particular that the outside world first came to be looked on from the point of view of man, of his requirements and interests. After all, it is to antiquity that we owe that simple dictum, "Man is the measure of all things".

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THAT, HOWEVER, is not the only source of the contemporary conception of the human dimension of world politics. The concept was brought into being by the Helsinki process which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) led off. For years past, Western specialists have been using it with reference to the humanitarian sections of the Helsinki Final Act—principle VII (Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) and the "third basket" (Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields). However, for a long time after 1975, the term was used mostly by specialists, its conceptual political content being practically disregarded.

With democratisation under way and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of Europe adopting humanist values of universal significance, this concept is entering a new phase and acquiring a new ring. The Vienna Meeting, which drew to a close in January 1989, granted it official status by entitling the last section of the Concluding Document "Human Dimension of the CSCE".

The prerequisite for the emergence of the concept in the Helsinki process at its current stage was an unprecedented increase in attention to humanitarian problems within its framework. At Vienna, the provisions concerning human rights were not merely reaffirmed in far greater detail than at Helsinki or Madrid but were worked out thoroughly in the "third basket". Thereby substantial progress was initiated towards extending the list of human rights being discussed in legal terms at European level.

Vienna added to the rights mentioned in earlier CSCE documents (making appropriate provisions in a number of cases: the right to free movement and residence within the boundaries of one's state; the right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to it; the rights of persons in custody or in prison; a ban on torture). For the first time in CSCE history, it registered the right of citizens to monitor and contribute to the implementation of CSCE documents. Thereby it confirmed the legitimacy of the activity of diverse non-governmental human rights groups, including the so-called Helsinki groups persecuted for a decade in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on charges of spreading "false" information about socialism.

Virtually for the first time the CSCE documents considerably diversify the conception of freedom of the individual to profess a religion or faith. The Vienna document devotes eleven paragraphs to it. They provide for, among other things, granting associations of believers professing or willing to profess their faith the right to do so within the constitutional bounds of the countries and for recognising the status envisaged for them; recognising the right of religious associations to found and maintain freely accessible places of worship or assembly; recognising the

right of everyone to offer and receive religious education personally or in common with others in a language chosen by himself, and so on.

Major changes were also decided on in favour of cooperation between states on human rights. That section of the Vienna Document headed "Human Dimension of the CSCE" describes procedures for this cooperation, which are often called the "Vienna mechanism". The participating states are to exchange information and answer questions about respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, contacts between people and other related humanitarian problems. They are also to hold bilateral meetings in order to study these questions and settle specific cases of a humanitarian nature. They have agreed on the possibility of drawing the attention of other participating states to questions submitted to bilateral meetings as well as of supplying information on such discussion in CSCE forums on humanitarian problems.

The Vienna Meeting resolved to hold three meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. One of them took place in May-June 1989 in Paris. Another is to be held in June 1990 in Copenhagen and the third, in the fall of 1991 in Moscow.

Both the mechanism and the conference are new phenomena in the Helsinki process. These innovations are a result of strenuous effort over a long period. The situation at the early stages of the discussion on human rights at Vienna differed little from what it was like in earlier years due to ideologised approaches, mutual recriminations, efforts to score propaganda points. Among the negative factors were the inertia of the "psychological warfare" of the West and our frequent allergy to the issue of human rights. The instructions received by the Soviet delegation remained hopelessly rigid at first, for our new thinking did not yet involve the humanitarian sphere unlike, say, the sphere of disarmament. Still, the earlier controversy at Vienna was useful in that the two sides proved to each other that violations of human rights were plentiful in East and West alike and that therefore the problem of guaranteeing them was in effect universal and could not be treated as a one-way street.

One other point made there was that the parties to the Helsinki process should not consider individual rights out of context (such as the right to emigrate, which Western delegates went out of their way to emphasise) but the whole range of civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights. This is actually what the Vienna Final Document says, and it provided the basis on which agreement was also reached on both the concept of the human dimension and the mechanism of realising it.

ON BECOMING established in the Helsinki process, the concept of the human dimension began to exert growing influence on our internal processes and create additional incentives for continued democratisation. This feedback expresses itself chiefly in a major effort to bring Soviet legislation into harmony with the country's international commitments, including those under the Vienna accords.

Frankly speaking, we assumed far-reaching obligations at Vienna, well knowing that our legislation and internal order were far in many respects from the agreed requirements. It was not the first time that we had agreed to the laying down of "anticipating" obligations, much of what was confirmed at Vienna had already been written into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ratified by the Soviet Union in 1973. Yet we have never complied to the full with the covenant provision concerning the right to leave one's country and return to it. This is also true of many of the humanitarian accords forming part

of the Helsinki Final Act. At Vienna, however, we deliberately gave far-reaching pledges for the first time, meaning to really honour them and not to pigeonhole them as we had mostly done in the past.

Many problems, once painful, were eliminated in the course of the meeting, especially at its closing stage. For instance, the Soviet Union stopped jamming Western radio stations and settled thousands of specific "humanitarian cases" complicating our relations with a number of Western countries (refusals of permission to leave, unwarranted confinement of people in mental hospitals, and so on).

Nevertheless, Vienna did not mark the end but the very beginning of this work, as we now realise. It is probably only now, one year on, that we can state with a clear conscience that we have set out at long last and on a large scale to bring our legislation and practices into line with our international commitments. But why didn't we do so earlier, seeing that perestroika has been going on for nearly five years?

This must be largely due to the fact that this work coincided with major steps to democratise our society. We began carrying out the slogan of forming a law-governed state. There were unprecedented alternative parliamentary elections. The people's deputies held their first congresses and a qualitatively new USSR Supreme Soviet began functioning. The most diverse laws are under discussion or have already been enacted. The new parliament deliberates against the background of the highest ever degree of political activity, thousands-strong rallies and the rise of numerous informal movements. Tens of millions of citizens follow the work of people's deputies at congresses and Supreme Soviet sessions by watching it on television and pass critical judgement upon it.

In these circumstances, the human factor and human dimension are becoming both a criterion and a motor of perestroika. This process, a product of the inherent logic of democratisation, has substantially increased interest in decisions which are largely new for us now and the desire to draw in making them on international experience and international standards, above all in the political sphere.

Now what has our country done, specifically, in the recent period?

In January 1989, the Soviet Union joined the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners approved by the UN in 1955. In February it recognised itself to be bound by the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague regarding the interpretation and application of six international conventions on human rights, including the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

We have stated that we are ready to participate in UN human rights control mechanisms although even now the realisation of this statement, specifically ratification of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is being blocked by the refusal of certain of our government departments to allow Soviet citizens to lodge with the UN Human Rights Committee complaints against violations of their rights.

In February 1989, the Soviet Union joined the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Bilateral examination of humanitarian issues and human rights with the United States, France, the FRG, Britain and other Western countries has assumed a considerably larger scale. We have set up with some of them working mechanisms to study such issues more concretely and to find solutions. In the case of Canada, Austria and some other countries, we have succeeded in settling all cases of a humanitarian nature, such as those of family reunions.

Our handling of some matters has become more liberal. We have simplified the procedure of granting permission for travel from and to the Soviet Union within the framework of cultural and humanitarian coope-

ration. Nearly all requests for permission to go abroad on private business that were examined in the first half of last year were granted (there were 17 million requests, or three times as many as in all of 1987). Whereas in 1988 about 108,000 Soviet citizens left the country to take up permanent residence abroad, in 1989 the number of emigrants came close to 200,000. Compare this with the 4,500 people who emigrated in 1985, shortly before the Vienna Meeting.

All applications for permission to leave the country on which no action had been taken towards the end of the Vienna Meeting had been considered within the six month time limit set by the Vienna Final Document, that is, by July 1989. Of the 1,855 applicants, as many as 1,556, or 84 per cent, had been allowed to leave, with only 299 temporarily refused permission.

After the European Information Forum held in London in April-May 1989, the Soviet government adopted a series of decisions to give the population greater access to foreign information by lifting the absurd curbs in force for decades and running counter to the Soviet Union's international commitments. Foreign newspapers and periodicals are now allowed to circulate freely in our country, their list has been extended and so has that of titles to which our citizens can subscribe (except that they must pay for them in hard currency directly or through relatives or acquaintances living abroad). The foreign press shall be withdrawn from the sadly notorious list of "restricted" publications and put at the disposal of readers in libraries and cultural information centres.

Now that Soviet citizens are free to receive foreign satellite television programmes, any organisation or private person may mount the necessary aerial (the technique of mounting such aerials is to be devised by June 1990). New liberal rules are being established for the import and use of copying equipment. They will apply to both organisations and private persons. Regrettably we come up in carrying out these progressive decisions against difficulties in the form of recurrences of old thinking and departmental barriers. The sooner we remove these hurdles, the more rapidly the democratisation process in this highly important sphere will go on.

The situation of believers and religious organisations in the Soviet Union is changing. In eight months of 1989, the Soviet authorities registered 2,235 religious associations, including 1,800 communities of the Russian Orthodox Church plus 174 Muslim, 88 Catholic and 89 Protestant communities, or more than twice as many as throughout 1988. Over 1,700 places of worship were transferred to religious entities in 1989. The church now has greater access to politics, public life and the media. A number of religious leaders have been elected People's Deputies of the USSR.

Treatment in mental hospitals has undergone a reform. All hospitals, including those formerly controlled by the Ministry of the Interior, have been transferred to the Ministry of Public Health. In conformity with the Vienna document, abuses in the treatment of mental cases and unlawful confinement in mental hospitals are punishable under the law.

We are also changing our attitude to international and national non-governmental human rights organisations. Spokesmen for the International Helsinki Federation, Amnesty International and the national human rights organisations of some Western countries were received in Moscow for an exchange of views on a wide range of problems of guaranteeing civil rights and freedoms.

The foregoing (which does not cover the whole list of changes) concerns our approach to human contacts, religious freedoms, access to foreign culture, information, and so on. But while a tangible change is taking place, we must admit that we still do not fully meet our com-

mitments under the Vienna document or other accords. It is in everyday practice that it will yet take us much effort to break for good the overt or covert resistance being put up by the bureaucracy on various levels, by those who are used to proceeding from "higher considerations" of their own when a concrete problem has to be settled.

One has only to recall the numerous obstacles that had to be overcome in registering religious communities or in transferring temples to them to realise that we must not delude ourselves with figures even though some of them are striking. The request for the registration of the Ukrainian Catholic Church has still not been granted although there are no legal grounds for refusing it. Many of the decisions on the treatment of mental cases that have been taken to date are inadequate because they fail to provide sufficient legal safeguards against various abuses. Even after new documents were approved, there were instances of healthy people being sent to mental hospitals. Even after the Vienna Meeting, we occasionally have difficulty in acquiring and using copying equipment.

Our practices are undoubtedly improving as they become more liberal. But they are still far short of what our obligations impose. There is no escaping this conclusion. Most important, even our changing approach allows wide scope for arbitrary decisions because it remains within the framework of old legislation. Without fundamental changes in legislation, no order guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens and meeting international standards to a reasonable degree can be brought about in the foreseeable future.

Legislation on human rights is a neglected—if not the most neglected—component of our legal reform. The past year has witnessed some advance. Many of the dozens of bills discussed at both initial sessions of the Supreme Soviet or being prepared for discussion have a direct bearing on the human dimension. We already have some new laws, such as those on the procedure of settling collective labour disputes (a law providing for the right to strike), the procedure of appealing against unlawful actions by officials, higher pensions, and so on.

Some bills have been published in the press. The draft Principles of the Penal Legislation of the USSR, for instance, are based on meting out punishment more sparingly. Exile and deportation are to be abolished. The proportion of corpora delicti punishable by death are to be reduced to the minimum. Article 190¹, which dealt with the dissemination of false information defaming the Soviet political and social system, has been taken out of the Penal Code. So has the concept of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"—formerly Article 70 of the RSFSR Penal Code. Both articles made it possible to get dissenters out of the way without much ado. At present citizens are only called to account in accordance with international standards for public appeals for the violent overthrow of the country's constitutional system. All those convicted under the above articles have been released (their number is set at about 600).

Current effort to bring our legislation into line with our international commitments centres on four bills: on Soviet citizens' departure from and entry to the Soviet Union, on the media, on freedom of conscience and religious organisations in the Soviet Union, and on social alignments (associations) of Soviet citizens. They have all been drafted according to high international standards. For instance, the bill on exit and entry takes account of the right of Soviet citizens to freely leave their country or return to it. No invitation will be required any more for trips on private business for a limited period of time or for permanent residence. Nor are there to be any more restrictions on the frequency or duration of such trips.

A five-year time limit is to be set for the first time within which a citizen may be refused for reasons of state security (access to secret in-

formation) permission to leave the country. This limit may be extended in exceptional cases by decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet commission concerned. The problem of so-called poor relatives blocking somebody's departure on the basis of alimony or other property claims is to be settled in court.

The bill on the press envisages serious changes: abolishing censorship and granting not only institutions or organisations but individual citizens the right to found their own newspapers or periodicals. The future law is to merely register the fact, not to authorise it.

And so laws are changing. Still, we find it necessary to level what we consider serious criticism against what is being done to bring our legislation into line with our country's international obligations. One of the criticisms concerns the time limits of putting the Vienna accords into effect. While the document was adopted more than a year ago, no new legislation has yet been passed on the majority of issues. The bills on exit and entry and on the press have only been given their first reading. Their approval has been put off until the third session of the Supreme Soviet. The debate on them was delayed unpardonably until last fall. Some bills, such as those on freedom of conscience or social associations, have not even been discussed in parliament so far.

We know that there are urgent and extremely urgent items on the agenda of the Supreme Soviet. Besides, the exhausting marathon of parliamentary debate makes it physically impossible to deal with all issues in a reasonably short time. Nevertheless, we do not think procrastination in passing laws can be attributed to a complicated situation or the deputies' heavy burden. The government, which has assumed definite obligations, should have taken the initiative of submitting those bills to the deputies and telling them why it considered the bills really urgent. But it did no such thing. What happened was that all the bills listed by us, some of which were drafted even before the end of the Vienna Meeting, were caught for a long time in the meshes of interdepartmental coordination and found themselves buried in the safes of ministries.

Those deputies who criticised the utterly unjustified delay in preparing the bills had good reason to do so. Nor can we get rid of a feeling that some are at pains to prevent the bills from being approved in their present form. We wonder who they are.

The overt or covert opposition being put up to the enactment of laws which our society is looking forward to so eagerly is understandable. There was no problem when the central authorities could change course at will, making the lower echelons proceed accordingly. But now that we are to have laws explicitly formulating the substance of civil rights, specifying possible restrictions upon them and assuring every citizen legal protection, there is a danger of "chiefs" ceasing to be "bosses". A situation is arising where nobody can be stopped from going abroad if he chooses to unless the labour agreement signed by him imposes a secrecy time limit, and no demonstration can be banned if it does not infringe the Constitution.

A law-governed state and new legislation are intended to limit the powers of diverse government bodies and hence their officials, which means that any government agency will only be allowed to do what is authorised by the law. Officials are to be deprived of the right to grant or refuse permission as they please. Nobody will ask them for a "favour" and everybody will demand that they should do their duty. Officials who exceed their powers and start giving orders, can be prosecuted. The bureaucratic machinery is to lose its habitual control of people, to act at will. There are to be fewer opportunities for arbitrariness.

Those who have made a career by applying such practices cannot possibly relish this prospect. And it is probably those whose years-long

unlimited power a law-governed state is to end that are interminably delaying the achievement of an interdepartmental consensus as they try to rob new legislation of substance. It would really be better and fairer to immediately refer all bills to the Supreme Soviet. If a department has objections or wishes to propose amendments, let it uphold its stance publicly, before parliament and the millions of televiewers, when the bill in question is given its first reading, when committees and commissions work on amendments to it and when it is put to the vote. This is the only way to reduce the vast damage which bureaucratic delays cause to the prestige of the state.

After all, delays breed uncertainty and create the impression of a continuing discrepancy between words and deeds. In January 1989, the Soviet leadership declared that we considered the Vienna accords effective from the moment they were approved in the Austrian capital. But everybody realises that their implementation will be out of the question until our legislation is brought into *complete* harmony with them no matter how greatly we liberalise our current practices. Our partners and fellow-citizens stopped long ago taking anyone's word on trust.

This is all the more natural because the value of words goes on declining. Last summer, our parliament stated in its Appeal to the Soviet People: "The USSR Supreme Soviet guarantees that the current and fall sessions will pass laws ensuring... protection of the rights and freedoms of every citizen. These laws include those... on freedom of conscience, the press and information and others." This promise was not kept. We suppose there is no point in further devaluating guarantees offered by the country's highest legislative authority.

Still, there is another thing that is equally important. The debate on the bills which we have listed and on which attention focussed last year may be said to have sidetracked some other serious problems of implementing the Vienna accords. Here are two examples. Freedom of movement implies not only the right to leave one's country or return to it but primarily the right to freely choose one's place of residence inside one's country. The passport and registration system existing in the Soviet Union since 1932 is at daggers drawn with this provision. A lot was said and written about this after Vienna, yet there is no sign of change.

The other example is of a more general nature. We are of the opinion that work on reflecting international standards of human rights in Soviet law must include a revision of the list of Soviet civil rights. The list should encompass rights and freedoms ignored before, such as freedom of movement. Besides the constitutional guarantees of exercising these rights call for a substantial revision because they have been purely nominal for decades.

Nor should we forget that debates on this issue as well as on others invariably evoke a widespread response at home and abroad. Their settlement (or failure to settle them) is often seen as an indication of the character of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and the possibility of trusting developments here or relying up on them in the future. Delay in settling these issues can do a lot of harm.

THE PROSPECT of progress in lending international affairs a human dimension will largely depend on our readiness to rise above the ambitions of the departmental bureaucracy and back our own slogans about the primacy of universal values and international law with more dynamic and consistent deeds. Experience has shown that this prospect is becoming more and more concrete. This was also evident at the Paris meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (summer 1989), at which the concept passed its first test.

In Paris, the tenor of the dialogue on humanitarian issues underwent a visible change. More often than not, we were able to calmly discuss certain questions, something which had seemed unthinkable shortly before. Neither we nor our Western partners tried to detect a "trick" in the stance or proposals of the other side. Even at that stage, the desire to see clear in the 36 proposals submitted to the meeting and consider whatever made sense bore fruit. For the first time since the beginning of the Helsinki process, the Soviet Union and France took a joint initiative in favour of forming a European legal space. It won the support of a number of socialist and Western countries.

True, we must admit self-critically that at the moment the initiative raises more questions than it answers. It offers an ample opportunity for discussion by both scholars and practical workers. We visualise advance to legal space as a gradual drawing closer together and mutual adaptation of the legislations and administrative standards of the CSCE countries, primarily standards regulating or having some relation to the development of cooperation and exchanges between nations. We believe this process should lead to eliminating where it is possible even now collisions in the legislations of various countries and to removing obstacles of a standard-setting, administrative or technical character still lingering in various areas of cooperation and exchange.

The idea of a legal space has a broad context and concerns the European process as a whole. A need for reciprocal adaptation exists in the most diverse spheres: the economy, the environment, science, technology, trade, customs regulations, the social sphere, culture, human contacts, the procedure of issuing visas, etc. The Paris initiative is closely linked in this sense with the idea of a European economic space, for common standards aimed at facilitating the economic integration of East and West are necessary and possible in the case of both relatively secondary problems, such as investment protection, avoidance of double taxation or regulation of the procedure of establishing joint ventures, and bigger problems, including the prospect of raising the degree of compatibility of the economic mechanisms of different countries.

We consider that in specifying the general parameters and concrete ways of realising the concept of a legal space, it would be useful to look closely at the experience of legal integration within the Council of Europe and the European Communities (EC). In many cases, it may well become unnecessary to invent any new standards if they exist already and have proved their worth.

This lends great importance to the working cooperation that is developing between the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries and the Parliamentary Assembly and other agencies of the Council of Europe, and to the intention to explore the possibility of joining some conventions worked out by the Council of Europe—an intention announced by the Soviet Union at Strasbourg. The USSR Supreme Soviet is already working on this. So is the Foreign Ministry. By joining certain of the conventions of the Council of Europe, we would adopt European legal standards in many important spheres.

A perfectly logical question arising in this context is that of joining the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Although the convention is exclusive, being open to none but members of the Council of Europe, there is apparently no reason to believe that this obstacle cannot be overcome in the future.

Nor do we think it would be right to underestimate the experience of legal integration within the EC in a number of areas, especially economic legislation, in which the EC are now far ahead of the Council of Europe.

While bearing in mind the promising vistas opened by the concept

of a law-governed state, it is now important to concentrate on specifying the spheres of cooperation in which legislation must be harmonised first of all and the means by which this must be done. After all, this is going to be a gradual process varying from sector to sector. A start should be made without waiting for a general movement. We think the human dimension is the area in which the process of forming a common legal space is important and can be led off in a relatively short time.

A definite alternative of harmonising the internal legislations of states by bringing them into line with agreed European standards in the sphere of human rights and humanitarian cooperation has already shaped up within the framework of the Helsinki process. The advantages of this path are obvious. Without imposing concrete standards on countries, substituting international for national standards or institutions or encroaching on the identity of legal systems (distinctions persist even in Western Europe, where they manifest themselves between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental legal systems), it establishes definite minimum standards of democracy below which no state may allow its legislation to go. The idea of a common legal space can lend a more consistent and purposive character to this process, which is virtually on.

Further work at the CSCE in the near future could, in our view, follow three main lines.

One, *evolving at European level the characteristics of a law-governed state*. This theme is now given priority in debates going on in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. These debates ought apparently not to be carried on in isolation from European experience within whose framework the phenomenon of the law-governed state has come into being. It is necessary to define the fundamental principles of a law-governed state on the basis of a comparative analysis and establish minimum standards making it possible to distinguish between a law-governed and a "non-law-governed" state. This is all the more important because the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union and France in Paris calls for a legal space to be built "on the basis of a Europe of law-governed states". Needless to say, there has to be a measure of mutual understanding on this issue.

We invite anyone who is doubtful of the ideological compatibility of the "bourgeois" and "socialist" concepts of the law-governed state to carefully study two of the proposals submitted in Paris: the French (No. 6) and the British (No. 8). Both set out their authors' conception of the main principles of the law-governed state and the supremacy of the law. Nearly all the provisions of both documents are consonant with the principles proclaimed by us in the course of perestroika. As for the British proposal regarding the supremacy of the law, it reads like a perestroika manifesto. There is hardly anything in it that has not won widespread recognition during public discussions in the Soviet Union or in statements by Soviet leaders. It follows that the aspiration to evolve a common conception of the law-governed state is not so utopian after all.

Two, *going further in elevating and concretising European standards in the area of human rights*. We should remember that Vienna did not merely establish relatively high standards but created a mechanism making it possible to carry them forward, for the Conference on the Human Dimension is empowered not only to discuss questions of fulfilling agreed obligations but to assume new ones.

Participants in the Paris meeting submitted many proposals extending the list of rights and freedoms written into CSCE documents or concretising the obligations which the latter contain. The aim is to add to the list freedom to express one's opinion; the right to peaceful

assembly, including the right to demonstrate as well as freedom of association, the right to social security and to education, the right to a safe environment; the rights of children, the right to refuse to serve in the armed forces on religious or other grounds, and other rights and freedoms

We wish to point out that by far most of the proposals submitted in Paris merely confirm the provisions of international pacts and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus they do not call for the assumption of fundamentally new obligations but for a legal discussion of the points at issue within the Helsinki process. This conclusion also applies to the US proposal concerning the principles of democratic elections and political pluralism.

The proposals understandably include points that are open to question, nor do they all deal exhaustively with the essence of the problems raised in them. Work on them will be anything but easy. Nevertheless, it is clear even now that the Paris meeting called for European human rights standards to be raised still higher than was done at Vienna. The decisions on this which could be adopted at the Copenhagen or Moscow meetings would mark further progress in forming a common legal space.

Three, *improving the Vienna mechanism of cooperation in respect of the human dimension*. To our way of thinking, the control mechanism set up at Vienna is bound to play an increasing role as a further international means of legal protection for man—not as a substitute for national means but as a mechanism exercising a measure of control over them and mobilising them for more fruitful work. This will necessitate agreed procedures to raise their efficiency.

In our view, the important thing at the moment is to get rid of old prejudices. Since the Vienna Meeting, many of our notions of the possibilities and limits of humanitarian cooperation have been undergoing a visible transformation. We often feared as the mechanism of the human dimension was evolved and the agenda of the proposed conference and conditions for holding it were discussed that the debate on specific "cases" might lead to a barren controversy over human rights.

The application of the Vienna mechanism has shown that the fears which until recently made us take a generally negative stand on such mechanisms were unfounded. The world is still what it was and so are we, yet solutions have been found to a whole range of humanitarian problems. What we mean generally is a revision of the absurd position upheld by us in the past. (Imagine a Soviet citizen being forbidden to go abroad 17 years after having had access to state secrets.) The Vienna mechanism helps do away with excesses which are still quite numerous in our case.

The experience gained over the past year suggests that formerly the tense atmosphere of discussions was due to our reluctance or refusal to deal with specific problems of guaranteeing human rights.

Willingness to search jointly for reasonable solutions prevents undue passions and paves the way for constructive cooperation. Furthermore, we are convinced of the need to recognise politically and psychologically that every time discussion reveals a discrepancy between our legislation and our international commitments (an ordinary occurrence in West European countries as well, where it is hardly ever seen as something terrible), the only correct, non-confrontational stand we can take is to show an unqualified readiness to amend our legislation rather than uphold the honour of the regiment.

If these conditions, which apply not only to the Soviet Union but to other participants in the Helsinki process, are met, the cooperation

mechanism brought into being at Vienna will become part of the concept of a common legal space, which implies, among other things, the establishment of the primacy of international law.

THE PROGRESS made at Vienna in the area of accords on the human dimension and recognised everywhere as a major breakthrough in the humanitarian sphere is not the final destination but the starting point. What seemed to be unthinkable and to verge on a miracle at Vienna is becoming a reality, primarily because we ourselves continue changing despite difficulties and vacillations. For their part, the rapid and radical changes taking place in other socialist community countries, which have already gone further in some respects than we have done in nearly five years of perestroika, are removing many of the artificial obstacles raised until recently to accords on a number of humanitarian problems.

There is no denying that not all such obstacles have disappeared in either the Soviet Union or other participating states of the CSCE. Still, the internal transformations born of the need to purify and renew socialism now offer—in conjunction with the Helsinki process—further opportunities to make the human dimension a priority in every social sphere.

Not long ago we used to feel quite free and tranquil at the CSCE forums, including those on human rights. The rate of transformations apace in the USSR let our country proceed much further than some of our Warsaw Treaty partners were ready to do, including Romania whose stand under the Ceausescu regime was a principal hurdle to decision-making at the Information Forum in London, at the Ecoforum in Sofia, and even in Paris. Yet, as life shows, the parts played by some nations may change, and quite rapidly at that. The tumultuous and explosive transformation processes afoot all over the Eastern Europe make one stop and ponder over our today's positions in advancing the CSCE concept of human dimension. With our present rates of introducing legal reforms we again are running the risk to find ourselves hindmost in this process.

In this new situation, it would only be right to put an end for good to bureaucratic games over new legislation and pay all our debts of yesteryear at an early date. We must no longer look back at Vienna, for the time has come to look ahead, at Moscow and Helsinki II.

TOWARDS NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE USSR

Koji KAKIZAWA

I HAPPENED to visit the Soviet Union in April, 1989, as head of the international department of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP). In the course of the visit I saw with my own eyes the process of perestroika now going on in the USSR, which one may call a second revolution, and had an exchange of opinion with members of the Soviet Government and journalists on a wide range of issues of East-West relations, the situation in the Asian and Pacific region and Japanese-Soviet relations.

The international community is undergoing considerable change at this point. The major trend in the world today is for the countries committed to a market economy policy, including the newly industrialised nations, to continue their economic growth and raise the living standards of the people, and for the socialist countries wedded to centrally planned economies to experience increasingly obvious economic stagnation. International economic activities have widened and deepened due to scientific and technological progress and, above all, to the advance of information and communication facilities, national frontiers have become more open for business contacts and the economic interdependence of nations has considerably increased. Further economic growth can well be expected to lead to the significance of science and engineering rapidly growing, particularly that of high technology development related to production. There will be a still closer relationship of world politics and economics with science and engineering.

This "major trend" in the world community is irreversible. It is this trend that has brought about far-reaching reforms in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. It has brought about changes in the economic policies of these countries. The modification of policy with a view to economic development brings with it reforms in the political and economic fields and leads to a serious reappraisal of human values in these countries. The once ideologically confined individual freedom and creativity are being disenthralled.

These changes in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe require a peaceful international environment. They have taken much wind out of the sails of East-West confrontation and put it into the age of dialogue and cooperation.

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By publishing this article, the editors mean to acquaint the readers with the viewpoint of a prominent politician on the key problems of Soviet-Japanese relations, including the territorial issue. On this subject, incidentally, without joining issue with the author, we could refer to a number of publications in *International Affairs*, including the article "Japan's Territorial Claims to the USSR" (No 2, 1989), setting out the Soviet stand and approach.

The major events taking place in the world community may, apparently, be represented as fragments of this historical trend.

So where does the relationship between Japan and the USSR come in, historically, considering the sweeping changes in the world? In its home policy, the Soviet Union has addressed itself to a great cause it calls "perestroika", while in international affairs it has committed itself to a "diplomacy of new thinking", giving up the tenets of traditional foreign policy. Japan is the second strongest nation of the free world in terms of economic potential (her GNP is over 10 per cent of the world's) and she is striving to play a part to match her potential in the world community. The way the relationship between our two countries will be built will have a tremendous impact on the Asian and Pacific region and on the world community as a whole. Needless to say that the leaders of the two countries have great responsibility to bear in this context.

REAL OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS

A DIALOGUE aimed at improving bilateral relations has been going on between Japan and the USSR since December 1988, due to the efforts of the governments of our two countries. In the course of the visit of Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sosuke Uno, to the Soviet Union in May, 1989, the two sides agreed on a common approach to the improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations. It consists in a balanced extension of the entire complex of bilateral links, including business contacts and human exchanges on the understanding that the conclusion of a peace treaty, comprising the territorial issue, is the most important task. In the course of the recent meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the USSR at the UN, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze announced the intention of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, to make a visit to Japan in 1991. With a view to extending and deepening the dialogue between our two countries, it is necessary to get down without delay to laying the ground for that visit by the Soviet leader. To this end, a visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Shevardnadze to Tokyo is scheduled for March, 1990, and subsequently the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs will visit the Soviet Union. With a view to promoting such intergovernmental dialogue and closer mutual understanding between the two countries, there will be more parliamentary exchanges: a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR will visit Japan, while a delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan will make a visit to the Soviet Union. It is my earnest hope that these efforts towards improving bilateral relations will be fruitful and effective in establishing a new type of relationship between Japan and the USSR.

The way to improving relations is not simple at all. The major obstacle in it is the fact that, with over 40 years gone since the end of the war, the peace treaty has still not been concluded because Japan and the Soviet Union have not been able to come to terms on the issue of four small islands lying north-east of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. I realize that it is an extremely involved and difficult issue for both countries to resolve. The legal and historical aspects of the positions of Japan and the USSR regarding the possession of these four islands are being widely discussed within the framework of the working group on the peace treaty, created in December 1988. All kinds of works by Japanese and Soviet scientists and researchers have been published on the issue. I think there is no need for me to go into detail again. There is only one point I would like to underline, and this is that the actual historical reality is such that the issue of sovereignty over the four northern islands (no matter how it may be called—the "territorial prob-

lem" or "the issue of the border line") remains unresolved in relations between the two countries. There is, furthermore, a controversial formula stating that "the issue of the possession of the four northern islands has been settled, but the national frontier has not been demarcated." For it is just because the territorial issue has not been resolved that it is impossible to demarcate the national frontier. The Soviet Union and Japan have each its own mode of approach to this problem. It is important, by using the ideas of both sides, to find a sensible formula for resolving the issue. There have been attempts at improving Japanese-Soviet relations, without touching upon the territorial problem, on the basis of an "intermediate document" or a "treaty of goodneighbourliness and cooperation." History has proved, however, that such attempts cannot, in the long run, set bilateral relations on the track of normalisation. I am confident that both Japan and the Soviet Union concur in the view that, whatever we may call the problem which has become an obstacle to the development of bilateral relations, the conclusion of the peace treaty by resolving it is a necessary condition for opening up a "new chapter" in relations between our countries.

NEW CONDITIONS FOR RESOLVING THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

WHY, THEN, does this problem still remain unresolved over 40 years after the end of the war? Obviously, if we confine ourselves to the issue of the title to the territories in question, for one side to gain in resolving it would mean for the other to lose. One may say that this is a game that cannot be won by both parties at once. Japan and the Soviet Union belong to different camps—the West and the East. Taking this into account, it would have been senseless to have wished this issue of the game between Japan and the USSR to be resolved, for instance, at the time of East-West confrontation—during the cold war of the 1950s or the collapse of detente in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Attempts and serious efforts were made for resolving the issue at the Japanese-Soviet negotiations so far held. But none have been of any avail, however, and that not so much because Japan and the Soviet Union had, in advance, expected one of them to be the loser as because no conditions for settling the territorial problem had been created.

At present, the situation is entirely different.

First, it is beyond doubt that the present-day international situation is one of diminishing East-West confrontation and increasing interdependence of nations. So the international situation is no longer that which would obstruct the solution of the problem. On the contrary, its solution is by itself a call of the times.

Second, the nations of the Eastern bloc are now seriously reconsidering the events, systems and institutions of the past in the political, economic and social fields. These nations are striving to pass over to new, more up-to-date and more sensible acts, systems and institutions. Is there any sense in the Soviet Union still upholding Stalin's "expansionist" policy which found expression in the occupation of the four northern islands? Adherence to the heritage of the past policy contradicts the trends of history. Besides, this cannot fail to make the Japanese doubt the seriousness of the policy of perestroika and new thinking pursued by the Soviet Union.

Third, and that is the main thing, at the present time, in the context of an increasingly consolidated relationship of interdependence in the international community, comprising Japan and the Soviet Union, it is no longer possible to resolve any issue, or any particular aspect of the issue, limited by its framework, at one's own discretion. Why, in Japanese-American relations, are both parties making appropriate efforts

towards overcoming foreign trade contradictions? Perhaps, somebody may find it more natural for one party, taking advantage of more favourable trade opportunities than those of its partner in the context of the free world economy, to build up its trade surplus. The point is that resolving this particular economic problem is an indispensable condition for creating a relationship of all-round and wide-ranging cooperation going beyond the framework of purely foreign trade links and conducive towards the normal development of Japanese-American relations in general. Speaking of Japanese-American relations in general, one thing that is in the true interest not only of the United States, which is reducing its foreign trade deficit, but also of Japan, to which the US efforts mean reducing her foreign trade surplus, is growing confidence and cooperation in other areas. Relations between Japan and the US today have nothing in common with a game that has winners and losers. On the contrary, one may say this is a game in which both sides stand to gain. In fact, one can say that not only about Japanese-American relations. One can say as much about Japan's relations with China, with the countries of Europe, with the Soviet Union, and with the ASEAN nations. Is it unlikely that events will take such a turn as to make the two countries really benefit, in the overall context of Japanese-Soviet relations, from a truly equitable, rather than narrowly ("who grabs what") interpreted solution of the territorial issue, the major one in relations between States? But to see that, one will, apparently, have to realise that an equitable solution of the territorial issue will be of benefit, in the long run, both to the side that recovers the territory and to the one that gives it up.

WHAT IS THE "NEW JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP"?

WHY, THEN, is the solution of the territorial issue certain to be of benefit both to the Japanese and to the Soviet side? An American magazine has intimated not so long ago that the Soviet Union might return the four northern islands to Japan in exchange for economic cooperation. Naturally, that was pure wishful thinking, and the Soviet Government dismissed the allegation at once. I also hold personally that such a solution of the issue is simply unrealistic. The idea of a territorial issue being resolved through material compensation is deficient by itself and, besides, it can hardly be appreciated, let alone, supported, by the people of either nation.

The one that will must be that of an overall improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations and the formation of a new type of relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The new Japanese-Soviet relationship must, as I said at the opening, form one of the major elements of the "main trend" of the modern world community. This means that, on the one hand, it (the new relationship) must make the life of the peoples of our two countries economically, culturally and spiritually richer, and, on the other, it must be a great contribution towards strengthening the peace and prosperity of the Asian and Pacific region which, because of its economic growth, is attracting the greatest attention of the whole world at the present time. Besides, the new Japanese-Soviet relationship must contribute towards making up the framework of East-West dialogue and cooperation.

The new relationship between Japan and the USSR, for instance, can upgrade exchanges between our two nations at all levels. We could think of annual exchange visits by large youth delegations, plans for exchanges between economists, scientists and personalities in the world of culture, of setting up a foundation for Japano-Soviet cultural exchanges, a Japano-Soviet scientific and technical information centre, a school

of enterprise and economic management, a centre for scientific and technological cooperation, etc.

There can be a full-scale development of tourist exchange between our two countries, passing over, to that end, to such practices as visa-free entry and the opening of all territories of our two countries to mutual free tourists travel, setting up a centre for the promotion of Japanese-Soviet tourist exchanges, etc.

Furthermore, we could, going beyond the framework of bilateral relations, extend the model of an improved Japanese-Soviet relationship to economic expansion and confidence-building throughout the Asian and Pacific region.

For example, the solution of the problem of the northern territories and normalisation of Japanese-Soviet relations can contribute towards a political settlement of the Cambodian problem, which is now the object of the efforts being made by the countries concerned, the lowering of tension on the Korean Peninsula as well as towards the progressive formation of conditions for creating a regional confidence-building system in the Asian and Pacific region.

It could be possible to launch large-scale joint ventures, involving the countries of the region, including Japan and the United States, within the framework of the Soviet Union's regional economic development projects on the territory of Siberia and the Far East, and, along with this cooperation in regional development, to build up economic links between the Soviet Far East, Siberia and the countries of the Asian and Pacific region.

Naturally, there must be appropriate aid from government, private, scientific, research and other organisations, if we are to gain a full idea of the new pattern of Japanese-Soviet relations and of the Asian and Pacific region on the threshold of the 21st century, and I am not going to list all the opportunities that may open up in this sense.

At the present time, the Soviet Government has to deal with such involved problems as ethnic relations, an economic crisis and so on. Can we raise the issue of the four northern islands at a moment like this? Maybe, we cannot. However, the policy you call perestroika is not, perhaps, just an internal economic reform, but it is also an attempt to coordinate the large-scale process of change in the Soviet Union with changes that are going on in the world community surrounding the USSR. It is just in these trying times, evidently, that peace and stability in the Asian and Pacific region, improved East-West relations and, of course, a new concept responding to the interests of every Soviet man and woman, are extremely important for the people. I believe that such a concept and new ideas will have the support and approval of the Soviet people.

None of those things will be a concession or a victory either for Japan or for the USSR. That will be a mutual display of political will for creating a new type of Japanese-Soviet relationship.

PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES

THE NEW SUPREME SOVIET of the USSR was formed last spring. I highly appreciate the great stride forward made by the Soviet Union for the first time in the direction of true democracy, which is basic to parliamentarism. The will of the people in Soviet policy-making has become more important than ever before in such conditions. That no major decision can be taken without the people's approval is quite clear to me, too, who has some experience of Japanese statesmanship. At the same time, each of the Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has tremendous personal responsibility to bear. As for Japanese-

se-Soviet relations, I would like the Supreme Soviet to debate at length what particular type of Japanese-Soviet relations would meet the interests of the peoples of our two countries. In Japanese Parliament, the MPs from the ruling and opposition parties constantly discuss Japanese-Soviet relations as one of the important foreign policy issues. This goes far towards shaping a consensus among the Japanese people. Consequently, Japanese-Soviet parliamentary exchange directly related to the formation of a consensus among the peoples of our countries, is extremely important. It is important for the MPs of both countries to see their partner's true face. My visit to the Soviet Union last April proved to be rather valuable experience in my parliamentary activity. I found at first hand that it was not simple at all for most of the projected reforms to be actually put through in the Soviet Union. I got a better idea, too, of the great difficulties that perestroika encounters. On leaving Moscow and recalling the emotional warmth of the Soviet people, I earnestly wished that the success of perestroika might lead to an increased well-being of the Soviet citizens, and, if we, the Japanese, have an opportunity to contribute towards it, I think we would readily do so.

I would also like Soviet MPs to get to know Japan. It is important for mutual understanding to grow not only between political leaders, but also between the MPs, as colleagues, and for exchanges to expand between representatives of different sections of society of our two countries.

IN CONNECTION with the projected visit of General Secretary Gorbachev to Japan in 1991 there are all kinds of judgements expressed in Japan. Some hold that this visit can spell a breakthrough in Japanese-Soviet relations, while others, on the contrary, presume it futile to pin any hopes on Gorbachev whose own position is not simple. I personally consider quite natural a desire for an early normalisation of Japanese-Soviet relations and, hoping that the Soviet leader's visit will become an important prerequisite for such normalisation, I want appropriate and sensible decisions to be taken to this end. At the same time, I would like Mr. Gorbachev to see our country with his own eyes, to understand it better still and to see what kind of relations with Japan would suit the interests of the Soviet people and the entire complex of East-West relations.

When General Secretary Gorbachev met the former Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Nakasone, he said that "something must be done" to improve Japanese-Soviet relations. We are also seriously thinking about it. And we want General Secretary Gorbachev and members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and all Soviet people to think together with us. This will help create a Japanese-Soviet relationship based on true goodneighbourliness and mutual understanding on the threshold of the 21st century.

ECHO OF PERESTROIKA IN THE THIRD WORLD

Obino Richard HAAMBOTE

ON A COOL but windy Monday morning of the 18th of July, 1988, I reported for work early as usual. I was perusing through the daily national newspapers before starting official work at 8 00 hours. A few minutes before the hour, a gentle knock sounded on the door and I asked the person to come in. It was one of the Senior Presidential couriers carrying a blue envelope. The letter was to be handed to me in person as per instruction, he said, while standing in front of me.

I opened the envelope immediately, the courier left the office. His Excellency, the President Dr. K. D. Kaunda was appointing me as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of my country to the USSR and in the same capacity, but on a non-residential basis, to five other socialist countries.

I had recently been reading foreign newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and books in English, all dealing with and discussing the ascendancy to power of Mikhail S. Gorbachev in the Kremlin and his drastic and dynamic socio-economic and political reforms in the Soviet Union. I wondered whether the President had taken cognisance of my keen interest in these developments in the Soviet Union and hence my appointment as the country's senior envoy to the Socialist World.

Quite frankly I was overwhelmed by the appointment and I felt then (and still do so now) that my countrymen, through the President, had bestowed a great honour on me. I still remain indebted to the people of Zambia for placing me in this position of trust. I have had, however, no illusions about the heavy responsibility on me and the enormous task that lay ahead.

The Soviet Union was a big country in more than one sense. It covered some 22.4 million square kilometers and was inhabited by more than one hundred Nations and Nationalities with a rich and enormous ethnic diversity. More important and relevant to the entire world today, was that the Soviet Union was undergoing a traumatic and dynamic socio-political and economic process whose objective was the total transformation of the ethos of the entire Soviet society. I thought then (and still do so now) that the Soviet restructuring programme would have decisive impact not only in Eastern Europe but the world at large.

Apart from the Soviet Union, I was also accredited to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland. There were a lot of important and interesting socio-political and economic developments in all these countries too. Each country posed its own unique challenge to me and I had to keep abreast with events in each one of them. This is no mean task particularly for a novice in the world of practical international diplomacy.

Obino Richard Haambote has been Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Zambia to the USSR since November 1988.

For the past eighteen years, I had been reading and analysing diplomatic dispatches from the hardworking and dedicated Zambian envoys all over the world. Now it was my turn to prepare such dispatches for others at home to analyse. I had not been an Ambassador before, although I had seen Ambassadors work at close quarters for a long time. But my position at State House afforded me the opportunity of travelling quite extensively to attend Conferences, and/or on State and Official visits to various places in the world (but I must admit I did not visit the Caribbeans, New Zealand and Australia). It was a challenge and, no doubt, an extraordinary life indeed. I am always conscious of the fact that those given more, more is expected from them. I had therefore to rise to the expectations of my countrymen. In spite of these odds, I accepted the appointment with grace and I was ready to take up my new assignment with zeal, dedication and enthusiasm.

ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW

ON SUNDAY, October 2, 1988 in the evening, I arrived in Moscow to a warm reception by the envoys of the African Diplomatic Corps. A good number of Heads of Missions or their representatives were at the airport to receive me. In spite of the delay of my Aeroflot flight, the African envoys were undaunted and waited patiently until I and my family arrived. I thought this was a true expression of African solidarity. In an impromptu speech, I apologised for having kept them waiting for such a long time although the delay was beyond my control.

I was now in Moscow for the third time, on two occasions on official visits with my Head of State, and now as Ambassador and, perhaps, for a much longer and exciting period.

On the 3rd of October, I called on the Protocol Department where I started the initiation ceremony into diplomatic life. The leadership at the Kremlin had just changed. It was on September 30, 1988, two days before my arrival in the Soviet Union. The Protocol Department informed me that my credentials had to be redone to take into account the political realities in the Kremlin. I sent back the credentials for appropriate action and received fresh ones in under a fortnight. I contacted the Protocol Department that I was ready for the traditional ceremony. The reply was that I could not present my credentials yet because other Ambassadors who had arrived before me and had sent their credentials to their respective countries for the same reason I sent mine, had not received theirs yet. I was caught up in the old trappings of traditions of diplomatic etiquette! (Perhaps conduct of diplomacy requires restructuring too in this day and age?) I had to wait until the principle of precedence took its course.

However, a date was later set to present copies of my letters to the Deputy Minister. In my case Deputy Minister, Viktor Komplektov received the copies. During that meeting, we exchanged views on a number of international issues in general and Southern Africa in particular. The Deputy Minister explained Soviet foreign policy objectives and goals based on the "New Political Thinking". At times he intervened, in English, to make a point the Soviet official interpreter might have missed or misrepresented. He was bilingual, a feature common to most senior Soviet leaders as I had established in due course.

Since I now had copies of my letter received by the host Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I could thereon perform my functions as Ambassador (albeit with a low profile) in accordance with diplomatic practice in most countries. However, it was not to be. The 24th of October is Zambia's National Day and it was around the corner. On that day, a reception was held in my residence and because it was technically on Zambian

soil, in the diplomatic and legal sense, I met the Soviet guests of honour and a number of senior Soviet and foreign diplomats from Moscow's Diplomatic Corps. I was touched by the warmth and sincere friendship expressed by the presence, in large numbers, of these diplomats. This occasion marked the beginning of an initiation ceremony into diplomatic life and above all, it was in cosmopolitan Moscow priding itself of playing host to 115 plus Ambassadors from all corners of the globe.

On November 1, 1988 I presented my credentials to the First Vice Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet who received them on behalf of the President. I was therefore, among the first foreign Ambassadors to present letters of credence to Cde Anatoli Lukyanov, the First Vice Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

From that moment onwards, I began paying courtesy calls on my counterparts. I was told that it was not always possible for an Ambassador in Moscow to call on all his counterparts in one tour of duty because they were many. I share this view. However, in less than a month, I called on more than fifty Heads of Mission in Moscow, their wide spectrum ranging from Ambassadors from developed North to Ambassadors from developing South.

During these calls, issues for discussions were many and varied ranging from bilateral ones, including the reform programme in the Soviet Union to international issues such as the debt burden of the Third World countries. I believe that there is an urgent need for these countries to use their debt power to seek redress from the current trade imbalance and the lopsidedness of the economic relations between them and the developed North.

On this issue, I held the view that while cancellation of debts by creditor Nations was welcome, it was not a solution in itself. It was merely a relief—like a pain killer administered to a patient suffering from a kidney ailment. I believe that the truth of the matter is that external debt is a result of the prevailing unequal economic relationship between the developed and industrialised North and poor and developing South. For instance, from 1970 to 1984 external debt of the Third World countries increased from US \$68 billion to US \$686 billion, while in 1987 external debt amounted to US \$996 billion. The debt servicing capacity of the developing countries deteriorated rapidly. The ratio of debt to Gross Domestic Products doubled from 15 per cent in 1970 to 34 per cent in 1984. In addition, the ratio of debt service to export rose from 14.7 per cent to 19.7 per cent during the same period. This situation spelt economic doom for the Third World countries.

The purchasing power of exports of developing countries in relation to imports from the rich North dropped by 80 per cent for the period 1970 to 1986. This led to a situation whereby domestic demands exceeded the amount of goods and services available. This situation creates inflationary pressures on the economies and also limits the capacity of these countries to reduce the volume of imports, let alone service their external debt adequately. In order to import essential goods from the North, developing countries will have to acquire foreign exchange in the form of loans, grants or private investments making them even more and more indebted. In turn, this becomes a vicious circle difficult to break. It is this circle that requires urgent dismantling by combined effort of the poor South.

The way out of this economic logjam is the creation of a New International Economic Order in which raw materials from the South are bought at reasonable prices by the North. The North must recognise the important role and indispensability of the South in the industrial development and prosperity of the North. The first decisive step would, I believe, be wholesome default on debt servicing by debtors until creditors

accepted meaningful restructuring of the current economic relations. The Third World could declare itself bankrupt and therefore unable to repay the debts. Although this strategy endangers their sovereignty, political stability and credibility, if it is undertaken by all of them simultaneously, the Third World countries would force the developed North to reconsider its current exploitative position. It is said, who owes the world a million of dollars runs the world. In my discussions with my colleagues, I found that there was a general consensus that the developing South deserved a better deal from the North, but of course there were differences of opinions on strategies on how to create a New Economic Order in which the Third World countries would benefit.

PANGS OF BIRTH OF A SOCIETY

IT IS NOT my intention to write an appraisal of the process of restructuring in the Soviet Union, neither is my submission an academic dissertation nor a value judgement. That task belongs to Sovietologists and the Soviet people themselves. I merely intend to put on paper my personal impressions of the socio-economic and political developments in the USSR since my arrival in October 1988. I should also add that it would be fallacious to believe that this submission is an exhaustive account of the current developments in this country.

As I called on my counterparts and exchanged views on the reform process in the Soviet Union and from reading Soviet publications, a general view was emerging and that view was that a new Soviet Society was about to be born. I was amazed at a continuous torrent of many and diverse ideas in Soviet publications, coupled with sharp public exchange of a variety of views throughout the width and breadth of the Soviet Union. However, the general theme was one and the same: the country was in urgent need of a new and dynamic order, a system that would answer and satisfy economic, political and social needs of the Soviet people and usher this huge country, endowed with enormous natural and human resources, into the 21st century as a modern, developed, self-sufficient and prosperous nation, with a free and vibrant society.

It is generally accepted that the constitutional reforms which paved the way for the elections held in March 1989 was an important milestone in the political history of the Soviet Union. I share the views of Professor Padma Desai of University of Columbia, USA, who said that the March 1989 elections to a new-style parliament were the most exciting political event in the postwar history of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people had an opportunity to exercise their rights at least in a degree determined by the concrete situation. The elections were a real school of an open political struggle between different views, platforms and individuals.

Indeed like in any society some elements have different perception of change, its place and direction while others even question the rationale of that change. Machiavelli's description of the attitude of society to change is apt and still valid to this day particularly so in present-day Soviet Union. He says that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more dangerous to handle, than initiate a new order of things (this situation is due) partly from the incredulity of mankind who do not (sic) truly believe in anything new until they had actual experience of it. But it is also true that you cannot have the "new" system exist parallel with the "old" for a long time and maintain an equilibrium. The old has to be broken to realise the new; one cannot have both in existence parallel to each other. As the English saying goes "you cannot have

your cake and eat it". One has to make a choice and the Soviet people, under the leadership of the CPSU, made theirs—that of perestroika in the socio-economic and political fields. But not everybody will willingly come along. This is understandable

The first session of the Supreme Soviet was an eye-opener to foreign diplomats and Sovietologists. Debates were diverse, sometimes critical, occasionally coupled with emotions and were carried out in a business-like manner. Literally all the Deputies wanted to speak up and have their views listened to by the leadership and the entire Soviet people as well as the world at large. Indeed, as a Radio Moscow commentator recently put it, "it was a political science school for both the Deputies themselves and the listeners alike who were glued to their radios and television sets during the deliberations of the first session of the Congress of People's Deputies". Indeed, the process of democratisation was in progress although one got the impression that there was a desire on the part of the People's Deputies to immediately make the country as democratic (perhaps even more!) as other so called democratic countries in the world. It should have, however, been appreciated that those democracies have had many decades, even centuries behind them of trial (and error) and tribulation to achieve that level of democracy prevailing in those countries today. At times it was apparent from the contributions of the Deputies that it was forgotten that freedom itself did not end problems once attained, but that freedom created even more serious and urgent problems which required foresight, ingenuity and patience to resolve to the benefit of the entire nation.

The attention of the People's Deputies of the USSR at the First Congress was glued to the discussion of the political questions. At the Second Congress in December 1989 the economic problems were high on the agenda.

It is clear to all and sundry that the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Party, had set themselves an enormous agenda whose execution required sufficient human and material resources coupled with pragmatism, patience and above all hard work on the leaders and the led alike. The economic restructuring is only two years old. I believe that it would be simplistic, and perhaps, naive, to expect the fruition of these economic reforms just yet, although, unfortunately, human nature being what it is, one would not be surprised to hear disenchantment from some sections of society on what is considered to be lack of their material improvement since the beginning of the reform programme. Some fragments of society would even look to the old days with nostalgia. Indeed, there lies a rough road ahead for all the Soviet people before they can expect tangible and substantial change in their economic wellbeing and standard of living. Our Soviet friends must remember that if "paradise" on earth cannot be realised for the current generations, at least let them build one for generations to come. There cannot be any nobler objective than realising this task. According to conventional wisdom, it is important and worthwhile to pay attention to the present for the sake of the future.

No doubt the reform programme is in the interest of the Soviet people and will produce the desired results for all in due course. I believe that if there is any period in the Soviet history that requires concerted effort and unity of purpose by all—that time is now and the political freedom that is prevailing in the country will undoubtedly unleash the energies in the Soviet people which will make the country economically prosperous in the years ahead. Historical records abound, the Soviet people are capable of solving the most difficult problems. Certainly, the CPSU has an immense task ahead of it. The Party has to mobilise the country's vast material and human resources and at the same time provide a leadership

worth of the tasks it has set before the Soviet people and the entire international community.

Since the reform process began there has been an explosion of mass media coverage of official views on a wide range of subjects as well as views from a cross-section of Soviet society. It is great fun and pleasure to read Soviet publications but it is now an absolute necessity for an Ambassador to browse through Soviet papers each day. Apart from carrying interesting articles on almost any subject, the papers are useful indicators or gauge of the pace and progress and general direction of the reform process. President Kaunda always reminds the Zambian people, particularly those who take offence to the critical press coverage, that the Press was a mirror of the Nation. A free press is as good as its own society. I remember discussing Soviet press with one Ambassador who had previously served in Moscow as a junior diplomat some years back. Recalling those days, the Ambassador said diplomats read Soviet papers and publications *between* lines to enable them know what was happening in society; but now, he said, Ambassadors read *all* the lines, not only because the publications always carried something new and important but because they were also interesting and entertaining and informative as they were educative.

On the minus side of the Soviet press, one can only say that it would also be useful to discuss perestroika in relation to the Soviet economic relations (now and in future) with the Third World countries. Whether or not perestroika holds a bright economic future for the developing South and what role the Third World can and should play I believe that the Third World can and has a lot to contribute to the Soviet Union in the field of economic cooperation. The Soviet Union has enough good trade partners in the Third World and with many of them trade is carried without convertible currency. Economic relations and business transactions between the Third World and the Soviet Union receive little coverage in the Soviet press. Surely such information is available and it is not beyond the capability of the Soviet comrades in the press world to publish and analyse such economic interaction between the Third World and the Soviet Union. Indeed in some cases such an effort would even assist identifying new avenues of economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Third World countries for the benefit of the two sides and mankind in general. One reads about joint ventures in the Soviet Union with developed countries only and yet there is a lot of foreign trade between the Soviet Union and the Third World countries. Of course, there is no harm in being Euro-centred but in this modern world and age where interdependence in all areas of human endeavour is becoming the hallmark of international relations, the Third World deserves as much attention by the press as any part of the world.

ZAMBIA-SOVIET RELATIONS

IT IS NOT my intention to go into detail on this subject because this requires more time and space. In that regard, I intend to provide a summary of the bilateral relations before and after Zambia's independence in 1964.

Immediately after independence of Zambia on the 24th of October, 1964 the two countries established diplomatic relations at Ambassadorial level. Zambia has had ten Ambassadors in Moscow since then, while the Soviet Union has had six Ambassadors.

Before independence, the United National Independence Party (UNIP)—Zambia's ruling Party, received assistance from the USSR in the form of training professional cadre such as medical doctors, engineers, technicians and other artisans. A number of such trained cadres

now hold prominent positions in the socio-political and economic structures in the country where their contribution is invaluable. Furthermore, hundreds of Zambians have since graduated from a number of Soviet institutions of higher learning while others are still pursuing their academic studies in this country.

There are a number of economic and technical agreements between the two countries. There are Soviet teachers and doctors in Zambia. It is my hope that both sides will continue to identify new areas of economic cooperation for the mutual benefit of the two peoples. On people to people diplomacy, a number of Zambian cities have been twinned with Soviet cities and delegations are being exchanged at this level annually.

In July 1989, an eight-man Zambian parliamentary delegation, led by Hon. Mr. Speaker Fwanyanga Mulikita, M. P., visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet. The delegation held useful talks with a Soviet parliamentary delegation led by Comrade Rafik Nishanov, Chairman of the Chamber of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The delegation was received in the Kremlin by Comrade Anatoli Lukyanov, First Vice Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and exchanged views on a number of issues. To my knowledge, Zambian parliamentary delegation was the first to visit the USSR since the election of the new Supreme Soviet.

Both countries share common positions on a number of issues and support each other in international fora. Since the day of the establishing of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level the warm and friendly ties have emerged between our countries. However, there was a time, which I think I must mention here, because of its importance both from the point of view of the past and of the present.

In August 1968, the troops of the Warsaw Treaty countries were moved into Czechoslovakia. President Kenneth Kaunda blamed the WTO for that action and said that all countries, Czechoslovakia included, had the right to decide their destiny by themselves, without interference from outside. Zambia demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Put at the foundation of the present Soviet foreign policy based on the new political thinking is the freedom of any country to decide its destiny by itself. The results of this policy are perfectly obvious. Zambia's national philosophy of Humanism stresses and recognises the importance and centrality of man in all five areas of human endeavour. These are political, economic, social and cultural, defence and security, and science and technology. We believe that achievements and developments in these areas are and should be for the benefit of man—man East, man West, man South and man North—all mankind should enjoy and share the benefit of scientific and technological advancement. However, man cannot realise his potential to develop to greater heights in a world riddled with conflicts based on artificial barriers such as race, creed, ethnic background; in a world under the cloud of constant threat of nuclear war; indeed in a world of "haves and have nots". Humanism believes that all these barriers are artificial and must be removed in order to attain a perfect society; a man-centred society in which man is recognised for what he is, irrespective of his station in life.

The Soviet home and foreign policy outlook is based on the universality of human values, on the premise that human beings, irrespective of their ideological and political persuasion, have something common and valuable to all: the right to live on this planet. In my view the Soviet foreign policy is based on the need to work for peace on earth and to find ways and means to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and fuse scientific and technological revolutions in order to bring to the full the poten-

tial of socialism for the benefit of mankind, in a society free from any form of exploitation.

It is, therefore, not by accident that the two countries hold, nay, share similar views on a number of issues in the world fora. Humanism is consonant with the Soviet policy of new political thinking. Zambia seeks peace and is ready to achieve peace the world over because we believe that man has the right to survive on this planet. We seek peace in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Europe. In our quest for global peace, we derive our strength from the moral, material and political support from the Soviet Union under the leadership of Comrade Mikhail S Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. We take due cognizance of and draw encouragement from the Soviet Union's diplomatic initiatives in attempt to achieve global peace. We believe that without peace, mankind cannot fully address itself to the serious and urgent problem of poverty, with its offshoots of ignorance, hunger, disease, crime, exploitation of man by man.

To the Soviet comrades and the entire Soviet Party and Government leadership, we in Zambia say, continue on this path of peace, however difficult it might prove to be, for it holds the key to the bright future and to the very survival of mankind.

AFGHANISTAN: ONE YEAR ON

A YEAR HAS PASSED since the day—February 15, 1989—the last Soviet soldier left the soil of Afghanistan, marking the end of the longest war in living memory, a war through which more than one million Soviet men passed, leaving, according to official statistics, 13,310 dead and tens of thousands wounded. It has left deep scars on the soul of the whole people, scars which may never quite disappear.

The Afghan war showed, apart from everything else, that the Brezhnev regime, the mechanism of power which took the decision to send Soviet soldiers to a foreign land, was worthless and, one could say, rotten. The new stage of the "Saur Revolution", which began on December 27, 1979, has gone down as a black day both for Afghanistan and for the Soviet Union. The ideologisation of foreign policy was carried to an absurd extreme, and it naturally developed into its opposite. Ideology began to command politics, together with the politicians. We have no intention of sitting in judgement on the Democratic People's Party of Afghanistan and its 1979 leaders for their "infantile disorder" of impatience and their adamant "revolutionary" attitude to their own people: that is something the Afghans themselves will have to sort out.

It is more important for us to sort out our own sins, for we cannot have peace of mind unless we know the whole truth. In this sense, the assessment given by the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR of the dispatch of Soviet troops appears to be the starting point for getting at the whole truth and moving on to clarity.

To his day we have no idea how the decision was taken, although those who took it have been named: Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov and Gromyko. Should one assume that this "secret of the court" was interred together with those who had known it? That is most unlikely, because public indignation is too intense, and so the truth will out.

It is all very well to point a finger, but who is going to pay the bill? Indeed, what sort of charge can we make against the ailing Leonid Brezhnev, as we remember him in 1979, a sorry excuse for the leader of a great power who spoke in firm tones and well-memorised words: "A revolution took place there (in Afghanistan—Ed.) in April 1978. The Afghan people took its destiny into its own hands and set out on the way of freedom and independence. As it has always happened in history, the forces of the past are up in arms against the revolution. The people of Afghanistan could have, of course, coped with them on its own, but from the very first days of the revolution it was confronted with external aggression, with gross intervention from outside." Everything is cut and dried, there is the ready-made classical set of iron-clad phrases which can be used to explain away any madcap venture, but which lacks only one thing: common sense, a readiness to look around and try to understand that times have changed.

One can do no more than speculate about the attitudes taken by the other members of Brezhnev's immediate entourage. One tried to convince the leader that, from the military standpoint, the occupation operation

would be short and easy. The other sounded the alarm about the then Afghan leader Amin having sold out to the CIA. The third probably maintained an eloquent silence punctuated with solidly intoned phrases of approval. Articles and reports have recently been published seeking to vindicate the generals and the military services, and trying to prove that the intention was only to "man garrisons and keep out of military operations", but that under pressure from the top a 100,000-strong army had to be sent into this essentially medieval country, so rousing the people both against the Kabul government and against ourselves. Here one is put in mind of the military man who keeps appearing on television and in the press with a marshal's stars on his shoulder-pieces, a golden star of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 11 rows of decorations on his chest—most of them, one would assume, awarded for action in Afghanistan.

IT WAS A HARD road that led to February 15, 1989, but the new Soviet leadership was firmly advancing along it because it had come to understand the futility of keeping the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan, together with the moral, economic and political costs, to say nothing of the human losses in this futile war. It began by taking the first few and fairly restrained steps: by withdrawing six Soviet regiments, helping the Afghan government in its policy of national reconciliation and in establishing a broadly-based coalition government in Afghanistan which could include the hostile parties and groupings as well. These measures did not yield the desired results, and the main reason was the continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

By the end of 1986, things had run into a dead end. Afghanistan refused to discuss the withdrawal of Soviet troops until Pakistan agreed to hold direct instead of UN-mediated negotiations. Pakistan, for its part, refused to have any direct negotiations, claiming that the government of Afghanistan had been installed by Soviet troops and was being maintained by them. It was high time to display political courage and wisdom and take the decision to pull out. Every extra day of the Soviet army presence in Afghanistan led farther and farther away from the natural goal.

It was no easy thing to work out and put through the decision to withdraw: there was resistance in Soviet military-political circles; there was rejection on the part of the Afghan leadership; there was disbelief about the Soviet Union actually withdrawing its troops.

The political efforts culminated in the Geneva accords in the spring of 1988, a package of four agreements on a settlement: non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, international guarantees of its neutrality, return home of almost 5 million Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran, and a withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

The objectives, motivations and attitudes of the parties involved in the conflict were different, and that is why each party quite naturally saw the post-Geneva situation in its own light. That is precisely why the signing of the Geneva accords did not automatically begin a count-down for peace to descend on Afghan soil, but the accords did have a major part to play, and they could have the crucial part in ending the conflict if all the parties honestly fulfilled them.

Today, a year after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the situation is once again one of confrontation, and if just after the troop pull-out the issue was being settled on the field of battle, now that the positions of the Najibullah Government have been consolidated in military and political terms, the Afghan problem could well present an ever deeper impasse.

Following the withdrawal of the 40th Army from Afghanistan, the opposition was unable to overthrow the Kabul regime, although there appeared

to be every likelihood of it doing so judging by the outward arrangement of forces. The practice of guerrilla warfare against alien troops had proved its worth at the preceding stage of the war, but things began to change when the war developed into a confrontation between two forces in which the adversaries have a good view and knowledge of each other. It is hard to fight in the East without an understanding of the local mentality. Both sides are now Afghans who have grown to adulthood in the same surroundings, and have the same religion, traditions and customs. The famous Afghan expression "parva nist" (it does not matter) which has become something of a byword and is supposed to mean indifference, actually implies the Sufi aloofness from the vanities of the secular world and one's consignment to the will of God. This moral principle is professed by both these forces, and in this sense they are on an equal footing.

The maintenance of this kind of equilibrium, or an equilibrium in maintaining the existing confrontation, could well last for a long time. The Afghan people have patience, both contending parties claim to be acting on their behalf, and each of them has a perfect right to be doing so. With the Soviet pullout, active or passive resistance has ended for the civilian population, the bulk of which is tired of the war and tends to take a wait-and-see attitude, if not a neutral one. The idea of territorial control in Afghanistan has historically meant no more than nominal administration from the centre. In the rural areas, administrative and economic life was kept going by means of self-government, while the central authority was content to have a mainly representative presence. The government now has control of the administrative centres. Life in the smaller administrative units is being regulated by the presence of field commanders, a local militia, or simply by the local mullah, as it had been before the revolution.

Let us add that the provisional government in Peshawar, which takes an extremely hostile attitude to Kabul and refuses to have any compromises, including any participation by former King Zahir Shah in the peace process, has, after all, failed to gain any essential authority among the Afghans.

The confrontation could well go on for a long time, provided the two sides are being kept supplied by their allies, i. e., victory or defeat for either side depends on the amount of aid it receives. Once again the issue of who beats whom is being decided outside Afghanistan.

THE AFGHAN ISSUE is a constant item in Soviet-US negotiations. During the ministerial meeting in Wyoming, and then at the summit meeting in Malta, there was an exchange of considerations about the hottest aspects of the Afghan situation.

Let us begin with the US approach. Concerning military aid, the US side claims, the US-Soviet view of "symmetry" was the cornerstone of the decision on the part of the United States and Pakistan to conclude the Geneva accords. This view is crucial to the issue and implies:

- we retain the right to give military aid to the Afghan side;
- if the Soviet Union continues its military aid, we shall use this right;
- we insist that we shall, in fact, be able to extend such aid, and we ourselves shall determine the forms in which it is made available, without taking account of the view of the Soviet side;

Pakistan will sign the Geneva accords on the basis of the above-stated understanding;

- we make an official and public declaration of what has been stated.

It is the view of the United States that all the parties concerned were clear on the point that the principle of "positive" symmetry gives the United States the right to continue its military aid, together with the possibility of realising this right. The United States accepts the basic principle according

to which the Afghan people must decide their affairs independently.

Whatever the final outcome in Afghanistan, the US side holds, there will most probably emerge something intermediate between the present situation and the formation of a future government which will represent the whole people of Afghanistan. The United States and the USSR are agreed that such a transition period may be used for the purpose of ending the hostilities and realising the principle of self-determination. The United States declares its readiness to discuss any plan with respect to the transition process leading to the creation of a broadly based government and to the status of a peaceful, independent, and non-aligned Afghanistan. But if such a plan is to have any chance of success at all, it must ultimately take account of the Afghan people's wishes.

In the course of the latest contacts with the Americans, the Soviet side put forward the view that we are gradually coming to probe for some new elements in the approach to this extremely acute issue, and that this gives some hope. This pertains especially to the discussion of some concrete proposals of the Najibullah Government concerning the possible transitional power structures in the country. This constructive conversation needs to be continued, and it should carry us to a result.

At the same time, the actual situation inside and around Afghanistan continues to be extremely tense and to have a negative effect on the overall situation in the world and on the Soviet-US dialogue. According to the document on international guarantees, the United States undertakes to respect the obligations contained in the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, notably, on non-interference and non-intervention, and insistently urges all the states to act likewise.

Consequently, the point is largely—one could say crucially—for the Pakistani side to fulfil the provisions of the said agreement. Meanwhile, Pakistan has violated virtually all the points of Article 2, which constitutes the substance of the document, and there are enough examples on this score.

According to another point of the Afghan-Pakistani agreement, each of the parties undertakes not to allow on its territory the presence, shelter in camps or bases, or in any other manner, the organisation, training, financing or equipment of armed persons and groups for the purposes of conducting subversive activity or creating disorders or disturbances on the territory of the other side. There is simultaneously a ban on the transportation of weapons, ammunition and equipment by such persons or groups. These key provisions are being systematically violated, literally every day. That is what happened in the attempts by the opposition to capture Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar. That is how it has continued to this day. As for the camps mentioned above, following the Soviet troop pullout, their number has even increased from 160 to 180, although under the Geneva accords they were to have been liquidated by May 15, 1988.

We believe that the United States has sufficient possibilities of exerting an influence on Pakistan and restraining it from violating the Geneva agreements.

It is being emphasised on the Soviet side that there must be a separate discussion of the question of arms deliveries to Afghanistan. Everyone knows about the way along which the arms are delivered: it runs through Pakistan. And that is a direct violation of the agreement concluded between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This question could well arise: and what about the Soviet deliveries of weapons to the Afghan government? There the situation is absolutely clear. They are being affected on a legitimate basis, in accordance with the contractual obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union with respect to the Republic of Afghanistan. What is more, these deliveries are intended exclusively for defensive purposes. But for the aggression against the Republic

of Afghanistan and the attempts from Pakistani territory to overthrow its government with the use of arms, there would have been no need of giving military assistance to Afghanistan.

What is more, Soviet military deliveries do not pose any threat to the existing system in Pakistan and are not designed to overthrow the Pakistani government. By contrast, arms deliveries to the mujaheddin are nothing but activity from the territory of another country aimed to overthrow the government of the Republic of Afghanistan, and that is in basic contradiction with the Geneva accords.

Besides, it is well known that, by agreement with the Afghan government, we have repeatedly invited the United States to take concrete steps to promote a ceasefire in Afghanistan without delay, and simultaneously to halt arms deliveries to the warring parties, whatever their origin. Unfortunately, no positive response has yet been received in Moscow.

The sizeable financial aid being given by the US side to the armed Afghan opposition falls in the same rank. It is the same "yeast" which the activity of the opposition in devastating its own country is leavened. This pertains precisely to the military aid to the armed contingents of extremists, whereas we, naturally, have nothing and can have nothing against US humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees.

There is the conviction in the Soviet Union that for the purpose of restoring peace, which is, after all, the greatest good, it is necessary above all, at the present and perhaps especially responsible stage in the Afghan saga over the entire past period, to enable the Afghan people to settle their own affairs. What we now witness is ceaseless—and even mounting—intervention from outside in these affairs, and there is no justification for it. There can be no military solution to the Afghan problem—there simply is no such solution.

THE OBJECTIVE comparison of the positions of the United States and the USSR set forth above speaks for itself. If there is no change in the US approach, all the Afghans, and not only the Afghans, will have to be more patient. No wonder the word "sabr" (patience) is the word most often used in the Koran: it is mentioned on 900 occasions on its pages. The United States holds the key to the way out of this impasse. Whatever may be said in the United States, it has, in fact, set up a bloc in Afghanistan with medieval fundamentalism, the Islamic fundamentalism which is being publicly condemned by the Americans themselves in other countries. And what about the new political vision which Washington has been urging others to adopt?

I HOPE TO GET AROUND TO THE SOVIET UNION

Ingvar KAMPRAD

IKEA (Ingvar Kamprad, Elmhult, Agunnarijd) is a network of retail outlets offering customers furnished household goods. It consists of many departments headed by a holding company in Holland, which is owned by a socially useful fund. The office of the executive directorate is located in Denmark.

The first IKEA branch was founded in 1943 in the town of Agunnarijd as exclusively a mail-order firm.

IKEA's first big shop was opened in Elmhult, Sweden, in 1958. Some 80 shops have been opened in 20 countries since 1958, the average sales space of each amounting to 15,000 sq m. The shops catered to about 68 million shoppers last year. Customers purchased goods amounting to 16,600 million Swedish kronas, not counting sales tax. At present IKEA has an aggregate staff of 15,000.

In its plans for the future the IKEA group intends to continue building six to eight shops a year. At present a number of new shops are under construction.

The first shop in a socialist country is to open this March in Budapest. In future it is planned to build shops in socialist countries first of all. The opening of the first shop in the Soviet Union is slated for 1991 in Leningrad, but, regrettably, it may be delayed for approximately a year. Another four or five shops are to be built in the USSR over the longer term.

WHEN A DEVIL gets old he begins believing in God, runs a Swedish proverb, one in which, looking back on my own life, I see a big grain of truth. Not that I feel old for my workfilled 63 years. However, I must admit that, being a sworn enemy of theories in my youth, over the past ten years I have begun reflecting more and more about causes and effects, successes and failures, joys and sorrows.

I have been fortunate in that throughout my life I have been quite healthy and have worked a great deal, and in my personal life I have known much joy and sorrow, success and failures. However, if you take a look at IKEA, the enterprise which I founded on June 1, 1943, at the age of 17, the last quarter of a century has been years of uninterrupted successes, naturally, not without some disappointments and the positive dissatisfaction that underlies any development.

We aspire to a clear and positive goal which is a valuable contribution to the overall process of democratisation, a goal which uplifts

Ingvar Kamprad is a big Swedish businessman, the founder and director-general of the IKEA firm from 1943 to 1986 and chairman of the board of the IKEA group since 1986. In 1989 he was named "Swede of the year" by the association of Swedes living abroad. The article was written especially for INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

and inspires all our employees; we have a high standard of production, which obtains from our goal, a standard which implies a lifestyle.

Can one, however, define why IKEA is successful, while other ventures are not? Then years ago it was difficult for me to answer this question, but now, after I have met with executives of other enterprises and organisations over many years, I think that I can trace a pattern. To my mind, success requires the following:

- a dream;

- an idea about how to bring this dream to fruition;

- energetic people prepared to implement the idea,

- consistent will that direct the realisation of the idea.

Permit me to begin with my roots. I was born and bred in a small farming family in the south of Sweden. I was very fond of my parents, who were good and generous people. My father dreamed much about how to improve our farm, but he did not have the resources to do so. I realised early in life that a dream should always be linked with possibilities for bringing it to fruition. So my first big dream was how to help my father obtain the means to implement his plans.

My father and mother had to sacrifice a great deal so that my sister and I could receive a secondary education. My modest abilities and our meagre funds were the reason for my finishing a modern school and a commercial Gymnasium. I had many difficulties: a limited vocabulary, which made it hard for me to read and write, and I was astonishingly poor at learning foreign languages, this inability plaguing me my entire life. However, I had many valuable qualities such as an ability to dream and fantasise, energy, a strong will, some humility, and, last but not least, a good amount of farmer's common sense.

Even before I started going to school, and also during it, I had taken a lively interest in goods distribution. Back then—in the 1940s—enormous efforts were being expended to attain full rationalisation of production, while the entire distribution sphere had been neglected. If, for example, the production of one stocking cost one krona, the same stocking retailed for perhaps four kronas. I simply failed to understand why people strove so hard to rationalise production, reducing production cost by a few ore, while big expenses (and, consequently, possibilities for economising) were involved in transport, warehousing and distribution, i. e., costs which arose on the item's path from producer to consumer. I made up my mind to devote my future to resolving these problems!

A short time later I began studying furniture and household interiors. I immediately figured out for myself that most of the goods being produced, which were designed well and were of high quality, were meant only for a small number of people. Most people with limited resources had to settle for furniture with low functional and qualitative characteristics. It was my desire to change this state of affairs and work for the majority of people, for all those whose means were marginal, and this desire kept growing in my heart and ultimately took the form of a lofty goal.

Now I would like to return to the four pillars of success: the dream, the idea, the people and the materialisation of the idea. None of these pillars may be excluded.

A dream which is not buttressed by ideas and a concrete plan for bringing it to fruition remains merely one of the many dreams which the world is full of. The dreamer who fails to find a link with reality and is incapable of finding people prepared to support him remains only a dreamer.

Dreams can be useful for development and for people, but they can also become negative and destructive. Many dreams can be positive

and filled with good intentions; however, they can become destructive as they are implemented. This can depend on a lack of possibilities or merely on the fact that the dream was built on false notions of reality. For example, many politicians, production managers and other persons who take important decisions do not have an understanding of the reality in which most people live, their contact with people's everyday lives is marginal, and their decisions are based on proposals which often rest on false statistics and embellished information coming from their closest associates.

Here at IKEA, the dream is formulated in the following guideline: "Better everyday life for a majority of people." This may seem to be an ambitious dream, however, as we understand it, the family and home are the centre of human existence. We want to implement our lofty goal with the aid of a working idea—offering a wide variety of goods for the household with good design and functional properties at prices low enough to enable as many people to buy them as possible.

Taking this working idea as the basis, all of us at IKEA consistently seek to implement it. We work in three main areas:

1. Energetic work on the design and technical characteristics of output while simultaneously integrating manufacturing subdivisions through capital investments and technical cooperation.

2. Development of our own concept in terms of bringing the finished output home to the consumer, namely, catalogues offering original interiors, and shops where customers can serve themselves. By packaging our output in flat boxes, we save on warehousing and shipping. The customers themselves assemble most of the goods, following easy instructions. All this leads to lower prices, which is in the customers' interests.

3. Due consideration for cost in all spheres and a constant striving for simple, intelligent solutions to any problem. We are familiar with the widely-held belief that the customers should cover all our expenses in the form of the price which they pay for our output; therefore, we often ask ourselves whether the shoppers really want to cover these expenses.

Our stubborn efforts on all three fronts have led to many radical and original solutions and have helped us cover a large part of the way to our goal. For us, the possibility to survive and further develop hinges on our ability to constantly revive old and find new and better solutions, which gives us fresh incentives to save for the benefit of the majority for which we are working.

This may be presumptuous on my part, but I have often been astonished by the fact that the IKEA dream is in many ways similar to the dreams for a better world which underlie major political ideologies. There is even a similarity to the communism that Lenin dreamed of and to the society that he wanted to create. The dream of making the lives of most people better is a common one with us, although, of course, for the world's biggest country the ways of bringing it to fruition should be more extensive. We at our small IKEA can concentrate on what surrounds the individual in his home, while in the Soviet Union, implementation of the idea should embrace all aspects of the everyday life of a majority of people.

Is it perhaps scope that determines the difference between success and failure? When an enterprise is small, it is easy to keep the dream alive, it is easy in everyday contact with all your employees to convey the connotations of the working idea on your personal example. It is also easy to influence an incorrect course of the idea and correct mistakes when you encounter reality yourself.

The bigger the enterprise the harder it is to keep the dream alive

and to monitor all the details of development, and the greater the risk that the dream will be replaced by a system, that the idea will become synonymous with the methods of implementing, and that it will not be conveyed to people or will perhaps be distorted on the way to them, and that therefore people will turn from those who dream together into instruments which need to be operated.

Of course, this comparison is imperfect in many ways. So small a business as IKEA cannot be compared to an entire country. But we have also grown and we had many problems when we rather rapidly covered the long road from a small mail-order enterprise in the town of Agunnaryd to one of the biggest enterprises in the world in the home interior field. The system and methods have also tried to get the upper hand in our business. The bureaucracy and a desire to win the market sought to lessen the importance of the individual and hamper the development which was my overriding goal for many years. No enterprise can be run by directors alone. All employees are important for attaining results. It is for this reason that we do not want barriers between different categories of employees. All these years I have tried to maintain good working relations with the different departments in order to keep abreast of our reality. I have also encouraged my closest employees to make their personal contribution to the development of our business. We have welcomed personal initiative and have invested our staff at all levels with responsibility and authority, and we have tried to overcome fear of the possibility of making mistakes or departing from the assigned schemes—only one who sleeps does not make mistakes. In short, we have sought to get each employee to realise that reaching the goal depends on the efforts he personally takes, and not on directives received from others.

WITH OUR TRADEMARK motto "Good design does not have to be expensive" we made many enemies among the merchants who have already entrenched themselves on the market. We decided once and for all to stay on the side of a majority of people. We had to enter into stiff competition against enterprises that were strong on the Swedish market at the time and we were forced to endure a mighty blockade for many years. Under the pressure of our competitors many Swedish factories refused to deliver output to us. Then, as had been the case in the past, too, we turned the problem into an opportunity—Poland became one of the many variants for solving this problem. In November 1960 our then buyer Ragnar Sterte and I went to Poland and began establishing cooperation with the Polish furniture industry, which was rather unique at that time. Over the years representatives of Polish industry and export organisations and we began spending entire months there, months filled with difficulties and joys. Our contribution to design and technology has exerted an influence on the furniture industry of that country, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that to date our cooperation has left its imprint on most Polish homes or official institutions. I remember very well the first contact with the system of a planned economy and the difficulties which we faced during joint work to attain the needed efficiency. There was a patent lack of initiative and competition, and despite the fact that in many areas we met many enthusiasts with great will power, our efforts were hampered by other people who had been swallowed up by the cumbersome system.

I also remember how I dreamed of once returning home and working hard in distribution, which was, regrettably, underestimated. Opening an IKEA shop in Poland was a dream at that time, a dream which proved possible much later. The possibility to take part in realising

the dream of most people for their own home became an important part of our aspirations.

To this day I am grateful for the knowledge I received and the opportunity provided by my Polish friends to acquaint myself with the conditions of the planned economic system.

We continued to implement our work concepts in East European countries—Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Romania, but it was only in the 1970s that we received permission to work in the Soviet Union. Don't ask me why. Perhaps this depended on the size of our enterprise. How could small IKEA meet the needs of such a huge country? Were people listening to our thoughts and ideas regarding design and technology? After all, we had our own ideas about the form and functional and technological characteristics of furniture. Should representatives of foreign trade organisations which controlled inexhaustible raw material resources and a huge production apparatus heed the opinion of such a small company as IKEA?

After many talks at different fairs with representatives of the Soviet timber export company Exportles who are responsible for this sphere, we managed jointly to receive permission to work, which will result, several years from now, in a big enterprise financed by us and a factory in the Leningrad area. However, this is merely a modest beginning which has yielded us, over the more than ten years of cooperating with the Soviet Union, results that are much more marginal than those with other socialist countries. We soon discovered that the management of the factory was very strong willed but that his will often led to an ineffective fight against the entrenched machinery of rules and regulations, a fight against obstacles which were difficult to sidestep. What is more, access to raw materials was a problem, and all this in the richest country in terms of natural resources!

We made a lot of mistakes ourselves. We were impatient and wanted immediate results, we paid too little attention to the differences in cultural traditions, and, perhaps (perish the thought!) we never had enough humility in the face of the special problems which our partners had to encounter. Our ignorance of Soviet customs and ways definitely came back to haunt us.

However, the Soviet side, too, sometimes failed to display sufficient understanding of the problems that arose. At times we got the impression that such a big country as the Soviet Union did not need cooperation either with little IKEA or with anyone else. Our friends from Exportles were not always successful in drawing attention to broadening cooperation with us.

Nevertheless, several years later we found reliable support among major producers. Just as in other socialist countries, an "IKEA Fan Club" formed, while a certain number of opponents of our cooperation appeared. The "fan club" included influential forces which wanted to rationalise production and develop their enterprises. The camp of opponents frequently consisted of people who did not want this. Those who believed that it was too difficult to meet our quality requirements. The argument frequently adduced was that IKEA pays poorly. These people did not notice our expenses and efforts aimed at creating an uninterrupted production cycle, and our desire to keep improving efficiency under the circumstances. There were unquestionably opponents, too, among ranking officials in the hierarchy which was forced to take additional efforts so that production could become more effective. In the intervening years more and more people began realising that success implies constant development. By dint of this the "IKEA Fan Club" strengthened with each passing day.

The chief cause of the slow development of our cooperation for

many years was, of course, the system. Lenin's dream was turned into a system, the initial ideas of implementing it, into frozen methods, and those who used to dream together, into passive executors. How could we at IKEA help rationalise factories when we were not even permitted to visit them? How could factory employees have a sense of responsibility for delivery deadlines when they frequently were not even able to control the delivery of raw materials or the transport system? How was one to deal with unnecessary losses of raw materials in a system where the plan was no less important than development? Perhaps such a system had its advantages, but we had difficulty discovering them.

THE PAST is dead and buried, and today the point at issue is what is new, the future and all its hope-filled signals. On the road of the sweeping reforms that are taking place today, on the road of the great transformations of humanity we are unquestionably encountering many disappointments and finding many wonderful concepts which have no place in the real world; however, stagnation always gives way to movement and development, and there is no road back.

As far as IKEA is concerned, the signal ushering in the new period was made in winter-spring of 1988 by Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov, when he visited an IKEA shop in Göteborg on his own initiative together with Prime Minister Karlsson. Several months later, on April 22, 1988, we signed two agreements in Moscow with the Ministry of the Timber Industry on long-term cooperation both in production and retailing. With regard to production the agreement dealt with modernising eight furniture factories, whose productivity after modernisation, on which some 150 million Swedish kronas are to be spent, will stand at approximately 200 million kronas. These capital investments will be financed by the IKEA group and then paid by the Soviet side over a specific period in the form of deliveries of finished output. In the area of retailing the agreement also concentrates on the first stage, i.e., on the building of the first IKEA shop in Leningrad, which is to open in 1991 or 1992. The shop floor will be some 14,000 sq m.

In connection with these changes we again met with Mr Ryzhkov to discuss, in addition to everything else, more distant goals into the middle of the 1990s, and together we considered it quite probable that by that time we would be able to open and commission five or six shops and in parallel renovate 30 to 35 factories, whose export, after capital investments to the tune of 1,200 million kronas, is to total between 800 and 1,000 million kronas, while the production for the domestic market will reach 400 to 500 million kronas and the corresponding volume in rubles in terms of the new currency rate for foreign tourists. This programme means that the main part of the export revenues will go to pay for the capital investments and also for the import of consumer goods for new shops. In our proposals we realistically proceeded from the belief that we should begin by creating a powerful and effective production potential so that there would be something to sell in these shops. Counting solely on imports would be unrealistic, considering the need for convertible currency in many spheres, and this would give nothing to most people in the Soviet Union. After all, in order to consume, you first need to produce.

A year and a half after this meeting in Moscow, which was historic for us, we can note the considerable progress that has been made in attaining the far-reaching plans with regard to the production sphere. At present the first eight factories are being renovated expeditiously.

their commissioning to take place as early as the first half of this year. Everything points to the fact that even in 1991 we will reach the volumes we were counting on.

In April 1989 we ran in Moscow an exhibition of IKEA output which we consider suitable for manufacture in the Soviet Union. The exhibition was visited by representatives of a good hundred enterprises, and virtually all of them displayed interest in it. After the exhibition they received fresh grounds for further hopes. Planning of the next group of facilities to be modernised is apace, but we can engage in only a small number of factories at once due to the limited resources.

We are indebted for the exhibition's success to our partners, i.e., Exportles, which engaged most duly in maintaining contacts with all interested factories and did everything in its power to help organise the exhibition. We also learned how to tackle large-scale tasks with small resources. It goes without saying that this big plan for modernisation is the biggest of the projects in which our organisation, in this instance a small one, has still been taking part in.

This has given us a great incentive, to experience on the micro-level, so to speak, the effects of the wave of reforms which is now sweeping the entire Soviet Union. Of course, we are seeing many examples of the confusion which is arising in this transitional period, and there are even examples of some paralysis due to a lack of confidence or, in any event, uncertainty. Of course, there are many people who are unsure of their competence in the future and who believe that the old stagnation was more convenient and who would like it to continue. However, life itself is making new and great demands. It is difficult, for example, for a factory director who is used to thinking solely about production to have to decide all commercial matters as well. However, a great desire to plunge into the new times is felt virtually everywhere, most people perceiving the situation as a great challenge. All resolute people on whom a great responsibility has been imposed and who used to devote much of their time to the fight against the entrenched bureaucracy should have felt enormous relief when they heard about decentralisation and free competition, even though greater demands are being made of them.

Competition brings flexibility, and the absence of it entails onerous sovereign bureaucracy. Living in the conditions of the latter is just as good as the fact that a number of matters are still being considered by the former monopolistic method is boring. I suppose that is the way it should be during a turning point in history. If all the partners are agreed that the opening of divisions of the IKEA group in different places is a prerequisite for a drastic increase in production volumes, then why is the issue of premises taking so much time? If we must send Swedish personnel there to pursue our common goals, then why is it so difficult to obtain residency and work permits and to decide housing matters?

Possibly we would not have had either an office or housing even today if we had not been helped from above. After all, housing can be obtained only after accreditation, while accreditation is provided after housing is received, etc.

Despite the various difficulties, the production part of the project is being carried out more or less according to plan. As far as my brainchild—organising retail trade—is concerned, we are already a year late!

Providing most people in the Soviet Union the same possibilities as people in Western countries have by opening, for example, 80 of our shops is one of my biggest plans, perhaps my greatest dream. The possibility to select furniture and other objects of domestic interior at

reasonable prices and of good design and with high functional and technical qualities is what IKEA is all about. It has never been in our interests to open a shop in the USSR that would accept foreign currency alone. We know that today this has become possible and even popular, but we do not want this. We want to serve a majority of people of all ages, people who have more taste than money.

There is nothing easier than doing what many firms have done, namely, opening shops for dollars and selling furniture to well-to-do customers. No, we must travel a long path to our goal. Together we have already traversed a considerable leg of the way, and efficient production is an earnest of success. Today we, together with the people who support us and on whom important top-level decisions depend, should find ways to give producers an incentive to turn out products for the domestic market as well. What is happening is that today factories want to export their output since they have received an opportunity to deposit on their accounts a large part of the foreign currency they earn. However, almost no one wants to fill domestic orders, for rubles—the currency of their own country.

Of course, each country needs export in order to pay for the required import, but room for domestic consumption should remain as well. The production modernisation process creates prerequisites for a constant growth in the export volume, and also for a constant growth in the volume of domestic consumption. We must find methods for interesting the production side in ensuring the domestic market as well. Suppliers of raw materials and semi-finished items want to export products themselves so as to receive hard currency themselves. Thus the carousel continues, while the domestic market can wait.

AGREEMENTS on IKEA's first joint shop in Leningrad have already been signed. The construction site has been determined, and the blueprints are being prepared. For many months the agreements were carefully studied by the wise people under whose jurisdiction individual factories are and who find long-range goals more important than the short-sighted interests of individual factories. However, we are actually building on sand. Individual factories should also have a direct vested interest in delivering to the domestic market, which should be envisaged by an agreement which all the partners should agree to. We have managed with great difficulty to coordinate the cooperation procedure and the sides' obligations. However, the agreement has not been signed for several months now. We witness a considerable lag in time. The domestic market has waited for a rather long span. We must proceed further!

If I understand correctly, today the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry decides which percentage of the export receipts in hard currency each factory can keep. At present I believe it is 50 per cent. A factory which exports goods worth 100 kronas can keep 50 kronas in hard currency and receive the remaining 50 in rubles.

Thus a factory which exports 100 per cent of its output receives 50 per cent of the revenues in hard currency. However, a factory which exports 70 per cent of its output and delivers the remainder to the domestic market receives only 35 per cent in hard currency and can possibly settle for a certain "take" in rubles from the output which goes to the domestic market.

Today there is no key to stimulating deliveries to the domestic market. Perhaps it is worthwhile to simply regulate the existing percentage ratios?

However, first forgive the old furniture merchant for his insufficient upbringing and lack of diplomatic expressions. My desire to bring the joint plan to fruition is so strong that I can't help going overboard.

As I see it, there are two reasons for the lack of interest in production for the domestic market at present. The first has been described above. It has emerged of late, and it seems, at least to the non-expert, quite simple to eliminate.

The second reason, to my mind, is one of the pillars of the old system, so its removal is a lengthier process. The old system of supplying the domestic market is structured not on the level of the prices of exchange in accordance with the law of supply and demand, but, in my opinion, on much harder to understand formulas of the correlation between the basic and additional needs of the individual which should be met in accordance with his economic possibilities so that everyone could have some minimum standard. It goes without saying that I have no possibility for correctly adjudging the solidness of such formulas in reality, but it is easy to note that more likely than not, they are very inconvenient and can easily be brought to the absurd. This can even lead to the following unsuitable conclusion. Since there are no goods for sale anyway, they can just as well be inexpensive.

Even today many relations in the Soviet Union are based on these old and unquestionably well-intentioned formulas. It is for this reason that changes towards a freer market should be made carefully. Such changes are already taking place and should proceed as quickly as possible. It is also important to generate producer interest on the domestic market. In future factories should be run in accordance with an analysis of expenditures, while consumer prices should be fixed by expenditures and by the profits which are required for future capital investments over the short term. To evoke consumer interest, prices should be fixed in accordance with the possibilities of the export market to enable the manufacturer to receive the same advantages in the case of export. Here, too, it is necessary to use the key for regulation, i.e., hard currency, in such a way that this would favour the domestic market as well.

Permit me to return to the example I have adduced above. If a factory which exports 100 per cent of its output and can today keep half of the receipts in hard currency were instead of this to keep only 35 per cent of the currency, it could compete with the factory which exports 70 per cent and delivers 30 per cent to the domestic market if the latter is permitted to keep half of the currency for its export.

In one way or another changes will come in the immediate future if the above proposal or any other, with similar consequences, is used. It is high time for the excavators in Leningrad to begin their long-awaited work and for them to lay the foundation for long and good cooperation that will be of benefit to many people.

I have laid out above the general problem, one which needs to be solved quickly. However, no less complicated moments are in store for us in the relatively near future, too. For example, it is quite obvious that for a large household furniture shop we also need to import a certain part of our product-mix. In our initial proposal which was submitted to Mr Ryzhkov we estimated that a large part of the export revenues which we will receive jointly with the renovated factories will go for the import of those goods for the shop that cannot be manufactured in the USSR. How this is to happen is still an open question. We have stated our readiness to purchase all the export output of the factories we cooperate with, which means that we will have to review the share of other suppliers; however, we must make headway with regard to the domestic market problem.

IKEA is not a philanthropic enterprise. In one way or another, we must create conditions to cover our expenses and to receive a sufficient profit. We need this to make further capital investments. Just as do all other enterprises. No one objects to us on this score; all we need is to find acceptable forms.

As far as retailing in the USSR is concerned, I have convinced my colleagues on the board and the management that we should not demand any share of the profit over the first ten years and that all of the retail profit over this period should be used for capital investments in new projects. It goes without saying that we hope that enterprises and bodies of power in the USSR use the same far-sighted argument in the interests of their consumers. We also hope that the convertible currency received from "our" part of the export, without consideration for the profit from changes in the exchange rate, is placed at the disposal of the shops for import and further capital investments.

We should also receive an opportunity to cover our expenses on the territory of the USSR in rubles just like local enterprises do. This applies to rent, travel of personnel and other production expenditures, which come to many millions of kronas in currency which should be invested in different projects. These are formidable expenditures which are not being covered at all.

Providing raw materials and intelligently solving transport problems are also among the many matters which we need to decide constructively with the aid of our partners and positively disposed bodies of power.

THE FIRST TIME the dream of serving people in the Soviet Union appeared to my closest associates and myself was during the visit of the USSR Minister of the Timber Industry to Sweden which took place about 15 years ago. To my question as to whether we could jointly build the first IKEA shop in the Soviet Union he gave an evasive answer, to the effect that that was possible some time in the future.

Today this time has come, and, generally speaking, nothing can prevent a country with such vast resources as the Soviet Union from making the most of them in the interests of its citizens. It is to this process that we want, with all humility and respect, to make our small contribution in a field in which we have acquired experience and ability over the years. Our assessments of the basic needs of the individual largely coincide: aside from food and clothing, they include his abode.

The first IKEA shop in the socialist countries will be opened not in the USSR but in Budapest. It will be followed by a second, a third, a fourth, and so on. Finally I hope we will get around to the Soviet Union. I think that it is the USSR that will become our biggest supplier as early as the mid-1990s. It is also very possible that at the turn of the century the Soviet Union will become the biggest market for IKEA with shops in different parts of the country, from Leningrad to Vladivostok. Perhaps I will not live to see this, but the next generation of the Kamprads are certain to.

MOZAMBIQUE: A TIGHT KNOT OF PROBLEMS

Georgi DERLUGYAN

THE PROCESS of Namibia's decolonisation, which began in 1989, and the realistic prospects for an internal settlement in Angola make Mozambique the most probable next point in the programme for eliminating armed confrontation in the South of Africa. Indications of this come from the continuing contacts between the leadership of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the armed opposition, which are being held in Nairobi under the auspices of President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, a fact which has determined the growing interest in the conflict in Mozambique, earlier overshadowed by the fiercer war in Angola with a higher level of involvement by external forces.

International diplomacy has long been seeking ways to halt the bloodshed in Mozambique, and if these efforts are to produce concrete results, there must be a clear comprehension of the roots and specifics of what is going on within and around the country. This can be done only if the old stereotypes are discarded, together with everything that could be described in one word. Eurocentrism. This equally applies not only to Soviet and Western scholars and diplomatists, but also to many of their African colleagues.

THIS IS AFRICA

UNWARRANTED optimism is sure to produce disappointment. One should like to hope that the tragedy in Mozambique, of which I am still very fond, will soon be over, so that Mozambique peasants will soon be able to cultivate their fields in the knowledge that theirs is not a futile effort and that they will be able to live without fear of nightfall. The European visiting Mozambique feels that the people's sufferings are so immense and the situation has reached such an extreme that it cannot go on for very much longer.

But it turns out that it can. It turns out that an extreme situation can also be stabilised, and that people come to accept as commonplace something that is not commonplace in any sense. This apparent paradox does exist and has to be explained.

The main developments in the dark history of the "Mozambique National Resistance" (MNR), which has now lasted for over 10 years, have been described adequately and with precision by Soviet and foreign researchers, to the extent to which this can be done by those who have generally accessible information at their disposal. It is true that we shall perhaps never learn all the circumstances of the death of MNR leaders Jorge Jardim, the Bomba brothers, Orlando Cristina and now also of

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Evo Fernandes, and it is perhaps just as well, for these are just the trees which obscure the wood, superfluous information which obscures the gist of the matter.

Sociologists studying the African scene are aware of a most instructive anecdote which gives an idea of what I mean. A team from the US Gallup Institute has arrived in Uganda under the Idi Amin dictator. The following morning, one public opinion pollster, equipped with cassette recorder and camera, goes out into the market place where he interviews a man selling bananas. He reaches out his microphone and asks in a loud voice:

"What is your attitude to the policy of President Idi Amin Dada?"

"Sha—sh—sh!", the banana man says and takes the interviewer aside. "Gimme ten dollars."

He gets the money, and says in a hoarse whisper: "We all love our great president very-very much!"

One finds something similar in Mozambique, quite apart from the deliberate distortion of information by the lower ranks in the army and in the party and state administration. The First secretary of a rural district committee of FRELIMO expressed this in a conversation with me as follows: "This is Africa, anything can happen here, but in Maputo, at the top, this may be misunderstood."

The most valuable information comes from the sources which are, in fact, on the surface and which give an idea of the internal everyday processes in the African countryside and of the armed detachments roaming the savannah. The whole point is to pose the right question, which is usually not done by those who conduct inquiries of interview refugees. There is, besides, the need to surmount the barrier which separates Africans from foreigners resident in an air-conditioned hotel and speaking a European language that is foreign to the local population.

I have now come to realise that my advantage in observing the armed thuggery consisted in the fact—which I then regarded as a major inconvenience—that I spent nearly a year in a provincial Mozambique townlet, where bandit raids were a daily occurrence and where one had an excellent opportunity of comparing reports in the local, central or foreign press with what one has seen with one's eyes at first hand.

RENAMO, "MATSANGA", MNR

IN CONTRAST to the Angolan UNITA, the Mozambique antigovernment group does not even have a generally accepted name. It first appeared in 1979 as the Mozambique National Resistance, with the English acronym of MNR, which in 1983 gave way to the Portuguese RENAMO, an obvious attempt to draw an analogy with the name of its adversary, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). The government does not recognise the existence of such an organisation and has refused to use the name. Instead, it has used the term "armed bands", or "BA" for short. Most Mozambicans do not use either the one name or the other, but prefer the word "matsangaissa", or "matsanga", which is much closer to the phonetic system of the Bantu languages and which was formed after the name of André Matsangaissa, the first commander of the anti-government forces, who was killed in 1979. His halved name has been most widely accepted and is, I feel, much closer to the reality from which the movement of armed resistance to the legitimate government originated. The term MNR is firmly established in Soviet writings.

Interest in the MNR was first displayed outside Mozambique in 1983 and 1984, when it managed to score a significant military success by paralysing the state administration over a sizeable part of the country's territory. The conclusion between the People's Republic of Mozambique

and South Africa of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourhood and Nonaggression (the Nkomati accords) in March 1984 provided for a mutual repudiation by the parties of support, respectively, for the armed groups of the MNR and for the African National Congress, and this led to a further growth of interest in the MNR, which remains a mystery surrounded by a mist of riddles and conjectures, as Professor William Minter of Georgetown University in Washington put it.

The past decade has been one of disastrous crisis that has led to the death of at least half a million Mozambicans and to chronic starvation of almost five million people, most of whom are refugees. The FRELIMO government has confident control over the main urban centres, which the MNR has never really tried to attack, while its control over the rural areas is vague and uncertain.

In the fairly extensive writings about the MNR, three main approaches stand out: the conservative, the left-radical, and the liberal, all of which see the armed struggle in Mozambique in extremely ideologised categories. The MNR is either said to be a "puppet of South Africa's racist regime" and various reactionary forces, ranging from Israel to Somalia, from the US Heritage Foundation to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing cannot but be a source of confusion; or an anti-communist insurgent army, a party fighting to restore "Western capitalist ideals trampled by the Marxist regime", which would rank it among the Afghan mujaheddin, the Nicaraguan contras and the Angolan UNITA. Another approach which could be called liberal is most clearly expressed in the report by Robert Gersony (the Bureau for Refugee Program, the US State Department) on the situation in the MNR-controlled areas, which presents the Mozambican anti-government forces as poorly disciplined and scattered bands led by virtually independent commanders and using methods of struggle which are all too reminiscent of those of the Khmers Rouges.

Why this discord in assessing the MNR?

The fact is that most social sciences, notably politology, have developed on the basis of a highly peculiar society—bourgeois Western Europe and North America of the latter half of the 19th century and the early 20th century—and are mainly a reflection of its characteristic realities. Unless the modern analyst removes his Eurocentrist spectacles, he is not likely to sort out the processes under way in the Third World countries, and this, unfortunately, applies not only to the Europeans: one will find Eurocentrists among Black people in Africa, and many African leaders are typical Eurocentrists.

Bearing in mind Marx warning let us try to refrain from identifying the given society with its own view of itself. Let us begin by trying to find out in what kind of society the subsystem of armed banditism has been operating.

TURNING TO THE PAST

PORTUGAL'S colonial rule bred conditions for its future gravedigger to come up in Mozambique, the peasantry and its vanguard, city educated native elite who expressed the peasants' basic interests at the anti-colonial phase of the struggle. With a few exceptions, the pre-colonial Tropical Africa had no peasantry, for the peasant is a class category while what was there was the primitive land-tiller whose main productive activity did not as yet involve relations of exploitation and, consequently, did not produce defined classes.

By the time of the imperialists slice-up of Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the Mozambican territory had been for four centuries an area of commercial influence of the Portuguese who had to share their influence with Swahilian and Indian merchants. Long before the

direct colonial rule was established, the area's African societies were evolving under manifold effects of trading over long distances, and from late 18th century of slave trade. Up to the end of the 19th century this evolution went on in a direction which was natural for local communities and led to formation of early class nationhoods in African savannahs. The class formation process took mostly the shape of formation of slave castes who were losing their ethnic and tribal ties and acquiring castehood and personal dependence on the slave owner. The name of slaves can be applied to this category only with many reservations, for its members were privileged groups carrying military and civil service functions. The Central Mozambican wars to capture slaves gave prominence to slave warriors (shikunda) who as often as not lost their owners and set up their independent "military republics", to use the term of 19th century documents. In the 20th century the shikunda and other castes who did not refer to any ethnic entity were classed as tribes by the Portuguese officialdom. So it was that by the time the colonial transformations commenced the Mozambique African communities were undergoing a deep crisis of interformational transition. At subsequent stages this transition went on within the colonial society framework and fitted rigidly the requirements of the capitalist periphery system and world markets.

When it came across the workforce that was pre-capitalist and even pre-class, the European colonial capital resorted to exploitation methods which were alien to mature capitalism. To wit, in 1980s serfdom was, in effect, introduced in Mozambique with the colonial administration acting as its agent and subject. In this manner, far from being acquired naturally in the course of evolution of traditional native communities, definite class divisions were very forcefully imposed on the Mozambicans by the Portuguese colonisers. It is the desire to cast off this imposed definitiveness and to return to original primitive freedom that is the leit-motiff of the liberation struggle. Being dependent and of middleman nature, the Portuguese colonialism had to represent more the foreign capital than the metropolitan one, and so promoted conservation of the cruellest forms of exploitation based on totalitarian administrative and police control and enforced labour. For a long time the Portuguese rule was evolving towards mere perfection of this primitive system which had been rejected by the other colonial powers before the first world war. In the result not only the native Africans' social reproduction was undermined but biological reproduction of the exploitation base as well. Against the backdrop of de-colonialisation in the majority of Tropical African countries this situation of ultimate crisis made possible the FRELIMO-led guerrilla warfare which could not be stopped by the hopelessly late reforms of 1962-1974.

Mozambique's independence was proclaimed in June 1975, following a revolutionary process that led to the dismantling of the old system of colonial administration and the flight of the Portuguese settlers, signifying the disappearance of entire echelons of the old social hierarchical structure. On the one hand, the aspirations of the Mozambican peasantry were fully realised: they were finally rid of colonial exploitation and slavery. But while the old mechanism of nonequivalent exchange was destroyed, there was obvious delay in setting up a new one. This produced a painful pause which led to growing discontent. Life without textiles, footwear, soap and matches was nothing to be happy about, especially since the towns, the plantations and the offices of the public servants had been abandoned by their owners and were there for the taking.

The hostile attitude of the new power to the tribal chiefs and village elders, who had made up the main stratum of officials appointed by the Portuguese administration led to a break between the state and the rural population. The movement for the establishment of grass-roots party

cells of the FRELIMO and elective organs of people's power, which were closed to everyone who had compromised himself by collaborating with the colonialists, in many cases led to chaos and acute rivalry, especially among the rural young.

The beginning of socialist-type transformations signified for independent Mozambique a break with the line of evolution imparted by colonialism: these changes tended to take the country out of the capitalist world market and the regional integration system dominated by South Africa. The country's economy was being reoriented to meet internal requirements (as these were understood at the time). One unforeseen result of such a strategy, which was ignored for a fairly long time, was the rapid destruction of the old social structures and the loss of the habitual social roles and relations by an ever larger part of the population.

The peasant, who was no longer subjected to exploitation and no longer produced anything for the market, because, first, the coercion had gone and, second, the market was rapidly growing empty and disintegrating, gradually also lost his ties with the town and evolved not into some pre-class, but even into some kind of a tiller outside class of the soil. Add to this the loss of ties with the land, for instance, with the elimination of "unpromising villages" and in the course of collectivisation, and the peasant tends to evolve into a rural lumpen proletarian who is left with the choice of being either a beggar or a robber.

In the towns, consumption standards are still maintained at the expense of international aid and accumulations of the fugitive colonial elite (there was blanket nationalisation of real estate, furniture, and cars abandoned in the streets), with an exceptional role now being acquired by redistributive mechanisms and control over them: legal cooperative trade, "candonga" (the black market), special distribution centres of varying exclusiveness, and a rationing system. All of this is attended by a whole set of ugly phenomena which we in this country have known all too well, but which in Mozambique reached fantastic proportions.

The decline of the productive forces led to a collapse of social relations, which plunged to their lowest primitive and natural level of simple group. Such a society now ranks among the objects studied not so much by sociology and psychology as by ethology, the science of the behaviour of the higher animals. It should be designated as "temporarily negative", consisting of non-peasants, non-proletarians and a lumpen elite. The laws of the pack and of the primitive horde inevitably reign in a lumpen environment which threatens to spread to the society as a whole. This state falls just short of criminalisation, of becoming a criminal community, because robbery and plunder tend to become a mass method of struggle for survival. It is characterised by a heightened state of individual and group conflicts over the redistribution of what remains of the goods of life.

A lumpen environment does not of itself generate war, because it lacks the organising subjective factor on a supragroup level, but once a catalyst of violence appears, say, in the form of external aggression, there is a chain reaction in which all manner of individual, family, ethnic and urban-rural conflicts evolve into armed struggle. Violence becomes wholesale, plunder becomes the main means of survival for those who have weapons, with weapons becoming the source of law.

CIVIL WAR OR TROUBLED TIMES

IN OUR OWN HISTORY such situations are usually called troubled times. That is, incidentally, why it is not right to speak of civil war either in Angola or Mozambique, and, as in the case of Biafra, "internal

strife" would be an apter term. All of this naturally presents various difficulties in the translation into English or French, because of their different history and different language.

When the framework of a society disintegrates, violence has no social address or reference point, which is why it is hard to find any class law-governed uniformity in the terror of the *oprichnina* under Ivan the Terrible or in St. Bartholomew's night. An ethnographic or culturological approach would probably be more useful when trying to comprehend the acts of people living in the midst of totally different social realia. Let us recall the highly indicative argument between Grinyov and Pugachyov in Pushkin's *The Captain's Daughter*: a well-educated member of the gentry cannot understand the illiterate Russian *muzhik*, who claimed to be the tsar and was followed by thousands of other *muzhiks*, who could expect almost certain execution. Pushkin finds himself having to explain the situation by relating a Kalmyk parable of the raven and the eagle, though if it does explain anything it is only Pugachyov's mentality, but not the social logic of events.

The MNR emerged as no more than a mercenary subversive and terroristic detachment operating in the rear of the Mozambican army and the Zimbabwe guerrillas at the last stage in the war in Rhodesia. As it grew, the MNR inevitably became a conglomerate of relatively independent armed detachments adapting themselves to the conditions of the area in which they operated. FRELIMO leaders have repeatedly admitted that for a long time they failed to regard the threat on the part of the MNR as being a serious one, and so the MNR was allowed to pillage and plunder villages and civilian vehicles.

The MNR had considerable difficulties in setting up an organisational structure and putting a political framework on the movement, which, in contrast to the Angolan UNITA, had no traditions of anti-colonial struggle or political leaders capable of presenting themselves as African ideologues. The MNR's so-called "external wing" consisted mainly of former Portuguese settlers without any real influence on the insurgent detachments. Only in 1983 was the MNR able to convene a conference of its own in Switzerland and to adopt a programme and statute. It is indicative that its structure was entirely copied from the structure of FRELIMO of the anti-colonial war period. Eduardo Mondlane, the founder of FRELIMO, was declared to be the MNR's ideological father, and the programme of FRELIMO's First Congress (1962), "the authentically nationalist programme undistorted by Machel's Marxism" was set up as the ideal, while the MNR's own programme turned out to be a curious collection of quotations from the speeches of Mondlane, Thatcher, Reagan and Che Guevara. MNR President Afonso Dhlakama, a former FRELIMO officer who had been tried for embezzlement, declared in the course of several interviews his commitment to Christian values, but there is no real evidence of any connections between the MNR and the church, with the exception of a few cases of aid on the part of US ultrarightist sects. There are many Muslims in the MNR's ranks at Nampula, and detachments operating in the valley of the Zambezi typically practice traditional cults.

In his report Minter noted that former MNR soldiers are clearly aware of being a part of the army, and not of a political organisation; none of them ever mention political work.

That is not quite so. Political commissars who had gone through a course of political education in FRELIMO did exist in some detachments in the south of Tete and in Manica in 1984, but alongside of them we find numerous witch doctors and sorcerers who have a strong psychological influence on the rank-and-file.

It is most important that at the sources of the MNR we find Rhode-

sian intelligence officers led by Ken Flower (probably the last practitioners of British colonial indirect rule). These men were aware of the difficulty of establishing direct control over their creatures. Shortly before he died, Flower said in an interview that he had deliberately given the MNR leadership a free hand, but he was disappointed to discover that it displayed a minimum capacity for conducting a real war of insurgency, and in 1980 requested that it should be put under the control of South Africa's special services.

It was the South Africans who set up some more or less combat-capable detachments which are now the backbone of the MNR. They carry out the most responsible operations, including the organisation of massacres of the population. The members of these detachments receive the same pay as South African soldiers, and this must cost South Africa a great deal of money and make any losses most painful. That is why most of the MNR detachments are ill-assorted bands "freely roaming the countryside". From time to time they fulfil various assignments (attacks on communal villages, convoy of subversive groups, delivery of cargoes, and forcible recruitment of new men).

But this contingent is hardly combat-capable in real terms, and it has not cut itself off from the central MNR command precisely because of its weakness. The crisis of social decay and economic dislocation through which the country is now going provides it with a favourable environment and a supply of potential recruits. I stress the social environment, and not some social basis in the form of a stratum or group of the population. In Mozambique, where not only the class, but also the ethnic disintegration has gone a fairly long way, there is no social class, no stratum or tribe whose interests could be represented by the MNR in the fight against the central authority. The partial and temporary coincidence of interests of a group of the population or of individuals with the MNR's objectives and tasks may occur mainly on the village or district level.

In these conditions, bands may be armed even with spears and machete (and there are many such cases). What is peculiar, perhaps, is that in a country which abounds in diverse weapons as a result of the 30-year war, the use of weapons is not as extensive as one could have expected, probably because of the cultural and historical traditions of the peoples of Mozambique, for whom the possession of weapons is not a characteristic feature of the way of life, as it is, for instance, among the nomads of Afghanistan.

The armed violence in Mozambique is an expression of the most diverse and latent conflicts which have no direct bearing on the manifestation of this "strange war" without battles that the political consciousness is aware of. Here are a few typical examples from various provinces of the country.

The expropriations of land by the Portuguese produced an acute shortage of land in the most fertile parts of the country, but until 1974 protests against it were suppressed by the administrative and police apparatus. Once the colonial state machine had been broken up, a spontaneous movement for the recovery of the lands got under way, but it was soon hindered by the "socialisation of the countryside" policy started by the new government and providing for the establishment of large state farms and cooperatives. The situation was further exacerbated in 1982 and 1983, when the authorities tried to protect the population against the MNR attacks by using troops to resettle the inhabitants in amalgamated communal villages.

The rural communities which still retained their tribal lands lost these as the unpromising villages were eliminated, and were forced to resettle on unknown territory. In a society in which land is regarded as

sacred, as traditionally belonging to ancestral spirits, and as not subject to alienation and inseparable from the collective living on it, resettlement inevitably signifies a tremendous loss of social status and predetermines dependence on the lucky people on whose tribal territory the new communal village is being set up. The members of the local native tribe automatically assume all the posts of power in the village (village chairman, party cell secretary, cooperative shop manager, chief of the militia), while the newcomers find themselves in a state of humiliating dependence: they are allotted the worst plots of land, they are not allowed to use the nearest water sources and fruit trees, and are often deprived of their goods coupons. This is a source of constant social tension, which leads to denunciations to the authorities, the giving of the "evil eye", and flight from the village. The situation in a village usually tends sharply to worsen whenever representatives of the traditional elite are confronted by young people who have been to the towns or have done service in the army, and who refuse to recognise the authority of the elders. Reports of such conflicts will occasionally be found in the Mozambique press under the head of "Letters" and "Reports from Rural Correspondents".

Events take on a tragic turn with the appearance of an MNR detachment in the vicinity. Those who are, for one reason or another, discontent with their position in a communal village may one night bring in the bandits to settle scores with their enemies, and then disappear into the forest. The impression left on the surface is that anti-government insurgents are destroying cooperatives, killing members of the militia and activists, but it is usually a settling of personal scores or tribal revenge, plus plunder. This kind of situation is also characteristic for most of the communal villages in the Limpopo valley. In the south, where over the past century virtually all the rural young people went to earn a living in South Africa, there is another powerful source of tension. Most gold miners managed to save some money by doing something that is close to hard labour, in order to pay bride money, "lobolo", and to buy some cattle and farm implements. The South African authorities' boycott of workers from Mozambique has produced a dramatic situation: tens of thousands of young men cannot afford to get married and start a family of their own. Some of them flee to the towns and there live as tramps, while others form bands and engage in robbery.

The "hunger wars" are marked by an extreme extent of social disintegration. In Mozambique, almost 5 million people—nearly one-half of the population—continuously suffer from hunger. Running wild and pushed to the point of desperation, they form hordes which tramp their way either to Red Cross stations and charity organisations or attack the population of the areas where there are stocks of food. Those who are in possession of such stocks, for their part, fiercely act in self-defence.

President Samora Machel of Mozambique declared for the first time in 1984 that the soldiers of the People's Liberation Army who engage in plundering the population are "armed robbers" like the enemy. In October 1988, President Joaquim Chissano said in a speech in Nampula that soldiers, militiamen and policemen who break their oath of allegiance and engage in pillage are like "armed bands and enemies of the people". Reports of the abuses by military men are sometimes published in the Mozambique press and are received from missionaries working in the interior. There is the very acute problem of deserters and the provision of jobs to demobilised army men, many of whom join the ranks of the urban marginals or loiter along the rural roads, being unable to return home and to engage in productive labour.

On the other hand, there is evidence of many desertions from the MNR, but not many of the former insurgents manage quietly to return

come to their villages, because of the great fear of being discovered and punished for betrayal (the MNR widely practices public executions of those who have tried to flee). Most of the deserters from these bands mingle with refugees and leave the territory of Mozambique.

The amazing tranquility in the towns of Mozambique is yet another remarkable feature of this war. The crime level there is much lower than it is in Lagos or Dar es Salam, and crimes of violence are especially rare. In 1988, the Mozambican authorities carried out the second mass campaign since independence to clear up the towns under the codename "Operation Production". In the course of the campaign there were raids in public places and mass check-ups of documents. Those whose documents were not in order were listed as "unproductive elements" and expelled to remote areas for re-education in front-ranking cooperatives or state farms. The exact number of those expelled has never been given. Among these were many urban criminals who soon swelled the ranks of the MNR. Those who have been held captive by the insurgents say that the urban marginals and criminals constitute the elite in many of the bands which have a higher standard of general and military training and practice perverted brutalities.

Among the most brutal are the detachments of teenagers, from the age of 10 years on, and there is every indication that there are more and more of them in the MNR's ranks. The point is evidently that children are a nonsocialised category of the population, which makes it easier to integrate them within the system of violence. Driven far away from home, living in fear of witch doctors and fierce punishment, habituated to drug taking, boys and rural young people are turned into a caste of slave-warriors without any social coordinates. That seems to be the main answer to the puzzled question in Minter's report about the clear prevalence of forcible recruitment into MNR ranks, without reliance on any ethnic, religious, class, regionalistic, political or even elementary mercenary mechanisms. The Mozambicans regard violence as being fatally inevitable, and it virtually never causes any active protest. The situation is similar to the period of the slave trade, when David Livingstone met great caravans of slaves in Zambezia resignedly tramping along with no more than two or three guards. Those who live in a world of social disintegration and universal instability lose their immunity to violence, easily becoming either a victim or victimiser.

WHEN POLITICS IS POWERLESS

THE SETTLEMENT of the conflict in Mozambique is usually regarded as a problem which lends itself to two approaches: a peaceful (i. e., political) settlement, and a military settlement which is not always called so and which is contrasted to a political settlement. This is a largely false dilemma. There are no purely military ways of routing the insurgency even if only because in a non-conventional war of this type one will not find any targets for bombing (the capture of territory and the destruction of guerrilla bases are not crucial).

Any attempts to achieve a political settlement imply, as their starting point, the existence of a national-state political life, something that has yet to be created in Mozambique. A most important step in this direction would be a democratisation of FRELIMO's inner-party life and a legal enactment of the norms of socio-political pluralism. For the time being, however, even in formal juridical terms, the army and the state are closely bound up with each other and are, for all practical purposes, organs of the FRELIMO party. That being so, the only way of re-integrating the MNR leadership into the Mozambican society is to offer them posts on the governing bodies of the party and the government, something

ing that, for understandable reasons, the latter finds it very hard to accept

The constitutional reform being prepared in Mozambique will make it possible to give up the party's role of "leading and guiding force" and to enact a law on the registration of alternative political and social organisations, a procedure which will only go to enhance FRELIMO's international prestige.

The vivid interest displayed in Mozambique in the restructuring and reforms in some of the socialist countries is an indication that this is something for which public opinion in the country is prepared.

The situation in Mozambique is often said to look like a vicious circle which defies breaking in any sure or obvious way. But any sufficiently developed conflict is a system of contradictions and incompatible trends and may, for that reason, be graphically presented as a vicious circle or an even more intricate and multi-dimensional geometrical figure. Common sense suggests that such problems do not lend themselves to Gordian knot solutions; indeed, cutting through such a system in practice usually means destroying it along with the contending parties.

A much more promising approach is gradually to widen the vicious circle and patiently to whittle down its walls to the point of a breakthrough and a way out, which is hardly ever there in the first place. The best way to go about it is to get the right diagnosis of the conflict and an idea of the thickness of the walls that need breaking through.

Stabilisation is the only response to destabilisation. This response needs to be systemic, covering every aspect of national-state life, the economy in the first place. Any settlement in Mozambique will crucially depend on the restoration of normal links between town and country, and a fresh inclusion of its national economy in the world market through the development of commodity-money relations. This will mark a tremendous step forward for Mozambique's rural population, a move away from colonial state serfdom and an end to the all-too-long and tormenting pause in economic and social development.

The measures which have been taken since the start of the economic rehabilitation programme in 1987 are a source of optimism, but the problem cannot be solved without sizable foreign aid and an end to subversive acts from outside.

It is most important, in any case, to abandon the political stereotypes and to try to understand the peculiarity of the situation in this African country, which is as different from the situation in Afghanistan or Nicaragua as a Mozambican peasant is from a peasant in Asia or Latin America. Thinking in analogies is a sure way to logical mistakes and gross miscalculations. Truth is always concrete.

FOR A BREAKTHROUGH IN ECOLOGICAL COOPERATION

Peter HARDI

IN THE MID 70S political and economic decision-makers of several advanced capitalist countries recognized or have been forced to recognize that industrial production has reached a level where the degradation of the environment could not be reversed and it could not be controlled or even forecasted. But, as a result of revolutionary achievements in science and technology, it has become obvious that economic development is not necessarily connected with environmental degradation. Some of these countries successfully made a structural change in their industries, mostly because of economic considerations, but partly based on this recognition. They increased the proportion of the so called clean branches of industry, in other industrial branches pollutive technologies were replaced by less pollutive ones; and significant resources were allocated to environmental protection investments. The outcome of the structural changes in these countries is the decrease of the specific raw material-and-energy-costs of the production by several magnitudes. In other words, it made possible a more saving use of resources, to stop the waste of energy and raw materials; at the same time it relatively decreased the amount of hazardous wastes and the emission of harmful pollution.

This type of development will also reduce the costs of environmental restorations (or retrofits) and, in a longer run, may also decrease the need for certain investments for environmental protection (like for cleaning technologies). These developments, however insufficient they might seem for environmentalists in the respective countries, may well serve as a comparison to the East European situations and as a desirable path to take.

In the East European countries industrial production has much later reached the level on which degradation of the environment has become as severe as it had been in the advanced capitalist countries at an earlier stage; that's why the awareness of environmental problems here is a relatively new development. In the Eastern European economies structural changes had not been carried through in the seventies, and economic development policies could not reverse the course of wasting energy and raw materials, and polluting and severely damaging the environment. In the eighties, structural changes were aborted by the lack of financial resources, by economic hardships, and by a basically unchanged set of priorities. Without structural changes there is no hope for replacing obsolete industries and technologies at a time when the shortage is extremely severe both of investment capital and imported high technology venture capital.

Economic policy planners cannot find a way out of this vicious circle; they have no ideas, no plans, and no resources to realize new strategies for a sustainable, environment-safe development policy.

At the moment we face a dilemma: our resources for investments are even more limited than before but we need an almost immediate change

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in industrial policy both by economic and environmental considerations. It means the following:

We are unable to cover energy and raw material needs of an economic growth based on our previous industrial structure neither by domestic sources nor by import. The only way to overcome our persistent energy and raw material shortages is to change for saving technologies instead of increasing the import or domestic output of energy and raw materials. Most of the East European countries are lagging far behind the developed industrial countries in the efficiency of energy consumption; the indices are particularly bad in the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

This problem has partly been recognized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences recently when its top energy experts opted for no new investments in the coming decade into the energy production sector. It will affect our nuclear energy program as well as the fate of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Danube barrage system under construction. In the latter debate one of the most serious economic arguments is related to this point: Why should Hungary and Czechoslovakia invest such a huge amount of money into a project with unforeseen environmental risks which will provide less than 3 per cent of our annual energy needs projected into the year two thousand by an unaltered pattern of energy reliance? The academicians share the view that we can make our energy consumption much more economical simply by changing for saving technologies and avoiding waste. (It also means that without any further investment we could save at least the amount of energy output of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam.)

The conservation of our previous type of growth would further slow down technological development and would hinder all changes necessary for a more competitive stand in the world market. The widening of the technological gap between us and the developed countries and backwardness from the main trends of development would be final and irreparable. At this point it is of great importance to emphasize the urgent need for substantial further economic reforms in the East European countries (including the Soviet Union). Even in Hungary, where economic reform has comparatively been carried to the furthest limit, we still lack a comprehensive reform of our highly centralized and State-directed macroeconomic structure which determines our energy and raw material dependency pattern and provides the significant influence of industrial power pressure groups which still base their influence on the existing growth patterns.

Neglecting environmental issues and further postponing structural changes will dramatically decrease our export capacities. In Western Europe environmental consciousness has reached a level where environmental protection is among the top priorities. It is changing consumer patterns: consumers are increasingly willing to pay a higher price for products made by environmental protective technologies; world market appreciates environmental protective components of production costs. In Western markets pollutive products are going to be uncompetitive or devaluated.

The countries of the European Community have established cooperation in environmental policy. The Single European Act prescribes a unified standard and regulation also for environmental protection. If we cannot meet these standards and regulations there is a high probability of our exclusion from the European market. (Even EFTA countries will adjust their standards and regulations to European Community ones.)

The small size of Hungary and in most cases, small scale production reduces the competitiveness of Hungarian products in a large variety of goods; smaller series, however, may be profitable if their production is based on environment protective technologies what is appreciated also in

higher prices, e. g. it seems to be ever more difficult to maintain the export level of large quantities of agricultural products in the EC market, while there is an almost unlimited market for exporting profitable bioproducts. There are excellent opportunities for such a change in the food processing industry as well.

For Hungary, it is an almost insurmountable problem that the requirements of the Western market are so different from those of the CMEA one. The latter does not require and does not pay for the extra costs of environment-protective products; there are no environmental protection standards in the qualification tests of CMEA products. It also means that if we constantly adjust to the regulations of the CMEA market, we lose the possibility of economic catch-up and face the slowdown of technological development. The adjustment of the Hungarian economy to Western standards is probably more imperative than in most other Eastern European cases, partly because we have the relatively biggest share of our own products in Western exports (and this trend is to be growing in order to reduce our significant Western debts).

An additional factor to conserve our backward position is to follow a shortsighted policy of forced foreign capital import even on a price of long term consequences. This means to let our countries become the deposit sites of Western industrial wastes and pollution if they are willing to pay for it in hard currency. We cannot even estimate how much it would cost us to repair the damages of such a policy in the future.

Our economic hardships tend to promote shortsighted approaches which usually consider environmental protection as a less important issue, definitely not as a top priority. Unfortunately, these approaches simply reproduce our own poverty. Environmental protective technologies and equipments may have a higher price but the costs of repairing environmental damages and degradations or those of retrofitting unpolluted environment are essentially higher. Our political and business leaders still share a view which deprives them of preventive actions. It does not simply mean that they prefer cheaper immediate solutions even at the risk of later higher costs but also an approach in all planning activity which considers costs only in direct economic terms and neglects environmental factors as parts of the overall costs.

A good example for this approach is clearly presented in the already mentioned Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Danube dam project where a) environmental damages have not been calculated into the overall costs (even the construction of the sewage cleaning systems which is a precondition of a safe operation have to be constructed from separate, mostly inadequate local resources); and b) the planners and constructors are not willing to invest into preventive methods; their approach is first to wait if there were any environmental problems and if yes, try to reduce the harms during operation. This is, by the way, the method which always proved to be the most expensive everywhere all over the world.

The change of industrial structure to environment-protective one necessitates new investments which would be possible only after a change in approaches both at the enterprise and the government level. This, however, is taking us to political problems because the conditions of a genuine change in our economic approaches are mainly political ones. We have to overcome the state and government or party monopoly in decision-making and reduce or eliminate the informal and behind-the-scenes influence of economic pressure groups. We have to make the decision-making process open to public and to parliamentary debates and control. Though the whole structure of our political life has not favored these changes up to now, there is a new chance given both by the Soviet glasnost policy and the changes in Hungary.

Our governments have to understand that the deep concern for en-

vironmental problems comes from local and national patriotism, from a responsible attitude for our resources and from the growing understanding of our responsibility for the next and future generations. Governments should not label these activities hostile and oppositional and definitely should not oppress them; rather they have to find common ground for joint actions. The reference to scarcity of resources cannot be an excuse; it rather highlights the need for changing priorities and creating new development pattern.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

THE NOTION of sustainable development is already quite well-known not only among environmentalists but also among economic planners. Though there are quite considerable reservations concerning the feasibility of sustainable development especially in countries which are just trying to catch up in their economic output to the more developed nations yet the compelling factors of resource scarcity and environmental degradation forbid us to abandon this idea.

The very idea of sustainable development is to link any kind of economic-industrial development to energy and resource conservation and to the prevention of environmental degradation by alternative and clean technologies and pollution-reducing production systems.

It basically means a new concept of economic growth which tries to meet the needs of present generations without risking their own well-being and without compromising the ability to meet the needs of a next generation.

The changes which are in progress both in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union offer a unique possibility to redefine sustainable development. This notion has permanently been associated with third world countries and extreme poverty. I am, however, convinced that it is quite meaningful to speak about sustainable development also in a broader sense. In all three countries mentioned above everybody speaks about the obsolete economic structure and the almost unbearable burdens it puts on both the leaders and the populace. There is also a wide-spread discussion of wasteful production and inefficient use of resources. Finally, there is a growing uncertainty in defining goals, especially long-term ones, for the society.

We can witness a debate on the notion of socialism in which nobody can offer an acceptable new concept: the old one is empty or proved to be wrong (leaders identify the previous model with a dead-end street). Reform communists hardly can distinguish their program from a social democratic one and there is almost nothing genuinely new to offer.

Both traditional and reformist communists are trapped in the logic of industrial development; the difference between them is mainly in terms of democratization and decentralization—from the relevant economic point of view these terms are essentially methodological rather than substantial in character.

While sustainable development has its own relevance to general human values, and should be pursued independently from ideologies or politics, it can well be a significant element of a genuine third approach which is different both from capitalism and traditional socialism. It represents a new global value and a new world view which tries to break our consumerism-driven, wasting patterns. The reform-oriented East European countries have a rare chance to adopt a sustainable development-related new economic development pattern and *link the restructuring of economy to an environment-conscious sustainable development*. If it succeeds, it will provide an influential example not only to third world countries but also to the West.

Being aware of the pervasive character of the previous development pattern, probably the first step in introducing sustainable development strategies is the dissemination of a new thinking and the creation of a consensus on the most important and immediate problems and priorities to be addressed. These are goals which best can be achieved by East-West cooperation in the sense of Western aid in promoting both a change of belief system and the setup of new priorities.

Sustainable development does not necessarily mean unprofitable production; just the contrary, it is linked to the promotion of technologies which are both safe to the environment or help changing for cleaner solutions and yet are rather profitable. We can find excellent examples in the energy conservation field, like the insulation industry or the energy efficient electric household appliances industry, or the organic food production, etc.

PROPOSALS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COOPERATION

POLLUTION and the degradation of the environment is no more a local or a national problem. Territorial pollution has a characteristic to become regional, from regional to national, from national to international, and, in worst cases, from international to global.

International approach in environmental policies are justified also because of the transient fluxes of pollution. Hungary is affected by fluxes of pollution from different directions, especially from the north and the south-east. It means an urgent need for regional cooperation in the field of air and water protection. Pollution, however, is spread not only by surface waters (rivers) or acid rain but also by the export and import of products and technologies what is largely characteristic to the East European region. The responsibility of the respective countries is mutual.

Hungary has accepted the findings and recommendations of the Brundtland report. The following list of proposed measures and ideas is also compatible with the recommendations of the Brundtland report.

1) The CMEA countries should urgently elaborate a list of norms which—even in the present obsolete and unreformed structure of CMEA—guarantees the following

- the costs of environmental protective technologies are taken into consideration both in the costs of production and in the prices of their products in mutual transactions;

- in case of alternative and substitutable products, buying environment-protective ones should be mandatory

2) There is a need to establish *a standardized international monitoring system* to control air, water, and soil pollution. The existing monitoring system is obsolete, its data are irregular, insufficient, and frequently unreliable. It does not solve the problem of exact testing of incoming and outgoing pollution (e.g. in the case of international rivers). An up-to-date monitoring system has extreme importance in cases of mishaps or catastrophes. We propose to *sign an agreement* to establish a standardized, international monitoring system in the region which could supply continuous and reliable data.

3) It has a priority importance to measure incoming and outgoing pollution in the case of the Danube. For example, the Hungarian-Czechoslovak agreement on the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam refers to the regular testing of water quality; but the evaluation of these tests is meaningful only if we can compare it to a so called zero-situation. The zero-situation, by definition, is the situation prior to the construction of the dam, so we need tests and comprehensive data immediately—these, however, are missing and the whole issue has remained unsolved.

It seems to be plausible to *create an international Danube-monitoring system* which would comprise an internationally linked network of automatic testing posts. The data should be evaluated in a neutral international centre and both the testing posts, methods, and the data would be open for international verification. Such a system can be established in a *joint effort of the countries along the Danube*, with joint investments and equipments (as an East-West joint venture). The foreseeable completion of the Rhein-Maine-Danube canal gives additional importance to this proposal. This system could exist, of course, as a part of the suggested international monitoring system, thus reducing the costs of implementation and operation.

4) We propose to *establish a regional coordination centre for environmental protection*. It would elaborate recommendations and solutions for environmental policy and problems; would provide professional justification for certain measures as well as controls for adjustments. This centre could conduct basic research too, while coordinating research in the field among specialists of the East European countries (mainly Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union) and certain West European countries (Austria, FRG). This centre could specify in concrete steps the recommendations of the Brundtland report for this particular region in the field of technology, environmental economy, supporting branches of industry, etc. This coordination should take place beyond the framework of the CMEA and of any Western institution (like EC) and would preserve an autonomous status. It would function as a non-partisan, non-governmental institution, open and available for international agencies, both private and public.

This centre could also function as an *international data bank in environmental protection* issues, and could also coordinate the international monitoring system's activity.

The growing awareness of environmental problems in Hungary contributes to the emergence of a well trained professional group to deal both with research and policy implementation in environmental field. A few centres are already dedicated to environmental studies in the natural as well as in the social sciences. These can provide the framework in which this project could be implemented. So it seems to be reasonable to set up this centre in Budapest. It could support Hungary's bridging role in East-West relations, or her possible integrating efforts in the Central European region. It would help to promote the orientation for selecting a more suitable trend of technology development and would fit into the line of structural changes. It should exist as an independent institution but could and even should get government support to create certain minimal conditions of cooperation between government agencies and citizen initiatives.

It needs mentioning that establishing a similar or identical centre was also recommended by the American president Mr. Bush during his visit to Hungary in July 1989. The novelty of his approach to East European economic problems was exactly the emphasis he put on environmental issues. The seriousness of his concern was shown by his commitment to devote five million US dollars to set up the above mentioned centre in Budapest.¹

ECOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES created political debates and inter-governmental tensions among East European countries, like a south-eastern Rumanian chemical plant's effects on the Bulgarian city Ruse, or the heavily polluted industrial triangle at the Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German borderline. Such conflicts spoil the Czech-Polish relationship

in the Silesian industrial region, see especially Polish protests over a Czech cokes-plant under construction. And examples could be further given to river pollutions as a recurrent source of bilateral and sometimes multilateral conflicts.

Environmental issues also have domestic political significance, influencing public debates, government decisions, and investment policies (see the debates on the Danube dams or on nuclear waste deposit sites in Hungary). In the Soviet Union it has emerged not only in such significant issues as the reversal of the Siberian rivers or the closing down of dangerous nuclear power stations but also in a less obvious way: it is an element of nationality conflicts as well. It is especially true if we can prove the linkage between national-ethnic hostility and scarcity of resources (which obviously is the case); in the scarcity situation, any damage to vital environmental resources can aggravate or trigger long existing ethnic, religious, etc. conflicts. One of the clear environmental related such issues is the desperate resistance of Estonian experts and later also politicians to the central Soviet plan of exploiting phosphorite layers in the North-Eastern part of the Baltic state on the expense of very serious environmental risks and degradation.

International conflicts arising from environmental problems, the management and/or resolution of these conflicts, however, are not yet analyzed in any systematic way, and they still belong to the white spots of East European studies. Despite the growing number of scientific and professional works and research dealing with environmental issues there is a complete lack of research both in the domestic and foreign political decision making dimension of these issues. This situation calls for a systematic study of environmental conflict management technic. This type of study is an excellent opportunity for an East-West cooperation a) in the elaboration of negotiation technic and conflict resolution methods for international environmental problems; b) in its application for educational training.

Our governments must be more conscious of the emerging conflict situations in a period when the overall relations among East European countries are in a stage of continuous change. Growing popular pressures to deal with environmental conflicts and to be more open and public in information compel government officials to elaborate adequate negotiating technic which can reduce tensions and help to solve the problems. The involvement of independent, neutral experts and/or non-governmental agencies which are able to coordinate such expert activities can provide a suitable framework for such activities, justifying at the same time the possibility of East-West cooperation in the field.

East European countries have joined many international agreements and protocols in the field of environmental protection. Yet the basic breakthrough in environmental policy has still to come. It seems to be a better strategy to voluntarily change concept and policy and set up new priorities than to wait for domestic popular pressure and the demands of external powers, especially in a case in which these pressures and demands for a different policy are fully justified.

¹ Our idea to establish such a centre was first presented to the Hungarian government in February, and to the international expert community in March, 1989

THE ROADS TO RUSSIA

F. Wilhelm CHRISTIANS

MY FIRST TIME IN MOSCOW

THE DC-9 PLANE of the Austrian airlines had been flying a good hour over Soviet territory. At that time, in December 1969, a German from the FRG who wanted to get to Moscow had to fly from Vienna by Austrian airlines. Lufthansa still did not have the right to land in the Soviet capital. Only 25 years had passed since the Second World War, and the Cold War hadn't ended yet.

Broad snow-covered Ukrainian fields were sprawled out under me. In the foggy-air and the white wilderness I could only make out the dark ribbon of the Dnieper with the vague outlines of Kiev. Then we flew over the vast forests by Konotop. There was snow all around. Just like in those "Russian winters" when Adolf Hitler awarded us an "Order for Frozen Flesh".

Somewhere below the Zhizdra River flowed. Back then I nearly remained forever on its banks. It was my second Russian winter. We were situated in a big forest, for which we had been fighting the Siberian infantry for several weeks already. Early in the morning I found the grave of my brother, who had been killed not far from there. Later, in an armoured reconnaissance vehicle, I went to a meadow to establish contact with artillery reconnaissance. I was wounded as I was crawled out of it. A sniper's bullet had slashed the top edge of my helmet and then penetrated my shoulder and lodged in my left lung. Today I smilingly recall my poor knowledge of anatomy, which exhibited itself in my groggy consciousness at that time. Our orderly examined me in a hut, and I heard clearly. "The left side of the lieutenant's chest has been pierced directly." I perceived this with relief. Since, I thought, my heart was on my right side, I would get off easy.

Today, everything notwithstanding, I survived and, in early December 1969, was sitting in an airplane that was flying to Moscow. I was heading to the Soviet Union on Deutsche Bank business to hold talks regarding a big Soviet-German venture. The increase of pressure inside the plane indicated that we were preparing to land. The plane made a sharp arc. When I walked down the gangway I was immediately surrounded by an incomparable Russian aroma—a mixture of cigarette smoke and exhaust from low-octane Russian petrol. I suddenly realised where I was—in the country which a quarter of a century before, I had broken into by force and upon orders, and where I was now to establish con-

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Mr. Christians contributed this material specially for INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

acts with political and economic leaders as a representative of another, new Germany.

I had to grow accustomed to saying not "Russia" but the official name of this country—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR, or the Soviet Union. The people with whom I would be dealing were Soviets and ethnically they should not be called Russian. My counterparts at the talks attached great importance to correct definitions, above all in the texts of the agreements.

Soon, however, I started hitting the "enemy" with his own weapon. Soviet people liked to call my country "the FRG" for short. Alluding to the text of our constitution, I constantly demanded that the full name—the Federal Republic of Germany—be used. Some years later, in 1979-1982, this led to a ridiculous situation, for example, during the signing of a voluminous agreement on credits for the construction of the Yamal natural gas pipeline. Right before the signing of the agreement in Leningrad—the protocol was to be signed by very highly placed people, I again noted the odious abbreviation "FRG" in the text. I demanded that it be corrected. My Soviet counterparts shrugged their shoulders, referring to the lack of time and to the journalists who were waiting, as had been planned, for speeches in front of the national and international press. But I insisted that the corrections be made, and this was done.

However, let's get back to my first arrival. The long road to the centre of town (I remember its last leg for the magnificent view of the gold domes of the Kremlin) led to the National Hotel, with the traditional exit at the end of Gorky Street right opposite the Kremlin wall. Once again the long wait as papers were processed and passports checked before we could get into our rooms.

The building has been around since tsarist times. It is richly adorned with elements of the modernist style and it was being restored right at that time. Here everything breathes of history—aristocratic and revolutionary history. German Communists in emigration lived here in the 1930s and 40s and avoided the Stalinist repressions. These were Wener, Leonardt and many others. I reflected on all of this as I walked down the thick carpets of the long corridors.

I feel nostalgic about the National. In my more than 30 trips to the Soviet Union I always stayed there. Often in the evenings after a long work day I would stand by the window and admire the view of the wide square: on the left was a building; opposite was an incline to Red Square with the Lenin Mausoleum and the huge GUM department store, the wonderful façade of the Kremlin and the many cupolas and towers of St. Basil's Cathedral; to the right is the former tsarist stable, which today is used primarily for art exhibitions, and there is a green strip by the foot of the 18-m Kremlin wall, where the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the Eternal Flame are situated.

Back then, on the first winter evening of 1969, I was unable to fall asleep in my modest hotel room. There were too many impressions and recollections. I again got dressed and walked past the wakeful Cerberus in a women's skirt who was on duty in the corridor, and went outside. It was a clear frosty winter night. Under my boots crunched the Red Square snow that had been pounded down by thousands of feet.

My gaze wandered along the immobile, marble-like figures of Red Army men who were standing on both sides of the entrance to the mausoleum, and from there, above toward the huge red banner, lazily swaying from the night wind, on the cupola of the building of the Supreme Soviet, under the roof of which the country's highest legislative body sits. The floodlights which cut through the night blue sky imparted something triumphant and almost majestic to the silk flag. Several windows in the

large building were still lit. "Who was bent over papers there?" I asked myself. Who were these *apparatchiks* possessors of unlimited power over 285 million people? And what would the people whom I would soon be meeting be like? Shining in the quiet of the night was a citadel—something between a fortress and a monastery, the control panel of a fear-filled empire, mysterious sorcery.

Was I beset by my former notions which for decades had been shaping my image of Russia? The huge red stars on the towers conjured up associations with what had long been forgotten. Such stars were on the caps of the Red Army men against whom we stood for months, and also on the turrets of their tanks which later chased us like rabbits, when we were retreating. Did we hate Russian soldiers then? And how was this in general, when attempts were being made to instil fanatical hatred in us for everything Soviet?

I thought about all this that night during my first encounter with Moscow, standing with my coat collar up and with my hands tucked into my pockets, and gazing up at the lit windows of the Kremlin. Many years later I myself stood behind these windows and looked down at people at my feet in Red Square, when I was a guest of honour of people who did not know me yet, the faceless mighty leaders of the cold apparatus we used to see on the rostrum of the Mausoleum during the October demonstrations.

That time and afterwards, many years later, while in Moscow I could see for myself time and again how strong Soviet peoples' memory of the war, which they call the "Great Patriotic War" is and how real the notion of a new threat is for them. For a German from the Federal Republic with its limited military might this is hardly understandable today.

PEOPLE AND THE COUNTRY

DURING my very first trips to Moscow in 1969-70 I noted how the image of a person from the Soviet capital differs from residents of other capitals. There were almost no cars on Moscow's streets at that time. Only functionaries rode in the many black limousines which belonged to the state. The standard car was the Moskvich, the Volga was for a higher class, and the highest rank of the *nomenklatura* rode in six- or eight-seat Chaikas. The model that was drawn on was the deluxe American limousine of the 1950s, which was lavishly decorated with chrome. Afterwards this impressive carriage, which could often be seen on mornings entering the Kremlin gates, was replaced with a newer model, which was similar to the American Lincoln.

As the years passed I grew in rank to a "state guest", who was entitled to such a Chaika, sometimes with a flashing blue light on the roof and accompanied by another car. This privilege was maintained even during my trips to distant Soviet republics such as Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan. However, despite the fact that it was convenient travelling around in the capital or the provinces in such a car, the foreign guest felt ill at ease in it. As soon as a Chaika appeared people would scatter. On highways or on country roads escort cars with flashing blue lights saw to it that all oncoming cars, trucks and wagons moved to the right edge of the road and stopped until the escort passed.

I tried to compensate for the unpleasant sensations from such privileges by a markedly friendly expression on my face or by waving to the respectfully waiting passersby. Soon I noticed, however, that such behaviour on my part was not understood. Many decades after the overthrow of the tsar and the revolution in this country, new special privileges were created in this country and taken for granted.

Here I can take the liberty of a brief digression. As far as help by

our counterparts regarding the way I was received is concerned, it was organised in exemplary fashion both in Moscow, where I often arrived, and in other cities—from my arrival to my departure. This was especially true if my family was accompanying me. My son and daughter as well as my wife wanted to take a look personally at what the head of the family was engaged in during his many trips to this enigmatic country, trips which were frequently the cause of negative assessments and scathing press comment.

However, there were also moments when my family wanted me to go to the Soviet Union as often as possible. This was soon after a number of cold-blooded killings of leading West German public figures by terrorists in 1977. At that time I felt my life threatened, too, and I followed the security rules in force in the federal department of police. This meant that I could freely move about only abroad. Foreign guests and business partners observed in astonishment that I had bodyguards in front of the door of my own bureau.

USSR Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Viktor Ivanov was unable to conceal his surprise and said, with a measure of cynicism, that if this was so necessary I would be better off coming to him in Moscow. I could see for myself during my frequent trips about the country how safely I could travel there.

But let's get back to the Muscovites.

Moscow has always been a city of pedestrians. Admittedly, the number of private cars has increased notably. As it was explained to me, it is mostly waiters working in restaurants for foreigners, whose customers paid chiefly in Western currency, who have become the new owners. However, the dominating picture in Moscow is still pedestrians moving along the broad sidewalks. A large part of these hurrying people laden down with bags and packages are rushing to metro stations. This was also the case 20 years ago, but that winter they seemed entirely disconsolate to me. In the dirty light-grey snow typical of big cities marched thousands of transparent beings, moving almost in step, dreary, dressed in dark clothing and silent, as if at a funeral. Light came step by step in the literal sense of the word over the past 20 years.

The once drab monotony in clothing, even among the Moscow young people, gradually came to life. Clothing was not the only thing that changed, people's behaviour became different, too. First and foremost, young people seemed more self-confident and uninhibited. Young girls suddenly donned miniskirts, which was officially frowned upon, while the latter had long disappeared in the West. The greater attention to cosmetics on the part of women was quite a surprise for me.

As far as the Russian population is concerned, one cannot but note its deep attachment to religion, an attachment which made its imprint on it. There are Marx' well-known words about religion as the opium of the people, which became the main tenet of the atheist state. While fighting as a soldier in the war against Russia, I searched everywhere for signs of aggressive atheism. However, I instead discovered the opposite. In towns and villages the churches were indeed separate from the state and served as venues for meetings or as warehouses. However, in clay houses located far from large townships, one could see something similar to an altar in the only room or in the guest room. It invariably had a small icon of the Mother of God, painted in a simple artistic manner, but with great feeling.

Once, to my surprise, I happened upon a service in a dilapidated, neglected church. This was the first Orthodox rite I saw. The sonorous voice of the deacon and the impassioned singing of the worshippers made a strong impression and stirred me. I arrived at the conclusion that despite the atheistic policy of the Soviet state, even a quarter of a cen-

tury after it was founded, the people still had strong living ties with religion.

Back in Russia years later, I again discovered that my observations of that time were borne out. I want to say that transcendentalism cannot be forced out of the Russian soul. This is also argued in the works of Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov and Pasternak that are known in the West. All the efforts, even the most ruthless ones, to uproot these "superstitions" were patently in vain.

Let us turn to Dostoyevsky. As both a believer and a doubting Thomas, he more than anyone else went through "great Purgatory", as he himself writes. Critics call his Orthodox religiosity "mystical", an adjective well loved in 19th-century Russian literature and in our day as well. Evidently, Dostoyevsky's faith was the faith of doubt. Nevertheless, for him the mission of the Russian people was "God-bearing". He said: "The purpose of all Russia is Orthodoxy, light from the East, light which should go to the people of the West, to people who have lost Christ."

Dostoyevsky also opens our eyes to another typical trait of the Russian people—an "age-old spiritual need" for suffering. "This agonising thirst for sufferings," he writes, "has been with it since olden times."

Dostoyevsky's interpretation of the Russian character type enables us to gain a better understanding of the millennium of Russian Christianity. In the year 988 Great Prince Vladimir of Kiev, after having studied all other religions, ordered the people to be converted to the Orthodox faith as the only salvific one. In the centuries that followed, up until the jubilee year of 1988, many often queried how unexpectedly quickly Vladimir's countrymen accepted the religion established from on high, and are still so passionately devoted to it.

The historical experience of enormous sufferings which was acquired as a result of invasions from within—let's consider the monstrous losses of the last world war—and the torture of foreign domination brought the Russians close to Christ's passions as an "example for consolation".

Over my many years of contact with Russians I have made still another discovery. Why, queries the public in Western Europe, and above all in the Federal Republic, does the Soviet Union arm itself so excessively? This is officially the top priority, with manpower and material expenditures seeming to have no bounds. Such expenditures are quite baffling, since under the existing correlation of forces the danger of an attack from the West is unrealistic. We find no rational arguments warranting the highly sensitive security of Soviet people. I believe that this need can be explained above all by bitter historical experience. For centuries it developed into a sort of trauma which cannot be understood through sober calculation.

Describing the Russian frame of mind and religiosity, I referred to Boris Pasternak, and there were reasons for doing so. In 1958 Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize for his novel "Doctor Zhivago", but he did not have the right to receive it. He died two years later, harassed and scorned in his own country, but deeply revered in the West, and also by Soviet young people. I still recall the indecorous neglect which the gravely ill poet suffered on the part of the Soviet authorities in Moscow. When, in 1972, I wanted to visit his grave in Peredelkino, a colourful spot just outside Moscow, I was not granted official permission. Ultimately, I got to his grave somehow in the small Peredelkino cemetery amidst a thick birch grove.

When, with my heart beating heavily—after all, I was on forbidden territory—I got closer, I found a middle-aged man and a young woman there. They were putting together benches from newly chopped birch logs. From the looks of them I figured that they were not cemetery employees. As I could gather from the conversation, they were a university

assistant professor and his assistant. In Russia there is the wonderful custom of putting up simple benches at the graveside where friends and relatives of the deceased could sit to speak to him or about him. Both explained this to me with friendly candour. This pleasant encounter impressed me.

Sixteen years later, in autumn 1988, I again had a desire to visit the great poet's grave. By then a small monument with a bas-relief of him and the dates of his birth and death had long been standing. The graves of relatives were nearby. Those of his wife on one side and his son on the other. Remains of a pie, apples and a corn-cob lay on Pasternak's grave. It was explained to me that this last communion is placed on the grave of a revered deceased person as gifts of life.

I sat together with my companions on the freshly built bench. The afternoon autumn sun was shining. We spent some time in quiet reflection, after which an ordinary-looking man carrying a cellophane bag sat down next to me. At first he remained silent, and then said quietly, talking more to himself: "We miss him, Pasternak, he left us too early." Later he noticed our "western" appearance and asked us where we were from. He was surprised to learn that we were Germans from the Federal Republic, and then he said: "Once you were our enemies. I fought in a partisan detachment near Gomel against the invading Germans."

"And I was a soldier of the Germany army," I muttered.

This brief exchange took place at Pasternak's grave. We sat on a small bench, tightly pressed to one another. Each was thinking his own thoughts.

THE FIRST SIGNS OF NEW THINKING

THE FIRST BIG TRANSACTION of the winter of 1969-1970 was followed by others several years later. In 1975 an agreement was concluded for large deliveries of air-cooled lorries from the Magirus firm. Deutsche Bank financed this undertaking, too. This lorry was needed for the construction of the famous Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), a railway running parallel to the Transsiberian Railway, which was to facilitate the development of Siberian deposits but also pursued strategic aims as well, of course. The construction was carried out in extremely difficult weather conditions. The German Magiruses were best suited to this, and their durability and dependability are valued in the Soviet Union.

Naturally, our business ties with the Soviet Union, which did not remain a secret, and should not have, evoked skepticism, disbelief and perhaps even certain envy among our Western partners and an avowedly critical attitude on the part of the American administration. This was manifest more explicitly than before in connection with the big Yamal Pipeline project, concerning which talks were held between 1979 and 1982 and in which several West European countries took part. The USA and especially Secretary of State Alexander Haig took an opposing stand and sharply assailed this multilateral project. Authoritative American newspapers often provided unfriendly commentary to the dialogue that ensued around it.

The Americans' main criticism was that the Federal Republic, like other Western client-countries, were supposedly risking finding themselves too dependent on the Soviet Union as a result of their being provided with primary energy resources, in particular, Soviet natural gas, and that in the instance of tense situations this would be fraught with the possibility of political pressure on these countries. What is more, in the Americans' opinion, there was reason to fear that the Soviet Union would use the currency it received for military purposes.

The federal government and in part the German public could not fail

to take note of these reproaches. However, as far as matters of dependence on energy supply are concerned, we acquired our own experience during the oil crises of 1973 and 1978. In effect the strategic line of the federal government after 1978 consisted in diversifying energy supply, which used to be implemented primarily by fuel deliveries from the Arab oil countries in other forms of energy raw materials such as coal and natural gas, by involving other non-OPEC countries in it.

Informal talks were held between the West German federal government headed by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the respective branch of German industry—the partner in the pipeline, pipe supply firms and financing banks. We had to work it in such a way that Soviet natural gas deliveries did not exceed five per cent of our overall need for energy raw materials and 30 per cent of our natural gas needs. A deadline until the end of the 80s was set for attaining this upper level. It was in this area that things actually developed.

Despite the policy of limiting gas supply, a policy that the federal government considered properly calculated, the criticism coming from the USA greatly hampered implementation of the agreement on the Yamal pipeline. However, the Americans were not the only ones who were skeptical. Many politicians in Bonn and also many West German economists shared their views. The most skepticism was levelled at my bank as the leading one in the consortium and at me. Individual banks even started leaving the consortium singly. I was particularly displeased that despite the strong criticism of my actions from without, at home I was constantly asked whether I, in view of my supposed good ties with Moscow, in the interests of one top politician or another, could assist in arranging their visits to the Soviet capital.

The extent to which this tension worsened the overall atmosphere is evidenced by the following instance, one which was typical of those times. The post of deputy prime minister in the Soviet government was held by Leonid Kostandov, who had replaced Mr. Novikov, who was in charge of relations with the Federal Republic. Kostandov was a chemist and used to work in the Soviet chemical industry. Even back then he persistently called for Soviet-German cooperation in the chemical industry and also in the sphere of deliveries of energy—coal, natural gas and oil. In June 1982 he was invited to Bonn for talks. Several visits were set up, and I also made arrangements to meet him. However, when I visited Kostandov, he appeared upset to me, which astonished me, since by nature he was a frank, enthusiastic and very amicable person. Soon I learned the reason for his being upset. Kostandov told me that he had hardly been listened to in Bonn. He had even encountered closed doors where they used to be open for him. The only reason he could fathom was the severe criticism from the Americans.

Some role may have been played by the Western countries' summit meeting in Paris, which was being held right at that moment and the agenda of which included energy supply matters. Kostandov got the impression that the Bonn government with its retinue had hurried to accept the invitation of President Mitterrand to the meeting at the Palace of Versailles and therefore had been unable to give him any time or show the slightest interest in him. He was patently pleased that I was at his disposal.

Functioning as a private intermediary for purely commercial matters, I again fell within the complicated political context of the East-West tension field. My Soviet counterparts expected to hear my opinions on matters having nothing in common with my direct instructions. This is not hard to explain either. My counterparts had long grown used to this owing to their many-year, almost uninterrupted contact with me, whether in Moscow or during their private trips to us, which they increas-

ngly valued due to the pleasant attendant circumstances. Trust was gradually established between us.

Initially things were quite different. In the 1960s both sides still felt very strange. Hostility was often felt on the Soviet side. However, contact only with one another, a livelier manner of behaviour took shape in the 1970s, the continuing skepticism notwithstanding. The ice of the first years had started moving; we had got to know each other in purely human terms, and even to appreciate each other. However, Soviet people for obvious reasons liked to debate political issues with me more than I did. Suspensions and reproaches were inevitable. They found it convenient to descry in me a "representative" of German policy and involve me in discussions of problems about which I could not and did not want to talk from an official standpoint.

In spring 1973 I communicated this to the federal government and discussed with various ministries the philosophy of my behaviour which I was supposed to compile for myself on the difficult Moscow arena. I subscribed then, and I subscribe now, to the view that the Federal Republic of Germany does not intend to roam in the darkness—it should be regarded more as a partner of the Western Allies, whose political orientation has been quite defined and whose main goals are unshakable. In short, the Federal Republic has always been a reliable member of NATO and the Common Market.

I made it clear to my government that I should not have to be the one to explain this to Soviet people, political instances should. If the Kremlin recognises this once and for all, then, I felt, all of us would have a sober and reliable stand for concluding long-term commercial agreements, meaning still more intensive cooperation. I also requested that the delicate issue of subsidies, which was stubbornly raised with me, be decided in Bonn. As has already been pointed out, the decision was unequivocally negative. As far as I knew, there was no consensus in the cabinet on this score, however, the persons responsible for West German financial and economic policy were patently inclined toward my viewpoint.

Still another difficulty had to be overcome. It obtained from the fundamental differences in our political systems. We had a liberal system of management with private initiative, while in the USSR there was a strictly regulated, centralised plan system. Soviet representatives would act on the instructions of state instances. They were guided by the orientations of the current five-year plan and the obtaining specific targets.

We quickly understood that we needed to make a more detailed study of the Soviet system in order to correctly assess the actions of our negotiating counterparts and their eternally irritated reaction and mode of thought. Thus we acquainted ourselves with the five-year plan in theory and practice.

In the Soviet Union, meeting a nominal plan target is proof of achievements, if this word is suitable at all, with quality playing a secondary role. Since goods are distributed according to norms of issue, there are reclamations; however, under the "quality" column, no adjustment is made by the product inspector. This meeting of the quota is what determines the thinking and actions of all people engaged in production, up to and including officials. The main thing is not to stand out. Mutual assistance is required here, of course. And hence the direct road to corruption.

Mikhail Gorbachev not only identified this, he mercilessly stated that if the Soviet economy wants to keep in step with the requirements of the world economy, planning should be implemented with an eye to the longer term—a minimum of ten years. What is more, he demanded quality as well as quantity.

However, in order to accomplish this task, we need to break the resistance and brace ourselves for certain complications. After all, the stereotype of behaviour diametrically opposed to "quality" thinking has taken shape in the people in charge of the implementation of the five-year plan. This is unequivocally manifest in attaining, in one's narrow limited field, indices as close as possible to the nominal, which should in and of itself attest to what has been achieved. It logically obtains that self-centred group thinking was encouraged in every possible way, including in the ministries. A sort of "pipe thinking" took shape. For each one separately, this means the following: thanks to the narrow "pipes" in your sphere of production, you should look only at figures, not showing concern for what is happening to the right and left of you, for any horizontal links, and not interfering in the work of neighbouring departments or ministries.

Branch ministries, of which there are an innumerable host in the Soviet Union, have been promoting the introduction of this thinking for decades now. I have still been unable to ascertain either their exact number or their specific tasks. Since we are talking about a centrally administered economy, some higher administrative state body, which decides and coordinates everything, is needed. But today the system has been worked to death. The increase in the number of ministers and their deputies requires great expenditures, with representatives of one's own sub-department being promoted out of purely selfish considerations, which leaves no freedom of action for a flexible business-like approach in the localities in this enormous country.

Hence the enormous helplessness, benefit from which is derived only by officials, who have every reason to defend their sinecures, which are retained for them for their lifetime. Most of them were appointed back in Brezhnev's time, in other words these people are middle aged and far from retirement. It hardly seems possible to remove them without creating a superfluous luss.

In all fairness, I should say that we in the FRG also have the danger of vertical "pipe thinking" somewhere in management or the central administrations of major concerns, although hardly on an equal basis with the Soviet authorities. In the USSR we invariably see for ourselves that any changes would hardly take place with centralised and uniform planning of production. This in turn leads to a situation where the use of resources and energy is not coordinated and actions take place that are completely unrelated and that hamper one another rather than promote general effectiveness. That is why the mechanism gets bogged down.

We also had to take into account this circumstance, drawing the conclusion that a number of ministries and their subordinate organisations, about which it was impossible to clarify anything in advance on a horizontal plane, were our partners on the Soviet side. Basically, we knew what point was at issue in certain instances and were able to assess who should be involved in the Soviet side; representatives of the Soviet administration, however, were almost never able to coordinate their efforts. It came as no surprise that unforeseen difficulties and prejudices arose.

I suppose that all the above is excessively detailed, but it is through this pragmatic path that we attempted to extricate ourselves from our plight. Nevertheless, things started working out. At present attempts are being made to revamp planning from the centre, implement plans and distribute national resources to the departments in a decentralised fashion. However, the new thinking is too uncommon and it is hardly possible to expect rapid changes in people's behaviour. It is not only uncommon; it asks too much of the people who functioned

in the old system. Now they are to take decisions at their own discretion, and, when need be, to depart from the plan mapped out earlier. Meanwhile, this was totally unthinkable in the past. If someone displayed a responsible approach to work, this was increasingly a pretext or inevitable boycott and punishment than a cause for praise or advancement.

The planning system in the USSR was sternly criticised in the past, too, such as during the times of Khrushchev or Kosygin. I remember very well how in 1982 Yuri Andropov became General Secretary after Brezhnev's death, and a fresh breeze began to blow in Moscow in the administrative spheres. Prior to this it had seemed to us that before us were people who were living in a badly ventilated, stuffy room, gloomily and phlegmatically, looking around, not displaying any initiative and not experiencing joy from labour. However, suddenly the windows were opened wide and the same people came to life, they became more responsible and suddenly acquired the boldness to take a critical look at things and explore ways of improving the situation.

The first symptoms of the nascent breeze appeared in spring 1983. We had been invited to a conference with officials of the State Planning Committee, the influential compilers of the centralised economic plan that still exists. The theme "Decentralisation of Responsibility" was again being modified. We acquainted ourselves with an academic study from Novosibirsk which had all the attributes of a scholarly work. However, it was difficult to determine what was predominant in it—the research or political part of it.

During the discussion I asked the deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee what this academic study meant. In the presence of his close associates he reaffirmed that initiative comes from above. He added that given the huge territory of the Soviet Union, the big distances and different radiuses of action, it was quite reasonable to consider reforms of the centralised system. He asked me my opinion on that score.

I once again remind you that in our contact with each other we had long grown used to lively, specific discussions, and we called a spade a spade. That time I replied that I could only agree with such a beginning. It is difficult even to prepare a general survey of the situation, say, of so small a geographical formation with a small economy as the Federal Republic. So what then can be said of the enormous Soviet Union with its 285 million people, different big industries and constantly changing conditions? If new ideas appear, then competence and a readiness to resolve problems independently will appear in the localities in the depths of the largely decentralised system, and elimination of the sway of bureaucracy will be conducive to better economic management.

"In any event, to my mind," I added, "this would be tantamount to your placing an 'ideological atomic bomb' under your desk. My words evoked general astonishment. What was I implying by this? I explained to my interlocutors that if I had learned anything in the Soviet Union over all those years, it was most likely one thing, that centralised planning leads to obliging working people to strictly adhere to plan targets and production norms. Departure from the target is not only unacceptable but is not practiced; making something on one's own responsibility is banned. And if responsible people are being appointed now, if thanks to decentralisation people who know how to take decisions are being promoted, then this will inevitably be followed by independent thinking and critical conclusions. And this cannot be confined to some individual spheres; everyone who is engaged in any large-scale production process will be involved.

Today they must all think together, decide, depart from plan targets in order to eventually boost production in real terms. That is, the point at issue is the transition to the path which, as I see it, the Soviet system did not permit in the past and did not consider correct. If changes take place in the above spirit, the Soviet system itself will change, and it is impossible to foresee what consequences, including in the social sphere, this can eventually have. Hence my remark about an "ideological atomic bomb" under the desk.* I was looking at the pensive faces of the participants in the conference.

Gorbachev propagated a system with independent thinking and action without waiting for instruction from Moscow. On October 1, 1987 he delivered a policy-making speech in Murmansk to workers and the ruling elite of the Kola Peninsula. "Do not wait for orders from Moscow," he urged his audience. "Moscow is far away! If you see what you need here, if you see how to arrive at your goal better, act. Act on your own responsibility!"

However, to this day I have not observed any decent progress in this direction in the depths of the economic apparatus. True, in newspapers and magazines and on radio and television frank discussions are being held on "new thinking", the scope of which has flabbergasted me. Even my Soviet negotiating counterparts, whom I have known for years to be so well informed, inquisitive and to be never evasive in conversation, candidly admitted that the changes taking place in the country do not make them even half-hopeful of prospective improvements. For a foreign observer it is an exciting spectacle when a formerly immobile social system fills with dynamism and decisiveness right before your eyes, setting about tasks and endeavours that are almost alien to its nature.

One example is the first so-called German-Soviet forum which opened in March 1989 in Bonn and which was supposed to discuss over a two-year period the main problems of our cooperation in different fields—from disarmament to religious matters and the return of Soviet citizens of German extraction, but above all economic and ecological problems. Its participants—high-ranking experts, chiefly scientists and members of the Academy of Sciences—had the explicit task of preparing a scientifically substantiated draft concept and proposals pertaining to government activity, and of working out norms for organising practical work.

To our question about the future probable economic and social system of the USSR we were given the following answer: "We want to have a socialist market economy. We expect to place the emphasis on consumer needs. We hope to amass experience in competition with the orientation on high productivity of labour, new capital investments, and greater individual responsibility and consciousness with regard to quality and to production costs. The adjective "socialist" meant that the former humanitarian achievements of the system were not being scrapped.

As one wise member of the Academy of Sciences explained to me, the market is now viewed as a "product of civilisation". Thus far, people cannot, or, rather, do not want, to see that the "market" is not only an instrument of an effective economic order but that it almost impellingly is the organisational form in which citizens feel free of any tutelage. However, the dialectic is helping to gradually overcome the ideological timidity that comes from the past.

* Such a bomb was destined to explode in 1989, but in China rather than the Soviet Union. With its one-sided economic liberalisation it evoked a socio-political chain-reaction which was totally uncontrollable.

The bold theoretical constructions of our negotiating counterparts, which are so enticingly expounded, are not, of course, free of a lack of coordination, which underscores their inner contradictions. Thus, here is no logic in the central issue—property. All the same, it is supposed that in approximately 25 years the system they are seeking to create will be more similar to the Swedish model than our West German one. We are greatly impressed with the seriousness and energy with which the most competent forces in politics and science want to draw the “new thinking” from the sphere of bare ideas and non-binding demands and embody them in a realistic policy.

This is graphically manifest in currency matters, which are perhaps the most difficult and delicate issues which the Soviet reformers have also addressed themselves to. The currency of a country and its value and importance on international financial markets play an important role both for the sense of national self-consciousness and for the self-consciousness of the government. For decades after the Second World War the American dollar was everywhere considered a world-wide value, including by the Soviets, although without particular enthusiasm.

Meanwhile, the region where the “transferrable ruble” is in use by virtue of the Soviet Union’s political and military weight extends from Mongolia to Cuba and covers the territory of the CMEA countries. It is hard to judge the extent to which any change correlations with the national currencies of the countries of this enormous region with a population of over 380 million correspond to the actual state of affairs. All the more so since the external value of the “transferrable ruble” can be fixed administratively, and this is the favourite exchange correlation in settlements between the CMEA countries and their foremost trading partner, the Soviet Union.

At talks with Soviet representatives, whether from a bank or simply customers, the Ministry of Foreign Trade usually acts on their behalf. I understood very soon how greatly they are interested in the dollar’s rate, and also the prices on gold, being maintained. Let us not forget that the Soviet Union together with South Africa is the biggest gold producer and supplier. Thus, it is hardly without South Africa’s consent that the Soviet Union through its banking offices in Zurich, London and Singapore influences increases in gold prices, not only by way of selling but also of purchasing in order to prevent a drop in the dollar’s rate.

In almost every trip to Moscow I could see for myself the extent to which the state of the dollar-gold prices worried our counterparts. As soon as we were in the car taking me from the airport into the city, my greeters would persistently ask me about the latest news in this field.

As far as hard currency and the ruble are concerned, the situation changed drastically in the 1970s. The Americans discovered that what they believed to be the unshakeable bastion of their currency had lost its former power, chiefly due to the war in Vietnam.

In August 1971 the compulsory gold content of the dollar notes was increased by the direct order of President Nixon. In December the Smithsonian Agreement was signed, which brought to light the Bretton Woods rules established by the UN in 1944, in a township near New Hampshire, in the presence of representatives of 44 nations, after which the dollar received the possibility for free circulation on the currency market. From that time the central emission banks of the major Western countries began engaging in currency intervention.

The dollar’s onslaught resulted in an ever increasing fall of its exchange rate on the international market in 1972-1973, which was strongly applauded in Moscow. Whereas previously the dollar had

enjoyed indisputable priority over the Soviet ruble, there now appeared a possibility to establish the value of the ruble higher than the dollar unilaterally, i. e., administratively. No one in Moscow worried about how this was influencing the market.

It is quite natural that this course of events evoked satisfaction there. Shortly before the first flight of the ruble, I happened to catch a taxi at the National Hotel, about to head out on a distant trip. I asked the driver about the cost of the ride. He demanded five rubles or one dollar. The next day I could not help recalling that episode during a conversation in the Central Bank. Perhaps it was tactless on my part to thus dampen my counterparts' fresh joy over the new rate of the ruble, but that was reality. As in other countries, the Moscow cab driver was a representative of the real market—20 cents for one ruble.

This value rate has changed little in the years that have followed. For the same reason—the prejudice in favour of the dollar. In the opinion of my Soviet bank colleagues, the German mark had better prospects for the future. It was at that time that an alternative currency was being explored. Later it was found in the person of the ECU, however small the chances of this European settlement unit may have been, considering its real, i. e., market, value. However, full convertibility, i. e., recognition of the ruble on international financial markets, is still the Soviets' goal.

Theoretically, they have long given concern to full convertibility of the ruble as a prerequisite for economic advance. I have constantly discussed this in Moscow with bankers, planners and scholars.

Present-day reform efforts are giving birth to new and bold ideas. I am talking about a "gold ruble" which for special purposes, above all for foreign countries, should be covered by gold and raw materials, i. e., should become separately convertible. This is only one example. Scholars are displaying the most impatience, their numerous proposals are ambitious. Practical workers are taking a more sober approach, as they see the real difficulties involved.

The price reforms in the USSR are considered an important and indispensable condition for economic improvement. The Soviets proceed from the belief that only free pricing can correct the difference between supply and demand and also create a realistic parity of buying power between the Western countries with their commodity-money economies and the socialist countries of the East. As long as the price tag on a sub-compact car is, by the order of the authorities, 10,000 rubles and a kilogram of bread costs ten kopecks, any equality of purchasing power is unthinkable.

Consequently, the Soviet Union needs above all price reforms, without which the overall reforms cannot be a success. This project, of course, is not without a certain risk. It will be unbelievably difficult to get moving only partially the free supply-demand game in a planned economy, which for years exhibited sheer centralism. For this reason certain dangers can be encountered here.

Soviet scholars are already playing out the following scenario: prices for food and other expense articles are becoming draconian; inflation is observed; loss-making enterprises should be closed; many workers who have become jobless are threatened with falling into a swamp which no social aid can rescue them from. All these are problems which the Soviet Union and its peoples did not know in the past. They are still sleeping soundly in the bosom of perestroika.

Moscow wants to become a full-fledged member of the world market. For a number of years now Soviet experts have been carefully studying the advantages of the international division of labour and trying to

calculate the possible results for the Soviet Union. They used to consider such organisations as GATT, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund weak; now they no longer criticise them; on the contrary, they are seeking membership in them. A distant but worthwhile goal is to become a partnercountry which has been invited to ascend the summit of the world economy. In any event, my talks in summer 1989 showed that in this sphere the Soviet Union wants to become a country that acts in a loyal manner.

May the reader forgive me for this excessively technical excursus. But for the Soviet Union the success of all its reforms is decided precisely in the political, economic and financial spheres.

(To be continued)

On the request of Mr Obino Richard Haambote, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Zambia to the USSR, the fee for his article "Echo of Perestroika in the Third World" published in this issue will be remitted to the Soviet Charity and Health Foundation.

THE BALTIC STATES JOIN THE SOVIET UNION

[Documents on the USSR's relations with the Baltic Countries in 1939-1940]

DO WE BEAR a responsibility for the past? Of course, we do. No generation can afford to liken itself to people who do not remember their antecedents. We do bear responsibility not for the mistakes, failings and crimes committed by anyone under the cover of a piece of paper with sign and seal, but for an honest and truthful presentation of our people's past and recent history.

The Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which was held at the end of last year, gave every Soviet citizen a lesson in civic courage, honesty, repentance and purification. The stand taken by the Congress on the political and legal assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty, on the political assessment of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and on other matters showed that being a true Soviet patriot means not only being able to see the pluses, but also the minuses of policies conducted on behalf of the Soviet state in this or that period.

Loving one's country means rejoicing in its successes and taking pride in its contribution to world civilisation. However, it also means a refusal to use modern means to put rosy cheeks on the lacklustre portrait of the past, and a determination to depict it in a realistic blend of light and shade, with all the good and evil, all the virtues and vices. It is a pity that it has taken such a long time—up to the end of this century—to start repeating, with the poet, honestly and without hypocrisy: "I love my country, but 'tis a strange and curious love..." (Mikhail Lermontov). It is a pity that it has taken us such a long time to start saying this, but it is a good thing that we are now doing so.

The removal of the scab of Stalinism from the history of our foreign policy is a slower process than that in our internal life, and the reasons for this are many. They were mentioned at the Congress of People's Deputies: some conventions and limitations are connected with the interests of third countries, but much remains hidden from the light of day in virtue of our habitual inertia and long-standing stereotypes.

The most important way of displaying realism in assessing the past is to go on from second-hand information to first-hand information, from an interpretation of history to hearing its actual voice, from commentaries to archive documents.

Such a broad approach to bringing to light the contents of secret safes at the foreign-policy archives of the USSR Foreign Ministry was taken in connection with the 50th anniversary of the signing of the 1939 Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty (see *International Affairs*, No. 10, 1989), and researchers are now able to make a public analysis of a wide range of documents which were earlier simply non-existent in Soviet publications, although they bear the signatures of the country's former leaders.

This is clearly no more than the start of a great effort to democratise the study of Soviet foreign policy and to shed on it a stronger light of publicity.

The need to make up for lost time in this area is also induced by the fact that efforts to use the Soviet people's mounting interest in the documentary presentation of history are being made for their own purposes by many foreign publishers who, apart from presenting deliberately biased materials, now and again publish what are distorted texts.

This is epitomised, for instance, by a book, *USSR-Germany, 1939-1941*, compiled by Y. Felshtinsky and issued in 1983 by Telex Publishers in New York, and put out in another edition in 1989 by the Mokslas Publishers in Vilnius.

Without going into details, let us consider one point, which could be called an odious one: it is the deliberately garbled text of the Soviet-German "Secret Additional Protocol" of August 23, 1939. The widely known facsimile of the text says "on the occasion of the signature of the Non-Aggression Treaty", "respective spheres of interest", "in the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic states the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the sphere of interest both of Germany and the USSR". Felshtinsky's book has something similar, but not quite "on the occasion of the signing of the Pact", "spheres of influence", "in the event of territorial and political transformations in regions belonging to the Baltic states", and "Lithuania's northern border shall be the line demarcating the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR".

We find a similar state of things in all the comparable documents, and now and again even more biased departures from the authentic content of the documents, although neither the German nor the Russian text gave any grounds for this kind of juggling. Meanwhile, upon their presentation by the Mokslas Publishers they migrated to many publications in the Baltic and Moldavia, and it was the falsified text that was read out by one of the respected speakers even at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

One can, unfortunately, do no more than complain of the fact that for a long time readers were able to satisfy their interest in documents adopted with the participation of the Soviet side only through books published abroad, and that not always quite honestly.

The collection of Soviet foreign-policy documents presented below, together with previous and subsequent publications in our journal, is aimed to rectify the situation, at least on matters that are of especially pressing interest.

A resolution passed by the Congress of People's Deputies says that the Soviet-German agreements were used by Stalin and his entourage to make ultimatums and put power pressure on other states in breach of the juridical obligations assumed with respect to them.

Such acts on the part of Stalin and his minions did not reflect the will of the Soviet people. The Soviet people bear no responsibility—either then, in 1939, or especially today—for Stalin's deal with Hitler, but we do bear responsibility for making an honest assessment of the crimes, and it is this kind of assessment that can alone burn the bridges over the gulf separating the grievous past from our own day.

Still, was our past an entirely dark one? And if there was anything bright in it, how is that to be squared with Stalinism?

A methodological key to this dialectical conundrum is, perhaps offered for the first time by the deliberations of the Second Congress of People's Deputies. There was, on the one hand, the Soviet Union's policy which reflected the socialist substance of this state, an open diplomatic line taken over from Lenin's period; and there was, on the other hand, Stalin's anti-people policy oriented towards collusion and perfidy.

At one point in the history of 1939, these two lines clashed and produced two different derivative magnitudes: on the one hand, there is the

Soviet-German nonaggression treaty, which does not contain a single word offending anyone in the Soviet Union or abroad; on the other, there is the "Secret Additional Protocol", which does not contain a single clause that fails to arouse protest even today, half a century later. The former is the result of Soviet policy, and the latter, the result of Stalin's policy.

Stalin would certainly have liked to remake both the state and the party entirely according to his own image and likeness, but they proved to be stronger than the tyrant, and all it took to start straightening out true Soviet policy was the convocation of the 20th Party Congress.

The events dealt with in the collection of documents below are also a reflection of these antipodes of Soviet policy. On the one hand, they echo the revolutionary views of the past, the faith in the rising strength of the proletariat in the Baltic republics, and there is no doubt at all that in these republics there was a yearning among the working people to move closer to Lenin's country, the country of the October Revolution. But these sincere sentiments were in a sense tarred and feathered by dictatorial designs.

One finds oneself in a state of utter confusion at the lengths to which Molotov and his henchmen Dekanozov, Vyshinsky and Zhdanov carried their cynicism and allowed themselves to talk in something like feudal tones with representatives of sovereign states.

Are such speeches a reflection of our policy today? No, they are not. By putting up for public judgement the documentary evidence of the past, Soviet diplomacy shows that the past remains beyond the threshold of our day.

Some may reproach the presenters of the documents published below by saying: why do you depict everything in dark colours? Haven't you any other colours for a picture of our common past? There have been, after all, joyous meetings, rallies, demonstrations and welcoming slogans. Or is all that not true, according to new thinking?

This kind of question may spring from a pure heart, and one must leave all cunning aside when trying to answer it.

Indeed, that is how everything was: the warm embraces, the jubilant sound of the bands, the fragrance of apple wine, and the foam-capped mugs of beer going the rounds. In Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the men and commanders of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army were welcomed as good friends, with presentations of bread and flowers grown on hard soil. Many good books have been written on this subject, and we have vivid testimonies and valuable studies, collections of documents, documentary and other films, and recordings of radio speeches.

Take, for instance, the collections of documents and materials published in 1986-1987 in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn—"The Restoration of Soviet Government in Latvia and the Entry of Latvian SSR in the USSR", "The Restoration of Soviet Government in Lithuania and Its Entry in the USSR", "The Socialist Revolution in Estonia and Its Entry in the USSR".

However, we are not concerned with what was there for all to see and what went deep into hearts and minds. It is now the turn of the secret diplomacy, the documents that have lain long under the proverbial seven seals, for it is common knowledge that the truth will out.

Some say that recognition and condemnation of the unlawful acts by the country's leaders in the past could play into the hands of separatist forces and lead to a revision even of the fine pages of history, like the decisions taken by the Rada of Peryaslavl.

Now that such doubts have been expressed—and they were expressed from the high rostrum of the Congress—it is best to try to respond to them. First, the decisions of the assembly which was convened 336 years ago are being often referred to deliberately, apparently in an effort to

demonstrate the absurdity of the approach (there is in the art of polemics a method known as *reductio ad absurdum*, when a proposition is taken to an extreme to show its absurd consequences). But the fact is that the decision which is linked to the name of Bogdan Khmelnitsky was, in fact, democratic, lawful and for that reason incontestable.

It is quite another matter that we shall have to go on calling a spade a spade again and again as we get rid of the "blank spots" in our history. Russian tsarism's colonial past must be given its proper name as it was in Lenin's day, even though it is our own past, and even though some may not like this critical attitude to it.

Furthermore, the most essential thing: recognition that this or that step in the past was a contradictory one does not at all imply any review of the present situation. The position of each republic, territory or region within the USSR is determined by the country's internal legislation—by the Constitution—and that is the only legal basis for any transformations.

Qualified international law experts refer to "extreme" examples which also fall just short of being absurd: any state may secede from the United States not on the strength of its attitude to the act of union, say, of California, Texas or Alaska, but of its present constitutional principles. And that is also how it is in all the other federations: one can hardly imagine a different approach.

What is also important is that generally recognised acts in international law, like the UN Charter or the Helsinki accords, have created a full-scale system of legal norms repudiating arbitrariness in such delicate matters as territory, border, and so on. In short, the statement at the December 1989 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC to the effect that "the present party and state leadership will not allow the federal state to disintegrate" is a reflection not only of the will of those who are in power, i. e., of the subjective aspect of the matter, but also of the objective circumstances connected with the whole set of economic, social, demographic and juridical factors.

Reading the documents proposed for publication by the USSR Foreign Ministry is a bit of a trial, and hardly anyone will remain indifferent. Young researchers whose memory is not burdened with a commitment to the past may find it easier to pass this station of our Way of the Cross, but what are the veterans to do? How is Stalin's deal with Hitler to be regarded by the highly respected and merited fighters of the old guard who went into battle with the leader's name on their lips?

They had sworn their oath of allegiance to another Stalin, and not to the one who betrayed and strangulated, for he was someone they knew nothing of or refused to know anything about. For many people Stalin has remained an image existing separately from the physical individual, which is why they often refuse to countenance any criticism addressed to him. Some of them who spent 10-15 years in prisons and concentration camps deny that Stalin was guilty of their calamities. This image may perhaps remain such in this or that heart, for a cult is like a religion, and like a religion, faith in an image can hardly be refuted by means of logic or facts, especially those but recently brought to the light of day. In this case time alone must have the final say.

It is up to those who refuse to accept this image or who have managed to resist its fatal "magnetism" to expose the acts of the real criminal, and the documents presented below are designed to serve this far from easy task.

Finally, the documents selected at the USSR Foreign Ministry also help to solve yet another problem: they help to connect foreign policy with domestic policy and to remove the touch of falsehood one finds in most recent descriptions of our country's policy under Stalin. This has resulted in something like a paradoxical situation: domestic policy looked

like the handiwork of a dictator, while foreign policy appeared to have been carried on without his participation. No, the fact is that he was present in both cases, but in the one and in the other there was a different set of forces tied into a tight knot, and refusing to be broken like a spring, and finally unwinding like the spring when the time came.

We owe this opportunity of now telling the truth to the fact that these forces have been preserved and continue to live in the hearts and minds of millions of Communists and non-party people.

VALENTIN ALEKSANDROV,

consultant at the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee,
took part in the work of the Secretariat
of the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR
for Political and Legal Assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German
Non-Aggression Treaty

**1. TELEGRAMME FROM THE USSR CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN LITHUANIA
V. S. SEMYONOV TO THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS**

August 25, 1939

In virtue of the Foreign Ministry's instructions, the main Lithuanian newspapers have refrained from assessing the latest developments. They confine themselves to reprinting foreign press comments. By now it has been possible to bring out in the general turmoil only the confusion and sense of fear for Lithuania's future. The conclusion is reached the positions of Estonia and Latvia have been strengthened because the danger of a German-Soviet clash which could crush them had receded. The Lithuanians are afraid that the USSR will finally cease to take an interest in Lithuania, and that it will also be taken outside the brackets in the future as it was in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. There is the fear that German-Polish clashes will affect Lithuania as well, and that the USSR could view this with indifference. That is why the newspapers have been requested to take a strictly neutral attitude and not to discuss German-Polish affairs.

Chargé d'Affaires

USSR Foreign Policy Archives, f. 059, r. 1, i. 299, f. 2063, p. 79

**2. FROM THE DIARY OF THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN
LATVIA I. S. ZOTOV**

August 28, 1939

I had a visit from the counsellor of the Lithuanian embassy Korečka. He was interested in many problems in current international affairs. On the whole, he makes a positive assessment of the Soviet-German treaty. He believes that the agreement has brought tranquility to the small countries of the Baltic, but he feels that it is very strange that two ideologically warring states have now become "friends", that they have found a common basis for close relations. "Have you forgotten what Hitler wrote about the Soviet Union in his book *Mein Kampf*? Do I take it that you seriously believe him?"

In my response I tried to prove to him that British conservative circles have tried to direct Germany against the USSR, and that in the light of real calculations Germany only stood to lose, which is why these changes have taken place in Germany's foreign policy. As for the Soviet Union, in my response I pointed out to him the compatibility of establishing good-neighbour relations with countries having different ideologies.

USSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Latvia (I. Zotov) USSR FPA, f. 06, r. 2, i. 12, f. 118, p. 54

The publication of these documents was prepared by Galina Takhnenko, first secretary of the Historical-Diplomatic Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry

3. FROM A REPORT BY THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN ESTONIA K. N. NIKITIN FOR THE PERIOD FROM AUGUST 27 TO SEP- TEMBER 13, 1939

September 15, 1939

The present period under review may have comprised no more than 16 days, but it has so abounded in developments which have left a deep imprint on the whole of Estonia's economic and political life that it could well be regarded as marking the start of a new era.

The first event which had a stunning effect on the Estonian government and on all the social circles in Estonia was the conclusion of the trade agreement and the subsequent non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany.

One must state plainly that the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany made such a stunning impression on the Estonian government that it was literally at a loss and initially felt itself to be totally disoriented. A government which had for so long been making preparations for a war against the USSR on the side of Germany, a government secretly incited by Britain to let German troops cross its territory, a government circulating and exaggerating rumours about the USSR's awakened red imperialism and the USSR's aggressive plans in the guise of "guarantees" of the immunity of the Baltic countries, now suddenly realised that all its efforts in this direction turned out to be futile. The idea, thoroughly cultivated and disseminated among the people that Estonia, a small and insignificant state, now, with the prospect of a fight between Germany and the USSR, acquires the significance of a factor of great importance, on which now depends the tilting this or that way of the balance in settling the outcome of the forthcoming struggle, suddenly lost all significance, with all these machinations by means of which efforts were made to "rouse the spirit" of the Estonian people now lying exposed in all their meagreness. It has turned out that the USSR did not offer Estonia any guarantees, and that it has no intention of doing so, and that Estonia can take its own stand for its independence, and since the tense atmosphere between the USSR and Germany has been relaxed, there was no need in the past for the great historical mission imagined by the Estonians in "swaying the destinies" of two major states, and now even the semblance of it has disappeared. The Estonian government sees itself once again as a border-line dwarf of a big neighbour. This harsh reality has greatly disheartened Estonian ruling circles, stripped them of an imaginary role, and deprived them of the hope for an early rout of the hated communist colossus making short shrift of which they had so cherished and so greatly relished.

Having conducted such a vividly independent line in foreign policy and refusing to reckon either with Britain or with France, the Soviet Union appears to stand anew before Estonia in the full panoply of its strength and power, making it take a sober look at the surrounding developments. This is a matter on which the government of Estonia has had two and very long sittings. Hence also the monotonous recognition, through clenched teeth, by Selter of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany as a factor of peaceful significance. The Estonian government's entire behaviour makes one thing clear, and it is that it would be highly satisfied to see the USSR in a war against Germany, now that their unfulfilled plans have impelled the Estonian press initially to "hush up" Comrade Molotov's speech at the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet on the ratification of the Soviet-German pact. A part of the newspapers did not print it at all, and another part printed it in such a way that the key passages in the speech dealing with the fundamental points of the USSR's foreign policy were left out altogether and replaced by suspicions, doubts and questions, something that made it much harder for the population to get an idea of the USSR government's real standpoint. It took my conversation with Selter and a telephone call from the First Secretary of the mission to the Foreign Ministry's press office for the Foreign Ministry to permit newspapers, with considerable delay (September 11) to carry a more or less decent editorial.

The declaration of war by Germany on Poland, and by Britain and France on Germany was the second matter that left an imprint on the Estonian government's line of behaviour.

Having realised that the USSR has not been involved in this slaughter house, the Estonian government initially, far from preventing, actually encouraged the Estonian press to spread rumours about the USSR coming from Anglo-French circles, claiming that the USSR had started the war by concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany, that the USSR had betrayed the cause of peace, that it had allegedly been aware that Poland would not let the Red Army across its territory, so that, being aware of this, it was able to say in advance that there was no need for Anglo-French negotiations, etc., but, being unable under our pressure to conceal Comrade Molotov's speech, it was forced, after all, to issue an order to the press to stop the slander and false insinuations, because

the situation created for foreign trade kept dictating the need for improving relations with the USSR...

USSR FPA, f. 06, r. 2, l. 20, f. 230, pp. 55-57

4. FROM THE DIARY OF THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV

September 20, 1939

Military attaché Comrade Korotkikh had been summoned to the Lithuanian Army headquarters in the morning, and told me that on the 20th of September about 5,000 Polish troops and about 200 various motor vehicles had crossed the Lithuanian border in the early hours of September 20 (I have instructed TASS to issue the report). He then told me that Lithuanian Army commander Rastikis had issued orders to the troops on the border to meet the Red Army units in a friendly spirit and to help them to establish the Lithuanian border (I have instructed TASS to issue the report). He also told me about the mood of Colonel Dulksnis of the Second Bureau. In the opinion of the latter, the Vilno Lithuanians would have a much freer life under the Soviet power than they had under landowner Poland, and that Lithuania, relying on the Soviet Union's neighbourhood, would feel itself much better than it had in the recent period.

USSRFPA, f. 012, r. 1, l. 4, f. 52, pp. 44-45

5. FROM THE DIARY OF THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV

September 21, 1939

Engineer Vidmantas, who is known to the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations, came to see me on minor current matters. I tried to use his visit to clarify the general mood. He says that there is evidence of two extremes in the mood of the urban public: one is that Kaunas should also become Soviet, and the other is that the city of Vilno should be returned to Lithuania (treaties are being recalled, discussed, etc.). Both variants are unacceptable to those who are concerned with their own well-being, and who have built for themselves houses in Kaunas (and it is no rarity to find members of the ruling circles among them). The Soviets are unacceptable because they do not respect private property, while a Lithuanian Vilno is undesirable because the transfer of the capital will entail the neglect of their houses, for which they now receive big money. According to Vidmantas, Lithuanian public opinion has recently been divided along three lines: one tugging towards Poland, another towards Germany, and a third towards the USSR (politically, economically and culturally). The advocates of the Polish line have now gone bankrupt, but there remain the other two. V. thinks that there will be a growth of the third line (towards the USSR), because the Soviet factor will be felt much more strongly than before in view of the greater proximity of the border. Generally speaking, V. said, very many are happy that the Polish landowner has, at long last, got what he deserves. They are happy because the rule of the Polish landowners is still very much in the memories of peasant Lithuania.

I have had a call from the journalist SIMON, the editor and publisher of the *Litauen Dienst* press bulletin. He began by expressing his admiration for the Soviet Union's tremendous foreign-policy successes. He believes that the brilliant Soviet foreign-policy move (the pact with Germany and subsequent events) will ultimately lead the Hitler regime to destruction, and that in the not too distant future. Then, like everyone else, he got down to the Vilno matter, which is an obligatory topic these days. He says that there is very great discord of opinions. Some propose that a demand for the transfer of Vilno to Lithuania should be made on the USSR right away, with reference to the treaties. Others express the hope that Moscow and Berlin will do this on their own, without any initiative on Lithuania's part. Still others who sympathise with all things Soviet, are in favour of leaving Vilno in the USSR, because this would increase the latter's influence on the whole of Lithuania's current life. Among the state politicians, S. says, totally different attitudes have been taking shape. They believe that a demand on the USSR now, in the present conditions, would be tantamount to intervention in the war (it could be interpreted as aid to the Poles, etc.). Such a variant is regarded as being excluded. Furthermore, they believe that it is impossible, if this is done, to accept even a joint proposal from Moscow and Berlin to receive Vilno from the hands of the latter. This, in their view, would signify Lithuania's participation in the partition of Poland, something that could be viewed in Britain and France as a breach of its own neutrality. The starting point for an expression of active

interest on the part of the Lithuanian government to the Vilno question is regarded by them as an end to the war in the West, when everything is made clear, and when the Vilno question could be settled through diplomatic negotiations and with the common consent of all the countries concerned Simon emphasised that such a directive reposition comes from President Sinetona.

Like many others, Simon is satisfied that the Polish landowners have been given a sound lesson.

Outside the context of this general conversation, Simon characterised a German firm in Finland as a Gestapo spy centre (the main purpose for which he dropped in to see me). I conveyed the name of the firm and other data to the proper person.

At 16 00 I received a telephone call from Turauskas (director of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department), who informed me that their envoy in Berlin Skirpa arrived yesterday in Danzig in due time, but for some reason there was no meeting with Ribbentrop. This meeting is expected today. I furthermore warned me that today's evening papers will carry an Elta communique to the effect that at some points Red Army units have already entered into contact with the Lithuanian Army guarding the border, and that these contacts have been taking place in a most friendly spirit. There were cases, I said, when in some places Red Army units touched on the Lithuanian border, but it was sufficient to point this out for Red Army commanders to request to indicate the frontier line, to offer their apologies, and to pull away at once. On the whole, I said, "your units behave with exceptional correctness and amity."

USSR FPA, f. 012, r. 1, i. 4, f. 52, pp. 45—46

6. PACT ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE ESTONIAN REPUBLIC

September 28, 1939

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the one part, and the President of the Estonian Republic, on the other part, for the purposes of developing the friendly relations established by the peace treaty of February 2, 1920, and based on the recognition of the independent statehood and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Party;

recognising that the peace treaty of February 2, 1920, and the treaty of non-aggression and peaceful settlement of conflicts of May 4, 1932, continue to provide a solid basis for their mutual relations and obligation;

convinced that it is in the interest of both Contracting Parties to define the precise terms for ensuring mutual security,

have recognised the need to conclude with each other the following pact on mutual assistance, and with this aim in view have designated as their authorised representatives

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

/ M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs,

the President of the Estonian Republic.

Carl Selter, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

and the said authorised representatives have agreed on the following:

Article 1

Both Contracting Parties pledge themselves to extend to each other all manner of assistance, including military assistance, in the event of there arising a threat of attack or a direct attack on the part of any great European power with respect to the maritime borders of the Contracting Parties in the Baltic Sea or their land borders across the territory of the Latvian Republic, and equally with respect to the bases named in Article 3.

Article 2

The USSR pledges itself to extend assistance to the Estonian Army on easy terms in the form of armaments and other military materiel.

Article 3

The Estonian Republic shall assure the Soviet Union of the right to have, on the Estonian Islands of Saaremaa (Esel), Hiiumaa (Dago) and in the city of Paldiski (Baltisky Port), naval bases and several airfields on the terms of lease at a suitable price. The exact places for the bases and airfields shall be set aside and their boundaries demarcated by mutual agreement.

For the purposes of protecting the naval bases and airfields, the USSR shall have the right to maintain, in the areas set aside for the bases and airfields, and at its own expense, a strictly limited number of Soviet ground and air armed forces, whose maximum numbers shall be determined by special agreement.

Article 4

Both Contracting Parties pledge themselves not to conclude any alliances or to take part in any coalitions aimed against either of the Contracting Parties whatsoever.

Article 5

The implementation of the present pact must not, to any extent whatsoever, affect the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, notably, their economic system and state system.

The areas set aside for the bases and airfields (Article 3) shall remain the territory of the Estonian Republic.

Article 6

The present pact shall enter into force with the exchange of the acts of ratification. The exchange of these acts will be effected in the city of Tallinn within six days of the day of the signing of the present pact.

The present pact shall be valid for a period of ten years, and if either of the Contracting Parties does not deem it necessary to abrogate the present pact within a year before the expiry date, the latter shall automatically continue to be valid for the following five years.

Article 7

The present pact was done in two originals, in the Russian and Estonian languages, in the city of Moscow on September 28, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV
USSR FPA, f. 03a—Estonia, f. 130

K. SELTER

CONFIDENTIAL PROTOCOL**I**

It has been agreed that for the purposes of pre-empting and cutting short any attempts to involve the Contracting Parties in the war now under way in Europe, the USSR shall have the right, in the course of this war, to maintain in the areas set aside for the airfields and bases (Article 3 of the Pact), as separate garrisons, a total of up to twenty-five thousand men of ground and air armed forces.

II

Temporarily, until the construction of the base in the city of Paldiski (Article 3 of the Pact) has been completed, however, for a period of not more than two years from the day of the signing of the present Protocol, Soviet warships may enter the port of Tallinn for food and fuel supplies and for mooring. The immediate procedure for the exercise of this right shall be determined by special agreement.

III

The assistance stipulated in Article 1 of the Pact shall be rendered at the express wish of the other Party, and, with mutual consent, the Party pledged to render assistance may, in the event of a war between the other Party and a third power, remain neutral.

IV

For the purposes of monitoring compliance with the present Pact and settling any issues that may arise, a Mixed Commission shall be formed on a parity basis to work out the rules for the dispatch of its business.

The present Confidential Protocol shall be an annex to the Pact on Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Estonia concluded on September 28, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV
September 28, 1939
USSR FPA, f. 03a—Estonia, f. 010

K. SELTER

INFORMATION SPACE

THE SOVIET leader's proposal to hold a European Summit (Helsinki-2) in 1990, i. e., before the scheduled date, has been actively welcomed abroad, in Europe in the first place.

Information is one of the lines of the Helsinki process, and it is a delicate sphere or, if you will, a touchy sphere, for it is much more pervaded and fettered with ideology than other spheres.

Advance along this line was, until quite recently, not all that brisk. While much of the fault was not ours, we ourselves did limber it with enough secrecy, bans and fears.

Following the Information Forum, which was held in London last year within the framework of the European process, the Soviet delegation drafted a package of concrete proposals and submitted it to the USSR government. I am sure that once these are implemented, there will be less estrangement and a wider two-way flow of knowledge between the Soviet Union and other countries via the press, television, films and other mass media.

These proposals were recently approved by the Soviet government. It could, of course, all have been done much faster, but each of these proposals had to be thoroughly hammered out and agreed with at least 10 ministries and government agencies.

However that may be, the matter has been settled. The idea is to put through the necessary measures to widen the range and the number of copies of foreign newspapers and magazines to be freely offered for sale through an extended network. Organisations, establishments and individual citizens will be able to subscribe to foreign periodicals, but will have to pay for them in foreign currency. Moreover, subscriptions may be taken out by foreign partners or relatives living abroad.

In addition, there is to be free access to foreign periodicals at library reading rooms and at the information and cultural centres of various countries. The relevant instructions have been issued to the USSR Ministry of Culture.

There was long and painful discussion among us over the use of duplicating machines, which were regarded by some, according to Academician Roald Sagdeyev, as being a class enemy. The number of class enemies has now been reduced by yet another one.

The bans are to be lifted, and establishments, enterprises, organisations, including cooperatives, and individual citizens will be allowed to use duplicating machines to copy any material, but, of course, those whose content is not at variance with the existing legislation and constitutional provisions.

Another group of approved measures allows the reception of foreign satellite TV programmes collectively or individually: everyone has the right to buy a dish aerial, install it on the roof of his house, and watch US and other foreign TV broadcast. The breakthrough in the matter of TV communications with Europe and the United States is especially noteworthy. Whether anyone likes it or not, let me recall that there was a ban on the installation and use of TV aerials for individual reception of satellite-beamed programmes not in some dim and distant past, but in the period of perestroika. Indeed, it was in this period of

ours that the mass production of radio receivers with short wave frequencies was discontinued because these could be used, God forbid, to tune in to foreign stations.

There is also this to be said: some aspects of the work of foreign journalists in our country are being eased. Thus, a journalist will be able to obtain an entry visa within a fortnight, even if he has no invitation to come to this country.

All these are important and concrete advances which help to consolidate this country's prestige as an open and well-informed society, but we must also bear in mind that a great deal still has to be done to pull up many of our internal laws and provisions to a much higher level, up to the benchmark we accepted by signing the Vienna accords

On the request of Gennadi Uranov, USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ireland, the fee for his article "On the Emerald Isle" published in the February 1990 issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS has been remitted to the Soviet Children's Fund.

IS A "THIRD ZERO" ATTAINABLE?

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THE BREATH-TAKING PACE of the political processes going on in Europe has turned aside military political issues that were traditionally in the focus of debates on European security. This is a welcome sign of demilitarisation of thinking on the European security system if not yet of the system itself. On the other hand, realities plainly lag behind thinking, and the mountain-high stockpiles of weapons which were produced in the years of political confrontation now becoming a thing of the past are still there. So is the military skeleton of European confrontation propped up by a system of military financing. The problem of dismantling it remains difficult both conceptually and from the practical point of view.

Specifically, the situation in regard to reducing and eliminating the nuclear component of the confrontation—tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)—is far from clear. The debate centring on this issue in recent years has not been exactly constructive. The Soviet Union insisted on eliminating all TNWs in the foreseeable future. But the majority of the political forces in power in the West took a stand for continued reliance on nuclear arms, refusing even to discuss any reductions in them in Europe because they feared a "trap"—a proposal for a "third zero" to support the INF treaty that it would have been politically impossible to reject. Things were made worse by many Westerners' advocacy of "modernising" TNWs, a posture which the other side was bound to interpret as aimed at building up military capability and obtaining specific advantages. In these circumstances, Soviet experts saw a "third zero" as the most effective means of preventing "modernisation".

The situation has largely eased off by now. On making a sober appraisal of its balance of interests, NATO postponed "modernisation" of its land-based missiles, a move seen by many experts as "burying" it. The demolition of the Berlin Wall, the spurt towards democracy in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania and the quickened process of rapprochement between the two German states apparently went beyond dropping "modernisation" from the agenda of *realpolitik*. The prospect of eliminating all systems of land-based TNWs—missiles and nuclear artillery alike—in the foreseeable future seemed to become very likely. Both political and military

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arguments in favour of preserving them are being eroded fast. A further component of the NATO TNW "modernisation" programme, namely, the key concept of replacing nuclear bombs by air-to-surface missiles, appears to be much more vulnerable than before.

In 1989, the Soviet Union, for its part, adopted a realistic stand. (Needless to say, it did not renounce the idea of ultimately abolishing all nuclear arms, an objective justified politically and morally.) First we proposed talks not only on eliminating but on reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Subsequently Mikhail Gorbachev stated in his Strasbourg address that we were willing to constructively discuss the concept of minimum containment. Lastly, Eduard Shevardnadze proposed in his December speech to the Political Commission of the European Parliament that the first stage of talks should concern itself with reducing deterrents to the minimum, whereupon the sides could move to the next stage, that is, begin discussing nuclear arms reductions first and not their elimination.

The road to fruitful talks is open. The political situation now shaping up gives promise of rapid progress. But before taking this road, we should reappraise our own interests and the interests of the other side and try to envisage both the ultimate goal and intermediate ones, which can only be done through political and scientific discussion. This article, like these writers' report on whose conclusions it is largely based, are intended to encourage this kind of discussion.

ONE OF THE PATENT shortcomings of Soviet political theory is the absence of an integral concept of national interests. Most long-term tasks were therefore set on ideological principles, with foreign political practice geared to these tasks in insignificant measure. The problem of Soviet interests in connection with nuclear weapons is among those requiring analysis whose lack makes all attempts to define our national interests vulnerable from the outset. Yet such attempts are necessary, if only as a means of stimulating discussion.

In what sense does the line of eliminating nuclear weapons definitely meet our interests?

The nuclear arms race initiated by the United States was one of the reasons for the division of Europe, giving rise to military confrontation structures and the consolidation of the West in opposing the Soviet Union. The movement in favour of eliminating nuclear weapons should help in principle demilitarise security system, something in which the Soviet Union has an unquestionable stake.

The proposal for doing away with all nuclear weapons (among them tactical ones)—a proposal indicative of our readiness to renounce our nuclear superpower status—drew attention in Europe to our new foreign policy. It helped and goes on helping improve the image of the Soviet Union.

Our country is interested in a continued policy for the elimination of TNWs also because it needs to respond to mounting anti-nuclear sentiments in Europe, its eastern part included.

The elimination of TNWs would reduce the likelihood of any conflict rising fast to a nuclear level and then to the level of a global nuclear conflict. Thus it would meet the interests of our country and the whole of humanity.

The presence of large quantities of ammunition and TNW delivery vehicles in an area of potential hostilities makes it possible to immediately escalate any armed conflict, a move which might be prompted by, among other things, fear of losing these weapons. Their massive deployment in the combat order of troops adds to the probability of a non-nuclear conflict

becoming nuclear also because the very first gun salvos and air strikes would hit control and communication systems, nuclear arms delivery vehicles and nuclear ammunition depots. This could have consequences hard to predict as regards escalation of the conflict (unsanctioned use), to say nothing of nuclear pollution of the environment.

All such hypothetical scenarios concern the possibility of a war already on growing into a nuclear one. Yet war is most unlikely, and this is also recognised by Western experts. Besides, Soviet policy and military strategy are increasingly directed towards averting any war. The growing defensive trend of doctrines and the changing structure of the armed forces of both alliances will reduce the possibilities of conducting offensive operations deep in enemy territory. In this situation, the destabilising effect of TNWs evidently tends to diminish.

As for other interests involved in the elimination of tactical nuclear forces, they are less obvious.

According to an opinion that has struck deep root in the West, the existence of these forces curbs the build-up of conventional ones. West European politicians often referred to NATO's superiority in nuclear weapons to resist US pressure in favour of building up conventional forces. Soviet armed forces reductions in the second half of the fifties and the early sixties were largely a result of increased nuclear potentialities, such as of the creation of a TNW arsenal (lagging roughly five years after NATO's). At the same time, the nuclear arms race occasionally urged on the build-up of non-nuclear forces. For instance, as well, the Soviet Union apparently regarded growing armoured power as a means of neutralising the nuclear superiority of the West.

By and large, however, there seems to be no strict correlation of trends in the conventional and the nuclear arms race; in any case, it has not been conceptualised. This is demonstrated by the trend of our military build-up in the seventies, when the consolidation of strategic parity and the abolition of NATO's advantages in nuclear arms in Europe were accompanied not only by a qualitative improvement but by a serious quantitative increase in our non-nuclear capability. There is hardly a rationale for so wide-ranging a military build-up, which went hand in hand with a process of easing tensions, and as for removing its direct and indirect effects, this still calls for serious foreign policy efforts.

There is sufficient reason on the whole to presume that whereas in the past TNWs were chiefly an incentive for the conventional arms race, today they generally restrain it. Militarists cannot but realise that with nuclear arms still there, it is practically impossible to win this race by reaping political or military dividends. Nor does the impact of the nuclear factor leave any room for hope should the arms race be extended to further areas in which NATO's technological superiority could be put to effective use, according to Western experts.

The connection between nuclear and conventional armaments in the context of the disarmament process is a complex phenomenon. It is obvious enough that cuts in conventional forces and armaments at the first stage of the Vienna talks could provide a favourable political atmosphere for nuclear arms reductions (NATO even insists on this as a necessary condition). At subsequent stages, the parties to the talks would find it hard to agree on really far-reaching cuts without serious reductions in TNWs. However, this does not imply their complete elimination, which the main ruling groups in the West find absolutely unacceptable. Fear of reductions in conventional armaments paving the way for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in Europe was one reason for the resistance put up during the drafting of the mandate for the Vienna talks, above all on the part of France and Britain. At present this consideration toughens the stance of NATO on tactical aircraft and the alliance's categorical refusal to define strike aircraft as well

as both European nuclear powers' bid to exempt their carrier aircraft from reduction.

The Soviet Union could in principle have a stake in the elimination of tactical and all other types of nuclear weapons in Europe even from the orthodox military political point of view that is renounced today (but is taken into account by Western experts). By virtue of a somewhat more favourable geographic location, the accumulated advantages in conventional forces and the possibility of relying on strategic forces some of which can be targeted on installations situated in Europe, the elimination of TNWs could place the USSR in a relatively preferable strategic position.

However, the Soviet Union cannot really be interested in the elimination of TNWs for this reason. The West, which commands substantial economic superiority over the WTO, would allow no reasonably serious change in the military balance and would restore the balance at a higher level should it be upset. No advantages can be secured also because there is very little likelihood of a scenario leaving the balance of conventional forces roughly on their present level should TNWs be reduced or even eliminated altogether.

What is likely is a different course of development in which the Soviet Union is strongly interested for political and economic reasons: an end to the main imbalances in conventional forces and major cuts in SOWs along with cuts in TNWs. If these cuts were made, the Soviet Union and the WTO would be left with an only irremovable advantage, their geographic location. They owe this advantage to the transoceanic situation of the United States and the absence of strategic depth in the system of the combined armed forces of NATO, but NATO's advantages in the qualitative parameters of armaments would evidently make up for it. In such a context, it could become necessary for the WTO to offset possible advantages of the West for the period of transition to entirely defensive structures (a process that will take a decade at the least).

A further conceivable interest of the Soviet Union could consist in loosening the unity of NATO and in trying to hasten the withdrawal of US troops. The West accuses us of such designs, proceeding from a widespread assumption that is not questioned there (we wonder how reasonably). According to it the elimination of nuclear arms in Europe would inevitably result in the United States withdrawing its force from West Germany.

The counter-arguments are obvious: attempts to stimulate crisis developments in NATO would be at variance with the Soviet Union's real interests and might prove counterproductive in the end. The important thing, however, is that our country is not interested at all in such developments in view of the contemporary political situation. Furthermore, thanks to the changing power balance between the United States and Western Europe and to the erosion of the notion of the existing threat, Western unity as opposed to the East is loosening in any case.

The Soviet Union can have no stake in adding further factors for instability to what is a more and more unstable situation anyway. The US presence, all its negative aspects notwithstanding, is a visible stabilising component of intra-Western relations and, to a degree, of East-West relations as well. At a time when the military balance in Europe shows a steady downward trend, the negative aspects of the US presence are losing in impact while its relative significance as a stabilising factor may increase.

Besides, it is in the interest of both the Soviet Union and Western Europe that the United States remain tied to Europe militarily. Such a dependence in a wide area of security discourages Washington from large-scale and dangerous recourse to force and makes it keener on European stability.

We do not mean to say that we think the Soviet Union has a stake in perpetuating the American and Soviet presence on the territory of their allies. What we do mean is that there should be a continued presence re-

duced to a symbolic level as a stabilising factor for the period of transition from the present to the future system of European security, to be based in much greater measure on political guarantees and European institutions.

One of the Soviet Union's fundamental interests lies undoubtedly in a substantial lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe. Cuts in military spending coupled with conversion of military production and science are indispensable to perestroika. Economically, priority should be given to reductions in conventional armaments, which swallow a sizable proportion of military resources. These writers therefore believe that in the period of transition, with the role of the military component of Soviet policy steadily decreasing, the Soviet Union could be interested in first reducing conventional armaments and armed forces while continuing to rely in a measure on the nuclear factor.

This interest will endure as Europe is unlikely to succeed before the end of this century in setting up a highly dependable security system based mainly on political guarantees. The period of transition is made more complex by the fact that the East European countries have embarked on inevitable and necessary changes involving elements of instability. The evolution of the political situation has already spelled an end to our military, primarily nuclear presence in some countries. In this situation the role of TNWs may come to play a bigger role also as a means of reassuring those sections of our public opinion that may be concerned about the effects of these changes in terms of the security and prestige of our country as well as some of our allies.

In appraising Soviet interests concerning the problem of eliminating TNWs in Europe, it is necessary to remember that fear of their elimination in Europe and, as a result, of a weakening of US guarantees and the possibility of a major or even a complete US troop withdrawal is one of the main reasons for the trend towards military political integration in Western Europe that has intensified over the past two or three years.

The above brief analysis does not warrant explicit conclusions about how far the elimination of TNWs in the foreseeable future meets or contradicts Soviet interests. On the strength of an analysis of the balance of these interests, we are inclined to consider that basically the line of doing away with this nuclear weapon meets in the long run the interests of the Soviet Union. At the same time, we feel that to eliminate it completely could mean rushing events unless preceded by a substantial consolidation and restructuring of the European security system and if effected before the Soviet economic reform bears tangible fruit and the pace of the country's scientific and technological progress is greatly quickened.

Besides, the majority of Western leaders regard such "crash" elimination of all TNWs as absolutely unacceptable for the time being. Washington considers that the provision of nuclear guarantees to its allies is a key prerequisite for maintaining the stability of NATO and preserving US positions in it.

The leaderships of West European countries are against renouncing TNWs, for they fear that this would erode the unity of the alliance, loosen US strategic ties to Western Europe and undermine their countries' largely restraining influence on the United States. Alarmist sentiments due to the changing role of West Germany and the evolution of relations between the two German states are particularly widespread now. The preservation of TNWs on West German soil and its modernisation are listed among measures that can slow down the advance to the unification of the two Germanys and prevent the FRG from becoming a nuclear power.

Paris and London are opposed to the elimination of Soviet and American TNWs, fearing that it would put the abolition of the tactical and then the strategic arsenals of France and Britain on the agenda.¹

One reason why the NATO countries reject the idea of a nuclear-free

Europe, of the elimination of TNWs, is the wide-spread conviction of historical origin that a non-nuclear balance, even at a lower level would be unreliable as a means of preventing war even if the political foundations of security were to be strengthened.

Western conservative centrist leaders are particularly uneasy about calls for the elimination of nuclear arms in Europe who know that in addition to a large body of Western opinion, it is sought even by influential right wing conservatives. Among these are American military political leaders who want to give the United States greater freedom of action by disengaging it from European security, as well as many West German politicians who see TNWs as an obstacle to German unification.

As for NATO's nuclear strategy, two trends coexist in it. The trend towards integrating nuclear and non-nuclear weapons into a common strategy goes on developing. The material basis for the close compatibility and "interoperability" of nuclear and conventional armaments is provided by ever stronger emphasis on double-purpose systems as well as by the use of a single system of reconnaissance, targeting, communications and control.

However, the evolution of NATO military strategy in this direction is hampered by serious realities. These include a growing awareness even among the military that any use of nuclear weapons even on an only occasion or with "demonstrational" intent is unacceptable because it would threaten an uncontrollable escalation, as would recourse to any large-scale non-nuclear war because it could not only have disastrous ecological consequences but lead almost inevitably to the disintegration of society in European countries and the destruction of existing political systems.

Coming increasingly to the fore as a result is another trend in the evolution of NATO strategy.

It consists in consolidating the role of TNWs as the most important means of deterring war and in ruling out in effect the possibility of using them in military operations. Advocates of this trend, who include liberals and many centrists in the United States and a wide spectrum of forces ranging from the Social Democrats to centre-oriented conservatives in Western Europe, declare for continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. But they single out a definite aspect of it, which is aimed at deterring war, at averting it, through the threat of retaliating for a conventional attack with nuclear weapons and escalating the conflict to a strategic level, which would automatically result in unsustainable damage. Exception is taken to the views of those partisans of deterrence who consider that to make it effective, one has to have a capability for a diversified warfare using nuclear weapons, a capability for "escalational domination", and so forth.² To put it plainly, there are differences between the advocates of politicised "deterrence through prevention" and militarised "deterrence through intimidation".

The concepts of the advocates of "containment/prevention" and "non-first use of nuclear weapons" have many negative aspects. They reject the idea of ridding Europe of nuclear arms, whose preservation means preserving the possibility of nuclear catastrophe and stimulates the race in nuclear arms and missile technologies. It also means preserving the role of nuclear weapons as a pillar of the military-bloc structure of European security, a structure resting to a considerable extent on military confrontation. Besides, there remain some possibilities for using TNWs as a means of deterrence and pressure.

But these concepts also have important positive aspects. They offer opportunities for drastic cuts in this weapon synchronised with large-scale reductions in conventional forces and for a notable reinforcement of military strategic stability on the continent. Hence the promise of ending or restricting certain potentially destabilising trends in the conventional arms race relating primarily to missile technologies.

BEFORE DISCUSSING the possible parameters of the balance of "minimum means of containment" which may result from future agreements, these authors wish to state some conclusions reached by us on the basis of an analysis of the evolution of the European nuclear balance between the fifties and eighties.

The build-up of both sides' TNWs was determined not so much by their notions of threats or by the military strategic concepts worked out by them but by military bureaucratic logic, by military technological inertia, by the "life cycles" of weapons systems. It became independent to a degree even of changes in military strategic guidelines, preceding them in many cases and going beyond rational requirements. Before the early eighties, political factors played no visible role in the trend of TNWs build-up. This politically and strategically irrational build-up was exemplified most strikingly by the increase in the American TNW arsenal in Europe in the sixties and by the scale on which the Soviet Union deployed its RSD-10s (known to the West as the SS-20s—Ed.) in the seventies and eighties.

The build-up of the two TNW arsenals went on along lines that were mutually independent to a considerable extent. It is hard to say whether the concept of balance played a real and not a propaganda role. The development trend itself was isolated in a measure from changes in the balance of SOWs and conventional forces in Europe. This discrepancy obviously imposed additional expenditures on the Soviet Union in the seventies and early eighties, when our country strove simultaneously to alter in its favour the balance in SOWs, TNWs and conventional forces alike. This build-up did not win and was not intended to win "superiority" but played a role in complicating the political situation.

The attempts which both sides made time and again to reckon up balances between various weapons, such as IRMs, were basically mistaken although much depended without doubt on the actual purpose of the operation. The nuclear balance in Europe is determined by the totality of the nuclear forces sited on the continent: those differing in range and supplementing or off-setting each other, as well as strategic forces intended for or seen as intended for use in Europe.

For all the importance of assessing the balance from the military point of view, it is greater from the political point of view, especially for NATO countries. For the West European members of this bloc, the problem of nuclear guarantees is more acute than it ever was for the WTO countries due chiefly to the geopolitical factor.

Both militarily and politically, the nuclear balance in Europe is linked most intimately with the balance of conventional forces. Specifically, the West regards NATO's nuclear weapons as a means compensating for the advantages of the WTO in conventional forces and armaments.¹ In turn, the Soviet military leadership saw these advantages, to the best of our knowledge, as a necessary means of countervailing the nuclear superiority of NATO, primarily in the air component of TNWs.

For these reasons, a verified parity in TNWs conceived as quantitative equality in means of delivery and ammunition or even as equality in combat potentialities is less necessary for achieving stability and security in Europe than a similar parity at strategic level.

Parity in this sense has practically never existed. However, there is no ruling out the likelihood of quantitative evaluations of TNWs during preparations for talks acquiring decisive significance and giving rise to deep-going differences, as was the case at the talks on Euromissiles. Negotiated solutions will probably be based on a particular version of quantitative balance although the two sides may depart from absolutising parity as they seek such solutions.

The main criteria which an optimum balance of nuclear forces in Europe should meet (until they are completely eliminated) may be listed as follows:

The nuclear forces of both sides should

- be seen as aimed, not at flexibly exchanging nuclear strikes or carrying on military operations, but merely at preventing war;
- be viable enough, especially in the event of a non-nuclear strike, and have a reliable and lasting control system precluding unsanctioned use;
- be of a size and have a structure adequate to maintain confidence in the dependability of the existing security system, including the maintenance of a measure of "linkage" between Western Europe and the United States;
- conform in qualitative and quantitative make-up to the task of stabilising the military balance in reducing conventional armaments as well as TNWs themselves.

Following are several options of reduction based on the assumption that the early phase of talks will be aimed at effecting drastic cuts in TNWs but not at eliminating them as yet.

The method of unilateral reductions, including reductions prompted by the example of the other side, may prove very fruitful. (Both sides virtually apply it already.) Accordingly, the sides could work out as an option parallel unilateral reductions to jointly specified intermediate levels (meaning also very low ones). In that case, the only object of talks would be to come to terms on the pace of reduction, the quantitative and qualitative parameters of residual levels, control and verification procedures and confidence-building measures in the nuclear sphere.

Seeing, however, that fairly influential political forces in the United States, Britain and France are still reluctant to accept far reaching reductions in TNW arsenals, reliance on chiefly unilateral steps may prove ineffective from the point of view of a drastic lowering of the level of the nuclear balance. The method that will in all probability remain preferable is that of traditional talks based on mutual understanding reached beforehand and backed by unilateral moves speeding progress towards accords.

Talks should be preceded by the settlement of some complicated issues concerning their object.

First, should the sides only discuss means of delivering nuclear weapons or nuclear ammunition as well? The possibility of repeated use of all tactical means of delivering nuclear weapons makes it important in principle to take account of the quantity of ammunition, which determines, strictly speaking, the extent to which the European theatre is saturated with nuclear arms. On the other hand, the extreme complexity of the technical aspects of verification and control and the need to achieve real results at an early date impose accepting at the initial stage of the talks an agenda aimed at limiting reductions to means of delivery. The readiness for unilateral cuts in nuclear ammunition shown by both sides creates favourable conditions for writing these cuts into a treaty at the next stage of talks.

Another issue is that including the TNWs of France and Britain in the object of talks. The special position declared by the two countries at Vienna on reductions in tactical aircraft, which they say must not include their aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, suggests that building an initial nuclear balance may run into a traditional logjam. This situation being unacceptable, it is advisable to discount at the early stage of talks the TNW arsenals of France and Britain on the understanding that they are to be taken into account without fail in working out decisions on the ultimate quantitative TNW levels in Europe.

The third question, the most difficult of all, is how far restricting the object of talks to land-based systems, that is, artillery and tactical missiles, is acceptable to the Soviet Union and the WTO. The answer to this question can be linked directly to the results of the first stage of the Vienna talks,

since the share of the aircraft component of TNWs may change substantially. The problem of ending imbalances in tactical aircraft is still one of the most challenging ones at Vienna, and the sides' positions did not show signs of drawing closer together until the WTO took steps in favour of a compromise which it set out in proposals submitted at Vienna on September 28, 1989.

In the event of the WTO approach being accepted—it calls for either alliance reducing its frontline air force to 4,700 aircraft (except for anti-aircraft units)—NATO superiority in aircraft carrying nuclear weapons is likely to be decreased by a considerable margin. It could apparently be eliminated altogether if strike aircraft were limited to a ceiling of 1,500 aircraft, as proposed by the WTO for a start. The situation would be more complicated were NATO to get its way by having the whole tactical air force reduced by 15 per cent against the NATO level. In addition, the quantitative ceiling, 5,700 combat aircraft, formally proposed at Vienna turns out to be much higher than was called for previously.⁴ If this proposal were accepted, NATO's relative superiority in aircraft for the delivery of nuclear weapons could even go up, since the Soviet Union would have to effect greater reductions.⁵

Thus there emerge at least two main alternatives of the likely object of talks on radical reductions in TNWs: broad and narrow. The former alternative would set limits to all delivery vehicles at once and a ceiling on nuclear ammunition. Presuming that the sides agreed on the latter alternative, they would first reduce land-based nuclear weapons only, limiting the quantity of ammunition mounted on aircraft and preventing its qualitative modernisation. In the former case, which is doubtless more preferable, the sides could arrive at more extensive accords while in the latter they could advance more rapidly to concrete results, except that this would not completely block the race in TNWs.

The initial purpose of TNW talks could be to extend reductions achieved at the first stage of the talks on armed forces and conventional armaments to TNWs. The talks should be aimed at bringing about large-scale stabilising cuts, which would be a spur for rapid progress at them. It is necessary, however, to proceed from the visible limits of the sides' flexibility, for they restrict the possibilities of compromise solutions.

In view of these limiting factors, the problem of eliminating nuclear artillery and reducing the number of control posts for land-based tactical missiles (not only of the Soviet Union and WTO but of NATO as well) without modernising them in any way could be settled in a short time at the early stage of the talks on TNW reductions.

The elimination of nuclear artillery is being made possible by both the increasing obviousness of its military inefficiency and the West's reassessment of it as a deterrent. The fact that by the early eighties the Soviet Union and WTO had attained rough parity in nuclear artillery capability is said to have convinced the majority of Western specialists more strongly than ever that this weapons system holds out no promise as a means of delivering nuclear arms.⁶ At the early stage of the Vienna talks the sides will in all likelihood set reasonably low quantitative ceilings on artillery systems not only throughout the European theatre (16,500 pieces of a calibre exceeding 100 mm) but in Central Europe (4,500 pieces). This means that further quantitative cuts within the framework of TNW talks will hardly be possible. Still, the elimination of all nuclear shells could be an attainable goal, and it would be preferable to extend such a "zero option" to the whole territory of the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an accord would be verifiable not only through inspections of ammunition depots and permanent monitoring at the plants concerned but through supervision of combat training within the framework of confidence building measures.

Guidelines for further cuts in TNWs can only be formulated in general

terms in view of the uncertainty surrounding the pace and scale of the disarmament process in the area of conventional armaments and SOWs.

In the event of the initial stage of talks only dealing with land-based nuclear weapons, the content of the second stage, which would presumably be synchronised more or less strictly with progress at the talks on further cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments, would apparently consist in extending the object and including the key issue of aircraft. The level already proposed by the WTO—1,500 strike or, in other words, carrier aircraft could serve as a general guideline for settling it.

In accordance with this guideline, the sides would solve another major problem of this stage of TNW talks, the problem of setting a common ceiling on tactical nuclear ammunition. The third problem would be to evolve an effective system of control and verification. The preservation of a reasonably powerful strike air force would presumably necessitate a certain nuclear security reserve that could comprise both forward-based systems and flexible, viable weapons deployed in the second strategic echelons. A combination of land-based missiles and aircraft weapons could be the optimum alternative structure of tactical nuclear forces meeting these requirements. But in view of developments in Central European countries, the elimination of all land-based TNW systems could become politically preferable. With due regard to the possible unilateral reductions considered above, the nuclear ammunition of either side could be limited to 1,000 rounds.

Such a potential could not be regarded as minimal or symbolic, for it would not in principle rule out the possibility of a flexible exchange of nuclear strikes in the course of hostilities. A qualitative reduction of this possibility could be achieved at the next stage of talks on a radical cut in TNWs that would lower the nuclear balance to the minimum level, and curb the race in military technologies. The transition to a symbolic nuclear potential would apparently require a twofold or threefold cut in ammunition against the previous stage (that is, to between 300 and 400 rounds), meaning ammunition mounted on aircraft that might be assigned for the purpose to facilitate control and verification.

We believe an important characteristic of this minimal or symbolic TNW potential should be the global dimension of limitation, that is, inclusion of the whole Soviet and US territory, which would make it impossible to build up a nuclear arsenal fast in a crisis situation. Besides, a decision would apparently have to be made at that stage on sea-based nuclear weapons intended for use in Europe. The parameters of this decision could include the elimination of the nuclear possibilities of carrier aviation and the establishment of a low ceiling on long-range SBCMs.

A reduction of TNWs to symbolic levels coupled with a reduction in conventional arsenals would make for a qualitative change in the political and military strategic situation on the continent. The simultaneous restructuring and stabilisation of the European security system by politicising it and building confidence would sooner or later create a situation where nuclear arms become unnecessary even for those who now consider them indispensable. The way would be paved for the elimination of all TNWs, and this, in turn, would constitute a most important stage in the transition to nuclear-free world.

¹ See F. Heisbourg "The British and French Nuclear Forces. Current Roles and New Challenges". *Survival* July-August 1989

² See L. Freedman, "I Exist: Therefore I Deter." *International Security*, Summer 1988

³ See H. Binnendijk, "NATO's Nuclear Modernization Dilemma". *Survival*, March-April 1989

⁴ This figure appeared in the proposals submitted by NATO at Vienna last June

DIPLOMACY AND SCIENCE

Vladimir SHUSTOV

FOR SOME TWO YEARS PAST, the Soviet Foreign Ministry has been engaged in an unprecedented effort to promote ties with science. Its door is now open to scientists. Over the last year alone, dozens of conferences, symposiums and other meetings have taken place, with diplomats and scientists from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Alma Ata, Riga, Vladivostok and other cities joining in discussions as equal partners. In turn, diplomats have begun to attend scientific council sessions and other meetings in research centres.

An event highlighting the establishment of new and mutually beneficial relations of cooperation between foreign policy and science was the meeting held by the Ministry's Scientific Council in November 1989. It drew diplomats, leaders of the USSR Academy of Sciences and scientists representing Soviet history, law, physics, ecology, regional geography and medicine.

Eduard Shevardnadze, Chairman of the Scientific Council, pointed out in his paper that politics and science were drawn together and prompted to merge and interpenetrate by common interests predetermined by the aims and tasks of perestroika, primarily by the key problems of its survival, progress and final victory. Political stability in society was paramount as a requisite for fruitful fundamental and applied research in the context of worldwide exchanges of ideas. It was also an earnest of successful diplomatic activity, for tensions inside the country limited its opportunities abroad. With perestroika on, foreign policy required fresh, original ideas and a solid scientific basis.

In the dialogue that unfolded at the meeting, all speakers stressed the close intertwining of the interests of science and diplomacy in today's world. Peaceful uses of space, thermo-nuclear synthesis, exploration of the Arctic, global economic and environmental crisis situations, gene engineering, the task of combating AIDS and drug addiction as well as many other world problems call for joint efforts by the scientists of many countries. Foreign policy must help by paving through treaties and agreements the way for international scientific cooperation and cocreation.

Diplomacy can cope with this task provided it is adequately informed about the latest achievements of science and has a clear idea of the trends of scientific and technological progress and research strategy. It is only from scientists that foreign service officials can get a knowledge of all this and a correct scientific orientation. This makes the education sphere the first level of ties between diplomacy and science, as the Minister put it.

Another level is participation by science in the framing of policy and the formulation of the country's approach to concrete items on the international agenda. This line brings research centres and individual scientists into foreign policy decision-making and necessitates permanent exchanges between them and the Foreign Ministry.

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The third level on which diplomacy is interested in science is the need to build up the theoretical basis of foreign policy, especially by carrying forward such fundamental aspects of the concept of new political thinking as the unity and interdependence of the world, the priority of universal values, freedom of choice, a balance of interests.

The meeting, which proceeded as an at once in-depth and free, informal debate, showed how perestroika has emancipated our science. Scientists set out uncommon conceptual and purely practical ideas many of which are certain to be adopted by our foreign service after proper analysis and appraisal.

By criticising themselves, scientists also criticised the diplomatic service (one of them said that science was a replica of our society in the sense that the old had been destroyed but the new had yet to be created). It was serious, well-founded criticism having nothing to do with facile fault-finding. The Ministry was said to be still cooperating too little with the science of law and with departmental research centres and the numerous higher educational institutions doing solid research into big international problems. Some speakers justly noted that our embassies, while devoting excessive attention to current contacts with science and to protocol connected with visits by delegations of scientists, have a poor idea of the main lines of scientific progress abroad, of advances in the solution of global problems facing humanity.

Guests from academic institutes declared for setting up a permanent and durable structure of cooperation between the diplomatic service and science, for a priority research programme to meet foreign policy requirements, for more effective and systematic participation by researchers in foreign policy activity as members of Soviet delegations or embassy employees.

For its part, the Foreign Ministry leadership asked scientists to discuss the possibility of signing agreements between the Ministry and the Academy of Sciences, the State Committee on Education and departmental centres on the main forms and channels of cooperation between diplomats and scientists. It listed the priority problems that are of primary interest to Soviet foreign policy and call for research. They include the following:

- theoretical assessment of the experience of introducing the concept of new political thinking into foreign policy;
- making the Soviet economy a component of the world economy;
- analysis and prognostication of the likely effects of developments in Central and East European countries;
- scientific foundations of putting all relations with allies and countries close to us on new principles,
- the new parameters of international security to be adopted after reaching agreements on cuts in Soviet and US strategic offensive weapons and on substantial reductions in troops and conventional armaments in Europe;
- scientific principles of conversion;
- the concept of supremacy of international law and of establishing a universal legal order, the law of peoples,
- prospects of the STR, the possibilities of building an environmental security system, likely demographic trends.

The exchange of views that took place at the Scientific Council meeting was recognised by all participants to have benefited scientists and diplomats alike and raised the quality of business ties between them.

IT WOULD BE unfair to affirm that prior to perestroika diplomacy

was separated from science by a wall. Life itself, all the good and bad things that the STR brought with it, influenced the foreign policy of states, including ours, and made politicians turn to science for assistance.

It was scientists who invented the nuclear weapon but they were also the first to call for ending nuclear tests and stopping the bomb. A case in point was the profoundly humane peace-making effort of Albert Einstein. He was one of the world's leading scientists who first raised their voice in favour of banning dangerous experiments with nuclear arms. In January 1958, as many as 9,235 scientists of 44 countries directed a message to the UN Secretary-General demanding a ban on experimental nuclear explosions. They included 216 members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It was not long before scientists joined directly in diplomatic talks.

In July 1958, this writer attended in Geneva's Palais des Nations a meeting of scientific experts of four socialist and four Western countries (Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, United States, Britain, France, Canada) on the problem of monitoring the discontinuance of nuclear tests. The meeting brought together scientists of world renown, including Academicians Nikolai Semyonov and Igor Tamm of the Soviet Union, E. Thomas Lawrence and Hans A. Bethe of the United States and several other Nobel Prize winners.

Those people knew how the atom bomb is made and how compliance with the ban on testing it should be verified. But they were official experts and therefore had to state on some points what was imposed by strict government instructions rather than prompted by their knowledge and conscience as scientists.

Shortly before the experts met, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said that the American delegates would be independent of the government and completely outspoken in making expert assessments. However, the very first sittings disproved that. Like their partners across the negotiating table, the American and other Western experts tried as members of official delegations to prove what was demanded of them by their governments.

The United States was firmly opposed—as it still is, by the way—to possibilities of detecting nuclear explosions while at the same time exaggerating the possibilities of concealing them with evil intent. One of them went as far as to advance the chimerical idea of exploding nuclear bombs on the invisible side of the moon, where he said the blasts could not be detected. I remember how the Americans argued that the technique of monitoring radio signals proposed by our scientists was no good as a means of detecting nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. They claimed that a signal coming from such an explosion could not be distinguished from a thunderbolt. To prove that, they gave the Soviet experts ten records of radio signals and asked them to tell thunderbolt from explosion. Some five minutes later, one of our experts returned the records. "We aren't schoolboys, you know," he told his American colleagues. "We can see that recorded here are three blasts and seven thunderbolts." That method was agreed in the end.

The number of warning stations turned out to be even more controversial. The US experts had been instructed to seek the deployment on Soviet territory of as many posts as possible staffed by foreign specialists. They insisted on having at least 650 such posts on the globe and on siting a large part of them in the Soviet Union. As for our experts, they were bound by instructions from those who preferred not to have any foreign inspectors on our territory. They proposed six times as few posts, which meant that there should only be one post in the Soviet Union. However, the protracted controversy culminated in a perfectly rea-

sonable compromise on setting up a world network of 160 to 170 posts, including 12 on Soviet soil. After a difficult debate, the experts' report was agreed. The possibility of detecting nuclear tests was demonstrated.

Shortly afterwards, however, the American side virtually disavowed its scientists' opinion. The talks dragged on for five long years without producing a comprehensive agreement on ending nuclear tests.

When, after 1963, an agreement banning tests in atmosphere, in outer space and under water was concluded, nuclear explosions continued unabated underground. We contributed our bit to that impasse by occasionally taking an inflexible stand which hampered progress at the talks. In the early sixties, Soviet and American scientists came close to agreeing on joint experiments to detect explosions similar to the experiments that were carried out in Kazakhstan and Nevada in the late eighties without the least damage to the security of either side. It follows that, twenty-five years earlier, we failed an accord between scientists, thereby playing into the hands of those in the United States who wanted nuclear testing to go on.

There were many similar facts in the postwar history of talks. Politics gave priority to the requirements and directives of policy-makers rather than to the arguments of scientists. In our case, excessive secrecy and a bid to keep our national territory under an impenetrable cover practically nullified all our declarations about favouring arms limitation under strict international control.

All of that took place at a time when professional politicians and military officials were losing their monopoly on military strategic issues and when many scientists taking interest in these issues could have offered wise advice. Yet nobody lent ear to scientists, and indeed, they were often pulled up short.

Whereas in earlier years there was a connection between our foreign policy and the natural sciences, if a lopsided and deformed one, it was almost non-existent in the sphere of social science. Besides, treatises, articles and monographs written with the sole aim of substantiating what was pronounced from higher up could certainly not help diplomatic practice, being devoid of objective scientific analysis, a free quest for new ideas or prognostic vision.

There was also the fact that diplomacy itself was for decades held down by the command system, which substantially limited the creative potential of diplomats. This is not to say that our foreign policy registered no successes. It did, and they went down in history. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the ABM Treaty and SALT I were signal achievements of our foreign policy paving the way for further effort to curb the nuclear threat and build up international stability and security. Along with this, however, our diplomacy often took an anything but scientific stand by trying to justify and bring about the implementation of voluntarist decisions or decisions made behind closed doors that were far removed from reality and out of keeping with the actual interests of the state and the people.

Due to the isolation of diplomatic activity from science, some of our foreign policy concepts and ideas were frankly situational and shortsighted. No room was left for alternative solutions, and this made the efforts of foreign policy primitive, dooming them to failure in the context of the intricate, fast-changing interdependence of the contemporary world.

Thus the task and necessity of building bridges between science and diplomacy became over the years a foreign policy imperative for us. To reshape foreign policy on the principles of new political thinking, it was indispensable to open the sphere of diplomatic practice for new ideas and initiatives without which a radical change in international affairs, a

transition from confrontation to dialogue, from tension to normal, civilised relations, is impossible.

If we want to put our foreign policy on a solid scientific basis, we can only do so by closely cooperating with the country's scientific community.

How should we proceed? This is no simple question, for many things had to be started from scratch. "Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy," Eduard Shevardnadze said, "are open for Soviet and world science. The point at issue is how to bring it directly into our system, how to fuse them."

All these questions were discussed in detail at the Ministry. Our embassies in a large group of countries were instructed to submit their views based on their experience abroad. Following a careful discussion of all ideas and suggestions, the Ministry Collegium in July 1987 adopted a detailed decision on promoting ties between diplomacy and science.

IN LINE with that decision, the Ministry set up a Scientific Council and a Scientific Coordination Centre as the Council's working organ entrusted with establishing and maintaining permanent ties with research centres at home and abroad. The Ministry's directorates and departments were recommended to form scientific consultation councils of diplomats and scientists. This is what the system is like today.

The decision specified the main forms of cooperation with science. It recognised conferences, symposiums, seminars and other meetings with scientific workers on theoretical and practical problems of international politics and the country's foreign political positions as the most accessible and effective form.

Such meetings, to which the Ministry invites not only scientists but specialists from other government departments as well as journalists, have already become something of a permanent practice. They owe this in very large measure to the climate of uninhibited constructive discussion created in the country. Originally some diplomats feared that due to a certain allergy that had developed over the years in relations between diplomats and scientists, meetings with the latter would be too controversial, with participants stating subjective views hard to benefit from. But they proved wrong.

Not all meetings were equally fruitful but at nearly all of them the participants exerted beneficial influence on each other. Scientists speaking in the presence of diplomats set out ideas and judgments that might be useful to foreign policy. For their part, diplomats arguing with scientists were led to give up a narrow-minded situational approach in favour of a conceptual one reaching farther beyond the political horizon.

We are occasionally asked whether we use the ideas and proposals put forward at joint Ministry meetings. Such questions come primarily from scientists who have always been keen on practical problems but have seldom met interlocutors willing to study and accept their proposals. I have repeatedly heard such scientists say that the main thing they derive satisfaction from is not the royalties they are paid by the Foreign Ministry but the realisation that their ideas and conclusions have translated into deeds and moved from the pages of theses and scientific works into diplomatic documents. The situation in the Ministry is changing, and I could give many facts relating to the most sensitive and demanding areas of diplomatic activity to show how scientists' recommendations not only meet with a favourable response but are put into practice.

It is a sign of the times that some discussions by scientists and dip-

lomatics went beyond foreign policy subjects, leading to an analysis of the country's economic development. This was the case with a discussion on the implementation of the proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech. One of the two days of the meeting was entirely taken up with the programme for the economic and social advancement of the Far Eastern region. Moscow scientists and diplomats and guests from Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Chita and Vladivostok offered many criticisms concerning the programme and its realisation. A summary of those criticisms was subsequently circulated to various specialists—an unusual initiative showing that the Foreign Ministry had begun paying attention to inner political problems as well.

Now that our science is reappraising many theoretical postulates in the spirit of new political thinking, many diplomats find meetings or theoretical problems of international relations particularly valuable. Noted Soviet scientists set out at them their views on the concept of peaceful coexistence, the principles of freedom of choice and non-use of force, the thesis of deideologising state-to-state relations, the role of international law, humanitarian issues, application of the principle of glasnost in foreign policy, and so on. Such discussions, which go beyond current affairs claiming the attention of diplomats, undoubtedly help extend the latter's horizons and add to their intellectual resources.

With help from scientists, the Ministry has begun studying so important a problem as the conduct of international talks today. The purpose is to work out at this stage of transition from confrontation to dialogue in world affairs ways and means of making talks more effective. This theme now draws the attention of analysts in many countries, who are searching for a short cut to agreements guaranteeing a balance of interests without detriment to any country. This is a sound idea. Negotiating partners should understand each other and jointly devise new methods of carrying on their talks. This was the Diplomatic Academy's aim in inviting a group of Harvard scholars to Moscow. The Americans held with young Soviet diplomats and Academy students a most fruitful four-day seminar at which diplomatic games covering some current subjects took place.

The outstanding event in a series of meetings with scientists held at the Foreign Ministry was the conference on "The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy". It brought together not only Ministry officials but practically all the Soviet ambassadors accredited to foreign capitals. The speakers included staff members of academic institutes, Foreign Ministry officials, scientists from Union republics, representatives of leading media. The debate, which ranged over many aspects of our country's foreign policy, disproved the long-standing notion of the Ministry's "caste-mindedness" and its isolation from life at home. The meeting was also expressive of the democratisation process under way in the shaping of our foreign policy.

The Foreign Ministry tries to use the possibilities of the Union republics with a view to increasing their role in the framing and implementation of Soviet foreign policy and to bringing the republics' sovereignty to bear in the foreign policy sphere. One of the roads to this goal is to promote ties between the Ministry and republican scientific centres. By attending meetings at the Ministry, people from these centres contributed fresh ideas. It was the first time that the Ministry had used this method.

Also for the first time ever, the Ministry sponsored a conference in Kazakhstan that was organised by the republican Foreign Ministry. The theme was Soviet policy towards the Asia and Pacific region. The conference was attended by scientists from all the republics of the Soviet Union, Foreign Ministry officials, Soviet ambassadors from several APF

countries and departmental specialists responsible for international economic and cultural relations.

The conference enabled the diplomats to establish direct informal contacts with the republic's authorities, public opinion and scientific community, "It is gratifying to see," said the State University of Kazakhstan professor, "that our effort and our opinions have turned out to be necessary for Soviet foreign policy."

The Ministry plans to hold several further conferences of a similar nature in collaboration with the foreign ministries of other republics.

Investigations and analyses of international problems coming into the Ministry from various institutes can be very helpful to diplomats. The Scientific Coordination Centre has received about 300 materials of this kind. Many of them contain original analyses and proposals and have won approval in the Ministry's echelons.

However, these materials are supplied to us on a strictly voluntary basis. In the years ahead, we must sign relevant contracts with institutes and individual scientists on research into specific subjects of interest to the Ministry. This must be done because all institutes are now introducing economic accountability (khozraschet).

International scientific ties offer ample and promising opportunities for cooperation between diplomats and scientists.

Recent years have seen a considerable increase in the number of invitations for Ministry officials to take part in international conferences. Our diplomats have established strong and mutually beneficial contacts on problems of the APR, naval problems and problems of reducing troops and armaments in Europe, the international economic situation and other subjects. In May 1989, Moscow hosted a meeting of WTO countries' scientists and diplomats.

Informal meetings between scientists and diplomatic and military experts are a relatively new phenomenon gaining ground in the area of international intellectual ties. They contribute to the work being done by ordinary diplomatic mechanisms, making it possible to appreciate each other's interests, to hold something like preliminary talks likely to facilitate the search for solutions to complex problems. Organising such contacts requires extensive and painstaking preparations and entails certain outlays but the results they can produce are worth both

Joint research by scientists and experts of various countries cooperating on a bilateral or multilateral basis can be particularly fruitful. Such research, preferably on the principle of a free exchange of opinion without any obligation to reach agreement on all points, could cover the most diverse aspects of world politics, economy and culture. The important thing is to choose the more pressing problems whose solution is likely to help end serious international conflicts and contradictions and extend mutual understanding and confidence between states.

International scientific ties are a component of relations between countries belonging to different systems. The more ramified they are, the more they make for mutual understanding in the world. This means that science will become an increasingly active subject of world politics. Soviet diplomacy intends to do all it can to contribute to this trend.

An occasional scientific achievement dating from long ago and hence unrelated to present-day politics may help more than a formal agreement in fostering mutual sympathy and rapprochement between peoples. In Soviet-Brazilian relations, this was exemplified by a highly successful exhibition held in the major cities of Brazil in 1988. The exhibition displayed specimens of that country's flora and fauna collected in early 1800 by Georg Langsdorff, the then Russian Consul-General in Rio de Janeiro, who was elected to the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences for his services to science.

At present it is essential for many countries, including ours, to study in common historical problems in order to close "gaps" in their mutual relations. This is a challenging task necessitating a retrospection of the distant and in some cases of the not so very distant past, which is interpreted variously and is almost invariably a most sensitive matter for peoples. This calls for particularly close cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the institutes of history, ethnography, geography and other entities of the Academy of Sciences as well as universities. Scientists must be given greater access to archives, and the Ministry plans to remove obstacles in their way.

Vast opportunities are opening up for mutually beneficial international cooperation in science and technology. Environmental protection, nuclear synthesis, peaceful uses of space measures to combat AIDS and other grave diseases affecting many countries are problems that have already invaded foreign policy and become the object of diplomatic talks and international agreements.

Global problems (occasionally called transnational) cannot be solved without global effort. The Foreign Ministry now has a Directorate of International Scientific and Technological Ties in charge of a wide range of problems requiring international cooperation.

The Ministry cooperated with the USSR Academy of Sciences in setting up a branch of the World Laboratory in Moscow to do research with the participation of all interested countries as well as to use scientific achievements for peaceful purposes. The Ministry is contributing its share to the organisation of the Baikal International Ecological Centre and to the inclusion of Soviet research centres in the drafting of the Eureka West European technological cooperation programme.

Foreign policy has appreciable possibilities for making a substantial contribution benefiting the whole of society not only to the solution of global problems but to the prevention of the disastrous effects that thoughtless use of scientific achievements can have.

An instrument which helped protect the environment from radioactive contamination was the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water signed in Moscow in 1963.

This is a widely known fact but few have heard how the treaty benefited our country on one occasion.

In the sixties, it occurred to certain enthusiasts for reversing the course of some northern rivers to carry out a series of underground nuclear blasts for the purpose. They could not shut their eyes to the Moscow Treaty, which was very popular at the time, and so they asked the Foreign Ministry whether the projected blasts would be a violation of obligations assumed under the treaty. Diplomatic experts, for their part, asked whether the radioactive waste to be released by blasts would carry across the border. The treaty prohibits such blasts. Discussion revealed that a huge quantity of radioactive particles released into the atmosphere would be carried by winds along with clouds from northwestern part of our country to the eastern area, some of them descending with rain and the rest moving towards the North Pacific. Such a nuclear "echo" would have constituted a gross violation of the treaty, and the plan for altering the course of rivers had to be abandoned even before it took final shape.

The treaty on a partial discontinuance of nuclear tests may rightly be described as the first global ecological agreement.

In compliance with existing accords on environmental protection, countries must bring their ecological legislation in line with international ecological standards. This is a priority because the threat to the environment does not stop at state frontiers. The close intertwining of home and foreign policy makes diplomacy and science partners in conserving na-

ture. It adds to universal values and prevents all use of scientific progress for the destruction of civilisation, to the detriment of humanity.

THE EXPERIENCE of two years of effort to promote ties with science was carefully analysed and generalised at a Collegium meeting attended by the heads of all of the Ministry's directorates and departments.

The meeting confirmed that the steps taken to draw science into the Ministry's work had proved their worth. The original doubts about the need for this activity and the formation of appropriate structures are a thing of the past. Cooperation with science is coming into its own at the level of both the Ministry and embassies. Scientists reciprocate the Ministry's efforts, with the result that a mutually beneficial partnership on an equal footing is developing between diplomacy and science.

Still, it is not all smooth sailing, and progress is slower than we would like. Diplomats and scientists have mutual claims.

It is too early to say that the Foreign Ministry and research institutions have already established well-functioning, effective ties with each other. The Ministry admits that the blame for this must be put chiefly on its directorates and departments as well as, not least of all, on its Scientific Coordination Centre.

One reason for the slow integration of the scientific potential in diplomatic work is that not all of the Ministry's echelons maintain regular contacts with scientists and that mutual confidence and a real aspiration to cooperate are not the rule yet. This is due to both inertia and recurrences of a past practice. What makes the situation worse is that some diplomats still feel superior as might members of an elite, for they have access to diplomatic secrets and therefore imagine that they can ignore the opinions of "uninitiated" scientists. It is also unfortunate that some officials heading directorates or departments neglect the task of seeking ties with science.

As a consequence, few researchers are invited to join in the drafting of foreign policy documents or in planning major diplomatic actions. Asking them to help compile routine documents would be wrong, of course, but where it is necessary to discuss and draw up conceptual documents indicating the main line of action in a particular area of world politics, the opinion of scientists can be very important and useful. The Foreign Ministry should ask their opinion on more of its documents. It need not accept all conclusions submitted by scientists but there can be no doubt that most of them would be valuable.

There are certain other shortcomings detracting from the value of contacts with science. One of them is the inadequacy of feedback between the Ministry and scientific institutions. Scientists get no oral or written response to some of their proposals and so do not know whether or not these were found useful.

The contract system of establishing relations with research centres is still very imperfect. This calls in the first place for the creation of financial mechanism to maintain such relations and for the allocation of the requisite funds. We are accustomed to budget financement of military research and development but do not stop to think why the budget of the Foreign Ministry contains no item of expenditure on foreign policy research and projects.

Lately our delegations have come to include a growing number of scientists. There were scientists among the members of delegations to meetings held within the framework of the CSCE, such as the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces. But this is still a limited practice.

Not all in the Ministry realise that the inclusion of scientists in delegations is doubly useful because they can help by offering delegates expert advice and because getting to know what talks are like in practice, familiarising themselves with background of diplomacy, will help them afterwards in making their research more substantive and ultimately useful to foreign policy practice as well.

Still fewer scientists are assigned to embassies. Far from all our embassies have established durable contacts with foreign scientific centres. Yet world experience indicates that research institutions and noted scientists in many countries are brought more and more into analysing international problems and even into formulating their country's position on this or that foreign political issue. This is true primarily of highly complex problems of international security, disarmament, world economy and international law.

Diplomats, who are people active in the sphere of practice, make many suggestions to scientists based on personal impressions of increased contacts with them.

They note that many scientists, primarily social scientists, have but a vague idea of the practical tasks facing foreign policy and are at a loss for answers to questions posed by everyday life and by the evolution of our international relations. This shortcoming comes out both during discussions at the Ministry and in the course of talks involving scientists, in situations requiring not general comments on a planetary scale but specific advice on how to proceed in changed circumstances. Occasionally scientists lack a sense of realism and therefore propose alternatives which may prove useful in future but are likely to complicate our relations with other countries if acted on in the given situation.

An unprecedented revival of discussion and political activity in the country has resulted in some scientists joining in situational controversies and diverting their attention to particular aspects of current politics at the expense of fundamental analysis and prognostication. This tendency is of no value to diplomats and, indeed, restricts their opportunities for cooperation with scientists.

The Foreign Ministry is short of in-depth studies of some realities of regional geography, especially the policies and economies of small countries, which in this period of a general democratisation of international relations play a growing role in world affairs as sovereign and independent partners defending their national interests.

We also come up against problems over contracts with research centres. Several investigations carried out for the Ministry by contract were found very competent and put to use. But we had to return some others, asking the authors to improve and extend them. One of the contracts had to be terminated because the requisite research was not done in time and proved to be of low quality. It seems that today, when some institutes are getting more and more orders for research, some researchers have too little time for proper work.

The Ministry needs original research containing conclusions and recommendations that can be used by diplomats. They may be at variance with today's official line. The principal demand we make on all such research is that it be based on solid evidence and characterised by inherent logic. Research which fails to meet these conditions is useless to diplomats.

Foreign Ministry officials welcome the pluralism of opinion and approach that is beginning to flourish in the scientific community, for it is easier to make a choice satisfying the requirements of our policy when there is an abundance of ideas. Fortunately, the time is past when scientists were made to speak as they were told and when both we and the rest of the world used to take the opinion of any Soviet analyst or com-

mentator for a statement of official policy. This tradition created unbearable conditions for initiative and impoverished practice.

The Foreign Ministry has no intention of exercising censorship or imposing bans. But while recognising freedom of scientific opinion, it reserves the right to choose its scientific partners. The criteria it will use in choosing them are conscientiousness and a sense of responsibility on the part of researchers, who should strive to contribute new ideas to our foreign policy and help apply the principles of new political thinking.

Diplomats have a stake in our science expanding its foreign ties. We therefore take a critical view of the incomprehensible persistence of red tape in issuing passports to scientists planning to go abroad to deliver lectures or do research. What tells occasionally is apparently also the somewhat unhealthy atmosphere surrounding such trips in some institutes. Be that as it may, the result is that barriers are raised to extending international scientific contacts and that our science is discredited in some cases. This can also have negative political consequences at a time when perestroika has aroused an unprecedented interest throughout the world in all that has to do with our policy, economy, science, history and culture.

Progress in foreign policy today depends largely on cooperation between diplomacy and science. In turn, the need for a science-intensive foreign policy is bound to stimulate progress in research and to help scientists see clear in the exigencies of contemporary international development and participate more fruitfully in efforts to improve or normalise relations between states.

IS A "THIRD ZERO" ATTAINABLE?

(Continued from page 12)

and concretising President George Bush's "Brussels initiative". We wish to underline that the figures cited in data published in January 1989 were 4,000 combat aircraft as well as 530 aircraft laid by and 530 training planes. See *Conventional Forces in Europe the Facts*, 1989, p. 27.

⁵ According to Soviet official sources, the WTO has 7,184 combat aircraft for the frontline and anti-aircraft defence and NATO, 5,500 combat aircraft. See *Pravda*, January 30, 1989.

⁶ See, for instance, Ph. Karber, *The Soviet Threat: Comparative Assessments*, 1988, p. 22.

The Problem of Power in International Negotiations

**Jeffrey Z. RUBIN,
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PEOPLE NEGOTIATE with one another all the time. Wives negotiate with husbands; managers negotiate with workers; nations negotiate with other nations. Yet, despite the fact that negotiations are a part of everyday life, it is only quite recently that scholars have begun to study negotiation systematically.

The body of the paper addresses a particularly vexing theoretical and practical problem: negotiation between parties of unequal power. Both the United States and the Soviet Union constantly face this problem, for both nations are continually called upon to negotiate with far less powerful states than themselves. These less powerful states wish to influence the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. to negotiate with them, while the latter may not be inclined to do so. It behooves both the Soviet Union and the United States, therefore, to understand better the strategies which the less powerful may use against the more powerful in negotiation.

Scholarly examination of negotiation dates back no more than several decades: research and writing in this area first appeared in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. Early writings by game theorists (see Luce & Raiffa, 1957) focused primarily on the mathematical decision rules than can be applied to rational choice under conditions of conflicting preference between two or more "players." This work was followed by several more "psychological" treatments of conflict and negotiation, including Schelling's (1960) classic treatise on the rational uses of nonrational behavior, as well as Rapoport's (1960) psychologically sophisticated analysis of rational decision making in "fights, games, and debates." Walton and McKersie (1965) provided one of the earliest and most influential treatments of negotiation in labor settings, using labor as a context in which to develop a more general formulation about the nature of negotiation. During the 1960s and 1970s social psychologists, led by the pioneering research of Morton Deutsch (1973), Herbert Kelman (1965), and others, conducted nearly 1000 experimental studies of negotiation in the laboratory, examining the effects of a wide range of factors on negotiation process and outcome.¹

While the volume of empirical negotiation research has declined dramatically over the last decade or so, the amount of conceptual analysis has increased in equal measure. A high divorce rate in American society, continuing labor-management unrest, an increase in the number

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of conflicts that are settled in an already overburdened court system, demands for more effective management of environmental issues such as hazardous waste disposal, and the changing climate of international business and diplomatic relations have each served to spur a recent emphasis on negotiation theory and practice in the United States.

Theory and research centers for the study of negotiation have appeared at more than a dozen locations in America, and each of these centers has been responsible for extensive writing in the field. Our own Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, for example, publishes a quarterly journal (*Negotiation Journal*), an extensive listing of teaching and training materials in negotiation, and the several dozen faculty associated with the Program have been responsible for authoring or co-authoring a large number of books.

Negotiation is not the province of any single discipline in the United States. Lawyers, political scientists, international relations analysts, psychologists, economists, communication specialists, sociologists, organizational theorists, labor relations scholars, anthropologists, urban planners have each been engaged in thinking about, studying, and writing about negotiation theory.

Nor is there a single, agreed upon formulation of negotiation. Some argue that wise negotiation, in any setting, requires disputants to begin by stating extreme positions, in which they ask for far more than they ever hope to obtain. Through a series of gradual step-wise concessions, each side then moves from an extreme position toward some middle ground that gains mutual acceptance. At this point a negotiated settlement is concluded. Architects of this point of view (cf. Lax & Sebenius, 1986, Rubin & Brown, 1975, Raiffa,² 1982) argue for the importance of such factors as time limits, communication channels, negotiation site location, and a host of other considerations, as these determine the information that each side conveys to the other about the meaning of a concession (or lack thereof).

A second school of thought approaches negotiation rather differently. Instead of analyzing negotiation as a confrontation between two adversaries, each of whom is determined to get as much as possible—while surrendering little or nothing along the way—the “principles problem solving” approach calls for greater collaboration. Each side seeks to do as well for itself as possible, but it views the other party not as an adversary in the process but as a potential collaborator. The objective is to find ways of advancing one’s own self-interest while leaving room for the other side to also do reasonably well. The key to achieving this result calls for negotiators to move from statements of “position” (*what* each says he or she must have) to an analysis of underlying “interests” (*why* each has particular needs).

Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981) tell the story of two sisters arguing over the division of a single orange.³ Each would like to have the entire orange. After considerable discussion, the sisters agree to divide the orange in half, thereby creating what would appear to be a wise and fair solution. One sister then peels the orange and eats the fruit, while the second takes her half of the orange, throws away the fruit, and uses the peel to bake a cake. What appeared to be a wise solution—namely, a 50/50 division of orange—was certainly fair, but not very wise at all. If only each sister had paid attention not to positions (how much of the orange she was asking for) but interests (what she would use the orange for), they might have been able to achieve an agreement that allowed each to obtain everything she wanted.

This, then, is the collaborative problem solving approach to negotiation. It argues that opportunities for joint gain result when negotiators

are able to metaphorically swing their chairs around so that, instead of facing each other, they are side by side. Instead of confronting each other, the two negotiators jointly confront a problem that challenges them both.

To be sure, not all conflicts are amenable to this joint problem solving negotiation approach. Many are, however. Others remain better suited to the more traditional concession-making approach, alluded to earlier, in which negotiators begin with extreme opening demands, then slowly shift from these in order to reach some sort of mutually acceptable agreement.

Although these two approaches to thinking about negotiation would appear to rest on rather different assumptions about the nature of the process, they are actually very much alike in one key respect. Both points of view are best suited to the kind of negotiation that takes place between parties of roughly equal power. Whether it is two sisters or two superpowers, as long as neither party has the power to impose agreement on the other, and the parties acknowledge their interdependence, there is room and opportunity for negotiation.

The interesting question, however, is this: What happens when power is *not* equally divided between the parties? What happens when one side has far more power than the other, when one side is far less dependent on reaching a negotiated settlement than the other? If two nations are engaged in a water rights dispute concerning a river, and one nation sits upstream of the other, why should the upstream party agree to negotiate—rather than simply decide unilaterally to do exactly as it pleases? In turn, what can the party with low relative power do to persuade its upstream counterpart to come to the negotiating table?

Scholars have yet to address the question of negotiation between unequals in a significant way. *Without exaggeration, it can be said that the problem of negotiation under conditions of power inequality is one of the toughest problems currently confronting scholars in this area.* In the international arena, this type of negotiation takes place most often when a developing country seeks to deal with a superpower—the United States or the Soviet Union. The following analysis reflects some of the current thinking about the problem; it may or may not be relevant and of interest to Soviet reader.

Negotiations between developing and developed countries take place in a special context. First, despite structures such as the United Nations and the World Court, no clearly superior authority, such as a legislature or a court, exists to create and enforce rules to protect parties with relatively little bargaining power. Second, while parties as the United States and Soviet Union may regard themselves as more or less powerful, depending on the particular negotiation in which they are engaged, developing countries, in their relationships with developed countries, *always* consider themselves powerless, regardless of the subject under discussion. This view is clearly reflected in work espousing dependency theories of development. Third, in international relations there is no real "escape" from the community of nations; nation-states are locked together in an interdependent embrace for which no alternative exists.

It is usually assumed that success in international negotiations is merely a matter of "power," and that the state with less power is always at the mercy of the state with more power. Yet the history of international relations is filled with examples of large states who failed to force small states to do their bidding (e. g., the United States and Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan) or of small states that achieved significant gains in negotiations with large states (e. g., Panama in its negotiations with the United States over the Panama Canal). These examples raise the question of whether results in such

negotiations are not just a matter of power but also of the strategies and tactics used by the small state to pursue its interests.

To answer that question, one must first examine the nature of power within international negotiations. First, it is important to recognize that negotiating power between two states is not an absolute; rather, it varies from case to case, context to context, and issue to issue. It is therefore important for the weaker state to evaluate its position and options with respect to the particular negotiation in question.

Second, "power" within the context of an international negotiation really means the potential to influence the decisions of the other party. The challenge for the weaker state is to devise strategies and to mobilize its resources in order to enhance its ability to influence the other side's decision making.

Our basic assumption is that decision making in international negotiation is influenced by: 1) positive strategies which hold out the prospect of either increased rewards or reduced costs or 2) negative strategies that reduce reward or increase cost to the other side. For example, the strategy of "linking" a negotiating issue on which one is weak to another issue, where one has something to offer that is sought by the other side, influences decision making by increasing reward. Similarly, the strategy of allying oneself with a rival of the other party seeks to exert influence by threatening increased risk.

Each of the strategies listed below can be viewed in this light. Moreover, they can be divided into two basic groups: 1) those that can be accomplished *within* the bilateral relationship between the weaker and stronger states, and 2) those requiring the weaker state to *go outside* the relationship and seek the aid or intervention of additional parties.

The following preliminary inventory of low power influence approaches offers examples of how each could be used, or has been used, with some success. The inventory also lists low power influence strategies in a particular sequence, moving from strategies that are "soft" or "friendly" (and largely *within* the context of a relationship) to those that are more coercive (and typically *outside* of the relationship in question).

(1) *Appeals to Principle* As Fisher and Ury (1981) have pointed out, negotiators in a position of relatively low power can always attempt to persuade the other side to come to the table and/or settle for less than they might otherwise by appealing to some external standard or principle. A nation with a relative paucity of resources can always attempt to appeal to its richer neighbor on the basis of international law, principles of fairness and equity, or the precedent set in relations among other comparable states.

In international relations, particularly between developed and developing countries, it is thus tempting to suggest that developing countries appeal to principle in their negotiations. But appeal to principle alone is rarely an effective strategy—because *both* sides base their positions on principle. The basic issue then becomes *which* principle should govern, and *whose* interest that principle represents. Indeed, in virtually all negotiations between the Third World and the industrialized West each side appeals to principle to justify its position, but those principles are very much in conflict.

For example, in the case of Third World debt, certainly one of the most difficult negotiations between the industrialized nations of the North and the developing countries of the South, each side frames its position ostensibly on the basis of principle. On the one hand, the North, seeking full repayment of loans, bases its position on the principle of sanctity of contract, *pacta sunt servanda*, and the soundness of the international banking system. The South, seeking relief from indebted-

ness, instead relies on the principle of changed circumstances, *rebus sic stantibus*, and equity in international economic relations. Thus, appeal to principle is present in all negotiations and may, in certain circumstances, be useful fostering public support for one side or the other, but it must normally be coupled with other negotiating strategies. Then, too, an unvarnished appeal to principle as a basis for negotiation may even backfire, as when the more powerful side correctly detects that the less powerful counterpart is resorting to such appeals to principle precisely because it is lacking the wherewithal to accomplish its objective through other techniques or means. Such appeals may be (correctly) seen by the more powerful party as an unartful bluff in a poker game, a failed attempt to conceal a bad hand.

(2) *Appeals to One's "History" with the Other Side.* Lord William McCarthy (1985) has observed that, while it is in the interest of the less powerful negotiator to appeal to principle, it is not at all clear why the more powerful should agree.⁴ If A controls all of the resources in dispute, while B controls *none*, then why should A "succumb" to an appeal to principle?

An alternative, then, entails appealing to the more powerful on the basis of one's continuing relationship with the other side. International relations, of course, constitute the quintessential illustration of an ongoing set of relationships. Nations have typically had many years of contact with one another; it thus may make sense for the less powerful nation to attempt an appeal based on the history of past relations between the nations involved.

In North-South relationships, one sees this strategy at work, particularly in negotiations between developing countries and their former colonial rulers. The developing country will emphasize its common language, cultural ties, and economic relationships in order to obtain favorable treatment from its more powerful but familiar negotiating adversary. For example, French-speaking African states have used this approach in negotiating favorable economic agreements with France.

(3) *Appeals to the Future.* If looking backward, toward one's relational history with the other side, is one possible way of inducing a more powerful party to negotiate, then the other end of the temporal spectrum offers a related avenue. The less powerful can point to the likelihood of an ongoing relationship, extending well into the future, and use this prospect as the basis to appeal for a more reasonable agreement in the present round "It is in your interest," the subordinate can argue, "to be agreeable and flexible on this occasion, since we will be working together on many subsequent occasions."

Appeals based on the anticipation of continuing interaction, of precisely the sort that occurs in international relations—where, after all, there is no such thing as permanently "dropping out" of the interdependent community of nations—*can* prove effective in persuading a more powerful party to come to the negotiating table. This approach is particularly likely to be effective if the less powerful party can persuade the other side that the distribution of resources may change in the future. For example, in negotiations over natural resources (e. g., oil, copper, tin), the nations of the South have pointed out that while the powerful nations of the North, because of their own mineral reserves, may give low prices to the South now, the North will deplete its reserves first and thereafter become dependent on the South.

On the other hand, it should be noted that this sort of appeal, based on the anticipation of future interaction, can function as a two-edged sword, inasmuch as it raises concerns by the stronger party about precedent. While one party may be willing to yield to another on this

particular occasion, knowing that they will never have to see or deal with each other ever again, the same party may feel rather differently about the matter if he or she knows that they will be working together on a regular basis indefinitely. To yield now may encourage the belief that one will also yield in the future, indeed, it may even lead to the (false) conclusion that if one is willing to give this much now, one will probably concede even more in order to secure a negotiated agreement in later rounds. Thus, banks are unwilling to make major concessions in debt negotiations today for fear that they will face even greater demands tomorrow.

(4) *Anticipated Renegotiation*. A cousin of the above approach entails persuading the more powerful party to a conflict that an agreement reached in the present need not be indefinitely binding or constraining. Agreement can be reached now, knowing full well that there will be another round of negotiation planned for the future. Thus, if the more powerful party is reluctant to commit to an agreement because of a belief that he or she can do even better after a delay, the presence of a contractual arrangement that guarantees a subsequent round of renegotiation may provide the assurance. Labor/management relations are replete with illustrations along these lines. One side manages to move the other out of stalemate, and the looming possibility of a costly strike, by creating an opportunity to "review the bidding" in the future.

The more powerful side may be reluctant to accede to such a persuasive appeal, of course. To do so may invite the risk of setting a precedent that makes it difficult—contractual understandings notwithstanding—to reopen the discussions at a later time. It is thus incumbent upon the less powerful side, the one who needs to make a persuasive case for a "buy now, pay later" scheme, to argue for the short-term merits of a negotiated agreement now.

The above approach might be called the "*declared*" anticipated renegotiation strategy, but there is also the "*undeclared*" anticipated renegotiation strategy by which the weaker party accepts a bad deal now with the unexpressed intention of seeking renegotiation of its terms at a later time, when it is stronger. Developing countries have repeatedly followed this strategy in their dealings with multinational corporations which, once they have made an investment in the country, become vulnerable to pressure for renegotiation of an earlier investment contract or mineral development agreement.⁵

(5) *Linkage*. In our increasingly interdependent world, relations between two nations invariably involve several issues on which individual national strength may vary. While one country may be weak in its trade relations with another, for example, it may be much stronger on questions of security. This situation suggests that a weaker party should seek to link negotiations to issues on which it is stronger in some way, but which are not then specifically subject to subsequent negotiation.

If two nations are engaged in a river dispute, with one country upstream and the other down, the question can be raised, as indeed it has many times over the years: Why should the upstream interest should sit down to negotiate with its counterpart? Upstream would appear to have complete control over the river's uses and movements—whether the river flows downstream or is dammed, diverted, polluted etc. Downstream can apparently do nothing to influence Upstream's behavior. However, suppose that more than one resource is of interest to the two parties. Imagine that Upstream controls the river, while Downstream has far richer mineral deposits than its upstream counterpart. Assuming Upstream has an interest in these mineral deposits, the matter of relative power rapidly disappears. Linkage is the oppor-

tunity created as a result of this distribution of various resources, inviting the possibility of a tradeoff of resources in ways that create incentives to negotiate.

It is not always the case, of course, that linkage is possible as a result of the balance or equitable distribution of resources. Nature is not always fair. One country may not only have the controlling upstream interest, but also the finest mineral deposits, forests, and industrial potential. Often, however, parties to a conflict overlook the possibility of linkage; developing countries need to devote more creative energy to the search for such linking arrangements, since they will allow the apparently less powerful party to a conflict to influence the other side's position.

Developing countries have often linked economic issues with security issues in their negotiations with western powers, particularly the United States. For example, South Korea was able to gain trade concessions in the United States in return for protecting certain U.S. security interests on the Korean peninsula. Similarly, Greece, Spain, and the Philippines, in their respective negotiations over base rights with the United States, have managed to link these negotiations to economic considerations in ways that play to their economic advantage.

(6) *Appeals to National Interest.* Linkage relies for its effectiveness on the inherently interdependent interests of the more powerful and less powerful parties to a conflict. In contrast, another basis of appeal focuses not on *interdependence*, but *independence*. If one party can persuade the other that allowing it to have what it wants will cost little or nothing, while the other party in turn can have all that it desires—at little or no expense to the first party—then it is the *absence* of interdependence that creates the basis for a possible negotiated agreement.

Fisher and Ury (1981), Lax and Sebenius (1986), and Raiffa (1982) have each written about the possibilities for agreement that are introduced when protagonists pursue their "enlightened self-interest," looking out for themselves—while, at the same time, leaving room for the other side to do well if this can transpire at no cost to oneself. In principle at least, Downstream should be able to appeal to Upstream in this fashion. At the heart of such an appeal is the distinction between "positions" and "interests", what parties demand rather than what they really need. While demands are typically opposed, underlying needs may tend to be more parallel or independent, allowing the needs of each side to be addressed at little or no cost to the other.

(7) *Stonewalling.* Sometimes the most effective thing for a less powerful party to do is *nothing*. Inaction—or stonewalling, as it is sometimes called—may help persuade the other side that, without one's participation or engagement in some course of action, a stalemate will result in the long run that is costly to the more powerful party as well as oneself. The symbolic message conveyed by the threat of a strike is that by doing nothing, by withholding our participation in the ongoing work of your organization, we will bring the machinery to a stop. More powerful parties may have control over many resources and their distribution, but the less powerful typically have control over their own participation in the arrangement—participation that, if withdrawn, may threaten the continued effectiveness, even survival, of the enterprise in question. Witness North Korea's boycott of the Olympic Games, held in September 1988 in South Korea, or the continuing boycott by Black African countries of activities in which South Africa is involved.

Granted, a boycott of any sort is more than inaction; it is a course of collective action that is designed to coerce the other side into a reassessment of the incentives to negotiation. Still, viewed as a decision to

withhold one's participation in a set of activities that one engages in ordinarily, a boycott is a form of inaction.

Strategic inaction relies for its effectiveness on the relative dependence of parties on reaching a negotiated settlement. The "risk" of high power stems from vulnerability to disruption, and the strength of powerlessness derives from having relatively little to lose. Clearly, stonewalling imposes costs on both sides. It is therefore important for the less powerful side to calculate the relative costs of inaction, both to itself and its adversary.

(8) *Using Third Parties as Intermediaries.* The strategies discussed thus far have involved various means by which the weaker party seeks to manipulate directly its bilateral relationship with the stronger party. If these means fail or are judged to be ineffective, the weaker party may look for levers outside that relationship. One such lever is the intervention of third parties who may be able to influence the stronger party to decide in favor of the weaker. There are various types of intermediaries which may be chosen, ranging from close allies of the stronger party to those which are neutral, or indeed may pose a challenge to it. The method of intervention by the third party may also take a variety of forms, including that of advocate, mediator, conciliator, fact-finder, or simply communicator.

(9) *Searching for Internal Dissension.* A more aggressive, confrontational strategy than inaction calls for the less powerful party to search for lines of cleavage within the ranks of its adversary. Having identified such divisions, it must then develop a strategy to exploit them. If as is often the case, more powerful entities are also more complex and differentiated, then such complexity carries with it the possibility of multiple viewpoints and areas of potential disagreement within the more powerful party's organization. Such lines of cleavage are to be found in the governments of all nations, to be sure, but may be particularly prominent in the ranks of the unusually powerful and complex.

Thus, to the extent that the less powerful party can find chinks in the armor of the other side, manifested as internal division among the key decision makers and those whom they represent, the result may be an opportunity to create new openings for influence. Student activists are well advised to know which deans within a university are likely to be most sympathetic to the "student cause," and to use this intelligence to advantage. The same thing holds for small, less powerful nation states vis-a-vis their more powerful counterparts.

Two related, but distinct, themes are at work here. One calls for strategic disruption, achieved by attempting to stir things up within the ranks of the other side, inducing internal dissension. For example, both the Sandinistas and the Contras have sought sympathetic elements in the U.S. government and public in order to influence U.S. policy—and specifically the giving of aid to the Contras—in Latin America. The second theme, however, has a rather different emphasis: namely, creating a coalition with one element of the more powerful party's organization, thereby increasing the opportunities for influence. The Israeli lobby in the United States has well understood this approach, and has successfully developed links to American politicians who are presumed to regard with favor particular aspects of the Israeli political agenda. Black South Africans, Greeks, and Palestinians have also learned the lesson of influencing a more powerful party through the development of ties with particular elements within the ranks of the other side.⁶

(10) *Coalition Formation.* One worker, standing alone, has little power vis-a-vis an employer; many workers, formed as a union, may have a great deal of power. Similarly, if several Downstream interests can combine forces, they may be able to hold sway over their Upstream

counterpart, changing the incentives to come to the table. As nations of the South have demonstrated, through organizations such as the OAS, OAU, the United Nations, and producer cartels, by forming a coalition among themselves it is often possible to persuade the apparently more powerful nation-states of the industrialized North that Southern concerns are to be taken seriously, and that it is in the best interest of the North to negotiate with its less powerful counterpart.

Witness, in this regard, the highly successful OPEC effort in the early 1970s to influence behavior of the industrialized nations. Alone, no single oil producing nation could possibly have had anywhere near the effect that emerged as a result of joint effort. Other illustrations of successful coalition formation and influence in the realm of international relations include ASEAN which, by combining the resources of the various developing and developed nations of Southeast Asia, has become increasingly capable of negotiating from a position of strength with the Japanese and the United States.

The ability to build a coalition often depends on the forum in which negotiations take place. Thus, coalition building, when one is engaged in a bilateral negotiation, may prove extremely difficult, while it may be far easier and more effective in a multilateral forum. Viewed in terms of the debt owed by a single developing nation, the Latin American debt crisis is not a particularly significant problem. Considered *regionally*, however, the problem is one of staggering proportions. Latin American heads of state are well aware of this fact, and are learning to leverage their influence to obtain loan "forgiveness," more favorable payment schedules, and reduced interest rates. Similarly, because the Law of the Sea negotiations were multilateral in nature, the developing countries were able to combine forces to obtain concessions from the industrialized world, concessions which never would have been possible under strictly bilateral conditions.

The lessons of coalition formation is not a new one, of course. However, it is important to note that less powerful parties too often tend to overlook the possibility of joining forces with other, comparably weak parties in an effort to create a new balance of power. By shifting from a bilateral to a multilateral forum, the weaker parties may be able to take a necessary first step toward enhancing their negotiating leverage.

(11) *Joining the Enemy's Enemy*. In parts of the Middle East, it is said: "The friend of my friend is my friend, but the enemy of my enemy is my brother." As Jordan's King Hussein has demonstrated over the years, it is often possible for skillful players in international affairs to position themselves in such a way that far more powerful players can be used to "neutralize" each other, to the advantage of the less powerful. Correctly understanding the ongoing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union for influence in the Middle East, Hussein has proven a master of ambivalence, turning now to the United States for military and economic aid, and then later to the Soviet Union for as much or more assistance as was just secured from the Americans. For many years, during the era of Nehru, the Indian government proved to be just as adept at playing off the United States and the Soviet Union against each other in much the same way.

The general principle, then, is this: A less powerful individual, group, or nation can attempt to offset this disadvantage by offering or threatening to become a "pivotal" player in creating a winning coalition. If we imagine a situation where there are three parties, whose "weights" (initial resources) are, say, 3, 3, and 1, then 1—although less powerful than either player with 3—can offer to create a winning coalition (with a combined weight of 4) by joining forces with one of the more powerful parties.

Notice that this gambit is rendered quite ineffectual to the extent that the two more powerful parties exist in a more open and collaborative relationship—not “enemies” but potential friends. If the United States and Soviet Union were to communicate with each other whenever a lesser power tried to pit one superpower against the other, opportunities for extortion would all but disappear.

(12) *Appeals to a Higher Authority.* If a subordinate in an organization is unable to persuade a superior to negotiate a conclusion to some conflict, it is often—although not always—possible to threaten to carry one’s grievance to some higher authority, to someone who has even more power than one’s superior. Analogously, less powerful states are sometimes tempted to try pushing a more powerful nation state into willingness to negotiate by threatening to carry one’s grievance to a higher authority such as the World Court, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, or to a third state more powerful than its negotiating adversary. The effectiveness of this approach is dubious since, strictly speaking, the world is divided into equal sovereign states, and the international organizations mentioned above have little or no power to impose an agreement on an individual state. Nonetheless, its use in certain circumstances may encourage the more powerful party to come to the table, if only to avoid the possibly more costly effort of having to deal with a “higher” authority. As Schelling (1960) has observed, the most effective (and least expensive) threat is the one that never has to be enforced. Low power parties would be well advised to bear this in mind, and to deliberately seek out threats of appeal to some higher authority (even one with the power to impose a settlement, if necessary) that are not expected to be carried out.

(13) *Threatening to “Go Public.”* A variation of the above approach calls for an appeal to international public opinion. While such opinion, as such, has no authority over a sovereign state, it can influence the negotiating behavior that results. Clearly such a threat will only work to the extent that the more powerful party cares about “public opinion.” Often this is the case, however, and the skillful negotiator can use this to advantage. Perhaps the most important effect of Gandhi’s fasts during the last days of the British Raj was to threaten exposure of British intransigence to international public view. In view of advances in communications technology, this approach may be more potent than ever. The televised spectacle of the Palestinian uprising and the Israeli response can be seen as one factor that led the United States finally to begin a dialogue with the P.L.O.

The general point is that less powerful parties may be able to use the club of exposure to public surveillance—and, by implication, public criticism—to persuade their more powerful counterparts to come to the negotiating table. Everyone wishes to avoid public criticism, humiliation, or ridicule, and this is particularly true of parties in conflict—who are thrust into a position where they run the risk of looking weak and/or incompetent. Third party intervenors understand the powerful effect that a threat of “going public” can have on bringing intransigent parties to the table and toward an agreement. The veiled threat of leaking a story of intransigence to the media is often all it takes to move protagonists out of stalemate, and back on the pathway toward agreement. The wise, if less powerful, negotiator understands this fact, and is often able to play to personal advantage the norms against “bullying” or unilateral domination in the hands of the more powerful. To be less powerful may also occasionally mean that one has the presumption of moral sway and justice on one’s side. In the United States, at

least, it is said that everyone loves an underdog; the skillful negotiator should be able to turn this phenomenon to advantage.

WE HAVE DEVOTED the bulk of this article to what remains one of the most important problems confronting negotiation theory: the problem of low power social influence. Because this issue is of such significance in international relations, in particular, the body of our paper has been devoted to an analysis of the moves and manoeuvres that one side can use to persuade its more powerful counterpart—be it the USSR, USA, or some other nation—to engage in negotiation.

It is perhaps only appropriate to conclude a brief essay on negotiation and power inequality by observing that often the weak are far more powerful than they realize—and that the powerful may be far weaker than is commonly supposed. Surely, this situation prevailed when, as Robert Keohane (1971) wisely observed, the United States found itself in the position of having to pay South Koreans, Thais, and Filipinos to secure their participation in the Vietnam War.⁷ Moreover, it is equally important to remember that power, in and of itself, is not enough. Power must be *usable* if it is to be applied effectively. A nuclear arsenal, and the mightiest economic club in the world, are of little strategic value unless the state holding them is credibly believed to be willing to use these weapons.

The scholarly study of negotiation, that took root in the United States, has now flowered in other countries as well. Indeed, as of this writing, IIASA (the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis)—a basic and applied research "think tank" situated outside of Vienna and jointly funded and operated by the nations of Eastern and Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States—is completing work on a two-volume monograph. This ambitious project focuses on the process(es) of international negotiation, and consists of essays by leading scholars from a dozen countries.

A project like this constitutes an important next step in the continuing development of wiser negotiation theory and more effective negotiation practice. Ultimately, if negotiation theory is to continue to evolve, it will be necessary for contributors from many countries—led, perhaps, by a new climate of collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union—to become fully engaged and involved.

¹ See R. Luce, H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey* New York, 1957; T. Schelling *The Strategy of Conflict* Cambridge, 1960; A. Rapoport *Fights, Games and Debates* Ann Arbor, 1960; R. Walton, R. McKersie *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System* New York, 1965; M. Deutsch *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*, New Haven, 1973; H. Kelman (Ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* New York, 1965.

² See D. Lax, J. Sebenius, *The Manager as Negotiator*, New York, 1986; J. Rubin, B. Brown *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation*, New York, 1975; H. Raiffa, *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, Cambridge, 1982.

³ See R. Fischer, W. Ury *Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, Boston, 1981.

⁴ See W. McCarthy *The Role of Power and Principle in Getting to YES*, "Negotiation Journal", 1985, No. 1, pp. 59-66.

⁵ See R. Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprise*, Cambridge, 1971; D. Smith, L. Wells, *Negotiating Third World Mineral Agreements*, Cambridge, 1975; J. Salacuse *Renegotiations in International Business*—"Negotiation Journal", 1988, N. 4, pp. 347-354.

⁶ Note that while these national and ethnic groups have had reasonable success influencing ethnically diverse countries such as the United States, similar use of this technique would almost always fail when directed at more ethnically homogeneous nations such as Japan.

⁷ See R. Keohane *The Big Influence of Small Allies*—"Foreign Policy", Spring 1971, No. 2, pp. 161-182.

EASTERN EUROPE IS OPENING ITSELF TO THE WORLD

Valeri KARAVAYEV

THE SOCIALIST community countries are living through a challenging period of social and economic transition. This reality is recognised universally in East and West alike and, indeed, almost sounds trivial now. True, it is interpreted variously. Some predict the failure of world socialism, the disintegration of the "last world empire" and the miscarriage of the socialist experiment initiated in 1917. What is more, these forecasts come not only from the West but from socialist countries as well, including ours. Others speak of a crisis not of the socialist idea but of its Stalinist distortion, the obsolete, bureaucratic command system. They expect this system to give way to a new—humanist and democratic—model of socialism based on contemporary scientific and technological achievements and the common values of civilisation. However, they describe this new model in rather vague terms giving the impression of something very abstract.

While these views are subjective, it is certain that the socialist community countries require deep-going social and economic changes if they are to end a crisis situation or a situation marked by stagnancy and fraught with crisis. Otherwise they are bound to be pushed to the sidelines of world technological and economic progress and may become a backyard of the world economy in the 21st century.

Current transformations in the socialist world are the object of bitter ideological struggles inside the countries involved, with opponents using negative experience as a trump card. Our conservatives readily accuse reformers of heading for a market economy "Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland are already following this road," they argue, "but look at their economic plight. What are you trying to achieve?" There is no doubt that those countries are burdened with debts and beset by inflation. Even so, the ordinary consumer there is incomparably better off than in our country because he is not suffering from shortages of sugar, soap, detergents or other necessities, and inflation is alleviated—at least partly—by adjusting wages, student grants, pensions.

The case of Romania under Ceausescu showed that the population is hit hardest in countries shunning reform. It was Romania that resorted to rationing, with the barest necessities in short supply, with heating shut off, and so on. Hence the conservatives' allegation that the blame for our economic troubles must be put on reforms does not hold water. No socialist country has demonstrated that people live better in the absence of reform.

As regards countries committed to reform, the conservatives' arguments are indefensible in this case, for what makes the situation difficult there is not the reforms they are carrying out, advancing in the right direction, but the inconsistency shown in implementing them or the fact that they were started belatedly.

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Hungary is an example. It launched its economic reform as far back as 1968, or more than twenty years ago. The similarity between the Hungarian reform and our perestroika as well as changes in other socialist countries—a trend towards independent enterprises, economic accountability (*khozraschet*), market relations, economic openness to the outside world—is obvious. The first decade of the reform was most successful and bore tangible fruit by saturating the domestic consumer market and raising the standard of life. An agricultural reform combining cooperative relations with individual farming enabled the country not only to solve its food problem and achieve high European standards of crop yield capacity and productive stock-breeding but to become a stable net exporter of food. The reform in industry made slower progress, for producers were provided "greenhouse" conditions, there was no competition, no incentives were offered for technological advance, and social controls preventing the elimination of redundant labour from enterprises played a negative role.

Besides, external conditions shaped up very unfavourably in the second half of the 1970s: growing world prices for oil and other energy resources led to a marked deterioration in the balance of turnover and to an outright flight of national income. Nor can we discount the dim view which the conservative Soviet leadership of the time under Brezhnev and Suslov took of the Hungarian reform, seeing it as a revisionist departure from "existing socialism" and almost a danger of capitalist restoration. Under pressure from the Kremlin, Budapest removed reformers, including Rezső Nyers, "father of the Hungarian reform", from the party and state leadership, just as Prague had dropped the leaders of the "Prague Spring" earlier (1968). The reform itself was held up. The regime set up a system of standard-setting industrial management based on rigid regulation of the distribution and use of profit, on which it levied extremely heavy taxes. Incidentally, the system bore a very close similarity to our own first model of economic accountability. Forced into the procrustean bed of such management, Hungarian industry was kept in effect from developing and stagnated, a state persisting to this day. Stagnation compounded by a large foreign debt led to inflation and social differentiation and forced down the standard of living.

The experience of Yugoslavia, too, is worthy of close scrutiny. According to our traditional notions, that country has long been dominated by a self-managing market socialism, with enterprises controlled by the workers, who elect managers and workers' councils by examination and draw up plans, and with the economy based on commodity-money relations. Yet the country is in crisis. In the report at the 14th (extraordinary) Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia it was noted that the galloping and even sky-rocketing inflation, which led to a serious disruption of relations in economic system, has found its concentrated expression in social-economic crisis.

However, Yugoslav socialism is not entirely self-managed or market-oriented—far from it. The technobureaucracy lording it over the country takes away in the form of tax nearly all the earnings of enterprises, thereby artificially restricting their growth. Also, it has artificially atomised industry, going as far down as the level of individual shops, where so-called associated labour organisations have been set up. Technobureaucrats rigidly control personnel policy, seeing to it that, say, plant managers are chosen from among candidates whom they consider eligible.

Economic life has been regionalised within the framework of Yugoslavia's republics and territories. There is no integrated common market. Surely an economic system under which a local party official can call up a bank and order it to get ungauranteed bills discounted—as in the case of Agrokomerc—cannot be regarded as a market economy. In the West,

such a thing would be inconceivable. Extraeconomic compulsion, too, remains a recurrent practice. It may express itself in, for example, pressure put on an enterprise to make it plan a larger amount of output, something which inevitably deforms market relations. It is only now that Yugoslavia is setting out to create a real market economy, as the introduction of a convertible dinar from January 1, 1990, indicates.

This is a course firmly adopted by Poland as well. Credit for going over to market principles of price formation and virtually abolishing centralised planning is due to the earlier, PUWP-dominated government and not to the present government led by Solidarity. The latter has gone still further by ending all directive planning of the economy and opting for the privatisation of industry. It goes on promoting a multistuctural economy guaranteeing all forms of property economic and legal equality but plainly giving preference to the private sector. The new government may be said to have scored a gain by signing a trade agreement with the EEC and extending contacts with the West, thereby securing a further influx of material and financial resources. However, there is no ignoring certain excesses on the part of Solidarity reformers, such as their campaign against the cooperative sector, which they describe as "much too socialist", their undue zeal for privatisation, their renunciation of income indexation. But the Left, including a transformed PUWP, is in a position to defend the interests of labour and underprivileged population groups by political means. In spite of shortages and high inflation, Polish society as a whole supports the government programme. There is a feeling of the country having taken the right road and seeing light at the the end of the tunnel.

China is yet another country undergoing reform. It is a theme avoided by conservatives and discussed less in the recent period by reformers. The June events on Beijing's Tiananmen Square dampened the enthusiasm of admirers of the reforms taking place in China. It looks as if the lag in the political sphere may delay economic changes even though the Chinese leadership says it is prepared to press forward with them. Nevertheless, China's economic achievements are beyond question and are greater than in any other field. I mean the fact that an agriculture based on family contract makes it possible to feed the country's billion-strong population, the saturation of the home market with relatively inexpensive consumer goods through market-oriented light industries; a high degree of economic openness, which has enabled China to attract billions in financial resources and to set up thousands of joint ventures and purely foreign enterprises, as in the country's numerous special economic zones.

For all that, the experience of socio-economic transformations in socialist countries suggests that no new model of socialism exists anywhere in the world. It is therefore wrong to accuse us of following the Yugoslav, Hungarian or Chinese road. The road taken by us is our own although we do use some elements of the experience of other countries. On the other hand, our experience shows certain originalities that are absent elsewhere, such as the lease system in industry, construction and other fields, which draws the attention of our friends.

The impression created occasionally is that we borrow negative aspects of the economic experience of other countries, disregarding the positive. It is quite clear now that we tackled perestroika at the wrong end by first setting out to develop mechanical engineering instead of the consumer sector, of agriculture, as we should have and as the Chinese have done so successfully. We did so under the impact of our leadership's long-running technocratic malady, of its hoping too strongly that up-to-date technology would remedy the economy. This did not happen, nor could it have happened.

Besides, we are developing the lease system in agriculture differently from the Chinese. What they did was to transform people's communes into administrative bodies and deprive them of economic functions, thereby emancipating the peasants and allowing scope for lease and family contract, so that the country's food requirements were met before long. As for us, we are still trying to squeeze lease and farmer households into the narrow framework of collective and state farms, with the result that they remain in an embryonic state. This is because a still dominant old system rejects them as something extraneous, just as the command system rejects, restricts or forces out cooperatives. After all, even collective farms have largely shed their cooperative characteristics, being run by the state.

The Polish experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s showed that introducing economic accountability and commodity-money relations into an unbalanced and, moreover, a monopolised economy affected by shortages can only lead to mounting inflation and growing incomes, that is, to an inflationary spiral for which we used to criticise the West so readily and which it has overcome long since. But we are reproducing all of the Poles' mistakes, driving ourselves into the very same spiral.

As for the positive idea of building a socialist mixed multistructural market economy, we are making extremely slow headway in this direction, stumbling over ideological dogmas every now and then. Fortunately, the phrase "market socialism" no longer sounds like a terrible profanity, and we hear it uttered by our leaders. By contrast, the phrase "mixed economy" still causes a sort of allergy. Yet we have not only a state sector but a cooperative sector as well plus an individual one; farmer households are springing up. The two last forms are private property however we may argue over terms, nor is it anything terrible, for it exists in the majority of socialist countries, where it has not shaken the foundations of the system in the least. As for mixed ventures with foreign participation, they are state capitalism. All this adds up to a socialist mixed multisectoral economy whose socialist character is determined by the absolute predominance of social forms of property.

Now isn't this very like the Swedish and other social democratic models comprising a state sector, a cooperative sector and a private sector and, at the same time, an elaborate system of social security and income regulation? Yes, nor is it anything bad at all. We should recognise at long last that the social democratic ramification of the labour movement has benefited working people more in the way of living standards and social guarantees than ours has. But the two ramifications have common roots, for our origins go back to social democracy. Borrowing its positive experience would both give fresh life to our ramification, which is patently out of breath, and return us to our origins.

To recognise the concept of a socialist mixed multisectoral market economy means clearing the decks for the most extensive international cooperation, economic cooperation included, and this is highly important to us. Economic openness, close association with the world market and integration into the world economy are inseparable from this concept. It is a meaningless slogan where the old command system persists, for such a system is inherently incompatible with the capitalist mixed economy and so cannot integrate into it. Not so the new, mixed socialist multistructural economy sharing common market relations with the West and therefore perfectly capable of integrating into the world economy.

Overall, speedy integration into the world economy is a locomotive which can shunt the Soviet economy onto a market track. Our own driving forces are still insufficient for us to accomplish this. Integration into the world economy makes for the development of market ties based on world prices, interest rates and other credit terms accepted in inter-

national capital markets, realistic currency rates and other objective economic indices. In step with our involvement in the world economy, these indices are forcing out our deformed, arbitrarily fixed internal prices, artificially lowered interest rates and absurdly unrealistic foreign exchange rates, thereby laying a basis for normal market relations.

The main channel for the integration of socialist countries into the world economy is economic ties with industrial nations of the West. Western countries are bound to retain a dominant position in the world economy, trade and technological progress, to remain a region of the greatest stability in economic growth and the main source of sophisticated commodities and capital. For socialist countries, it is particularly important to attract material and financial resources from the West at the early, most difficult stage of restructuring for the purpose of, among other things, saturating the home market with consumer goods in short supply. It would be hard for them to restructure and modernise their economies in isolation from the main centres of world technological and economic progress. The Western experience of management and marketing is gaining sharply in importance as a factor for the transition to an open market economy.

The point is that none but an open economy can really integrate into the world economy. It is an economy developing with due regard to the international division of labour, its participation in the latter fitting in organically with the reproduction process, an economy oriented to the world market, having an economic mechanism adjusted to international cooperation, receptive to whatever is positive in the world economy and equal to protecting itself from negative processes. This is what the economies of industrial countries of the West are like today. Socialist countries have taken the road to an open economy, except that they are very late.

Needless to say, so vast an economy cannot open itself to the world completely or at once. This is still impossible due to our economic mechanism, which has still not been reformed in sufficient measure, nor our technological and even cultural level and ideological stereotypes inherited from the past: class chauvinism, xenophobia, excessive fear of espionage. We must open ourselves to the world gradually, by establishing an open sector encompassing all the regions and industries that are more prepared than others for foreign economic activity.

A radical economic reform was bound to include a restructuring of the foreign economic sphere. The number of decisions made and organisational changes effected to date as well as the radical character of some of them invite the conclusion, as some believe, that foreign economic perestroika is ahead of the economic reform as a whole. Indeed, production combines, enterprises, cooperatives have been granted the right to seek direct access to foreign markets and authorised to use part of their export earnings in hard currency as they see fit. This has made it possible not only to end departmental monopoly on foreign trade but to pull down the barrier dividing production and foreign economic activity for decades. The procedure of setting up joint ventures in the country has been substantially liberalised, and there is a decision to create free economic zones.

Nevertheless, the time for rejoicing is not yet. Our foreign trade is making no progress, its structure remains unfavourable and so do imbalances in exchanges with the West. Our foreign debt is mounting. Of the more than 1,000 joint ventures registered to date, only about a quarter are actually operating, with the production sphere accounting for a small fraction of them. The creation of free economic zones is being retarded. There is no clarity about the pattern of managing foreign economic activity, the functions of the State Foreign Economic Commission

(SFEC) and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations have not been separated clearly enough, and then it is hard to understand why one and the same field of activity should be controlled by two administrative bodies.

Perestroika in the foreign economic sphere, like radical reform generally, is following an intricate and contradictory course, one step forward being offset by two steps or at least half a step back. Thus, the undeniably progressive decision by which the USSR Council of Ministers on December 2, 1988, authorised in principle all combines, enterprises and cooperatives to do business with foreign partners directly was supplemented with another decision of March 7, 1989. This one raised such bureaucratic hurdles in the form of registration, licencing, quota-fixing, declaration and other rules as to seriously complicate the exercise of the rights granted by the original decision. And in December 1989 there came further restrictive decisions.

These instruments are said to be universally accepted in the world, which is true. The point at issue is the extent and manner of using them. It is unlikely that any other country in the world has banned the export of discarded electric motors because it considers them a strategic commodity. Nor can the rule by which all enterprises and cooperatives must seek export licences from the ministry producing the output concerned even if they are not subordinated to that ministry be described as wise. This is as unreasonable as having American companies making cars seek export licences from, say, Ford. Nothing good would come of it—if anything, it would produce a further instance of departmental monopoly.

Regrettably, our foreign economic activity is going through what happened to the state order, for attempts are being made to give new forms an old directive and prohibitive content, to adapt them to the obsolescent command system. Foreign economic activity certainly needs to be regulated as elsewhere in the world but, really, we have too many regulating agencies staffed by too many highly paid officials.

The weakest point of our foreign economic perestroika is that we have not yet worked out its regional aspect. Republican and local entities operating in the foreign economic sphere may be said to lack real rights. Even the registration of parties to foreign economic ties at local level was entrusted at first to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and not to their own people. Our central bodies generally have a strong predilection for the assignment of representatives. The SFEC, for one, plans to have in the still non-existent free economic zones representatives vested with ample powers. This looks like a hangover of that sad one-time practice of appointing representatives of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security.

To give an idea of the powers and opportunities of local government bodies in the area of foreign economic activity, suffice it to say that on March 7, 1989, the USSR Council of Ministers authorised its counterparts in the Union republics to issue licences for the export of fish caught in inland reservoirs (with the exception of sturgeon), liquor, wild animals and birds, medicinal herbs and waste paper (this last item in cooperation with the USSR State Committee on Supplies), as well as for the import of films and audiovisual products (according to established lists). Everything else, or practically all exports and imports, is subject to licencing by central departments. Continued overcentralisation in the foreign economic sphere is apparently unjustified, for it does not square with the general policy of extending the powers of Union republics.

True, a decision adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers on December 2, 1988, provides that not only enterprises, combines and organi-

sations controlled by republican ministries but also those controlled by Union ministries and situated on the territory of a republic or region shall allocate five per cent of their foreign exchange earnings to the local government bodies, which the decision authorises to spend up to 50 per cent of this amount on consumer goods imports. Compare this, however, with the fact that in China the provinces are allowed to spend 30 per cent of their planned export receipts in foreign exchange and 70 per cent of their above-plan earnings for their own ends.

While China is not formally a federal state, its provinces enjoy far greater foreign economic rights than our Union republics or economic regions. All control of foreign economic activity in the provinces has been entrusted to local people's governments, and ever since 1985 local government bodies have been allowed to issue export and import licences. The central apparatus of China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Foreign Trade licences a mere 15 commodities. The rights of provinces in regulating joint ventures with foreign firms are being extended. Specifically, local bodies have been authorised to reduce income tax on joint ventures which produce technological items or have invested over 30 million dollars in production. The country's special economic zones and open cities are controlled by local government bodies.

What tends to delay the creation of free economic zones in our country is the centralist tendencies of our government departments. The point is not only that the SFEC is dragging its feet over drafting an all-Union decision on free economic zones and has monopolised the selection of places where they are to be set up first. It intends not only to appoint its own representatives but to impose on the projected zones departmental subordination of the enterprises to be situated there, state orders, rationed distribution of resources and complex bureaucratic management structures. Now who wants these command system enclaves at a time of transition to republican economic accountability and economic autonomy? The bureaucratic velleities of the SFEC have understandably come under fire at local level and raised fears that free economic zones are going to be regarded as zones of the Soviet Union controlled by Moscow. Commenting on a relevant document prepared by the SFEC, Latvian economists note that it "faithfully follows the traditions of the old system and is aimed not only at preserving and strengthening it but at providing basic conditions for the future prosperity of the elite".¹ The reference is to the administrative, bureaucratic elite.

In his article "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'", Lenin wrote: "It is said that a united apparatus was needed. Where did that assurance come from? Did it not come from that same Russian apparatus which .. we took over from tsarism and slightly anointed with Soviet oil?"² Our present-day bureaucratic apparatus in charge of foreign economic relations was taken over largely from the period of stagnation, and slightly "anointed" with perestroika.

It is only fair to say that centralist excesses over the issue of establishing free economic zones are coupled with another extreme, localism. For instance, the early project of the concept of republican economic accountability in the Estonian SSR envisaged rather considerable isolation from the Union economy. "In implementing economic accountability," proponents of the concept wrote, "the Estonian SSR shall have jurisdiction over the organisation of banking and money circulation, including the introduction of its own currency and the establishment of the procedure of exchanging it and the rate of exchange between it and other currencies, including the ruble as the common currency of the USSR. The currency of the Estonian SSR shall be the only currency circulating in the domestic market of the Estonian SSR".³ Suggestions were made for

the creation of free economic zones encompassing whole republics, nor did they come from Estonia alone.

However these extreme views running counter to objective trends towards internationalising production failed to gain ground and were described accordingly by Baltic economists themselves. "I think a republican currency would make sense in the context of full economic autonomy," said I. K. Kirtovsky, Director of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics. "It would be unrealistic to search for ways to adopt a republican currency within the framework of the federation. That would hardly help protect the market in our conditions."⁴ "The republic is one juridical person and the zone another," said one of his colleagues. "This is why the whole republic cannot be a zone at the initial stage."⁵

In proceeding to create free economic zones, definite rules must obviously be kept. It is absurd of officials serving in Moscow to try to decide, as they did in the past, concrete questions relating to the situation in republics whereas they have never set foot in many of them. But the other extreme is just as unacceptable. We need general legislative principles of republican and local economic accountability.

In the case of free economic zones, these principles could be written into a framework decision of the USSR Council of Ministers establishing general zoning conditions and principles. It would be advisable to define in this fundamental document the general objectives and principles of setting up free economic zones, describe their types and lay down the rights and duties of central and local bodies as well as of Soviet, foreign or mixed enterprises and organisations active in the zone. The document should include general provisions concerning the tax, customs and visa regime of economic activity in zones, the organisation of management and rules for relations with subjects outside zones. Of course, the document would first have to be discussed with the republics and regions involved.

As concerns specific problems of creating zones within the general framework established by decision of the Union government, republics should be allowed proper scope for initiative. Not every decision on creating a zone need be made by the USSR Council of Ministers. Such a procedure was originally decreed for joint ventures as well but afterwards it was renounced as inadvisable. Decision-making on setting up zones could apparently be left to the Union republics' Councils of Ministers, which should only agree with central departments the conformity of zone projects to the general framework set by decision of the Union government. If this were done, zoning could be taken out of the narrow framework established by the SFEC. All three zones selected by it—Vyborg, Nakhodka and Novgorod—lie in the RSFSR.

The adoption of universally accepted instruments of regulating monopolised foreign economic activity and the creation of free economic zones, while important, are not the only lines of opening the Soviet economy to the world, of integrating it into the world economy. We ought to heed the view of the American economist Wassily Leontief and his colleagues, who advise against limiting the open sector of our economy to definite regions and propose including in it some industries in which we are adopting a management structure used by firms and market conditions of functioning. These American economists consider that the Soviet Union's light and food industries, which directly supply the consumer market, could become part of the sector. To this end they would have to be modernised by drawing extensively on Western credits and switching to the firm system and market conditions of management, including direct ties with subpurveyors and consumers and market prices. We would be expected to effect this transition stage by stage so as not to

provoke an upsurge in inflation. We could benefit in the process from the experience of Western managers, who are used to operating in a market economy, and from managerial services, which should be paid for in hard currency to be derived from Western credits as one source.

The open sector of the economy could apparently encompass some other fields of activity, including partly agriculture, some of whose output the state pays for in foreign exchange even now as well as non-industrial construction. It is important that the entire open sector, regions and industries included, should consistently apply market principles of free enterprise and prevent any recurrence of methods of the command system.

Lastly, integration into the world economy is unthinkable without active effort to advance to a convertible ruble. The inconvertibility of our currency is the chief obstacle to joint business and to more extensive ties with the West generally. Also, it explains the increasing role of the dollar in our internal economic activity. True, there are signs of progress towards convertibility: we have decided to hold foreign-exchange auctions, established a more realistic exchange rate for the ruble in relation to the dollar in the case of non-commercial transactions, and so on. Still, the most promising approach to this problem seems to consist in the American economists' idea of introducing a gold standard for the ruble, of freely exchanging it for gold. There is a certain similarity between this and the reform of the early 1920s, when we acquired a hard currency by introducing the gold chervonets.

Leading officials of the USSR Foreign Economic Bank and some economists overhastily express the fear that the result may be a flight of our gold reserve into private hands, including foreign hands. But then Americans propose fixing a sufficiently high price for gold to limit its purchase and introducing a gold standard for the ruble stage by stage and sphere by sphere at home and abroad, which would do away with all cause for fear. As for the advantages of this measure, they are beyond question, for it would give the gold ruble direct access to the international money market as a full-fledged currency. Free conversion to gold of rubles circulating in the sphere of joint ventures would undoubtedly provide fresh impetus for this promising form of cooperation. Besides, it would be more convenient for the state to pay producers of grain and other farm products in short supply in gold rubles instead of in dollars. In short, the idea calls for both a serious analysis and a careful formulation.

The integration of socialist countries into the world economy presupposes a fundamental reappraisal of the role of the foreign economic factor in their social and economic development. What is an important yet supplementary factor or instrument needed for the solution of inner economic problems is becoming a major factor for world economic specialisation. The world economy is not going to adapt to our economy; it is for our economy to become a structural component of it, to find a fitting place in the world division of labour at the threshold of the 21st century. The socialist community countries recognised this at the 45th CMEA Session (January 1990), which led off a radical restructuring of the Council with a view to accelerating the integration of member countries into the world economy.

Not that an organisation for multilateral economic cooperation like the CMEA is becoming less necessary, let alone redundant. With the internationalisation of economic activity going deeper, organisations for regional economic cooperation exist everywhere, even in Tropical Africa. Hence it would be utterly illogical to renounce organised cooperation in so relatively developed a region as Eastern Europe and countries associated with it. But the need now is for a new CMEA, for a compact and dynamic organisation and not just for a 30-story skyscraper where highly

paid officials turn out an incredible quantity of papers against the background of virtual stagnation and diminishing cooperation between member countries. The task facing the CMEA is to advance fast towards greater openness to the outside world and higher efficiency.

Perestroika in the Soviet Union and the revolutionary changes coming about in Eastern Europe are objectively drawing us closer to the civilised world, removing all that had separated us. "The world," says the CPSU CC Platform for the 28th Party Congress, "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism", "is freeing itself from the fetters of confrontation. The oneness of contemporary civilisation, which needs a new world policy, has become more evident. The cold war has been stopped." The renunciation of the barren, outdated policy of confrontation has opened the road to a rapprochement between countries with different social, economic and political systems. Collapsing under our very eyes after the "Iron Curtain" of the cold war period are the concrete walls and barbed-wire fences which for long decades isolated peoples from each other and even divided one nation into two states in the heart of Europe. Ample opportunities are being provided for the really free movement of people and ideas across borders. The road to a common European home is open, nor is that home going to be what EC Commission Chairman Jacques Delors described earlier as a European village of separate cottages carefully locked against poor neighbours.

Far-reaching changes are also taking place in Europe-wide economic cooperation. There is a decision to establish a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development with the participation of West and East European countries. It will create a financial basis for multilateral economic cooperation. Trade agreements have been signed between the majority of European CMEA countries, including the Soviet Union, and the EC Commission. Thereby a real groundwork has been laid for the subsequent creation of an all-European economic area as the material foundation for a common European home.

Viewed against the background of qualitative changes in international economic cooperation, the COCOM ban on exporting technology to socialist countries and the Jackson-Vanik amendment, now rejected by one of its authors (the other is no more), are an obvious anachronism. "It is only by removing obstacles to scientific and technological exchange and by really making the work economy a world system that a material foundation can be provided for peaceful development," to quote the CC Platform.

Incidentally, this is the first time that an official party document of ours has used the concept of world economy in the sense of a single whole, thereby overcoming a concept that for years had distinguished between a "world capitalist" and a "world socialist" economy. Life itself and the realities of today's world have disproved this scholastic formula.

The CC Platform reflects and carries forward the idea of forming one world comprising increasingly interdependent countries, with the Soviet economy joining organically in world economic relations. It states that creating a single full-scale and regulated Union market is a prerequisite for this as well as for moving on to a convertible ruble. The Platform stresses the importance of competition on the home market by producers, foreign firms included. It directly sets urgent tasks in foreign economic activity: making Soviet goods and services more competitive, steadily reinforcing the foreign economic independence of enterprises and hence their independence as to hard currency, ending the raw material trend of exports and restructuring imports.

Looking Back at the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly

R. Spencer OLIVER

AS THE WORLD enters the last decade of the second millennium, with enormous changes taking place in rapid succession, the United Nations is emerging as the forum of choice and convenience for discussion of major problems and as a mechanism for the settlement of international disputes. It was proved in part by the 44th General Assembly convened last September amid a new spirit of optimism and anticipation as the Cold War began to disappear. Although the size and diversity of the U.N. make it a cumbersome and unwieldy body, such broad representation enhances its prestige and authority. Many problems are global in nature and require international unanimity in order to be resolved.

The U.N. has certainly proved its worth through its peacekeeping mission and is fast becoming desirable as a monitor and overseer of controversial national elections. In some cases, of course, problems or disputes do not lend themselves to global attention and can be addressed only on a regional level and, since most disputes are between two parties, bilateral negotiations will always remain the most effective and desirable method of resolving differences. As the 43rd session was nearing its conclusion in December of the previous year, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev delivered a speech that surprised and stunned an admiring world audience. Announcing unilateral troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, pledging respect for human rights and support for democratization, Mr. Gorbachev continued and accelerated his drive for East-West cooperation and accommodation.

Within days of the General Secretary's historic address, the Soviet Union was backing a determined United States initiative to move toward troops from Angola. Both of these initiatives were achieved under the free elections and independence for Namibia and withdrawal of Cuban auspices of a newly energized United Nations, the recipient of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize for its peacekeeping operations. As 1989 began, the U.N. was gearing up for a high-risk role in Southern Africa. And, as the General Assembly opened in September, the high-wire balancing act in Namibia and Angola was still in place and moving toward a successful Namibian election in early November.

Although the tragic slaughter of innocent, unarmed students by Chinese authorities at Tiananmen Square slowed the movement toward a more peaceful world and caused suspicion and doubt about Communist regimes among Western leaders, the 44th U.N. General Assembly nevertheless opened with considerable momentum for improved East-West relations.

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The early weeks of general debate brought a parade of Presidents, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and other assorted leaders. President Bush called for abolishing chemical weapons. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze called for the removal of all troops from foreign soil by the year 2000. Colombian President Virgilio Barco delivered an inspiring and courageous speech condemning the international drug cartels and calling for worldwide cooperation in the fight against drugs and, as the speeches resounded in the General Assembly Hall and the mass media carried their messages to all corners of the world, serious bilateral consultations took place on the periphery of the formal proceedings.

Secretary of State James Baker and all of his top advisors, including all regional Assistant Secretaries of State, engaged in extensive consultations in New York for nearly a week. President Bush also took advantage of the U.N. forum to hold several bilateral discussions with other world leaders. One of the distinct advantages of the UNGA is the opportunity for high-level officials, including heads of state and government, to have quiet, serious talks in an informal setting without the constant glare of the media. The main attention, of course, is focussed on the formal presentations in the General Assembly Hall and on the whirlwind of social events brought on by the visits of so many high-ranking dignitaries. Much productive work goes on away from the eyes of the television cameras and press, on the sidelines and behind the scenes, between both principals and experts discussing serious problems.

As officials of all foreign ministries and around the world will readily acknowledge, the most important reporting cables from the early days of each U.N. General Assembly contain the accounts of those unseen bilateral consultations between key diplomats accompanying their principals to the annual ritual at the UNGA. It is in these meetings that new initiatives are launched, new problems discussed and new solutions explored. If the United Nations General Assembly did nothing else but listen to speeches for a few weeks each year it would still be a valuable forum around which diplomats from throughout the world could quietly address serious issues and concern in bilateral talks.

As the general debate winds down in mid-October, the various committees begin their tedious work. From this observer's point of view, much of the work of most of these committees is meaningless and a real waste of time, effort and expense. Some committees sometimes advance the cause of peaceful settlement of disputes in a productive and useful manner. For the most part, however, the committees simply drone on and on with discussions of resolutions which will—in the end—go nowhere, or come out as resolutions reduced to the lowest common denominator of agreement signifying nothing and neither pleasing nor disturbing anybody. Some argue that these committee debates and resolutions allow many countries, which have no other forum, to let off steam or put forward their views where no other opportunity is afforded. That may be a valid point, yet there should be safeguards against over-doing these matters, particularly when the work of some of these committees threatens to stretch out beyond the normal time for concluding the General Assembly just before Christmas.

The 44th General Assembly was able to resolve the work of the committees within that normal timeframe, but only under great pressure from the Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Joseph Garba of Nigeria. Mr. Garba's performance during last year's UNGA was widely praised by diplomats from every section of the globe. He showed wisdom and finesse, as well as firmness, throughout the proceedings and did a splendid job of breaking deadlocks,

reducing tensions and avoiding confrontations at crucial moments. It is widely rumored that he will seek to succeed Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in two years if the incumbent chooses not to run for reelection.

The most remarkable developments during the 1989 session centered around the increased cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The East-West confrontation that had been center stage of every UNGA for decades simply disappeared. The Americans and the Soviets cosponsored a resolution calling for enhancing international peace, security and international cooperation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. On the issue of the credentials of the Israeli delegation, a perennial propaganda exercise by the Arab states which had always had the enthusiastic support of Warsaw Pact countries in previous years, the Soviet Union backed off and abstained on the vote. The annual struggle for U.N. reform and budget reduction found the U.S. and the USSR on the same side, as usual, but more solidly than ever.

The Fifth Committee, where the budget, personnel and reform issues are debated and decided, is the most important of all the committees that meet during the annual General Assembly. Although most diplomats eschew the tedious number-crunching of this committee, it is here that the future of the U.N., its success or failure, will ultimately be decided. The U.N. must have the financial resources to do the job for which it was created. And, as new areas of responsibility open up and expand—peacekeeping, election-monitoring, mediation—more resources will be required. As new tasks are undertaken, however, old and outmoded mechanisms and bureaucracies must be eliminated. There is no doubt that there are pockets of redundancy and inefficiency in the bloated U.N. bureaucracy. That is not to say that there are not good people doing a good job in the U.N. Secretariat, it is simply obvious that something needs to be done about the positions that are either unnecessary or inefficient. At the top, the staff of the Secretary General is—for the most part—very impressive. It is elsewhere in the bureaucracy, however, that career U.N. employees have created small fiefdoms of outlived usefulness that resist all efforts at elimination. Streamlining the staff and the budget will continue to be a top priority in the future.

The United States is, at the moment, the farthest behind in the payment of our dues and assessments to the United Nations. This is, of course, an embarrassing predicament. The Soviet Union understands this embarrassment, however, since it has also occupied such a position on occasion in past years. The reality is that the United States is presently in a difficult financial situation. We have a huge deficit that requires serious budget-cutting across the board and the United Nations does not seem to be very high on the Bush Administration's priority list. When President Bush addressed the 44th UNGA everyone listened carefully for him to say that we were going to pay our arrearages. He didn't say anything at all about it, a fact remarked upon constantly in the corridors of the U.N. in the days following his speech. As the U.N. reform process continues, however, it is virtually certain that Congress will support a request by President Bush for approval of the five-year program of payment of the debt owed by the United States to the U.N. which he recently proposed in his draft of the Federal budget.

It is also certain that the United Nations will be viewed in a more positive light if the constructive efforts which resulted in the 44th UNGA's agreement on a program directed against international narcotics trafficking, efforts to clean up the world's environment and a ban on drift net fishing continue during the months and years ahead. There is still a need, however, to reduce the amount of political posturing and

propaganda that is promulgated by certain countries involved in bilateral or regional disagreements which cannot be resolved by the U.N. or are being addressed in another manner or in other forums. As the reduced tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States open up new opportunities for constructive cooperation in the United Nations, it is important that third world nations begin to act more constructively and more responsibly on traditional North-South issues. It does little good for the poorer nations of the world to continue to demand more money and support from the richer nations of the world without some realistic assessments of what is possible and feasible in this regard. It is also highly likely that—as observance of human rights and representative democracy become the almost universal conditions that exist in the industrialized world—these same standards will be applied as conditions for economic and technical assistance to third world countries. In the short term such conditionality is likely to heighten North-South tensions, but in the long run it will result in a more humane and democratic world.

Arms control and disarmament issues at the United Nations are, for the most part, out of place. While there may be room for efforts aimed at banning biological and chemical weapons and reducing arms transfers throughout the world, the main issues in this field should really be addressed in other forums. In particular, arms control issues between the Soviet Union and the United States are best resolved in bilateral talks or, in some cases, regional discussions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Even though these latter talks are now underway and hold some promise of at least limited results in the near future, it is perhaps more likely that bilateral efforts by the Soviets and the Americans could bring faster and more positive results. For instance, in the CFE talks now taking place in Vienna, the United States is negotiating as part of the 16-member NATO alliance. The only possible threat to Soviet security that could be perceived by the Soviet general staff is an American-led NATO presence. The United States is tied to multilateral decisions of the cumbersome NATO consultative mechanism. One of the problems with this mechanism is that the stationing of American forces in Western Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, produces a tremendous economic benefit for the host country. A recent study by a West German think-tank showed an estimate that the American presence in that country provided nearly one percent of that country's GNP. The report stated, that "A departure of US troops would be a loss for the FRG economy. In total there would be nearly DM 13 billion less flowing to the business sector (1988). In the areas of special consideration the damage would be existence threatening." It is unlikely in such a case that the Federal Republic of Germany would assent to a substantial reduction of U.S. forces during NATO consultations on the subject. Perhaps the only possible solution would be for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to the withdrawal of their forces from both Germany and Eastern Europe and then have the balance of forces from the Atlantic to the Urals addressed in the continuing CFE and CSBM talks in Vienna.

The problem of conventional arms reductions in Europe is an example of where a preliminary bilateral solution may be necessary to enable regional discussions (CFE/CSCE) to make a major breakthrough. As bilateral and regional negotiations address problems which are capable of resolution in such a way, the United Nations will continue to provide the ultimate forum for worldwide agreements. In addition, its good offices will continue to be sought for mediation and conciliation and its peacekeeping and election oversight activities will continue to

be utilized in places such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, Central America, Asia and Southern Africa where difficulties continue to avoid final resolution.

Regardless of its limitations the United Nations is now in a better position to play an important part in the rapidly changing world than ever before in its history. The new attitude of the Soviet Union, directed toward reducing and even eliminating the aggressive international posture it has assumed since World War II, is certainly the most dynamic factor in the new U.N. equation. And, increased cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union contributes enormously to the great possibilities for positive contributions to world peace by the United Nations. The 44th UNGA made substantial progress in this direction in 1989.

EASTERN EUROPE IS OPENING ITSELF TO THE WORLD

(Continued from page 44)

Thus we have reaffirmed the fundamental trend of our foreign economic perestroika, of a radical economic reform intended to make our economy more open and to integrate it into the world economy. This constructive approach merits unqualified support for the CPSU CC Platform as preparations for the 28th Party Congress go on. Every effort must be made to carry forward the ideas of the Platform and to put them into practice as speedily as possible.

¹ Rigas Balss, October 24, 1989.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1966, p. 605.

³ *Sovetskaya Estonia*, September 30, 1988.

⁴ Rigas Balss, October 26, 1989.

⁵ Rigas Balss, October 25, 1989.

DETENTE AND NON-ALIGNMENT

Alan Gabriel GARCIA PEREZ

IT SEEMS OBVIOUS that the changes that are taking place in relations both between East and West and within certain East European countries are for their part influencing the prospects for the development of the current situation in countries which have been members of the Non-Aligned Movement since 1961. It is necessary, however, to be aware of the fact that an incorrect understanding of the changes occurring in the world can cause the Non-Aligned Movement to lose its conceptual autonomy and also to retreat from the role which it is playing as a group exerting international pressure in the sphere of policy and finances. In order to progress, a firm collective stand is more necessary than ever before.

Let us recall the political situation of that time, when in 1961 Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Josip Broz Tito and others founded the Non-Aligned Movement. They did this in a bipolar, warring world that was characterised by the existence of military blocs espousing irreconcilable ideological stands. In the atmosphere of the danger that the rivalry between these blocs would lead to war, the Non-Aligned Movement emerged as a manifestation of an independent stand in the military and ideological spheres.

However, this stand was very flexible in what concerned talks with either of the two blocs or simultaneously with both. The existing practice of conducting negotiations led many to the thought that the Non-Aligned Movement held an ambiguous stand. In reality, however, the stand selected by the movement made it possible, for example, to take a hard line toward Western representatives and, on the other hand, it enabled it to grow closer to the other bloc, or the other way around.

Today the processes of detente and nuclear disarmament that are apace, and also the attainment of peace in conflicts which existed for the past ten years (Iran-Iraq, Central America, Angola, Afghanistan, etc.) are becoming for many Third World analysts proof that the two blocs are proceeding toward reconciliation. For this reason apprehensions are being expressed that one large hegemonistic bloc will be created before which the possibility for the Non-Aligned Movement to manoeuvre and negotiate in the manner peculiar to it will disappear. The new reality can evoke differences in the Third World and a tend-

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ency toward making concessions and adapting to a force integrated into one big political bloc.

Something similar is taking place in the economic sphere. Thirty years ago the West's market economy and the East's planned economy were irreconcilable and constituted two different and almost divided markets. The Non-Aligned Movement was able to conduct talks with them, alternating its preferences. It was this stand that was the reason why a mixing or overlapping of the ideologies of the two blocs arose in almost all the movement's countries. For this reason analysts do not tire of repeating that the market theory dominates in the developing countries, while the state apparatus has exaggerated dimensions and rules through bureaucratic methods.

However, today, these two blocs must also integrate economically. Disarmament is followed by renovation of the world market. Over the past 15 years the concentration of production and finances is becoming with each passing year more noticeable in favour of the world powers, especially the Western countries. This was also attained through exploitation of the Third World countries by way of the external debt and their reduction of consumption. However, a great contradiction arose in this process between a concentration of technology and finances in the hands of the rich countries and the market of the Third World, which is becoming poorer and poorer with the passage of time and is losing its possibility for consuming and buying resources accumulated by the rich countries.

When disarmament begins as a consequence of detente, enormous financial and technological resources will be released which have been frozen or are being spent on the military. Disarmament will release this enormous wealth. Non-construction of nuclear missiles or submarines means an additional possibility for each power to invest in its economy. It is here that the problem arises, for this wealth needs a new and more dynamic world market in which it can be placed. One of the ways of attaining this goal could be annulling the foreign debt in order to include the Third World in the rebirth of the world market.

However, this has not been done. Quite the contrary, the West is exploring an alternative to the market of the developing countries in the Eastern countries which are to increase their consumption as a result of reforms and modernisation. The result is such that nuclear disarmament is being followed up by universal revamping of the world market, which is to blend Western technology with the enormous markets of Eastern Europe, the USSR and China.

This is where a big paradox emerges. By uniting economically and pooling their great productive possibilities, these two blocs, strengthened by disarmament, will ensure peace to a greater extent, yet they will serve to exacerbate North-South contradictions. This can happen since East-West integration will either allow the impoverishment of the Third World or assign it a very secondary role in the revitalisation of the world market, and also in the distribution of the possibilities emerging with disarmament according to contributions to their economies and consumption.

The Third World countries fully realise all this, but they cannot do anything to counter it. The present reality can spawn in the Non-Aligned Movement an incorrect understanding of the fact that the economic convergence of the two blocs is the ultimate victory of neoliberalism and unlimited hegemony of international organisations (e.g., the International Monetary Fund, etc.) which defend the stand in question. Thus, it is obvious that the Non-Aligned Movement, which used to have scope for manoeuvring in talks between the blocs, will in future be able to conduct talks only with a single big bloc and explore the best possibility

for integrating into the new big market. Such is the viewpoint of some non-aligned countries regarding their future.

This view can be subscribed to if we analyse the events that are taking place in Poland, namely the transformation of a centrally planned and totalitarian state. The point of view of those who have already been frightened by the alliance of the two blocs finds in the Polish process confirmation of the fact that the state apparatus is not necessary and has excessively ballooned, and that only the forces of the world market, penetrating each society, have real value. For this reason, many Third World countries have already approved as exemplary the struggle of Solidarity in Poland in order to predict the destruction of the centralised state in all areas on the globe, without taking specific realities into account.

In the face of these dangerous interpretations which can lead us to full capitulation, I think that with regard to the Non-Aligned Movement we need to elaborate a more balanced viewpoint for the longer term. Following Nehru, Nasser and Broz Tito, the Non-Aligned Movement needs a firm stand more than ever before. And until the alignment of forces in the world changes realistically, energetic and weighed pressure from it should not decrease.

Take, for example, the problem of the external market. Let us note that certain successes have been scored here over the past four years. In 1985 the Baker Plan was proposed, which spelled new debts to pay off old ones. The year 1989 saw the Brady Plan, which deals with reducing the overall amount of the debt. Peru holds advanced stands on this issue, and it should be realised that both these proposals are not only proof of goodwill but also the result of pressure—a constant protest by the debtor-countries and the threat of an inevitable moratorium on their part. It is worthwhile to support this protest and the constant pressure so that this 20 per cent interest rate would not, depending on the circumstances, turn into 50 per cent and more. The danger is that if the view spreads that the political and economic alliance of the two blocs leaves space only for bilateral talks and that we should therefore avoid rhetoric, confrontation and firm demands, the retreat will begin in the next few years simultaneously with the integration of Eastern and Western markets, with the transformation of the societies of the East European countries and the less firm stand of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this instance we can end with repudiation even of the small concessions (the Brady Plan), which we attained with such difficulty thanks to our united stand.

In other words, if the Non-Aligned Movement emerged as a "third voice" in 1961 in the face of the two blocs and today these two blocs are converging and uniting, speaking the same language, in this instance we should impart greater conceptual fullness to the Non-Aligned Movement's stand and give it a possibility to act. In this case the movement will already sound not as the "third voice" but as the "second voice" of humanity. Asia, Africa and Latin America cannot be divorced from the overhaul of the world market that will be generated by disarmament. Therefore, this is not the time for bilateral talks and concessions. This should more than ever before be collective efforts by continents and the Non-Aligned Movement.

This stand satisfies the Non-Alignment Movement's demand for greater justice and also the people of Europe and the United States, for which Latin America and the Third World are a guaranteed and direct opportunity for their economic prosperity and a prime factor for maintaining peace.

A Model of Economic Relations That Does Not Work?

IN JANUARY 1989, the then Permanent Representative of the USSR to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was interviewed by *Pravda* on the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Council. Speaking of the CMEA members' "major achievements in the social and economic sphere and in the formation and buildup of a socialist type of international economic relations", he attributed them to the policy worked out "by the collective efforts of the Communist and Workers' parties, which have been operating as the leading and organising force of our entire community". Slightly more than one year after, our new thinking unhesitatingly rejects both the substance of that statement and the definitions used in it.

The interviewee described the CMEA as an instance of socialist internationalism in action. Yet we are now witnessing a virtual trade and tariff war between Council member countries that is causing considerable material and moral damage to all sides, robbing them of real results. And it is in this area that the solidity and quality of "fraternal cooperation" are being put to a real test, not in the stillness of offices full of lifeless, overweight volumes containing the Comprehensive Programme for Socialist Economic Integration, the collective Concept of the International Socialist Division of Labour up to the Year 2005, the Comprehensive Programme for Scientific and Technological Progress, whose makers called it without false modesty and East European "Eureka", and other ambitious projects.

The idea of an integrated socialist market, solemnly proclaimed over two years ago at the 43rd CMEA Session as a new panacea, the cherished goal of a new type of integration, has lost all appeal and, indeed, all real meaning. How can anyone talk about an integrated market at a time when most CMEA countries have no national markets? As for the Soviet Union, it is only just trying to organise "planned market relations".

In short, the CMEA has proved to be an impotent entity. This is not surprising, nor can we blame it on anyone but ourselves. We reap as we have sown.

The autarkic economic model that was cultivated in East European countries and put the emphasis on heavy machine building, the extractive industries, the fuel and power complex, lent the economies of those countries a lopsided character. It prevented them from restoring in the early postwar years the traditional lines of their economic development and rational relations with the West.

The East European countries' rejection of the Marshall Plan in 1947 led off their economic isolation from Western Europe, their economic reorientation to the Soviet Union and the formation of economies duplicating the Soviet model.

In that context the CMEA, whose establishment in 1949 was not made conditional on economic prerequisites in the form of properly functioning trading and economic relations between the partner coun-

tries, was considered a response to the West. Up to the mid-fifties, the Council was hardly used as an instrument of coordinating national economic plans.

We have now entered a period of critical reappraisal of past experience. Looking back, we realise that the preservation of the CMEA and ties between its members in their original form was becoming less and less reasonable or profitable both economically and politically.

The Soviet Union was gradually reducing itself in effect to a raw material appendage to the Council's European members. What is more, the possibilities of meeting its partner's requirements for fuel, power and raw materials were dwindling due to the depletion of its fuel and raw material resources and to rising costs of extraction. Continuing deliveries from the East European CMEA countries to the Soviet Union of finished products that could not compete in the West discouraged the former from seeking technological progress and restructuring production, thereby dooming them to lag behind the West.

In short, all Council members had plenty of reasons to be unhappy over cooperation within it.

Can this state of affairs be reversed by the decisions adopted at the 45th Council Session in Sofia last January? Will the change over to payments in convertible currency and to existing world prices proposed by Nikolai Ryzhkov work? Will the "new, reorganised CMEA" be attractive enough for its members? Experience tells us not to jump to conclusions.

The reason why economic relations between East European countries are not effective enough to meet present-day requirements is by no means the shortcomings there are in the structure and functions of the CMEA. The trouble goes much deeper: its roots lie in an economic model based on the command system, which continues determining in large measure economic relations in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe even though the latest (Sofia) session of the Council found it indefensible.

So what is to be done? Are we to admit the disintegration of the CMEA without a murmur? Are we to allow it to die a slow death? These are no idle questions.

It would be wrong to imagine that the Soviet Union has a bigger stake in the preservation of the Council than any other member. We do not need the organisation more than the other countries, and it would hardly be useful or advisable to try to talk any one of them into staying on.

The East European countries are setting their sights on the West, nor can they be dissuaded from doing so. They have boldly opened their economies westwards to achieve a breakthrough in science, technology, production, the standard of living. Interest in subregional formations has revived in Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, there is the idea of an economic integration of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary aimed at helping them draw closer to the EC countries in development level so as to join that group afterwards as full-fledged members. The possibility of integrational processes in Eastern Europe differing in "pace", that is, unfolding through closer cooperation on a bilateral or trilateral basis where no unified model would work, cannot be ruled out.

Growing economic cooperation between Eastern Europe and the West is a perfectly normal process reflecting an objective trend toward internationalising economic activity. It must certainly not be seen as running counter to bilateral relations between CMEA members or to continuing efforts to find suitable forms of cooperation within the Council.

In the future, if any, the CMEA will most probably be a consultative or advisory and coordinating organisation. It would hardly be realistic to expect to evolve a genuinely integrational structure, an Eastern model of common market.

Some authors write that the dilemma is whether the East European countries will integrate into the global, primarily the West European, economic system together or severally. Collective, coordinated integration into the West European economy would undoubtedly be more fruitful. But there is no dilemma—not for the majority of East European countries, anyway. "Every country is now doing its own thinking," to quote a Polish diplomat.

EEC bodies have declared Eastern Europe an important line of their policy. What they mean is an eventual association of the countries in the region with the EEC and economic as well as political cooperation. They are actually discussing plans to include Eastern Europe in the sphere of the EEC.

The main hurdle to building collective European structures is the marked discrepancy in economic level between West and East European countries. Much will depend on a radical restructuring of the economic mechanism of the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries.

Currently the chief obstacle to our integration into Europe and greater involvement in world economic ties is inside our country rather than in the West or anywhere else. Our internal weakness, which manifests itself in an economic crisis, instability, inner political frictions and difficulties, is making it very hard for us to take up a proper place on the world scene. Our priority task is to remove these negative factors. Nobody else is going to do this for us. A successful perestroika is our paramount goal at home as well as abroad, where we must maintain our international status and prestige and see to it that our country is treated as an equal partner.

Norway and the Soviet Union.

Neighbours in the North

Olav BUCHER - JOHANNESSEN

I HAVE HAD the good fortune to be posted to the Norwegian embassy in Moscow three times, two of which coincided with two important periods of Soviet history. The first was at the end of the 1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev was in power, and the second was when I was accredited as ambassador in May 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev had just been elected Secretary General. These periods were very different in many ways, but they had some striking similarities.

Under Khrushchev's premiership one was aware of a strong current of hope and promise. There was a feeling that the country was on the brink of emerging from the darkness of the Stalin era into a new age that would mean a better life for everyone. When I arrived in Moscow in June 1985 I sensed the same atmosphere. The bitterness and frustration of the years of stagnation seemed to have gone, to be replaced by an attitude of optimism and an awareness that the country was moving in a new direction.

The last four and a half years have been a fascinating experience for me. I have been given a unique opportunity to follow at close quarters the development of perestroika, or restructuring, as it has been carried out under the strong leadership of Secretary General Gorbachev. I feel that this process of glasnost and increasing democracy in the Soviet Union is a historic event of great significance not only for the Soviet Union itself, but also for the rest of the world. I hope these efforts will succeed, in spite of any temporary setbacks, and create a better society for the Soviet people. I know that my hopes in this respect are shared by my countrymen and by leaders and ordinary people throughout the world. The most important part of my work in Moscow has been concerned with the bilateral relations between Norway and the Soviet Union. These have shown a great overall improvement during the last four and a half years, in line with East-West relations in general.

Our present relations are characterized by a much easier and more relaxed tone than the rather strained atmosphere that prevailed during the not-too-distant days of the cold war. I should like to make the point here that these advances in international relations, including those between our two countries, are due to a large extent to the new political thinking in international affairs shown by the present leadership of the Soviet Union. I believe these developments will contribute to a further improvement of East-West relations and to the expansion of Norwegian-Soviet cooperation.

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Norway and the Soviet Union have been good neighbours for over a thousand years. During all this time we have succeeded in avoiding serious conflicts, even during the last forty years, when the northern regions have acquired such strategic importance. In this connection I wish to mention that an agreement concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea would lead to an even greater increase in trust and confidence between the two countries and create opportunities for cooperation in the exploitation of the rich resources of the continental shelf in the north. We have been conducting negotiations on this issue for eighteen years. I hope we shall not allow another eighteen years to elapse before we finally reach an agreement. I feel the time is now ripe for a solution in view of the great improvements in the international and the bilateral climates.

I should now like to pursue the historical background in a little more detail than comment on the situation in the northern areas, and conclude with some reminiscences from my time as a diplomat in Moscow.

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

ANY DISCUSSION of the relations between Norway and Russia should start with the fact that I mentioned above, that during the more than one thousand years that Norwegians and Russians have been neighbours, there has been no war or serious conflict between the two peoples.

According to the Treaty of Novgorod in 1326 the Norwegian king had the right to levy taxes as far east as Trianema, i. e. what is now Ponoy on the east coast of the Kola peninsula, and the Russians were empowered to levy taxes on the Sami people in Finnmark and Northern Troms as far south as Skibotn. This was because the people on both sides of the border were mainly nomads, and at that time there were no clear boundaries between the two countries. Under the terms of the Treaty of Novgorod the Norwegian king was allowed to define the border "according to his conscience". The border continued to be defined in this indefinite manner for several hundred years, until in 1826 a treaty was made delimiting the frontiers between Norway and Russia for the first time. In 1949 the present frontier agreement was entered into with the Soviet Union, in which the frontiers drawn in 1826 were retained, with slight alterations.

The establishment of the Pomor trade towards the end of the eighteenth century considerably strengthened relations between Norwegians and Russians in the northern areas. The primary beneficiaries of this trade with the Russians were the merchants of Finnmark and Tromsø. The goods were mainly limited to raw fish, which the Norwegians exchanged for timber, flour, and fishing equipment. Communication was carried on in a special language known as "Russonorwegian", which contained a basic vocabulary in both Russian and Norwegian and was thus understandable to both sides. This trade continued in the Norwegian and Russian northern areas right up to the 1920s.

Russia was the first great power to recognize Norway as an independent country after its secession from Sweden on 7 June 1905. This occurred on 2 November 1905, when the Russian foreign minister Count Lamsdorff, sent a telegram to his Norwegian counterpart, Lovland, with the personal consent of Czar Nicholas II, and informed him that the Russian Government had recognized Norway's "independence and integrity".

After the Revolution in November 1917, Norway recognized the new Soviet government de facto in connection with the signing of a trade agreement on 2 September 1921, followed by an exchange of notes on the same day. This was succeeded by de jure recognition on 15 February

1924, in the form of a letter from Norwegian Foreign Minister Michelet to the Soviet representative in Oslo, Mme Alexandra M. Kollontay, stating that the Norwegian Government recognized the Government of the USSR "as being, de facto and de jure, the only legitimate and sovereign power of the Union".

The Norwegian de jure recognition was connected with the question of Soviet recognition of Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard and accession to the Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920 (originally known as the Spitzbergen Treaty). The Soviet Government's reply to Foreign Minister Michelet's letter confirmed its recognition of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard.

The de jure recognition laid the foundations for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, and shortly afterwards the first Norwegian representative accredited to the Soviet Government, Andreas Tostrup Urbye, took up his post as minister in Moscow, where he remained until 1939.

At the request of the Soviet Union, diplomatic relations with Norway were broken off one year after the German invasion of Norway in April 1940. However, relations were resumed after Germany's invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941.

Since the end of the war Norway and the Soviet Union have exchanged a number of visits at ministerial level; official visits to the Soviet Union were paid by the Norwegian prime ministers Gerhardsen in 1955 and 1965, and Bratteli in 1974, while Premier Khrushchev visited Norway in 1964, and Prime Minister Kosygin in 1971. After the mid-seventies, however, no state visits were exchanged for many years although there were several useful visits by ministers and exchanges of parliamentary delegations.

As chairman of the UN World Commission for Environment and Development, the Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland visited Moscow in December 1986 and conducted political talks with Secretary General Gorbachev and Prime Minister Ryzhkov. Since then, there has been a certain increase in high-level contacts, such as the official visit paid by Prime Minister Ryzhkov to Norway in January 1988. This visit provided an opportunity for a comprehensive review of bilateral relations and matters of common interest. Cooperation agreements relating to the environment, sea rescue services in the Barents Sea, Arctic research, and an early warning system in case of nuclear accidents were signed, and Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland was invited to make a return visit to the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Ryzhkov's visit laid a solid foundation for an extension of the cooperation between our two countries beyond the areas already encompassed.

The bilateral relations between Norway and the Soviet Union cover a large number of fields and are continually evolving. I do not intend to describe the concrete areas of cooperation, but I would like to say a few words about the northern areas in view of the strategic and economic importance of these areas.

THE NORTHERN AREAS

CONTACT with the Soviet Union in the northern areas plays an increasingly important role in Norwegian-Soviet relations. Our neighbouring areas are of great strategic importance for both countries. Furthermore, the Barents Sea itself is rich in natural resources, including fish and potential oil and gas reserves. These are factors that we have to bear in mind when we design our policies, and that make it extremely important to preserve stability and avoid tension in this area. Both parties seem to be aware of the importance of these factors.

On the Svalbard archipelago, in the most northern part of Norway, the Norwegian authorities have maintained good relations with the Soviet settlements, represented by the Soviet consulate in Barentsburg and the mining company Arktikugol. Norwegian policy regarding Svalbard is based on the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 granting Norway full and unrestricted sovereignty over the archipelago. The Soviet Union is one of the approximately 40 states that has acceded to the Svalbard Treaty and is the only country apart from Norway that has commercial activities there on a permanent basis, pursuant to the terms of the Treaty, which states that all the signatories have equal rights to carry on economic activity on Svalbard. A further important provision is paragraph 9, which prohibits the establishment of naval bases and the use of the archipelago for warlike purposes.

Norway attaches great importance to maintaining the correct and business-like relations with the Soviet settlements that have evolved during the last few years. Social contact is also good, and sporting events, concerts, and tourist exchanges are arranged regularly. The recently signed contract between Arktikugol and the Spitsbergen Travel Company concerning the opening of Barentsburg to regular tourism is a very positive contribution to social relations.

The question of the legal status of the continental shelf and the territorial waters around Svalbard has been raised by several of the parties to the Treaty, including the Soviet Union.

Our view is that the Treaty, and thus the provisions specifying equal rights for commercial activity, only applies to the archipelago itself and the territorial waters within the four-mile limit. This is in full agreement with the provisions of the Treaty itself, and is supported by generally accepted principles of interpretation. Thus the Norwegian Continental Shelf extends from the Norwegian mainland to the north of Svalbard, and Norway is in no doubt about her right to establish a full economic zone around Svalbard for the purpose of rational control of fishing and mineral resources. Norway's view is that she, as the area's coastal nation, is the best guarantor of a stable and correct administration of the area, and would be best able to safeguard these interests.

The fact that Norway has not reached agreement with the Soviet Union on the delimitation of the economic zones and continental shelf areas belonging to the two countries in the Barents Sea is a matter of concern to us and negotiations have been proceeding for 18 years. Pending agreement on the actual line of delimitation, the two countries made a temporary, practical arrangement in 1978 concerning fisheries jurisdiction in adjacent areas, usually referred to as the "grey zone" arrangement. This comes up for annual renewal as long as the negotiations on the line of delimitation are still going on.

Needless to say, agreement on a clearly defined and mutually respected delimitation line would have a significant effect on the further course of Norwegian-Soviet relations. We are convinced that a solution to this question would contribute to greater stability, a sounder management of resources, and better solutions to problems arising between our two countries.

This question was also raised during Prime Minister Ryzhkov's visit, and the Norwegians made it clear that they could not accept any form of cooperation that bypassed the main issue of delimitation. The Soviet Union has since introduced a new element into the discussions by indicating a willingness to allow a small modification of the northernmost sector line. It is important that the two countries continue their dialogue on this complicated issue and reach agreement on a final line of delimitation. More active contacts at political and senior civil service levels may be a fruitful method for achieving this.

The importance of the Barents Sea to both Norway and the Soviet Union means that there is a great deal of civil and military shipping and air traffic. Dangerous incidents have sometimes occurred, caused by ships or aircraft passing too close to each other. In order to avoid such incidents in the future, the Norwegians have proposed negotiations for an "Incidents at Sea" agreement, which would set out a mutually acceptable code of conduct at or above the sea, and improve the routines for the notification of accidents or dangerous situations. It is hoped that such an agreement will make the Barents Sea safer for both parties.

There is already an excellent cooperation between our two countries as regards sea-rescue services in the northern seas. The basis for this cooperation is set out in the agreement on sea rescue services in the Barents Sea that was signed during Prime Minister Ryzhkov's visit. The Rescue Coordination Centres in Bodø and in Murmansk work together under this agreement. The necessity and usefulness of such an agreement was demonstrated when cruise ship Maxim Gorky was wrecked off Svalbard in June last year.

President Gorbachev's visit to Finland and his speech in Helsinki have once again highlighted the situation in the northern regions and Norwegian-Soviet contacts and cooperation in this context. The visit received considerable attention in Norway. We regard the president's speech as a confirmation of the positive attitude towards a dialogue with all the Nordic countries that has been expressed increasingly often during the last few years and that I have emphasized above.

A number of the thoughts and ideas in President Gorbachev's speech have been presented before, for example, in the above-mentioned speech in Murmansk. But the speech in Helsinki.. We take a positive view of the President's ideas on arms control and confidence-building measures at sea, and we agree that all categories of weapons should in principle be subject to negotiations aimed at reductions and confidence-building measures, including naval forces. We are in some doubt, however, as to whether the situation regarding military policy in the northern regions has in fact improved radically, as the President maintains. Even if we accept that the Soviet northern fleet must be considered in the context of global strategy, we remain concerned about the continued modernization of Soviet forces on the Kola peninsula, especially in view of its geographical proximity to Norway.

On the other hand, the proposal concerning notification of accidents at sea, including those involving atomic submarines, is of great interest to us, in spite of the fact that it revolves around a multilateral agreement, while we, as I mentioned above, have proposed a bilateral incidents agreement that would also cover notification of accidents involving submarines in the Norwegian Sea.

There were many other ideas and proposals in the President's speech that we welcomed as well, for example, those concerning economic and environmental cooperation and the proposal relating to contacts with the Nordic Council. However, it should be remembered that the Nordic Council does not of course involve itself in matters relating to foreign and security policy. Nonetheless, I assume that the national assemblies of the Nordic countries are extremely interested in extended contact with representatives of the Supreme Soviet.

The statement that made the greatest impression in Norway, however, was President Gorbachev's emphasis on taking a fresh look at the negotiations concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea. I feel that this indicates a willingness on the part of the Soviets to expedite these negotiations, so that, as I mentioned above, we shall not have to wait another eighteen years before coming to an

agreement. We therefore have high hopes with regard to the next round of these talks.

In concluding my remarks on the Northern areas, I would like to emphasize that Norway will approach new discussions and negotiations concerning all the points raised by the President in his Helsinki speech, as well as all other issues, with a positive attitude and a determination to find mutually acceptable solutions.

A NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT IN MOSCOW

LET ME NOW DELVE into some reminiscences from my three stays in Moscow and in that connection comment briefly on some political developments in these years.

I have always been extremely interested in Russian and Soviet history. During my schooldays I developed a fascination for classical Russian literature, and I also read a good deal of western literature from the 1930s and 1940s about the tragic history of the Soviet Union under Stalin.

Moscow was therefore a natural choice for my first posting. But there was another reason as well. I realized that the Soviet Union, with its enormous size and unlimited resources, would always have a decisive influence on the course of world events, and that it was therefore important for a young diplomat to acquire as soon as possible a good knowledge of the country and of the forces influencing the development of Soviet society.

I arrived in Moscow at the end of 1955. My first impression was one of greyness. The days were dark and wintry, and the standard of living was strikingly low and still bore the marks of people's terrible experiences during and after the war. I came with introductions from a number of people in Norway to friends and relations, and through such contacts I realized that housing was one of the greatest problems that people had to cope with. No one disguised their difficulties. Life was hard for almost everyone.

The Norwegian embassy stood in stark contrast to its surroundings. Number 7 Vorovskovo Street was, and still is, a remarkably beautiful mansion. The original edifice was built in 1816 by a priest at the Kremlin, but it was considerably modified and enlarged during the 1880s by a wealthy merchant who had made his fortune in sugar. He added a great deal of gold leaf and plaster decoration and built a splendid ballroom that has no equal outside the Kremlin. The mansion was confiscated by the Soviet authorities after the Revolution, and has since been used to house various foreign delegations.

During the 1930s and up to 1941 it was the headquarters of the German military mission. Stories still circulate about the German general's entertainments and the wild parties that were held. There is a legend that one of the young cavalry officers rode his horse up the staircase and into the ballroom to impress a young lady to whom he had taken a fancy. The marks of his cavalry charge can still be seen. The story says nothing about the general's reaction.

During the 1950s the building housed the chancery and served as living quarters for the whole Norwegian embassy. The staff was small, and still is, in relation to the amount of work, and there was plenty of room. The Arbat district had not yet been modernized, and we could see what old Moscow used to look like. The Kalinina Prospect, with its high-rise buildings, was fortunately still in the future. Unlike today, there was very little pollution and almost no noise, and on summer evenings we used to invite friends to sit outside in the summerhouse and discuss the

latest political news, of which there was plenty in those days, over a glass of wine.

Over the years a certain amount of astonishment has been expressed that a small country like Norway has had such a splendid building for its embassy. I am not sure of the reason, but the story goes that we acquired it through the Norwegian ambassador who was posted here during the war. He was a rather unusual character, who made a large number of highly placed Soviet friends at Kuybyshev, where the Diplomatic Corps and the Foreign Ministry had been temporarily evacuated. Immediately on arrival he presented himself to the local hospital and offered to donate blood to injured soldiers. This attracted a good deal of attention, and when the Corps returned to Moscow the ambassador's wish for a larger and more representative chancery was granted. I do not know whether this is the whole story; the fact that we were allies during the war may also have had something to do with it. Whatever the reason we have been lucky enough to remain in Vorovskovo Street ever since, even though the quarters are becoming rather cramped. We are therefore building on an office extension and at the same time giving the embassy a much-needed facelift.

I have dwelt at some length on the embassy building, but I feel it deserves it. Let me now return to my first impressions.

Although everyday life was hard and grey for most people in Moscow in the 1950s, there was a feeling of relief in the air. Stalin had been dead for three years, and there was an atmosphere of expectation, which was enhanced by the Twentieth Party Congress and Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's crimes in the famous "secret" speech. The speech was immediately published in the West and, although it was not published in the Soviet Union until much later, almost everybody knew the main gist of it. Thousands of former concentration-camp prisoners were released, and this directly affected us at the Norwegian embassy, since many of those with Norwegian connections applied to us. Books such as Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* and Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* were the subject of intense discussions among the foreigners in Moscow.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world became more open at about this time. Western statesmen visited Moscow, and Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders visited the West. The Norwegian prime minister Einar Gerhardsen's visit in 1955 was particularly significant for us Norwegians. It was one of the very first state visits paid to the Soviet Union since the war, and it had a direct effect on the subsequent cooperation and contact between our two countries.

Another effect of the greater openness at that time was that Soviet leaders began attending national day celebrations at the various foreign embassies. Since the Diplomatic Corps was quite small in those days, and since we all knew each other and attended all the diplomatic functions, even the younger diplomats were sometimes able to exchange a word with officials as high up as members of the Politbureau. I myself, for example, met both Mikoyan and Brezhnev on more than one occasion. Brezhnev once came to our embassy and asked to see the few paintings on our walls. He was not impressed. He found them too abstract and unclear. Brezhnev's interest in and his attitude to the paintings may have been influenced by the controversial art exhibitions that were being held in Moscow at about that time.

I found it very interesting to note that on these occasions Khrushchev showed a strong partiality for my chief, Ambassador Braadland. He appeared to seek him out at receptions in order to make forceful comments on international affairs. Braadland was a tall man with an aristocratic appearance, and he and Khrushchev made an unusual pair. I do not know why Khrushchev was so fond of Braadland, but he used him as a medium

for disseminating his views and those of the rest of the Soviet leaders to a broader Western audience. The fact that Norway was a small country yet firmly tied to NATO may have played a role, and also the fact that Braadland had a good relationship with his colleagues.

There is a story that when Braadland was recalled from Moscow in 1958 Khrushchev expressed his personal regret at his departure. His reaction to Braadland's successor, a former minister of justice and a well-known Social Democrat, was unusual, to say the least. The story goes that Khrushchev said to him "So you are the new Norwegian ambassador. I knew your predecessor well. I liked him. He was a Conservative and of course an out-and-out class enemy, but we always knew where we were with him. Now you are a Social Democrat. What sort of person are you, and what can we expect of you?"

I cannot vouch for the truth of this story, but it fits in with Khrushchev's character. He may have been influenced by the suspicious attitude to Social Democrats that Soviet leaders held for a long time, especially during the 1930s.

I was lucky enough to be able to see a good deal of the Soviet Union during these years. There was one journey that was especially memorable, when a colleague and I drove in our own car to the Caucasus in May 1957. I think we were among the first to make that journey after the end of the war. We drove south through the Ukraine to Yalta in the Crimea. There we loaded ourselves and our car on board a former German pleasurecraft, which ferried us down to Sochi on the Black Sea. It was a long and pleasant cruise past beautiful stretches of coast. Later we drove inland to Tbilisi, along roads that were certainly not made for Western cars.

We arrived in Tbilisi not long after the protest demonstrations that followed the discrediting of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, and we found the atmosphere still very tense. I especially remember an incident at a restaurant. The mood in the restaurant became more and more heated as the evening wore on, and several young Georgians indicated in no uncertain terms that our presence was not wanted. Finally one of them came over to us and told us threateningly that as Russians we were not wanted in Georgia and that we should leave immediately if we knew what was good for us. But when they found out that we were Scandinavians the atmosphere changed immediately, we were invited to join them and the occasion turned into a party, where our hosts seemed to feel that nothing was too good for us.

The next day we continued our journey along an even worse road over the mountains to Pyatigorsk and Stavropol, where we just missed meeting Komsomol Secretary Gorbachev. The journey over the mountains was a wonderful experience, but it was not without problems. Halfway up a mountain we found that the road had been washed away by a stream formed by the newly melted May snow. We thought we would have to turn back, but were saved by a fellow traveller. With the typical friendliness of the Caucasus he offered to help, and several hours later a military truck arrived and pulled us through the stream at a great pace, so that sheets of water shot up on either side. Unfortunately the self-starter never recovered from its wetting, and for the rest of the trip we had to push the car to get it started. It did not give a very good impression of Western technology.

We met many other interesting obstacles on our way over the mountains. At one point we were stopped by a person of uncertain status who refused to allow us to go further, on the grounds that large flocks of sheep were being driven up to the mountains to the summer pastures. He called on all the power of Georgia to support his claim, but fortunately our travel-

ling companion came to our aid once again, and we were allowed to pass. Not a single sheep appeared in view for the rest of the journey.

As I mentioned above, we foreign observers noticed increasing signs of a more relaxed atmosphere after the Twentieth Party Congress. We saw that Khrushchev made great efforts to improve the standard of living. The pressure on agriculture was lessened, more houses were being built and the new land cultivation in Kazakhstan was yielding good results, at any rate initially.

This period was not without a number of internal and external crises, including the "anti-party group" conflict and the crises in Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. In spite of these setbacks, progress was being made under Khrushchev's leadership in internal affairs and as regards contact with the outside world.

It is not my intention to write an uncritical defence of Khrushchev. In implementing his reforms he undoubtedly made a number of mistakes, some greater than others. He must take his share of responsibility for the international crises that arose during his leadership, like the Cuban and Berlin crises. Nor could he be called a liberal or a supporter of artistic freedom. Yet this does not alter the fact that it was he who took the initiative to discredit Stalin, and it was he who forced through the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, one of the most prominent symbols of the new cultural and political liberation. His personality was undoubtedly very complex, but all in all he was a positive element as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.

I had no direct experience of the last years of Khrushchev's leadership, since I was recalled to Oslo at the end of 1958. My journey home, however, provided yet another interesting experience. The Norwegian fleet was visiting Murmansk for the first time since the war, and I was sent there to represent the ambassador. The visit ran along the normal lines for such occasions, but although the conventions were observed, neither party showed any enthusiasm. Both sides were too fixed in traditionally hostile behaviour patterns. Although it was obvious to me that we had a long way to go before we could achieve relaxed, not to say confident, relations, I felt, as I travelled home to Norway with the fleet, that the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and its relations with the West were improving in spite of everything. I would not have guessed, however, that it would take twenty-five years before there was a real breakthrough.

As I mentioned above, I returned to Moscow in 1970 as counsellor of embassy and second-in-command. I had done quite a lot of work on East-West relations in the intervening years, both at home in Oslo and in Washington and Bonn. The Cuban crisis, which occurred while I was in Washington, was undoubtedly the most nerve-racking period I have ever experienced. The nervous tension in Washington was palpable; many people were afraid that there was no solution and that an explosion was inevitable.

Back in Moscow in 1970 my impressions were both positive and negative. The negative impression came from the fact that the process of liberation in Soviet society seemed to have made no headway since 1964. There was no more talk of reform only of "stability". The more open relations with the rest of the world did not seem to be progressing, and the country appeared to be in the throes of a new period of self-isolation. The positive factor was that the SALT talks had begun and promised some relaxation of the tensions between the superpowers, especially since the Soviet Union declared that the overriding objective of strategic stability had been achieved. But all in all, my stay this time did not give me a particularly promising impression and was quite different from the exciting and colourful period under Khrushchev. There had been some eco-

conomic progress, although it was obvious that Khrushchev's optimistic prognosis of catching up with and surpassing the West by 1980 would not be fulfilled. The hopes generated in 1970 by the SALT talks of the possibility of a gradual long-term relaxation of tension between East and West were not realized. On the contrary, tension began to build up again during the seventies. In Norway this was noticeable among other things in the increasing attacks by the Soviet press on Norwegian policy, which was described as support for American warmongering. My chief at that time, Foreign Minister Frydenlund, attached great importance to our relations with the Soviet Union, and his ambition was to improve them. I am afraid he cannot be said to have succeeded. During his two periods of office as Foreign Minister, 1973 to 1981 and 1985 until his death in 1987, he tried to achieve a closer contact with Soviet politicians, primarily with Foreign Minister Gromyko, but he was met with a cold shoulder. It was probably his greatest disappointment as foreign minister. He attached such importance to our relations with the Soviet Union that the staff of the Foreign Ministry were required to keep in close contact with our diplomatic colleagues at the Soviet Embassy in Oslo on the grounds that the more Soviet officials knew about Norwegian attitudes and views, the better it would be for both sides and the easier it would be to avoid misunderstandings. In April 1986 Frydenlund published an article entitled "Europe and the year 2000—a vision of the future", in which he predicted some of the events that are now actually occurring in Europe.

During these years, as in previous years, a number of undesirable incidents involving spying occurred that did not improve our bilateral relations. I shall not discuss these here, but merely add that the expulsions of Norwegian diplomats in connection with these incidents dealt a considerable blow to our small pool of Soviet experts. This meant that we were not able to expand our contacts as much as we would have liked, so that one could say that these expulsions were not really in the Soviet interest either.

Another event that influenced our relations with the Soviet Union during the 1970s was the Norwegian Nobel Committee's decision to award the Nobel Prize to Andrei Sakharov in 1976, in recognition of his efforts on behalf of human rights. The extremely negative official Soviet reaction to this award and the subsequent cooling of our relations made the work of the Norwegian embassy in Moscow very difficult. It was thus a source of great satisfaction to us when Sakharov was recalled from exile in Gorky in 1986 and was able to return to Moscow and continue his work on behalf of greater democracy in the Soviet Union and peaceful relations between East and West. Sakharov's death on 14 December was deeply felt in Norway and we echo President Gorbachev's words that his death has been a great loss to us all.

I arrived in Moscow as ambassador two months after Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary. I soon realized that he represented a completely new type of visionary politician. But if anyone had told me then what would be happening four and a half years later, I would have said they were dreaming, that such a course of events was impossible.

However, perestroika did not arrive out of the blue. I imagine that during the stagnation period many people saw where the country was heading and began to make alternative plans. Previous experience of the NEP policy of the twenties and Khrushchev's reforms would probably have been taken into consideration.

I have often wondered, however, whether Gorbachev had a clear idea in 1985 of the details of the restructuring process. Was he aware at an early stage that the economic reforms would involve political democratization, or did this awareness come gradually? Did he realize that political democratization and an effectively functioning national assembly would

lead to glasnost and the formation of a constitutional state? The answers to these questions are perhaps not so important. The main point is that all these events are part of a restructuring which will transform the Soviet Union, which again will pave the way for peaceful coexistence in the European House.

Another question that arises is whether the altered views on global development, and the acknowledgement that the concept of class war is no longer viable if the overriding global problems are to be solved and armed conflict and atomic warfare avoided, are a direct product or consequence of the internal restructuring process. Or was this new thinking an independent result of facing up to the global situation and the armageddon of atomic war? The answer is probably a combination of factors. However, once more the main point is that the new political thinking has been a major impetus in the changed relations between East and West, which have ended the cold war and led to the gradual disappearance of the old European divisions and the dawn of a new Europe.

It is obvious, however, even to a foreign observer, that the country's economy is in difficulties. The reformers clearly thought that the economic reforms would be easier to implement and would provide results more quickly than they have. It is difficult, however, to change long-standing institutions. As far as I understand, there is no longer a single system that applies throughout the country. The old command system still functions to some extent, but the new system based on economic criteria is obviously not working, perhaps because the markets presupposed by these criteria do not exist. Some Western (and perhaps Soviet?) experts think that it will not be possible to introduce a market-based economy into the USSR. I do not have the necessary expertise to be able to judge, but I would assume that under any circumstances a transition to a new system would take a fairly long time. The critical problem at present, however, is to ensure a reasonable supply of consumer goods within a reasonably short time. Will the Government manage this before the protests against the shortages become overwhelming? Have the Soviet people enough patience in reserve? A more long-term problem is whether it will be possible to combine an efficient economic system with social justice. What sort of social differences will people be willing to accept? For social differences will occur in the wake of economic efficiency. What about unemployment? It will be tragic if the reforms cannot be carried out and even more tragic if they are replaced by a regression to the old command system from the stagnation period, not to mention a return to Stalin's methods.

My own opinion is that the Soviet people will demonstrate their patience yet again, and that the country's leaders will have the courage to implement the necessary measures, regardless of their unpopularity. From the politics of my own country I know how difficult this is. I do not think, however, that those who are calling for "a strong man" and who hark back nostalgically to the "order" of the Stalin years, apparently forgetting the terror and the oppression, will succeed because the Soviet people are not the same as they were under Stalin. "The Soviet Union has the best-educated population in the world" said President Gorbachev. This may be a little exaggerated, but one can see what he means.

In this connection I wish to express my lack of sympathy with the writers and others who are painting such lurid pictures of the destructive impact of Western culture on traditional Russian values and culture. I am the first to admit that Western culture leaves a good deal to be desired. On the other hand, the West has also developed valuable cultural forms of expression, economically viable welfare states with social security systems, and pluralistic political systems that function. I think it would be a good idea to invite the severest critics to visit the West

and see for themselves what Western culture really is. Cultural isolation, at any rate, will not benefit anyone, and surely Russian culture is strong enough to resist negative influences from abroad, without the necessity for setting up barriers. I believe both sides have something to teach each other in the building of the European House, in which good neighbourly relations will have to prevail.

In this connection there is one point I would like to make. The Soviets tend to describe all industrialized Western countries as "capitalist countries". This gives the impression that the political and economic life of the country in question is run by those with large capital interests. This is simply not true, and "capitalism" in this sense of the word is not an accurate description. Norway, for example, has an advanced political, economic and social system with a mixed economy, a large public sector, a pluralistic, multi-party political system and a good social services network for special groups with few resources. Although a good deal of business is in private hands the state has considerable ownership interests in our largest companies and a strong central government lays down a framework for the activities of the business sector. We feel that this system has functioned well, allowing an equitable distribution of material goods and one of the highest standards of living in the world. It cannot be called "capitalism". Has not the time come to use a less negative and more descriptive epithet for Western countries in line with the new political thinking?

Like East-West relations in general, those between Norway and the Soviet Union are showing a positive development. Attacks on Norwegian policy are few, and we have noted a number of objective analyses of political developments in Norway. The exchange of visits at a high political level has also been resumed after a long period of stagnation during the seventies and up to 1985. I have described some of the most important elements in this bilateral relationship above, and so I shall not discuss these questions in further detail.

I would like to conclude my remarks with some impressions of what it is like living and working in Moscow now compared with previously. I must begin by saying that the social restructuring that has been going on has made my work as a representative of a foreign country much easier. People's attitude to foreigners is much more friendly. I used to feel that we were tolerated but not much liked, and that ordinary people were afraid of the consequences of contact with foreigners. Today much of this has disappeared. It is also much easier to have a good working relationship not only with the Foreign Ministry, but also with other government ministries and institutions, even though one occasionally comes across bureaucratic rules and regulations that seem unnecessarily complicated. The opportunity for contact with the foreign policy institutes is also a very positive development. This used to be a difficult and frustrating task. Formal applications had to be made by letter, and since replies to the letters were often long in coming, it was sometimes tempting to give up. Such contacts have now been made simple and easy. Very recently we have also been able to make contact with representatives of the International Section of the Central Committee. I think this will have fruitful results.

Last but not least, I should like to say how impressed I am that within such a short period the Soviet Union has achieved a genuine people's representation through the People's Congress and the Supreme Soviet. The debates I have attended in these institutions have been among the most interesting experiences of my stay in this country, and I am looking forward to making contact with individual representatives.

I have tried to travel as much as possible during my stays in Moscow. Unfortunately the small size of the embassy has restricted the time avail-

able for travelling and I have not seen as much as I would have liked. A trip I made not long ago will always stand out in my memory, however. At the beginning of September this year I visited Armenia to attend the opening of the hospital built by the Norwegian Red Cross in Spitak for the survivors of the terrible earthquake last December. The sight of the tragic effects of the earthquake made an indelible impression on me. The Norwegian people were strongly affected by the event, and raised a substantial sum of money (NOK 70 million), which has been used by the Red Cross to build this hospital. The hospital is named after the Norwegian scientist and humanist Fridtjof Nansen, who made a great effort to help Armenia and the Armenian people after the First World War. It has a high standard and is relatively large, with over 70 beds, an out-patient clinic and housing for the employees. I am sure it will provide much-needed support and help for the people of Spitak now and in the future.

I should like to mention here a moving letter I some time ago received from a woman in Spitak. She writes that she has just born a baby in the Norwegian hospital and asks me to be god-father to the girl and even give her a name. That letter made a strong impression upon me and I took it as a sign of gratefulness by the people of Spitak for the solidarity shown by the Norwegian people to the Armenian people in a very difficult time.

AS I HAVE TRIED to show above a diplomat's life is not all work. There is time for many other activities. The richness of the cultural life of Moscow is one source of great pleasure to all foreigners living here. My wife and I are particularly fond of music and we have enjoyed the wonderful orchestras, both large and small, with their repertoires of modern and classical music. We were introduced for the first time to the music of the composer Alfred Schnittke and to many brilliant soloists whose names and performances we shall never forget. We have also been frequent visitors to Moscow's theatres and art exhibitions.

There have also been other rewarding experiences, for example friendship established with Russian and diplomatic colleagues, but I think I should end my reminiscences now by just mention one last aspect of life in Moscow which to me is quite important. Since childhood I have enjoyed outdoor activities. Walking and running in the woods in the summer and skiing in the winter may not be the normal pastimes for most ambassadors, and are perhaps a Norwegian peculiarity. But it has always been a source of regret to me that the possibilities for outdoor activities in Moscow are so limited, because most of the Moscow *oblast* is closed to foreigners. When approaching the city by air I have noticed a number of beautiful areas that I should like to explore both in summer and in winter. Since the areas open to foreigners are so restricted, however, I always have an uneasy feeling when I am out skiing, walking or running that I might stray by accident into a forbidden area and unintentionally create an unpleasant situation. I therefore hope that the greater trust that is growing up between East and West will enable more of the countryside around Moscow to be opened up, to the joy of people like myself who are looking forward to being able to appreciate it.

But anyway, let me once again say that the years I have spent in Moscow have been most rewarding, from the professional and the personal points of view.

THE ITALIAN WAY

Antonio ZURZOLO

THE MAIN REASONS for the rapid development of Italy, which has become the fifth industrial power of the West and which undoubtedly has good prospects for further growth, are complex, multifaceted and have yet to be studied and explained in full. In my view, attention should be focussed on the 1960s, which were marked by a spurt in industrial development.

At the same time, the roots of that spurt could probably be traced back to the sense of responsibility and foresight displayed in the early postwar years, when the economy and the social sphere were a shambles. Italy had emerged from World War II with great losses: housing and the transport network were virtually in ruins, ferrous metallurgy had retained no more than one-quarter of its capacities, and most industrial enterprises were totally dislocated, especially in the north of the country, the scene of the longest and fiercest fighting.

Considerable damage had also been done to agriculture, which was then the main source of income for most of the population. From 1938 to 1945, the production of the staple crops and other produce had fallen sharply: by nearly one-half for cereals, maize and potatoes, by one-quarter for wine and one-third for milk.

Italians were starving because of food shortages and high food prices. Unemployment was another grave problem, with something like 2 million unemployed (about 11 per cent of the active population) and a great many part-time labourers, especially in agriculture. Inflation had got out of control altogether: in 1945, prices were twice as high as they had been in 1939.

The external debt had swelled, for the country was obliged to import foodstuffs, and also raw materials and energy resources in order to resume industrial production and meet the needs of the population. In these conditions, the country was faced with the complicated task of restoring its material facilities, resuming industrial production, which had suffered heavy losses and was in many respects technologically obsolete, reducing the external debt, and offsetting the economic and social effects of unemployment. In short, the thing to do was not only to restore the war-ravaged economy, but also to make good the lag in development caused by the long years of limited international exchange.

The basic choice that had to be made was that between the market economy and centralisation with directive planning as the way to save the country. Ideological and political debates between the advocates of the two approaches ran high, but the free-market conception finally prevailed. Faced with objective difficulties resulting from a shortage of raw materials, Italy took the way of liberalising its exchanges with the world.

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outside, orienting its production largely towards producing goods for export so as to cover, at least in part, the country's high import costs.

The first bold and farsighted step was to open up the borders to foreign goods, and especially to foreign capital required to rehabilitate the economy. At the same time, Italy began turning out consumer goods not only for the domestic market, but also for export so as to set right the balance of payments and the exchange rate of the Italian lira against the currencies of other states. One should recall here that before this new process could be launched, the lira had to be heavily devalued: in 1947, its exchange was up from the prewar figure of 19 lire per dollar to 225 lire per dollar.

Competition on the external markets induced our industry to renovate its producer facilities so as to catch up with the more developed countries with an advanced economy as soon as possible. In that period, Italy joined the European system of trade agreements that preceded the 1957 Treaty of Rome on the formation of European Economic Community: it joined the OECD in 1949, the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1953.

Legislation was enacted to promote the activity of small and medium enterprises, and special credit departments were simultaneously opened at a number of big banks. In other words, there was no lack of state efforts to support private initiative. These were coupled with social measures, including a programme for the development of the country's South, whose historical lag behind the North was ever more pronounced, a plan for industrial and social construction, and a reform in real-estate relations.

State intervention under a free-market system became a characteristic feature of Italy's development. Private initiative at that time was indeed happily wedded to state intervention measures, as in the reorganisation of the Industrial Reconstruction Institute (IRI), set up to support banks and industrial enterprises in the economic recession of the 1930s, or in the establishment in 1953 of a large state-owned energetics company (ENI).

By setting up large industrial complexes and modern infrastructures, whose efficiency is crucial to the country's economic and social development, the state extended its assistance and support to private industry, which enabled it to get on its feet and to compete on the world market. On the other hand, the system of state holdings helped to train more career managers. For a long time, this system was the only industrial structure in Italy that was independent of the "owners"; in fact, it could be compared with public corporations in the United States.

In the field of finance, government action was mostly aimed to stabilise the purchasing power of the lira. The system of fixed parities envisaged by the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement also provided for internal price stability. In 1947, the Einaudi Government decided to limit the excess liquidity that led to inflation in view of the existing goods shortages. Limits were set on credits to tie down a sizeable part of the bank deposits.

The lira was stabilised by increasing the burden shouldered by the whole nation, officially entering the system of international exchange. At that point, Italy set off along the road which brought it to full membership of the European Economic Community, which has a total population of 320 million and the world's largest trading potential. That raised it to the ranks of the leading countries of the Western world.

So, the main choice of ways in rehabilitating and developing the country through an open national market was made right after the war, and all the subsequent decisions—from the convertibility of the lira to the entry into the Common market and the European Monetary System, and

right up to the full liberalisation of the capital and financial services markets that is to be accomplished in the Economic Community by January 1, 1993—are nothing but stages in the process started back in the late 1940s.

ANY EXPERIENCE, be it individual or collective, is often unique, and each country should build its own history. One cannot expect to have theoretical models or practical schemes to be blindly followed, but the experience of others, when it is correctly applied, could prove to be useful in one's own decision-making.

The Western countries have been following the perestroika in the USSR with special attention and confidence, and are prepared to do what they can for its success. This is well in accord with their own interests, for the world is now an integrated system, within which there should be a free exchange of ideas, goods and scientific and technical achievements, and where people will freely communicate with each other. Each country can and must benefit from the general prosperity and, if possible, make its own contribution to it.

The Western countries are now in the eighth year of an economic boom, but there are signs of a slowdown which could lead to a recession. Nevertheless, if the East European countries continue along the way of opening up their internal markets, new opportunities for capital investment and broader trade will help to strengthen the economic situation and enable the world economy to sustain its momentum for many years to come.

The situation in the less developed countries of the Third World should also be seriously analysed. Neither the Western nor the socialist countries, which have often in the past 40 years contrasted themselves with each other, have been able, with rare exceptions, to help the Third World countries overcome hunger, disease and poverty. Coordinated East-West action is the only hope they have for the future.

To ensure closer East-West cooperation, both sides should make appropriate efforts, and these should be translated into reality in the social, juridical and technological fields. As for Western businessmen, they do not want to confine themselves to one-off supplies of goods, but intend to become permanent partners of the Eastern countries. That is precisely why they are so keen to set up joint ventures. The facts show that this form of cooperation attracted their attention even before the Soviet law of January 1987 laid the necessary groundwork.

The Soviet Union has followed a similar strategic line: as of today, the USSR Ministry of Finance has registered over 1,000 joint ventures. Only one-fifth of these, however, are really working, for they are faced with a host of objective problems.

Western enterprises, especially small and medium ones, may run into serious difficulties in their quest for a partner among the more than 20 ministries and over 70 research institutes and departments which have the competence in matters of setting up joint ventures and developing external trade. Once the contacts have been established and the general framework of an agreement has been outlined, difficulties may arise in drawing up founding instruments and statutes, for the juridical norms and the instructions meant to explain them are often imprecise, because for one thing, problems of this kind are indeed quite new to the Soviet Union.

Once the initial obstacles have been overcome (as they usually are by joint effort), new ones arise when the enterprise is finally launched. The point is that mixed enterprises are not provided with means of produc-

tion or raw materials, for the state plan does not extend to them, so that now and again they have to apply in these matters to ministries and competent departments. Once the goods have been produced, there is the problem of prices and of efficient marketing through the existing channels, with cost accounting being hindered by the fact that the rouble has several exchange rates.

The relations between the Soviet and Western partners in the process of production are also complicated by the difference in their business culture. Finally, since the ruble is nonconvertible, there is the question of how the Western partner should remit his part of the profit. The Soviet reader is well aware of the complicated problems I have briefly listed, and, let us hope, they will be gradually resolved. Some of them are already being settled: a number of agreements have been signed with Italian and other partners on remitting a part of the profit in hard currency, on hard-currency payments for a part of the goods produced and on their marketing abroad.

The main problem, however, is that of domestic prices, which should reflect the balance between supply and demand so as to promote the establishment of an exchange rate for the ruble that would be more in accord with the parameters of international exchange. One should not forget that world trade in the postwar period took a vigorous turn precisely because of the Bretton Woods monetary agreements, and that the present plans for a European Economic Union are based on the adoption of the European Currency Unit (ECU) as a single currency.

But before one can discuss the external convertibility of the ruble, a more realistic system of internal prices should be introduced. In other words, the thing to do is to create a system of competition which would guarantee (irrespective of state or private property at this or that enterprise) the possibility of comparing their performance in terms of efficiency, economic common sense, and ability to meet—or even anticipate—consumer demand. In this sense, Italian experience could be interesting and instructive for the ongoing perestroika, since private enterprises and partially or fully state-run enterprises in Italy operate in conditions of real competition, using the same kind of instruments to attain greater rationality and efficiency.

Without waiting for the time when structural changes in production, the opening of the Soviet market, and the development of international cooperation will make it possible to saturate the market with goods, steps could be taken even today to soak up the excess money supply by selling off to the public some of the assets now available which are not as yet on the market, primarily land tracts and real estate. Shareholdings in existing or newly created cooperatives could also be bought and sold as a transitional measure to the formation of joint-stock companies with mixed property ("public companies"), which offer broader opportunities for useful investment of savings.

Long-term (15 to 20 year) pecuniary obligations could also be issued at a guaranteed interest rate that would be higher, however slightly, than the existing or expected level of inflation. Finally, more realistic prices could also be introduced for state services, whose present price goes to cover only a part of the costs.

As the excess money supply is withdrawn through this kind of measures, there are bound to be definite social privations, of which all should be aware, but this will make it possible to attain greater internal stability of the rouble through gradual price liberalisation to cushion the effect of the inevitable changes in its exchange rate.

This process could also be supported from outside, for the Western countries are ever more eager to create supranational structures using a single international currency unit. Take the International Monetary

Fund and its special payment units or the European Fund for Monetary Cooperation (FECOM) and its ECU.

If such a structure is created or if some existing bodies (like the Bank for International Settlements at Basle) are changed accordingly, the Soviet Union could become a full-fledged member without delay. If the ruble has not as yet attained full convertibility by that time (which, I hope, will not be long in coming), the USSR could accelerate its development by obtaining foreign currency at this bank with a part of its gold stock as collateral. So, the USSR will have no need to offer its gold on the free market, which could lead to essential changes in its price. The Soviet Union will retain its gold stock, and these real values will enable it to obtain credit in the new supranational currency at current gold prices.

ONE COULD SAY, in effect, that possibilities for cooperation do exist and that they are fairly considerable. There is a rapid advance towards an atmosphere of mutual trust, which is the main prerequisite for joint work. Any residual mistrust that still remains on the part of the West will gradually disappear as the state organs continue the perestroika and carry out conversion in the arms industry.

Another thing to do in the Soviet Union is to train a new generation of managers both in industry, and in banking and the services able to understand and organise production in the new conditions and faced with the new challenges, to assume the risk and responsibility, and promptly to take the right decisions. A new model of an advanced competitive economy cannot be created by blindly following the West, for one should always follow one's own independent way.

Italy has demonstrated its readiness for fruitful cooperation with practical moves. Even before President Gorbachev came to Rome, where he was welcomed with great respect and sympathy, Italian firms had taken part in joint ventures with the USSR to the tune of 181 million rubles, ranking second after the FRG (187 million rubles). The new contracts signed in connection with the visit have carried Italy to first place.

Major contracts have been signed, in particular, in such fields as car manufacturing (Fiat and Borgo Nova), agriculture (Ferruzzi), tyre covers (Pirelli), electric power plants (Ansaldo and Fata), foodstuffs (Italmobiliare and Fata), shipping (Selenia), caprolactam products (SNIA-Bpd), air carriage (Selenia), telephone communications (Stet), hotels (Impresit), service stations and trading centres (Italstat), accelerators (Snamprogetti), sensing devices (Marconi), gas pipelines (Nuovo Pignone), nonferrous metal working (Samm), electric power engineering (Enel), and gas production (Snam). The list could be continued to include numerous small and medium enterprises in the garment industry, public catering and tourism.

In the first eight months of 1989, Soviet-Italian trade was 21.2 per cent up on the same period of 1988, rising from 4,472 billion lire to 5,421 billion lire. However, Italy's trade balance deficit in its trade with the Soviet Union increased from 770 billion lire to 1,095 billion lire over the same period. So, more Soviet orders could be placed with Italian enterprises, especially since there are ample credit opportunities: to the \$680 million worth of credits extended along state lines in October 1988 and rapidly utilised, one should add those envisaged by the agreement on cooperation for the decade ahead (1990-2000) and by the so-called measures to facilitate business under bilateral trade agreements.

Banco di Roma, for its part, has arranged and made available its

first credit in Eurolire in support of the Moscow External Economic Bank in February 1989. There was instant market demand for these funds (a total of 75 million Eurolire), which is proof of the confidence the Soviet Union enjoys in the West. Banco di Roma can also take pride in its long-standing traditions of cooperation with Soviet ministries, economic departments and banks, as it has had its representatives in Moscow since 1976. Our bank has not confined itself to finance, but has made available its services and specialists for consultations and training of personnel. Last year, for instance, we received 22 Soviet managers who came to Rome to study the latest forms of organising production in the West.

I HAVE TRIED to illustrate the idea that we have wide opportunities for cooperation and that the USSR could soon join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund, which will further facilitate our contacts and agreements. If the Soviet Union carries out a reform of producer prices in the early 1990s and takes the way of modernisation and conversion in industry (something we believe to be realistic and desirable), it could well be possible, in my view, to establish efficiently functioning commodity and financial markets, and to make the ruble fully convertible by the mid-1990s. The projected "free-trade zones" in some parts of the country could markedly accelerate this process.

Perestroika appears to be the only possible way for such a vast country seeking to boost its efficiency and attain a living standard that is in line with its enormous natural wealth. One could assume, with cautious optimism, that this is not a very distant prospect. In any case, no matter how important international cooperation may be, everything will depend on the confidence and enthusiasm with which Soviet managers get down to this great endeavour, whose results are in many respects crucial to the future of peace in the world and to the progress and prosperity of the whole of mankind.

DOUBTS RAISED BY THE INF TREATY

**Letter to the Editors by the People's Deputy of the USSR Captain
Eduard Gams**

OVER THE PAST YEAR, various newspapers have carried explanations in response to the concern expressed by apparently quite a few readers with reference to the terms of the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles [known also as the INF Treaty].

I suppose we will yet have to return to this subject more than once, if only because the arguments marshalled every time in reply to readers do not sound convincing enough and, far from reassuring them, add to their misgivings.

The problem is not so simple as it seems at first sight. Practically every argument can and obviously should be refuted by citing evidence to the contrary. The totality of counter-arguments is apt to mar to a notable extent the idyllic picture painted by various analysts.

Look, for instance, at the difference in the number of Soviet and American missiles to be eliminated (1,752 and 859 respectively). It is particularly distressing in the light of the number of warheads, which are rarely mentioned at all.

There is no denying that we turned out to have more intermediate- and shorter-range missiles than the Americans. So what? We needed more because we had to take account of the nuclear forces of France and Britain. For many years, the Soviet side saw inclusion of West European nuclear forces in the tally as a requisite for any agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Was it reasonable to renounce this principle in order to sign the treaty we now have? Andrei Gromyko wisely pointed out that the nationality of missiles to be dropped on our cities made no difference whatever to our people. Since then, the military plans of Paris and London have undergone no change inspiring us with optimism.

Here is what *l'Humanité* wrote about French nuclear ambitions: "In 1985, the French nuclear forces were capable of destroying from 25 to 34 million Soviet people and 16-25 per cent of the Soviet industrial potential. By 1990, Soviet casualties resulting from a French nuclear strike might range between 48 and 55 million and destruction of the industrial potential, between 25 and 40 per cent. By 1995, Paris plans to have nuclear forces capable of killing 81 million Soviet people and razing two-thirds of the Soviet industrial potential to the ground."

Yet we accepted Reagan's "zero option" in Europe. Wasn't the step too daring? If it was a manifestation of new thinking, which is invoked at present in reasoning with doubters, I prefer old thinking, to be frank. In the past, we had at least missiles to rely on. And now? Are we to pin our hopes on the fact that the Americans and French are humans like anybody else, that Armand Hammer is our big friend or that Margaret Thatcher is a woman after all even though there is something very stern about her? Some of our leaders seem to have adopted the

political philosophy of Leopold the Cat [a famous character of TV cartoon series—*Ed.*], whose wisdom does not go beyond the formula, "Boys, let us be nice to each other."

I recall what I have read about the early days of the Great Patriotic War, when many of our men and officers, being lulled by ill-advised propaganda, earnestly expected that German soldiers would show proletarian solidarity and that this would immediately put an end to the war. Elements of this kind of "worldview" are also taking hold of the thinking of many of our contemporaries, and this not without help from the media.

It may be a comfort to know that stationed somewhere beyond the Urals are one or two hundred intercontinental missiles which compensate for the Eurostrategic systems being scrapped. They certainly are but then they form a component of strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, and their reorientation in practice would amount to our losing this parity. This is not a purely hypothetical possibility as I see it but also a perfectly "physical" one, whose negative impact we will soon feel at the political and diplomatic level and ultimately at the military level as well. The issue will become still more acute in the event of a Soviet-US accord on a 50 per cent cut in SOWs, which would at the very least double the "value" of our every missile left.

There is another argument against unequal commitments under the INF Treaty, one that is probably even more important as a matter of principle.

Long-standing political wisdom advises against creating a precedent. By accepting, if with the best intentions, a treaty imposing greater obligations upon us than upon the other side, we created a most undesirable precedent.

Some write that in years past Soviet diplomacy got a bad name in the world as Mr "No" by refusing to make any concessions whatever even where a compromise could have been reached. I wish we didn't now go to the other extreme by becoming a Mr "Yes" who is obliging enough not only to compromise but to go still further. Our acceptance of Reagan's formula of eliminating Euromissiles seems to have been interpreted to our disadvantage abroad. There is a real threat of our opponents considerably toughening their position at subsequent political and military talks, of their making additional demands unthinkable in a different set of circumstances. Indications of such an evolution are in evidence already. The signing of the INF Treaty was followed in Japan by a clear uptrend in the campaign for the "return of the Northern territories", as Tokyo calls the Soviet Union's Kurile Islands. The Japanese side seems to be hoping in earnest that the Soviet leadership will display "new thinking" on this issue as well.

The assertion that the difference in reductions was programmed by the initial missile imbalance between the two countries is untenable. Arithmetically, we must scrap twice as many missiles as the Americans. But there is also a thing like higher mathematics. Nobody has ever proved that politics must follow the four rules of arithmetic.

At any rate, it is obvious that our diplomats at Geneva should in any circumstances have sought a formula of agreement imposing completely equal obligations on the two sides (meaning their totality) and hence doing no harm to our international prestige. If the framework of the Geneva talks on intermediate and shorter-range missiles was too narrow to allow such a formula to be adopted, they should have been widened by extending the talks to further spheres, by switching to the practice of package agreements—in short, everything possible should

have been done to ensure that ultimately the two sides assumed equal obligations.

Opportunities for this were not lacking. There is, for example, the enormous discrepancy in power between the two countries' surface fleets. Why not put this problem on the agenda of the talks so as to offset the issue of our superiority in Euromissiles? To be sure, Washington is unlikely to relish such an approach but why should we worry about that? We must defend our interests. Indeed, see what is going on: while we are scrapping our missiles, their aircraft carriers keep on hanging around all seas as if nothing had changed. In choosing areas and a framework for talks, aren't we taking our cue from that "good man", Uncle Sam? When he is unwilling to discuss an issue he blocks the talks. Naval forces and the notorious SDI are cases in point. The result is that we only discuss with the Americans what they are ready to discuss and that we only do so within a framework acceptable to them. Yet it is not without malicious intent that the West decides on parameters for its talks with the East.

Who benefits from the fact that talks on military matters are conducted chiefly on a bilateral (Soviet-American) and not a bloc-to-bloc basis? One does not have to be very clever to realise that this is in the interest of the West, for it leaves out the military power of Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and other countries in the imperialist camp, which remain, nonetheless, members of an integral anti-Soviet, anti-socialist club. It would certainly be preferable for the Soviet Union, which has no such strong allies, to carry on talks at the level of the military coalitions because this would allow real (or absolute) military parity to be achieved instead of a parity artificially deduced from Soviet-US parity as a whole.

Our military parity with the United States is depreciated by completely uncontrolled superiority over us in the sum total of imperialist armaments. Meanwhile the West pretends to regard this state of affairs as the only possible one. It thwarts all our attempts to shift the military dialogue onto a coalition-to-coalition basis. Hence the 15-year-long beating of the air at the Vienna talks on troop and arms reductions in Central Europe. Hence also the more than tepid reaction registered at first to the proposal for a European forum on military detente, the WTO initiative pronounced in Warsaw. All signs are that our opponents have no intention of renouncing the bilateral Soviet-US dialogue, which they seem to like and whose progress tends to lead to a further relative weakening of the military coalition of socialist countries in the face of the West's military alliance. Having agreed to this bilateral formula when the power balance came down to the Soviet-American military or rather missile balance, we risk getting into serious trouble that may become still worse subsequently. This is why we must revise priorities and feed a new algorithm into the programme for military dialogue with the West before it is too late. This would be genuine new thinking unlike the semblance of it created by the INF Treaty.

This treaty, a typical product of the given political situation, is essentially tantamount to a major diplomatic setback for us, one fraught with foreign political consequences. By upsetting the principle of equality, it impairs the prospect of further disarmament talks and works objectively against the policy of lowering military confrontation levels and providing greater world security.

Conclusions regarding certain particulars also breed doubts. I am sure many Soviet people cannot understand the reason for the haste shown by our side in setting out to implement the provisions of the treaty on a practically unilateral basis. We began withdrawing our missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia even before the treaty was

ratified, that is, before it came into force. The Americans began to eliminate their missiles on September 8, 1988, but we blew up as many as 70 missiles already on August 26. Also in August, we proceeded to eliminate SS-20 intermediate-range missiles while the 56th Field Artillery Command equipped with Pershing-2 IRBMs held exercises in the FRG.

Why must we hurry so? Did a bid to score a propaganda point (to show that we were "ahead of everybody else" on this as well) prove stronger than elementary self-respect? What is this irresistible urge to report victories?

I am convinced that the time frame for the destruction of the first batch of missiles should have been the same for the two powers. It would be hard to think of a more forceful symbol emphasising the equality of the contracting parties and their mutual respect. That we had more missiles of this type than the other side was immaterial. Afterwards we could have blown up a hundred missiles a day if we chose to.

As for inspection, the issue is less simple than analysts would have it. It was no accident that the problem of control almost became a stumbling-block at the eleventh hour, during treaty ratification hearings in the US Senate. *Za rubezhom* published a report by an American journalist about a visit to US missile bases in some states by Soviet inspectors. The brief account is noteworthy for what is a rare absence of euphoria nowadays in dealing with the issue of compliance with the INF Treaty. The writer pointed out that even at a base subject to inspection, by far not all facilities were allowed to be inspected and that the inspectors were admitted to 18 depots and kept out of another 18 of the same type. He quoted the American colonel responsible for secrecy as saying that he would not allow anybody to see what he was not intended to.

Of course, we can scornfully dismiss the bourgeois journalist's report as discordant to the chorus of praise.

Still, if we take sober stock of things, we must admit that inspection cannot guarantee compliance with treaty provisions (any inspectors' team can be fooled by keeping it out of "18 depots" because they are "off limits"). The only guarantee is reciprocal goodwill. We can say with a fair degree of certainty that right now goodwill exists. But nobody can guarantee that it will still be there tomorrow. Nor does anybody know how the whole thing will work out in the end.

I wonder whether the near future will not see us start restoring in all haste the missileery we are now scrapping. This is quite an interesting question, all the more since there was a precedent in our recent history. The only difference at the time was that Khrushchev had everything but missiles scrapped whereas this once it is missiles that turn out to be "unwanted". I shudder to think what will happen if a further spiral of history (there will yet be many of them) faces us with the need for a new round of arms modernisation. We must realise quite clearly that such turnarounds are more disastrous to us than to the West. The United States would hardly suffer much from a new spurt in the arms race, and as for American business, it would be delighted. Besides, the West fully uses the possibilities of sharing out the military burden among partners.

For our overtaxed economy and our state as a whole, which is on a wobbly hand and foot by unsolved social problems, the task of modernising weapons, which we might have to accomplish in order not to find ourselves defenceless in the face of powerful enemies, could prove ruinous, especially after the "brilliant" disarmament we are now carrying out. The West is in effect playing a winning game. Even while

disarming in part on terms favourable to it (remember that it prefers bilateral talks to talks between the two coalitions), it retains a capacity for a possible new spurt in the military contest. As regards us, we risk being duped because we are destroying what we have in the area of defence and also because we lack a comparable potential to counter a new spurt by the West should it come. Our military potentialities are diminishing in view of our current policy of adopting intensive methods of management and curbing command methods of leadership.

I would like to deal at some length with the history of the SS-23 missile. Eduard Shevardnadze says that we showed goodwill by agreeing to destroy this missile under the INF Treaty although the treaty does not cover it. But the Americans, ignoring our noble gesture, decided to deploy in Europe missiles analogous with the ones we are destroying in accordance with the treaty.

Now if matters stand as Shevardnadze puts it, why did we have to include in the treaty a missile not covered by it? What kind of "goodwill" is that? I doubt whether any other country would demonstrate its goodwill in the same way. The Americans are unlikely to go back on their plan to deploy new systems with a range of up to 500 km. There is no law to stop them. And this means that we may have to deploy something similar but not SS-23s. The hints of our possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty over these systems cannot be serious because the Soviet Union never violates treaties, as everybody knows.

Incidentally, the assertion that our country was prompted by "goodwill" in eliminating SS-23s of its own accord does not seem very credible. There is some evidence that the explanation is far more prosaic. The thing is that when the draft treaty was under discussion, the Americans insisted on SS-23 being included on the grounds that it had a rated range of 500 km or more. We probably tried to prove that they were wrong but nothing came of it. The new missile complex that was to have been substituted for obsolete mobile systems (with a range of up to 300 km) came to be covered by reductions while old missiles were left to rot quietly on site. Besides, it seems certain that the lower range limit of the missiles included in the INF Treaty was not chosen accidentally but with due regard to the potential of Soviet missiles, primarily SS-23. There is hardly any reason to doubt that had this missile had a rated range of, say, 450 and not 500 km, the lower range limit would also have been brought down to this level under the treaty.

The foregoing suggests that the problem of SS-23s should have been settled while the INF Treaty was in its drafting phase. The line of the Soviet side at the time must have been prompted in large measure, if not chiefly, by a desire to sign at all costs a treaty seen as a very important political victory for our new leadership, and the Soviet Union therefore showed an inclination for a certain flexibility in settling disputed issues, even at the cost of injuring some of its legitimate interests. Now that the treaty is in force, there are those who apparently regret the "goodwill" shown by us in those days. But it is too late.

To prove that the treaty is so indispensable to the Soviet Union as to justify unilateral concessions, reference is made to the extraordinary nature of the threat to our security posed by the deployment of Pershing-2s in West Germany, from where they could have reached Moscow in 10 minutes. This development is said to have greatly heightened the risk of an armed clash (meaning also an unsanctioned one) and disastrously shortened the time left for the adoption of any political decisions. Quite right. Pershing-2s fired from West Germany could have reached our country three times faster than Minutemen flying in

from North Dakota. The danger of any conflict automatically assuming a total character would have increased accordingly. But then it would have threatened the two sides in equal measure. Our missiles could have hit most NATO capitals in a matter of five to ten minutes. The flight-in time for Soviet missiles aimed directly at American territory was reduced by moving part of our missile-carrying submarines to forward areas. All this guaranteed maintenance of a rough "balance of terror" at the new level reached by the military balance with the deployment of Euromissiles.

It follows that we did not have much more reason for apprehension that the West. Hence there was no reason, either, for us to accept terms providing for great sacrifices on our part.

The above is by no means an ex post facto statement. It is precisely today, when far more important disarmament accords are in the making, that we must weigh the pros and cons once again and submit our disarmament strategy for exhaustive public discussion.

The one-sided glasnost prevailing in our country at the moment and aptly described by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 19th Party Conference as degenerating into the supremacy of various "groups" in the media virtually makes it impossible to ensure unbiased discussion of a number of disputed aspects of our home and foreign policy, with the INF Treaty unquestionably one of them. It is clear to me that in our country in general and in its Armed Forces in particular there are people, including competent specialists, who take a critical view of the treaty as it now stands. Yet not one of them was given a chance either before or after the signing of the treaty to state his opinion in public. As in earlier times, healthy and fruitful debate and comparison of differing points of view were replaced by sweet-voiced, harmful hallelujahs and perfunctory unanimity. In the United States, meanwhile, discussion on the treaty and the outlook for Soviet-American talks generally is going on continuously, bringing out dozens and hundreds of viewpoints which provide the administration soil for optimum foreign policy decisions.

My arguments may be completely wrong but I had to state them. I am by no means the only one to have misgivings. And this is why we need a serious debate and not a further campaign of hollow propaganda.

EUROPE WOULD BE INCOMPLETE WITHOUT RUSSIA

Andrei BESSMERTNY

EVEN A RUSSIAN, who is used to the Eastern Slavic expanses from childhood, is astonished by the vast size of his own country. Its land mass stretches from the Arctic to the subtropics and the hot deserts, from the bounds of the ancient kingdoms of the Old World to the Japanese islands and the American forests. Its riches enable even inefficient economic systems to function, its forest and land resources are incalculable, and Lake Baikal alone contains one-fifth of the globe's stores of fresh water.

The riches of Russia astounded Western travellers many centuries ago, and in later times its territory kept on growing, and the stream of Cossack and trade colonisation rushed along new deep rivers to vast steppes, forests and foothills. Meanwhile, Early Russia, the biggest state in Europe as it was, did not at all, by its geographical position, have to increase its expanses uninterruptedly. From the South and the West it bordered on powerful states—Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, Turkey and the Crimea. The Eastern boundaries of Early Russia were less defined, but here, too, there existed for centuries many developed states, most of the descendants of whose subjects exist to this day and which could well remain on the modern map of the world, too. Khazaria and Volga Bulgaria, Kazan and Astrakhan, the mysterious Biarmia. The state of the Polovtsians did not survive Khan Batu's onslaught, but the Horde itself left the world arena, having merely cleared the path for the Russian colonisation of the Volga region, the Ural area and Siberia. Numerous kingdoms, principalities and khannates sooner or later became part of Russia—from Georgia, Kabarda or Shirvan to Khiva and Bukhara with Kokand, which lay on the approaches to India and China.

A description of Russia invariably requires parametres which are more applicable to continents than to national political formations. Even powerful empires which lay claim to domination under the skies, like China, or those which actually possessed territories in all parts of the world, like Britain or Spain, are not similar to Russia, which combined at once several types in its political and social development—Chinese, British (in the 19th century), and Austro-Hungarian and even North American (the settlement and development of Eastern Siberia and the Far East, the border Cossack lines; naturally, there is the obvious analogy with the Far West and the moving American frontier).

How could it happen that the distant state that emerged in the middle reaches of the Dniepr and consolidated in the upper Volga expanses unexpectedly transformed into an entire continent, whose influence at different levels began to substantially determine the course of modern historical processes? What are the specifics of Russian history which conditioned the Russia—West antithesis that has now become traditional? Is this antithesis realistic and, if so, what is its positive

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and negative influence on Russian culture, and, through it, on world culture? Lastly, why did the existence of this "continent" and the life of the people living on it become so complicated at times with the growth of great power mentality?

Many sovietologists frequently insisted on Russia's alienation from Western civilisation, and on a fundamentally different historical path, one different from the West European one. This stand is paradoxically at one with the viewpoint of some Russian publicists and culturologists, including such brilliant ones as A. Khomyakov, K. Leontyev and N. Danilevsky. And if authors hostile to Russia following Abbot Jean Chappede d'Auteroche and Marquis Adam de Custine insist on the juxtaposition of bad Russia to the good West, the above Russian writers and people espousing their views merely changed the signs: for them the West is bad and Russia is good.

The we're-good-they're-bad juxtaposition is as old as the hills; it proves nothing and even fails to characterise their adherents in particular, since it is essentially irrational and is based on passions, ambitions and overstated claims. This juxtaposition was typical at various times for Anglo-Spanish, Franco-British, German-French, Arab-Persian and even Russo-Byzantine relations, which were based on the political and cultural rivalry between the respective sides. In our instance, too, the point at issue can above all be rivalry between cultures, and, as we know, any theoretical or ideological basis can be construed as rivalry—all you need are the emotions!

Indeed, why is it that Russia definitely has to be "like the West", and the West, "like Russia"? Norway never had serfdom. But where is it enshrined that it did not have to be in France or Russia, even if we close our eyes to the fact that the Russian North and the Cossack regions never knew serfdom either? And is the simple fact that slavery in our country was abolished without pain and from above, while in the USA it took a ruthless Civil War, not in Russia's favour? Russia did not have the British Magna Carta. It would have unquestionably been better if it had had it, but since this did not happen (as, incidentally, was the case everywhere other than Britain), Russian history, culture and civilisation should be regarded and accepted the way they are, and no ideal image should be created, drawing on which it proves so simple to expose and hate the "other", whether it is a nation or an individual.

A cut and dried definition which comes from a set of stringent methods becomes not even a labelling but a sort of branding, which leads to misunderstanding, division and enmity. Regrettably, both sides—both Russia and the West—were and are equally at fault in this passion to brand one another, delivering verdicts that "are not subject to appeal". Another problem with any "verdicts" is that it usually lay claim to exhaustive truth, by virtue of which they simply become outmoded quickly.

John Milton considered Muscovy a civilised European state—back in 1682. The Croatian writer and Catholic priest Juri Krizanic, was a sort of Russian nationalist, also in the 17th century, and Johann Herder predicted a great future for Russia. The historian A. Schlözer, who was of German extraction, was an enthusiastic Russian patriot and considered Russia the "crown of European history". "Early Russian history! I almost become lost in its grandeur!" Schlözer wrote. "Open the chronicles of all times and lands and show me a history that surpasses or only equals Russian history!.. A Northerner is more capable than anyone else of becoming an educated person."¹

Nor would it be truthful to maintain that most Russian thinkers were hostile to the West. A certain rejection of the West and search

for ways to return society to a certain integral and unique Russian culture, which began with Gogol and was continued by the Slavophile movement, cannot at all be understood outside the general European context, which is linked with Romantic literature and was intensified after the Napoleonic wars by the national feeling of the European peoples of the centre and the East—from Germany and Austro-Hungary to Poland, Croatia ("Ilirism") and Russia.

Rather the excessively emotional, and therefore at times very aggressive denial of the elementary value of Russia and its culture proved to be an eerie specificity of our thought. This tradition, which dates back to pre-Petrine times, is manifest in the historical conceptions of Academician I. Boltin, who lived in the 18th century, and in the last century it was not alien to a number of leaders of the incipient Russian intelligentsia (up to and including P. Milyukov). A certain role in promoting anti-Russian views in the West was also played by the extremely superficial book by S. Stepnyak-Kravchinsky entitled "Russia Under the Power of the Tsars", which was published in 1885 in English in London and was read rather extensively in West European countries.

The correctness of the critical spirit of these authors is unquestionable. Nevertheless, historical justice demands that we call to mind the fact that it was not Poles or Ukrainian nationalists, but Russians and only Russians—representatives of both our left and right camps—who subjected Russia and Russian ethnicity to the most severe and often unjust criticism. And if the main tenet of the March 13, 1921 report of A. Gastev, a leftist poet and director of the Central Labour Institute under the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions was "Sloth and lethargy are the scourge of Russia", in this sense Gastev was only repeating an idea of an ultra-rightist deputy of the State Duma, N. Markov II. The latter accused the Russian people of wholesale laziness, and the fine poet Sasha Cherny exposed and ridiculed the right-wing deputy.

Ah, through the prism
Of cretinism
The question brilliantly arose:
Our people are not God-bearers,
But sluggards
And ditherers!

Russians were often accused, including by themselves, of passivity and a lack of personal dignity and civic responsibility. Today, too, some Russian authors descry the historical misfortunes of Russia, especially in the period of Stalinism and post-Stalinism, in various individual shortcomings, such as our lack of a developed stratum of bourgeoisie and urban life in general (what about the Magdeburg Law, according to which many western Russian cities lived until the middle of the last century?), the weakness of individualistic principles, social inertness, the determined nature of obedience to central authority and the supposedly related need for a "firm hand".

Even if some of these "labels" are warranted, none of them solve the main problem that was stated at the beginning of this article: Why did history "need" the creation of so vast and mighty a state, a state that played one of the most important parts in the world "concert of nations"? How and why was our state created in all its complexity and diversity? Are the various diagnoses which formulate the shortcomings and negative facets of the Russian soul a verdict pronounced upon the defendant or a stating of the specifics of the historical formation of Russia?

The latter is unequivocal. On the whole, however, we can answer all these questions more concretely only with a concrete stipulation, namely, that it is impossible to construct a theory of Russia, and hardly because "Russia cannot be understood through the intellect, she cannot be measured by a common yardstick, she has a special image, Russia can only be believed in" (F. Tyutchev). Russia does have its own image—this is true, and no one should be measured by a common yardstick—let's leave this hopeless work to Procrustes. Faith in Russia comes under the sphere of natural patriotism. But one can and should try to intellectually understand any culture and civilisation.

It is impossible to "discover" Russia's formula because no science possesses an almighty key that would unlock the magic door of a total and absolute understanding of any national-cultural community which always preserves a certain element of "eternal mystery". If we scuttle a search for such a pick-lock, an unbiased and objective analysis of any historico-geographical region of the Earth is quite possible. In such an analysis, which, as a rule, pursues the goal mainly of explaining the actual situation of a country and society, turning to earlier epochs is inevitable.

IN HIS INTRODUCTORY essay on Russian historiography, the historian V. Klyuchevsky wrote, among all else, that a "historian of the civil order in Russia often has to turn to the Church order historian for advice and instructions."

The view that the society that was being built in our country was fundamentally and essentially different from all previous ones predominated in this country for several decades. Today we understand full well that we are living in a society that was shaped for centuries by Christianity. To understand Russia's place in world culture we need to follow Klyuchevsky's advice and examine the role of Orthodoxy in Russian history without any prejudice.

As the custodian and spreader of Christianity, the Church in this country became all the more powerful a force in that it came here from Byzantium, the most civilised country of the time. However, unlike the West European peoples, who were in one way or another introduced in their time to ancient Roman civilisation, Early Russia, its proximity to the trade route "from the Vikings to the Greeks" notwithstanding, did not have its own flourishing antiquity and even a formed national consciousness. Many-tribe Early Russia emerged as a state only after it was converted to the Greek faith.

There is no need to talk about the favourable influence of Christianity, which proclaimed in principle the value and unique nature of each individual, who was created for freedom and love, on the conglomerate of Eastern Slavic pagan tribes. However, it would be simplistic to forget that during the first few centuries Russian Orthodoxy was under the strong influence of Bulgarian literature, which was largely suffused with the latent ideas of dualistic bogomilism, which professed belief in the equality of the principles of good and evil (the "truth" and "falsity" of Russian folk hymns). Whereas a consolidated and mature Western Christianity proved capable of withstanding the expansion of this dualism, the young Russian Church was able merely to push bogomilist ideas into the sphere of "grassroots" culture. Dualistic ideas made deep inroads into the everyday consciousness of the Russians, drawing on numerous apocryphal essays and later manifesting themselves in the most stringent forms of purely Russian sectarianism.

What is much more important for an understanding of Russia is the fact that this unconscious dualism was felicitously combined with the keenly pantheistic sense, one peculiar to the Eastern Slavic world, of the skepticism of Greco-Roman antiquity. The Slav, not having gone through a period of weary skepticism of Greco-Roman antiquity, lived in organic unity with the natural cycles, among vast woodlands, rivers and lakes. Divine Wisdom (Sophia), which created the world, touched the Russian heart—the first cathedrals of Kiev and Novgorod were dedicated precisely to Sophia, whose traits were transferred by the people's consciousness to the Mother of God—the Mother and Protectress of the Russian land. The cult of the land as Mother ("mother—damp land") dates far back, but remains in the form of hope in the Mother of God, in the form of a perception of the sanctity and principled beneficence of the Russian land protected by Her—Holy Russia and the Home of the Most Holy Mother of God. Nevertheless, with such an approach Russia did not oppose itself to other lands, even ideologically. Historical documents also attest to how little the Russian consciousness was affected by the Rome-Constantinople schism during the first three centuries after the adoption of Christianity.

The transformed and Christianised currents were reflected in the architectural designs of the Vladimir and Suzdal cathedrals; they subsequently inspired many 19th-century Russian writers who created images of the country's nature with astonishing ability and love. These trends also conditioned the emergence of Tolstoyism as a religious-pantheistic teaching. Having partially neutralised each other, the pantheistic and bogomil-dualistic tendencies coexisted in Early Russia for some time; however, the national catastrophe that was caused by the invasion of the Horde gradually led to a crisis of the idea of a harmonious universe. The mentality of the cognition of God through the beauty of the created world and the entire symbolical cosmological system of Russian literature and art were forced to retreat in the face of the obvious imperfection of the world across which raced the hoofs of the all-destroying cavalry and the horrible "black death"—the global plague of the 13th century.

From that time, the latent dualism that lay dormant in the Russian soul came to the surface, transforming in its own way the traditional Russian cosmos, which was so different from the more rationalistic and yet keenly individual perception of God by the Latin world (different yet supplementing it).

The external world gradually becomes "evil" and hostile, and the idea of "heaven on earth" is fitted solely within the confines of the Church around which everything "lies in evil". The real transformed world is an inner one, hidden from the eyes of mere morals—it is the city of Kitezh, which invisibly praises God with the pealing of its bells that are inaudible in objective reality. However, the dream of "peace on earth" which charmed the Russian soul remained.

There were two ways to overcome the national and social crisis that had entrenched itself above all in the consciousness of people. The first, psychological, one was linked with the mystical doctrine of the Mt. Athos monks which taught the need for the inner ascent of man to Good and Light and the attainment of a "paradise of thought". This path gave Russia a brilliant galaxy of spiritual, cultural and public figures, from Sergei of Radonezh, Dmitry Donskoi, Stefan of Perm, Kirill of Beloe Lake, and Andrei Rublyov, to our days. Its practice presupposes both control over the passions and the creation of a normal, responsible and mature "inner man". In other words, this is the path of inner action by advantage, which rules out any dualism,

the dissolution of the individual in nature or the crowd, and a search for the "guilty" on the side, amidst sorcerers, Tatars or Masons.

The second path was largely shaped precisely by dualistic-pantheistic notions, while in practical spheres it transferred all aspirations primarily to external actions. The "external" extensively predominated (and predominates to this day) in it over the "inner"; also dating back to this phenomenon are the slogans of the Stalinist and partially post-Stalinist times, when the external magic of the formula of great achievements and growth indices made the very achievements and the very growth "as if existing", supplanting reality with illusion.

The decisive influence on the formation of the second path was rendered by the concrete historical encirclement of Early Russia and the events taking place in this external world. The pillaging of Constantinople in 1204 by the Crusaders was perceived by the Russians as outright betrayal. The victory of Alexander Nevsky over the Swedes and the knights of the Livonian Order and all the subsequent incalculable unrest in the Roman Church—the split between Rome and Avignon, the Husite movement, the exposes of Savonarola, the adoption of Protestantism by half of the European population—Early Russia thought of all this as retribution against Rome and enabled it to declare it "fallen".

The elimination of the Orthodox kingdoms of Bulgaria and Serbia by the Turks, the betrayal of Orthodoxy by part of the Constantinopolitan episcopacy at the Ferraro-Florentine Council of 1438-1439 and the rapid and final fall of Constantinople right after this act "as punishment for apostasy"—all this showed that the Second Rome was falling, too, and imposed in the eyes of Russian contemporaries preservation of the plenitude and purity of truth only on Russia, which had been declared, initially by a Tver monk named Foma, and later by a Pskov spiritual adviser-monk named Filofei, "the third and final Rome".

The Russian land was thereafter proclaimed the only chosen one. Both in the national consciousness and especially in the "corridors of power" of Ivan the Terrible, the primitive division into "good—ours" and "bad—theirs" became popular. Thereafter the political opponents of Russia were perceived as enemies of Orthodoxy, they were either pagans or people who had fallen into the "Latin heresy" (this never existed at all). Interest grew in the "world of evil" and in demonology, which was reflected even at the architectural level in the replacement of zoomorphous decorative symbols by distorted ugly masks. The Russian land remained holy, however, the polarisation between the Church and the world, between spirit and body was reaching its peak.

IN OTHER WORDS, the transformation of the world came to be understood as the sacralisation of everyday life in the apriori true kingdom. There arose the spirit of petty lawmaking, of scrupulous regulation of everyday life, that which is called "tenor". In this Muscovian period of our history, which was not fully overcome by its St. Petersburg period, lay the roots of many of Russia's current misfortunes. What is particularly important is this unrealised aspiration for "paradise of earth", i.e., for a search for the harmonisation of the universe, through a strict tenor, regulation of all spheres of life and their subordination to specific rules, this time "the most advanced and scientific". In such a simple, ossified and static universe everything is "correct", and this is the most important thing, for "if you go North, or go South, you will always meet a comrade and friend", as a Soviet song went. This attraction towards a tenor is the explanation for the seeming passivity and

"civic irresponsibility" of many of us, as deliberate selectivity does not require especial activity, and one is supposed to be held liable solely for noncompliance with the tenor.

Mention should be made of an extremely important thing: For all the seeming passivity and "civil irresponsibility" (or docility?) of the Russians, no nation has developed so subtle a form of civil disobedience that Russian "passive resistance" is.

The average person is forced to live in constant expectation of punishment for having done something "wrong", for incorrectly crossing the threshold of a house, and so on. The religion of the tenor inevitably becomes also the religion of fear, albeit only in the ordinary mass consciousness.

This accounts rather fully for the antireligious feelings of the masses in the 1920s and 30s and their search for some "new religiosity", which was manifest in the cult of the pseudo-charismatic leader and the avowedly dualistic division of the world into "class enemies" and "socially close", into a country "where man breathes so freely" and the "Hydra of world counter-revolution". Keenly manifest in the period of the revolution and the subsequent decades, this dualism also frequently determined the view of the Russians themselves of their people, which became, irrespective of the emotional mood of the authors, now a "God-bearer", now a "sluggard and ditherer". In reality this was neither, but simply, the people.

Proceeding from formal attributes, it can be stated that the fall of the "Third Rome" came with the departure of an enormous part of active religious citizens to the Old Believer schism and sectarianism, and also with the move of the capital to St. Petersburg.

The spirit immediately became inflamed: it was at that time that great Russian literature emerged, followed by science, music, painting, theatre and, lastly, the cinema. Russia not only rapidly became one of the world's leading cultural powers, but also began influencing the Western social consciousness. The West was going to Russia as a sort of Canossa in order to study from it. This process did not have absolute scope, of course, but writers Gavrila Derzhavin, Nikolai Gogol, Alexander Pushkin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Ivan Turgenev and Anton Chekhov, philosopher Vladimir Solovyov, and composers Alexander Borodin, Modest Mussorgsky, Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, Pyotr Tchaikovsky, Alexander Scriabin and Sergei Rakhmaninoff are among the masters who determined the development precisely of world civilisation. They are quite Western for the West, while remaining Russians for Russia.

What is more, during the St. Petersburg period, which put an end to Moscow isolationism, we have before us a galaxy of foreigners naturalised on our land, on the one hand, who served Russian civilisation and culture selflessly and fruitfully, and, on the other, who were simply inconceivable without Russia and the Russian spirit that inspired them (proof of the fact that this spirit did not exhaust itself in the previous Muscovian period). The following are part and parcel of Russian civilisation: F. Emin, a Hungarian by extraction, a prolific 18th-century prose writer; the Germans D. Messerschmidt, a geographer and traveller, and the fine doctor F. Haas, a major Slavic scholar (and Slavophile) A. Gilferding, the Croatian linguist and folklorist I. Jagic, and linguist I. Boduain de Courtenay, a Pole of French extraction. The first "Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language" was compiled by Vladimir Dahl, a Dane by extraction, who also became a subtle Russian fiction writer; and the St. Petersburg German M. Fasmer, the author of the only still definitive "Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language", who viewed his work solely as service to his

homeland—Russia. Many authors have pointed to this uncommon trait of the Russian conciliar soul to perceive and creatively transform, imparting to them a special, purely Russian national colour, not only ideas but also living representatives of Western Europe. Like any complicated and diverse country, Russia naturally absorbed all talents, providing them an opportunity to blossom and bear fruit. It can only be compared to America in the number of such instances.

Very little was needed for this astonishing flourishing of the nation: rejection of the introverted model of society, admissibility of doubt about one's own exclusiveness and righteousness, openness to foreign influences which were later reworked and yielded purely Russian unique fruit.

The next isolationist period, the Stalinist one, not only had catastrophic consequences in all spheres of the national state's existence but also set about physically destroying all the bearers of the former burning spirit. It is in this sense that it can be boldly stated that any introversion of Russia into itself, which, is usually linked with claims to self-sufficiency and great-power Messianism, posed and will continue to pose a threat not so much even to our neighbours as above all to Russia itself. Another period of this type can call its very existence into question.

Like any living organism, Russian society has entered a phase of restructuring and renewal. And in this present renewal, recent antagonists—Russia and the West—are surprised to find very common traits in each other. It turns out that each side has something to learn from the other. But even this is not enough, the essential values of both the West and Russia have proved to be common as well.

In the biographical dictionary by J. Wintle entitled "Makers of Modern Culture"³, 36 world authorities are enumerated who were shaped by the Russian cultural environment in one way or another (science fiction writer Isaac Azimov, playwright A. Adamov and theatrical director Peter Brook). We find here writers and poets (Maxim Gorky, Yevgeny Zamyatin, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Osip Mandelstam, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Vladimir Nabokov, Boris Pasternak, Alexander Solzhenitsyn), artists and sculptors (V. Kandinsky, K. Malevich, K. Sutin, V. Tallin, O. Tsadkin, M. Chagall), scientists (R. Yakobson), theatrical masters (S. Diaghilev, V. Meyerhold, K. Stanislavsky, M. Fokin), film directors (D. Veron, A. Dovzhenko, V. Pudovkin, S. Eisenstein).

What is most astonishing is that it is these very people who exerted the decisive or a significant influence on our country's culture, too, in the 20th century. The dictionary contains only names which determined the evolution of the international mass consciousness, which the publisher makes a special point of. It has no individual items (but there is mention) of brilliant Russians who influenced narrower spheres of science and culture, namely philosophers Nikolai Berdyayev, S. Bulgakov, L. Shestov and L. Karsavin, economists P. Sorokin and A. Chayanov, writers A. Rezimov, M. Bulgakov and A. Platonov, engineer I. Sikorsky, ballet dancer and choreographer V. Nijinsky, theatrical director M. Chekhov, film stars I. Mozzhukhina, O. Chekhova, O. Baklanova, K. Douglas and many, many others.

Also typical is the fact that many of the aforementioned are immigrants, which is directly due to the isolationist and barbaric policies of Stalinism and post-Stalinism.

To solidly define Russia's role in the context of world civilisation and culture it is insufficient simply to adduce a list—albeit one that is very impressive and not compiled by us—of brilliant thinkers, creators

and scientists who were nurtured by the Russian element and came to be considered as "their own" for many peoples.

The humanistic civilisation which was linked with Christianity and arose 2,000 years ago split apart at the end of the first millennium into West European (Latin) and East European (Greek) cultural areas. The historical collapse of East European Hellenism not only spelled the emergence of a substantial lacuna in European civilisation on the whole, but also posed a threat to its very existence, destroying as it did the initial harmony of Mediterranean civilisation. As a consequence of this the very logic of history required that Russia become the heir and custodian of the spiritual values of Byzantium by spreading them from the Volga reaches to the Pacific shores where this expansion of Europe is "linked" with another, later expansion, Western expansion, which conquered and civilised the American continent. Let us also recall the fact that through its history Russia kept driving out Islamic conquerers from Europe, without the "Russian shield" Western Europe could have dissolved in a sea of Mohammedanism, so there might not have been any birth of the American nation to speak of. The Islamic, Indian and Oriental worlds are no less important and valuable for humanity; the point at issue is not "Eurocentrism" but merely specific influences linked with Europe.

The vast expanses of Russia (the image of "oikoumene" built into it by Byzantinism), its strengths and weaknesses, the universal range of its geography, culture and spirituality—all this is strictly determined historically, since it was Russia, and not, say, Iran or Arabia, that took Byzantium's place in preserving and disseminating the East European heritage.

Precisely here is the start of the "Russian paradox": Russia did not merely adopt Byzantine values but uniquely transformed them, creating a new and unique, yet the same East European cultural and historical type without which European civilisation would have remained incomplete and deficient. It was for this reason that this vast country, one which is not Western and not Eastern and yet remains both Western and Eastern, was "needed". Russia found itself in the paradoxical situation of an East European outpost of the West and a Far Western outpost of the East. Such is its historical calling or, if you will, cross. All attempts to cast off this cross and change its purpose by creating within itself some isolated and self-sufficing world led Russia to an extremely deep moral and economic crisis and all the diverse "difficult epochs", the last of which is still fresh in our minds. Any stringent ideological system would be useless. For history does not brook artificial "mechanisms", free development and functioning of any society within the framework of a legal and democratic system, but its uniqueness and national specifics definitely being preserved—this is the earnest of the political, economic, social and cultural health of any nation or alliance of nations.

Russia will never be self-sufficient without the West; and the West and the rest of the world for that matter will always lack something without Russia. At the same time Russia will never be fully "Europe", nor should it be, for that matter, just as America is not "Europe". However, no matter how paradoxically this may sound, Europe will never be itself fully without Russia. Only a realisation and acknowledgement of this fundamental duality of the "Russian oikoumene" by Russia itself as well as by the West will dispel the fog of misunders-

The Global Dimensions of Ecology

Mikhail KALOSHIN

THE GLOBAL FORUM on Environment and Development for Survival, which was held in Moscow this past January and gathered 1,400 delegates from 83 countries—political, religious and public figures, scientists, diplomats and journalists—demonstrated once again that ecology, being closely linked with the task of eliminating the military menace, above all the nuclear danger, is a sphere in which the fundamental and vital interests of the whole of humanity are concentrated. The Moscow ecological forum in effect functioned as a united family, as an integral organism oriented to accomplishing the overriding universal task of preserving life on Earth. And in this sense it was a very encouraging event of the start of the final decade of the 20th century, one which inspires confidence that it will be a decade of ecology. This is all the more important since an alarming picture of the threat hanging over our planet and its biosphere, which did not leave any of the participants indifferent, was presented at the forum. One would not like to believe that man could so befoul the Earth—the cradle of humanity, our common home in which we were born and were formed and which is called upon to be the abode of many, many generations of world civilisation. A veritable offensive, a large-scale war is being waged against the environment in all areas—from cigarette butts and papers thrown into the green grass, and tens of millions of tons of wastes and toxins belched out by giant cities and industrial enterprises, to the increasingly intensive eating away of the Earth's resources, shots into the planet's bowels from the test sites of Semipalatinsk, Nevada and Mururoa, the destruction of the ozone layer by aerosol preparations, and the burning of the atmosphere's oxygen by airplanes and spaceships. In effect all life on Earth is under the gun: nine nuclear reactors and 50 units of nuclear ammunition lost at different times from submarines, ships and aircraft rest on the bottom of seas and oceans, and for who knows how long. How perspicacious the great Italian Leonardo da Vinci was 400 years ago when he spoke about the consequences of human incursions into the environment and wrote that the time would come when nothing would survive and remain untouched either over or under the Earth.

Our planet is seriously ill, and unexampled coming ecological disasters are knocking on the doors and windows of our common home. And people have literally lost their hearing: caught up by the pursuit of fat profits or by the search for foodstuffs, they fell forests, burn coal, petroleum and fuel oil, poison water with weed-killers and fertile land with pesticides, and kill the Earth, forgetting that their children will have to pay for all of this. Will the prophetic words of the great book, the Bible, which has been warning humanity for several millennia of the inevitability of retribution for violation of the principles of the harmony of the universe and for transgression of the threshold of man's incursion into the environment, really come to pass?

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The paradox is that the main, the only, destructive force in nature is man, *homo sapiens*, who hardly comports himself as a thinking man. No animal, not the simplest organism in nature destroys its habitat as ruthlessly, as senselessly, as consistently and extensively as man does. Even the simplest germ is programmed for ecological self-sufficiency, self-regulation and restoration of the habitat. Only man engages in self-destruction. Man has never been so merciless towards the environment and himself. He has become similar to a cancerous tumour which appears in the body and feeds on it and grows, gradually destroying the body and, as a result, itself.

The reasons for this behaviour by man lie above all in his base moral and spiritual qualities which lag far behind the requirements of the modern level of the technological development of civilisation. The formation and development of man and his consciousness, spirit and morality are evolving. Revolutionary spurts, bypassing certain stages, are impossible here. At the same time, humanity is advancing, especially in the 20th century, at a cosmic pace in science and technology. Here one revolution is following another. Today we have learned to orbit huge chunks of metal, which just recently seemed fantastic, and relay information over any distance. Yet man has remained what he was 2,000, 4,000 and more years ago in his spiritual and moral development.

This has led to a situation where we have violated the warnings contained in the Holy Scriptures, for example, not to cross a certain line, not to touch technologies and discoveries which man has not yet matured morally enough to utilise.

The most serious consequence of the lag of man's spiritual and moral development has been the fact that he has placed himself in the centre of the environment as its master and directed efforts at altering, adapting and subordinating it to fit his needs. Man has concentrated not on himself, not on the goal of his evolutionary development in nature, but on acquiring machines and gadgetry designed to replace man, perform physical and mental work for him and even think for him. On the one hand, the results of such an approach have been the separation of man from nature, a split of internal biological links with it, a gradual undermining of the foundations of evolutionary development for it, and the ultimate transition to degradation as a biological species; on the other hand, uncontrolled exploitation by man of the environment and its wealth, which is fraught with catastrophic, destructive consequences, has begun. The overlapping of these processes, which have been developing increasingly rapidly, is especially manifest at the close of the 20th century. The urgent task today is to save both the environment and man; the ecology of nature has become indivisible from the ecology of the spirit.

For this reason, the enormous importance of the spiritual and moral perfection of man for the purpose of rectifying his attitude to nature and ensuring the survivability of civilisation is being underscored with increasing forcefulness nowadays. Regrettably, man now truly needs above all an ecology of the spirit, a moral ecology in order to unite in the general endeavour for self-preservation and survival. For the purpose, all of us, in the East and West alike, need to depart quickly from the ideologies that disunited humanity, and turn to the teaching of the great spiritual prophets of humanity who for centuries called for unity among people on the basis of universal values and joint creation for the sake of the future. In the West this is Christian teaching with its lofty humanistic precepts, so far no one has come up with anything better. It should be admitted that our code of the builder of communism which we tried to introduce is in effect suffused with the spirit of many Christian precepts. However, it did not take shape, for the entire practice of our

life did not correspond to its content. A realisation of the need for the spiritual and moral perfection of humanity to ensure its survival is becoming so extensive that we are observing a sort of return to the faith, a renaissance of religion. It is not fortuitous that the Moscow ecology forum was attended by representatives of virtually all the main religions and religious teachings of the world.

Yes, the ecology of the spirit is very important and necessary, and work needs to be stepped up in this direction. It should be admitted, however, that the evolution of the consciousness of man and his spirit and morality will not be able to make up for the destructive consequences of technological advance. The onslaught on nature is proceeding so rapidly that it would be unforgivable to pin one's hopes solely on the moral facet of man and not take urgent practical measures to protect the environment.

BY VIRTUE of the fact that for a long time we tried not to pay attention to them, all ecological disasters were heaped upon us from all sides and on a global scope, too. They are the destruction of the ozone layer, the global warming, acid rains, burial of poisonous and radioactive waste, and pollution of water and foodstuffs, to name a few.

The danger of overpopulation is becoming an urgent problem. The Earth's population reached 2,000 million people over the span of 10,000 generations of people, while today it has jumped from 2,000 million to over 5,000 million within the lifetime of one person. Scientists claim that the planet Earth is capable of holding not more than 10,000 million people, but even they will create a serious strain on the environment. Given today's population growth rate, this point will be reached as early as the beginning of the third millennium. What next? Are we Soviets, say, justified in considering as heroism the birth of ten or more children, who are doomed to poverty and antisanitary conditions what with the lack of housing, food, clothing and other consumer goods?

The uncontrolled development of civilisation and man's barbaric attitude to the environment have led to a situation where there is not a single secluded place untouched by civilisation, not a single plant, animal or person, not a single drop of water, or food remaining in its natural, pristine purity. The result of this is a slowing down of the mental development of people and an increase in traditional diseases and the appearance of new ones. The genotype of man is being deformed and destroyed. Nature is as if taking revenge on man and fighting him in order to make him less dangerous for itself.

THE RECORD of world development has clearly shown that, regrettably, there is no political system or development model that would guarantee in and of itself ecological prosperity and a harmony between man and society, on the one hand, and the habitat, on the other. Although it has proven its high effectiveness in providing the population with material boons and services and comfortable living conditions, and although it has created a society of constantly growing consumption, the Western model has not been able to blend in with the environment and ensure preservation of nature; it has proven to be destructive for it. Western and Eastern ecologists, religious leaders and representatives of developing countries are becoming more critical of the Western model in its present form as being anti-ecological and not ensuring the survival of civilisation.

Our, Soviet, model, which we have followed up to now and from which we are trying to depart during the course of perestroika, is also anti-ecological and inadequate to meet the needs of the normal development of the individual and society. For one thing, most importantly, this model has proven incapable of providing the population with the requisite level of material goods and services at any stage in its 70-year existence, it has functioned with constant intensiveness of all its structures and also manpower and material resources and, having been brought to other countries, has not proven itself in any of them, which is why it has not become firmly entrenched on Earth. For another, the structures of this Soviet model not only have not blended into the environment; they have proved more destructive for it than the Western ones.

Obviously, the question is arising of the need to develop a new and all-purpose development model that would ensure countries and peoples rapid attainment of an adequate level of well-being with harmonious relations with the environment being maintained, and would guarantee preservation and reproduction of nature and the survival of civilisation. What with the absence of such a model in the East European countries and in our country, too, for that matter, we are observing a tendency towards copying the Western model. It appears that in advancing along this path we will not catch up to the West, for it will also be making progress. While we are catching up it will shoot far ahead. Therefore, we indeed need other development models that would lead to the rapid self-sufficiency of the country and the creation of the optimal standard of living and of self-regulating ties with the environment.

It is quite obvious from the ecological standpoint and for the sake of civilisation's survival that neither we nor the rest of the world can afford to blindly copy the specifics of production and consumption typical of advanced Western societies. The world simply does not have the resources and the space where the wastes of such a civilisation could be sent.

THE TASK at hand is to teach as soon as possible the current generation, especially children, the simple truth that by destroying nature they are destroying themselves, their children and the generations to come. It is important for humanity to take account of the entire experience amassed in the ecological field, as people who do not remember their history will make the same mistakes.

Development of an international strategy of survival is the overriding task facing the world community. Radical reorientation of the economic development of individual countries and human civilisation as a whole, and of the world's material resources and means, and self-limitation and a rational approach to natural resources should be the focal point of this strategy. It should ensure economic development, which used to be tackled by the method of trial and error over a lengthy historical period, over a very short span with minimal damage to the environment. It cannot but be admitted that this task is unprecedented in its complexity, so the entire world's intellectual potential should be mobilised to tackle it.

The point at issue is the elaboration of a strategy of the ecological survival of humanity. The main prerequisite for the solution of this problem is support by the world public at large, governments and international organisations, the involvement of all the media, and the creation of an educational network.

It is high time to work out an international ecological code of behaviour that would be studied from the first grade in all the schools across the planet.

We need to create a mechanism of world monitoring and control of the state of the environment. We should think about instituting an international ecological court or tribunal. Of course, a spiritual leader can impel industrialist to concern themselves, the losses notwithstanding, with the purity of the air and rivers, and instil in people a careful attitude to nature by appealing to their moral instincts. It should be admitted, however, that today we cannot do without legislative measures.

The formation of a global mechanism to protect the biosphere requires the creation of ramified organisational and technological structures, which in turn demands enormous expenditures. The military organisations of countries possess good possibilities for taking immediate and effective measures in the ecological field, and a special role could be played by the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, especially in emergencies (accidents, natural disasters, etc.). The two military alliances and the military organisations of the biggest countries possess a well organised structure of transport and all types of communication, including space communication, and dispose of top-class specialists in many fields. Why not use this enormous potential in the ecological sphere and carry out conversion along these lines? Special subdivisions could be set up even now within the framework of both military alliances, or international forces formed to render rapid assistance in the event of different disasters or catastrophes on any point on the globe. The participation of Soviet chemical defence troops in dealing with the Chernobyl disaster proved very effective.

Back in the 1920s the Soviet thinker N. Fyodorov called for efforts to turn the army away from destruction and towards creation, so that it would engage not in struggle and the destruction of people, but in the destruction of natural evils. Evidently the time for this has long come.

Disarmament is an important source of funds for ecological needs. Future agreements in this sphere could include special articles providing for joint international projects in ecology to be financed with the funds released from disarmament and also prohibiting the use of disarmament funds for upgrading weaponry.

Measures to prevent ships and submarines from plowing the seas and oceans and aircraft from taking off with nuclear warheads on board could be a big step in environment protection. Otherwise the death-dealing stockpiles of lost warheads lying on the beds of seas and oceans will continue to grow.

Some countries must stop locating in other countries ecologically harmful factories, deployment of which is prohibited in Western Europe, the USA and Canada. It is important to realise that ridding oneself from toxins is only a temporary measure; it is a boomerang which will come back sooner or later. Today we can break the dangerous trends in ecology and halt the dangerous movement to a disaster only if each person and each state treats every place on the green globe, no matter how far away it may be, like his own garden. Each person should realise that our Earth is our common home, and that defiling or otherwise harming it in one place ultimately does damage to it as a whole. We are living on a globe and must understand our interrelation and interdependence and the fact that the Earth is our common abode and we must concern ourselves with its well-being together.

THE EARTH and civilisation are an integral live, pulsating organism, and humanity today is the collective mind of this organism. This means that an illness—physical, spiritual or moral—that appeared in one place can gradually spread to the entire organism. The mob effect comes into

play, and it does so where the people is passive and subordinated to the mob law. Let us recall how the virus of nazism struck one of the most advanced and enlightened nations of Europe and the world. Or how the virus of Stalinism infected our country. These phenomena still need to be analysed appropriately.

Humanity is nothing more than a part of the biosphere, and it should determine its place in it. To do so we need to give an answer in the immediate future—this is now obvious to everyone, politicians included—to very complicated questions. What are the limits of the industrial growth of civilisation? What are the limits of demographic growth? How can the problem of resource saving be solved? How can the biological diversity on our planet be preserved? And so on.

As Lester Brown, the president of Worldwatch, an independent global ecological expertise institute, said, the conclusion of the cold war put an end to ideological thinking. The time has come for new thinking—ecological thinking. This means that the people of the Earth need to “green” more quickly. This applies the most to the industrialists—the people who do the most harm to the biosphere today. Their voice was not very prominent at the Moscow forum. Nor were the military very visible at the forum. This is unfortunate!

Nearly a third of the Earth population in all continents could watch and hear the appeals of the Moscow ecological forum via the international TV network. The Declaration and Action Plan adopted by the forum are based on the call upon all the nations to cede some of their sovereignty and rights so that we do our duty before all the living things on the planet. A number of specific international actions have been mapped in the field of ecology. Yet, it can hardly be expected of the forum to have started the chain reaction of our realisation that we all share a common responsibility for the Earth. The civilisation's machinery possesses vast power of inertia; to overcome it, international effort must be built up to promote fervent mobilisation and interaction of people on the global scale.

All the same, the 1990 Moscow Global Forum on Environment and Development for Survival showed that the movement towards conciliarity, towards unity of humanity against the common ecological threat is gaining momentum. However, we are still at the very beginning of the path, and we are moving very slowly. We want to tell everyone that we must not be late, the rate at which the biosphere is being destroyed is greatly outstripping people's efforts for salvation and survival.

The Soviet approaches and ideas in the ecological field were set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev in his address to the participants in the Moscow ecological forum at its final session, held in the Kremlin. They evoked a most lively and positive reaction on the part of the diverse audience of delegates from all parts of the globe and were a worthy conclusion of the forum itself.

It would seem that if we analyse the proceedings of numerous international conferences, symposiums and other forums on ecology, there exists, if not a consensus, then a solid understanding and readiness not only in the scientific community and among the public at large, but also on the level of governments to work to save the planet. However, when it gets down to practice, energetic and effective actions have yet to be taken both internationally and within individual countries. The task at hand is, while maintaining efforts on the political level, to concentrate on carrying out realistic, specific measures in the ecological field, above all where this does not brook delay.

AND YET, the civilisation of this Earth shall not be able to solve the problems of its survival and well-being, to carry on its historically cognised and oriented development, and to realise its universal mission unless it finds an early answer to the fundamental philosophical question: what is the meaning of man's life and that of mankind as a whole? Neither appeals to human morality and spirituality nor introduction of most perfect and ecologically pure technologies effective as they may be, are guaranties of right orientation of the mankind's development, and, consequently, of its survival. The life of civilisation cannot be successful as a whole, if it is made up, chaotically and without system, of cells and brilliant individual lives and divided societies, if it has no common universal purpose, no universal compass which would provide understanding and viewing of the profound meaning and direction of life of man and all mankind. Regretfully, contemporary science as yet is unable to supply a clear and comprehensible answer to this question. Nor it is able to explain the mystery of birth and the mystery of death, or whether human life is finite.

Religions and religious teachings provide their own empirical interpretation of the question. However, their explanations are not quite convincing for people as they lie outside human experience and cannot be tried in a lifetime. A universal search for a universal answer to the question is needed. As Fyodor Dostoyevsky put it, "the mystery of human life is not in living but in the purpose of living".

When every person understands and realises deep in his mind the answer to the question, then within the Earth's every denizen there shall switch on the inner natural and universal mechanism of co-evolution of Man and Nature as the decisive factor of the civilisation's survival. Then the Universal compass and universal clock shall be started which are to determine the direction, purpose and tempo of the mankind's development.

EUROPE WOULD BE INCOMPLETE WITHOUT RUSSIA

(Continued from page 89)

tanding and be able to guarantee both the normal development of our country and its truly constructive and effective dialogue with the rest of the civilised world. It is on this, and only this, understanding of the problem that the political, social and cultural figures of all the sides concerned should draw.

¹ A. L. Schletzer. *Nestor*, Part I, St. Petersburg, 1809, pp. XXXIV—XXXV, 177.

² V. O. Klyuchevsky. *The Church and Russia*. Paris, 1969, p. 12.

³ See: J. Wintle. *Makers of Modern Culture*, London and Henley, 1981.

THE BALTIC COUNTRIES JOIN THE SOVIET UNION

(Documents on the USSR's Relations with the Baltic Countries in 1939 and 1940)

International Affairs is completing the publication of documents on relations between the USSR and the Baltic countries in 1939 and 1940. The documents come from the USSR Foreign Policy Archives and from the Central State and Party Archives of the Lithuanian SSR. Most of them are published for the first time.

7. PACT ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC

October 5, 1939

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the one part, and the President of the Latvian Republic, on the other part, for the purposes of developing the friendly relations established by the peace treaty of August 11, 1920, and based on the recognition of the independent statehood and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Party,

recognising that the peace treaty of August 11, 1920, and the treaty on non-aggression and peaceful settlement of conflicts of February 5, 1932, continue to provide a solid basis for their mutual relations and obligations;

convinced that it is in the interests of both Contracting Parties to define the precise terms for ensuring mutual security,

have recognised the need to conclude with each other the following pact on mutual assistance and with this aim in view have designated as their authorised representatives

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs,

the President of the Latvian Republic

Vilhelms Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

and the said authorised representatives, upon the mutual presentation of their credentials, found drawn up in due form and proper order, have agreed on the following

Article I

The two Contracting Parties pledge themselves to extend to each other all manner of assistance, including military assistance, in the event of there arising a threat of attack or a direct attack on the part of any great European power with respect to the maritime borders of the Contracting Parties in the Baltic Sea or their land borders across the territory of the Estonian or the Lithuanian Republics, and equally with respect to the bases named in Article III.

Article II

The Soviet Union pledges to extend assistance to the Latvian Army on easy terms in the form of armaments and other military materiel.

Article III

The Latvian Republic, for the purposes of ensuring the security of the USSR and of strengthening its own independence, shall accord the Soviet Union the right to have, in the cities of Liepaja (Libava) and Ventspils (Vindava), naval bases and seve-

The publication was prepared by G. A. Takhnenko, first secretary of the Historical-Diplomatic Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Final instalment See, *International Affairs*, No. 2, 1990.

ral airfields on the terms of lease at a suitable price. The exact places for the bases and airfields shall be set aside and their boundaries demarcated by mutual agreement.

For the purposes of protecting the Irben Straits, the Soviet Union shall have the right, on the same terms, to erect a shore artillery base on the coast between Ventspils and Pitragi.

For the purposes of protecting the naval bases, airfields and the shore artillery base, the Soviet Union shall have the right to maintain, in the areas set aside for the bases and airfields, and at its own expense, a strictly limited number of Soviet ground and air armed forces, whose maximum numbers shall be determined by special agreement.

Article IV

The two Contracting Parties pledge themselves not to conclude any alliances or to take part in any coalitions aimed against either of the Contracting Parties whatsoever.

Article V

The implementation of the present pact must not, to any extent whatsoever, affect the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, notably, their state system, their economic and social system, and military measures.

The areas set aside for the bases and airfields (Article III) shall remain the territory of the Latvian Republic.

Article VI

The present pact shall enter into force with the exchange of the acts of ratification. The exchange of these acts will be effected in the city of Riga within six days of the day of the signing of the present pact.*

The present pact shall be valid for a period of ten years, and if either of the Contracting Parties does not deem it necessary to abrogate the present pact within a year before the expiry date, the latter shall automatically continue to be valid for the following ten years.

In certification of which the above named authorised representatives have signed the present pact and have appended their seals thereto.

Done in the city of Moscow in two originals, in the Russian and Latvian languages, on October 5, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV

USSR FPA, f. 03a—Latvia, f. 13a

V. MUNTERS

CONFIDENTIAL PROTOCOL

I.

It has been agreed that for the purposes of pre-empting and cutting short any attempts to involve the Contracting Parties in the war now under way in Europe, the USSR shall have the right, in the course of this war, to maintain in the areas set aside for the airfields and bases (Article III of the pact), as separate garrisons, a total of up to twenty five thousand men of ground and air armed forces.

II.

The assistance stipulated in Article I of the Pact shall be rendered at the express wish of the other party, and, with mutual consent, the party pledged to render assistance may, in the event of a war between the other party and a third power, remain neutral.

III.

For the purposes of monitoring compliance with the present pact and settling any issues that may arise, a Mixed Commission shall be set up at parity basis to work out the rules for the dispatch of its business.

In the event of any differences arising in designating the places and boundaries of the bases and airfields, and generally in the work of the Mixed Parity Commission, controversial issues shall be settled by diplomatic means or through direct negotiations between the Governments.

IV.

The present confidential protocol shall be an annex to the Pact on Mutual Assistance.

* The exchange of the acts of ratification took place on October 11, 1939.

between the USSR and Latvia concluded on October 5, 1939.
Moscow, October 5, 1939

V. MOLOTOV
USSR FPA, f. 03a-Latvia, f. 05

V. MUNTERS

8. TREATY ON THE TRANSFER TO THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC OF THE CITY OF VILNO AND OF THE VILNO REGION, AND ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND LITHUANIA

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the one part, and the President of the Lithuanian Republic, on the other part, for the purposes of developing the friendly relations established by the Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, and based on the recognition of the independent statehood and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Party,

recognising that the Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, and the Treaty on Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts of September 28, 1926, continue to provide a solid basis for their mutual relations and obligations,

convinced that it is in the interests of both Contracting Parties to define the precise terms for ensuring mutual security and a just settlement of the question of the state appurtenance of the city of Vilno and of the Vilno Region, which had been unlawfully severed from Lithuania by Poland,

have recognised the need to conclude with each other the following treaty on the transfer to the Lithuanian Republic of the city of Vilno and of the Vilno Region, and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, and with this aim in view have designated as their authorised representatives.

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs,

the President of the Lithuanian Republic
Jonas Urbis, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the said authorised representatives, upon the mutual presentation of their credentials, found drawn up in due form and proper order, have agreed on the following.

Article I

For the purposes of consolidating the friendship between the USSR and Lithuania, the city of Vilno and the Vilno Region shall be transferred by the Soviet Union to the Lithuanian Republic, with their inclusion in the state territory of Lithuania, and the establishment of the border between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic, in accordance with the annexed map, with the border being described in greater detail in an additional protocol

Article II

The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic pledge themselves to extend to each other all manner of assistance, including military assistance, in the event of a threat of attack or attack on Lithuania and also in the event of a threat of attack or attack across the territory of Lithuania against the Soviet Union on the part of any European power.

Article III

The Soviet Union pledges itself to extend assistance to the Lithuanian Army on easy terms in the form of armaments and other military materiel.

Article IV

The Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic pledge themselves jointly to effect the protection of the state borders of Lithuania, for which purpose the Soviet Union shall be accorded the right to maintain, at points in the Lithuanian Republic designated by mutual agreement, and at its own expense, a strictly limited number of Soviet ground and air armed forces. The exact location of these troops and the boundaries within which they may be deployed, their number at each separate point, and also all the other matters, such as economic, administrative, jurisdictional and other matters arising in connection with the presence of Soviet armed forces on the territory of Lithuania shall, in accordance with the present Treaty, be regulated by special agreements.

The areas and structures necessary for this purpose shall be made available by the Lithuanian Government on the terms of lease at a suitable price.

Article V

In the event of threat of attack on Lithuania or on the USSR across the territory of Lithuania, both Contracting Parties shall immediately discuss the existing situation and shall take all the measures which are deemed necessary, by mutual agreement to ensure inviolability of the territory of the Contracting Parties.

Article VI

Both Contracting Parties pledge themselves not to conclude any alliances or to take part in coalitions aimed against either of the contracting parties whatsoever.

Article VII

The implementation of the present Treaty must not, to any extent whatsoever, affect the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, notably, their state system, their economic and social system, their military measures, and, generally, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

The places of the stay of Soviet ground and air armed forces (Article IV of the present Treaty) shall, in any circumstances, remain a component part of the territory of the Lithuanian Republic

Article VIII

The present Treaty, in the part pertaining to the obligations of mutual assistance between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic (Articles II-VII) shall remain valid for fifteen years, and if, within a year before the expiry of the said period, either of the Contracting Parties does not deem it necessary to abrogate the provisions of the present Treaty laid down for the period, these provisions shall automatically remain valid for the following ten years

Article IX

The present Treaty shall enter into force with the exchange of the acts of ratification. The exchange of the acts will be effected in the City of Kaunas within six days of the day of the signing of the present Treaty.

The present Treaty is done in two originals, in the Russian and Lithuanian languages, in the city of Moscow, on October 10, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV
USSR FPA, f. 3a—Lithuania, f. 55

J. URBSIS

CONFIDENTIAL PROTOCOL

1.

It has been agreed that, in order to effect joint protection of the borders of the Lithuanian Republic, the USSR shall have the right to maintain, at definite points in the Lithuanian Republic (Article IV of the treaty), a total of up to twenty-five thousand men of ground and air armed forces

2.

The assistance stipulated in Article II of the treaty shall be rendered at the express wish of the other Party, and, with mutual consent, the Party pledged to render assistance may, in the event of war between the other Party and a third power, remain neutral.

3.

For the purpose of monitoring compliance with the present treaty and settling any arising matters, a Mixed Commission shall be set up on a parity basis to work out the rules for the dispatch of its business.

If on any matter arising in connection with the implementation of the present

treaty, the members of the commission have failed to reach agreement, the question on which no agreement has been reached shall be settled in the usual diplomatic way. In the case of no agreement being reached in this way, the difference shall be settled through direct negotiations between the Governments of the two countries.

4.

The present confidential protocol shall be an annex to the Treaty on the Transfer to the Lithuanian Republic of the city of Vilno and of the Vilno Region, and on Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania concluded on October 10, 1939.

V. MOLOTOV

USSR FPA, f. 3a—Lithuania, f. 55

J. URBSIS

9. LETTER FROM THE USSR CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN LATVIA I. A. CHICHAYEV TO USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV

October 10, 1939

The mutual assistance pact signed in Moscow on October 5, inst., has done something to relax the recently evident tension and confusion in government circles. However, the pact did not bring complete quiet. Together with their government, the ruling classes do not believe in the durability and longevity of the situation that has taken shape since the conclusion of the pact. Fear of Latvia's possible Bolshevisation is connected with the forthcoming introduction here of our military units for the protection of naval bases and airfields. The ruling classes are also afraid of action by revolutionary forces within the country, the grounds for this being provided by the mood of broad masses of working people openly voicing their sympathies for the Soviet Union. There is a conviction within this part of the population that the days of the fascist dictatorship in Latvia are numbered, and that in the near future Latvia will be Soviet. There are rumours of an incipient movement in Latgale for the establishment of revolutionary action committees, in the underground, for the time being.

The characteristic mood of the government circles was expressed in a speech on October 6, inst. by Minister of Agriculture Birznēks, who declared that "even if circumstances have been created in the world which demand of us certain duties and sacrifices, we must still not be downcast and not engage in chatter and empty talk. We must go on doing what we have been doing up to now." That, one could say, is an official recognition of the forced nature of the "sacrifices" the government has agreed to make. Meanwhile, there is unofficially franker talk depicting the conclusion of the pact as a retreat in the face of a threat of the use of force. This mood was expressed by the Commander of the Latvian Army General Berkis in a conversation with our military attache whom he asked somewhat maliciously for what purpose 280 tanks have been concentrated along the Latvian border?

The desire to present the USSR in the role of "aggressor" is also manifested on the part of the so-called democrats, in particular, of some leaders of Social Democracy (Bastian), who have been spreading foul labels about "an offensive by Russian reaction", "the USSR's imperialist schemes", and so on.

But a large section of influential circles (Minister of Finance, Valdman, Chairman of the Credit Bank A. Berzins, among others) have perceived the pact as "the lesser evil", on the plea that it was better to be under the influence of the Russians than of the Germans, because under the Russians the Latvians would still preserve their nationality, while the Germans would destroy not only the national culture, but the Latvians themselves.

The attitude of the government circles to the pact was most graphically expressed in the behaviour of the press, which is under the strict control of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Commentaries on the significance of the pact for Latvia first appeared in the Latvian papers only four days after its signing. Before that not a single paper had expressed its attitude to the pact. But even the printed commentaries were extremely dry and restrained. The newspapers had evidently been given orders not to overdo the description of the pact so as to minimise its value and usefulness for Latvia. In the past few days, the press has somewhat loosened its tongue, and has begun to give greater attention to the pact, but one still does not feel any sincerity or desire to give a real appreciation of the benefits of the pact for Latvia.

It is interesting to note the following fact in characterising the position of the government: it is being said here almost openly that before the conclusion of the pact, the Ulmanis Government tried hard to secure support for its position in Berlin. It decided to conclude the pact only after receiving the answer that Germany had no interests in the Baltic apart from economic interests. The habit of agreeing its actions

with the West European powers appears to weigh on the government to this day.

In contrast to the position of the ruling elite, broad strata of the Latvian people—workers, propertiless peasantry, especially the Russian peasantry, and the progressive intelligentsia—have welcomed the mutual assistance pact with unconcealed joy. We have had telephone calls, received letters and personal calls by people to express their satisfaction over the USSR's greater influence in the Baltic. They express regret about only one thing, namely: the Soviet Union has bargained out for itself too few concessions from the Latvian government. Our friends would like to see Latvia, if not Soviet, then at any rate free from the dictatorship of the Ulmanis Government.

The forced turnabout in the Latvian government's foreign policy has produced here much talk and guessing concerning Ulmanis's intentions. It is being said, for instance, that he intends to set up a coalition government with the participation of the Social Democrats, and among the names of future Social-Democratic ministers are P. Kalniņš and Lorenz. Rumour has connected this with Moscow's demand, allegedly made on Munters during the negotiations in Moscow. There is a similar assessment of the resignation of the Army Chief of Staff General Gartmanis, who had the reputation of a germanophile.

Many proposals have been made in view of the delay in the negotiations on a trade treaty. It is widely assumed that Moscow has deliberately drawn out the trade negotiations in order to worsen the economic situation, thereby causing popular discontent with the Ulmanis Government.

In the past few days, the situation has been complicated by the measure taken by the German government on the resettlement of the local German population to Germany, of which I already informed you by telegraph. You will find more details on this matter in the materials we have been reporting through TASS.

Chargé d'Affaires of the Mission
of the USSR in Latvia
I. CHICHAYEV

USSR FPA, f. 06, r. 1, l. 12, f. 118, pp. 106-109

10. TELEGRAMME FROM THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV TO THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN ESTONIA K. N. NIKITIN

October 20, 1939

I have read the report "The Situation in Estonia" by the Tallinn correspondent of TASS which had been sent to TASS by diplomatic bag. The report shows that its author is trying to play up to the harmful attitudes, concerning the Sovietisation of Estonia. This obvious thoughtlessness on the part of the TASS correspondent in Tallinn could play into the hands only of the enemies of the Soviet Union, into the hands of diverse anti-Soviet provocateurs. The Plenipotentiary Representative must understand this and cut short such attempts in due time. The Plenipotentiary Representative must bear in mind that the USSR will honestly and punctually fulfil the mutual assistance pact and will demand of Estonia to do likewise. The thoughtless and provocative elements generating by their actions rumours concerning the Sovietisation of Estonia and, consequently, concerning the wrecking of the concluded Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance pact must be immediately and firmly rebuffed, with explanations of the true meaning of the concluded treaty. I am giving you, Comrade Nikitin, a reminder of this your elementary duty.

The said correspondent will be recalled by TASS.

20 10 39

MOLOTOV

USSR FPA, f. 059, r. 1, i. 306, f. 2112, pp. 90-92

11. TELEGRAMME FROM THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV TO USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV

October 21, 1939

You, and all the other workers of the mission, including the military attaché, are categorically prohibited to interfere in inter-party affairs in Lithuania, to support any kind of opposition trends, etc. The slightest attempt on the part of any one of you to interfere in Lithuania's internal affairs will entail the strictest punishment of the guilty person. Bear in mind that the treaty with Lithuania will be fulfilled on our part honestly and punctually. We shall demand of the Lithuanian government to do like-

wise. The idle talk about the Sovietisation of Lithuania should be rejected as provocative and harmful.

21 10 39

MOLOTOV

USSR FPA, f. 059, r. 1, i. 299, f. 2064, p. 61

12. TELEGRAMME FROM THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV TO THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV

October 22, 1939

I have informed Katkevicius, who called on me, that:

- 1) we do not object to Lithuanian troops entering Vilno even today.
- 2) we are against any changes in the border laid down in the October 10 treaty, but we do not object to having Lithuanians wishing (I repeat, wishing) to leave Western Byelorussia for Lithuania make use of this right and depart for Lithuania. To carry this out, the Lithuanian government may send a commission to Moscow. A commission could also go to the place where there are those who wish to depart for Lithuania.

22 10 39

MOLOTOV

USSR FPA, f. 059, r. 1, i. 299, f. 2064, pp. 66—67

13. TELEGRAMME FROM USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV TO THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN ESTONIA K. N. NIKITIN

October 23, 1939

You have failed to understand our policy in Estonia in connection with the Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance pact. Your latest coded messages, in particular, today's coded message No. 201, in which you write about the special celebrations and speeches on the day of November 7, and also about the meetings and receptions of navy men by workers' organisations in Tallinn, show that the wind has blown you along the course of the mood of Estonia's Sovietisation, which at root contradicts our policy. It is your duty to understand, at long last, that any encouragement of this mood concerning the Sovietisation of Estonia or even the mere non-resistance to this mood plays into the hands of our enemies and anti-Soviet provocateurs. By this incorrect behaviour of yours you are also confusing Estonians like Pip, who seems to think that he now has to deliver pro-Soviet speeches on November 7. Your only concern should be that our people, including our military men in Estonia, should punctually and honestly fulfil the mutual assistance pact and the principle of non-interference in Estonia's affairs, and to ensure a similar attitude to the pact on Estonia's part. In all the rest, and in particular on November 7, you must not go beyond the usual bounds of the mission work. The main thing you have to bear in mind is not to allow any intervention in Estonia's affairs.

In this connection, you are obliged:

- 1) not to allow meetings between navy crews and ground units with workers and other Estonian delegations;
- 2) give Pip advice on my behalf not to arrange a concert with speeches on November 7, because such a concert could be interpreted by the left-wing workers of Estonia as a symptom of the pressure they desire the USSR to put on Estonia's internal policy, something that would resolutely contradict the principle of non-interference in Estonia's affairs;
- 3) I categorically prohibit you to interfere in the struggle between groups within Estonia, to receive from them or from the trade unions any delegations, etc;
- 4) I put on you the duty to cut short any talk about the Sovietisation of Estonia, as something that is at this moment desirable and advantageous only to provocateurs and enemies of the USSR;
- 5) I believe that at the present moment it is inadvisable to issue an invitation on your part to a delegation of Estonian textile workers for the November celebrations in Moscow;

6) do not display any initiative on the question of Laidoner's visit to Moscow, but inform us if he himself should want to come

23 10 39

MOLOTOV

USSR FPA, f. 059, r. 1, i. 313, f. 2155, pp. 83—87

14. FROM THE DIARY OF THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV

November 3, 1939

At 12 00 I was received by the President, to whom I presented my credentials (the text of the speeches has been sent separately to the Baltic Department). Following the ceremony, and in the presence of the persons who took part in it, there was a 15-minute private audience, in the course of which the President referred to the Lithuanian language, the character of the Lithuanian people, etc. As I was leaving, the President unexpectedly let fall a phrase to the effect that Lithuania's historical destinies have always been closely and in a positive sense interwoven with Russia, and this circumstance was most vividly manifested in the very latest events. I replied that it was a pleasure to hear him say so, and making use of the moment, I remarked that there was a very strong difference between the policy of the old Russia and the present Soviet Union.

USSR FPA, f. 012, r. 1, i. 4, f. 52, p. 56

15. LETTER FROM THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV TO THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV

January 30, 1940

The striving of the Lithuanian nationalists (*tautinkai*) to recapture the domination of the country is at the present moment the most characteristic and principal political phenomenon in the life of bourgeois Lithuania.

Following the severance of Klaipeda, the position of the nationalists, who had then held undivided power, was heavily shaken. In order to avoid a total rout of their ranks and the positions they had gained in the country, they retreated from power, with a good political sense and without waging any battles, ceding it to the mixed cabinet of General CERNIUS. At the recent annual congress of the union of nationalists, its chairman CESEVICIUS spoke of this period with cynical frankness. He declared, in particular, that the CERNIUS cabinet could not satisfy them, and that they had to tolerate it out of necessity.

In October 1939, in consequence of the receipt of the city of Vilno and of the Vilno Region from the USSR, and the signing with it of the Mutual Assistance Treaty, SMETONA'S personal position as head of state and "leader" of the union of nationalists began markedly to strengthen. The nationalists decided to exploit for their own political interests, i.e., to ascribe the success to themselves and to their "leader", the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty, which met with the most positive attitude among broad strata of the working people of Lithuania. Following the signing of the treaty on October 10, 1939, they mounted a broad propaganda campaign, whose main aim was a desire to convince people that the ancient Lithuanian capital had been received without any shedding of blood—thanks to SMETONA'S wisdom and the conduct of the right policy by his supporters, the nationalists. One has to say that they did have some success, and this did do something to improve their own position.

In November they already made an attempt to take a more proximate stand to power. Putting down resistance from opposition groups, they removed CERNIUS from the cabinet, and set up a new one headed by their own man MERKIS. Along with CERNIUS, who was a proxy of the army commander RASTIKIS, they also removed the most stubborn representatives of the opposition groups (BIS-TRAS and others). But at that moment they were not yet quite sure of their strength, which is why they did not dare to take power entirely. While removing rabid adversaries, they still left in the new cabinet representatives of other political groups, but these were men of a different cut, with less commitment to principle, prepared to reach agreement, etc.

In early January 1940, in their reports and speeches at their congress, the nationalists went even farther, issuing public declarations about their switch from defence to an offensive, and making outright statements that power must be exercised by the "national trend", i.e., the nationalists. The speech by the chairman of the union CESEVICIUS was the most frank and striking in this sense. It contained criticism of the CERNIUS government, and also a direct threat to make short shrift of mem-

bers of the cabinet from the opposition to whom it may occur to be guided in their activity by the interests of their own groups instead of SMETONA's instructions, etc.

In mid-January, they switched their offensive to another plane, the plane of easing pressure on the cabinet on the part of the army by removing general RASTIKIS from its leadership. The latter, as we duly reported, had imposed the CERNIUS cabinet on SMETONA. After this, RASTIKIS began greatly to gain in political weight, especially in the groups in opposition (to the nationalists) because he began to come out, ever more straightforwardly, against domination by one political group, and for the creation of a national unity government, i.e., for a coalition cabinet. For this reason he was displeased with the nationalists' offensive drive, in particular, he was also against MERKIS as the prime minister. He voiced these sentiments publicly in his well-known New Year's article, so causing much displeasure in the midst of the nationalists and handing them a weapon against himself. In backing up his view, RASTIKIS put himself in a state of clash with the vital interests of the union of nationalists. A short fight followed, and RASTIKIS fell, having failed to find any strong support from the other groups. RASTIKIS's return to the army leadership in the present conditions is conceivable only if he entirely repudiates his political views.

General Vitkauskas has been called to run the army, a man who knows the military business well, but who has a weak will and stands outside politics, i.e., in terms of the two latter qualities, he is the very opposite of RASTIKIS.

If the nationalists' offensive continues to develop as successfully, we must reckon with a strengthening of political reaction in the country. It was emphasised at the above-mentioned congress that the ideas of the "leader" of the union have been far from comprehended by everyone, that much effort would have to be done to bring about the reverse, etc. In practice, this will mean not only more intense propaganda but also a toughening up of police and administrative pressure.

Additional indications of such a possibility also come from the fact that SMETONA has thrown open the gates to the young wing of the union and has set it in motion. In recent years there has been a constant struggle within the union between the elder and the young generations for power in the union, for lucrative state posts, etc. This struggle greatly weakened the stability of the nationalists' ranks. When starting the new offensive, SMETONA sent the young ahead, thereby temporarily removing the internal dissensions and injecting into the ranks of the offensive fresher forces which are straining to rush forward. To the latter belongs, in particular, the new chairman of the union CESEVICIUS, a man hardly known to anyone until quite recently. These young cadres, among whom there are many so-called dynamists and activists, will undoubtedly leave their imprint on internal day-to-day policy as well.

The nationalists will undoubtedly try to do their utmost to use Lithuania's stable position, which has been created through the presence in it of Soviet troops. They will try to make up for lost time, i.e., to build up their positions, to inject their ideology, to strengthen the apparatus of coercion, without any fear of being disturbed by some third party.

As for their attitude to the USSR and to the treaty of October 10, 1939, it is safe to say that in the present international conditions they will loyally fulfil the obligations of the above-mentioned treaty. The Lithuanian nationalists have a much more sober and realistic understanding of the situation than, say, the Christian Democrats.

However, the same sense of reality will keep making them look this way and that in order to make sure whether or not some kind of changes are coming to a head in the international situation. They are doing so even now, directing their view at the Western front, at Britain and France. They have a subconscious inkling that the Anglo-French bloc will still come out on top. This circumstance cannot but leave on Lithuania's current foreign policy a corresponding imprint in the form of various vacillations and hesitations.

Plenipotentiary Representative
USSR FPA f. 011, r. 6, l. 37, f. 44, pp. 1-4

(N. Pozdnyakov)

16. TELEGRAMME FROM THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV TO USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV

May 25, 1940

I summoned Natkevicius today, May 25, and made to him the following statement, the text of which I handed to him.

"According to a report from Plenipotentiary Representative Pozdnyakov, there were recently new cases of disappearance from Soviet army units of two military men, Nosov and Shmavgonents. We have reliable information that the disappearance of these military men is being organised by some persons enjoying patronage from the

Lithuanian government's agencies who get Red Army men drunk, involve them in crimes and then arrange their flight or destroy them. The Soviet government regards such behaviour on the part of the Lithuanian agencies provocative with respect to the USSR and fraught with grave consequences. The Soviet government requests the Lithuanian government to halt these provocative acts by individual agents of certain agencies of the Lithuanian government and to take immediate measures to search for the disappeared Soviet military men and to convey them to the command of the Soviet troops in Lithuania.

"The Soviet government hopes that the Lithuanian government will meet its proposals and will not force it to take other measures."

Having heard out my statement, Natkevicius tried to convince me that the Lithuanian authorities could not be taking part in patronising the acts indicated in the statement. In response, I asked him to inform the Lithuanian government of my statement.

MOLOTOV

USSR FPA, f. 059, r. 1, l. 323, f. 2222, p. 109

17. TELEGRAMME FROM THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV TO THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVES IN LITHUANIA, LATVIA, ESTONIA AND FINLAND

June 14, 1940

I set forth the Soviet government's attitude to the current activity of the Baltic Entente.

Following the signing by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of Mutual Assistance Pacts with the USSR, the Baltic Entente, whose members, Latvia and Estonia, were even earlier connected in a military alliance against the USSR, far from being liquidated has, in fact, intensified its hostile activity to the USSR and the pacts concluded with it, by also including Lithuania in the military alliance, and has also begun to prepare the inclusion of Finland in it. Prior to the Pacts, the Baltic Entente did not meet for nearly a year. Following the signing of the Pacts, it had two conferences only within a space of three months (December 1939, March 1940). At these conferences, which were in fact, held behind the USSR's back, there was a secret mapping out of ways of fighting against the USSR's growing influence in the Baltic and against the Mutual Assistance Pacts, in particular. The latter circumstance is confirmed by the concerted approach by all the three states to matters relating to the implementation of the Pacts: delays with the signing of individual agreements, attempts to reduce the armed contingent of Soviet troops, etc.

Generally speaking, from December 1939 on, the Entente developed exceptional activity never before evident in the past, and that along every possible line: military, political, economic, cultural, press, tourism, etc. All these measures, both in major and in minor areas, have in fact been and continue to be anti-Soviet.

Over the past several months, there has been an intensification in the Baltic Entente, secretly from the USSR, of coordinated measures of a military character in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Estonia has appointed a military attache to Lithuania, and Lithuania, to Estonia. In November and December 1939, reciprocal trips were made by the chiefs of staff of Lithuania and Latvia. In December 1939, three Lithuanian generals, accompanied by a Foreign Ministry official, travelled to Estonia and Latvia. A printed organ of the Baltic Entente, *Revue Baltique*, began to be published in Tallinn in February 1940, in English, French and German, and one should note, for instance, that in its first issue, the Lithuanian Premier Merkis did not say a word about the Soviet Union and the Mutual Assistance Pact, but made a point of emphasising that all the political obstacles for FULL COOPERATION (meaning also military) between the three Baltic states had been removed, etc.

In connection with the aforesaid, the Soviet government regards the military alliance of the three Baltic countries as a breach of the Pacts, which prohibit participation by the Contracting Parties in all hostile coalitions.

I have made a corresponding serious representation on this matter to the Lithuanian Premier Merkis, who was in Moscow. I report this for your orientation. You will be kept informed of subsequent developments by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

V. MOLOTOV

USSR FPA, f. 059, r. 1, l. 339, f. 2319, pp. 125-126

18. FROM AN ADDRESS BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF LITHUANIA TO WORKERS AND PEASANTS

May 31, 1940

Comrades, all citizens of Lithuania! We all know what immense assistance we have received and continue to receive from the Soviet Union. It has returned to us our capital Vilnius and the Vilnius area. The Red Army stands guard over our independence. It is only owing to the Soviet Union that Lithuania has up to now escaped the terrible war that has already turned into ruins many prospering towns and villages in Belgium, Holland, Norway, Poland and France. And it is against this friendly state that Lithuania's reactionary circles, backed by the organs of the reactionary government, have been staging provocations.* Isn't it clear that these provocations against the USSR amount to provocations against Lithuania, against our people!

These provocations are not simply an "unpleasantness" or a "misunderstanding", as the bourgeois papers have been trying to convince us. The clandestine anti-Soviet agitation, the crusade against all those who speak favourably of the USSR, the unheard-of terror campaign against the Communists, and against workers and peasants generally, and, finally, the provocations with the "disappearance" of Red Army men are all links of a single chain.

All of this shows that the reactionary government does not loyally abide by its treaty with the USSR. It also goes to show that the reactionary circles, which have the crucial influence in the government, have maintained clandestine ties with the imperialists and are already trying to sabotage the Mutual Assistance Pact with the USSR.

We appeal to one and all, irrespective of their views, to protest against the anti-Soviet provocations. We appeal to one and all to struggle for consistent observance of the Mutual Assistance Pact with the USSR, for ever closer relations with the Soviet Union. Lithuania's future depends on that alone. We call on one and all to struggle against the Merkis-Skucas government, which is mainly to blame for these provocations, to struggle for an amnesty for political prisoners, and for democratic rights.

Down with anti-Soviet provocations!

Down with the anti-Soviet campaign!

We demand consistent observance of the Mutual Assistance Pact with the USSR!

We demand the resignation of the Merkis-Skucas government!

We demand that the state apparatus and the army should be purged of imperialist agents!

Russian white guards and all imperialist agents out from Lithuania!

We demand an amnesty for political prisoners!

Down with the terrorist regime!

Central Committee, Communist Party of Lithuania

Translated from the Lithuanian

Published in Tarybu Valdžios Atkurimas Lietuvoje 1940 Metai

Dokumentu rinkinys. Vilnius, "Mokslo", 1986, pp. 73-74.

19. RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC URBSIS

June 14, 1940

Comrade Molotov tells Urbsis that he has a most serious statement to make on behalf of the Soviet government to the Lithuanian government. He reads the statement (see annex) and hands it to Urbsis, emphasising that, after all, the thing to do was to take serious action instead of exchanging pleasantries. The Lithuanian government is still apparently unaware of the full gravity of the situation.

Urbsis asks Comrade Molotov, referring to the extremely complicated and crucial moment in Lithuania's life, to postpone the deadline mentioned in the Soviet governments' statement.

Comrade Molotov replies that he has announced to him the Soviet government's decision, in which he cannot alter a single letter. The statement, Comrade Molotov emphasises, is a serious and categorical one, and no changes or amendments in it are possible.

* On May 25, 1940, Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov addressed the Lithuanian government on behalf of the Soviet government through the Lithuanian envoy in Moscow, pointing to the disappearance of USSR army men from Soviet garrisons stationed on Lithuanian territory, and warned that the Lithuanian government should take steps to end such acts.

Urbsis asks how many additional troops are to be brought in?

Comrade Molotov replies. 3-4 corps

Urbsis asks him to specify the number of divisions. Comrade Molotov replies that it is about 9-12 divisions, and explains that the Soviet government wants to create conditions under which fulfilment of the Mutual Assistance Pact would be fully ensured

Urbsis asks to which points it is intended to dispatch the Soviet troops and, in particular, what the intentions are with regard to the city of Kaunas. Comrade Molotov replies that, in the final count, this is up to the military, but one thing is clear. troops would have to be brought to all the major points, including Kaunas

Comrade Molotov goes on to warn Urbsis that if the reply is delayed, the Soviet government will take immediate and unconditional action. Merkis knows the general state of affairs. He is sufficiently informed about the matter. The matter was discussed on one occasion, on a second occasion, and then on a third occasion, but the Lithuanian government does not seem to have taken any action. It is time to stop joking

Urbsis remarks that the Lithuanian government realised at once that the situation was a grave one. Comrade Molotov replies that no, it did not realise that. He knows and allows that some have honestly abided by the Mutual Assistance Treaty, but the Lithuanian government has been far from it

Urbsis asks whether the Soviet troops will interfere in Lithuania's internal affairs. Comrade Molotov replies in the negative, emphasising that it was the government's own affair. The government of the Soviet Union is pro-Lithuanian, says Comrade Molotov, and we want the Lithuanian government to be pro-Soviet

After a brief conference with envoy Natkevicius, Urbsis asks whether the required measures will be permanent or temporary. Comrade Molotov replies that they will be temporary, but the final answer to that question ultimately depends on the future Lithuanian government. Comrade Molotov goes on to emphasise that the above-mentioned statement of the Soviet government is an imperative one, and if its demands are not met in due time, Soviet troops will be dispatched to Lithuania right away

Natkevicius asks if the Soviet governments' demands are met, will the matters relating to the date for the entry of the Soviet troops, the areas of their deployment, etc. be then agreed with the Lithuanian government? Comrade Molotov gave a laconic answer: "yes, provided that all the demands are met in due time"

Urbsis asks what kind of Lithuanian government would be acceptable to the Soviet government? Comrade Molotov notes that it is difficult for him to give any names, and emphasises that what is necessary is a change of cabinet that would lead to the formation of a pro-Soviet government in Lithuania, a government able not only honestly to fulfil the Mutual Assistance Treaty, but vigorously to fight for its implementation. Then Urbsis puts the next question: how does the Soviet government view the various individual members of the present cabinet? Comrade Molotov evaded a concrete answer to that question, referring to the condition he had just formulated with regard to the future cabinet of Lithuania

Urbsis asks whether there should be a new cabinet by 10 a.m. on June 15, inst., and Comrade Molotov answers that this is not necessary, and that the cabinet could be formed later (the next day, for instance), but on the binding condition that all the demands of the Soviet government are met in time

Natkevicius puts a new question on whether the composition of the new cabinet will have to be agreed with the Soviet government and, if so, in what way? Comrade Molotov replies that it will have to be agreed, and as to how, this can be agreed later, either in Moscow or in Kaunas with the Plenipotentiary Representative. The important thing here, Comrade Molotov says, is that it should be an honest government guaranteeing 100 per cent fulfilment of the Mutual Assistance Treaty. This is something which cannot be expected of the present government of Lithuania. The Soviet government does not trust it and does not think it possible to come to an agreement with it

Urbsis says that he does not see any article under which Minister of the Interior Skucas and head of the political police Povilaitis could be brought to trial, and asks what is to be done. Comrade Molotov says that, first of all, they should be arrested and put on trial, while the articles will be found later. Besides, Soviet lawyers could help in this matter, once they study the Lithuanian Code.

Since time is short, Urbsis asks permission to convey the Soviet government's statement to the Lithuanian government by telephone. Comrade Molotov emphasises that the final part of the statement should be coded. He gives another reminder that he will be expecting an answer by 10 a.m. on June 15, inst.

Urbsis says that as a participant in the talks on the Mutual Assistance Treaty, he is very sorry that no more than a few months after the signing of the Treaty of October 10, 1939, Lithuanian-Soviet relations have reached such a state of tension, and that he is concerned for the future of his homeland.

Comrade Molotov replied that the blame for all that fell on Lithuanian provocateurs like Skucas and others, who were playing an infamous role with regard to the Soviet Union. They are enemies not only of the Soviet Union, but also of Lithuania itself

In conclusion, Comrade Molotov gave a reminder that he was expecting an answer no later than at 10 a m on June 15, 1940.

Present at the meeting were Lithuanian envoy Natkevicius and Plenipotentiary Representative in Lithuania Comrade Pozdnyakov.

The reception ended at 00 22 a m, June 15, 1940.

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 21, f. 248, pp. 38—41.

Annex

As a result of the recent exchange of views in Moscow between Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania Mr. Merkis, and also Lithuania's Foreign Minister Mr. Urbis, the Soviet government deems the following facts established:

1. Over the past few months, there have been several cases of abduction in Lithuania by the Lithuanian authorities of Soviet servicemen from Soviet military units stationed on Lithuania's territory under the Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty, and their torture in order to find out the military secrets of the Soviet state. It has been established that serviceman Butayev was not only abducted, but killed by the Lithuanian police upon the USSR government's demand to hand over serviceman Butayev. Two abducted Soviet servicemen, Pisarev and Shnavgonets, managed to escape from the hands of the Lithuanian police that had captured them and applied torture to them. Serviceman Shutov abducted in Lithuania has not been found to this day. By such actions with regard to servicemen from the Soviet military units deployed in Lithuania, the Lithuanian authorities seek to make the stay of Soviet military units in Lithuania impossible.

That is also evident from such facts, which have become particularly frequent in the recent period, as the numerous arrests and deportation to concentration camps of Lithuanian citizens from among the personnel servicing the Soviet military units: catering, laundry, and other personnel, and also the mass arrests of Lithuanian citizens from among the workers and technicians employed in building barracks for the Soviet military units. Such unwarranted and unbridled repressions against Lithuanian citizens servicing the Soviet military units are aimed not only to make the stay of Soviet military units in Lithuania impossible but also to foster a hostile attitude in Lithuania to Soviet servicemen and prepare an attack against these military units.

All these facts indicate that the Lithuanian government has grossly violated its Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Soviet Union and is preparing an attack against the Soviet garrison stationed in Lithuania under this treaty.

2. Soon after the conclusion of the Mutual Assistance Treaty between Lithuania and the USSR, the Lithuanian government entered into a military alliance with Latvia and Estonia, thus turning the so-called Baltic Entente, within which Latvia and Estonia had alone been linked in military alliance, into a military alliance between three states. The Soviet government deems it established that this military alliance is directed against the Soviet Union. Upon Lithuania's entry into this military alliance, the contacts between the general staffs of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, carried on in secret from the USSR, have been intensified. It is also known that since February 1940 this military Entente has had its own periodical, *Revue Baltique*, published in English, French and German.

All these facts indicate that the Lithuanian government has grossly violated the Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty, which prohibits both parties from "concluding any alliances or taking part in coalitions directed against one of the Contracting Parties" (Article VI of the Treaty).

All these breaches of the Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty and hostile acts by the Lithuanian government with regard to the USSR have taken place in spite of the exceptionally good-will and definitely pro-Lithuanian policy of the USSR with regard to Lithuania, to whom the Soviet Union is known to have handed over on its own initiative the city of Vilno and the Vilno Region.

The Soviet government believes such a state of affairs cannot continue any longer.

The Soviet government deems it absolutely necessary and urgent:

1. That there should be no delay in putting on trial Minister of the Interior Mr. Skucas and head of the political police department Mr. Povelaitis, as those directly responsible for the provocative acts against the Soviet garrison in Lithuania.

2. That there should be no delay in forming a government in Lithuania that would be able and ready to ensure honest implementation of the Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty and resolutely curb the enemies of the Treaty.

3. That there should be no delay in ensuring free passage to Lithuanian territory of Soviet military units to be deployed in Lithuania's major centres in sufficient numbers for ensuring the possibility of implementing the Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty and for preventing provocative acts against the Soviet garrison in Lithuania.

The Soviet government regards fulfilment of these demands as an elementary condition without which it is impossible to ensure honest fulfilment in good faith of the Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty.

The Soviet government expects an answer from the Lithuanian government by 10 a.m. on June 15. Non-receipt of an answer from the Lithuanian government by this time will be seen as a refusal to meet the above-listed demands of the Soviet Union.

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 21, f. 248, pp. 42-44.

20. RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC J. URBSIS

June 15, 1940

Urbsis notified Comrade Molotov that the Lithuanian government had met the demands of the Soviet government, that it had resigned, and that the president had asked General Rastikis to form a new cabinet.

Comrade Molotov told Urbsis that the matter of who was to head the cabinet had to be agreed with the Soviet government. Rastikis was not an acceptable figure. Urbsis said that he had understood from earlier conversations that Rastikis was acceptable to the Soviet government as head of cabinet. Comrade Molotov explained that Rastikis had merely been mentioned in connection with the facts indicating the Lithuanian government's hostile attitude to the Mutual Assistance Treaty, and that he had not been meant as premier.

Comrade Molotov went on to say that he would report to the Soviet [government] the reply conveyed by Urbsis, and that he would then get down with the military to matters relating to the immediate entry of the Soviet troops.

Urbsis suggested that the Soviet side should agree the matter of the entry of Soviet troops with the Lithuanian command, proposed that commander Vitkauskas should take part in the talks on the Lithuanian side, and asked where Vitkauskas could meet the representatives of the Soviet command. Comrade Molotov replied that the Soviet government had been waiting for their answer and had not as yet discussed these practical matters, but he believed that he would be able to answer all these questions within a few hours.

Urbsis once again returns to the matter of a premier. He requests acceptance of the candidature of Rastikis, pointing out that Rastikis has a good name among the population, etc. Comrade Molotov replied that Rastikis was an uncertain and colourless political figure, and that what was necessary was quite a different figure—a definite, pro-Soviet figure. It was high time to make it clear that a sharp turn towards the Soviet Union had been effected in the policy of the Lithuanian state.

Urbsis asks where and when it will be possible to discuss the question of the cabinet. Comrade Molotov replied that this would have to be done in Moscow or in Kaunas. If in Kaunas, it would perhaps be necessary to send over, together with the Plenipotentiary Representative, a special representative of the Soviet government. Comrade Molotov promised to give a final answer after consultations with the Government.

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 21, f. 248, pp. 31-32.

21. RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV AND ENVOY OF THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC IN THE USSR F. KOCINS

June 16, 1940

Comrade Molotov summoned at 2 p.m. today the Latvian envoy Kocins and told him that, as Kocins must have guessed, the question to be raised with him related to the activity of the Baltic Entente. Then Comrade Molotov read out to Kocins the text of a statement by the Soviet government to the government of Latvia, and handed the statement to Kocins (annexed).

Having heard and accepted the text of the Soviet government's statement, Kocins started saying that Latvia's pact with Estonia had existed for something like 10 years and that this had long been known to all. As for Lithuania, it had not joined this military alliance.

Comrade Molotov asked the envoy whether he really believed that the existence of this military alliance did not contradict the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact?

Kocins murmured by way of reply that, after all, the pact had been concluded when Poland had existed*, and asked Comrade Molotov whether the question could not be settled in some other way. He said at this point that Comrade Molotov should know

* This is in the text.

him, Kocins, well personally that he had always favoured good relations with the Soviet Union, etc

Comrade Molotov replied that he knew Kocins and that he had nothing against him personally. He is convinced that not only Kocins, but others in Latvia stood for good relations with the Soviet Union. But the existing Latvian government did not display any good will towards the Soviet Union and whereas the government of the Soviet Union followed a pro-Latvian policy, the Latvian government did the opposite.

In answer to Kocins's statement that he had always asked Comrade Molotov and other functionaries of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs whether they had any suggestions to make for improving Soviet-Latvian relations, and that he had never heard any complaints, Comrade Molotov replied that these statements by Kocins had largely applied to current matters.

Kocins started saying once again that he does not see any grounds for such a statement by the Soviet government.

Comrade Molotov replied that the Soviet government had ample facts. The recent conversations in Moscow with Prime Minister Merkis of Lithuania not only confirmed this, but opened our eyes. We saw that a military alliance against the USSR had been formed behind the Soviet Union's back. The Baltic Entente was very active, having set up its own periodical, *Revue Baltique*, in which Merkis himself wrote of close cooperation among the Baltic countries.

In answer to Kocins's remark that this was cooperation on an economic basis, Comrade Molotov noted that it was said there "and in economic matters". Whereas in Lithuania this hostility towards the Soviet Union was manifested in a cruder form (abduction of Red Army men, etc.), in Latvia action was also taken against the USSR, but in a more camouflaged form.

Following repeated attempts to prove that there were no grounds for the Soviet government's statement, Kocins went over to concrete matters of that statement. He declared, in particular, that the Latvian government was being asked to give an answer at very short notice. Since he himself would like to go to Riga, where he could still do something in the interests of both parties, he asked Comrade Molotov to postpone the deadline.

In answer to that, Comrade Molotov told Kocins that the statement handed over to him was not a personal statement by Comrade Molotov, but a statement of the Soviet government, so that he could not change it himself.

After that, Kocins asks him to elaborate the question of a new government.

Comrade Molotov replied that the incumbent government had to resign, and that the Soviet government would come to an agreement with the president, a point on which instructions would be given to our plenipotentiary representative in Latvia. Besides, someone would perhaps be sent over to Riga from Moscow. The important thing was to abide by the agreement. And if the Latvian government would not agree to that, the USSR government would take the measures listed in the statement.

Comrade Molotov went on to say that he was surprised by the behaviour of Latvia's government and its envoy. The measures with regard to Lithuania had been known the day before, but Latvia's government and envoy were keeping silent as if it was no concern of theirs.

Kocins declared that he found out about the matter only in the morning. The text of the TASS report was received late in Riga as well.

After that, Kocins asks Comrade Molotov how many troops were to be brought into Latvia.

Comrade Molotov replied that he could not as yet give the exact figure, but about two corps. Comrade Molotov warns the envoy that this measure is a temporary one. Later on, when a new government is formed, it could be agreed upon.

At the end of the conversation, Kocins once again asks to give the Latvian government more time for an answer so as to enable Kocins himself to go to Riga next morning, where he would still be able to do something in the interests of both parties.

Comrade Molotov repeated his refusal.

Kocins said before leaving that the day before an armed group of men had crossed the Latvian-Soviet border from Soviet territory and attacked two border posts. As a result, several Latvian border guards had been killed, some had been carried off to Soviet territory, a Latvian border-guard building had been burnt down, etc.

Kocins asked for an investigation of that incident.

Comrade Molotov replied that he would order an investigation of the facts stated by Kocins.

The conversation ended at 2 23 p. m.

Recorded by

S. KOZYREV

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 21, f. 239, pp. 9-12.

Annex *

Note on the document: "Handed over to Kocins at 2 p.m. 16/VI. V. Molotov."

On the basis of factual data at the disposal of the Soviet government, and also on the basis of the recent exchange of views in Moscow between Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov and Chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers Mr. Merkis, the Soviet government deems it established, that, far from eliminating the military alliance with Estonia set up before the conclusion of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact and directed against the USSR, the government of Latvia has even extended it by drawing Lithuania into the alliance, and has been trying to draw in Finland as well.

Before the signing of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact in the autumn of 1939, the Soviet government could still afford to take a tolerant view of the existence of such a military alliance, although it was essentially in contradiction with the earlier Soviet-Latvian Non-Aggression Pact. But after the conclusion of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact, the Soviet government regards the existence of a military alliance between Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania directed against the USSR not merely as inadmissible and intolerable, but as profoundly dangerous and threatening the security of the USSR borders.

The Soviet government expected that upon the signing of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact, Latvia would withdraw from the military alliance with the other Baltic states, and that this military alliance would thus be eliminated. Instead of that, Latvia, together with the other Baltic states, has sought to invigorate and extend the above-mentioned military alliance, which is evident from such facts as the holding of two secret conferences between the three Baltic countries in December 1939 and in March 1940 in order to formalise an extended military alliance with Estonia and Lithuania; the strengthening ties between the general staffs of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania exercised in secret from the USSR, the establishment in February 1940 of a special periodical of the military Baltic Entente, *Revue Baltique*, published in English, French and German in the city of Tallinn, etc.

All these facts show that the Latvian government has grossly violated the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact, which prohibits both parties from "concluding any alliances or taking part in coalitions directed against one of the Contracting Parties" (Article IV of the Treaty).

And this gross violation of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact by the Latvian government takes place at a time when the Soviet Union has conducted and continues to conduct an exceptionally good-will and definitely pro-Latvian policy, scrupulously meeting all the requirements of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact.

The Soviet government believes that such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated any longer.

The USSR government deems it absolutely necessary and urgent:

1 that there should be no delay in forming a government in Latvia that would be able and ready to ensure honest implementation of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact.

2 that there should be no delay in ensuring free passage to Latvian territory of Soviet military units to be deployed at Latvia's major centres in sufficient numbers for ensuring the possibility of implementing the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact and for preventing any possible provocative acts against the Soviet garrison in Latvia.

Soviet government regards acceptance of these demands as the elementary condition without which it is impossible to ensure honest fulfilment in good faith of the Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Pact.

The Soviet government expects an answer from the Latvian government by 11 p. m. on June 16. Non-receipt of an answer from the Latvian government by that time will be seen as a refusal to meet the above-listed demands of the Soviet Union.

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 21, f. 239, pp. 16-18.

22. RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV AND ENVOY OF THE ESTONIAN REPUBLIC IN THE USSR A. REI

June 16, 1940

Comrade Molotov summoned Estonia's envoy Rei at 230 p. m. and told that the envoy must already be aware of what Comrade Molotov wanted to talk to him about. Interrupting Comrade Molotov, Rei replies that yes, he is aware, and that he himself wanted to ask Comrade Molotov to receive him.

Comrade Molotov notes that he, personally, is surprised why the envoy has not done so.

Rei says that the Estonian government has not had time to give him the necessary instructions, for they did not have the full text of the Soviet government's state-

ment to Lithuania. But he was instructed to say that Estonia had no military alliance with Lithuania.

Comrade Molotov interrupts Rei and asks him to hear the Soviet government's statement on this issue. Having read out the Soviet government's statement, Comrade Molotov hands over the text to the envoy (annexed).

Having heard the Soviet government declaration read out by Comrade Molotov, Rei declares that the Estonian government has loyally observed the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact. The envoy recalls that in the autumn, during the talks on the pact, mention was made of the military alliance with Latvia without the Soviet government demanding its abolition. The envoy himself believes that in view of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact, Estonia's alliance with Latvia has, of course, lost its significance.

Comrade Molotov declares that even if this alliance between Estonia and Latvia was ever mentioned, no one ever said that this alliance could be extended. The Moscow talks with Prime Minister Merkis of Lithuania have shown us that the activity of the Baltic Entente was particularly invigorated after the conclusion of the Mutual Assistance Pact. This is evident from the general staff visits, from the formation of a special organ, *Revue Baltique*, etc. There is some kind of fuss over the military alliance, with all the goings-on behind our back.

As for the fact that the activity of the Baltic Entente has increased, Merkis himself openly said as much in his article in the *Revue Baltique*.

Rei notes that the wishes expressed by Merkis in the *Revue Baltique* are no more than wishes.

Comrade Molotov goes on to say that, in addition to the above, two secret conferences have been held in the recent period, an exchange of military attaches was begun, and so on, and so forth. Moreover, we know of statements in connection with the transfer of Vilno to Lithuania and the solution of the Klaipeda problem which put it bluntly that the obstacles to Lithuania's entry into this alliance have been removed. So what, in your view, Comrade Molotov asks Rei, is the military alliance—a joke, or what?

After that Comrade Molotov warns the envoy that if there is no answer from the Estonian government by midnight, the Soviet government will carry out the measures projected in its statement.

Rei asks what points will be occupied by Soviet troops?

Comrade Molotov replies that it will be the main cities of Estonia, including Tallinn.

Rei wanted to ask something and already started saying "couldn't it" *.

Comrade Molotov interrupted him by saying no, no.

Then Rei says that the Estonian government has not allowed any provocative acts, as in Lithuania.

And what about the military alliance, Comrade Molotov asks and adds that he has nothing against the envoy personally and that he is convinced that there are other such people in Estonia. But the existing government in Estonia does not show any good will towards the Soviet Union.

Rei once again returns to the military alliance with Lithuania and says that Estonia has always said no to any hints on the part of Lithuania about admitting it to the military alliance.

Seeing that Comrade Molotov does not keep up the conversation on this point, Rei asks him to explain what is meant by a new government, whether there are any people, etc.

Comrade Molotov replies that the important thing now is to decide the question in principle. On every other point we shall later agree with the president. Our plenipotentiary representative will be given due instructions.

Rei expresses the apprehension that there is too little time for an answer.

Comrade Molotov replies that there is nothing he can do.

Before leaving, Rei asks how many troops will be brought into Estonia.

Comrade Molotov replies that about 2 or 3 corps. Comrade Molotov also warns the envoy that the measure is a temporary one.

Recorded by

S. KOZYREV

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 27, f. 356, pp. 21-23.

Annex **

On the basis of the factual data at the disposal of the Soviet government, and also on the basis of the recent exchange of views in Moscow between Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov and Chairman of the Lithuanian Coun-

* This is in the text.

** Note on the document "Handed over to Mr. Rei at 2.30 p. m. 16/VI V. Molotov".

cil of Ministers Mr Merkis, the Soviet government deems it established that, far from eliminating the military alliance with Latvia set up before the conclusion of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact and directed against the USSR, the government of Estonia has even extended it by drawing Lithuania into the alliance, and has been trying to draw in Finland as well.

Before the signing of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact in the autumn of 1939, the Soviet government could still afford to take a tolerant view of the existence of such a military alliance, although it was essentially in contradiction with the earlier Soviet-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact. But after the conclusion of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact, the Soviet government regards the existence of a military alliance between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania directed against the USSR not merely as inadmissible and intolerable, but as profoundly dangerous and threatening the security of the USSR borders.

The Soviet government expected that upon the signing of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact, Estonia would withdraw from the military alliance with the other Baltic states, and that this military alliance would thus be eliminated. Instead of that, Estonia, together with the other Baltic states, has sought to invigorate and extend the above-mentioned military alliance, which is evident from such facts as the holding of two secret conferences between the three Baltic countries in December 1939 and in March 1940 in order to formalise an extended military alliance with Latvia and Lithuania, the strengthening ties between the general staffs of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania exercised in secret from the USSR, the establishment in February 1940 of a special periodical of the military Baltic Entente, *Revue Baltique*, published in English, French and German in the city of Tallinn, etc.

All these facts show that the Estonian government has grossly violated the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact, which prohibits both parties from 'concluding any alliances or taking part in coalitions directed against one of the Contracting Parties' (Article IV of the Treaty).

And this gross violation of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact by the Estonian government takes place at a time when the Soviet Union has conducted and continues to conduct an exceptionally good-will and definitely pro-Estonian policy, scrupulously fulfilling all the demands of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact.

The Soviet government believes that such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated any longer.

The USSR government thinks it absolutely necessary and urgent

1. that there should be no delay in forming a government in Estonia that would be able and ready to ensure honest implementation of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact,

2. that there should be no delay in ensuring free passage to Estonian territory of Soviet military units to be deployed at Estonia's major centres in sufficient numbers for ensuring the possibility of implementing the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact and for preventing any possible provocative acts against the Soviet garrison in Estonia.

The Soviet government regards fulfilment of these demands as the elementary condition without which it is impossible to ensure honest fulfilment in good faith of the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact.

The Soviet government expects an answer from the Estonian government by midnight, June 16. Non-receipt of an answer from the Estonian government by that time will be seen as a refusal to meet the above-listed demands of the Soviet Union.

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, f. 27, doc. 356, pp. 27-29.

23. RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV AND ENVOY OF THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC IN THE USSR F. KOCINS

June 16, 1940

At 7.45 p.m., I had a visit from Latvian envoy Kocins, who informed me that he had already contacted Riga, passed on the Soviet government's statement to his government, and received the following answer:

1. The Latvian government expresses its readiness to ensure free passage of Soviet troops to Latvia, but in view of a big holiday in Latvia today, many citizens have gathered in the Loukasi area and will stay there late into the night, so that the Latvian government is afraid that the big crowds of people could lead to some undesirable incidents between the Soviet troops that are to enter Latvia and the people taking part in the festivities. That is why the Latvian government requests a postponement of the entry of troops into Latvia until the morning of June 17.

Besides, the Latvian government requests an indication of the routes along which the Soviet troops are to move on Latvian territory.

2 In view of the fact that not all members of the Latvian government are now present and there is no quorum for a decision on the resignation of the incumbent government and on the formation of a new government, the government of Latvia requests that it should be given an opportunity to inform that a quorum would be formed by 8 p. m.

Besides, the president of the Latvian Republic would like to know whom he should contact in the matter of the formation of a new government.

3 The government of Latvia requests that the Soviet government's statement should not be published in the press, for the ultimatum could leave a bad impression. For the relations between the two countries it is better not to publish that statement.

Comrade Molotov pointed out in his reply that the entry of Soviet troops into Latvia could begin tomorrow, on June 17, at 3 or 4 a. m., so that the festivities would not hinder the entry.

As regards the routes along which the Soviet troops will move, Comrade Molotov and Kocins agreed that both sides would appoint their authorised representatives, who would contact each other in these matters. They agreed to name the authorised representatives within one or two hours.

Comrade Molotov told Kocins that the Soviet government would issue a special address to the Latvian government requesting it to instruct the local authorities and the population not to allow any misunderstandings during the entry of Soviet troops into Latvia.

With regard to the government's resignation, Comrade Molotov said that since a quorum would be formed by 8 p. m., Kocins would still be able to give an answer before the time ran out.

As for the president's request to name a person whom he would be able to contact in matters relating to the formation of a new government, such a person would be named.

Comrade Molotov turned down Kocins's request not to publish the Soviet governments' statement. Then Kocins asked Comrade Molotov to postpone its publication for some time. In answer to Comrade Molotov's question for how long the Latvian government would have liked to postpone the publication of the statement, Kocins said that he hesitated to answer this question, for he had been given no indication of the period.

Comrade Molotov promised the envoy to report to the Soviet government his request not to publish the statement, but said that he, for his part, could not promise a positive answer to that question, for this could not be made a secret.

Recorded by

KOZYREV

USSR FPA, f. 06, Inv. 2, r. 21, f. 239, pp. 19-21.

24. RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV AND ENVOY OF THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC IN THE USSR F. KOCINS

June 16, 1940

Kocins came to see me at 10 40 p. m. and declared on behalf of his government that the whole cabinet (6 members) has resigned, except for two members of the cabinet who had not yet returned to Riga. So, Kocins officially notifies Comrade Molotov that the Soviet Union's demand with regard to the government has been met.

Kocins goes on to say that he had been instructed to find out whom the president should contact as regards the formation of a new government.

Comrade Molotov replies that tomorrow, on June 17, Comrade Vyshinsky, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, would leave for Riga, where he will hold talks with the president concerning a new government together with plenipotentiary representative Comrade Derevyansky.

Kocins confirms the Latvian government's decision on a free passage of Soviet troops to Latvia, and says that Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Udentins was being appointed on Latvia's side for contacts with the command of the Soviet troops.

Kocins requests that the troops should begin crossing the border not earlier than 9 a. m., for it will take some time to prepare a reception of the Soviet troops.

Comrade Molotov declares that as for the time of the crossing and the areas through which the Soviet troops will cross Latvia's border, he will give Kocins additional information.

General Pavlov has been appointed authorised representative on the Soviet side.

Kocins then asks about the result of his request not to publish the Soviet government's statement.

Comrade Molotov replies that he has reported the envoy's request to the Soviet

government and that the latter has found it possible not to publish the ultimatum part of the statement

Kocins asks for a communique which would simply say that on the Soviet government's proposal the Latvian government has agreed to increase the number of Soviet troops in Latvia

Comrade Molotov asks, and what about the government?

Kocins replies that it could be said by way of point two that the government of Latvia has resigned.

Comrade Molotov notes that the facts mentioned in the statement cannot be bypassed, and that the statement will therefore be published, but the final part, i. e., the ultimatum, will be excluded. The statement will end with the words that the government of Latvia has accepted the conditions put forward in the Soviet government's statement. The envoy's proposal not to publish the statement cannot be accepted, for this would mean that we are concealing the essence of the question from public opinion, and it would be impossible to understand what the matter is, where this entire question came from, etc. This is all the more undesirable since the question could be given different readings, whereas its essence is perfectly clear: it is the military alliance. What, one may ask, was its purpose, why was it necessary to draw Lithuania into it, etc.

Kocins once again tries to prove that the Latvian government has displayed goodwill to the USSR.

Comrade Molotov notes that there are, of course, people in Latvia who are more favourably inclined towards the USSR. You had General Balodis, Comrade Molotov went on, and he was more favourably inclined towards the USSR, but he was dismissed. And what is the point of all these secret conferences, general staff visits, the establishment of a special periodical of the Baltic Entente, the drawing of Lithuania into the military alliance, etc.?

Kocins declared on behalf of Latvia's government, as he put it, that Lithuania was not in the alliance.

Comrade Molotov remarks to the envoy that "you are saying what your government instructs you to say, and we do not trust this government. You are declaring what your government has instructed you to declare. You are in duty bound to do so, but one should look at things with one's eyes open. The Latvian government's attitude to the USSR was not quite honest, and we have been convinced of this during the recent conversations in Moscow with Prime Minister Merkis of Lithuania."

Kocins once again returns to this earlier statement, the one he made to Comrade Molotov earlier in the day, that he always made a point of asking in his conversations with Comrade Molotov and Comrade Dekanozov whether they had any wishes in the matter of mutual relations between the two countries. And he never heard of any complaints.

Comrade Molotov replies that these questions mostly concerned current affairs.

At the end of the conversation, they agreed that in order to be informed of the Soviet government's measures connected with the crossing of the Latvian border by the Soviet troops, Kocins would be summoned additionally.

Recorded by

KOZYREV

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 21, f. 239, pp. 22-24.

25. RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. M. MOLOTOV AND ENVOY OF THE ESTONIAN REPUBLIC IN THE USSR A. REI

June 16, 1940

Estonian Envoy Rei came to see me at 11 p. m. and declared that the government of the Estonian Republic had accepted the conditions put forward in the statement of the USSR government. The government of Estonia has resigned. Rei adds that the answer was not given earlier because the president was away and it took some time for him to reach Tallinn.

Rei goes on to say that, according to the Estonian Constitution, the outgoing government continues to perform its functions until a new government has been formed.

Rei then asks about practical matters connected with the crossing of the Estonian border by the Soviet troops.

Comrade Molotov replies that he will summon Rei additionally to give him an answer as to when and where the crossing of the Estonian border by the Soviet troops will take place.

Army General Meretskov will be appointed authorised representative on the side of the USSR for contacts with a representative of the Estonian command

Recorded by

KOZYREV

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 27, f. 356, p. 31.

26. TELEGRAMME FROM USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LATVIA V. K. DEREVYANSKY TO THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

18, 1940

It was only on midday on June 17 that our note and the Latvian government's reply were announced on the radio and published in the evening papers. At about 1 00 p m, our advance tank units began arriving in Riga, quickly taking over the city and its key points. The authorities had not expected such an early arrival and rapid action on our part, for at 0 30 p m Ulanis was still calmly driving around the city streets. The deployment of our units has been reported by Comrade Loktionov along his line. Our troops were warmly welcomed by the population, with cries of "We thank you for liberating us from the regime of the dogs, down with the war-mongers", and so on, and also cheers in honour of the USSR, the Red Army and Comrade Stalin. The tanks were surrounded by crowds of people. Red Army men were hugged, kissed and given flowers. In some places, attempts were made to stage demonstrations. Red banners were thrown out of the crowd. There were clashes with the police, resulting in 30 wounded policemen and as many wounded among the population. I am verifying these data. The gatherings of demonstrators were largest after working hours at 8 p m. The movement was a spontaneous one. The Latvian authorities tried to send troops and tanks against the demonstrators, but at our demand these were removed. Our command took measures to establish order in the city. It proved to be enough for our commanders to appeal to the population for calm and order, and within 30 minutes full order was restored and by 11 p m the city was already calm. The night went by calmly. I and our command demanded that the Latvian authorities should withdraw their artillery units from Riga brought in from the camps upon the entry of our troops, allegedly to maintain order. There were virtually no appearances of aizsargs in uniform, but reinforced aizsarg guards and police were stationed in the Latgale suburbs earlier today. Together with the command, I put forward the demand that demonstrations or unrest, if such should occur, should not be subjected to armed suppression. There have been no reports of home arrests on the night of June 18. According to information coming in from the town of Rezeki in Latgale, the Red Army units there were welcomed with particular enthusiasm, with cheers and red flags. At first the authorities did not try to prevent that, but later on the police began to suppress the expressions of enthusiasm and to detain certain persons. This led to clashes with the Rezeki police and aizsargs but there was no shooting. Today, on June 18, people are waiting for the formation of a new government, for the establishment of a new regime in the country and, in particular, whether political prisoners will be freed. There is great animation in the city. Goods and foodstuffs are being bought up on a massive scale. Reports of armed clashes are coming in from the city outskirts and workers' neighbourhoods. All enterprises and establishments, including the bank, the telephone and the telegraph, are functioning normally. Last night we allowed radio broadcasting, on condition that programmes would henceforth be agreed with us and that no reports disloyal to the USSR or the Red Army should be allowed on the air. Earlier this morning we permitted a resumption of the normal work of the port. We have demanded that a special order should be issued banning acceptance of Soviet banknotes in exchange for local currency or for goods at the shops, and this was carried out immediately. We demanded that a special body should be formed to supply our units with all they need, and such a body was set up with General Yartmanis at the head. The president and the ministers are still at their posts.

Derevyansky

USSR FPA, f. 059, inv. 1, r. 329, f. 2263, pp. 189—191.

27. TELEGRAMME FROM USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LATVIA V. K. DEREVYANSKY TO THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

June 19, 1940

The workers of Libava staged a demonstration carrying red flags. The Ministry of the Interior and the command of the Latvian Army ordered the police to prevent the demonstration and called out the garrison. I demanded that the Latvian authorities should not hinder the peaceful demonstration and not use weapons in any event. Not to allow police measures to irritate the people. Our command in Libava, for its part, has been instructed to ensure peaceful passage of the demonstration.

Plenipotentiary representative

USSR FPA, f. 055, inv. 1, 329, f. 2263, p. 198.

28. FROM A REPORT BY USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN ESTONIA K. N. NIKITIN FOR THE PERIOD FROM JUNE 13 TO 25, 1940

June 26, 1940

[] 2 The demands of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the resignation of the Estonian government and the dispatch of additional army contingents to the territory of the Estonian Republic immediately sobered the rulers, dampened the military ardour of the kaikelite-bourgeois circles, and made them agree without delay to the conditions set before them. At 8 p. m. I was summoned by Foreign Minister, Prip, who declared "The Estonian government has agreed to resign and to admit the Red Army to the territory of Estonia in numbers necessary to ensure implementation of the pact." At the same time, Prip informed me that General Laidoner would like to speak to me at the president's request. It was the first attempt by the former government, rapidly reorienting itself, to reform and try to remain in power, retaining its erstwhile positions. General Laidoner informed me that he was acting on the president's personal instructions and in total secrecy, and asked me "Does the Soviet government believe that the Estonian government as a whole did a bad job of implementing the pact and that it should therefore leave the scene or does it see the reason for the insufficient implementation of the mutual assistance pact in certain individuals, who should bear full responsibility for that?" I replied that I can only repeat what Comrade Molotov said when handing the note to the Estonian government, namely the government of the Estonian Republic should resign as having failed to ensure the fulfilment of the Mutual Assistance Pact it concluded on September 28, 1939.

"Since the pact has not been fulfilled, all should answer for it, starting with the prime minister."

Laidoner then tried to find out from me whom the Soviet government would like to appoint as prime minister, for they (the Estonians) did not want to repeat Lithuania's mistakes. I replied that I could not say anything definite on that point at the present moment.

Before Comrade Zhdanov's arrival, the Estonian government held a number of meetings on the situation. They discussed a number of alternative compositions of the new cabinet under the chairmanship of different persons. Rei, Jan Tomisson, Palvadie, and others. Pats is said to have declared at a government meeting that he would not allow the Soviet government to impose its own candidates on him. Minister of the Economy Sepp expressed an opposite view, pointing out that it would be more judicious for K. Pats to accept the USSR's demands without resistance, for the situation could otherwise take a turn for the worse. Rei's subsequent telegramme on Comrade Zhdanov's arrival for the formation of Estonia's new government put an end to all debate on that issue, leaving the glimmer of a hope that they could, perhaps, somehow contrive to retain Rei as head of government (on which they pinned great hopes).

3 News of the coming visit by Comrade Zhdanov and of the Laidoner-Urim government's resignation spread across Estonia with the speed of lightning. The broad working masses rose up at once. In spite of an order issued by commander-in-chief of the army General Laidoner, who banned all meetings, processions and rallies on the basis of the "statute on heightened security", workers at plants and factories began to gather, demanding an opportunity to discuss the Soviet Union's note, for they wished to express their attitude to the Urim government's breach of the treaty with the USSR.

The police began to disperse these meetings, some arrests were even made, but the people, feeling the Soviet Union's support, thronged towards freedom, trying to take part in the solution of this important problem without permission.

There was a characteristic incident in the district of Kopli (a working class district, which had a ship-building yard in the days of the tsar). A Red Army unit was deployed in the district. Old workers gathered around the Red Army men, with young ones coming up and joining in the conversation. Workers openly said: "We are very glad that the Red Army has come", and others asked "I wonder if my son is here? He went away to Russia and he should also be serving in the Red Army."

A plain-clothes man hiding in the crowd cried out: "So what of it, if the Red Army has come? It will be thrown out of here just as it was thrown out in 1917." The workers turned around to the voice, many of them recognised the man, and one worker couldn't help saying "You wore a police uniform only yesterday, why are you trying to change your spots?" The plain-clothes man whistled, a group of policemen ran up to him, seized the worker and began to beat him up. The worker, sure of being protected, seized a stone and hit a policeman. He was grabbed and taken to the police station. All that happened before the very eyes of Red Army commanders, who did not dare to intervene. Such an attitude on the part of the Red Army emboldened the police, who elsewhere arrested 15 persons. Members of the State Duina, Unt and others, intervened and secured the release of those arrested within 24 hours.

4 The arrival of Comrade Zhdanov and a directive from Moscow on the inadmissibility of a passive attitude to police repressions brought about a sharp change in the situation. Large-scale meetings were held at all plants and factories, going on across Estonia throughout the night of June 20. The Laidoner-Urim government saw for itself that it would be unable to retain any positions, for the rumour that the Soviet government itself was taking part in organising the government of Estonia had spread to the farthest corners, everywhere meeting with a sympathetic response, but it had left an entirely wrong impression on some minds. Some people failed to understand our policy, saw the change of government as a revolution, and introduced elements of October into a demonstration on June 20. At 1 p. m. on June 21, we were to visit President of the Republic K. Pääts to present J. Vares-Barbarus as a candidate for prime minister. A demonstration began at midday. Workers marched in step, singing revolutionary and Soviet songs "Wide is my native land", "Katyusha", and others, and carrying their old trade union banners. Constant cheering and cries of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" were heard from the columns passing by the Soviet mission. They were welcomed from the balcony by Comrade Zhdanov.

During the demonstration we went to see the president. We found him in a most distressed state of mind. The reason for this was that before our arrival a workers' demonstration had come up to his palace. The columns stopped in front of the president's palace, and speakers stepping out of the crowd addressed the president with a petition and demands: 1) to remove the Laidoner-Urim government, 2) to free political prisoners; 3) to free the trade unions.

K. Pääts went out on the balcony and told the demonstrators that he could not meet their demands, because that would be up to the future government. At this point, a man stepped out of the crowd and addressed the people: "Do you know me, comrades?" A chorus of voices answered "We do we do!" "And since you know me," the speaker went on, "I tell you that this man cannot be trusted. Divide into three parts: let one part go to the arsenal and seize weapons. Another part goes to the prison and releases political prisoners, and a third, captures the post office, the telegraph, the police department, and so on!" Having heard that order, the demonstrators immediately got down to its implementation.

Having heard this, Pääts was frightened, and when we came in, he was barely able to collect himself and kept repeating in confusion "What a funny people ours is, so unorganised." When we suggested Johannes Vares (Barbarus) as a candidate for prime minister, he accepted it without objection and said in a tremulous voice, "But, please, organise a government as soon as possible and put everything in order." Our visit was over in less than 8 minutes. We spent the rest of the day in finally forming the Estonian government []

11 The lessons of the demonstration

As I mentioned above, the workers' demonstration at 1 p. m. on June 21 turned from the president's palace at the call of one of the speakers: one part went to seize the arsenal, another went and seized the police department, and the third set off towards the prison to free political prisoners. They were joined on the way by other citizens of Tallinn.

The demonstration made stops along the way, short rallies were held, and the advance continued. By about 3 or 4 p. m., the popular movement had gone beyond a mere demonstration. Arms depots were seized, weapons were handed out, and the police dispersed in fear, each trying to hide where he could. The city was in the power of the armed workers and other citizens. What are the reasons why a peacefully minded demonstration suddenly went over to revolutionary action?

The reason is that the hated Laidoner-Urim regime, which had lasted for 20 years, had so embittered the population of town and country that it was ready, given half a chance, to make short shrift to its oppressors. The mere fact that they were out in the streets as free citizens after long years of silence exhilarated the demonstrators to an extreme. There were already signs of excitement when they were passing the building of the mission. K. Pääts put a start to the whole business by his speech, and hot-headed speakers carried it farther. One should mention in this context the head of the political department of the corps Comrade Ivanov, who misunderstood the ongoing events and decided to revolutionise the demonstrators by making an excited speech. Indeed, the speech had a most stirring effect on the demonstrators, while some armoured cars that had somehow found their way among the demonstrators reinforced that mood, and the people, spurred on by other speakers, seeking to imitate Comrade Iva-

mov, went out of bounds. Arrests were made. True, the workers proved to be highly organised. They quickly elected their representatives, who with a red sash over the shoulder sought to restore revolutionary order. Old workers immediately signed up for the guard, shouldered arms, and stood at the head of patrols to protect the key institutions.

Provocative elements took advantage of that, inciting the population to reprisals. The night of June 20 was a restless one. In several places, Estonian officers fired at our military units and tank posts. Shots were heard from the military hospital (the shooting was done by the hospital committee and two Estonian servicemen), shots were fired from the military school (our units had to disarm that school, a total of 400 persons), and the kaikelites fired at the trade mission. Our men and commanders acted swiftly in each particular case to remove ambushes laid by armed officers, kaikelites or other organisations trained for anti-Soviet activity by the former government.

Workers detachments rendered active assistance in identifying and wiping out hotbeds of preparation for armed clashes. Losses were suffered as a result of hostile action, up to 10 Estonian workers were wounded and two or three killed.

In the evening of June 21, Comrade Zhdanov summoned M. Unt and ordered him to stop the revolutionary action and to disarm the workers detachments. Measures were taken later that night, and in the morning everything was quiet. But the former government was so terrified by the movement that it began to phone the mission asking for protection. I received phone calls from General Laidoner and General Kazenkampf, who even asked for an armoured car to protect the defence ministry, which "the crowd wanted to storm".

At around 6 p. m., General Rolberg was brought to the consular department of the mission escorted by a worker representative with a red sash over his shoulder. Having talked to him, we suggested him as a candidate for the post of defence minister.

The conclusion here, in my view, is as follows: 1) the leaders of the workers movement—Unt, Ruus and Andreze—let the demonstration out of hand, 2) we are to blame because our hold on the leaders of the workers movement was not tight enough, and, 3) the head of the political department Comrade Ivanov had no right to make inflammatory speeches calling for revolutionary action.

12 Our tasks at the present stage

Since the Estonian population's attitude to us today is very good and trustful, this trustful attitude should be developed and strengthened, and so, for a start, we shall:

1 Help the new government with our consultations to put its projected declaration into effect.

2 In launching military construction, attract Estonian workers in every way and so help to eliminate unemployment.

3 Unfold across Estonia a network of societies for friendship with the USSR, draw broad worker, peasant and intelligentsia strata into that network, organise a network of libraries, show the best Soviet films, and send our best Soviet artists, singers and musicians on tours of all Estonian cities. Moscow should do its utmost to help us in this effort.

4 In the Russian-language newspaper being organised, start a series of articles on Soviet construction in every field of the people's life (technology, culture and art).

5 In view of the growing volume of work, our apparatus should be increased. I am once again raising the question of the need to open a consulate in Narva, which lies 25 kilometres from Tallinn. We have no spare staff at the mission, we go there extremely rarely, and have not been able to study that region in detail, whereas we shall need it in the nearest future.

6 We need a person to assist the plenipotentiary representative in observing the various Soviet work being conducted on the territory of Estonia.

7 In view of the workers' demands for organising a legal communist party that were made at the rallies, it is necessary to consider this question as well.

USSR plenipotentiary representative in Estonia

NIKITIN

USSR FPA, f. 012, inv. 2, r. 20, f. 205, pp. 33-47.

29. RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT A WORKING PEOPLE'S RALLY AT MARIJAMPOL

June 29, 1940

1 To confiscate land from the landowners together with the livestock and farm implements, and to hand all this over to landless and land-hungry peasants.

2 Immediately to confiscate the property of fugitive enemies of the people.

3 To put a ban on the eviction of people from their abode, and reduce rent to a minimum.

4 To democratise mutual aid funds, improve medical assistance and make it more accessible, especially for low-paid workers; to relieve workers from payments into mutual aid funds.

5 To destroy the syndicates as exploiters of the working people.

- 6 To abolish labour income tax for low-paid workers
 - 7 To review the law on employment, to abolish all kinds of "labour exchanges", etc. and clauses directed against the working people
 - 8 To provide work for the unemployed
 - 9 To introduce an 8-hour working day without delay, and
 - 10 To punish slanderers, speculators and provocateurs
- Lietuvos žinios, 1940, birželio 2. Translated from the Lithuanian
Published in Tarybu Valdžios Atkurimas..., p. 85

30. DECLARATION BY THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT CONCERNING ELECTIONS TO THE SEJM

July 5, 1940

TO THE LITHUANIAN PEOPLE

The People's Government formed after the fall of the Smetona regime has in the short period of its existence already carried out a number of urgent and priority measures to improve the country's political life and break the chains of slavery that had fettered and enslaved the working people of the Lithuanian Republic. The government is now facing tasks that are of no less importance than those of further reorganising the country's life in every area. But before getting down to this work, the People's Government wants to make a report to its people on the work it has done. Then it wants to hear the true will and wishes of the people of our country so as to continue its work in creating a peaceful and happy life for our Homeland on the basis of their initiative and support.

The plutocratic government of the tautininkai and its dictatorial regime, whose only purpose was to enrich the clique, were afraid of people's representatives. That is why they did not call the Sejm for over ten years, and they adopted a law on elections which excluded all clauses containing any mention of democracy or granting certain rights to the Sejm.

The People's Government deems it necessary to elaborate the law on elections so as to bring the Sejm closer to the people, to make it truly democratic, and enable it to express the will of the working people of our country.

In its determination and unshakable desire to carry on its state work in close contact with the people, the government has resolved:

- 1. to issue a new law on elections to the People's Sejm,
- 2. to announce elections to the new People's Sejm,
- 3. to form a central electoral commission,

4. bearing in mind the imperative state tasks, to appoint the elections to the People's Sejm on July 14, 1940.

J. PALECKIS,
Acting President of the Republic,
Prime Minister

Vyriausybės žinios, 1940, liepos 6, Nr. 715

Translated from the Lithuanian

Published in Tarybu Valdžios Atkurimas..., pp. 87-88.

31. TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V. G. DEKANOZOV AND USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV TO THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

July 9, 1940

The election campaign is proceeding at a normal pace. After the supreme electoral commission, district commissions were formed towards the end of the day on July 6. The formation of local district commissions has largely completed on July 8. The supreme electoral commission has already given popular explanations of the election law. The press and radio have been called upon to service the election campaign. Under the plan for the election campaign, a large peasant delegation (about 1,000-1,500 persons) is to arrive in Kaunas on July 11 for a meeting with the working people and the soldiers of Kaunas. We are devoting much attention to this. At this time we intend to open a House of the Peasant in Kaunas.

On July 7, a big rally and demonstration, with up to 80,000 participants, were held in Vilno. The main slogans were "Long live the 13th Soviet Republic", "Proletarians of all countries, unite!", "Long live Comrade Stalin!", etc. About 3,000 soldiers took part in the rally and demonstration in an organised way. A resolution was adopted at the rally with a message of greetings to the Soviet Union and the Red Army.

Candidates to the Sejm nominated by the Labour Union group were then proposed and accepted. After the rally, its participants proceeded along the streets of Vilno in organised columns. Greetings were exchanged between the demonstrators and representatives of the Soviet consulate and command. After the demonstration, there were some incidents. For instance, someone from the crowd gathered near the church invited the passing soldiers to sing church psalms. The soldiers refused. Then people in the crowd began to sing a prayer and threw several stones at the soldiers. Several fights took place at night between representatives of the party of the old Polish government and leftist-minded workers. No serious wounds were inflicted. On July 7, in response to a performance by the Red Army ensemble of the Byelorussian Military District, the Lithuanian Army staged an amateur concert. Lithuanian soldiers proceeded to the concert in organised columns with red banners, flags, political slogans and portraits of Comrade Stalin, Molotov and Dimitrov. The columns of soldiers were warmly greeted on their way. The amateur concert of the Lithuanian Army in effect turned into a rally with the participation of Soviet and Lithuanian servicemen and the local population. The president, some members of the government, and senior generals were present at the concert-rally on the Lithuanian side, and on our side, the signatories of this telegramme, staff members of the mission and of the Soviet command.

A special representative of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs — Ed) arriving to evacuate the Polish internees has today got in touch with the Lithuanian authorities. According to a preliminary understanding, the embarkation and dispatch of the internees will begin on July 10 and end on July 13. It turned out that quite a few Polish officers had in the past been joined by their families. We are trying to assess their precise number, if there are not many of them, we shall evacuate them as well, and if there are many, we shall ask for your instructions.

The monthly wages being paid to Soviet servicemen in Lithuania total about 5 million lit. But there is still an old limit (once established for a single corps) on the purchase of local consumer goods by the special military marketing centre: 45,000 lit per quarter.

The situation is not a normal one: our commanders and men have money, but they are forbidden to buy goods at ordinary shops, while the special military marketing centre cannot meet their needs, for it cannot make significant procurements. I request that the limit on the purchase of local consumer goods by the special military marketing centre should be raised to 5 million lit, and that instructions should be issued to have it fulfilled at once.

It would be a good thing to use the general exhilaration among the masses in the pre-election days to demonstrate Soviet art. With this aim in view, a tour of Lithuania by Soviet artists would be most welcome. I would ask you to give instructions for Mikhaïlov, Lemeshev, Nortsov, Shpriller, Davydova, Ruslanova, Kozolupova, and a ballet group with Lepeshinskaya to be sent over to Lithuania as soon as possible.

**DEKANOZOV
POZDNYAKOV**

USSR FPA, f 06, inv. 2, r. 21, f 252, pp. 6-8.

The document bears this inscription in Molotov's hand: "For Mikoyan I think the proposals to be correct. (The artists should be sent over, if possible.) V. Molotov".

32. REPORT ON ELECTION RALLIES IN THE VILNIUS AREA

July 11, 1940

Numerous meetings and election rallies were held in Vilno and the Vilno area yesterday. These rallies and meetings were attended by large masses of working people, who heard speeches by activists of the Union of Lithuanian Labour and passed resolutions welcoming the new era of the people's freedom and expressing the wish that on July 14 all working people should take part in the elections and vote for the candidates of the Union of Lithuanian Labour.

Such resolutions were adopted at meetings held by:

- 1 Insurance agency staff. Attended by 250 persons.
- 2 Workers and employees of the "Baltic" factories — 80 persons.
- 3 Workers and employees of the electric power station — 100 persons.
- 4 Workers and employees of the city fire brigade — 200 persons.
- 5 Confectioners — 32 persons.
- 6 Staff members of the Maistas society — over 200 persons.
- 7 Tanners' committee.
- 8 Workers building an electric power station at Turnishk — over 100 persons.
- 9 Workers of the Kurland creamery — 36 persons.
- 10 Musicians — about 120 persons.
- 11 Workers of the flax-cleaning plant — 60 persons.
- 12 Jewish workers' choir — about 100 persons.

Such resolutions were also adopted in Olkeniki, Meisagol, Duksty, Podbrodye, Lan-

davarov, the village of Veselyankis, Podbeski Volost, the village of Darguze, Puskarnja, at Olkenkai station, and in Silany

A very active and massive rally was held in Olkenkai on July 9, with 2,000 people present. That meeting passed the following resolution

"We, land-hungry peasants and workers of the township of Olkenkai and its neighbourhood, having met on July 9, 1940, in numbers of more than 2,000 persons, and having discussed the platform of the Union of Lithuanian Labour, recognise it and support the candidates proposed by the Union, who will truly defend the interests of the workers and land-hungry peasants and build a new working Lithuania

"Long live the People's Sejm! Long live our friend the USSR! Long live the Communist Party of Lithuania! "

The central trade union bureau in Vilno (5 Jaksto St) informs all citizens that the following meetings and rallies are to be held in the city later today

4 p m—land surveyors, land improvement technicians and agronomists, on the trade union premises

5 p m—newspapermen, 8/14 Jogailo St (former Jagellonska St).

5 30 p m—disinfection services personnel, and also market-place and public square watchmen, 7 Lukisskaja St, on the premises of the disinfection chamber.

6 p m—pensioners, at the Milda cinema

8 p m—chemists, dental technicians and trainees, on the trade union premises.

8 p m—workers and employees of the Oda tannery, also 5 Jaksto St

8 p m—self-employed and non-self-employed handicraftsmen, at the Milda cinema.

Novaya zhizn, July 11, 1940

Published in: Tarybu Valdzios Atikurimas..., pp 93-95.

33. MOTION BY DEPUTY OF THE PEOPLE'S SEJM A. SNIECKUS TO PUT THE QUESTION OF LITHUANIA'S ENTRY INTO THE USSR ON THE AGENDA OF THE SEJM

Kaunas

July 21, 1940

SNIECKUS Comrade deputies We have accepted the proposal of deputy Grigalavicius on the question of the state structure in Lithuania. I have no doubt that the People's Sejm, as a true spokesman of the people's will and the people's expectations, will decide this question by introducing the Soviet system, the most democratic system in the world, demanded by the whole Lithuanian people. (Applause)

Still we, comrades, would be stopping half-way and would be wronging the Lithuanian people if we were to confine ourselves to deciding this question alone.

All the working people of Lithuania today are demanding that we should join the family of peoples of the mighty Soviet Union. (Applause)

That is why we, deputies from the electoral districts of Kaunas, Vilnius and Sauliai have taken counsel with each other and have decided to propose that the question of accession to the USSR should be put on the agenda.

The introduction of Soviet power in Lithuania cannot as yet provide a firm guarantee that socialist Lithuania will be protected against imperialist encroachments on its existence.

The Lithuanian people, which has shouldered the foreign yoke and the burdens of the war and occupation, knows that such a guarantee of its existence can only be provided by its entry into the fraternal family of the peoples of the Soviet Union. (Applause) []

Comrade deputies, it should be clear to all of us that the Lithuanian people have only one way to follow if they wish to live in happiness and freedom. This way is to join the Soviet Union. Any other way would bring our country to ruin. (Applause)

That is why, on behalf of the delegations of Kaunas, Vilnius and Sauliai, I motion that the question of Lithuania's entry into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should be put on the agenda. (Applause)

Verbatim reports of the People's Sejm

First session, July 21-23, Kaunas, 1940, pp 24-25

Published in Tarybu Valdzios Atkurimas..., pp 101-102

34. TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V. G. DEKANOZOV AND USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN LITHUANIA N. G. POZDNYAKOV TO THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

July 21, 1940

The first day of the work of the People's Sejm ended at 6 30 p m (Moscow time) on July 21

The opening speech by acting president Paleckis was repeatedly punctuated with loud ovations and cheers by the whole assembly addressed to Comrade Stalin, Comrade Molotov, the Soviet government and the Red Army.

Reports were then heard and declarations adopted on the first two items on the agenda

1. On Lithuania's state structure

2 On the entry of the Lithuanian-Soviet Socialist Republic into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Both the reports and the declarations were received exceptionally well

The declarations were approved unanimously to powerful and prolonged ovations by the members of the Sejm and the guests

The work of the Sejm proceeds in an atmosphere of high political enthusiasm, cohesion and purposeful unanimity.

A demonstration of the working people of Kaunas and its meeting with members of the Sejm prepared for today has had to be postponed in view of incessant rain, so that a report on the first decisions of the Sejm will for the time being be made over the radio

**DEKANOZOV
POZDNYAKOV**

USSR FPA, f. 06, inv. 2, r. 21, f. 252, p. 28.

WHAT THE AMERICANS THINK OF OUR PERESTROIKA

The latest *International Affairs* Guest Club meeting was unusual in that the only guest was Alexander Yanov, professor of political science at New York University, who visited Moscow early this year at the invitation of the journal. He is well known in both the United States and our country as an original analyst, and thus made the meeting particularly interesting.

LOOKING FROM THE OTHER SIDE

International Affairs. Perestroika is getting on for five years. Many things have changed over the past years in both our country and the world. We trust the perception of the Soviet Union as an aggressive empire has been discarded for good. The world community, above all the West, has discovered a new Soviet Union, one willing to cooperate on universal principles and take up a fitting place in the family of civilised and prosperous countries. Interest in our perestroika has grown immensely and extends to both our foreign policy, in which we've made visible progress, and our internal affairs, in which we are far from having done well throughout.

We know the gains and miscalculations made by us in the years of perestroika, and we lend an attentive ear to opinions expressed by the other side. As a man of Russian origin who has been living in the West for fifteen years now and has a good idea of the mood prevailing in social and political circles there, how would you comment on the view people overseas take of the processes going on here today?

Alexander Yanov. Let me say to begin with that my attitude is somewhat different from that of the majority of Western scholars and politicians. I don't mean only those who take a hostile view of developments here or are indifferent to them. Their attitude to perestroika may be described when all is said and done as "They made the broth, now let them sup it".

Such is also the attitude of some of my colleagues who have done much to evolve concepts like "evil empire", "totalitarianism", and so on. I believe their whole ideological rhetoric was actually an attempt to fill a theoretical vacuum because they can't understand what is really going on. I tell them that there are two Russias: a Russia of reform and a Russia of counter-reform, a European Russia and a Byzantine Russia. The former had made no "broth" at all. On the contrary, she had always

fought against aloofness from the rest of the world, against isolationism, doing so as best she could

This Russia, the European one is inseparable from the European family and seeks above all a reunion with her family. That she has for centuries been defeated by her twin sister is a different matter. Over the centuries, that Byzantine sister turned out more than once to be equal to subduing her, to keeping her out of the world, to cutting her off from civilisation. But European Russia cannot be blamed for what was her misfortune. Now that she has risen again—for the fourteenth time in twenty generations, according to my estimate—to fight for reunion with her family, how can the family refuse to help?

However, I also disagree with those who, even while taking a positive stand on Soviet perestroika, consider themselves outsiders and prefer to refrain from giving any advice, from what they see as interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign foreign power.

Now how does the West interpret perestroika? To put it in a nutshell, as a global defeat of communism, said to have lost the cold war and the historical contest with capitalism. I'm sure you will agree with me if I say that after forty years of cold war with its pseudo-religious slogans, there is nothing surprising about that ideologised opinion. Even intellectuals find it more convenient to react in habitual terms to the problems they unexpectedly find themselves faced with.

The trouble with that opinion is that it's both essentially ideological and irrelevant, since it doesn't answer the main questions put by perestroika to world politics: How to make this great reform irreversible?

As far back as 150 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville, the French statesman and author, realised that "a time when a people denied political rights obtains them should be regarded as a time of dangerous crisis".

International Affairs. Tocqueville was quite right. Such statements were made long before him. Here is one: "When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them..."

"...See how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws..."

A young democratic system is certainly like new wine. It has a very nice flavour but is also extremely treacherous, for those who aren't used to it, people "intoxicated with freedom", are in for a bad hangover.

This quotation comes from Plato's *Republic*, a treatise written 2,400 years ago.

A. Yanov. Let us, however, come back from hoary antiquity to our troubled days. It appears that currently Western intellectuals and politicians have no coherent concept explaining the rise of perestroika. Hence their sluggish reaction. Hence also certain paradoxes pursuing them.

For instance, many are sure that perestroika is a result of Western pressure on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the same people are convinced that there is no point in helping perestroika because Western influence can't change anything in the Soviet Union anyway.

The Liberals were the first to reverse their attitude. In these past years, they've come to respect the Soviet reformers. They wish them good luck and are worried about their fate. In December 1989, the Liberals' influential *New Republic* magazine gave a danger signal, "The Moscow Apocalypse", on its cover. *The New York Times* write editorially that in the absence of Western aid in meeting consumers' needs, a counter-revolution was brewing in Russia. However, such influential intellectuals

as Abraham Rosenthal and William Safire in the States or Alain Bésançon in France go on calling for an anti-communist revolution.

Noted experts like Stephen Sestanovich, who heads Soviet and European research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, gloatingly assure readers that Gorbachev is beyond help now. The powerful Washington triumvirate comprising Dan Quayle, the Vice-President, Robert Gates, deputy National Security Adviser to the President, and Lawrence Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State, still take a wary, if an intransigent stand on perestroika.

Nevertheless, the issue is not so much the American right but the fact that the liberal intellectuals opposing it are as conceptually defenceless as ever. They would like to help but have no idea how to go about it, what they must do, what doors they should knock at. I wouldn't like to minimise their effort, for they've achieved a lot. It is to them that credit is due for the recent change in the attitude to perestroika on the part of President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker. But what next? How is one to avert the "Moscow apocalypse" mentioned in *The New Republic* or the "counter-revolution" predicted by *The New York Times*?

And here's another paradox: people expect answers to these crucial questions from the very same experts who until recently refused to believe at all in the possibility of "de-Brezhnevizing" Russia and have no idea today what promise a "de-Gorbachevized" Russia would hold for the West. The political potential of the American intellectual community is running idle. An immense reserve of goodwill finds itself untapped.

International Affairs. But what's there to prevent harnessing it? Can Western opinion be made to realise that a successful perestroika is actually important to all, if only because humanity as a whole may be brutally thrown back to a political medievalism should a great nuclear power be overwhelmed by a counter-reform?

A *Yanov*. I discussed this problem in New York with several people who are very influential in the intellectual community. I mean people like Arthur Schlesinger, whose work *The Cycles of American History* brought him fame, Wassily Leontief, the Nobel Prize economist, Robert Silvers, Editor of *The New York Review of Books*, a periodical seen as a literary authority in America, George Soros, the financial magnate who has set up a fund to aid perestroika.

Discussions with them resulted in conceiving the idea of forming a body similar to the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), such as would group outstanding American intellectuals by the idea of helping perestroika in Russia.

You probably know about the CPD, which until recently—the mid-seventies—demonstrated the monumental, not to say the crushing, political potential of the American intellectual community to the world. I have no sympathy at all for its ideas. It saw the "danger" in the African escapades of the moribund Brezhnevism which it regarded as threatening the very foundations of the Western world. The Committee called for a mobilisation of forces to save the West and for an uncompromising confrontation with the "evil empire". Even that phrase owes its origin to the Committee.

The main thing, however, is not the Committee's ideas, which perestroika has torn to shreds long since, but its amazing political activity. It took the Committee a mere four years to rally public opinion against the Carter administration, defeat it in the 1980 elections and bring to power a new team created in the Committee's own image. The Brezhnevists in Moscow helped the Committee, voluntarily or not. When storm clouds gathered over the Committee the Brezhnevists deployed new powerful SS-20 missiles. They applauded Iran's ayatollahs while America

followed with a sinking heart the fate of its citizens held hostage in Tehran. At the crucial juncture preceding the presidential elections, they dealt the Afghan trump card to the Committee, as if they wanted to ease for it the burden of the election campaign.

But since conservatives accomplished that in the past, why shouldn't liberals try their luck today? What could a new, liberal committee on the present danger do today? It could at least neutralise the "intransigent" Washington triumvirate, secure from American bankers loans for the Soviet Union on easy terms (as proposed by Leontief), coordinate all Western ideas of aid to the Soviet reformers, most of which come to nothing at the moment, and above all, evolve its own strategy for an irreversible reform. Of course, the aim shouldn't be to impose it on the Soviet government but to judge its steps competently and be able to offer its own alternatives.

Can it be done? My interlocutors said that a new CPD could in principle be set up. Didn't the West agree before our very eyes to protect Poland and Hungary with a financial shield when they entered a period of crisis? To be sure, the Soviet Union is a far more complicated case. It would be necessary to break much stronger resistance and to challenge prejudices which have taken much deeper root in the West in cold war years. Another aspect of the problem is the long-standing prejudices of the Soviet economic leaders themselves. Whereas the old CPD fulfilled its task with what may be called tangible support from Moscow, a new CPD would have no allies on Moscow's Olympus, to judge by the evidence. It would have to fight on two fronts, against both retrograde people in the States and the Moscow advocates of the old-regime, Maoist doctrine of relying on one's own forces.

International Affairs. The political climate in Moscow doesn't at all depend on "old-regime doctrinaires" which was graphically shown by the February 1990 CPSU Plenum. The number of perestroika supporters has grown substantially since it was launched. Today's realities include the increasing politicisation of social forces. Most of them are in favour of perestroika, reform and even radical change. Similar movements, including new parties in the making, also set the tone in the transformations taking place in the East European countries.

A. Yanov. That's right, but please note the difference between the positions of Moscow and Budapest or Warsaw. The Hungarians and Poles have worked out an effective strategy for political and economic modernisation as well as for bringing the West into that process.

International Affairs. Sorry, but we wouldn't equate Budapest with Warsaw. Besides, it is doubtful that they've worked out an "effective strategy for modernisation".

A. Yanov. Even so, Moscow has no such thing. And I must say that I find that very strange. After all, it was Soviet foreign policy that advanced the daring and startling idea of the interdependence and interaction of the world community as a condition for its survival. Why is it, then, that the Soviet economic policy is following entirely different, fundamentalist, not to say isolationist ideas? Why is it still oriented to surviving all alone, without cooperating with the world community? It's impossible for anyone in New York to explain that striking contradiction in the policy of a reformist government. You can't help an administration that is trying to sit on two chairs.

Another aspect of the matter is: Whose reform programme should be backed, since the Soviet centre-left alliance, the originator of perestroika, is falling apart before our very eyes; since Gorbachev, whose dedication to the reform is beyond question, suggests that a no less dedicated reformer, Yuri Afanasyev, surrender his party card while Afanasyev says that Gorbachev has joined hands with the apparatus; since the programme

for the survival of perestroika submitted by the moderate left to the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies was voted down not only by conservatives and rightists but by technocrats and the reformist centre, or one-time allies of the left; since at the Second Congress the left cast a vote of no confidence in the technocrats' economic programme; since each of the three factions into which the one-time reform coalition of radicals, moderates and technocrats has split is following its own road, having lost its sense of a common goal, as far as anyone watching things from New York can say?

International Affairs. A committee on the present danger is certainly very necessary but why in America only? Haven't five years of perestroika in practice proved to us that we need such a centre primarily here? Watching our current policy of situational reaction, which is similar to useless fuss during a fire, and deploring the absence of an anticipating policy with a powerful reserve of moves carefully calculated beforehand, we realise that we need such a committee and have needed it for a long time.

We need a centre that would pool all that is best in our country in the way of political science, diplomacy, social psychology, economics, ethnography and other independent and deideologised sciences—a quality we wish to stress. We need a *policy* based on information about all inner political trends and all the interests they represent, analysis, consideration and coordination of these interests, a policy involving a search for compromise.

A. Yanov. A good idea—I fully subscribe to it. But I feel that the key issue today is whether the one-time reformist coalition has fallen apart for good or whether it's capable of regeneration. Can there be a compromise between its warring factions in the face of the common fate that would threaten all of them without distinction should the split prove irreversible? I mean a compromise that would enable them to extinguish by joint efforts the conflagration of social tensions, thereby preventing the emergence of ultras on the political scene; a compromise that would enable the reformist alliance to survive.

The problem of the Soviet left is that it doesn't believe in the willingness of the centre to compromise with it. Why should the centre compromise with it, left-wingers ask, since it looks on the left as it might on a tiresome fly and since, in Yuri Afanasyev's words, the space to the left of the centre is neither organised politically nor represents a real force and since nobody has any reason to compromise with it? Those people are affected by an inferiority complex. Nobody reckons with them, nobody takes them seriously. What is more, they are portrayed as opponents when there is talk of danger from the left.

Actually there is no such danger. The centre ought to realise that. If it treats the left seriously there can be a compromise. The problem and difficulty lie in helping the centre get rid of the outdated idea of a "left danger". I don't know yet how this can be done. All I can say is that I think the left is ready to accept a common platform, except that it doesn't believe the centre would ever agree to that.

This is why I hope you will agree with me at least on the need for peace. Not peace with anti-reformers, let alone counter-reformers, but with one another. It's only peace and cooperation between reformers and an alliance between them and their supporters in the West that would make it possible to form a united front in defence of perestroika.

CONVERTING THE FOREIGN POLICY INDUSTRY

International Affairs. Peace in our own house, among perestroika supporters, is an obvious requisite for the progress of perestroika. This task seems to be coming to the fore now whereas at the initial stage of

perestroika it was highly important to provide favourable external conditions for it, a task which we believe Soviet foreign policy has accomplished successfully.

A. Yanov. I've already pointed out that in recent years Soviet foreign policy has been so incontestable and rare a success of perestroika that this is recognised everywhere, both at home and abroad. Those who criticise it at all do so indirectly, in a purely domestic policy context.

I won't go into criticism from the right, which accuses perestroika of having thrown the country's door wide open to Western "depravity". You are well familiar with accusations of that sort. Nor will I praise perestroika any more—I only wish to say what I think it's lacking today.

What leaps to the eye first of all is the appalling distance separating foreign policy from its economic, inner political rear. Conceptually, intellectually and politically the Soviet foreign policy industry has blazed a trail into the 21st century but its rear is still trudging through the 1920s or thereabouts. This can't go on indefinitely. Foreign policy must raise its economic rear to its own level or the rear will pull it down, into the abyss.

At the early stage of perestroika, the chief task was, logically, to bring about a lessening of international tensions. You did it. At the current stage of perestroika, it is an easing of social tensions inside the country that has come to the fore just as logically. What must the Soviet foreign policy industry do in these circumstances? There's no question that it can build up its gains in the world arena and contribute to the common depository, so to say, further dividends derived from arms cuts and world detente. But something more than that is needed today.

Take conversion of the defence industry as an example by analogy. Concentrated in the industry are some of the finest specialists and most sophisticated technologies. Now is the time to put these resources in the service of the national economy. That's already being done, as you know. I think home policy, too, is in need of the intellectual resources of the foreign policy industry now in the van of perestroika. It's another field requiring a sort of conversion.

What else could foreign policy do besides this conversion, besides harnessing the vast intellectual potential concentrated in it and being kept "hors de m  le", as it were? There are controversies over key problems of perestroika between Nikolai Ryzhkov, on the one hand, and Nikolai Shmelev, Yuri Afanasyev, Gavril Popov, on the other. But what's the opinion of Soviet foreign policy? It keeps out, as if the problem didn't concern it since it has its tasks in world politics and is working fruitfully in that area. As for internal affairs, it apparently expects them to be taken care of without help from it. Yet five years have passed without those affairs being taken care of. It follows that something has to be done.

Secondly, there may really be some other obvious things, such as Nikolai Shmelev mentioned in part at the First Congress of People's Deputies. The six to eight billion dollars which the country certainly needs badly today but which goes to Latin American "clients", as he called them. I would add Ethiopia, a country fighting a civil war, and ask whether it makes sense to put perestroika, that is, the destiny of the world as a whole, at risk to ensure that Ethiopia prevents the national self-determination of Eritrea? I suppose the time has come to concentrate on this problem because it's one of those ignored by Soviet foreign policy.

There is yet another idea. It is said that several rocky islands in the Kurile Archipelago could be sold to Japan for 35 to 40 billion dollars.

International Affairs. Is that as simple as that? There's a long-standing opinion on this issue in our society, and a frontal solution is unsuitable. What is needed is probably stage-by-stage advance, such as would give the Japanese people increasing confidence and make them feel cer-

lain that the problem doesn't stand still but is making progress. Also, public opinion in our country should be gradually moulded in the same sense

In his recent address in Tokyo, Boris Yeltsin set out a phased plan for the settlement of the problem. Its gist is that at the first stage we should formally recognise that the problem of the four islands exists. After that we should declare the islands a zone of free enterprise for Japan and sign a relevant treaty with it. At the third stage we should demilitarise the islands, which would take time in view of the likely reaction of our military. The fourth stage should see the signing of a peace treaty. That would necessitate a move by the Japanese side to meet us half-way, for it makes the conclusion of such a treaty conditional on the transfer of the islands to it, as you know

Boris Yeltsin considers that these four stages might take about fifteen years. Lastly, at the fifth stage, the status of the islands could be decided by future generations (that would be in the 21st century).

A Yanov. I realise the importance of taking account of public opinion on the issue. I also realise that the islands have a definite military strategic importance. The military are sure to resist but then the fate of perestroika is at stake *today*, and there's a chance even *today* to obtain the large funds you need so badly. You could make a compromise in these circumstances. Japan wants those islands to be turned over to it, and you should do so for a large sum. In exchange Japan could head a new "Marshall Plan", so to speak. You can hardly expect America to assume that role. Right now it's too poor to do that. What I mean is that it can again make a spurt and is going to try but at the moment it is not in a position to act as a philanthropist helping the Soviet Union.

One reason is that everybody in America is fighting everybody else over what is known as "peace dividends". The point at issue is how the money to be released as a result of disarmament should be spent. George Soros thinks the United States could set aside 25 billion out of that money for the Soviet Union but I don't believe it would. I don't because President Bush wants to stop a gap in his own budget and has firmly said so

Others think America's present infrastructure is in need of modernisation. (Hardly a day goes by without some bridge collapsing in America. They were all built in the thirties, under Roosevelt, and are collapsing now.) Surely with its infrastructure in such a state, America can't compete with Japan or Brazil. It follows that large investments must be made in its modernisation.

A third group, in which Wassily Leontief is very active, says that America lags behind in standard of education, that it's forming no intellectual elite. In other words, it wants that money to be invested in an educational breakthrough for America.

None of those involved in the controversy mention the Soviet Union, and nobody is going to give it anything. That means a plan similar to the one-time Marshall Plan is out of the question. However, it could come from Japan, the other financial centre of today's world. Japan is already doing that for Asia and could probably do it for the Soviet Union, too. It could head a financial consortium, a new "Marshall Plan". But the Soviet Union and Soviet foreign policy refuse to meet Japan half-way.

Summarising what we've said about foreign policy, I wish to stress again that it still has an untapped potential. I feel that it could bring quite a lot of benefit. Most important, it should mobilise its intellectual resources for just that kind of conversion. It can't afford to stay "hors de mêlée" at this crucial stage of perestroika. It needs to adopt a position of its own, meaning also a position on the country's internal problems.

What builds confidence in Soviet foreign policy is deeds, not rhetoric.

It follows that external credibility is bound to grow in step with deepening internal reforms. This calls for steps to carry reforms deeper but right now they are hardly making any headway. I don't mean reforms in foreign policy but reforms inside the country, for the crisis here is gaining in acuteness, with situations becoming increasingly uncontrollable. To end the crisis and deepen reforms, it would be useful to draw on the experience of other countries. This is another sphere in which foreign policy and diplomacy could accomplish a lot.

International Affairs. It's hardly right to draw a line between home and foreign policy. The division is conventional, for there is policy proper, that is, pursuit of the national interest at home and abroad. But, of course, the foreign political image of the Soviet Union is determined primarily by our domestic affairs, and in defending the country's interests at home and abroad, we have to do with qualitatively different audiences. You can't tell which of them is best, they are just different.

I suppose it is safe to say that the chief problem of perestroika lies in our society itself, in the stereotypes conditioning our thinking. We've stated, for instance, that there is no abolishing economic laws by decree, any more than abolishing the law of gravity in one country. But our opponents respond by accusing us of trying to impose alien ideals leading back to capitalism.

A. Yanov. Foreign experience requires an open-minded, nonideologised approach, which has been so typical of Soviet foreign policy in recent years.

Take a look at contemporary capitalism. Why, it is far from what it was at the beginning of this century. It no longer wants to enslave anybody—there would be no point in that. After all, to enslave anybody also means shouldering an additional burden, which Bush, for one, did by invading Panama. That was plainly a foolish thing to do. I don't mean Noriega's throwing down the gauntlet but the fact that America has assumed a new burden. Why, it will now have to maintain Panama. Today it is responsible for the lack of order there, for rampant robbery and an inefficient police. To remedy the situation, the country needs lots of money, credits, and so on.

Present-day capitalism does not have to enslave anybody, thereby shouldering an unnecessary burden. To do so would mean injuring its own interests. This approach was characteristic of imperialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when having a colony was like owning a Mercedes in the United States today. To have colonies used to be fashionable, it earned you prestige and respectability. Nowadays it's all a hopeless anachronism. The only thing capitalism needs today is markets but they can only be won by non-forcible means. I know that capitalism poses no threat. It doesn't want to grab any territories as far as I can say, and besides, it isn't controlled by monopolies of any sort, which is rather the case with the Soviet Union. Your "ministerial" monopolies really have their hands on the government's throat. The government is being held hostage by dozens of major monopolies (ministries), which make not only economic but domestic policy in the country.

Socialism, for its part, is no longer what it was just a few years ago, and many are those who now say it didn't exist at all. Looking back from the heights of today, we realise that socialism split into two wings at the beginning of this century. One of the wings, the Social Democrats, proved equal to expressing the interests of the middle class—not of monopoly but of precisely the middle class. The one that, incidentally, exists in the Soviet Union as well and comprises, along with the most competent intellectuals, skilled workers and peasants as well as, needless to say, the more active managers.

And so, one wing proved its worth. As for the other, it ended up in

impasse. The results are evident. In carrying on perestroika, you are trying to get away from the results brought about by the other wing, which turns out to be historically incompetent.

History has shown the Social Democrats to be a real force. Even now, a hundred years on, they demonstrate an ability to participate in the solution of all problems of world and national politics. They have neither vanished from the political scene nor led their countries to a dead-end. And that is their main achievement. As regards the other wing, it regrettably *has* reached a dead-end in many respects. And that's a universal phenomenon. It doesn't involve the Soviet Union alone but the East European countries as well. Had we been talking in the thirties, you could have said that, for historical reasons, the Soviet Union was a backward country with a backward political culture, and so on. Czechoslovakia, however, was a country with a most advanced political culture but see what happened—the result was the same.

The road which the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe have now taken is not a betrayal of socialism. It isn't leading to betrayal of the fundamental principle of social justice retained by socialism in spite of all. That's a logical and reasonable process, and it's going on at a swift pace. Of course, it is meeting resistance as it advances, and occasionally the resistance is formidable. Even so, "European" Russia is heading for social democracy.

Some twenty years ago, when I was writing a book about the origins of autocracy, I proceeded from the fact that in the 15th century, or when Russia came into being as a nation-state, it was relatively small northern country of the Scandinavian type, with a trading and industrial centre situated in the North. In other words, it was a country of the Swedish or Danish type. So what happened? An empire and a counter-reform stepped in, and then the country began to swell, to grow in size, and took a different road. That's another paradox for you: the country has turned full circle—a circle 400 years long—and is now reverting, I think, to the same, Scandinavian type of political system.

PARADOXICAL HISTORICAL PARALLELS

International Affairs. Since we've touched on history and since you've mentioned a "Scandinavian" Russia in addition to "European" and "Byzantine" Russia, I believe we ought to say that we all know these definitions are conventional. Still, both universal and Russian history abound in parallels. Without crossing, they trace a general trend characterising historical processes and making it possible to bring out similar phenomena which we would do well to grasp.

A. Yanov. Let us try. Let's take tsarist Russia in the early 20th century as an example. Its transformation into a constitutional monarchy after 1905 was undoubtedly a major reform. An equally important reform was the founding in 1919 of the Weimar Republic, which succeeded the semi-absolutist empire of William II. Both reforms were entirely in keeping with what de Tocqueville described as the winning by a people of political rights denied to them before. Thus both states found themselves in a dangerous crisis zone. In this sense, both transitions are comparable to Soviet perestroika.

To be sure, these restructurings could have been interpreted as a defeat of autocratic ideology in Russia and imperial ideology in Germany, that is, in the same way as Western ideologists interpret Soviet perestroika today. But would such an interpretation have helped prevent the counter-reforms that were in the making at the time and actually shook not only Russia and Germany but the world 12 or 13 years after the launching of the reforms?

Let us put it differently: interpreting what was a great reform was useless if it left out the problem of the reforms' survival and failed to tell the public that the glorious year 1919 would be succeeded by a disastrous year 1933, with the West doing nothing.

Here is a further fact of history illustrating the dangerous barrenness of the interpretation of perestroika now prevailing in the West. Let us look at the Weimar Republic in the late twenties. Its economy was disintegrating under the impact of a depression. The masses were polarising fast. The original centre-left coalition, which embarked on a great reform and was the only force capable of making it work, split in two. The Weimar left, or the Social Democrats, no longer trusted the Weimar centre, and the centre despised the left. The resultant political vacuum was understandably filled by extremists and counter-reformers, who were also divided, with the ultra-right furiously attacking the ultra-left and vice versa. In other words, there was still a chance to revive the centre-left alliance which had fallen apart, to reach a workable compromise between its warring factions, to oppose to the ultras fighting among themselves a united reform front as in 1919, to offer the masses a bold strategy for a way out of the crisis.

But the Weimar reformers didn't see the possibility of so bold a manoeuvre because they lacked political experience. Plato and de Tocqueville were right: nothing can be more difficult than the art of using freedom. And the role of Western intellectuals should have consisted in enlightening the Weimar reformers and prevailing on them to make peace. Why didn't they share with the reformers their century-long experience of "using freedom", their strong tradition of compromise, their intellectual perspicacity? In 1929, the world may have needed George Orwell more than twenty years later. Western intellectuals were offered an excellent chance to disclose to the Weimar Left, Centre and Communists their common future in case they allowed the ultraright to take power. Had this been done, all their political differences wouldn't have been worth a rap.

Regrettably, Western intellectuals were so carried away by celebrating the triumph of democracy over the ideology of German imperialism under William II that they missed the chance. Wasn't that a stupendous historical lesson? Nor was it the first. Indeed, the same sort of thing happened a quarter of a century before the disastrous de-Weimarisation of Germany, when, between 1905 and 1917, Stolypin's perestroika tottered on the brink of the precipice. At that time, too, the West did nothing but exult in the triumph of its values over the barbarous tsarist autocracy. Nor did the Western intellectual community realise for a moment that its own fate was being decided in the course of Russia's restructuring and that it would take the West longer than the rest of the century to sup the broth being made in Russia in those years.

Yet it could probably have tried at least to avert the failure of the reform by bracing its intellectual muscles and using its whole political experience.

International Affairs. You are drawing an analogy with current processes in our country in the sense that Western intellectuals missed their chance of influencing "barbarians". You say they missed it because they exulted at the downfall of regimes predicted by them and also because they didn't see the catastrophe threatening them. But the impression created is that intellectual aid from without is rejected for the simple reason that each generation must travel its own path with all the mistakes and setbacks that go with it and that only when it has gained experience of its own rather than skipping this task can it accept intellectual aid as something natural. Until it has done so, it will

see all attempts as encroachments on fundamental principles if not on power.

There is a need for "flexible response" which, being coupled with an ability to accept ideas held "alien" before, creates a situation where bold innovations, truly reasonable risk and even a change of general policy are possible.

A. Yanov. We have no way of knowing whether the course of history would have been altered by the West joining in the restructuring of Russia or the Weimar Republic, by the West's ability to perceive it as an internal affair or a family matter, if you will, on which its own future hinged. All we know is that two formidable historical lessons were lost on it. For even today, when it is faced with a transitional Russia, a Russian restructuring itself, a Weimar Russia if you will, which has posed the same old accursed problems before the West, people there are again rejoicing over victory instead of perceiving the pains of Russia's crisis as their own, of performing the role of a midwife at the birth of a new world. They must draw at least some lessons from history, mustn't they?

International Affairs. What kind of lessons?

A. Yanov. They should at least realise that a time when an imperial superpower is struggling belatedly to shake off the fetters of a political medievalism and when centuries-long autocratic worlds are falling down is a crucial, awesome time. And so it is wrong or even indecent to dance, to celebrate or to drink ideological toasts at such a moment. The hangover may prove terrible. I hate to think what it could be like in this nuclear age.

I've already said that I specialise in the theory of political changes in Russia and the Soviet Union. This theory has revealed to me the mutual antagonism of political regimes in each historical cycle. You must have noticed that at least in the current cycle, which you have watched with your own eyes and in which each further regime was invariably the antithesis of its predecessor and began with "de-": de-Stalinisation, de-Khrushchevism, de-Brezhnevism.

International Affairs. To detect antagonism in political regimes in what you call "historical cycle", there's no need to discover a theory of political change. In fact, all those "de-'s" are essentially normal in the sense that the old is put out of the way by the nascent new. Didn't the change of regime in other countries follow the same pattern? It took different forms, of course, but that's probably beside the point. The main thing is that all the "de-'s" listed by you took place under what turned out to be an artificial political system. It was therefore the political system that imposed up on us forms of political culture in the broad sense of the term, including a distinctive struggle for power with all ensuing consequences, such as "de-". All the "de-'s" preceding today's perestroika came down in principle to overthrowing the previous leader without radically changing the system. As a result, everything turned full circle in the end. Thus trouble is programmed in the essence of the system itself, after all.

A. Yanov. It is important to note that, judging by the experience of similar restructurings undertaken in this century, the country concerned finds itself unable to cross that fatal zone unaided, without intellectual and political support from the world community; that where a restructuring explodes, the whole geopolitical structure of the world explodes with it; that unless the West joins in that process in time, the chances of "de-Weimarisation" increase thousand-fold.

I would present the concept of "de-Weimarisation" or the failure of the earlier 20th-century restructurings, as follows:

Invariably present in *Act I* of the historical drama was an economic dislocation going very deep and leading to a menacing upsurge in social

tensions.

In *Act II*, tensions led just as invariably to the disintegration of a reform coalition. The twilight of restructuring set in, and reformers began shelling each other with heavy guns.

In *Act III*, disintegration invariably paved the way for counter-reformers and hence for the very same ultras who had come onto the political scene from nowhere, so to speak. The day before, nobody had taken them seriously as political opponents but now they turned out to be a force to be reckoned with. A storm was gathering.

In *Act IV*, the centre-left coalition, which had fallen apart for good and whose diverse factions were already involved in an internecine war so deeply as to fear and hate each other, invariably found itself unable to stop the ultras seeking power.

In the *final* scene, the ultras took over the levers of power even though they had remained throughout an absolute minority of the politically active part of the population. End of restructuring. Beginning of a counter-reform. The curtain fell.

According to this scenario, today's Soviet reform has reached a point somewhere between the second and third acts of the drama. And while the early flashes of lightning on the horizon presage a storm, the ultras aren't yet prepared to mount an organised counter-attack. They haven't yet picked a charismatic leader who could lead those disappointed in perestroika. But while counter-reformers still have no leader capable of consolidating them politically, the disintegration and differentiation of diverse factions of the reform coalition has gone far.

International Affairs. The picture you're painting is cheerless, all right. The experience of abortive 20th-century restructurings is instructive and shouldn't be forgotten although they took place in a context different from that of ours. Now that we are striving to take up our place in the family of civilised states, a place befitting a great power, we can benefit in equal measure from instances of joining in world processes that are fit for emulation.

IS A "CONSUMER PARADISE" ATTAINABLE?

International Affairs. We've now come to the main thing agitating both us and, from what you've said so far, Westerners watching perestroika. I mean our economic environment. Everybody is aware of the discrepancy between new political thinking, which has borne fruit primarily in foreign policy, and an economic thinking that is visibly behind it. Five years of perestroika have seen many changes in this respect, too, but the results—

A. Yanov. Yes, the results, or their absence to be exact, are striking.

But let me first give you some personal impressions. On arriving in Moscow this once and getting our baggage, we understandably decided to use a handcart. That's no problem because you only have to pay one ruble. Luckily for me, I had it. But dozens of foreigners who had arrived on the same plane had no rubles. They were willing to pay for the cart in dollars, marks, francs or any other currency but the employee at Sheremetyevo 2 stood pat. He said that they must either pay in rubles or carry their baggage. Now what's one to make of that? Doesn't this country need hard currency that can, moreover, be had almost for the asking?

Now for another fact. I was listening to a captain of the Soviet economy as he spoke with inspiration on television. He said this year consumer goods production in the country would go up by more than 60 billion rubles. It followed that that amount would be snatched out of 300 billion rubles uncovered by goods. How do you like that? He also

aid that in 1990 the state budget deficit would be lowered to 60 billion rubles, which meant that it would stay at the 60 billion mark.

So what will the country have by late 1990? With one hand it will take 60 billion rubles out of its oversupply of money, that is, will redeem it. And with the other hand it will add the same amount, that is, the remaining 60 billion deficit, to keep the oversupply at 300 billion. That means the country won't achieve the main goal, won't make money without which it can neither regulate nor reform the economy. Yet money is the core of the reform. I'm not saying that people have no money to spend. They do, and even more than they need. But there is no money as an instrument of reform, a regulator of the economy.

International Affairs. Let us be precise about certain things. We're talking about different kinds of money, aren't we? The 60 billion deficit is money belonging to the state while the oversupply in question belongs to consumers, that is, individual citizens. I'm not sure it is right to mix them up, using rules of arithmetic like addition or subtraction. We also need to take account of "economic algebra", such as inflation, the possibility of increases in consumer prices and nominal incomes of the population, and so on.

Besides, any reduction in a deficit, especially so large a deficit as in our case, is useful in itself. This also goes for reducing the oversupply of money, because the less of it there is, the less it presses on the consumer market and hence upon all of us.

Of course, those measures would make no essential difference because the deficit would be still there and the oversupply of money would remain too large. It is clear that these problems can't be solved in one year. They will take time, which I'm afraid we are also short of.

A. Yanov. Was there an opportunity to gain time, a valuable "item" in short supply, before the approaching consumer goods shortages actually set in? Certainly. The Soviet Union is neither Poland nor Hungary. It is fabulously rich in natural resources, and besides, it has vast reserves for a rainy day, in case there's a crisis or war. Soviet deposits in Western banks add up to 15 billion dollars. Furthermore, it has four billion invested in land, housing and administrative buildings, a share in mixed ventures, and so on, a gold reserve set by the West at 32 billion dollars and so-called strategic reserves whose amount is unknown to anybody except that it is fantastic.

Now that Soviet diplomats have practically removed the threat of war, why keep all that wealth hoarded up? And what about the nearly 70 billion dollars lent by the Soviet Union to other countries? Western economists estimate that a good half of that money bears interest. Nor is that all. Why, foreign policy gains have opened the world financial market to the Soviet Union.

In these circumstances, it would have been no problem to procure enough money to saturate the Soviet consumer market with Western goods so as to ensure that Soviet workers saw to their performance rather than trying to figure out where they could get a pound of sausage. The oversupply of money in the population's pockets would have been withdrawn, creeping inflation would have been subdued and the black market knocked out. People would have been delivered from humiliating shortages and queues turned into a curse if not a symbol of perestroika, the strike wave would have been headed off and dangerous social tension eliminated.

I grant that it would have been a "consumer paradise" on loan and would only have lasted a few years, but those years would have been enough for you to adopt a new line toward the economy. What the masses would have come to identify with perestroika would have been consumer prosperity, not crisis.

International Affairs. A "consumer paradise", eh? We could settle for much less than that

A. Yanov. The phrase is figurative—let it not jar on your ears. In terms of political science, it means expanding the social basis of the reform.

Besides, a few years of "consumer paradise" would have enabled the Soviet Union not only to join the world economic system but to prepare for a further economic spurt, as Brazil is doing today. Please note that while Brazil's foreign debt is twice as large as yours, that country isn't in bondage to transnationals and, moreover, is fast making its way into the ranks of leading industrial powers of the world.

To be sure, the Soviet Union is treading unexplored ground. After all, this is the first time in history that a country has set out to switch a command economy to a market economy regime. So how can the reformers be expected to do it competently? It's true that the Moscow economic hierarchy has no Shevardnadze but then there is glasnost in the country, and there are healthy political forces and clever specialists.

What can you look forward to now as you cling like Shylock to the gold in your chests and to your deposits in Western banks? Are you to go on keeping them for a rainy day? That rainy day has come, and it's as rainy as can be. Who keeps you from spending that money today to immediately remove social tension?

There is still time, for instance, to balance at long last the country's situation as debtor and creditor on the world financial market, that is, to borrow another 20 billion in addition to what you have and to create the "consumer paradise" you ought to have created in 1987.

Yet some in Moscow still can't understand that it's a hopeless and dangerous anachronism to try to scare the people even in this era of new political thinking by invoking the size of the foreign debt. They stick to the late Mao's dogma, which claims that to draw on the resources of the world community is to court bondage. They still can't bring themselves to follow the example of the East European capitals, which have started a restructuring and don't hesitate to tell their peoples the truth, saying that their countries can't scramble out of a crisis of such proportions without help.

International Affairs. To be sure, wariness of foreign investments still remains a tenacious "public stereotype" of the past. However, it is increasingly evident today that no competitive modern economy can be developed without its vigorous participation in international exchanges. It means one cannot do without inviting investors from abroad. This should not breed any national inferiority complex, for this is a practice the best developed economies resort to.

This is well understood by other East European nations that have embarked on the road of restructuring. In this connection it would be worthwhile to have a look at the ratings that compare attractiveness of the East European countries for foreign investors. The ratings were made by US consulting company Plan Econ which specialises in analyses of East European economies.

The criteria used in drawing up the table include economy conditions of each nation and prospects of reform, inflation rates, size of foreign indebtedness, foreign investment receptivity, profit transfer conditions, market capacity, provision of resources and some others. Each category is evaluated by a five-point system.

The investment rating of eight East European nations is as follows. Czechoslovakia leads by the sum total of points, averaging 4+, next comes the GDR (4 points), and then Hungary (4-). Our country shares the 5th and 6th places with Yugoslavia and is ahead of only Bulgaria and Romania. We score highest in market capacity and a comparatively

mall foreign debt.

A. Yanov. Your public opinion may be unaware that in terms of per capita foreign debt, the Soviet Union ranks last among the East European countries restructuring themselves. The Hungarians owe ten times as much, the East Germans nearly six times. Nor do they fear any bondage. On the contrary, they are persistently seeking further credits. Meanwhile Moscow, which has started it all, seems to be waiting for the very ground under its feet to catch fire instead of making up its mind to stamp out the fire of social tension.

International Affairs. I still think that everybody dreads bondage. Is there any alternative besides seeking credits? Probably not in Poland—not any longer. As for the GDR and Hungary, they seem to have no choice, either.

The situation varies from country to country. If the standard of living in the Soviet Union were to be raised to, say, Czechoslovakia's level, many Soviet people might see that as the advent of a "consumer paradise" while a rainy day as conceived by the Czechoslovaks might be taken by many of us for prosperity. Everything is relative.

The fire must certainly be stamped out as quickly as possible by carrying out, among other things, the measures to put the economy on a healthier basis submitted by the government to the Second Congress of People's Deputies, which didn't accept them without qualification.

A. Yanov. The issue isn't whether the government plan is good or bad, as some of its critics affirm. It is simply that the country can't afford the six-year time frame required for the implementation of the plan.

So what is to be done? I've given the problem a lot of thought and have consulted knowledgeable people. As a result, I want to offer you a three-stage plan aimed at creating a "consumer paradise" for the duration of, say, the time required by the Soviet economic reform.

Here's the gist of the plan. The country needs 400 billion rubles to begin with. Why 400? Because there's a budget deficit of around 100 billion and a 300 billion oversupply of money at the disposal of the population. That money has to be covered by goods, that is redeemed. In terms of prices on the world consumer market, 400 billion rubles is close to 25 billion dollars.

How to get it at the first stage, which is likely to last two or three years? In what way can 25 billion dollars be found without borrowing a cent? By drawing on the country's own resources.

To begin with, the Soviet Union has 15 billion deposited in Western banks, as I've said, and what is more, it's money bearing interest. It is the lion's share of the amount the country needs. By using those deposits as a security, you could borrow 15 or 16 billion and then pay interest on it out of the interest derived from your bank deposits. That would be the first part of the requisite money.

Now for the second part. Extra-bank investments abroad add up to another four or five billion. They wouldn't have to be sold, especially because they are growing in value despite inflation. You should also use those extra-bank investments as a security on which to borrow four or five billion, with interest payable, at least partly, out of its growing value.

Lastly, five billion could be taken out of the 10 to 12 billion at which Soviet strategic reserves to be used in the event of a protracted war are estimated. I've been told that those reserves include copper cable as thick as the human body. It is said to have been buried between Moscow and Yaroslavl thirty years ago. What point is there in letting such reserves lie idle? And who is talking of a protracted war now? I can understand why there was such talk thirty years ago but why talk about it today? After all, the achievements of Soviet foreign policy have taken war, especially a protracted one, off the agenda. It follows that part of the reserves

should be put to use. By including five billion of them in the first package, you would get the 25 billion you need.

Let us assume that the first two or three years will prove insufficient. How to gain another two or three years? Let us say the country at the second stage will require another 16 to 18 billion to prolong the atmosphere of prosperity at home. To obtain this amount, it would be enough to sell half the gold reserve. That would yield 16 billion, which would be important not as money but as food products and other goods that would keep the Soviet standard of living high for a couple of years more.

Should it turn out to be impossible to solve all problems in those two or three years, there is a third way. The Soviet Union should balance its situation on the world financial market as creditor and debtor. This means that while the Soviet Union owes 50 billion, other countries owe it 70 billion. Besides, Western economists describe half of that debt as quite good, meaning regular receipt of interest. That means nothing would be wrong with borrowing another 15 billion so as to prolong the "consumer paradise" for a further two or three years, that is, extend it to the year 2000. If the country fails to reform its economy even by the year 2000, the implication will be that the economy just doesn't lend itself to reform and perestroika is over.

I've discussed this plan with many people here in Moscow, and the discussion was lively.

International Affairs. Economists, and many others are sure to raise quite a few questions. Here is one, by the way: there are fears that these huge sums could be frittered away (this sort of thing is known to our national history, I'm sorry to say). How to spend it effectively enough for economic mechanisms, the market and the money itself to prove their worth? Where should we invest those enormous sums to the best advantage? We fear we could achieve little by making that money available to our traditional "ministerial economy".

A. Yanov. I'm certain that priority should be given to the "alternative" economy, which differs from the shadow economy in that it's perfectly legal and from the "ministerial" economy in that it's perfectly efficient. There you have an ideal vehicle, an infrastructure making it possible to start the whole economic mechanism and operate it at full capacity.

The debate on this theme in Soviet society reveals a wide variety of opinions, including some polar ones. Whereas Gavrul Popov calls for the immediate introduction of a market mechanism into the economy, Nikolai Ryzhkov warns that adopting full-scale market relations in 1990 or 1991 would inevitably bring on a further spiral of runaway inflation, a decline in production, mass unemployment and still worse social tensions.

Who is right in this controversy? I think both. Ryzhkov is right to fear that switching to a market economy at a time when social tensions are at their worst could result in national disaster. Popov is right to contend that introducing right- and left-side traffic on one and the same Soviet street could lead to innumerable collisions and a state of chaos. There is no solution to this contradiction. Unless a third factor is brought in, that is, unless the West is drawn into perestroika, the contradiction is bound to degenerate into confrontation.

The achievements of new thinking make it possible to immediately saturate the Soviet consumer market by getting help from the West. The conflagration of social tension can be extinguished, and the road to a market economy is open.

Needless to say, both sides would have to renounce the extremes of their points of view. One of them would have to overcome its antiquated prejudice against foreign loans, a prejudice dating from the last century and having nothing whatever to do with contemporary economic reali-

es. The other would have to desist from what is in Soviet conditions politically dangerous minimising of the role of the state in the period of transition to a market economy. Strictly speaking, it is a reciprocal renunciation of extremes that could produce a compromise.

What I mean by Western participation in perestroika is financial aid and a willingness immediately to supply the Soviet reformers with consumer goods in quantities sufficient to crush the black market, withdraw the oversupply of money in the population's possession, end inflation and stabilise the ruble. In other words, the provision of an abundance of consumer goods in the Soviet Union, failing which social tensions can hardly be ended in the foreseeable future. To lose time in a crisis situation is tantamount to losing perestroika.

International Affairs. You regard the alternative sector of the economy, that is, cooperatives, farmers, tenants and others, as the best recipient of hard currency and consumer goods. That's unquestionably better than the command system but we should be realistic and admit that our cooperatives haven't yet realised even one per cent of their potentialities. Worse still, what we call cooperatives aren't really worth the name. Nor is this surprising, because a distorted economic system could only produce an evil parody of cooperatives. What we've got is rather artels run on the principles of economic accountability (*khozraschet*), of contract, lease, individual or group entrepreneurship, and so on.

According to the criteria of economic theory, the cooperative movement is a mass movement of major social groups organised according to their production interests or requirements. Before the revolution, we had such an organisation in the form of the powerful Siberian Dairy Cooperation which not only bought produce from the population but supplied it with everything from implements to consumer goods. The cooperation had facilities for the processing, storage and sale of butter and milk not only in Russia but throughout Europe, and many of its products were beyond compare abroad.

There are other instances of such activity in the world. After World War II, food supply in Italy was in almost as bad shape as in our country. But a host of agricultural cooperatives sprang up, and the problem was solved. There was a shortage of housing as in our country but construction cooperatives were set up, and the problem was dealt with just as quickly. (Incidentally, 45 per cent of the able-bodied population of the EEC countries now belong to cooperatives, which account for 60 per cent of the community's agricultural output.)

In short, one has to pay much too dearly for ignoring world experience. The conclusion one must draw is that one needs a network of full-fledged, viable cooperatives honeycombing the whole of society and must consolidate it and establish economic solidarity in it, if you will. One must help them to their feet by supplying them with both hard currency and consumer goods. Afterwards they will operate on their own, and so one won't have to depend on the world for food or other products.

A. Yanov. The Soviet economy today needs something more than an alternative denationalised sector even of optimum dimensions. It also needs to make that sector competitive vis-à-vis the privileged state sector. Primarily it's a question of the ability of farmer (or tenant) agriculture to compete with the collective and state farm sector.

Even if it came shortly to transferring unprofitable collective farms to farmers, tenants or cooperatives, again vast investments and substantial technological assistance would be required for this "inner Poland". This makes Western participation in the proper outfitting of the denationalised sector of Soviet agriculture an imperative of solving the problem of Soviet food supply.

You may take exception to my concept of political modernisation, my

assessment of the current stage of perestroika and the recommendations flowing from it. You may even say like Leo Tolstoy did, speaking of Leonid Andreyev, that I'm trying to frighten you but you aren't frightened. But I have no intention at all of playing the role of a prophet. What I propose to you is merely a political hypothesis.

Regardless of whether or not you accept my proposals, I would like you to be certain that my attempt is disinterested and unofficial. I wish to assure you that the great cause of perestroika initiated by you arouses sincere interest and sympathy among many in the West and that I regard myself as one of them.

FROM MR "NO" TO MR "YES"?

THE APRIL issue of *International Affairs* carries a letter to the Editors from USSR People's Deputy Eduard Gamis. The letter is more like a reflective commentary in which doubts about the advisability of the INF Treaty lead the writer to concern about the whole foreign policy of the perestroika period. The case is put calmly and competently although the conclusions are too rigorous. According to one argument, Mr "No" is giving way in Soviet diplomacy to his antipode, Mr "Yes", who is obliging enough not only to compromise but to go still further.

Until not long ago, our foreign policy excited the envy of other lines of perestroika, being practically exempt from criticism. It was a zone invaded once in a while by brawny men who would deliver one or two sabre thrusts and pull back shortly after. But the situation is changing now. The salvoes have become more rapid and better aimed. Well, this was only to be expected. Over the past four years or so, foreign policy has really done much for the country. But the safe-conduct issued to it is not permanent.

It is important to see clear in the character of the doubts in question. I can understand those whom the reduction of missiles to junk and the discharge of half a million troops have prompted to sound the alarm because we may be undermining our national security. After all, the country must be like an impregnable fortress, and generally speaking, power is respected in today's changing world. However, it is time we know how much power we need. There is no answer yet. But when academic experts make a serious attempt to ascertain "how much defence is sufficient" some people resent it. In recent years, the idea of "reasonable defence sufficiency" has been tampered with so badly that having more weapons may be seen as the most reasonable answer.

Criticism is levelled above all at the foreign policy aspect of perestroika, being provoked by bitter impressions of developments in Eastern Europe. Indeed, what we lived with for more than four decades fell apart almost overnight. The trouble is not that the "empire" is disintegrating but that the theory and practice to which the ruling parties had adhered in imitating us turned out to be helpless. This is certainly disheartening. But it would be very wrong to blame everything on a miscalculated foreign policy even though part of the blame must be put on it.

The concern I have mentioned is justified and comprehensible. But there is a group of other motives also. You are unlikely to hear them stated in public but they came up to light in speeches some conservatives delivered at the CPSU CC Plenary Meeting last February. What we have is a bid to curb or slow down some lines of internal perestroika, primarily the processes of democratising society and ridding it of worthless ideological dogmas, by raising a panic over developments in the foreign policy sphere. An effort is being made to chain foreign policy to a conservative home policy. Openness to the outside world and integration into the community of civilised nations apparently affect the interests of those who prefer to live and rule surrounded by a thriving military-industrial complex, with civil rights and freedoms at home, such as freedom of information, of press and others, falling short of European standards.

All this calls for scrutiny. Fair criticism helps while biased criticism

fetters people's activity and imagination and tells on the general course of perestroika.

We invite our readers to discuss this, to exchange views on what is going well in our perestroika foreign policy and what requires a more thoughtful approach to avoid blunders. As far as I know, the leadership of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, including the Minister, is willing to join in such an exchange in the columns of International Affairs. We look forward to your letters, comments and articles.

Boris PYADYSHEV

ERRATUM

In the article by Oleg Shakhnazarov "On the Class Struggle" published in the December 1989 issue of *International Affairs* paragraph 3 from top on page 84 should read:

It was for this reason that entire civilisations flourished in the past, civilisations that exhibited forms of ownership, labour productivity and productive forces that were sophisticated for their times, but by the very same token they perished if they did not acquire a rather powerful, natural foundation for further development. This was the case with the civilisations of the Incas, Mediterranean and the Ancient Orient.

BULGARIA: A BREAKTHROUGH IN RENEWAL

Petur MLADENOV

AFTER A LONG POLITICAL WINTER, spring has returned to Bulgaria. In the political calendar, natural and political seasons do not always coincide. We witnessed this in Bulgaria last fall, when spring set in on November 10. Readers are familiar with the events which led to a drastic political change in Bulgaria in the fall of 1989, to the breakdown of the command system and its embodiment on Bulgarian soil, the personal regime under Todor Zhivkov.

Emphatic condemnation of that anti-popular regime does not, of course, come down to identifying those to whom the biggest share of the blame for deformations and distortions must go. A certain moral and political responsibility for all those decades of authoritarian rule falls on the BCP itself, reduced by virtue of outdated principles of party structure to a paramilitary organisation controlled by an undisputed "leader". However, credit is due to the party both for admitting that responsibility and for dissociating consistently from a totalitarian legacy disgracing its century-long history. This legacy now affects us all. But realising it and appraising it through the prism of our own conscience make possible the spiritual purification which we need so badly and without which no individual or society could embark on real renewal and democratisation.

For many, this summing up, questions arousing their conscience and the resultant exacting self-appraisal began long before November 10. It took a notable degree of civic courage to pierce the veil of self-deception, to call a spade a spade, to realise the need for resolute action. Thereby a number of party officials and ordinary citizens put their personal prosperity and, indeed, their personal safety at risk. But surely personal prosperity means little in comparison with the prosperity of the country, just as personal safety means little compared with the destiny of the fatherland.

It so happened that in those days I took a direct part in relieving Todor Zhivkov and the corrupt top leadership of their posts. The situation was extremely complicated and alarming. The former leader and his entourage were aware of the upsurge in popular discontent and were preparing to quell it through outright terror. I realised that there was no avoiding bloodshed and that what might happen could turn the evolution of Bulgaria back to its cave period. I knew full well that in the event of a possible clash in the leadership, Zhivkov and his entourage would spare none of their opponents.

But I had come to the firm conclusion that a continued wait-and-see attitude would be not only amoral but disastrous for the party and the people. I realised that a number of leading persons belonging to the Political Bureau were in a painful quandary: they saw the abyss to which Zhivkov's rule was pushing the country but at the same time they dreaded the prospect of infringing canons and giving in to "heresy", with all that this implied. None but vigorous if risky action could help them overcome their misgivings.

In that situation I took advantage of an insignificant occurrence, an unrounded reproach made by Todor Zhivkov at my expense, and wrote a

letter* to the members of the party CC. That was on October 24, 1989. The letter, which began with brief autobiographical data, emphasised Todor Zhivkov's responsibility for the worsening situation in the party and the country, his fallacious style and methods of leadership and the need for change in the upper echelons of power. The possibility of vengeance was perfectly real, and so I decided to present the matter as a political issue and called on the comrades on the party CC to take a stand in the event of a possible moral and physical attack against me and my family.

It is difficult to say what role that letter actually played but it undoubtedly paved the way for an open debate in the Political Bureau on the most painful problems of party and state leadership. The "taboo" — the vow of silence and obedience and the principle of "Comrade Zhivkov's" immunity as an authority and a judge of the highest instance — was broken. Conditions were provided for a frank exchange of opinion between CC and Political Bureau members. The ice of thoughts that had accumulated without being expressed, thoughts born of the critical situation in the country and the BCP itself, began to shift. It was in that situation, at a meeting held by the Political Bureau on November 9, 1989, that a motion was carried by a minimum majority for asking the upcoming plenum of the Central Committee to relieve Todor Zhivkov of his leading posts. I can say that it was a hard battle between forces of the old and the new: the regime's people put up resistance and manoeuvred, there was not the slightest doubt as to the fate in store for us should they win the upper hand.

But they lost. Nor was their defeat an accident. What made for the failure of the authoritarian system and its exponents was primarily the fact that it had forfeited social support among the people. Active social and political forces turned out to be alien to it. The regime's supporters found themselves rejected by the people, who made no secret of their aspiration for radical change. The principled civic position of the armed forces also played a role. It had a restraining effect on some members of the Zhivkov regime who were prepared to resort to outright violence.

Those were the circumstances which made November 10 in Bulgaria possible, the transition being effected, moreover, by completely lawful, constitutional means and in accordance with the party Rules. In this way it also became possible to take the path which is bound to lead Bulgaria to the family of civilised nations, to make it a prosperous law-governed state with a civil society advocating democratic and humane socialism. It will be no easy path. We are still at its beginning. In fact, we are making our first steps. They are rather uncertain, for we are still hampered by long-time torpor and a disquieting awareness of our tremendous responsibility for the future of Bulgaria. But we must travel this path in the name of that future.

The burden of the past holding up our progress is not light. We have inherited a ruined, debt-ridden economy which used to be called prosperous, a society rent by a moral and ethical crisis yet alleged to be "developed socialism", a political life crushed by the burden of totalitarianism yet made out to be the most democratic system. The deepening of the crisis in recent years was cynically described as restructuring.

But verbal smokecreens are a thing of the past now. The time has come to gather stones and build new temples. This construction will be attended by difficulties, and we are well aware of them.

The short period since November 10 has seen the rise of new political parties and movements, the restoration of a number of old parties banned in 1947, the founding of an Alliance of Democratic Forces. There is a "round table" functioning, a forum typical of Eastern Europe in which spokesmen for the government and the opposition sit.

* This letter is given in this issue in the section The Editor's Page (See pp. 157-160).

Early last March, I held consultations in my capacity as Chairman of the State Council with leaders of the main political and social forces to search for a mutually acceptable way out of a complicated situation and carry the democratic process deeper.

All this is no more than a promising beginning. We are still handicapped by the strong inertia of one-time approaches; we lack adequate democratic habits and the culture needed for civilised dialogue, and emotions often overwhelm reason. The situation reflects in all probability the level of democratic traditions in our country, something which we cannot hold against anyone. As a matter of fact, the Bulgarian people have had rather few opportunities to enjoy briefly the fruits of democracy. In the 113 years following liberation from the Ottoman yoke, there were only some episodic periods during which socio-political life developed on parliamentary and democratic principles. What predominated was events that could hardly be called generators of democratic processes. I mean the abrogation of the Constitution, military coups, the cashiering of deputies, sabotaged elections, banning the activity of political parties, bloody clashes, revolts against the powers that be. It follows that nostalgic recollections of the democratic "paradise" of the period of monarchic rule in Bulgaria are hardly based on a sound knowledge of national history. But democracy cannot wait until everybody is equal to meeting its requirements. Hence the need to advance to it while at the same time learning to live by its rules.

Many conclusions and decisions we arrive at as we learn the rules of democracy would have been taken for heresy a few months ago. But now we say and are firmly convinced that we need tolerance and restraint in political dialogue, need reciprocal empathy to grasp and appreciate the way of thinking and the problems of political opponents, need a compromise between the interests of the party and the nation as a whole. We satisfy ourselves more and more as we advance to a civil society and a law-governed state that we must begin by separating legislative, executive and judicial powers, separating the Communist Party from state power, transforming the party into an ordinary political party, dissolving power structures formed in the totalitarian period and dependably guaranteeing all human rights and freedoms.

We see the need to create at all levels of government mechanisms that would make any recurrence of totalitarianism impossible. Under an integrated socio-political system, such a mechanism is provided by the existence of an opposition. A constructive and cultured opposition motivated by an awareness of its duty and a desire to serve its country rather than by purely selfish interests is the marvellous balance that contributes to the normal functioning of the state machine. An opposition makes a critical appraisal of the performance of the ruling party and helps bring about a gradual, smooth transfer of executive power when the people demand it by expressing their will. We have reason for hope and sincerely wish for the Bulgarian opposition, which is still young and not strong enough, to evolve in precisely this direction so as to share in political and moral responsibility for the future of the people and the country.

The gravity of the current social and economic crisis calls for serious efforts to find a way out. These efforts will be really fruitful only if exerted jointly and directed toward a common goal. Such activity, especially at the initial stage, can be undertaken by a government of national concert formed on a broad basis and involving all significant socio-political forces. It is also necessary to invite the people to the polls within a reasonable time limit and form through free and democratic elections a really representative people's parliament which should enact fundamental laws on economic, legal and political reform and appoint a competent government capable of ending the crisis. The domestic situation, the imperatives of democratic change and challenges of the future are putting on the agenda the problem of an authority chosen by the people and proceeding in accordance with democratic

rules but having ample powers, an authority capable of bridging the gulf of current problems and ensuring a tranquil and peaceful transition to democracy and prosperity.

TODAY, when the process of democratising political life is making great strides, one of Bulgaria's main problems is to break out of the deep crisis afflicting the economy. While this crisis was chiefly due to the inability of the totalitarian regime to develop the economic system after the potentialities of the extensive model of economic growth had been exhausted, currently there is a danger of crisis deepening due to a slowing down of the requisite radical economic reform. We realise that if we want to lead the country out of its present plight, we must ensure that democratisation processes in the political and economic structures of society go on simultaneously. But this is a very difficult task given the ambitions and possibilities of various political forces active in the country. We must remember that any effort to revive the economy in today's conditions would involve primarily a series of unpopular measures placing the political force behind them at a disadvantage on the political scene. But then inaction in the economic sphere would produce the same result, for we continue sliding to the lowest level of the crisis.

Whatever the concrete economic measures to be adopted in the near future, they must be aimed at enabling Bulgaria to cooperate with the world economy. Everybody realises that our country can hope for prosperity only if it integrates into the world economy, primarily into the united Europe to come. If our economy is to occupy a normal storey in a common European house and not a place in the basement, it must adapt as early as possible to the exigencies of the international market. This is certainly a formidable problem, for Bulgaria is not open to the world contrary to what we often affirmed before November 10. It is open to and dependent on CMEA countries. Yet it is common knowledge now that those countries are also in an acute socio-economic crisis which they will in all likelihood continue trying to resolve mainly outside that economic alignment. Reorienting a substantial part of Bulgaria's trade turnover to developed countries of the West is an arduous and protracted process requiring a restructuring of exports and production and a marked rise in the qualitative and technological standards of exports. The low solvency of the majority of developing countries and increased competition on their markets prevent us from redirecting part of our present-day output to those countries at an early date. We apparently need a new approach to our relations with various groups of countries; it is on it that both the trend of the Bulgarian economy and the degree to which it is restructured will depend.

We must carry out an economic reform under the pressure of the totality of these factors, years-long goods shortages, social tensions mounting across the country. At the moment we can only indicate the general contours of the reform, which should lead to a market economy assuring diverse types of property equal rights and reducing the economic influence of the state. The latter should ensure respect for national interests and a social orientation of economic growth. But while we can formulate this requirement in precise terms, there exist serious contradictions, with no one in East or West knowing how to eliminate them.

A radical economic reform in Bulgaria is very hard to effect even though the chief cause of the crisis is clear enough. The point of departure has nothing to do with the objective. The reform we need will not be aimed at quickening the pace of development in its present form but at bringing about a revolutionary transformation of the country's course of development. To implement such a reform, it is indispensable that a stable authority controlled by the public adopt prompt yet well-considered measures. The country will also require aid from without. We expect such

aid from our main foreign economic partners, who ought to appreciate our problems, certainly without disregarding their interests. But we also count on developed countries of the West. They could help us by deferring economically unsustainable payments on our huge foreign debt, granting new credits for development, encouraging direct private investment in the Bulgarian economy and removing obstacles to our country on their markets. Now that the iron curtain is falling to pieces and becoming mere junk, we must be very careful if we do not want it to be replaced by a so-called technological curtain which would make it very hard to end economic division on the old continent and hence to build a peaceful, united Europe.

Not so long ago, the idea of a common European house was nothing but a metaphor. It was essentially an intellectual challenge to all—one giving no ideological preference to anybody—to search for ways to end an unnatural military political confrontation. But the time of an intellectual reaction as the only possible line of behaviour is past. The time has come when an architectural metaphor should become a project put into effect. This project should be a fruit of common effort by all the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Bulgaria is prepared to join to the best of its ability in planning and realising this great cause of the 20th and 21st centuries.

It is now obvious that a socialism built on the principles of a totalitarian model could not really have opened itself to either the world or Europe. Opportunities for this and hence of really building a common European house can only be provided by a complete and definitive dismantling of a barrack-like bureaucratic system. Dissociation from totalitarianism does not at all mean breaking with socialism, rejecting it as an idea and a doctrine. Socialism as an idea is inseparable from the cultural legacy of humanity. It is based on general democratic values and on universal ethical and moral principles. The fact that this idea was discredited over a certain period by feudal despotic distortions does not at all imply that there will be no place for democratic and humane socialism in the united Europe to come. My personal conviction, like the conviction of the overwhelming majority of Bulgarians, is that henceforward socialism will realise its actual potentialities as a democratic and humane socialism in the united Europe to come in a climate of economic prosperity, social justice and demilitarised politics. Of key importance from this standpoint is the experience of all socialist countries, primarily Soviet perestroika, which has put the philosophy and practice of social development and world relations in their entirety on new foundations.

The changes taking place in Eastern Europe call for a reappraisal of the possibilities and pace of building a common European house. The all-European process will apparently remain at the basis of the movement in this direction. But it will be a process raised to a qualitatively new level, a process rid of ideological accretions and far more effective.

Of course, it would not be quite correct to speak of a completely determinate trend. We are in the presence of a complex onward movement necessitating an attentive and constructive approach to all problems arising from the need to end the division of Europe. Bulgaria is ready to work for this end.

Building a common European home will also open up proper opportunities to solve problems of relations between Balkan states. A parallel movement has actually sprung up and is asserting itself in the Balkans, and while it was led off by the all-European process, it is relatively independent and has peculiarities common to the Balkan region.

Early in this century, socialist parties and movements in Balkan countries proposed forming a Balkan federation as a possible means of cutting the tough knot of ethnic, religious and territorial problems. The idea was premature at the time. There were no historical conditions for its realisation,

and so it went unnoticed. Today, when the century is drawing to its end, we could return to that half-forgotten idea not to seek to realise it as conceived originally but to use its rational kernel. What can solve the Balkans' complex problems stemming from their historical destiny is not to delimit them on ethnic lines, to say nothing of opposing them to each other, but to bring them out of narrow national bounds and search for a common Balkan approach and mutually acceptable solutions. Such was the chief message of the social democratic groups of the early 20th century, a message that is almost as valid as ever. Implementing the concept of a common European house and building its Balkan storey, to which Bulgaria is prepared to contribute, would constitute a kind of rehabilitation of an idea which was advanced too early whose scientific and human logic enabled it to leap across the gulf of decades.

After decades of a lethargic sleep "producing monsters", Bulgaria is starting on its new path. This path may be described in brief as leading through democracy to social and economic prosperity and a common European house. We hope the efforts to be made by the Bulgarian people to this end will assure them the place that is theirs in the family of civilised countries.

THE ROADS TO RUSSIA

(continued from page 142)

balance of economic chances. If, as Gorbachev promises, his people will acquire their freedom and human dignity on this path, the free world will have no more cause to prop him up.

None of us has reason for complacency. Natural disasters, interethnic strife, religious fanaticism, global ecological problems, and lastly, epidemics like AIDS and the ever growing worldwide threat of drug abuse will require all our efforts and attention in future. "Each generation is equally close and equally far from God," was approximately how Leopold von Ranke put it. We are no more intelligent, no more just and no more of moralists than our forebears were. However, in this century we have suffered more sorrow and trials than all previous generations. This gives us grounds to hope that the sufferings we have gone through can give us an understanding of how to make peace on Earth irreversible.

THE WORLD ECONOMY. APPROACHES TO REGULATION

Ernest OBMINSKY

THE PROBLEMS of regulating the world economy, which have for decades been largely of academic interest for us, have now been put on the agenda of practical action. Why is that so?

First, the experience of others in coordinating and tying in what would appear "hopelessly" contradictory interests, with all its failures and successes, is highly important for our perestroika and economic reform. The main point here is that this experience is not based on directive-command methods, but on political and economic instruments. Hence the slow progress of negotiations (a thing we often find hard to understand), painstaking efforts to thrash out a compromise, and a gruelling struggle virtually over every comma in the agreement. It is, of course, much more usual for us to settle such things "at a single stroke", but the cost may be exorbitant.

Second, since our further involvement in the world economy is an inexorable process, we have come up against the problem of compatibility between the national economies of the East, West and South, of negotiations in a "common" economic language, with the use of indicators intelligible to all, on the basis of open statistics and a wide range of unified rules and standards in industry, science and technology, environmental protection, etc.

Third, some of the national prerogatives we have always considered to be an attribute of sovereignty, will simply have to be surrendered on a par with other states. It is no longer permissible for any country to pollute the global atmosphere with sulphur or nitrogen; the problems we have to deal with today include such "niceties" as the movement of interest rates, labour legislation, fair competition, etc., and tomorrow it will be necessary not only to put into effect the 1989 Vienna accords, but also to take advantage of the even greater prospects opening up in the Helsinki process.

And fourth, dogmas denying (for seemingly opposite reasons) the need for and possibility of strong regulating mechanisms for the entire world economy have been crumbling both in the West and in the East. In the West, common sense keeps stumbling across the "sacred cow" of a free market. To be sure, the free market has proved its worth, but blind abidance by its laws, as in all other things, could easily be carried beyond the point of common sense. No wonder the market has never existed in its pure form, and built-in dams and sluice-gates have been used to keep its elemental forces under control. Nonetheless, whenever more resolute measures to correct the negative aspects of the allegedly "self-regulating" market economy are put on the agenda, their initiators are obliged to make excuses for them and are lectured by the adepts of "true" capitalism.

It was this dogmatic attitude to the "sacred" principles of the freedom of private enterprise that prevented its advocates from responding in time to environmental pollution, to the formation of huge imbalances and disaster areas in the world economy.

As it has turned out, such an attitude is not only bound to hurt everyone, but inflicts the greatest economic damage on those who stick to these dogmas (and that of their own free will). Here is what C. Bradford, US economist and head of the World Bank's strategic planning department, said in this context: US insistence that free enterprise, free markets and free trade are the "only true way" is an ideological postulate which is ever more at odds with the experience of other countries; it not only misinterprets the constituents of the success of the newly industrialising countries, but misdirects the US response to the challenges of international competition and its approach to development strategies. Since the Pacific rim challenge is based on development determined by strategy rather than on a free market economy, Bradford goes on, the best response on the part of the USA would be a competitive strategy, and not only a demand to open up foreign markets.¹

It is only natural that when the advocates of a free market make an icon of the postulate about an "invisible hand" creating harmony out of millions of individual decisions taken by separate economic agents (a postulate formulated by Adam Smith, the father of classical political economy), the advocates of regulation are apt to add that behind this hand one will find groups of "invisible people" who have little interest in the future of mankind. As a matter of fact, we, too, should bear this in mind, for in our hurry to dismantle the command system and establish market relations we should not underestimate the complexity of this process, which should not only unfetter individual initiative and enterprise, but should also gear these invaluable qualities to meet social interests.

As for the high priests of the command system, they go to the other extreme, regarding virtually any step on the way to a real market as a "departure" from socialism, so that our involvement in the world economy is denounced as ceding a part of our socialist economic territory. Such an approach dates back to the days when we used to oversimplify the struggle and interplay of socialist and capitalist ideas, transplanting these to a geopolitical soil "for the sake of convenience".

That was the soil on which the essentially autarkic theories of "the two world economies" blossomed out to prevent any alien influence that could mar the "purity of the experiment". But history has never known anything of the kind: slave-holding states did not fence themselves off from feudal states, and vice versa, bourgeois England did not complain of its "feudal encirclement", and our own alliance with the Western democracies against Hitlerism did not bear out the tenet on the need to foster socialism in hothouse conditions. The outcome of the struggle between formations has always been decided as new and more efficient economic forms have won over public opinion. And today, basic economic processes are not expressed in a mechanical comparison of gross indicators in the developing systems, but in the assertion of ever new methods of economic activity, transitional types and forms constituting the inner fabric of the world economy.

The assertion of these forms on a national scale increasingly implies a combination (either voluntary or compulsive) of high labour productivity and social protection for the working people. And that, in a nutshell, is the essence of economic activity as it is conceived under socialism. That is why this country's intensifying involvement in the international division of labour (IDL), in the world economy, should not be

treated mechanistically: either we engraft "our own" principles and tenets upon the world economy or "surrender" to it, giving up our socialist ideals.

To paraphrase the US economist quoted above, one could say that instead of lamenting the "incorrect" methods that have been used abroad to achieve indisputable economic successes, we should do our best to fit these into our own development strategy.

IT WILL CERTAINLY take a lot of effort to achieve all that. The world economy today is burdened with many concrete problems, which cannot be solved automatically, but which call for concerted political measures. Unfortunately, the legacy of the past is divided in such a way that the areas in which one of the sides is prepared to make resolute headway leave the other side cold, and vice versa.

Nonetheless, practice shows that the thing to do is to continue the joint quest for solutions instead of bewailing the fact that the other side "refuses to see" the benefits of the measures proposed (a deeper look will show that such "stubborn" behaviour always has its reasons).

The main objective difficulty here (together with the historically rooted obstacles) is that whereas the moral, philanthropic, humanistic and other similar aspects of the said problems are obvious, the economic benefits of this or that decision are often impossible to demonstrate on utilitarian 'cost-benefit' lines in the light of purely national considerations.

The economic benefits of any global measures, more than anything else, should be analysed in depth by collective efforts at the United Nations and other international forums so as to avoid accusations that some incur the costs while others pocket the profits. Evidently, the peoples should be enabled to obtain tangible results from their contribution to global measures without unwarranted delay, but if the residual principle is applied to the national contribution, one can hardly expect any results.

All of that goes to prove the point that measures dictated by global interests should be backed up with measures to join the separate links of the world economic chain: national contribution—realisation at international level—national benefits.

The answer to the question of how this is to be done is not as simple as it may seem. It calls for joint action not only on global problems as such, but also on the stable functioning of the world economy as a whole, for if it is only the first aspect of the matter that is accentuated, the "daily bread" difficulties could well outweigh the longer-term perspective. That is why the effectiveness of international cooperation, which should be evident to public opinion in various countries, depends on how well we manage to harmonise the advance to humanistic goals with "prosaic" calculations in matters of dovetailing national economic interests, and with the use of the whole gamut of economic and political instruments, interpreted in a way intelligible to all.

Ever greater though varied interest has been displayed in the economic aspect of disarmament, the key problem, as disarmament, once a vision and a dream, begins to look ever more like a practical proposition, in spite of sceptical predictions. Computations are now being made both on a national and on an international level of how to reorient the economy from an arms build-up to arms cuts. Unless that is done, economic arguments will play an ever more important role in salvaging the expenditures of defence departments as the real threat of war recedes. The well-known US economist John Galbraith wrote in

an article on East-West relations that when military outlays in general, and outlays on weapon systems in particular, were suddenly jeopardised, their advocates took to pleading economic necessity. Thus, a jet fighter programme worth \$1 billion was "salvaged" in the US Congress allegedly to support the economy of Long Island.² There are many examples to that effect in this country as well.

One specific feature of the effort to integrate the disarmament process into world economic life is, I believe, that the success of the process itself largely depends on an understanding between the USSR and the USA, whereas its integration into the world economy involves other key players as well. It is hard to imagine, however, that the historically shaped balance of power, the prestige and influence of individual states in the global political structure will undergo a radical change at the expense of the countries which, as life would have it, are to take the most responsible steps in the interests of the whole of mankind. It is time to look for lines of approach that would lead to an adequate solution of this formidable problem, a problem which is evidently no less important than the Western concern over the US balance of payments deficit in the light of the huge surpluses run up by the FRG and Japan. Such lines of approach could, perhaps, envisage measures by the international community to help the countries making the greatest contribution to disarmament get a footing on the new markets (by bringing into play the huge scientific and technical potential, skilled manpower and other factors being released). Naturally, this will not rule out, but will make it easier to use the fruits of disarmament in the interests of all countries, primarily those which are in distress.

The problems of saving the environment and protecting human health are high on the agenda of the world community, and consensus there appears to be easier to attain than in other matters, but there as well an effective solution can hardly be achieved through budget appropriations and philanthropy alone.

It goes without saying that unified rules cannot be applied in this area right away, since the more developed countries have made greater headway in national legislation, having managed, in addition, to relocate many dirty lines of production to the less developed countries. So, the LDCs maintain that the developed capitalist states should compensate the Third World's outlays on environmental protection, but this idea is far from popular in some developed countries, and international agreements on assistance in this area can hardly be avoided. But even such agreements cannot cure the chronic disease of noble goals: lack of resources, in spite of all sorts of funds, donations and contributions. Hence the quest for ways to commercialise the above-listed problems in accordance with the "collective" or "public" goods theory, which says that the elements that are necessary for human life in different countries but are not an object of purchase and sale (atmosphere, ocean, international rivers, etc.) function as public goods, so that collective economic instruments may be applied to them by analogy. But this once again calls for coordination of economic policy on the "lower" macrolevel in order to stimulate the suppliers of new technology and services. As it has often been the case in the past, financial and trade privileges would lead to intense competition, which would eventually make it possible to switch this initially set process to the lines of conventional market operations.

The problem of hunger and low living standards facing Asian, African and Latin American countries in dire economic plight falls within the vicious circle of debt bondage: debt service payments—lack of funds for development—more debts. What it means is that many countries cannot service their debts even with new borrowings, and

thus have to spend a large part of their own resources, which are vitally important for development.

Since the debt situation exploded in 1982 (with Mexico's statement that it could not repay its debts), the 1980s have been lost for most less developed debtor-countries from the standpoint of economic development: virtually all their basic indicators characterising the state of the economy and living standards have taken a turn for the worse, and social tensions have sharply increased.

In spite of what many prominent financiers and politicians in various countries believed, the problem has not gone away, and the periodical glimmers of hope have not amounted to a light at the end of the debt-crisis tunnel. This is a serious matter not only for the debtor-countries, but for the world economy as a whole.

The chronic debt crisis on such a gigantic scale cannot be resolved through philanthropic measures alone, for these can bring no more than temporary and partial relief, however important this may be in the present situation. The main thing is to overcome the dangerous tendency to squeeze many less developed countries out of the world economy, and so to put them on the brink of extinction.

As in viewing other global problems through the prism of the world economy, the question to be answered here is whether the world economy's "own interest" is adequate to ensure efficient operation of collective mechanisms in order to overcome the crisis.

The specifics of the situation in this area is that the importance of the various less developed countries and regions for the normal functioning of the world economy is far from equal. There are calculations to show that the decline in business activity in the group of the more developed Third World countries has an adverse effect on world economic life (leading to a drop in world production, investments, trade, etc.), so that their further decline can do no good either to Western business or to the Western consumer. That is why there is an objective basis for collective action, which naturally does not rule out a sharp struggle on every aspect of the activity of multilateral economic mechanisms.

At the same time, a sizable group of the poorest states is still of little commercial interest from the standpoint of its possible contribution to the world economy. Even if their debts are written off on the "forgive and forget" principle, that is, if the very nature of their relations with the world market is not changed, this will hardly do any good. Evidently, so long as these countries remain outside the market, they will go on stagnating, and once they enter the market, they will be the first to fall victim to any changes in the market situation, get into new debt, etc.

The need for diverse special programmes to develop these countries is, in principle, recognised by the world community, so that one can expect a more comprehensive multilateral approach to their problems.

SO, ALL THIS GOES TO SHOW that global problems have a basis (although in varying degree) for collective action not only from the standpoint of general humanistic, ethical, cultural and other considerations, but also from the standpoint of commonplace economic pragmatism.

However, an understanding that a solution of global problems will ultimately be of benefit to all is far from adequate for their effective solution: everyone involved in the world economy plays his own game

of patience, with his own priority interests, which have to be coordinated, if loftier goals are to be attained.

As we enter the world economic system, we should be well aware of who, why and to what extent is prepared to strengthen the regulating element in the world economy.

This is all the more important since we ourselves tend to lay emphasis on common problems, whereas the actual motivating factor is a community of concrete interests. The difference here is that in the first instance it does not appear to be necessary to have a well-defined sphere of *one's own* interest, an interest which is not abstract but perfectly concrete, reflecting the whole spectrum of internal pros and cons.

This approach is rooted in the past, when any problem set up as a target to be attained was tackled by mobilising one and all, even to the neglect of one's proper business. Such was the logic of a depersonified society, in which one will and one interest reigned supreme. Even today, when the economic interests of all or even only the basic strata have yet to be adequately represented in the society, we are still more inclined to pitch into a problem instead of trying to dovetail our own economic interests with the various other interests within an incipient common approach.

Of course, progressively-minded political leaders who do not confine themselves to local, domestic—and often very narrow—ideas of costs and benefits are able to take a broader view of the problem and to come up with bolder and farther-reaching initiatives. That is why our state-level proposals on global problems, expressing the torment of mankind, are so highly valued by world public opinion. These proposals, I believe, make it possible to use the positive effect of mobilising efforts on the mass consciousness, helping it to rise above its earthly interests and agree to their limitation.

Experience shows that an elevated state cannot be maintained for long. The usual way up is to build the steps and then to go up the ladder. But the present state of the world, when the whole building site is clogged with debris, makes it necessary, first and foremost, to "soar" above the steps that have been built in order to decide how to go on building the ladder.

Our present inability to get an adequate economic return on our involvement in international economic relations is evidently a telling argument in favour of giving our society a definitely featured economic face as soon as possible, for otherwise the country's economic, scientific and technical departments will go on regarding the Union's involvement in regulating world-economic mechanisms as a target that has no direct relations to their activity, and will continue to make up reports on rising economic efficiency after attending international functions. At the same time, they are well aware of the acute struggle between the representatives of countries which speak a common economic language, and of the real results for *internal* economic life that are actually yielded by *international* coordination of positions. We can hardly be content with a walk-on role on the world economic scene, and the thing to do is to overcome the intrinsic indifference of our economic executives to international problems ("we've got our hands full at home") by developing competition in our own economy. It is only as we overcome monopolism that we shall be able to understand the processes under way in the world economy, the very concept of "regulation" in particular.

Meanwhile, this is a problem of the squaring-the-circle type, in which the square can never catch up with the circle. The market itself is the main regulator (something that is often forgotten), and it is not the market as such that necessitates regulation and coordination, but

the clash of diverse interests seeking to gain control of it. In other words, the ceaseless struggle and interaction between the market as an automatic regulator and its deliberate regulation mean that regulation keeps tying down the market with definite rules and constraints, while the market keeps proving that the regulation is imperfect and runs up a new twist in the producer-consumer spiral, so that regulation has to set out once again in pursuit of the market. The forms of this interplay have been steadily refined, being part of the civilising process in economics and law.

Regulation of the world economy has a long record of state-market relations to fall back upon, whereas we have nothing of the kind. Nevertheless, however paradoxical this may seem (yet another paradox!), it appears that although regulation of the world economy and coordination of international economic policy are a highly complicated business synthesising the whole national experience to date, this is the sphere in which we could achieve important results both for structuring our internal economic mechanisms and for accelerating out integration into the world economy.

First, national experience of the developed states, be it the USA or Japan, is so specific that one or two attractive features borrowed from that experience can be of little help to us, while a more profound scientific analysis of the economy of these countries has yet to be correlated with the evolution of our own economy in a comprehensive way, and has little to offer by way of practical recommendations.

As for the experience of international regulation and coordination, it has been gathering momentum before our very eyes and is complicated enough to match many of our own problems, for it is necessary to interface rich and poor regions, to determine who pays for what (and in what), to accept some instruments and forms of interaction and reject others, in short, to bring out and multiply the spheres of coinciding interests.

Second, we are often surprised that at a time when integration processes are under way throughout the world, our own "separatists" have been pursuing a disintegrative policy. And they are bound to press ahead with it unless the unity built according to a given scheme is replaced by a unity of coinciding interests. This is not to say that all the existing material structures and connections should be totally dismantled, something that is never done anywhere. But joint elaboration of interaction mechanisms, of financial mutual assistance, a harmonised tax policy, rules and norms to determine the movement of monetary resources, goods and services, and the movement of population and labour-power—all of that would merely serve to dispel the harmful emotions while carrying on a genuine integration process.

Third, the scale of the task of ensuring the most favourable conditions for the development of an integral world economy makes it possible to minimise the costs of going into that economy with more reliable computations of the evolution of our role and place in its material and institutional structures. Other states should be just as interested in this as we are, for our involvement should make their own computations more reliable as well.

No system of bilateral relation, however elaborate can yield such a result, for its balance is bound to "catch cold" whenever there is a draft from any direction, while restoration of the status quo is a protracted and most expensive process.

Such are only some of the most obvious spheres of our interest in coparticipation in regulating the world economy, to say nothing of the fact that the very process of selecting regulation and coordination instruments on the basis of the most effective economic and financial in-

struments being used on a national scale to dovetail diverse interests is a truly practical school of worldwide economic education.

SO WHAT ARE THE WORKINGS of the "cuisine" in which world economic processes are regulated and coordinated, and what kind of menus (one of the latest buzz words used in international finances to mean a package of measures for the solution of this or that problem) does it offer the world community?

First of all, a few words about the world economy as a category of political economy, i. e., the subject whose interests these menus are meant to serve. In the course of long-drawn-out debates in our scientific community, life itself has introduced radical changes into its theoretical comprehension.

There is clear evidence of an evolution: recognition of the world economy as a single system, with the socialist and capitalist economic systems being designated as "subsystems"; renunciation of the theory of a deepening division of the world into two economic systems and recognition of their advance towards compatibility as the basic trend; greater depth and breadth for the operation in the world economy of general economic laws (those of value, competition, optimisation of economic proportions, material incentives to labour, etc.) and functional interconnections (international division of labour and integration, links between production, distribution, exchange and consumption, etc.)

As regards the very substance of the world economy, however, two different lines of approach have come to light. First, there are those who regard the world economy as a system of international economic relations which run across national barriers only in so far as it is necessary and adequate to meet the country's interests.

Then there is the view that the world economy is an integral system of national economies, and not simply their sum total, but a multisectoral economic space in which interaction is due to the genetic unity of economic producer relations.

This dispute, however theoretical it may seem, has a direct bearing on practice, bringing to mind the well-known disputes in the West of the "protectionism vs. free trade" type, in which the scales have been tipped up and down. The first approach, in effect, emphasises the primacy of *specific* national-state interests (say, interests based on class distinctions), which can accept the world economy in doses not affecting in any essential way their social substance or its self-development.

Hence the logical conclusion that the two "subsystems" of the world economy can develop their own substance to an optimum (if and in so far as they are able to do so) each in its own *autonomous* way, assimilating through *mutual relations* only that which is beneficial and useful for each subsystem.

The second approach, on the contrary, starts from the primacy of global economic processes, to which the subsystems have to adapt, whether they like it or not, as a result of which their own distinctions are bound to lose their essential importance. That is why the self-development of the subsystems in the world economy is "non-Euclidean", but is more in accordance with Lobachevsky's axiom that parallel lines are bound to draw ever closer together (converge).

These two different approaches should not, of course, be viewed outside the context of the above-mentioned consensus on some key features of the world economy, and especially on the operation of general economic laws. Nonetheless, the essence of the dispute remains.

The growing interconnection and interdependence of the various national economies, when global development trends "reach out"

(even if indirectly) to the most isolated regions, make it ever more obvious that the world economy is, in principle, a single organism. That is why, all things considered, the second approach is a more adequate expression of the gist and direction of the movement.

Both the time factor and stages of the movement are extremely important in this context, but these questions have yet to be elaborated. The first approach makes one think of ways to realise the potential (or ideal) of a harmoniously developed world economy without sacrificing the part to the whole. After all, we have had to pay dearly for such "sacrifices" in our attempt to attain the ideal in this country.

That is why in dismantling the command system in the economy we should not (as we often do in practice) dismantle our national-state interests as we enter the world economy. Our reasonable external economic policy aimed at making the Soviet economy truly competitive will always meet with understanding among responsible business and political circles abroad. National regulation in all countries always proceeds from the country's *own interests* (whether these are correctly or incorrectly understood is a different matter), while an awareness of the integrity of the world economy and of the primacy of its economic laws is necessary to enable all the agents of world economic relations not only to abide by the "rules of the game", but also to readjust the course of their development in due time.

Owing to the long-drawn-out etatisation of our society, all our participants in external economic relations (however these were called) could not pursue their own interests or display initiative, but simply had to carry out decisions taken at the centre. However convenient and perfectly logical such a setup may appear to be (after all, the state's economic interests are realised directly, "without any contradictions"), it yielded the same results as it did in internal economic life: work for the sake of gross output, lack of incentives to use the new market opportunities, relations confined to a narrow range of partners (mostly monopolists as well), etc.

The main result, however, was that the feedback the state got from its agents was tailored to meet its expectations: from "proof" of inevitable external crises and crashes to an illusion of our sound position on the external market. As for those who tried to present the real picture, they could be made easily brought into line just as well as anyone else. Hence our recent attitude to international economic organisations, to the Common Market, and to the business world as a whole. Hence also our profound unpreparedness for cooperation with other players in world economic relations, who have outstripped us simply because we had no such relations to speak of.

While professing the dialectical principle of Heraclitus that one cannot enter twice into one and the same river, we did not realise that one can enter hundreds of times into one and the same state of stagnation. A vicious circle in which the state both issues orders and carries them out has left us outside the trying but necessary period of "storm and stress" in the world economy, when its well-reasoned participants have overcome many (though far from all) dinosaurian notions about one's own gain and are learning how to make profit from legitimate competition and cooperation.

Unfortunately, few of our own economic agents are now prepared to do so. Most of the thousands upon thousands of independent economic agents that have entered the external market for the first time (plus frontier trade) have still a long way to go before they realise what they have to do to assert themselves on the market. For the time being, many of them have been misappropriating from the state without much effort what is to be had for the taking. Is that what society

expects of them? That is why what we need today is some filigree work on the part of our legislators, Soviet organs, and the state apparatus to identify these "dinosaurs" and stop them in their tracks, but so that the baby—the nascent Soviet business world—should not be thrown out with the dirty water. Associations of the business circles themselves should play an ever more important (and ultimately decisive) role in this process in accordance with law and ethics, as it is done in civilised societies, for this is the only way for us to come to play a vigorous and effective part in the operation of the world market and in its regulation.

What can international experience, including our own share of it, teach us in this context? The golden rule of the market is that all the mobile elements of the economy—goods, services, capital—tend to move to the regions, industries or spheres in which the highest price can be obtained for them or, in other words, in which they are in relatively short supply. In the past, we used to emphasise only one side of the market mechanism—the drive for profit—while underestimating its other side, its capacity to convert any shortage into a surplus without delay. One could say that there is no more efficient mechanism today for meeting individual requirements. Collective, social requirements, which call for a coordinated effort on the part of the society, are a different matter: this is something the market cannot do (foreign analysts call this market failure). But administrative structures exist for this very purpose.

National market economies have accumulated diverse experience of interaction between the market and administrative mechanisms in different combinations. In the course of this interaction, the interests of diverse social groups are dovetailed within the framework of the national administrative system under definite legal procedures.

As for the world economy, its more efficient functioning as a single whole is much harder to attain. The basic function of the market mechanism—the movement of goods, etc.—is obstructed by national barriers, since the benefits obtained by the foreign producer or supplier are not the same thing as benefits for "one's own" producer or seller within the country. (It was Marx who pointed out this distinction from the standpoint of exploitation of a poorer country by a richer country.)

No administrative methods on a global scale can both keep the market going and serve to protect the interests of individual countries in the conditions of diverse politico-economic interests and structures, except in some kind of utopian "global state", whose models were mostly pivoted on the postulate of "political will", so that their realisation was highly unlikely. Hence the as yet timid attempts at international coordination of macro-economic policy, whose "menus" in the West are confined to the monetary sphere (maintaining realistic exchange rates), but do not risk intruding into the sphere of taxation.

NEVERTHELESS, the record of the past few years has driven home the point that automatic harmonisation of world economic development on the "do as I do" principle does not work. The most typical example here is the recipe offered by the IMF and the IBRD to the less developed debtor-countries in the early 1980s: to boost production for export. It turned out, however, that the markets of the developed countries did not intend to open themselves out to the lower-priced export goods from Third World countries, for this would not only have reduced the profits of Western companies, but would have also jeopardised the social security of their workers and employees. As a result, the growth of

export production in the LDCs has done nothing to reduce their huge debt.

In a study summing up ten years of lending to the less developed countries in order to help them adjust to the world economy, World Bank experts write: "Investment ratios have declined, and budget deficits are higher in the highly indebted and Sub-Saharan countries."³

Could it, perhaps, be that the decline in investments has led to an increase in consumption? By no means: "Another matter of concern is the near stagnation in nutrition levels since 1980, especially in the low-income and Sub-Saharan groups, where per capita caloric intake remains below required levels."⁴

That is why any recommendations to restructure just one part of the world economy without a reciprocal movement of its other components can hardly be taken seriously. There is still a long way to go before this conclusion is recognised by all, but it is ever clearer that there is no other way out.

A real *common interest* in the normal functioning of each segment of the world economy is becoming the main constituent of the converging movement by various countries and regions. Up to the second half of the 1980s, such interest could not be displayed, for in the confrontation epoch the success of one party was seen as a defeat for the other party, while the poverty and disease of the third party appeared to be "its own problem".

The persistent failures in building a fair economic order in the world have now come to be seen in a different light.

In fact, such an order could not be attained so long as the contestants insisted on their own incompatible black-and-white programmes of action. The Declaration on a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action proclaimed by the 6th special session of the UN General Assembly on May 1, 1974, sparked off sharp clashes from the very beginning whenever it was a matter of getting down to real action.

Diverse structures of global and regional regulation, with a wide range of functions, competence and degree of effectiveness, have taken shape in practice. Their activity mirrors the inadequate response by some groups of countries to the mounting development disproportions. One should admit, with the benefit of hindsight, that it was the sharp political and ideological confrontation that distorted and threw a false light on the true long-term interests of the countries involved, carrying forward into the international arena not those who saw and understood these interests, but those who kept rehearsing, year in year out, one and the same set of homespun dogmas.

Without putting all the blame on any one party, one should nonetheless sum up the actual results of the evolution of regulating mechanisms in the world economy. The confrontation had the worst effect on the United Nations, the most universal and virtually the only genuine global mechanism. The gap between word and deed was widest in the UN General Assembly's Second Committee, and in its other socio-economic agencies and specialised institutions. That is only natural, for in various other fields of human activity—be it environmental protection, science and technology, human rights etc.—it is possible to set *concrete* goals and to harmonise joint and national efforts (as in lowering pollution levels in this or that sphere, adopting legal norms, improving the education system, etc.), whereas in the economy any measures aimed at the *common good* should be thoroughly assessed from the standpoint of the *national economy*. It usually turned out that expenditures were needed at once, whereas the common good was most problematic even in the future.

Hence the futile struggle between rich and poor countries at the United Nations for a redistribution of the world income without due measures to compare internal economic mechanisms and indicators. Hence also the reason why effective UN measures in the economic sphere were mostly confined to what could be called philanthropy.

In international trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been in operation since 1949, based on the idea of creating the best possible conditions for the movement of goods from country to country. Like a few other countries, we did not accede to that agreement at the time. In spite of numerous exemptions from GATT's basic principle (the most favoured nation treatment), the GATT mechanism has helped to develop international competition, enabling consumers in all the member-countries to reap certain benefits from the international division of labour. Its compass has been widening as the services, protection of intellectual property, agricultural policy, etc., are drawn into the orbit of negotiations.

Political confrontation has played a negative role in this field as well, inducing GATT's more powerful members from among the developed countries, the USA above all, to adopt measures and sanctions going against the letter and spirit of the agreement.

As for more local groupings, the formula applied to the "North-South" problem in principle applies to these as well: "the rich have become richer, and the poor, poorer". The developed capitalist states seek to coordinate their action at a summit level (annual meetings of the G-7), aiming to work out a joint system of indicators (rates of growth, employment, inflation, etc.) that would enable them to take preemptive measures within the various countries, as well as in interstate relations. The EEC has advanced even farther along this way, with ever more supranational functions being vested in the EC Commission.

The economic successes of the 24 developed OECD countries and the 12 EEC countries stand out in sharp contrast against the background of other regional and interregional groupings, a contrast which was a grim factor in destabilising the world economy as a whole, pushing entire regions out of the development orbit.

One could say that the various groups of countries had reached the mid-1980s in an atmosphere of extreme tension, diverging national and regional socio-economic processes, and the inability of global and other multilateral structures to halt the slidedown to a catastrophe.

The revolutionary decisions taken by the Soviet Union over the past few years have radically changed the political climate in the world, for the first time creating real prerequisites for rational use of the advantages of involvement in the world economy. The whole "scenario" of regulating the world economy, and the role of global and other multilateral political and economic structures in this process now appear in a different light. This new vision stems from the radical changes in the qualitative state of the world, whose consequences are just beginning to take effect in practice: the dismantling of the military confrontation; the cutback and elimination of stockpiles of the most deadly weapons; cooperation in settling regional conflicts by political means; free choice by all people of their socio-economic setup on a democratic basis, and the elevation of human rights as the essence of internal and international development.

The visible manifestations of these trends include a shifting of the accent in military-political blocs to the political aspect of their activity; subsiding armed conflicts in Africa, Asia, and to some extent in Latin America, and their reorientation towards a political settlement; the revival of the ideas of humane, democratic socialism in Eastern Europe,

and the accelerating removal of perverted bureaucratic impediments to the free movement of people, goods and services.

So, the worst clots obstructing the normal circulation of the blood in the world economy and disrupting its heartbeat are being removed. All countries and regions have been striving to adapt to the new conditions, but one can safely say that the Soviet Union, with one-sixth of the world's territory, is faced with the most formidable problems. What we have to do now is to reorganise the whole structure of our involvement in world economic affairs: from bringing our economic mechanism into line with free market relations to putting in order our cross-border contacts, developing regional cooperation, and taking part in international organisations and agreements so as to give a qualitatively new impetus to UN economic activity.

Time is short, and it appears that in many areas our business partners are much more prepared than we are to take advantage of the new opportunities for economic cooperation. Hence the danger that the stock of goodwill being built up in the course of bilateral and multilateral talks will not be realised in due time because of our sluggish transition period, when new mechanisms have yet to be brought into play, whereas the old ones can no longer operate efficiently.

Here are some of the main areas of external economic activity which are to provide the necessary basis for our real involvement in the regulating mechanisms of the world economy.

A deep-going reform of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), as envisaged by the decisions of the CMEA's 45th session in Sofia, is aimed to rearrange the relations between the member-countries so as to gear them to the conditions of world economic exchange. Cooperation on the level of world standards and prices instead of an autarkic exchange of uncompetitive products will enable the CMEA countries to take an equal part in any other forms of relations with the outer world. This approach will make it possible to use diverse instruments of mutual assistance for their designated purpose: to help apply STR achievements and turn out more competitive goods.

The efforts to transform the CMEA should also take into account the problem of creating an all-European economic space, so as to some extent to synchronise the processes bringing together all its economic groupings, including the EEC and EFTA, especially with a view to the movement towards the unification of the two German states. It is highly important in this context to fill out with material content such a key document as the agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the EC, signed in December 1989.

Important changes are under way in the structures of our cooperation with Asian, African and Latin American countries. These are being gradually purged of ideologised elements, tending to become ever more open and predictable as they are switched to the basis of mutual benefit and economic efficiency.

The problems of our economic cooperation with the USA and Japan are far from simple. Whereas prominent businessmen in both countries have a direct stake in such cooperation, the authorities have not as yet given the green light by providing normal conditions for many large-scale deals. There is still a lot of cold-war residue around: export controls through COCOM, and diverse political strings to economic accords. COCOM regulations meet with justified criticism in the West as well. Here is what the West German magazine *Osteuropa Wirtschaft* wrote of that committee: "A reform of COCOM is long overdue. The old gentlemen's agreement does not meet the requirements of East-West trade... Security would not in the least be jeopardised if the COCOM lists of manufactures were immediately reduced by 40 per cent. If the

henceforth, the United States will be the one threatened and that the U. S. had better get used to this situation.

The American right added fuel to the fire. Pressure groups, such as the Committee on the Present Danger mobilized powerful elements in American society to dramatically increase U. S. defense-spending and the development of new weapon systems. As a result of trend in both countries, the arms race soared to new heights.

Some in the East and the West were hopeful and worked in a difficult environment for a dramatic change in East-West relations. However, many people in the United States, France, the United Kingdom and other Western countries remained unprepared for fundamental change in the USSR. Many preferred a predictable relationship based on confrontation to an unpredictable one.

General Secretary Gorbachev did not, however, fit into this mold. After he had consolidated his position, one of the first actions he undertook was the extension in August 1987 for an additional six months of the year-long moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, originally announced by Gorbachev in August 1986. This step began to convince Western specialists and officials that real change was afoot in Soviet foreign and defense policy. Some Western experts, recognizing that anything longer than a twelve-month moratorium was likely to cause a real disruption in the Soviet nuclear weapons program, were forced to consider by the six-month extension that the changes taking place in the Soviet Union were more than simply propaganda gestures. By the fall of 1987, some mainstream voices in the West had begun to support the idea of a moratorium on nuclear testing and were calling for the United States and its Western allies to support the initiative. They also believed that the West should take the reforms in the Soviet Union seriously. Research work in leading Western foreign policy institutions began to demonstrate that the changes taking place in the Soviet Union were deeply rooted in the Soviet foreign policy debate then going on in Moscow in the foreign policy bureaucracy and academic community.

The growing rapprochement between East and West had still to find concrete expression. The signing of the INF Treaty in December 1987 was the first significant action demonstrating that the USSR's talk of change was more than talk—it was for real. The ground-breaking October 1987 report of the bipartisan Task Force on Soviet New Thinking "How Should America Respond to Gorbachev's Challenge?", has also been credited with initiating a shift in the United States towards a re-examination by the U. S. foreign policy elite of the fundamental nature of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This report had a large spillover effect in Western Europe.

The central question began to shift from "Is Gorbachev serious?" to "How should the West respond to the fundamental changes taking place in the USSR?". This report summed up this change in attitudes by saying that "The Task Force strongly recommends that the United States and its Western allies welcome the reformist tendencies that Gorbachev has set in motion and encourage those which promote a moderation of Soviet power... New political thinking in the East requires new policy thinking in the West."¹

Since then, specialists and officials in the West have focused mainly on studying the implications for the West of Soviet "new thinking." To date, little attention has been given in the West to the question of how the Soviet people themselves perceive their country's foreign policy initiatives of the past five years.

It comes as a surprise to many that Gorbachev himself and his foreign policy initiatives seem to be more popular in the West than they are at home. The Western perception is that these policies should and do

enjoy broad support at home. The fact that Eduard Shevardnadze sailed through the Supreme Soviet confirmation hearings last year appeared to signal a broad national consensus in the USSR in support of Gorbachev's foreign policy. Nonetheless, in 1989, public criticism of these policies began to emerge in the USSR. A discussion in the West has now also begun on how to interpret these criticisms: on what grounds are the criticisms justified? How has the USSR itself benefitted from new thinking in foreign policy? These are among the major questions which Western analysts are asking today.

DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY

WITH THE INTRODUCTION of the new policy of *glasnost*, Gorbachev challenged the traditional attitude of Soviet governments towards criticism of policy decisions. For the first time, an open debate took place in the media and a wide-ranging discussion among intellectuals and experts was encouraged. Gorbachev introduced a welcomed note of honest self-criticism into the Soviet policy. Despite this openness, the initial domestic criticisms which emerged about Soviet foreign policy were largely confined to things which had occurred in the pre-Gorbachev era.

As early as June 1987, Shevardnadze publicly called on the Soviet mass media to comment frankly on the formulation and implementation of Soviet foreign policy. No doubt, the debate over foreign policy had been going on for years, but behind the Kremlin's closed doors, unbeknownst to the public. "Even three years after Gorbachev assumed power, it was not the 'done thing' in our country to talk about the mistakes committed in our foreign policy. To this day, you will not find a mention at all in any book of a blunder or incorrect action," wrote *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on June 19, 1988. Today the debate in the USSR is open and frank.

Its openness is a sign that lively exchange of ideas and opinions has taken hold. Public participants in the debate include the International Department of the Central Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, which was set up to hold hearings on questions of foreign policy; the press which keeps an independent watch on the initiatives coming from the Party and the government; and the intellectual community which also plays an active role in this debate.

As the Soviet Union transforms itself from an authoritarian to a more democratic society, criticism of government policy, including foreign policy initiatives and achievements, is a natural and important phenomenon. Open debate serves as a safeguard against a repeat of imprudent policy decisions, such as the invasion of Afghanistan or over commitment in areas of the Third World.

Such actions in the past were the result of a closed debate among a very few people. Open debate allows for stricter accountability on the costs and benefits of policy decisions. Indeed, one of the central objectives in the shift in Soviet foreign policy since 1985 has been to adjust foreign policy to the country's economic means.

Public debate can also serve as a way of galvanizing support behind government policies. It can serve as a check and balance against government excess and can help society determine the path which it wishes to follow. For example, conservative critics of Soviet foreign policy complain that it shows a preference for common human values over class values and gives second priority to the international revolutionary movement. Such a debate, however, can serve a useful purpose in helping the Soviet people decide what role they want to play in the world in the future.

Is an annual 5 billion dollars worth of aid and subsidies to Cuba a fair price for Soviet consumers to pay for solidarity with Fidel Castro? In comparative terms, as a recent article in *Ogonyok* points out, the Soviet com-

mitment represents "5 billion (dollars) a year, that is 25 billion (dollars) in the current five-year plan... that is almost twice the two-yearly volume of aid which the U. S. officially gives to other countries in the world... in 1990 the general expenditures on all the enterprises undertaken for the improvement of life in our country (USSR) does not amount to 13.4 billion...."

The American public is grappling with a similar challenge with the huge amounts of aid which is being pledged to Poland, Panama and most recently to Nicaragua. As both societies face up to the realities of the costs involved in addressing their major internal problems, the issue of rethinking priorities and goals in foreign policy becomes critical.

In recent months, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have come under direct criticism from both conservatives and radicals in the USSR. Conservatives blame Gorbachev for making too many concessions to the West. They argue that Gorbachev has given too much to the West without receiving a reasonable *quid pro quo*. As a result, they feel that he has left the Soviet Union with no bargaining power. They also hold Gorbachev responsible for losing Eastern Europe and, in particular, conceding a united Germany. For example, at the February Plenum of the Central Committee one of the speakers pointed out that the present government had "thrown the country into the vortex of crisis." Aleksandr Prokhanov's controversial article, published on January 5, 1990 in *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, bemoans the collapse of the centralized Russian state and blames the disintegration of the Soviet sphere of influence on the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev: "'The philosophy of new thinking', 'the priority of common human values over class ones' in fact has turned into neglect of the interests of the Socialist state in order to satisfy the arrogance of the imperialistic oligarchies," Prokhanov writes.

Other indignant voices, while also critical of the central government, feel that many of the non-Russian Soviet Republics are ungrateful for the huge sacrifices the Russian people have made for them, arguing that they should be encouraged to leave the USSR and suffer the dire economic and social consequences of such a separation.

The criticisms are thus a combination of ideological and nationalistic concerns and they tend to focus more on broad philosophies and directions rather than on specific policies. Such criticism ignores the many benefits which the USSR has accrued from the new policies. These will be discussed later in this article.

Nor is the attack on Gorbachev confined to conservatives. Criticisms of Soviet foreign policy from radicals tend to focus more on specific issues and the lack of cost-effectiveness of the new policies. Professor Nikolai Shmelev of the USA-Canada Institute has spoken out against the excessive spending of the Soviet Union in Latin America. A recent foreign policy article by Izyumov and Kortunov published in *International Affairs* in 1988 points to the wide gap between principle and behavior—a criticism, by the way, that is levelled with equal justification against governments the world over. The article criticizes the Soviet foreign policy apparatus for failing to take principled stands on military and economic issues. While it is debatable how influential this point of view is and how far it actually reflects any sizeable portion of Soviet public opinion, it is noteworthy that Shevardnadze's powerful October 1989 speech at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet addressed the past moral shortcomings of Soviet foreign policy, with a particular condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

It is important for all of us to remember that the criticisms of the conservatives and the radicals are not necessarily reflective of the views of the Soviet population as a whole. It is likely, however, that the more

extreme critics of Gorbachev and his leadership are capitalizing on the general frustration and despondency of the Soviet population at the lack of improvement in their economic and social conditions. Some Soviet parliamentarians view the attacks against Shevardnadze and other leaders as driven by political considerations and aimed at inciting the population against the present leadership and their policies of reform.

Recently, Gorbachev has also been criticized for devoting too much of his time to public relations, foreign trips, summit-level meetings and to Soviet foreign policy in general. Such criticisms of how a leader spends his time are not unusual in Western countries either, but they are a new phenomenon in the USSR. It is quite easy to understand how Soviet citizens are no longer excited over new foreign policy successes. When one cannot easily buy sugar or coffee in the shops, why bother to get excited about new achievements abroad?

Moreover, one must remember the inaccessibility to the average citizen of many of the underlying concepts of new Soviet foreign policy, ideas such as common human global values and the Common European Home. These are vague ideas and seem far removed from the pressing day-to-day concerns of the average consumer. In the West, such apathy is viewed as an important message from the Soviet population. The leadership can no longer buy time for more boldly pursuing *perestroika* by undertaking bold foreign policy initiatives, whose major result is seen by the Soviet public as being a further increase in the international prestige of the Soviet Union abroad, but bringing them no tangible benefits. The people are impatient for immediate improvement in the conditions of their daily life now, not more promises of future recompense.

But what the Soviet people have forgotten is that they have the luxury to think this way because of the outstanding success of Gorbachev's policies in removing any real threat of external attack on the USSR. Radical and conservative critics seem to have already forgotten that the danger of war has been greatly reduced; Soviet foreign policy had become more economically realistic; and the USSR has gained great international prestige as a result of the new policies. As one Leningrad factory manager recently said, "Since the threat of nuclear war has been removed, we can now make our first focus our stomachs and living conditions." By Soviet and Western standards, this, indeed, is a significant accomplishment for Gorbachev and his team. It comes as a major surprise to many of us in the West that the Soviet public already seems to take these major achievements for granted.

HOW HAS THE USSR BENEFITED?

WHERE HAS GORBACHEV'S foreign policy had its most significant impact to date? What are the achievements of the Gorbachev leadership which now appear to be overlooked by the majority of the Soviet population, if not by its Western counterparts? In the author's view, the three major areas of achievement which Gorbachev's foreign policy has brought to the people of the USSR are:

1) THE DANGER OF WAR HAS BEEN REDUCED

FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE, the West and indeed the world, the single most important achievement of Gorbachev's new foreign policy has been the dramatic reduction of the threat of nuclear and conventional war and a fundamental transformation of the Soviet Union's interaction with the United States, Europe, China and Japan. For the first time in its history, the Soviet Union faces no realistic threat of invasion. After years of Cold War, alternating between periods of detente and confrontation,

the threat of an East-West, primarily Soviet-U. S. military confrontation has now largely disappeared, thanks to the bold foreign policy initiatives undertaken since 1986.

A CBS/*New York Times* public opinion poll in the summer of 1989 showed that less than 1 % of the American population feared the possibility of war. Instead, the greatest concern of the U. S. population is the danger to their society posed by drugs. This is a dramatic shift in public opinion of the threat perceptions of the USSR. As economic strength becomes the most significant factor in defining the power of a nation, Japan is increasingly seen by the American public as the major challenger to the United States. Respected public opinion polls conducted by the National Public Opinion Research Center of Tatyana Zaslavskaya in Moscow demonstrate similar phenomena in the USSR, with the threat of war being replaced by overwhelmingly domestic concerns by the vast majority of the Soviet population.

Domestic critics have charged that Gorbachev has paid too high a price for this fundamental change in international relations. They claim that the Soviet Union was outmanoeuvred during disarmament negotiations, citing the INF Treaty as prime example of this phenomenon. Did either the U. S. or the USSR get a "better deal" from the INF Treaty? It is true that the USSR agreed to remove twice as many intermediate and short range missiles as the United States. However, that is because the Soviet Union deployed more. Both sides reduced to zero and the Treaty removed the threat of American Cruise and Pershing IIs to the territory of the USSR.

The Pershing II system had the capability of hitting Moscow within seven minutes of their launch from West Germany, thus posing what was seen as a serious first strike danger to the USSR. Their destruction under the terms of the INF Treaty has also greatly lowered the possibility of accidental nuclear war. Since American missiles in Western Europe could hit the Soviet homeland and their Soviet counterparts in Europe could not hit any part of the United States, the removal of American INF missiles from Europe represents a greater achievement for the security of the territory of the Soviet Union than for that of the United States.

Moreover the INF Treaty established the important principle of verification by on-site inspection (OSI), which in turn has opened the door to further disarmament measures, such as substantial conventional reductions as part of the Conference on Military Forces in Europe (CFE). The use of OSI increases the confidence of both sides in the good faith of the other and makes it more difficult for extreme right-wingers in the U. S. to sabotage disarmament agreements by charging the Soviet Union with cheating on treaty obligations.

The development of OSI and the advent of military *glasnost* have undermined the "Soviet threat" image in the West, which was fueled by Soviet military secrecy. Many in the West believe that the Soviet Union gains more valuable information from on-site inspections than does the U. S. military. Recent strong opposition by powerful elements in the U. S. military to the more intrusive OSI proposed by the Soviet Union seems to reinforce this point.

The fact that the Soviet Union has replaced the U. S. as the principal proponent of vigorous inspection measures has further added to Soviet prestige. Moreover, much of what the USSR was trying to conceal was already common knowledge in the West and could be readily found in Western periodicals such as *IISS Military Balance*. Apart from helping to confirm the enemy image of the USSR in the West, the greatest consequence of Soviet military secrecy has been, to withhold from Soviet citizens an accurate picture of the extent of the burdens which military expenditures place on the Soviet economy. A serious debate on the military

budget can only take place with the disclosure of more detailed information on the military budget, as is done in the West. Military *glasnost* will help the Supreme Soviet and, indirectly, the Soviet public itself, to adequately supervise the composition and extent of the military burden. Its success is critical if reductions in that burden, as part of the process of restructuring the armed forces and defense industries, are to continue.

The calculated Soviet response to President Reagan's 'Star Wars' initiative also served to encourage Western critics in their opposition to the entire concept of building and deploying a space-based ballistic missile defense system. The refusal of the Soviet Union to contemplate building a similar system and the detailed analysis of Soviet specialists on the enormous technical and budgetary difficulties, which would have to be overcome to deploy such a system, led many U. S. politicians to question both the viability and need for SDI.

The Soviet insistence that they could negate any spacebased missile defense system with relatively cheap countermeasures, coupled with Gorbachev's repeated calls for continued U. S. and Soviet adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the complete exclusion of weapons from other space, were among the major factors which have caused the U. S. Congress to repeatedly cut the funding which SDI research receives. Once again Gorbachev's diplomacy and non-polemical argument, rather than a military build-up, scored a success in largely negating an issue which could have posed a major security threat to the USSR.

Soviet unilateral disarmament initiatives, in particular the reductions in the Soviet armed forces announced by Gorbachev in his UN speech in December 1988, were not immediately reciprocated by the West. However, these initiatives, together with the Soviet decision to allow non-Communist governments to come to power in Eastern Europe, have helped create an environment facilitating U. S. unilateral concessions. For example, U. S. Secretary of Defense Cheney announced in February 1990 during a tour of East Asia that the U. S. will reduce its forces in South Korea, the Philippines and Japan. The NATO decision in May 1989 to table, in effect indefinitely, the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is another case in point.

Although the Bush Administration is proposing only a 2% cut in the defense budget, many in the U. S. Congress are calling for much deeper cuts in U. S. defense expenditure, averaging 5% annually. If, as seems likely, this route is followed, the U. S. defense budget will be \$75 billion lower in 1995 and \$150 billion lower in 2000, than it would have been under the Bush Administration plans.² The cuts may even be larger.

In view of Soviet unilateral arms reductions and its decision not to oppose the emergence of non-communist governments coming to power in Eastern Europe, the U. S. political landscape is increasingly tilted in favor of those in Congress who want deeper cuts in defense spending. U. S. politicians are now actively debating how to spend the largesse of defense savings—to improve the education system, fight drug abuse, revamp the U. S. social security system and the like. A similar public debate in the USSR would also be very helpful as the USSR reorders its priorities.

Beyond the issue of disarmament, some conservatives claim that by allowing free elections in Eastern Europe and conceding that the two German states should be re-united in a single country, Gorbachev has seriously damaged the security interests of the USSR. However, the East Europeans were not reliable military allies and their major contribution to the security of the USSR was simply geographic. They provided a buffer from the West. The success of Gorbachev's foreign policy was the end of the military confrontation in Europe, rendering such a buffer irrelevant. Similarly, on the question of the future of Germany, Gorbachev

has managed to place the Soviet Union, thanks to the '2+4 Formula', squarely alongside the three Western powers, the U. S., the United Kingdom and France in the negotiations with the Germans. Before Gorbachev, it would have been these three Western powers and the Germans on one side of the negotiating table, the Soviet Union on the other. Now it will be the Germans negotiating with the four powers. This approach will give the Soviet Union much more leverage in the negotiations. Leading West Germans have already made it clear that the Soviet Union will not suffer politically or economically from the unification of Germany and instead stands to gain major benefits, particularly in the economic and technological field. Thus a longstanding confrontation has become a symbol of the new cooperative spirit between East and West.

2) FOREIGN POLICY HAS BECOME MORE ECONOMICALLY REALISTIC

WHEREAS IN THE 1970s, the Soviet economy maintained average growth rates of 4-5 percent per year, in the 1980s that figure dropped to 1-2 percent. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was even falling technologically behind the New Industrialized Economies ("NIEs") such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. In 1986, Japan's GNP surpassed that of the Soviet Union. Although the new leadership did not immediately realize the deep-rooted nature of the economic stagnation in the Soviet Union, they nonetheless came to the conclusion that the USSR's international commitments had to be subordinated to the prime task of economic modernization at home. For the average Soviet citizen, economic conditions have actually deteriorated. There is no doubt that the USSR must suffer through this difficult period of restructuring if it wishes to improve the living conditions of its citizens and to play a significant role in the modern global economy of the 21st century.

In contrast to the past, a tight linkage now exists between domestic needs and foreign commitments. The Gorbachev leadership understood that serious economic and technological deficiencies jeopardized the USSR's international position. Reversing these trends would require both major economic modernization and new foreign policy approaches. In the future, Soviet diplomacy will have to live within the country's economic means. Gorbachev's desire for domestic reform led him to search for structures of stability in critical areas—arms control; disengagement from Third World conflicts; large-scale slashing of economic and military assistance to the Third World; troop withdrawal from Afghanistan etc., as a way to provide a durable framework of stability for the resource choices that have to be made. As part of this policy, foreign economic relations have become an integrated, coordinated part of Soviet foreign policy. The appointment for the first time of a Deputy Foreign Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, reflects the central role economic affairs are now beginning to play in the Soviet foreign policy establishment.

The past five years have witnessed a slow but steady globalization of Soviet economic policy, which has begun to displace military and political initiatives as the prime instruments of Soviet power. The Soviet leadership has begun the complicated, time-consuming process of becoming involved in the world financial and trading systems, including the GATT, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The problems at the domestic level include the basic incompatibility of the USSR's existing economic system with the Western market economies, the non-convertibility of its currency, and few potential markets for its manufactured products. Nonetheless, factors in the global economic environment, such as the lackluster performance of several key economies and low world market prices for petroleum continue to stand as obstacles to this process of integration.

Discernable progress is being made in a number of areas. A new agreement was recently signed between the European Community (EC) and the Soviet Union. Among the most important aspects of this agreement are: the EC granted most favored nation status to the Soviet Union; the liberalization of some discriminatory measures toward Soviet imports to the EC and the potential expansion contained in the agreement in many areas of economic, scientific and technological cooperation. In addition, the American and Soviet governments are currently negotiating a comprehensive bilateral trade and finance agreement which is due to be signed as soon as U. S. Congress waives the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments.

The Soviet Union has also turned its focus inward with a curtailment of its economic ties and obligations to Eastern Europe and the Third World. There has been a major shift towards more balanced market relations with all its foreign partners. Foreign economic relations have been restructured. The orthodox concept of state monopoly on foreign trade was revised and now more than 10,000 grass-roots state enterprises and production cooperatives can make deals with foreign partners without intermediaries in Soviet foreign trade agencies.

More than 1,200 joint ventures between Soviet and foreign partners were established in the USSR. Western direct investment in the Soviet economy jumped from close to zero in early 1987 to 1.5 billion dollars at the end of 1989. The long neglected Soviet consumer sector is now beginning to challenge the primacy of the military/industrial sector in terms of the priority accorded to it in resource allocations within the Soviet economy. This has displeased some members of the military-industrial complex who interpret the shift in budget allocations and priorities as working against their own interests and those of their workers.

The Soviet Union has been freed of the economic burdens of supporting unpopular and economically inefficient regimes in Eastern Europe, countries which enjoyed living standards considerably higher than those of the Soviet Union itself. According to some estimates, the USSR was spending \$17-19 billion to support its Eastern European allies at the beginning of the 1980s. Subsequently the amount of aid is claimed to have dropped to \$10-11 billion by 1984.³ It should be noted, however, that this drop encouraged Eastern European countries to increasingly divorce themselves from the Soviet Union over questions such as relations with the West, increased military spending and the speed of implementation of domestic economic reform.

A major indicator in this shift in the relations has been the drop in the quality of Eastern European manufactured exports to the Soviet Union, as indicated by numerous Soviet complaints. However, the CMEA countries which have been dependent for decades on the Soviet Union for a large part of their trade—in particular raw materials—cannot simply stop trading with the USSR. By shifting to more flexible market arrangements within CMEA economic relations and with trade in convertible currencies all East European economies will face competition and incentives that in the longer run will contribute to economic growth and development.

When Gorbachev came to power, he faced the two sharply contrasting choices of either significantly reducing the defense burden on the Soviet economy within the conceptual framework of new thinking or redoubling efforts towards what would have been a futile and wasteful attempt to compete with Western military technologies. As early as October 1982 General Secretary Brezhnev, when addressing senior-level military officials indicated that the fear of a technological lag was already a serious concern: "Competition in military technology has sharply intensified, often acquiring a fundamentally new character. A lag in competition is inadmissible."⁴ However, it is widely agreed that the thrust of Brezhnev's

lecture to the Soviet military was that they could no longer rely on unlimited resource allocations as they had in the past.⁵ Gorbachev took up this philosophy. As a result, he pressed ahead with the restructuring of Soviet military doctrine towards a more defensive orientation, as well as pursuing arms control and unilateral arms reduction initiatives. These have allowed the Soviet Union to avoid a huge increase in military spending which would have further depressed living standards without increasing the security of the USSR.

3) THE USSR HAS IMPROVED ITS INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION

SINCE GORBACHEV came to power in March 1985, the prestige and international reputation of the Soviet Union has risen dramatically. The Soviet Union is increasingly considered an important, reliable member of the world community of nations. This is in large part due to his foreign policy initiatives. The Gorbachev leadership concluded that a favorable international environment can only be created on the basis of political cooperation with the leading industrial powers and above all the United States.

Since 1985, the Soviet Union has shown a clear resolve to take its proper responsibility as an important member of the world community of nations. This is clearly evidenced in the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the shift in Third World policies, seeking peaceful resolution of regional conflicts rather than exploiting tensions in the Third World and making conflicts in these areas battlegrounds for superpower competition.

Moreover, Soviet foreign policy analysts and officials largely agreed that past policies have resulted in many expensive commitments for the Soviets, especially in the Third World. Soviet support for radical regimes has burdened the Soviet people with responsibility for the economic and political survival of some of the weakest and poorest countries in the world. The USSR is increasingly coming to realize that it cannot continue such large commitments if it is to improve the living conditions of its people.

In addition, the Soviet Union has recently successfully managed to end its diplomatic isolation in several key areas of the world. It has established diplomatic relations with a number of countries in strategic positions such as the Middle East and Asia where it did not previously enjoy relations. Gorbachev has gained international respect and prestige for the importance he has attached to the primacy of international law and the strengthening of international organizations, in particular the United Nations. It is ironic that one of Gorbachev's least known achievements is that the Soviet Union has now received guest observer status in the Council of Europe, an organization which was created as part of the Cold War machinery in 1949 to prevent the subversion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union. After the Malta Summit-level meeting, the United States has decided to support the application of the Soviet Union for observer status in GATT.

Although the Northern Territories dispute has not been settled, Soviet arms control initiatives and unilateral reductions have undermined the rationale for any continued Japanese military buildup. The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China has also dramatically reduced the security threat. Since 1969, this threat has been taken very seriously by the Soviet leadership.

Another dimension of Soviet foreign policy since 1985 has been its human face. In the past, foreign relations were the sole domain of a very limited circle. Today tens of thousands of Soviet citizens are participating in the myriad relations with the outside world. Students, factory workers, miners, scientists, librarians and many others—the so-called "citizen

diplomats"—are building new bridges to the West and the Third World. This openness in contacts can be further felt by the warm reception Westerners receive in the USSR including visits to private residence and offices, long held off-limits to foreigners, and by Soviet citizens who are being warmly welcomed in the West. The USSR has benefitted from and participated in humanitarian aid programs to victims of natural disasters around the world. Soviet foreign policy has become more human—and thus more respected in the world.

ON BALANCE, one can conclude that the Soviet people have benefitted greatly from the foreign policy achievements of the last five years. For the first time since 1929, the Soviet leadership has begun to shift the focus of the Soviet economy from industrial investment priorities to one based on the priority of improving the standard of living of the individual. Such a shift could not have begun until the threat of external attack, a just and historic concern of the Soviet people, was reduced. This has been accomplished. The trust between East and West which has been built with great difficulty must be nurtured and reinforced. This is the obligation of the West as well as the USSR.

It is clear that the major priority for the USSR is now to address the pressing domestic economic and social problems. Bold economic reforms will require a great deal of sacrifice by the people of the USSR and substantial risks by their leaders who will soon have to make unpopular decisions in order to raise the efficiency of the national economy.

If the West really does wish to see perestroika succeed, it cannot sit back and watch. The West must be willing to be of assistance—including contributing to the creation of a positive international environment which will allow the USSR to devote its resources to improving its domestic economic and social mechanisms. Czechoslovak President Havel shocked the United States Congress in late February 1990 when he argued that the "best way for the West to help Czechoslovakia is to help the Soviet Union in its irreversible but extremely complicated way to democracy." Havel argued that this is not a luxury but an obligation as East and West move together from a world based on military and ideological competition to a new type of cooperation.

Considering the difficult internal situation in the USSR today, it is easy to underestimate the tremendous vision and effort of those who work on foreign policy issues. Their successes have given the USSR an enormous opportunity to improve the domestic situation. Soviet and Western leaders, however, must not have the illusion that new foreign policy accomplishments can substitute for internal economic reforms. One can only hope that the same boldness and creativity which has characterized recent Soviet foreign policy will be applied with equal zeal to the process of internal economic reforms.

"How Should America Respond to Gorbachev's Challenge?" A Report of the Task Force on Soviet New Thinking, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York, 1987, pp. 9, 14.

² *The New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1990.

³ See Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982 and Charles Wolf, *The Costs of the Soviet Empire* R3073-1-NA, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1983.

⁴ *Pravda*, Oct. 28, 1982.

⁵ *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1986, pp. 63-77.

that it was there that the centre of the military rivalry with the United States was located. The focal point of policy in the Third World was the desire to put as many countries as possible under our control and do as much damage as possible to the other side's interests. On the other side, this was veiled by the philosophy of solidarity with progressive regimes and support for social transformations, although in reality the ideological motives and all the more so a real assessment of the nature of the regime and its policy vis-à-vis its people did not have substantial meaning. Brazen anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, if the situation fitted into the scheme of anti-Americanism, was forgiven. A typical example was the then widespread assessment of the Iranian revolution, which essentially boiled down to the fact that, all its specifics notwithstanding, it accorded with our interests as being strikingly anti-American.

The "Vietnamese syndrome" that the US went through only whetted appetites. As a result, we waged an outright war in Afghanistan, we were deeply enmeshed in several acute regional conflicts (and we encouraged socialist developing countries to take part in them), and we promoted the creation of regimes in different parts of the world that tried, under the banner of anti-imperialism, to implement in their own conditions the administer-by-command model and therefore counted on us in everything. The specifics of these regimes, the militarist bent typical of our domestic and foreign policy, and the backwardness of the Soviet civilian economy that was strongly manifest even then made for the fact that military cooperation and arms deliveries were the heart of our relations with developing states "friendly" to us. Their militarisation only pushed them even farther into participation in conflicts and into authoritarian rule and worsened the situation in the economy that was rapidly falling apart as it was, as a result of the application of our scheme. The "allies" demanded more and more resources, became more deeply involved in conflicts, and increasingly strengthened in everyone's eyes the association between Soviet policy and instability, authoritarianism and economic failures. Other developing states, above all the most prosperous ones economically, cooperation with which could have yielded us real benefit, came to have a stronger distrust in the Soviet Union and a reluctance to have anything to do with it, and even openly protested against its adventures in the Third World.

After 1985, the reassessment of our Third World policy did not begin right away. It took several years to set about the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and even more time to admit that the Afghanistan war was a mistake. Clearly, this decision was a difficult one and required great political courage; nevertheless, this was obviously the most urgent foreign policy problem. Soviet people continued to die in Afghanistan, and our participation in the war there remained the chief impediment to normalisation of relations with the rest of the world. Our turn towards settling other regional conflicts and reducing our involvement in developments in different parts of the Third World also began very gradually. Dialogue on this topic was launched with the USA, we began energetically using multilateral mechanisms, the United Nations above all, in the search for solutions to conflict situations, and we started urging our partners in the Third World to work for peaceful settlements of problems and to attain reconciliation within their countries.

The successes scored on this path are obvious: with UN participation, the framework for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was devised, the process of provision of independence to Namibia drew to a close, the war between Iran and Iraq has been ended, progress toward a peaceful settlement in Central America has begun, and the outlines of a normalisation of the situation in Cambodia and the Western Sahara are starting to take shape.

At the same time, many Third World countries' attitudes to the Soviet Union have changed drastically, we have begun winning trust even among those which did not want to have anything to do with us at all. Many of these states are promising and quite solvent counterparts for developing trade and economic relations.

The changes in our foreign policy philosophy and in the nature of our actions in the Third World, and the development of extensive relations with different countries from this region have enabled us to take a fresh approach to many global problems on a multilateral basis as well. Our confrontational approach to the West and desire to involve the Third World in it and divide the former into countries that were "ours" and "not ours" largely impeded a possibility for the UN and other organisations to solve international economic and many other problems. The removal of tensions and the realisation that today's problems require cooperation from everyone who is prepared to tackle them have made it possible to normalise the situation there somewhat, and to begin exploring ways out of politicised dead-ends and proceed towards pragmatic compromise solutions based on our practical interests, not ideological ambitions.

Nevertheless, the changes in our relations with the Third World are less impressive than those in our relations with our former "enemy"—the West. Some of the most odious manifestations of the old policy have been eliminated, the elements that created the most difficulties for us in our relations with the USA and other Western and developing states not oriented to us have been removed, and attempts have been made to lessen the economic burden of our involvement in Third World affairs. However, a detailed assessment of the former policy is still at development stage, and the tenet on the repudiation of confrontation has not been brought to the logical conclusion that the system of priorities and the nature of the ties that have taken shape in the epoch of the support of the "anti-imperialist struggle" in the Third World should be reassessed. The latest of our official statements, especially those made during Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's tour of Africa, and the noticeable evolution in the positions of countries close to us inspire hope that there will be a faster progress towards a new policy in the Third World. For these changes to become more profound it is important that the old infrastructure be discarded, above all in the military sphere, which ensured and generated a confrontation policy.

All our partners in Eastern Europe, this region that is truly important for us, have been replaced over these years. There are now non-communist governments in power in some countries. Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe has been reduced considerably, and the withdrawal of troops from there continues. There is nothing wrong with this. Without such revolutionary breakthroughs, a new non-confrontational period cannot be ushered in, the splitting up of the world cannot be overcome, and its advanced achievements cannot be drawn on. As to the Third World virtually all our partners are in place. They continue to receive our political support and military and economic assistance, albeit perhaps to a slightly lesser extent. In most cases they are not the initiators of the settlement of conflicts into which they have been drawn. They are brought with great difficulty to stands which open at least somewhat the door to a settlement. More often than not these countries are in a catastrophic economic state and cannot ensure the elementary needs of their populations. More often than not they are far removed from democracy and respect for human rights, and many of them are waging war with part of their own people. Evidently, we just recently felt ashamed that just a few days before Ceausescu's fall we were not telling the truth about him and were even prepared to render him political support. I am certain

that we can perhaps feel much more shame for many of our former and current partners in the Third World.

That this state of affairs goes on like this is hardly harmless. Wars continue in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and to a certain extent in Central America. The situation is explosive, in Cambodia, Mozambique and elsewhere. We or our closest allies have been drawn into all of them in one form or another. People are dying in all of them. Our weapons are being used in all of them in one form or another. All of them are potentially fraught with a drastic worsening of the regional and overall international situation, a worsening that is capable of throwing the world far back. The arms race continues, also not without our participation, in Southern Asia, the Near and Middle East, Northern Africa and the Caribbean Basin. Reports are still coming in of the appearance, now in one point, now in another, of new Soviet weapons, weapons that are likely more destructive and modern than those in other countries of this region.

The paradox is that we took an active part in the attempts to settle the situation in all these regions and, moreover, scored certain, but almost always limited success. Of course, we cannot settle conflicts, some of which are rather difficult, unilaterally or only together with the Americans. On the other hand, all these wars would have in effect been impossible if we had not supplied the weapons and resources for them, if we had honestly told the forces waging them that we would not be supporting them any more. However, in order to do this, we need to scuttle our former categories of victory or defeat, we need to carry out the same revolutionary turnabout as in Europe, and overcome internally the confrontational logic of rivalry with the USA, most of which spawned or perpetuated these conflicts. Thus far, this is not taking place, or it is taking place very slowly. The most vivid and difficult example for us is Afghanistan.

Just over a year ago our troops left Afghan territory. Soviet people have stopped dying there. This is an enormous and indisputable achievement. This does not mean, however, that we have left the war, that we have rid ourselves of its moral, political and material burden. The war in Afghanistan continues, and at times even more actively than during the period of our military presence there. Afghans continue to die, and there is still a hotbed of tensions in direct proximity of our borders, at a most important point of Asia. Afghanistan continues to be a country that cannot ensure its development, or even feed its people, for that matter. Aside from arms deliveries, we are still shouldering the burden of extensive economic aid to Afghanistan, and not the aid that ensures independent development, since the war in effect rules out construction, but daily supplies of food and other essentials that are not in great supply in our country. Differing expenditure figures are named. Regrettably, not in our press or in our official statements. Nor are our deputies taking a real interest in this. As far as weapons *per se* are concerned, Western sources are quoting between 250 and 400 million dollars a month. It is not hard to calculate how much this has cost since the troop withdrawal.

Of course, the conflict in Afghanistan and around it is a highly complicated problem where the inertia of hatred and irreconcilability is enormous. Many participants, above all a motley kaleidoscope of intra-Afghan forces, are involved there. It is difficult to settle this conflict, no matter how much we want to do so. It would be incorrect to maintain that throughout these years the Americans were consistent in their attempts to extinguish this fire. Their line exhibited a vacillation between a desire to truly settle this conflict and a desire to preserve it as a burdensome thorn for the Soviet Union. Pakistan's line is even more con-

tradiotory. On the other hand, it would be wrong to assert that the Americans are not giving, nor have ever given a chance for settlement. The USA is not interested in Afghanistan turning into another Iran, and is definitively declaring in favour of Afghanistan's not being hostile to the Soviet Union and of its legitimate interests being taken into consideration in a settlement. With all that it should not be forgotten that the mujaheddin are difficult interlocutors even for those who are supporting them.

The situation is also complicated by the fact that the mujaheddin are also more inclined to a settlement through force in hopes of winning a military victory over the Najibullah government. Nevertheless, our main task in Afghanistan should have been not only the troop withdrawal, but also efforts for solutions that would promote the establishment of such a structure against which the Afghan people would not fight and which would normalise political life in the country, when the struggle would not be waged by force of arms. There is no guarantee that this goal would have been reached, but the aspiration to it should be dictated by a sense of responsibility for the many years of armed intervention and by a sincere desire to put an end to the war and truly halt the interference in the affairs of another country. Otherwise, this is not a sweeping reexamination of the view of this conflict, and of all conflicts in general, but merely a change in the means of politics and no direct involvement of troops.

It is only today, when the strong-arm line is increasingly showing its futility, when at least a stalemated outcome of the war there has become even more obvious, slow progress to other stands, stands aimed at settling the conflict, has begun. We ourselves are already talking about the necessity of negative symmetry, we recognise though in cautious expressions, our responsibility for finding settlement formulas, and we are voicing the readiness of the UN to take part in this process, and we understand that the path to normalisation of the situation is a somewhat transitional, neutral state, not reconciliation with one of the belligerents remaining in power.

The same approach, in principle, not in detail, holds true for the other conflict situations in which we were involved most of all and which were linked above all with internal contradictions and struggle. In principle it should be obvious to everyone that we have no intentions of continuing to preserve a situation where such wars are waged with our weapons and our resources. The only aid we can render is to promote a rapid settlement formula that would enable the people to determine freely, with safeguards, and, preferably, under international control, what form of administration and what government it prefers. Only in this way will talk of freedom of choice have real meaning, rather than serve as a veil for preserving the status quo. There can be different concrete schemes of action here—from preserving the government in power and simply holding fair elections, as in Nicaragua, to UN representatives more or less fully replacing the state structures, as seems to be taking shape in the Cambodian case. If this variant does not suit the government in power, there can be only one alternative—the cessation of our military, economic and other aid, and of political support in the international arena. We cannot force an end of the war, but we certainly should not fuel it.

Such an approach will not only yield us big political and economic dividends but also accord with norms of universal morality and solidarity. It cannot be seriously believed that, from the moral standpoint, it is more important to observe and extend commitments made to certain governments in earlier times, when the entire logic of a vision of the world was different, than to try and end the destruction of people and rid one's ruined country of additional burdens and prompt other countries to de-

velop independently. What solidarity can we be talking about when in practice it develops above all into military aid to countries whose peoples are literally starving not as a result of natural calamities but largely as a result of war and political ambitions. True human solidarity is being manifested at this time by the other world, one which, despite political antipathies, helps with foodstuffs and other things required for people's survival. We, however, "helped" to such an extent that even without new deliveries of weapons so much of them had been stockpiled for hostilities to be actively carried on. This, incidentally, is taking place in many areas where both sides are fighting, ultimately, with our, essentially unpaid-for, weapons, which demonstrates once again the absurdities and immorality of such policy.

Military cooperation is the main element of the structure of relations with the Third World countries closest to us who are used to imitate us in basing their foreign and home policies on force. It is practically impossible to obtain our official data on arms deliveries, all the more so with regard to individual countries. It is also impossible to learn how much resources are being spent on all this. The claim that arms deliveries yield us enormous hard-currency profits seems, at this juncture, nothing more than a myth. Of course, individual transactions are profitable, but they have long been cancelled out by all sorts of debts and gratuitous deliveries. The theme of arms deliveries is becoming increasingly acute in our talk about the Third World. It is becoming a self-sufficing factor of our policies, one which prevents us from manoeuvring freely.

Arms deliveries, which are uncontrolled and not linked with the strategy of new political thinking, to countries where the situation is relatively calm, are dangerous, too. More often than not, our weapons are being stockpiled on a large scale which often tips the regional balance of power. Some of our steps to beef up the military potential in the Third World, including those that might, even indirectly, help the appearance of potentialities in the nuclear, chemical and missile spheres, will sooner or later inevitably complicate the global disarmament situation as well. Talk about any "strategic alliances" and defence needs can hardly be convincing in this case.

Evidently, we will have certain interests in the Third World linked with our security. However, they are extremely limited. The specifics of our geographical location and economic development level, and the nature of economic ties do not make it possible to seriously talk about our having vital interests in the developing world which need to be protected with the aid of weapons, if we do not consider as such interests the senseless race to establish our influence far away from our borders, a race dictated only by the logic of maintaining confrontation. Nor will we forget that even the most massive weapons deliveries do not guarantee stable influence at all, as was shown by the example of Egypt and other countries.

While remaining a nuclear power, we probably need certain military installations abroad to maintain communications with the submarine fleet and to carry out electronic surveillance. However, we need to weigh well, not only with the participation of the military department, the scope in which this is necessary, and if it is necessary, then to see whether it would be cheaper to meet these needs through the development of space-based facilities. The tenet of the need for the virtual omnipresence of our Navy and, by implication, bridgeheads for supplying it evokes still greater doubts. It would not be bad if the military clearly explained how and what vital interests of our country it protects in oceans far from our shores. If it turns out that its presence there is, after all, expedient, then it is worthwhile to weigh our possibilities and decide whether we can supply it there on a commercial basis. Incidentally, al-

though the USA and other Western countries have interests in the Third World that are objectively somewhat different from ours, our restraint will inevitably lead to a substantial scaling down of military presence abroad, above all by dint of financial considerations. Demands for this are persistently being made in the West even today.

Evidently we are not prepared, like Czechoslovakia, to end weapons exports in principle. Economically, it is expedient not to stop this entirely; but they should be delivered on a completely different basis. For one thing, firm restrictions should be introduced that are linked with the undesirability of deliveries to explosive areas and of deliveries that would violate the principle of reasonable sufficiency at the regional level which change the balance of power there or introduce qualitatively new weaponry there. Such restrictions could be introduced on both a unilateral and a coordinated basis. In principle, the West is prepared for talks on this theme, if we do not attempt to make arbitrary exceptions for ourselves. For another, arms deliveries should be made on a purely commercial basis, one that would take account not only of current solvency but also of the prospects for economic development. We simply have no other option in our current state.

Economic expediency, not ideological and political preferences, should become the determinant for developing economic ties with the Third World as well. This will be ultimately profitable not only for us but also for the countries with which we cooperate. Other kind of economic interaction corrupts more often than not. It is not fortuitous that virtually no country that counted above all on cooperation with us has been able to establish a mechanism of stable development, even though it has put up some major facilities and scored certain success in individual areas. In our integral and interdependent world it is preferable for such a big and potentially rich country as ours not to fully stop rendering gratuitous aid. This is not only a moral obligation but also a certain contribution to the future, to its development and stability. However, the volume, nature and direction of this aid should be discussed publicly and promote what our country can do without detriment to its own development. In any event, the procedure for using it should be strictly controlled, including through multilateral mechanisms, and it should be aimed above all at the development of the economies of Third World countries, and, in extreme instances, at aid to the population directly. Otherwise this is both a waste of our resources and a disservice to the peoples of the developing countries. Our experience, and that of the West, too, for that matter, has amassed much proof of this.

Our approach to global, above all economic, problems and a discussion of them on a multilateral level should change accordingly as well. We should be guided not by considerations of "unification of forces in the struggle against imperialism" and not by abstract slogans of solidarity, but by calculations of expedience based on the objective laws governing the economy, and by our interests. Considering our "intermediate" position between the industrialised and developing worlds, our interests in different matters can coincide with the different groups of countries.

Such a turnabout in relations with so many states will evoke a host of questions. What about our friends and our moral commitments to them? What about the entire "three worlds" concept and the West's role in the developing countries? What should our criteria in assessing Third World governments be?

Of course, every state and every people have moral commitments. However, one should regard moral commitments above all to peoples, not governments or regimes. If we are talking about internationalism, we need to clearly visualise what internationalism the point at issue is—the

internationalism of authoritarian regimes, the internationalism of the administer-by-command system which existed in the past and which has not died yet, or universal internationalism. If we are talking about the latter, free development and well-being of our people and other peoples should be our main concern. We cannot force regimes to leave, but we can honestly talk about changes in our policy, in our political morality. And if it is truly new, it cannot ignore such a criterion as democracy in assessing the situations in the Third World. Societies in the developing countries are different, and they cannot be made democratic overnight. But tolerance has its limits here as well. We must make it clear that our sympathies lie on the side of compliance with democratic norms and human rights as they are understood in international documents. Nor should we be afraid of insisting on international control, neither of determining our attitude to any regime depending on the results of such control.

It is important to depart once and for all from dividing the world into camps. There should be criteria of universal morality and human rights, a criterion of our national interests, and a criterion of the need to pragmatically tackle the development needs facing humanity. With whom we will be solving these or other problems depends on how close a country is to these criteria, not on whether this country is a member of our camp or another camp. An analysis, including a critical one, of the US policies in the Third World is a separate subject. Unlike the earlier practice, we should determine our line not by the rule of contraries but by our interests realistically understood and openly discussed. Should they clash with the US interests we shall have to seek solutions jointly. In any other case US actions should be of no concern to us.

The term "Third World" has come from the times when there was a split into two hostile worlds. Today, when we are trying to overcome the split of the world into two hostile camps, the term "Third World" loses its former meaning, although, of course, there is still some commonality in the developing countries, which is linked with historical roots and the economic and political development levels. However, all of us are moving more and more rapidly to an integral world in which contradictions and problems will remain but which will be able to be solved only through concerted efforts. The quicker the legacy of confrontation is surmounted in the Third World, too, the quicker we will all move forward.

EUROPE IS BOTH EAST AND WEST

Lothar SPÄTH

HISTORY IS URGING US ON

IN THE FINAL MONTHS of 1989, an international order that had seemed immutable collapsed with unexpected rapidity. Concepts, categories and thought patterns we had for four decades regarded as all but unshakable must now be reappraised and so must the political, economic and military structures behind them.

History has drawn all scientists and forecasters into a fast-developing political process, to say nothing of the majority of people directly involved in it. The cards have been reshuffled, and the task of those in positions of responsibility is to channel the energy of contemporary development in a beneficial, constructive direction. We are living through a period of crisis, when the world is being switched to a new track. We have a chance to change everything for the better but there is also a danger of missing once again the opportunities we are offered.

The peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have forcefully demonstrated the meaning of democracy. They have shown that no regime can last long against the will of the population. And they have demanded in no uncertain terms that the state, society and the international community as a whole be humanised, with everyone given a chance to live and be delivered for all time from the threat posed by confrontation between the two hostile blocs and from the danger of global disaster. This is an anything but simple task for politicians the world over.

Currently we are faced with a formidable number of practical problems. How to improve the situation by supplying the population of the globe with all that is basic and vitally important as well as with what lends colour to life? How to satisfy people's constant desire to travel freely without draining national economies of their lifeblood? How to start a democratic process and form an efficient government where there is an ill-organised opposition?

Lastly, how to discuss that extremely sensitive theme, bloc politics and security, in which the slightest changes may imperil international stability? In general, how to achieve all this without losing sight of long-term trends, which we need to be clear about? How to lay solid foundations for an international order that would last many decades or perhaps centuries?

All these problems are difficult to solve. Nor are they made any simpler by the situation in Western countries today. While developments in Eastern Europe undoubtedly dominate both the lively public debate under way and mass consciousness, we must not forget the need for a sober analysis of the revolutionary elements now being introduced into the Western socio-political life.

A few months ago, everybody was speaking of creating a European

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home market by January 1, 1993. The outlines of a European federative state to be brought into existence in the new millennium loomed large. All observers realised that a decisive change was in the making. Pondering on events, they looked back in search of historical analogues.

West European countries that were hostile to and fought against each other a mere five decades ago, have not only buried the hatchet but set out to abolish the concept of nation state once and for all in favour of the entirely new concept of supranational unification.

This concept is currently the order of the day in world politics and implies at the very least revolutionary changes comparable to those taking place in the East. The West will therefore have to solve very many complicated problems that are bound to require attention and effort on the part of Western nations. Finding an adequate response to the processes unfolding in the East is also a major exigency today.

Those active in today's development face a twofold task. First, they need to form a clear idea of the world they want to build and the track onto which they must switch. Second, they must find without delay the best solutions to a vast variety of concrete problems, including even some banal ones.

This article is intended to encourage reflections on both tasks. I would like to begin by setting out my concept of the future world as both a globalised and a regionalised system and then to dwell on some major, primarily economic and military issues.

END OF THE EAST-WEST ANTAGONISM

ALL THE SIGNS are that, as a result of today's transformations, the division of the world into two hostile blocs of states will be written into handbooks of history for good as a one-time antagonism between East and West.

This transition cannot, of course, come overnight, for what we have is a process that began many years ago and will certainly take several more years to complete. While the strongly fortified borders between NATO and the WTO are still there in spite of certain relaxations (until recently, this fact could have been stated in far more explicit terms), it must be borne in mind that the East-West antagonism has long been eroded from within.

Even in past years, the European continent could not be divided into West and East, at least not as strictly and obsessively as was done in some cases. To be sure, there were and still are a number of countries which must be listed as belonging to the West because they are members of both the EC and NATO. But at the same time there were and still are countries integrated into the CMEA and the WTO. Midway between them there is a whole group of countries rather oriented to the West economically and socially but refusing, nonetheless, to align themselves without qualification with either of the blocs. These countries, which lie in a sense between East and West, remain important components of the European community of states.

Besides, there are various ties and elements of interpenetration between the blocs themselves. For instance, the EC in the early seventies signed agreements on cooperation and trade with various East European countries. In 1980, a comprehensive agreement on cooperation was signed with Yugoslavia. There came further agreements, primarily a treaty with Romania. Not long ago this group was joined by Hungary and Poland, and the other East European countries will probably follow.

These multiple legal and economic links softened the rigid bloc system years ago, not to mention the innumerable historical, personal and

cultural contacts which European countries maintain between themselves, now as before.

But I would like to go one step further. I believe it is wrong to divide Europe into East and West or to take a stand East and West. Moreover, we must declare that the East-West antagonism in its deeper historical context was not imposed on Europe but is part of European history. In a sense, Europe itself is the root of the antagonism, being both East and West.

Due to a narrowing of certain concepts that has occurred in recent years, one occasionally got the impression that Eastern Europe was outside our part of the Old World. Europe might be said to have shrunk to the size of the EC plus the EFTA nations. All gazes were fixed on progress or stagnation in integrational processes in the western part of the continent, the rest of Europeans being regarded as a secondary factor. This approach was always wrong, and we must put this on record no later than now.

It emerged that in some cases ties between East European countries and their Western neighbours were stronger than their association with the military political blocs artificially formed less than half a century ago. The East Europeans have proved that they too, are part of Europe. Like the neutral countries outside the EC, they are participating in the European process; they see themselves as Europeans and must play their role in the future development of the continent.

Incidentally, this benefits in the broader context both leading powers of the two blocs. The Soviet Union is mainly part of Europe. The Russians, Ukrainians, Baltic peoples and many others are indisputably Europeans, and the whole Russian state, including its trans-Ural territory, has always been recognised to be a European power and has been a member of the European community of powers. True, the Soviet state includes many peoples and territories very remote from European culture and European history, some of them having nothing in common with either. Even so, I must declare as a matter of principle that the Soviet Union is a European power.

Something similar may be said about the leading Western power, the United States. Although it lies outside Europe, it was born of Europe, for it was founded by Europeans who crossed the ocean in search of a new destiny. America is still largely a European state. People there speak a European language, and what is more, their way of life, their mentality and the manner in which they run their economy and do scientific research are essentially akin to Europe's. A way of thinking suggested by natural science and constituting a result of the transition of Europe from medieval to modern history puts its imprint on the image of both European countries and the United States. Nor is this the only fact.

The foregoing invites the logical conclusion that Europe comprises both the East and the West and hence the regions considered so far to belong to different blocs. At the same time, these blocs themselves, the problems of Europe and the two different socio-political worlds formed on the continent under their impact are all purely European products. This is why Europe must not adopt a position half-way between East and West but must overcome division and hostility to restore Europe as the integrated continent it was for many centuries.

Ending the division of Europe is certain to have its effect on the rest of the world, which identifies itself with the two blocs to a very small degree as it is. Most third world countries have stayed out of the blocs and have always been the main advocates of non-alignment. If Europe is extricated from the fetters of an antagonism fatal to it, this will undoubtedly lead to a corresponding course of development throughout the world.

All this is also important to us Germans, for our people, our nation, is hit hardest by the loss of European and world unity. And this explains why the prevailing view in Germany is that building a united Europe does not contradict the demand for reunification made in the Federal German Constitution but, on the contrary, is a prerequisite for meeting it. There can be no Europe without reunification, and without reunification there can be no lasting peace in Europe.

GLOBALISATION AND REGIONALISATION

SINCE THE DIVISION of Europe into blocs is becoming a thing of the past, we should stop to think what will succeed it. I am convinced that bloc-mindedness was an unrealistic way of thinking that for a long time presented a distorted view of real problems and the structure of the future. It had a negative impact in a "downward" and an "upward" direction.

Looking "down", we often failed to realise that the countries considered to belong to one of the blocs had never really been at one on this issue. Nor did the uniform phenomenon of "people's republic" exist. In the political superstructure, showing through the texts of constitutions, diverse declarations and government statements were, invariably, the contours of entirely different nation states resting on centuries-long traditions.

Inner political realities varied even under communist regimes. Communism in China, communism in African countries and communism in Europe were ultimately incomparable. What remained a reality was distinctive, original societies and structures at whose basis lay their ancient history and the mentality of various world regions.

The above is also true of the West, needless to say. There is no "capitalist" state here, nor has there been any. Western Europe, Asia and Latin America, too, were dominated by entirely different relations, the degree of state participation and economic regimentation varied from country to country and so did the actual character of democracy, which reflected both the notion which various peoples had of life and its values and their cultural traditions.

Thus existing in reality within both blocs, until recently seemingly monolithic, was an intricate complex of entirely dissimilar, distinctive regions which I would like to call "world regions" and which always differed more than if this had been conditioned by their belonging to one and the same bloc. Strictly speaking, it was not "East" and "West" that were the real criteria of the division of the world but "Europe", "Latin America", "East Asia" and many other concepts.

Bloc-mindedness was as wrong when directed "upwards". The mistake consisted in believing that even blocs made no difference because their member countries were part of an integral, interdependent world whose every problem concerned all in equal measure and must be solved by all. We need only refer to key problems of protecting the environment and the climate of the planet, which cut across all "iron curtains" and national borders. The idea of "one world" had been persecuted from of old and combated on ideological and political grounds. But it was always quite correct and still is.

To make a brief summary, I would say that over the past years and decades thinking in terms of East-West blocs has changed our consciousness to such an extent that interconnections of real importance to the world have crystallised in the form of two fundamental concepts: globalisation and regionalisation. Globalisation implies the totality of problems and the need to discuss them in talks that inevitably rise to a global level as a result of progress in various human activities. As for regionalisation, it is a means of adequately reflecting the peculiar conditions,

way of thinking, mentality and experience of individual world regions. It enables everyone to find a homeland in a particular social, cultural and historical environment which so abstract and remote a concept as "the world" cannot provide.

I think this pair of concepts—globalisation and regionalisation—is stronger than bloc-mindedness or thinking in national terms; these last categories will die out sooner or later as I see it.

THE WORLD ECONOMY TODAY

IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE, we have to do increasingly with global processes. Shaping up more and more tangibly is a common world market, a common platform for economic interconnections covering the whole globe to a greater or lesser degree.

We are witnessing the rise of a global civilisation directly linking the "global customer" who is supplied with goods and information by producers operating at global level. This civilisation looks on state borders as an annoying obstacle that should, however, not be very hard to overcome. The formation of macrostructures in trade, transport, communications, research and ecology is creating new interconnections that do not coincide with the political map of the world.

Major international combines have long been active all over the world. Their economic might exceeds the state budgets of the majority of developing countries and probably those of some industrial powers. Their real power appears to be at least equal to power of some nation states. Be that as it may, they do not allow the nation states concerned to control them. By installing their affiliates elsewhere, they can defeat attempts by the state to regiment their activity.

The globalisation of economic life is accompanied by development in a variety of other fields. What shaped up long ago is, for instance, a "world internal policy" on environmental protection, transport problems, crime control and, last but not least, cultural problems. It is an open secret that cultural output is kept to world standards and is marketed and consumed worldwide. Satellite technology and a network of up-to-date communications coupled with efficient media form the necessary infrastructures.

The global scene I have described comprises world regions, as I have noted earlier. Economically, one of these is the triad made up of Western Europe, the United States and Japan. It will apparently not be long before this triad comes to include some other world regions. Similar symptoms are in evidence in Latin America as well as in Asia, where India, for one, may already be considered an industrial power. In Southeast Asia, the Four Tigers—Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore—are equal to forming a centre and could, furthermore, merge together with Japan into something of an East Asian economic community.

Lastly, mention should be made of Eastern Europe, whose natural resources and intellectual potential unquestionably offer all prerequisites for rising to the level of a world economic region of outstanding significance. This is the direction in which its development is being channelled or will be in the near future. It is very important that the region's reformers should succeed in opening up the whole system, in making it freer and more flexible so as to allow scope for everyone's initiative.

Summing up, it is logical to presume that by the beginning of the next millennium there will form—along with the triad I have mentioned—a veritable constellation of five to seven world regions that will serve as crystallisation centres for a high degree of competence in accomplishing their tasks, cultural advancement included. Thus there will be a combi-

nation of the horizontal structure of a global market and hence global politics and the vertical structure of world regions.

INSIDE WORLD REGIONS

BUT THERE IS MORE to it than that. World regions are too large and lie too far apart to adequately solve all problems and to fully meet people's desire for a homeland. Even "Europe"—meaning the EC in this case—is too far removed from the peasants of Greece, the handicraftsmen of Baden-Württemberg or the miners of Britain to be able to make political decisions suitable for different situations. No European agrarian policy, however well-founded, can suit in equal measure reasonably large British farms and small peasant households in the south-west of the Federal Republic of Germany. And what is right in the case of, say, the policy of subsidies and control over mergers in an advanced North European country is by no means very wise if applied to small production structures in Portugal.

It follows that to be able to take these real distinctions into account, world regions must be subdivided into minor internal regions. In Europe this implies the historical provinces and areas that have existed for centuries. In Germany, for instance, the *Länder* have certain state powers of their own while elsewhere historical provinces like Burgundy or Lombardy have yet to be granted such prerogatives. This also goes for other world regions, in particular Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin America.

At present internal regions which have been there for centuries and will be necessary in the future need competent specialists who can take care of future policy aimed at purposeful development of such regions.

Looking ahead, I visualise the world to come as a multi-story pyramid. It would be topped by a world arena for solving global problems by global means. The story below would be occupied by world regions with a degree of exclusiveness. And the stories farther down will be occupied by internal regions whose task would be to respond to problems and circumstances typical of them within the bounds of global and world regional measures. In principle, they should be empowered to regulate their local affairs and answer for them.

The Japanese have coined a fine saying, "Think globally, act locally." This is decisive, for the more uniformly macrostructures are controlled (for they must be controlled), the likelier it is that regionally and locally, that is, at microstructural level, there will develop incompatibility and conflicts over key issues.

Besides, the tasks that will have to be fulfilled differ greatly. Whereas in the industrial areas of the North the problem is to set up industries presenting no environmental hazards (at that, the introduction of up-to-date technology meets growing criticism or even hostility), people in other areas—even within the EC—welcome the slightest advance towards industrialisation.

It will be seen that the evolution of post-industrial society and the transformation of pre-industrial into an industrial society are planetary processes taking place simultaneously and on parallel lines. The multitude of concomitant problems cannot be adequately solved under one centralised roof, and this apart from the fact that development, progress, growth are concepts meaning different things in different parts of the globe.

It would be unpardonably arrogant of us Northerners to try to impose our models of general evolution and economic growth on Third World countries. We should rather give them a chance to choose their path. But this cannot be done without regionalisation.

I believe we have made the right choice in this respect. Far from weakening centuries-long development processes to which we submit judging by past experience, regions are strengthening them. It is no accident that within the EC as well, including centralised countries, regions are going from strength to strength. This trend should be stepped up and encouraged. This is why Baden-Württemberg maintains numerous ties with other regions the world over even if their development level prevents them from keeping pace with the Federal Republic's *Länder* enjoying state powers.

FUTURE TASKS FOR EUROPEANS IN EAST AND WEST

WE EUROPEANS in East and West alike will have to do much before the picture I have painted becomes reality. To begin with, it is necessary to remove as speedily as possible the vestiges of the East-West antagonism still there and to replace it by cooperation in every field. We should cooperate globally in various international forums, including the UN, and get together at intraregional and interregional meetings. As for the various internal regions, in particular those of Eastern and Western Europe, they should promote varied and active ties with each other.

However, Europeans must first put their "European house" in order. It seems to me that, from this point of view, it is particularly important to begin by strengthening the EC within a narrow circle and building a real European federative state open to all European countries willing to join it.

At the same time, other European countries still unable or reluctant for some reason to participate in the unification of Europe should be allowed to do so. This could take the form of association to varying degrees of intensity or at least of close cooperation. I believe East European countries may have a special stake in precisely this form of cooperation in the foreseeable future.

Internal regions should be further strengthened throughout Europe and in individual European countries. Local problems now dealt with centrally although there is no need for it, should be left to the regions, which should also cooperate vigorously with each other and with regions in other continents. All the internal regions of Europe should establish mutually beneficial contacts. Some such contacts exist already; Baden-Württemberg, for one, is cooperating with its neighbours on the Upper Rhine.

We also have ties with other regions comparable to Baden-Württemberg in development level. It is at European and international level that common interests manifest themselves most effectively. But Baden-Württemberg is also cooperating with such less developed regions as the central part of Portugal.

The future may see cooperation between West and East European regions aimed at establishing close ties between them and rendering aid if necessary. Promoting cultural and humanitarian contacts would certainly help do away with prejudices and all pretexts for cold war.

Before this project for a future world can be put into practice against the background of universal development, political solutions need to be found in the near future to three specific problems: economic aid to the East, military prospects, and the German question. I feel that an early solution can be found in the economic sphere. Incidentally, the problem of the economic growth of Eastern Europe bears on both the peoples of the region and, needless to say, those of Western Europe.

Of course, selling whole states or making demands to this effect is out of the question. Also, I wish to stress that it is undesirable to offer any country "clever" advice or try to tell it how it should develop from

now on. It would probably be best for West European countries to have an economic interest in contributing to the development of their East European partners without aiming, however, to make them mere appendages to the West European system. At work here, too, is the main principle of the right of nations to self-determination, including their autonomous choice of political, economic and social system.

At the same time, those countries should realise notwithstanding their autonomy that it would be absurd to waste subsidies. When it comes to setting up joint ventures between Eastern and Western companies, the latter must be offered firm guarantees of protecting their property and enabled to transfer their share of profit without hindrance. And it should be clear that no Western company could bring itself to operate in the East if productivity and quality are too low to yield reasonable profit. These are banal economic facts which are not supposed to be debatable. For the same reason, no state would want to merely put forward programmes while pumping money into rigid economic structures.

By contrast, economic aid from the West could play a decisive role in private economic activity by Western companies. Hence East European countries seeking it should provide the requisite legal and organisational conditions.

Another problem is the need to decide on the future of military blocs. For all the euphoria now prevailing, we must not delude ourselves into drawing overhasty conclusions and ending with a stroke of the pen situations unripe for it. However much I believe in the possibility of eliminating blocs and military confrontation in the world, I am convinced, nonetheless, that we must proceed with circumspection as we search for short-term and long-term solutions. I regard the idea of dissolving both pacts overnight as not only inadvisable but downright dangerous.

The process of building mutual confidence between East and West is still too frail a sprout. It requires full support and various concrete steps. I therefore think we should go on discussing disarmament, paying special heed to confidence-building measures. One of these measures could be a substantial cut in troops in a definite part of Europe but this is a process that will take time and effort on both sides.

The two sides should continue exchanging figures and taking other steps (sending observers and so on).

A word about the German question. I have pointed out that this question and the problem of ending the division of Europe are inseparable. One of these aims cannot be achieved without the other. It would be a perilous illusion to imagine that the German people would be reconciled to their disunity for a long time. German unity is not just a phrase written into the Federal Republic's Constitution. The past four decades have seen it take deep root in German hearts. An impressive proof of this was furnished by developments following the opening of the border on November 9, 1989.

All parties should realise that German unity must not lead to the emergence of a new Germany seeking domination and hegemony. For nearly forty years past, the Federal Republic has been playing an active role in the E.C. It is one of the main advocates of greater unity and the creation of a single internal market and hence a United States of Europe. Nor does it mean to withdraw from this process, which is so fruitful for it (economically and otherwise).

I do not think anyone in the GDR is going to take a militarist or revanchist stand on the German question. After all, the point at issue is merely the right to free self-determination, which is proper to any people on Earth.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Yuri KHILCHEVSKY

TO ASSESS THE CURRENT STATE of Soviet culture means to talk about a number of positive shifts and about still existing sharp crisis situations.

One of the main positive results is the strengthening of the creative independence of both individual artists and arts groups. Freedom of creativity is not only declared, it is exercised in reality. Revelations of "blank spots" continues, in assessing works of art, ever greater importance is attached to the criterion of spiritual value. Dozens of new names, currents and trends have been discovered in the fine arts and music.

All records in international cultural exchange have been broken today. Hundreds, thousands of Soviet artistes have gone on tour abroad. Many world famous theatres and ensembles have visited the USSR. New forms of joint creativity and cooperation have appeared and the process of affirmation of commercial principles in cultural exchanges has begun. The first experience has shown that commerce is not always an enemy of art and can frequently be a good aid in consolidating the material and technical base of culture.

Of course, culture is defined not only by facts and figures; its significance lies in influencing society. Cultural life in this country over the past few years has been marked by the on-going development of glasnost, pluralism and convergence of the artist and the spectator and reader. This is unquestionably exerting a considerable impact on the country's social and political life. Perestroika has yet to engender geniuses, however, a certain step towards further democratising cultural life has been taken. However, certain negative phenomena have accumulated as well. The so-called residual principle, when culture is pushed to the background, continues to function. Admittedly, today literally everyone is demanding "Culture! Give us culture now!" Yet what is typical is the little attention which the Supreme Soviet and the Congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR paid to the practical solution of cultural problems. What is emerging is a paradoxical consensus with regard to the vital necessity of cultural development and yet the predominant attitude towards culture as something secondary.

Indeed, true culture is expensive. Patronage did not arise by chance and overnight. All over the world culture is maintained through a system of foundations and subsidies and a tax system that stimulates aid to culture.

We are justly called a great nation, but it is high time to concretely make the people's well-being and the preservation and growth of the cultural heritage a value on the level of a patriotic absolute, a national shrine. No power, especially a great one, can survive without such an approach.

Culture can no longer exist in and of itself, it must penetrate all spheres of human activity. That is why it is necessary to create a power-

ful balanced and comprehensive socio-state cultural programme that will make it possible to mobilise all the spiritual potential of our people and its intelligentsia.

Recently I came across a selection of articles and speeches by Soviet cultural officials of the early 1980s, many of which dealt with the state of the spiritual life of our society and with international cultural exchanges. If the historians of the future study the above period of the country's development from these publications, they will soon arrive at the conclusion that we were living in conditions of the "flourishing of multinational Soviet culture" and "its winning of ever newer positions in the world", that "there has arrived a new stage of cultural cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries which is firmly based on full unity of ideologies and historical aspirations", while "the ruling quarters of the West, seeking to export rock music to our country, are doing all in their power not to allow the finest works of Soviet culture, which contain the lofty ideals of humanism and peace, to enter their countries". It will not be difficult for historians to find out that the Soviet Union is the most advanced power in cultural development, a country of full literacy, where nearly 100 per cent of the population visit clubs and are members of amateur arts groups.

However, we, the people of today, well remember this period in our history; perhaps more acutely than ever, we painfully understand what was actually going on, and how this was garbed in a descriptive form. As in other spheres of our life, be it the economy or politics, we felt even then the yawning and ever-growing abyss between words and the actual state of affairs. All international cultural exchanges were monopolised and often served momentary interests said to be "politically imperative". In many respects the situation in international cultural exchange was a natural result of the internal situation in our culture and its continuation.

The administer-by-command apparatus regarded the creative individual as a sort of instrument for implementing its plans, plans that were more often than not geared to itself. It was in those years that we signed, in 1982 at the World Conference of Ministers of Culture in Mexico City, the declaration which stated that "man is the beginning and ultimate goal of development".

The years of perestroika have enabled us to take a look at ourselves as if from the sidelines, as if in a mirror. And we felt pain and fear from what we saw. Twelve cultural and historical monuments fall into ruin daily in this country. This makes for 4,380 a year. It is our heritage departing from us forever. According to UNESCO figures, we rank 28th in the world in the educational level. Cultural poverty is an abyss on the road to humanising the country and improving the economy and inter-ethnic relations. Today it pains us to see how the decades of this country's "cultural policy" have led to a situation where the roots of the traditional national culture, folklore, and crafts have dried up and the national languages have become poorer. Art has been driven out from the schools, our cities have become faceless, and certain so-called monuments are an affront to aesthetic taste.

The roots of many of our economic and social problems and misfortunes lie in the decline of culture and morality. Everyone seems to realise that culture is a vital necessity but, on the other hand, they do not think it is as essential as food or health care. And today we need to realise fully that without raising culture, we cannot solve political, social or economic problems. Political culture, for that matter, begins simply with culture. Culture is not a branch. A departmental, sectoral approach to it is baneful. Culture is omnipresent. Lenin raised the issue of culture as the centre of the entire policy of the party and state. And this was in

the conditions of an extremely difficult crisis. The cultural degradation of the nation takes revenge in the form of losses in the intellectual potential of society, in the moral potential of the masses, economic officials, politicians, and cultural figures themselves.

Today we do not consider ourselves teachers; we ourselves are prepared to learn from the people, and not only from our own. Rejecting international experience would be the greatest conceit. We think that international cultural links today can breathe what is new into the cultural life of our country and promote its rebirth (precisely "rebirth", not the word combination "further onward development", as was the case of a few years ago, comes to mind).

We are witnessing the life-giving process of change in the relations between the state and the Church. Society is gradually coming to truly understand the Church as a part of its own culture and a bearer of it in many respects. We are at the very start of the road to full-fledged cooperation with the churches and confessions existing both in this country and abroad. Progress along this path will ultimately not only lead to greater prestige for our culture abroad but also exert a favourable impact on interethnic relations in this country.

I THINK it follows from the above that the role of the USSR Ministry of Culture should change drastically today, too. It should become a sort of nerve centre sending out impulses of our spiritual improvement—new and original solutions. The world is interrelated, it is not the one-way street we used to want to imagine.

It cannot be said that the five years of perestroika have been for us only a period of analysis where we are and what we are. One proof of this is the fact the public is addressing itself to the problems of cultural development. The place which has been assigned to culture in the draft platform of the CPSU truly inspires hope.

Certain shifts have also taken place in the nature of the Soviet Union's external cultural ties. A decisive influence on it is being exerted by perestroika and the participation of the Soviet intelligentsia in it, and by the democratisation of cultural life in Soviet society. The first steps have been taken to democratise and decentralise cultural ties, broaden independence of actions in this sphere by the Union and autonomous republics and local Soviets, and spread the practice of direct ties among our creative unions and cultural organisations, arts groups, public, cooperative and other organisations and mixed enterprises. These processes are irreversible, and, in all likelihood, they will grow. They have changed the overall picture, including our priorities in cultural links with foreign countries.

The sweeping changes that have been taking pace of late in the world, and especially in the Soviet Union and the East European countries are posing the task of reviewing the structure and traditional forms of our cultural contacts. The point at issue is not only involving new participants in these exchanges, developing direct ties, joint creativity and personal contacts among cultural figures, and paying especial attention to youth exchanges. We need to analyse the new tendency of growth of cultural exchanges with the capitalist countries, as a result of which the socialist nations have conceded their leadership in this process and the volume of exchange with the developing countries have declined somewhat. Generally speaking, this state of affairs is due to the financial and economic difficulties of these countries. On the other hand, in the context of independence, many participants in cultural ties on our part are placing the emphasis on receiving incomes in convertible currency. This is one facet of the problem.

The other is the total lack of coordination in the foreign tours of our creative groups.

A great deal has already been said about the need to coordinate international cultural exchanges, which is especially important with due account for the growing processes of their decentralisation. Ideally, the market or, to be more exact, normal market relations in the sphere of cultural exchanges could be a mechanism for this coordination in the very distant future. Of course, such types of art as folklore and classic genres will require support by the state—they cannot be left to fend for themselves. At the present stage, however, it is simply imperative to elaborate an effective coordinating system.

Today, coordinating international cultural exchanges has been entrusted to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for the political aspect of this activity. Frankly, however, no real coordination mechanism has been worked out at present. In the foreseeable future, the role of coordinator could be assumed by a state-public council of the type of assembly of cultural figures, proposals for the formation of which were heard, in particular, in the addresses by people's deputies at the USSR Supreme Soviet. This council could determine priorities both in national cultural development and in external ties on the national level, in the financing sphere included. The establishment of an association of major Soviet organisations engaged in external cultural ties is promising as well.

At the present juncture, aside from decentralisation, we need to ensure greater coordination of exchanges, otherwise we will lose a great deal and devalue our art. We cannot do without a coordinated "cultural export" policy. In fact we need more energetic assistance from our institutions abroad, above all the embassies. Only they can realistically analyse locally the level and effectiveness of our cultural presence in a country, success or failure in this work, the solvency and reliability of the partners, etc.

The role played by the Soviet embassies is all the greater if we take into account that poor consideration for the moral and political atmosphere in countries and for the specifics and cultural needs of their population is a major shortcoming of the programme of cultural exchanges and plans for their implementation. Derangement of planned or already announced events is still frequent. All this, of course, does damage to our country's prestige and evokes a sense of frustration in cultural figures on both sides. We unquestionably need to work for better coordination and order, and the Soviet embassies are a prime link in this system. Assistance from embassies in planning and arranging cultural events abroad includes not only consideration for the real possibilities of their own countries and a sober assessment of the expedience and effectiveness of the events being planned. Advancement of new and original ideas and initiatives is very important to us.

The Ministry of Culture is grateful to the embassies for their prompt response to our request for materials about the legislative and tax practice in their host countries, which are very important for elaborating the pertinent legislation in this country. Thanks to the initiative of the Soviet embassies in the USA, Switzerland, Holland and a number of other countries we have held of late a number of major Soviet culture and art festivals which have generated broad repercussions in the world. This practice will be continued in the years to come, and we are now talking about comprehensive events such as the declaration of a year of Russian culture and language in the USA and, correspondingly, of American culture and language in the Soviet Union, etc. The recent talks with USIA officials in Washington are making it possible to speak of the practicability of such projects.

A word about the meetings held in Washington last February within the framework of the third round of talks on Soviet-American information exchanges. Remarkably, the theme of cultural exchanges was discussed for the first time as an item on the agenda along with a wide range of problems of cooperation in information examined in a fairly constructive spirit. It was a question of, among other things, a coordinated approach to and the implementation of such projects as a substantial increase in bilateral exchanges of students (1,000:1,000), major art and complex exhibitions (like "USSR-USA: 20th Century"), the idea of founding an American-Soviet cultural education university and holding in Moscow a Soviet-American seminar on cooperation in artistic exchanges, etc.

The meetings confirmed the vigorous trend of cultural exchanges, the need to constantly readjust and extend the relevant intergovernmental agreements signed earlier, which may be said to have proved too limited or to lag behind fast-growing cultural cooperation. It was not by chance that USIA Director Gelb proposed that the final communique describe this process as ushering in a decade of growing mutual understanding requiring considerably more attention and additional effort on the part of both countries. This holds out the hope that cultural cooperation will be on the agenda of the coming summer meeting between the two countries' leaders. These ideas are increasingly appreciated by and find favourable response among American and Soviet legislators, who declare—from what conversations suggest—for the formation of a kind of cultural lobby to encourage and support cultural initiatives.

In the process of revamping patterns of cultural exchanges, many traditional events such as the overly regimented culture days are giving way to original projects. One illustration is the extensive discussion in the Soviet press of the establishment of consortium of the Bolshoi Theatre and a British firm. This project, which is designed to protect the interests of the world-famous Bolshoi and enable the theatre to receive additional revenues from souvenir production and advertising, was perceived by some as the selling-out of the national heritage. The logic of the critics of this initiative is not convincing. The following question naturally arises: Is it really better to continue putting up with the ruthless and, what is more, free use of the name of the Bolshoi Theatre by different foreign enterprises, and Soviet ones for that matter, instead of enabling the Bolshoi to receive considerable revenues for strengthening its material base?

OUR APPROACH to the emigre creative intelligentsia has changed drastically. We have at long last realised the fact that it is part and parcel of this nation's cultural heritage. Most active cooperation with this part of our culture is a prime factor for consolidating the country. Artists have left their country for different reasons. Over the past few decades they were more often than not forced to do this. Today this needs to be admitted definitely. The moment has come for repentance of sorts. The time for casting stones has passed; it is now time to gather them. Consider carefully the following figure: over the past 100 years, immigrants from Russia and the Soviet Union comprised 70 per cent of all the masters who performed in New York's Carnegie Hall. This is a huge stratum not only of our culture but of world culture as well.

However, so acute a problem as the drain of our intellectual potential to the West remains. We lost some musicians last year, among them Alexander Palei, Rannop, Valentin Kozhin and Valentin Zhuk. Our outstanding masters Oleg Krysa, Alexander Slobodyanik, Oleg Kogan, Vladimir Viardo, Natalia Gutman and Valeri Klimov virtually permanently

work abroad under contract. Just recently a famous Soviet teacher Bron from Novosibirsk signed a two-year contract to work abroad, and five of his best pupils will be working in the West. And what guarantee is there that they will not be lost to our culture forever? In the near future the USSR Supreme Soviet will adopt a law on travel. Whom will we be left with then? Who will teach at our educational institutions? Why are people leaving? We must give extremely precise answers to these questions, state the diagnosis and determine a course of treatment. We do not seem to be talking today about the "absence of freedom of creativity in the USSR". Now no one can dictate to a pianist what music to play, or to an artist what trends in art to keep to.

Therefore, the matter lies elsewhere. One of the reasons is our still derogatory attitude to the individuality of a creative person and the still prevalent attitude to culture as the entertainment industry. Another is the poor social protection of cultural workers and the weak material and technical base of culture, which, frankly, has fallen hopelessly behind the West's. Lastly, there is the still prominent attitude to cultural workers as sources of currency revenues. These matters need to be decided without delay. We have to do all in our power to raise the moral and material status of cultural workers in this country and make it as close as possible to the Western level, even though this seems improbable today.

The passing of a law on intellectual property, and the adoption of new tax regulations corresponding to world practice, etc. are viewed as immediate steps. These measures will in many respects force us to extensively break down existing stereotypes, but we are in dire need of these measures. Of course, it is also necessary to raise the overall level of our culture and its understanding by people. After all, our cultural figures know not just from hearsay about the enormous difference that exists, for example between the entire range of matters involved in arranging tours and concerts (accommodations, halls, advertising, etc.) in any Soviet regional centre and in any even somewhat important city in Western Europe.

Matters of labour remuneration of creative workers abroad and the provision of equal conditions for all partners (state, public or cooperative) in entering into cultural exchanges are not of a rhetorical nature. The USSR Ministry of Culture and the creative unions are seeking, with the aid of a number of deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet, a sweeping overhaul of the tax policy with regard to culture and the passing of a fundamental law on culture. Only the establishment of justified legislative norms in this sphere will enable us to find a solution to the problem of the on-going drain of artistes abroad and help eliminate the recent practice of using various unofficial channels and events for arranging foreign tours. Both cultural workers and the state ultimately stand to gain from such a solution to these problems.

Also very important in this context is the imposition of a "culture tax" to be levied for culture from each paid cultural event and from each participant in external economic operations, and the introduction of incentives, in the form of tax breaks, to contribute to charity work.

Regrettably, the residual principle of financing culture is still an enormous unresolved problem. It is hardest to break down stereotypes here. In this sense we need a veritable conversion of the public consciousness, a conversion of policy and, of course, a conversion of the economy from its petrified forms to free development based on economic laws. In only one area—education and culture—society cannot be considered wasteful, no matter how much funding it allocates. The average monthly wage in the country today is 240 rubles, but in the cultural sphere it is much less: a librarian or a museum employee earns 90 rubles. The British Council has a budget of almost 500 million dollars for the promotion and support

of British culture abroad. The USSR Ministry of Culture, however, is allocated between 10 and 12 million rubles for all international ties and 1.5 million dollars in freely convertible currency. Another problem is the outdated and totally ridiculous resolutions and regulations which sometimes impose financially humiliating terms on world-famous artists.

I would also like to touch upon the use of scientific and technological advances in the cultural field. Computer technology, modern science-intensive equipment for concert halls, circuses and theatres, the production of quality goods for the needs of culture without which satisfaction of the population's cultural needs is inconceivable—all this should be tackled through state subsidies of culture, above all from the possibilities of converting funds and technologies of this country's military-industrial complex, and also through international cultural exchanges in the material production sphere.

The economic aspect of our problems is most directly linked with the legal one. Today we are talking a great deal about the establishment of a rule-of-law state. How necessary legal underpinnings for our culture and its full-fledged development are! We know today the content of the law on property, but we do not fully realise how our state will be structured economically. We are talking about taxation, but we still do not have a copyright law, despite the Berne Accords which we have signed. The provisions of the Berne Convention, for example, are still too far removed from our realities. In Vienna we committed ourselves to immediately setting about changing our domestic legislation in accordance with the Concluding Document. However, fundamental bills that would directly affect the humanitarian aspects of Vienna and cultural changes, in particular, on the press, religion and travel, have yet to be adopted by the Supreme Soviet. It is for this reason that the elaboration and passing of a law on culture do not brook delay. This is all the more important with due account for the circumstance that although we have departed from command method of "managing culture", we do not precisely visualise how it exists and functions in our rapidly changing society. The legal basis of this functioning is perhaps the fundamental issue for us today. And, I repeat, here we need to adopt the best elements from world and above all from the European experience. It is studying and absorbing this experience that will help us to truly become part of world culture.

TODAY INTEREST in our culture is above all interest in perestroika. If we take the notion "perestroika" in the broader sense, it is a revamping of international relations in Europe first and foremost. The situation in Eastern Europe is changing rapidly. Many of the problems that have accumulated in the community have been laid bare, and a diversity of approaches of the East European countries to the further development of relations and to new phenomena in the world has manifested itself. In the context of democratisation of allied relations, the specific national positions of different countries have begun manifesting themselves in bolder relief, coordination of bilateral and multilateral initiatives has become more complex, and tensions in interrelations, more acute.

At the same time, we are sensing ever greater support for the idea of creating a common European home among the public on the continent, the intelligentsia included. Here, too, culture can indeed play a unique, vanguard role, since in the cultural sphere it is easier to begin engaging in a specific endeavour together. Today we need to map out in concert the outlines of possible international cooperation, the outlines of a common European home of culture. Without such a home a common European home will hardly be possible at all. Of course, there are a host of problems on the road of this cultural development.

One of these problems is the absence of a pertinent mechanism for effective international cooperation in culture and the arts. Today we are in a sort of limbo, when we definitely need to find a point of departure, not even for progress but for moving off square one. It is obvious that signed international agreements, above all the afore-mentioned Vienna Concluding Document, can become this point of departure. Today the term "dusk of Europe" is rarely encountered in the international vocabulary. The cradle of world civilisation seems to be finding the strength to consolidate and create a united European cultural space. The inclusion of the Soviet Union in this process can not only promote this consolidation, what with the enormous contribution the nation's peoples have made to European culture, but also become a point of departure for the renaissance of our own culture and for a European programme of restoring the culture of the continent.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the Soviet Union is not only a great European power, but also an Asian one with extremely rich cultural traditions and long-standing ties with the peoples of this enormous awakening continent. New approaches are also expected in our exchanges with the countries of other regions of the world.

It is also time for practical and franker dialogue among states at a rather high level of management of the cultural sphere. The international climate today is favourable for this. Whereas, say, five years ago international meetings on matters of culture and humanitarian cooperation frequently turned into a verbal boxing ring, today dialogue is possible in the search for common views and stands. The first steps in this direction have already been taken. Thus, last November French Minister of Culture Jacques Lang met with his colleagues and cultural figures from the West European and a number of East European countries, including the USSR, to attempt together to map out the guidelines for possible international cooperation—the outlines of a common European home of culture. Proposals for convening similar meetings are being made more and more frequently. Thus, Italy, Austria and the FRG recently came forward with an initiative to arrange them in one form or another. Austria is organising a meeting for representatives of that country with cultural officials from East European countries being a go-between in East-West cultural dialogue. And why not? All the possibilities for this should at least be used.

In many matters which used to be considered dead ends, things have got off the ground of late. The question of opening on a mutual basis our cultural and information centres in Western countries and that of similar institutions in the USSR, a question that was difficult in the recent past, has been decided in principle. Agreements to the effect have been signed with West Germany, France, India and Egypt, and talks are being held on concluding agreements with the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Finland and Greece.

Generally speaking, we have every reason to speak of our cultural breakthrough to foreign stages. Today our task is to deepen this breakthrough and keep up the current peak of interest in the culture of the epoch of perestroika. If the programme of cultural ties with each country, one which takes account of both the "saturation" sometimes with one type of genre and the need for new names and talents to emerge on the world stage, is not devised and coordinated, the current interest will wane. The existing programmes of interstate cultural exchanges are based chiefly on the principle of rather modest government subsidies and, although they cover the leading spheres of culture, are geared, for all that, mainly to an elitist audience. So it is obvious that cultural exchange agreements must definitely take account of the possibilities of television, i. e., the "window" to every home. Today there is big worldwide demand

for information about us, about our culture, and we need to handle this intelligently.

The nature and content of our external ties in the cultural sphere have changed drastically over the past few years. However, we are only at the very start of our journey. There are still many more unresolved problems than resolved ones. And today we need to concentrate on the most urgent areas. They are more or less clear to us now. What is also evident is that we will not solve these problems in one day or in one year. But we must tackle them. There is no other way. And this can be done only by pooling the efforts of state and public organisations and our creative intelligentsia, in short, of everyone who wants our culture to flourish and take a fitting place in the world.

EUROPE IS BOTH EAST AND WEST

(continued from page 50)

It is difficult to say at the moment when or how German unity will materialise. For the Federal Republic, the paramount problem is to pave the way for a really free decision and to bring about maximum cooperation between the two German states.

Whatever the outcome of the current process, it will make no difference in regard to the task facing us: ending the division of our continent by peaceful means and freely. No one can refuse to join in building a common European house. There is no alternative to global, continental and regional cooperation in practically every sphere of human life.

THE HARD ROAD TO CHANGE

Nikolai GOLOVKO

WE ARE BEARING WITNESS to the discarding of the outdated ideas about the sum and substance of contemporary world relationships and about the permanent confrontation of the two systems as the leading trend of the times. A number of political categories are being revised and the dogmas that seemed well established and unchallengeable abandoned. Much of what was so actively and, regretfully, not unsuccessfully drilled into people's minds has to be tested by common sense today. The pluralism of views is imperatively making its way in the process of constant renewal. Naturally, the propagation of the principles of Soviet foreign policy is undergoing considerable change, both in form and in substance, in the course of this process.

THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT about the importance of working for peace and the necessity of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems appears, at first glance, absolutely clear, true and having stood the test of time. The only thing that I see as clouding this clarity is the obtrusive memory of a propagandist passionately pleading with his audience to fight for peace to the last drop of their blood.

But why just a memory? For even today a speaker on international affairs, one of a "good old mould", will, in his heart of hearts, prefer the obvious reality of the "struggle of the two systems" to the vague new political thinking. Such speakers are legion.

The duality of the principle of peaceful coexistence—a plea for peace, on the one hand, and the realisation of the inevitability of the struggle of the two worlds, on the other, showed itself up in our practical policy ever since it was first enunciated. Viewed against the background of expectations of a world revolution, the policy of peaceful coexistence was seen only as a historically enforced measure, a kind of breathing-space on the highway to the universal reign of freedom. It is interesting to analyse, from this standpoint, the affinity of the doctrines of "peaceful coexistence" and "proletarian internationalism", as they were understood at that time, of course. The affinity is close, beyond doubt, and it is very aptly expressed by the slogan "Peace to the Cabins, War on the Palaces!" Indeed, there seems to be no more peace than war there.

Until quite recently, even after nuclear weapons had been invented and spread throughout the world, it was still believed that capitalism would not survive another world war, while the "new world" could and must. Hence the menace that resounded even at the United Nations: "We will bury you!" It had nothing to do with a Marxist understanding of the historical inevitability of the replacement of social systems. Today, it is needless to prove, of course, how unrealistic, utopian and harmful such ideas were.

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After World War II we developed the habit, particularly in the context of the Cold War, of considering peaceful coexistence as a kind of a parallel in historical geometry. Such an interpretation of coexistence as isolated development was sanctified by the task we had set ourselves—that of winning the competition of the two systems by any means. The thinking behind it was that the advantages of the socialist system would work all by themselves outside of world contact and, like wonder-working relics, would assure us a quick and sure victory.

That cost us very dear, in fact, brought us into a state of isolation and, indeed, led to the isolation of the entire socialist community from the international division of labour. I can well expect to be charged with being too peremptory and challenged in the sense that there was no isolation, nor could there have been any. Alas, there was, indeed, and, in fact, just to the extent to which we are falling behind now. Sticking to our guns, we stubbornly refused to do what the natural course of life would prompt us to do, that is, to draw on the experience of the nations of the other social system and turn to account the objective achievements gained on the other side of the ideological barricade.

Finally, the “pre-April” understanding of peaceful coexistence implied accepting peace, perhaps, in the context of international politics only. Now, while in the economic field the proclaimed idea was that of “contest”, the one in ideology was nothing short of a struggle which ruled out in advance the slightest chance of reconciliation.

Now, since the natural course of life flows beyond the scholastically constructed frontiers around isolated areas, in actual practice ideological dogmas inevitably influenced international relations, and that influence was nothing short of destructive, nothing short of confrontational.

It should be pointed out that international political realities were rigidly ideologised on both sides. Bipolarity fed on a dogmatic scheme of some sort of metaphysical dichotomy, a struggle of absolute evil with just as absolute virtue. On our half of the ground there arose the doctrine of two camps opposing one another in every area of human existence. The aim was to bring about the complete triumph of the “camp of peace, democracy and socialism” by means of the full victory of “our system” in the international arena, which was actually identified with the final victory of Communism. On their side, the “free world” ought first to have contained and then to have rolled back and wiped off the face of the earth “totalitarian Communism” or, as was the current phrase until recently, “to leave it on the ash-heap of history”. That was the counter crusade, as it were.

Peaceful coexistence, as seen in the light of the struggle of the two systems, inevitably presumed this struggle to be central to international relations. It is such a lop-sided method of approach, which implies remembering everything about the struggle but nothing at all about unity, ever keeping in view the opposing systems, yet failing to take development into account, that has been at the root of dogmatic thinking in world politics.

The cunning undertone of the “pre-April” interpretation of the principle of peaceful coexistence is all the easier to note once you realise that there can be no genuine peaceful coexistence so long as mutual terror dominates the existence of the opposing states or groups of states. All you can speak about in these circumstances is the absence of war.

If you recall the situation that preceded the spring of 1985 and try to describe it in broad outline, I think you will find that fear was most characteristic and most essential element.

The stockpiling of huge heaps of weapons created a threat of wiping all that humanity had created, indeed, life itself, off the face of the earth.

Bipolarity and the confrontation of the two camps or blocs, with

diametrically opposite conceptual guidelines implanted in each of them, made it imperative to secure military superiority by any means. The absolutely irrational waste of effort and resources for the arms race, senseless from the standpoint of human needs, was explained and even "commended" in the eyes of the public by means of political incantations about the growing military threat: on the one side, from the West, and, on the other, from the East. Large sections of the media, and, along with them lecturers who are well to the fore in public relations throughout the nation, were at pains to create an enemy image, inciting suspicion and hatred, malice and fear.

Gleams of intelligence, i. e., the right perception and comprehension of realities, as shown in the international arms control and nuclear test ban agreements, the Helsinki process, and attempts at normalising relations between the blocs, combined, of course, to inspire a modicum of optimism, but could not, however, change the nature of the general trend towards worsening the world situation.

In that setting, the major world groups focussed their policies on contradictions instead of seeking common ground and compromise solutions based on properly appreciated common interests. Indeed, in the recent past the USSR found itself in an unfavourable relationship with all advanced nations or groups of nations. The international prestige of the USSR was fast falling; after the Soviet troops had been moved into Afghanistan, it reached the lowest ebb throughout Soviet history.

Side by side with the military-political danger there had emerged a no less formidable one in the last few decades—the threat of ecological death. Its direct cause has been the violence wreaked on Nature for years on end, along with invariable glorification of human abilities after each more or less destructive folly.

So by the mid-1980s the world found itself face to face with two problems—how to avert a holocaust and how to save the environment? And swarming around these two global problems, the two bastards of civilisation, there was a myriad of democratic, energy, raw material, food, financial, urbanistic and other misfortunes of modern humanity.

The principle of peaceful coexistence, as it stood at the time, could not provide the answer to these questions, for, treated as though it was a theoretical corner-stone, it was, however outwardly fine-looking, no more than a deficient model of enforced neighbourhood in the context of a suspended mutual war peril. There had to be a quantum leap in the appreciation of the world realities and prospects, the very intellectual breakthrough which has since been so much written and spoken about.

The new political thinking made it imperative, first and foremost, to pass over from preaching the virtues of our own policy and condemning that of our opponents to actual moves to reverse the escalation of tension. Our leadership made the only correct and the only possible conclusion: with huge stocks of weapons of mass destruction built up in the world and experts arguing about how many times or scores of times humanity could be wiped out, it was high time to change over from the balance of terror to normal civilised international relations.

By proclaiming the high priority of common human values, the integrity of the world and deideologised (and, consequently, democratised and humanised) international relations, we are modelling a fundamentally new type of relations between states belonging to differing social systems. This type of relationship could well be translated into practical action to ensure the survival of humanity and this is, beyond doubt, the main thing today. However, the trickery of the principle "even if we have to follow enforced tactics today, the strategy is not theirs, but ours, just the same" has already brought us so much trouble that it is high time for us to understand that both "their" strategy and "ours" is peaceful co-

operation, excluding not only a physical war but ideological, psychological and all other propaganda battles. The times when fears and apprehensions over ideological virginity gave rise to dangerous political strain are irretrievably and irreversibly receding into the past. Let us accept as a postulate of the new times and a product of new thinking a simple and sound idea: social progress can be achieved only through cooperation and there is no reasonable alternative in this case, nor can there be any. The favourite model of the partisans of unidimensional thinking—a cross-breed of an economic pygmy and a nuclear-missile giant—is inexorably doomed to oblivion.

Incidentally, it is high time we stopped identifying social progress with a revolutionary process: the actual course of life has furnished enough evidence to show that there is quite appreciable progress going on in the countries which have experienced no revolutions for centuries.

The new way of thinking means rejecting any dogmatic approach whatsoever as well as any pre-conceived proposition as an absolute one. It is a direct result of the unhampered development of Marxism, an intellectual product of the creative application of Marxist-Leninist theory to the global realities of today. An apt reply to the dogmatic priests and adherents to the pseudo-Marxist scholastic constructions has been given by Mikhail Gorbachev in his article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika" published by the "Pravda" in November, 1989. "Karl Marx wrote in his time that Communism is not an ideal but a real progress of society, which eliminates its former state. With us, however, contrary to this idea, effort was concentrated on describing some kind of an ideal "model" of the future, and forcing into it any changes that take place in society. This abstract scheme was imposed on the reality both in theory and practice. However, the progress of life was often different and followed the objective conditions as they developed."

The integrity of this world of ours is the major reality and the main objectively existing truth complete with all the historical circumstances which have brought it about. The fact that the world is generally diversified and contradictory and the world today has yet complex problems to face, besides, because of its military-political and ideological divisions, does not make it any less integral. On the contrary, the sharpening contradictions in all global directions (East-West, North-South, East-East, West-West etc.) and, at the same time, the growing danger in the face of common human problems objectively prompt humanity to move towards closer integration and greater awareness of the growing interdependence of nations and peoples.

This irreversible trend spurns any idea of an alternative to the new thinking: the history of humanity can go on only by overcoming the vicious circle of pseudopeaceful coexistence arising from anti-human prejudice.

When this century, now drawing to a close, was still young, this kind of prejudice found expression in exalted notions of a world revolutionary conflagration that would burn up the old world, the world of exploitation. And although the actual course of life seemed to disprove the dream of a world-wide uprising of the oppressed and all kinds of attempts at pushing on the revolutionary process and exporting revolution to other countries (what Lenin so emphatically opposed), all these ideas proved to be so tenacious as to exercise a tangible influence on international relations for quite long. As time went on, they were transformed into something that was outwardly more attractive (or less repulsive): a theory of opposition of the two worlds and a principle of active and unqualified support for the revolutionary movements. Naturally, the declaration of such principles, let alone their actual embodiment in foreign policy action, provoked an emphatically negative (and, perhaps,

overdone) reaction from "the rest of the world" and further strained the international situation.

As a result of the hard, often bloody experience the 20th century has reaped in plenty, the world has been gradually coming round to appreciating the need for these doctrines of terror to be replaced by realistic thinking and political sober-mindedness. Is it worth today, building up the sorrow of that experience, to persist in ignoring the world's integral character? This persistence may compel the world to show up a property humanity has only guessed about—its finality. Clausewitz pointed out that a good army commander is capable of more productive thinking at the sight of a danger. An appreciation of the actual probability of an Armageddon makes the politicians' thinking more productive.

THE PHRASE THAT OUR WORLD of today is living through great change is commonplace. Properly speaking, to live through change is its lot and its quite natural state, and, indeed, all history is nothing short of constant change. All that is new about it is its meteoric swiftness. True, I may be reproached and, perhaps, rightly so, with being superficial and even primitive in my reasoning. In any case, I am not in a hurry, indeed, to bring out the "essence of the epoch", so tenderly loved by stand-by theorists.

However, some trends in the development of the modern world and in international relationships have to be noted by all means. One of them is particularly manifest and will, apparently, largely determine the course of international affairs in the future. It is connected with the loss by the State of its once incontestable prerogatives. This amounts to a sort of erosion of classical sovereignty, with the State forfeiting its competence in most diverse areas of life.

One example of this kind is the military (or disarmament) field: for nearly two years US experts have been monitoring our nuclear tests, just as Soviet experts have been doing similar monitoring in the States. This is an example of an act of will by a State consciously and voluntarily sharing some of its competence in the defence field with a potential opponent. Incidentally, competence-sharing in this, just as in other areas, can take place regardless of the will: there is satellite surveillance, for instance, that does not depend on the wishes of States.

The interrelationship between quotations on the stock exchanges of New York, London and Tokyo provides a classical example of the destruction of traditional national economic sovereignty. Indicative in this respect is the development of the process of integration in Europe: from the European Economic Community to the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, and then, through the incorporation of all the nations of Eastern and Central Europe in all-European economic cooperation to the realisation of the humane and constructive model of the common European home.

It is, perhaps, in the field of information that the transparency of boundaries shows itself most. While in earlier times, throughout the history of humanity, the everyday life of the State was always determined by its geographic position and confined to more or less distinct boundaries, the information revolution of today reduces the power of these factors. The advance of technology not only makes the frontiers pervious to information but inevitably leads to information being internationalised and, if you like, to it being socialised at global level.

Beyond doubt, this process has its negative aspects as well, first of all, in the sense that it confronts one with no end of discomforts arising from excessive information pressure. One cannot fail to notice that the information transparency of frontiers in the case of our State inevitably

has the effect of letting in all dross in the shape of pseudo-science, pseudo-culture and pseudo-morality along with objective achievements of advanced nations in the field of science, culture and social organisation. There are enough examples of that in the diversity of our present-day life; they come up in growing numbers of public lectures involving various issues of ideological warfare and information to counter hostile propaganda. I refrain from restating them; it is not they that matter: humanity is just on its way to waste-free and ecologically clean production, above all, mental production. For we, too, while sharing our mental values with the rest of the world, "present" our neighbours on this planet with our own dross.

I would hate to see what I have said about the trend for the State to lose its traditional sovereignty taken mechanically or unidimensionally, as is peculiar to dogmatic thinking. This is an intrinsically conflicting, wide-ranging and dialectical process. Indeed, on the one hand, a classical State today becomes too small to resolve the problems which have to be resolved at regional or even global level, on the other, too big for effective management of the economy or for resolving some issues that are easier and better resolved at local level. At the same time, the processes of integration, while leading to an erosion of the prerogatives of a sovereign State, do not at all cross out the peoples' aspiration for sovereignty and for an appreciation of their own place and their own value both in the modern world and in the history of civilisation.

Rethinking the role and the mission of a State in general, and ours, in particular, in the modern world is a difficult, and, unfortunately, by no means painless process. Overcoming, under the influence of the new outlook, the view of ourselves as a kind of model of the prospective order of society, pioneering the way for all humanity to follow, we are experiencing considerable discomfort: say what you like, but feeling sure of our Messianic role was a point of special pride for us. In fact, there had been quite a sustained effort to cultivate this feeling in our minds. Poets, those sensitive souls, have reacted to it at various times in various ways: from the categorical assertion that "the Soviets have a pride of their own..." to the ironic statement "...we are ahead of the whole planet!". Incidentally, however, it is easier to suffer the loss of Messianic illusions than that of imperial ambitions—after all, we did have some well-founded doubts even before the times of reform about our image being irresistibly attractive to the world community.

It is a much harder and more painful job to destroy another stereotype arising from the feeling of being a superpower surrounded by satellites unquestioningly doing the suzerain's foreign policy bidding. Even the political term "the socialist camp", which had been current for a long time and fell into disuse only quite recently, served to keep our minds fixed on a bipolar model.

THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS of the revolutionary and democratic change in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe make it imperative to hurry up with renouncing "satellite-suzerain" dogmatism. However, the carriers of the dogmas of fear are in no hurry to discard their misguided notions of the "correct" and "incorrect" structure of the world. They appear to see the world of the Cold War time, balancing on the brink of a holocaust, as more secure and reliable than it is today amid natural and historically inevitable change. They cannot still bring themselves to accept the idea of moving towards a common European economic space, suggested by Mikhail Gorbachev in Strasbourg in July, 1989. They understand that the world's political health is largely determined by the state of affairs in Europe, but they find it hard to believe

that common interests and partnership are far more useful and effective for peace than a confrontation of forces and consequent mutual terrorism.

It is worth noting the typical behaviour of the dogmatic lecturers belonging to this category. While seemingly accepting the process of reform, that is, to tell the truth, accepting it not in virtue of persuasion, but only in virtue of the standing practice, established over the years, of accepting any directive that has been handed down, they interpret any foreign policy action towards scaling down military confrontation as prejudicial to our national interests and backing down from the positions gained. Naturally, such public lectures, being as they are veritable "lamentations on the rivers of Babylon", become a brake on, rather than a booster of, reform. True, it is increasingly difficult for these old-world agitators to speak in public and, realising or just sensing that, they step down from the rostrum, grumbling.

The reaction of the dogmatists to the reshaping of our external economic activity is no less interesting. As you know, once enterprises and organisations were granted the right to enter the external market independently, many production groups, keen on rationalising their economic performance, found it necessary to exercise this right, to the extent of launching joint ventures with their Western partners. As was to be expected, the way to go through in setting up external economic links proved anything but smooth: all the flaws stemming from our typical dilettantism made themselves felt right away. Yet for all that, in spite of all the inevitable (sometimes even fatal) teething troubles, the new measure produced a positive effect, on balance.

However, what turned out to rivet the attention of the dogmatists, whiners and weepers over the good old times, was not the effect, but the flaws, and up went yet another outcry. We are just selling ourselves out to accursed capitalism, lock, stock and barrel! Incidentally, some of the "weepers" turned up on the Board of the All-Union *Znaniye* Society involved in establishing something like a dozen joint ventures.

The inevitable challenges we've got to meet as we move towards a free, highly advanced and really civilised society, give the addicts of the old outlook ample food for complaints and plenty of ammunition for accusations. They cannot follow Lenin's rule—clearly see the goal, however obscured it may still be; the least thing they've got to do to see it is to raise their head. But how hard and painful it is to straighten your neck that decades of fear bent down!

AND STILL HARDLY will anybody venture today to deny that we have reached what is a turning point for the future of civilisation. The tidal wave of democratic regeneration which has swept across the countries of Eastern Europe has produced striking evidence of the deep-going process of change going on in the modern world.

Naturally, the world process is neither straight, nor even. The U.S. invasion of Panama has reminded everybody that there can yet be relapses and even backtracking. And still, even though in our increasingly crowded and interconnected world, just like in a system of communicating vessels, a swing of the political pendulum in one place cannot fail to tip the scales somewhere else, that does not cancel either the objective trends of world development, driving the beneficent process of reform of international affairs, or the correct starting point of new political thinking, to the effect that the key to the future of human civilisation is in the triumph of the consolidating forces over the power of jingoism or ideological blindness.

The statements by East and West leaders that the world is, at long last, really getting out of the times of the Cold War seem natural, something taken for granted today. There is a growing mutual recognition that our interrelationships are undergoing fundamental change which for the first time in the entire post-war period is actually opening a prospect for a dependable long-term closer East-West relationship. This, it appears, makes it a matter of high priority to drop unequivocally the notions, terms, ideas, and vocabulary of the past and update all of these to suit the theoretical groundwork now built up for East-West relations, produce general theories living up to the call of the times and the opportunities that are opening up. There has to be determined action to further updating the political vocabulary and terminology we use to formulate the rules and standards of national behaviour adequate to the principles of new political thinking.

In practical terms, this requires a concept of the new model of East-West relations to be formulated and worked up through consensus, one which, precisely within the framework of the new mode of political thinking, would mean discarding the old dogmas, schemes and postulates, and passing over to a new philosophy of relationship between the two systems and, above all, to the understanding that the modern world is not two mutually exclusive civilisations, but one, common to all of us, one dominated by common human values and freedom of choice.

The need for new doctrinal and conceptual guidelines, capable of giving the practical workers clear bearings and an integral vision of the prospect ahead, appears to be all the more important at the present, opening stage of the formation of new structures, with its inevitable uncertainty appropriate to any transitional state. There has to be a generalised theoretical model capable of canalising the energy of regeneration on to the track of predictable constructive endeavour. The imperative need for such a theoretical model and conceptual guideline stands out against the background of the sweeping process of reform going on in Eastern Europe, for there is a danger, as Eduard Shevardnadze has said, of the very process of regeneration losing its lodestar.

The scientific search for conceptual designs of the future model of co-creativity and co-development of nations and peoples, of all humanity has produced various points of view: from a modification of the notion of peaceful coexistence to a recognition of its total irreality in the modern world.

I wouldn't share either of these views. But pondering over the matter and analysing it does bring me round to the following idea. We used to give up instantly our old principles, theories, and concepts, those we had once stood by, and so it is high time for us to understand that nothing actually happens instantly in the process of historical development, even if that change is of a revolutionary kind. Everything has to go through a process of gradual transition, that is to say, there has to be a certain period of transition. And one cannot cut off the old thing with a stroke, without having yet created the new thing, without a risk of finding oneself up at a dead-end or at a parting of the ways. That is true of the principle of peaceful coexistence as well. You can't just wake up one fine day and declare this principle to be dead. We have yet a long way to go from the womb of peaceful coexistence, the structures of the Cold War and confrontation to a new model of East-West relationship. But this process, whatever the pace, is inevitable.

Of course, the principle of peaceful coexistence does not by itself express, nor can it express, the particular specific historical essence and form of the East-West relationship through which and in which the fundamental principle of peaceful coexistence has worked in various stages. While remaining valid in the general political sense, this term can no

longer adequately convey the full meaning and substance of the advancing East-West relationship as it exists even at this point, let alone the type of relationship to come. Nor can it reflect what are now objective opportunities for changing or transforming the very nature of the East-West relationship.

Coexistence in the ordinary sense of the term, that is, a situation where either system "coexists" side by side with the other, while still remaining a system all by itself, as it were, is no longer enough. On the contrary, it is just the object in hand in East-West relations to reach beyond the bounds of an armed opposition with everybody on the alert. The relationship between them must reflect the progressive internationalisation of all processes of economic, intellectual and cultural life in the world and the character of the modern world as one increasingly interconnected and integral.

NOBODY IS LIKELY TO QUESTION the hard fact that these are the times that require an entirely new mode of thinking, the times that radically differ not only from those of the beginning or the middle of this century, but even from those of the early half of the 1980s. Beyond dispute, our understanding of the world's fortunes has become more dimensional and more realistic. At the same time, whether we want it or not, the old catechised mode of thinking is still alive and kicking in our minds, just like pagan superstition was alive and kicking in the Orthodox mentality of Kievan Rus'. This strange coexistence shows itself up, above all, in our reaction to the processes going on both inside this country and in international affairs. While the fundamental political conclusions of the past often look naive to us, the present-day major decisions, not yet wholly appreciated by our minds, seem paradoxical.

The December 1989 issue of *International Affairs* carried an article by R. Ivanov about Nikita Khrushchev's trip to America. Khrushchev was then accompanied by the well-known diplomat Henry Cabot Lodge. While chatting with him about the world to come, Khrushchev said he was sure that when Mr Lodge's grandchildren had grown up they would all have become Socialists and there would be no more capitalism. Of course, it would be naive to believe that we all unreservedly shared that view at the time, even though applauding it quite unanimously. But, obviously, being as it was the opinion of the head of the Party and the Government, it could not fail to produce an active influence both on the nation's practical policy and on our minds.

"My grandchildren and your grandchildren will be very much like each other, although politicians will still be repeating the old truths for a long time," the American diplomat replied to the Soviet leader. He, a man of the Western world, that is, by our former standards, a person with a misguided outlook, had a far sounder view of the world than our leader at the time.

But the point, of course, is not so much that somebody saw things better than somebody else as in the ideological blinkers which we often put over our own eyes at our own free will and even with a good measure of enthusiasm. What makes us prefer the illusory images arising under the blinkers to the actual pictures of a multi-dimensional and multi-coloured world? Is it just the conviction that we know the right road and the deceptive belief that the alarming and fast changing pictures of modernity only distract us from the right track?

I think that there is only one nature of a blinkered ideological outlook, it is the nature of fear. Its sequel in any event is political self-deception capable of a dual manifestation, as the practice of reform has demonstrated.

My mind associates the most typical manifestation of a blinkered ideological vision in the context of reform as it is going on in our country, with the image of a traveller who has strayed off the right road. This traveller is vexed and scared by the sight of an unfamiliar locality and yet, a stubborn pedant, he, instead of finding the right way by the right bearings, keeps on going by an outdated blind map. Dogmatism of this kind is there for everybody to see and hear; it is, as a rule, brought before the bar of public opinion, most often.

There is yet another way of a blinkered vision, that is, of a kind of mentality that is poisoned by fear and laziness, something I would call a "political reflex of pseudojoy". It comes from our common ability to indulge in a euphoria over any more or less detectable positive trend. This kind of reaction calls to mind the character of Doctor Pangloss from Voltaire's *Candide* who was convinced that any event happened for the better in this best of the worlds. This type of terror, showing itself up as pretending to be cheerful in the face of reality, does look "consistent" with the policy of reform and, for this reason, far from being criticised, is greeted as a kind of "social optimism".

But the most important starting basic reason behind our blinkered ideological outlook is that throughout the entire course of our history after the October Revolution of 1917, we had ideology coming first and practice long afterwards. We attempted to fit practice to the Procrustean bed of ideology. Yet even Marx said in his day that ideology came second.

Now, in our approach to international affairs, too, we proceeded not from an objective appreciation of reality, but from an ambition to appraise events depending on how they fit in with our ideological postulates. Therefore, raising today the question of deideologising international relations is not so much an abstract philosophical matter as a specific political problem. We are striving, and asking everybody to do so, to free or purge relations from dogmatic prejudice, class-governed narrow-mindedness and Messianic self-assurance. We have to cooperate, to work together, and we can do so only when we have definitely abandoned the stereotypes of the "enemy image" and the structures that had developed in the times of the Cold War and when we have learned to view the dynamics of the modern world soberly and realistically.

A realistic perception of the world means that an assessment of the unquestionably beneficent political manifestations of new thinking should be more diversified, more deep-going and better appreciated theoretically than we do it sometimes. In any event, while analysing the political results of the new way of thinking, we must by no means confuse them with the total record of the actual policy of reform as it has been carried through ever since it was launched, for it is well known that practical policy is actively made by unalloyed dogmatists and thoughtless upbeat doers capable of converting any enterprise into its opposite. Incidentally, I am far from reproaching those "personalities" with ill intentions. Their actions, in virtue of imprescriptible law, conform to their type of mentality and their manner of viewing the world.

Some time ago, when the theoretical foundations of the new mode of political thinking were just being laid down, a Soviet diplomat was asked to explain the gist of this notion. He replied: "You know the new political thinking means just to see the world as it is." Incidentally, that was our Ambassador to France. Perhaps, today one should add to that: "And, having grasped what one has seen, one has to make appropriate practical conclusion."

And it is just when, to follow the Marxian precept, with a smile we have definitely and irreversibly parted company with the chimeras of the past and have learned to look soberly upon ourselves and around our-

selves, and, besides, not to be afraid to make practical conclusions, we shall have consigned to oblivion the agitator of the sad image that urged us to fight for peace to the last drop of our blood.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT HALLMARKS of the process of change we are living through is the galvanisation of the political reasoning of the masses, of large sections of our people, of our public opinion. One simple fact to illustrate how dynamically this process is developing can be seen from the record of our All-Union *Znaniye Society*. There is a breakthrough under way in human minds, a hankering for new ideas and modes of approach, and a process of materialising the new outlook. This is by no means a simple or smooth process. It is not easy for everyone to drop the stereotypes of the past. But still it is safe to say: the nation is passing over to a new perception of the world and of its place in it. In the process of democratisation, encompassing as it does all areas of our life step by step, the public is ever more determined in forming its judgement of the events taking place at home and abroad, and calling on its leaders to produce decisions adequate to the demands of the modern times, taking into account the fundamental interests and aspirations of the peoples. They do not want to be hostages of "superior" decision-making by a handful of men behind closed doors. They want political mechanisms created to make sure there will never be anything like the mistakes of the past, when a divided world, torn asunder by ideological models, was, as a matter of fact, hostage to the nuclear jinni and when we saw no option but to "fight for peace". Rather than just fight for peace, people want to live in peace, considering it the most important of all natural human rights.

LENIN'S LEGACY

WHENEVER a turning point sets in and concepts of many values are revised, the approach to the ideological legacy of the past takes extreme forms. Some say that truths born long ago cannot help solve today's problems. Others insist on sticking to classical postulates so as not to be led astray by false guidelines of today.

All extremes are doubtful. This applies in particular to extremes in certain appraisals of Lenin's writings. Of course, it would be dogmatic to try to deal with current problems in the same way as similar problems were tackled in the distant past. On the other hand, why impoverish our inner development by refusing to learn from a strategist and tactician of revolution who skilfully steered the ship of party and state politics in the stormiest days?

Lenin was far from regarding himself as an enunciator of everlasting truths. Undeterred by criticism, he resolutely revised his own conclusions, especially when theoretical concepts formed earlier clashed with life. The result was a transformation of his approach to a number of important problems before and after the February Revolution, before and after October 1917, before and after the introduction of NEP. This applies to both home and foreign policy.

Photographs of the revolutionary period show the slogan "Long live the world revolution" alongside the call "Peace for the peoples", suggesting a close connection between these two goals, which are by no means identical from today's point of view.

It took the leaders of the October Revolution some time to reconcile themselves to the unexpected fact that the revolution accomplished in the country had failed to spread any farther. Lenin came sooner than others to the conclusion that it would be risky to wait for the example of the revolution to be followed by others and that the country must proceed from the need to build a new life without looking forward to the proletariat's victory in the outside world.

It was a bitter, disenchanting lesson taught by reality. And it made the Bolsheviks give up their speculative ideas of how proletarian revolutions and history could unfold. Hence the special value of Lenin's experience of building foreign political relations, an experience which included a revision of many theoretical propositions that had failed to pass the test of practice. That experience is concentrated in the last notes, letters and comments written by Lenin from December 1922 to March 2, 1923, when he put his signature to his last article. It was his political testament, whose main point consisted in joining together the destinies of Marxism and the country.

On December 24, 1922, Lenin's secretaries on duty received two volumes of *Notes on the Revolution* ordered for him earlier. The author was Nikolai Shukhanov, a noted Menshevik leader and former member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Three weeks later, Lenin dictated comments scathingly criticising Shukhanov and other petty-bourgeois democrats for "their slavish imitation of the past" and their fear of "the minutest deviation from the German model". "They

have completely failed to understand what is decisive in Marxism, namely, its revolutionary dialectics. They have even absolutely failed to understand Marx's plain statements that in times of revolution the utmost flexibility is demanded...." (Analysts believe that Lenin meant Marx's definition of the Paris Commune as "a thoroughly expansive political form".)

Joining issue with his opponents, Lenin asked them in what books they had read anything about the inadmissibility of modifying historical routine. It was time to renounce the idea that a textbook could predict every form of the future course of world history and to say "that those who thought so are simply fools".

Lenin defended revolutionary dialectics as a method of solving problems missing from all textbooks but posed daily by life. He never resorted to speculative combinations to be used as "props" for practice. He simply addressed himself to every problem that arose as the revolution went on.

In the same article, Lenin quoted Napoleon. "On s'engage et puis... on voit. Rendered freely this means: 'First engage in a serious battle and then see what happens'. Well, we did first engage in a serious battle in October 1917, and then saw such details of development (from the standpoint of world history they were certainly details) as the Brest peace, the New Economic Policy, and so forth." There is a connection between this and an idea stated in "Better Fewer, But Better", Lenin's last article. "Great revolutions, for really great revolutions grow out of the contradictions between the old, between what is directed towards developing the old, and the very abstract striving for the new, which must be so new as not to contain the tiniest particle of the old."

People seldom quoted Lenin in his lifetime but they argued with him frequently enough. As for the tendency to "adapt" quotations from Lenin to the topic of the day, it did not come until later.

The task shouldered by Lenin was not meaningless theorising but the solution of concrete problems of home and foreign policy. "Vladimir Ilyich," People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin pointed out in notes written in 1924 under the impression of Lenin's death, "never set out the entire foreign policy of the Soviet Republic as a plan worked out systematically." This must have been why Chicherin analysed not so much Lenin's political views but his approach to international affairs. And more often than not, he used the definition "political realism".

In January 1923, Lenin himself wrote about what this was like in practice. "It is one thing to draw up fantastic plans for building socialism through all sorts of workers' associations, and quite another to learn to build socialism in practice in such a way that *every* small peasant could take part in it."

Those who are no more cannot defend themselves. On the occasion of the very first anniversary of Lenin's death, Stalin published in the journal *Bolshevik* an article generalising, as it were, Lenin's theory of revolution. "A victorious revolution in one country is not a self-contained task. The revolution of a victorious country must consider itself not a self-contained quantity but a factor for and a means of hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries.... It is... the beginning of and a requisite for the world revolution." The author referred to "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" and some other writings of Lenin's. In this way he reduced Lenin's ideas to dogmas to pursue on that basis a policy having nothing to do with Lenin.

Less than a year before his death, Lenin published "Better Fewer, But Better", an article really generalising his ideas of the revolution and the policy of the Soviet state. But there was a most complex dialectical connection between these ideas. Lenin admitted that it was not easy for the

country "to keep going until the socialist revolution is victorious in more developed countries". But right after that he asked himself whether this could be done "until the West European capitalist countries consummate their development towards socialism".

Lenin visualised the world socialist revolution as an advantage for this country, that is, as an ally rather than a product of Soviet policy. But to live to see the final victory of socialism, it was necessary to build a state, bring about an alliance of classes and develop industry. "In this, and in this alone, lies our hope."

In five years of rapid post-revolutionary development, many momentous decisions were made. "We ought to have learned something in five years," Lenin wrote with a touch of irony. The start of the revolution was accompanied by dashed hopes for aid from the world proletariat, the conclusion of a shackling peace, the founding of the Comintern and the nationalisation of foreign property. Proposals for talks, the idea of coexistence, the granting of concessions and the formation of joint enterprises were developments dialectically carrying forward the October Revolution.

Whatever the overall guidelines, foreign policy invariably and scrupulously carried out the task of guaranteeing the interests of internal life assigned to it. The call for trading concessions could not have been launched under military communism, nor could the idea of peaceful coexistence have been advanced to the accompaniment of civil war guns.

It is deplorable that social consciousness was robbed of the logic of these realities by the makers of the strategy of military political rivalry between the two systems which forced the country to grapple with tasks it could clearly not fulfil. It might seem strange that our thoughts go back to the idea of the world revolution now that 120 years have passed since Lenin's birthday and 67 years since he published his last writing. But it is not, for the messianism that was inculcated upon us from the mid-twenties on not only helped overpower NEP and fan the flames of a new Inquisition but prevented us even after the tragedy of the Patriotic War from saying honestly how many compatriots we had lost: was it seven million, the figure mentioned initially, 14, as estimated afterwards, 20, as admitted two decades later, or 25 million, the figure we give now?

The same approach to the chief object of foreign policy dragged our country into an arms race and military gambles abroad. It still makes itself felt, nor is the grumbling of viewers in slippers its only indication. There is also the inability of many of those sitting behind office desks to realise the meaning of new thinking in politics, their not knowing how to "bear spears into pruning-hooks" rapidly and effectively or how to relieve state-to-state relations of ideological pressure.

Until not long ago, it was not mythical "overriding" interests but the ossified prejudices of concrete people that made the country resist a drive by the foreign policy and public opinion of other countries over the pressing problem of reducing arms and armed forces. Now is the time to think not only of our foreign partners but of our countrymen, who are entitled to demand clarity at long last about the mechanism of foreign policy calculations.

It is most gratifying that the leadership of the Soviet Foreign Ministry plans to "fully spell out every event in our foreign policy activity to all our fellow-citizens". But this is only a first step towards democratising foreign policy—a step commensurate with the principles of glasnost. What will obviously be needed besides "informing" public opinion is more active participation by it in the shaping of foreign policy, which the revolutionary dialectic of perestroika is bound to lead to. This is also an exigency of political realism.

Lenin's last writings, such as his note of December 31, 1922, repeatedly touched on the country's diplomatic service, which he commended for its Bolshevik character. Could it be that in the grim 1930s Molotov, then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and chief of one of the three-man tribunals who signed lists of sentences on officials of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, recalled Lenin's praise for our diplomats as people holding "an exceptional place in our state apparatus"?

While high efficiency and firm convictions may have played a fatal role in a galaxy of Soviet foreign service officers being banished in several waves to the GULAG archipelago, these qualities are now regaining their original value, for the task is the same as before: preserving peace for the country and helping it "not only through diplomatic victories but through real trading relations".

Speaking to the party congress which discussed NEP, Lenin told his contemporaries that the country must coordinate its effort with internal class relations in such a way as to be able to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat for a long time and to remedy, at least gradually, all the troubles and crises that befell it.

This certainly applies to us as well, provided we grasp the essence of present-day revolutionary dialectics.

RUSSIA, BRITAIN'S HISTORIC ALLY AND HISTORIC RIVAL

Rodric BRAITHWAITE

IT IS EASIER TO SAY when the Cold War began than when it ended.

On 4 March 1946 Winston Churchill told his listeners in the small American town of Fulton, Missouri, that an Iron Curtain had descended across the continent of Europe. We all remember that. No-one remembers what else he said. But he spoke with wisdom, and his words still have relevance today.

It was barely a year since Churchill had been defeated at the hands of the British electorate in the moment of his great victory in war. Out of office he could afford to stand back and look at the world from a broader point of view. He spoke "to give true and faithful counsel in these anxious and baffling times". His conclusions were frightening: "The Dark Ages may return, the Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science, and what might now shower immeasurable material blessings upon mankind may even bring about its total destruction. Beware, I say; time may be short."

Contrary to legend, Churchill did not declare a Cold War at Fulton. He spoke instead, with great passion and humanity, of the need to avoid a new hot war, a war that would be unbelievably destructive for mankind. He knew better than most just how destructive nuclear war would be. He was to say in 1955 that thermonuclear weapons had revolutionised "the entire foundation of human affairs... and [placed] mankind.. in a situation both measureless and laden with doom."

Yet even in 1955 he looked forward to a time of hopeful negotiation between the antagonists in the Cold War, "where these matters can be put plainly and bluntly, from one friendly visitor to another. Then it might well be that, by a process of sublime irony, we shall have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation". It is just by this process of mutual plain speaking that we are not bringing the Cold War to an end.

At Fulton, Churchill defined the over-riding objective of government policy, an objective which must be shared by any decent government: "The safety and welfare, the freedom and progress, of all the homes and families, of all the men and women in all the lands.. To give security to these countless homes they must be shielded from the two giant marauders, war and tyranny."

Churchill thought that war and tyranny could best be kept at bay if the United Nations became "a reality and not a sham... a force for

action and not merely a frothing of words... a true Temple of Peace in which the shields of many nations can some day be hung, and not merely a cockpit in a Tower of Babel."

In the grim world of 1946, Churchill thought it essential to retain both conventional and nuclear weapons for the deterrence of war. But he believed that this was only half a policy. In the end, he said, war could only be avoided by reaching "a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organisation, and by the maintenance of the good understanding through many peaceful years by the world instrument."

Things did not work out quite like that. For much of the second half of the twentieth century, the United Nations has been a Tower of Babel, not a Temple of Peace. Nevertheless, the last twenty years have seen a growing understanding by the great powers, under the pressure of mutual deterrence, that war is no longer a feasible method of continuing policy by other means; and by isolated and introverted totalitarian regimes that their countries cannot hope to compete in today's complex world without much greater political and economic openness.

But in one important sense Churchill was right. Governments have indeed spoken to one another plainly and bluntly in a series of conferences: on Germany in the 1970s; in Helsinki; in Vienna; at a series of Summits. Durable deals have been struck, not least as a result of the transformation of Soviet foreign policy since 1985. And the United Nations has at last begun to play the role which Churchill foresaw. The Five Permanent Members of the Security Council now work together as they were meant to do under the Charter. The ceasefire in the Gulf war, the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, the Namibia settlement, are a long delayed triumph for the vision of Churchill and his wartime allies who created the United Nations in 1944.

We could not have got so far if the Cold War had become a real war, and the United Nations—like the League of Nations before it—had been swept away in a global conflict which it was powerless to prevent. So the Cold War had one salient virtue. It was a Peace, not a War. It was not, by a long way, a universal peace. Bloody regional conflicts marred the scene, and they still do. Neither East nor West can wholly escape blame. But in the grim post-war years, the Cold Peace was the alternative to a Third World War. And it was the Cold Peace that ushered in periods of faltering detente, of growing stability; and now of increasing optimism about the long-term future of the European continent and of relations between the major powers. The Cold War carried us, not ideally but in the end safely, through a most dangerous time to something like a stable peace.

Peace is not an abstraction. It must have sound political and economic roots; and it must be tended day and night. Governments solemnly and regularly affirm, though they do not always observe, the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others. Churchill endorsed that principle in Fulton. But sharp differences between the way that governments conduct their internal affairs are almost bound to give rise to trouble. Between Athens and Sparta they led to war, and to misery for the whole of Greece. Between East and West in the time of the Cold War they led to continual political tension and the risk of worse.

That is why an essential guarantee that the new peace will last is the slow convergence between East and West towards common principles of law and government. Churchill described these at Fulton: "The great principles of freedom and the rights of man... the power by constitutional action, by free, unfettered elections with secret ballot, to choose or change the character or form of government... that freedom

of speech and thought should reign, that courts of justice, independent of the Executive, unbiased by any party, should administer laws which have received the broad assent of large majorities."

These, it seems to me, are the principles of the law-based state which the Soviet Government is now creating with such determination.

But politics and political institutions are shaky at best unless they are firmly underpinned by a healthy economy. Churchill believed that, in the era of peace to which he looked forward, "science and cooperation can bring in the next few years... an expansion of well-being beyond anything that has yet occurred in human experience... there is no reason except human folly or sub-human crime which should deny to all nations the inauguration and enjoyment of an age of plenty." Material well-being has of course expanded throughout the world since Churchill spoke. But this is still not an age of plenty for all. War and the preparations for war, human folly and subhuman crime have prevented that. But the hope is there, more clearly even than in 1946. And so is the opportunity for mutually advantageous cooperation between the countries of East and West that were for so long divided by the hostilities of the Cold War.

I WAS A SCHOOLBOY when Auschwitz was liberated, when Hiroshima was destroyed, and when Churchill made his Fulton speech. The Nuclear Age and the Cold War have dominated my professional life. I was in Warsaw soon after the "Spring in October" of 1956, when the Poles were making their pioneering effort to create Socialism with a human face. But I was in Warsaw, too, when the Berlin Wall went up and Gary Powers' U2 came down. I was in Moscow from 1963-1966. The international scene was rather less turbulent. But British diplomats in Moscow were the object of suspicion to the authorities. Normal human contact between ourselves and ordinary Soviet people was actively discouraged. We did our job of defending British interests as best we could in an era of confrontation. It was an austere business, demanding strong nerves. The work had a fascination for those, like me, who have always been absorbed by the history, culture, and society of Russia. But very little of it was constructive, and not much of it was fun. I do not suppose that it was much fun for those who were serving at the time in the Soviet Embassy in London either. It was a poor basis for building the peace and friendship between nations about which the propagandists spoke so much.

Now I am back in Moscow and it is my task to help consign the Cold War to the dustbin of history. The role of the British Embassy is not merely changed: it has been totally transformed. We have friendly relations with Soviet citizens from all walks of life. We are invited by Soviet partners to join them in so many common endeavours that we can no longer keep up with the flood. We work for genuine practical and political cooperation with our host country, without the fruitless, timewasting and sometimes bitter polemics which accompanied our business in the past. These are the normal uses of diplomacy. In exercising them, we are helping to preside over the obsequies of the Cold War. It is an intensely exciting and moving experience. I for one did not believe that it would become possible in my professional lifetime.

The central task of the British Embassy in Moscow is to help manage the political relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union. The welfare and security of my country will be deeply affected by the historic and radical changes in the Soviet Union. We need to be able to report on them to our Government accurately, sympathetically, and soberly. And we need to know and to report what the Soviet

Government thinks about the great international issues of the day, on which our leaders will be called to negotiate—bilaterally, in Vienna, in the United Nations. Now—unlike in the past—we can count on the wisdom of our Soviet friends in the political and official world to help us form our judgments. Our reports are closely read in London, and help to form the views and policies of the British Government.

Europe, its security and stability, is the common concern of both our Governments. The old certainties of the Cold War have given way to a universal desire to construct a new Europe, open and cooperative. We do not have, or perhaps need, an all-embracing blueprint. But to manage change in stability, to replace inherited suspicions by growing confidence, we need a dense network of contact between the statesmen in all the countries concerned. With our common responsibilities in Europe and the United Nations, and our membership of the economic, military, and political institutions in East and West, the relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union has a particular importance. The British Embassy in Moscow, like the Soviet Embassy in London, will spend much of 1990 making the practical arrangements which enable our leaders to meet so regularly and to maintain this network.

Because the Cold War was—to rephrase Clausewitz yet again—the continuation of hot war by other means, its outward manifestation was the massive concentration of weapons on both sides of the division of Germany. The reduction of armaments in Europe is essential if the Cold War is to be finally buried. Yet neither side will reduce if it is not confident about the intentions and military capabilities of the other.

Of course the political will must be there: and it is being demonstrated by the political leaders and negotiators of East and West. But immensely complex technical and professional issues are involved, which can only be appreciated by the military men of both sides. That is why I strongly believe that we have a mutual interest in expanding contact and mutual understanding between our professional soldiers. In 1989 this began to happen. The Soviet Minister of Defence went to Britain for the first time since the war. The Vice-Chief of the British Defence Staff came here for talks with his Soviet opposite numbers. The programme of visits, which is managed by the military staff of the British Embassy, will be expanded in 1990. Our soldiers will increasingly compare notes about their common problems: defining a new role for the armed forces in a time of reduced confrontation; managing the human and technical problems of arms reduction, and, no doubt, preventing the civilians from doing anything too rash.

The new relationship between our two countries is opening up rapidly growing opportunities for commercial, scientific, educational and cultural exchange. British businessmen crowd every hotel in Moscow, to expand their traditional trade and increasingly to develop joint ventures and new forms of cooperation with Soviet partners. Scientists and academics flood the airlines in both directions: the days when Khrushchev prevented the great physicist Kapitsa from returning to Cambridge are a distant nightmare. In the old days, very few Soviet citizens entered our courtyard facing the Kremlin. Now they come for visas in almost embarrassing numbers, and we are delighted to see them. In 1989 we issued around 30,000 visas, more than twice as many as in the previous year. Up to one hundred thousand Britons visit the Soviet Union each year: since mass tourism began, I would guess that nearly two per cent of my fellow countrymen have been here.

At the height of the Cold War, the British Embassy and its staff fitted neatly into the magnificent town house which the sugar merchant Kharitonenko built opposite the Kremlin at the end of the last century.

The staff has doubled to cope with the mass of business and the torrent of visitors in both directions: this year alone we shall see in Moscow the Princess Royal, the Prime Minister, three or four Cabinet Ministers, and a host of other political, commercial, and cultural figures.

Alas, our accommodation has not yet expanded to match. Our Visa Section is cramped into one wing of the building, our Commercial and Scientific Sections are at the other end of the city, and the Cultural Section camps in Kharitonenko's stables. The accommodation was adequate in an era when travel was severely discouraged. It is now bursting at the seams. We cannot give our Soviet or British customers the service we would wish until our plans to acquire and build new offices come to fruition.

Meanwhile we are at full stretch and more: a matter of the greatest satisfaction for all of us, who can surely now be certain that the Stone Age will not—as Churchill feared—return on the gleaming wings of science.

CHURCHILL WAS A MAN of the nineteenth century. His political thinking was dominated by Romantic ideas of Empire and the great movements of world history. Much as he disliked and feared the Communist ideology, he saw international relations essentially as the interplay of historic nation states pursuing their own national and imperial interests. So for him the Soviet Union was never really the Soviet Union: it was Russia, Britain's historic ally and historic rival. Even as the Cold War began, he had the wisdom, magnanimity, and vision to distinguish between current troubles—which he attributed to the “expansive and proselytising tendencies” of “my wartime colleague, Marshal Stalin”—and the underlying realities of history. In his Fulton speech he said with warmth and sincerity:

“I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people... There is sympathy and goodwill in Britain... towards the peoples of all the Russias, and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her Western frontiers... We welcome her to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. Above all we welcome constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people.”

It is not a bad text on which to approach the Twenty First Century. Reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not be easy, and it will take time to work its way through. The debris of confrontation is not completely dismantled. In the course of nature there will be disagreements—sometimes sharp ones—between East and West and between the Soviet Union and Britain. But we now have the network of personal contacts and the institutions political and economic, to manage our business in good times and bad.

As we did not at the height of the Cold War.

How Have the Japanese Done It?

Victor SPANDARYAN

AS WE GROPE FOR THE BEST WAYS to solve our acute economic and social problems in the course of our perestroika, we are inclined to take a closer look at business experience in the West: how is it done, and is there anything we can borrow for our own economic reforms to pull the economy out of its state of crisis and make it dynamic. In this context, Japan's successes are of much interest, and these have been lately ever more frequently discussed in the mass media by our public figures, politicians, scholars and journalists. There have, quite naturally, been some exaggeration and even idealisation, but one certainly cannot deny that the impressive achievements of the Land of the Rising Sun give much food for thought: how have the Japanese managed to do it? After all, Japan went down in bitter defeat in World War II, but within the lifetime of virtually one generation it has risen from a state of ruin and devastation to become a first-class economic power and a leader in many fields of industry, commerce, science and technology.

For a long time I was posted in Japan as the USSR's trade representative, and I want to share some of my impressions and reflections on what I saw and heard.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM DEFEAT

JAPAN HAD TO START its postwar development from very unfavourable beginnings: the economy had been devastated by the long war, while the big cities and many industrial enterprises lay in ruins. Industrial output was at 14 per cent of the prewar average. The population was impoverished and there was a shortage of the most elementary things: food, housing, jobs, raw materials and energy resources. Japan appeared to be doomed to drag out a miserable existence as a third-rate power.

In 1949, E. Ackerman, an expert with the US army of occupation, believed that Japan could develop only if it got unlimited foreign (meaning US) aid. It would then be able to restore the prewar living standards by the end of the 1970s, and otherwise it would be condemned to watch the world go by.

The Japanese did not take the advice offered by their US guardians, and preferred to rely mainly on their own efforts (US aid was relatively small): by 1951, they had already restored the prewar level of industrial output, and in the latter half of the 1960s, they outstripped, one by one, Britain, France, and the FRG in the level of economic development. In the capitalist world's GNP league, Japan ranks second to the United States. With only 0.3 per cent of the territory of the world and with only

2.5 per cent of its population, Japan now turns out more than 10 per cent of its gross product.

I think that one should go beyond the mystical and unscientific talk about some kind of "exclusiveness" of the Japanese nation *só as* to get at the roots and to bring out the true causes of Japan's rapid rise to the status of economic superpower.

However paradoxical this may be; *it is Japan's crushing defeat in World War II that provided a powerful impetus to its economic and social development*, and helped to remove the numerous economic and political impediments to the free and natural development of the capitalist mode of production, the operation of the market mechanism and Japan's integration with the world economy. The defeat led to the elimination of the feudal relicts and a land reform; it undermined the sway of the militarists and the military bureaucracy, and curbed the influence of the old classical *zaibatsu*, the monopolies which had dominated the economy in the past. Indeed, the defeat made Japan take the way of bourgeois democratic development. What is more, all these crucial and far from painless measures were put through by alien hands, by the US occupation authorities, for it is they, and not the Japanese ruling circles, that bore the responsibility for the hardships of the transition period which sprang from the transformation of Japanese "military-feudal imperialism" (as Lenin described it) into a modern capitalist state.

It may also seem very odd that the scarcity of natural resources was another paradoxical factor which provided the impetus: Japan has to import 80 per cent of its energy, including 99.6 per cent of its oil; only 75 per cent of the foodstuff and other similar requirements is met by domestic production.

The well-known Japanese economist Kaoru Kobayashi says: "The scenario was, and still is in the main, to import natural resources from resource-rich countries, process them to add value and quality, and export such products to adequate markets."

In these conditions, *Japan was doomed not only to take the intensive way of economic development, but also to join in the international division of labour as efficiently and as swiftly as it could.*

In the course of rehabilitation and industrial development, priority was given to industries designed to meet both internal demand and export, notably, the basic industries (metallurgy, and chemicals) and the engineering complex.

In view of the tough competition on the external markets, the export orientation demanded the manufacture of goods *up to the highest world standards and competitive on every indicator*: price, quality, post-sales services, etc. Conversely, the heavy dependence on imports at once posed the problem of *saving energy and resources* in industrial development.

However, in order to achieve all that, the Japanese had to work very hard indeed and to keep all their efforts and resources at full stretch. No wonder they came to be known as "workaholics", and here most of the credit goes to the Japanese people.

One postwar study of Japan opened with the statement that "Japan's wealth is its people", and that is very true. Over the centuries, in arduous and persevering labour, and in ceaseless struggle against the harsh elements—earthquakes, tidal waves and hurricanes—the Japanese people forged the main traits of their character: industriousness, dedication to achievement in the face of hardship, an open mind, enterprise and business acumen.

Throughout the long postwar years, the people of Japan have been working longer hours and putting in a greater effort than those in many other industrialised capitalist countries, and that for much lower wages (only a short while ago have their wages risen to the level of those in

the developed capitalist countries). They have lost very much less time from strikes and absenteeism, their holidays have been shorter, and their social security worse than that in the United States and Western Europe. And all that while unemployment in Japan has been lower than in these countries.

The US researcher Edward Lincoln says: "During the 1950s the Japanese shared a rather broad consensus on the desirability of rapid economic growth. People were willing to work long hours and endure a lack of investment in social amenities on the assumption that this represented the best road to future prosperity. In fact, the belief that this was the only feasible route to follow was so strong that many Japanese do not see even in retrospect that any personal sacrifice was involved; *there was no realistic choice except to work very hard and do without if the country—and the individual—were to prosper.*"

The Japanese working people's sense of discipline and application was often said to be due to the special relationship between labour and capital in Japan based on "three sacred principles", namely: lifetime employment, the system of raising wages depending on age and work record, and the shop or company structure of the trade unions, which collaborate with management. It would be wrong to deny that these principles do have some effect on relations between workers and employers, but with the reservation that this system is being mainly practised at major enterprises. It operated most successfully in the period of high economic growth rates, when Japanese business had a material stake in toning down labour conflicts. Serious students of labour relations in Japan note the decline of this system as the Japanese economy moves into a period of more moderate growth rates. Still, one should give credit for the skill of Japanese entrepreneurs and managers in arranging relations with the working people by giving them a stake in the interests of "their own" enterprise or company, notably, by paying large bonuses twice a year (coming to between double and four times the basic monthly pay a year), depending on overall company performance.

Nevertheless, it is the *growth of real wages* that has been the crucial factor in the relatively peaceful cooperation between labour and capital in Japan.

Thus, from 1955 to 1975—a period of high economic growth—wages went up 6.4-fold, and the retail price index, 3.2-fold, a substantial rise in well-being (however low the postwar starting base may have been), which the Japanese working people felt through their family budgets. The growth of wages slowed down, but still continued to rise even after the recession and depression of the mid-1970s. From 1980 to 1988, manufacturing wages in real terms (i. e., discounted for inflation) went up by 9.8 per cent. But here it is most important to stress that the source of higher wages in the whole of that period was *the steady growth of labour productivity, which, as a rule, ran ahead of the growth of wages*. Thus, in that same period (1980-1988), labour productivity in manufacturing went up by 26.1 per cent, i. e., 2.6 times the increase in wages.

It is important to note that the growth of wages is indexed to the subsistence minimum, retail prices and the rate of inflation, with all these data being published both by official agencies (the prime minister's office) and by the parties concerned (trade unions and employer federations). There is nothing automatic about the rise of wages in Japan: it is forged in class struggle, in bargaining and negotiations, which are often long and hard, but which, as a rule, leave strikes for the extreme cases.

The Japanese working people's contribution to Japan's economic rise is obvious, but it is also obvious that sizeable funds were required to boost the economy, and these the Japanese obtained mainly by mustering their internal resources.

The hard school of life has made the Japanese not only industrious, but also most thrifty: up to a quarter of Japanese family budgets go into savings. These now account for over 18 per cent, and in mid-1988, Japanese family savings came to an average of 180 per cent of annual net income. Japanese *thrift* has been an important factor in mustering funds for the postwar economic boom. Another important source, especially with the rehabilitation and recovery of the economy, was provided by the ever larger *revenues from the taxes* on individual incomes and corporate profits. The Japanese government has, besides, made wide use of bond issues, i. e., *deficit financing*. Japan's national debt now stands at more than 40 per cent of its GNP, and debt servicing takes up more than 20 per cent of the budget expenditures. However, with the steady growth of the GNP, of the national income, and of industrial production, together with a balanced market, this has not produced any inconvenience for Japan, which is close to the bottom in the inflation league of the industrialised capitalist countries.

The surplus on Japan's trade and payments balances produced by the sharp growth of exports (a point to be dealt with in greater detail below) provided a major source of accumulation, especially in the 1980s.

The mustering of internal resources, deficit financing, and the growth of export earnings have enabled Japan to put a lot of money into boosting the economy, *without resort to major borrowing abroad*. In the period of high economic growth rates, investments in the economy came to 15-20 per cent of GNP.

There was also the relatively *low level of military expenditures*, which for many years after the war were small, and which in the recent period virtually fell short of 1 per cent of GNP (as compared with more than 5 per cent in the USA). In Japan's 1988 budget, defence expenditures were 6.5 per cent, in the United States these were 26.8 per cent, and in the USSR (under the 1989 budget), 15.6 per cent. What is more, Japan not only refrained from diverting sizeable funds and resources for military purposes, but also made money on military deliveries to the US army during the US intervention in Korea and Vietnam. From 1950 to 1966, the Pentagon's special orders to Japan were worth a total of \$83 billion, and in some years—at the height of the wars in Korea and Vietnam—these special orders accounted for between one-quarter and one-third of Japan's foreign-currency earnings.

In absolute terms, Japan's military expenditures are now, of course, considerable in view of its tremendous GNP growth, but they fall as a lighter burden on Japan than they do on the United States, and this gives the Japanese obvious economic advantages in world market competition. There is good reason why some circles in the United States have been insisting that the Japanese government should increase its military outlays, and not so much out of concern for enhancing Japan's defence capability as for making it less competitive.

PLANNING-CUM-MARKET MECHANISM

IN ORDER TO REALISE its resources and potentialities for the most rapid postwar economic recovery, Japan had to elaborate and implement an optimal, flexible and long-term economic policy.

For one thing, the Japanese managed to find a fairly happy and effective combination of *the regulating role of the state and elements of planning with the advantages of a market economy*. At the various stages of Japan's postwar development, these two components were combined in different dozes, but it is their combination in the proportions required by the concrete development period that made it possible to conduct an optimal and effective economic policy both in remodelling individual

enterprises and in restructuring the economy along the lines most rational for the whole country, i. e., both on the microlevel and on the macrolevel.

Through its organs like the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Finance, and the Economic Planning Agency the Japanese state exerted a resolute influence on every aspect of the reproduction process and economic relations, including economic growth rates, the balance between large and petty property, competition and monopoly, the structure of industrial production, education and science, employment and capital-labour relations, credit, the circulation of money, price formation, and external economic relations. Such a comprehensive intrusion by the state into every aspect of economic life even made some foreign economists raise the question of the kind of economy Japan had.

Japanese scholars mostly took the view that in the early postwar years Japan had a "mixed" economy, i. e., a highly competitive market economy with pronounced elements of planning embodied in the state and its regulating agencies. They also went on to stress that, in contrast to the Soviet model, the Japanese state was not, with rare exceptions, an owner of the means of production, which were the property of private capitalist entrepreneurs. The Japanese state did not exert its influence on the economy by direct command methods, but by means of indirect measures (taxes, credit, subsidies, interest rates, tariffs, privileges, etc.).

Like many other capitalist countries, Japan also made use of the Soviet experience in long-term planning on the scale of the whole state. However, the Japanese took from our experience only that which fitted their own economic model, discarding the blanket etatisation of property and the willful command methods in running the economy. The Japanese made a contribution of their own to planning methods, notably, with their multivariant plan which takes account of the movement of prices for energy resources, the changes in exchange rates, etc., an approach which made their plans flexible in the face of the sharp fluctuations in the state of the world economy.

Indeed, it is the active intervention by the state in the economy that economists in the West define it as "Japan Incorporated", to emphasise the unity of the state and the private capitalist companies in the drive to attain their objectives. It is true that the role of the state in Japan's economic life has lately been declining as state property is being transferred to private capitalist enterprises, but regulation of the economy still ranks among the priorities.

STAKE ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND QUALITY

THE MAIN TASK in boosting the Japanese economy was the attainment of the highest rates on all the basic indicators: GNP, industrial output, labour productivity, exports, etc. Japan has largely succeeded in achieving these goals, even if the social and environmental costs have been high.

GNP growth is the best synthetic indicator of economic development, and throughout the postwar period Japan's GNP growth has been faster than that of the United States and all the other most developed EC countries, although in terms of industrial output Japan is markedly behind the United States and the aggregate EC indicator.

It is highly important to identify the factors which have enabled Japan to attain faster growth rates for the GNP, industrial output and export, and that not only during the boom, which took off from a low level, but even today.

The Japanese economist S. Okita believes that there is nothing "miraculous" or "magic" in Japan's economic achievements: *its success has been due to the rapid growth of labour productivity*. Within a relatively

short period, Japan's labour productivity caught up with that of most West European countries, while still lagging behind the United States, although in the export-oriented industries it is already ahead.

Japan's impressive spurt in the key economic indicator of labour productivity was attained above all through resolute *reliance on scientific and technical progress* with stepped-up imports of high technology and modern hardware. From 1950 to 1979, Japan bought almost 26,000 foreign patents and licences at a total cost of \$7 billion.

The mass influx of foreign high technology enabled Japan to win time and economise sizeable funds as it modernised its economy. It has been estimated that in the 1950s and 1960s alone the import of patents and licences gave Japan a gain of \$70 billion, or 25 per cent of the total gross accumulations of fixed capital in that period. To become aware of the powerful impetus the Japanese economy got from the massive borrowing of foreign experience, one should compare these two figures: the \$7 billion spent on the import of foreign technology and the \$70 billion gained from these purchases. Here it is important to stress that the Japanese made highly efficient use of this experience, losing no time in applying the purchased patents and licences, with the state actively helping business, notably, by means of concessionary financing of the purchases of foreign high technology and hardware.

The Japanese borrowed advanced experience mainly from the United States and Western Europe, but they also borrowed something from us. Thus, Japan's successes in developing ferrous metallurgy, which it raised to the highest level in the world, were due mainly to the introduction of advanced Soviet technology (the continuous steel casting, gas turbines, dry quenching of coke, water cooling of blast furnaces, etc.). What is paradoxical is that we have used these inventions on a much smaller scale than has Japan, and this results, in particular, in a vast overconsumption of energy and metal. *Japanese specialists have estimated that the overconsumption of energy alone comes to 442 trillion large calories a year, which is equivalent to 12.6 per cent of all the fuel inputs into thermal power plants in the USSR or almost as much as all the Soviet nuclear power plants generated in 1985.*

Once it had assimilated everything the United States and Europe could offer, Japan was faced with the need to *develop its own high technology*. Its R&D outlays went up from \$15.5 billion in 1975 to \$50 billion in 1987. In the capitalist world, Japan ranks second to the United States in R&D outlays, but in Japan they make up a higher percentage of the national income. In the 1960s and 1970s, Japan's technology imports were 10 times its technology exports, but in 1986 the two indicators were close to each other. A recent poll of leading research institutions in Japan showed that the Japanese have decided on new materials, electronics and computers, biotechnology, informatics and modern means of communication, new sources of energy, medicine and public health, the aerospace industry, robots and mechanotropics, and environmental security as the priority lines in R&D. To the reputation of the Japanese as the best imitators must now be added their contribution to developing the most modern lines of scientific and technical progress.

Together with the stake on introducing high technologies, whether foreign or national, *the Japanese have made the attainment of the highest product quality the basis of their economic development*. Quality, one British researcher remarked, is a national obsession of the Japanese, which they rank ahead of other key problems. That is very true. It is perfectly obvious that, with competition on the external markets being as brutal as it is, the Japanese must attain the highest product quality. It is the orientation towards export that has largely helped them raise the quality of their products as a whole.

The Japanese have developed their own system of total quality control which differs basically from other generally accepted systems. The Japanese system is based on *the idea of preventing defects at every stage of the producer process*: the point is not to unearth a defect, but to prevent it from being there in the first place.

Another key point is that, for all practical purposes, the workers have been entrusted with quality control ("quality circles"), which amounts to instituting the principle of self-control: the worker bears a personal responsibility for the quality of the product he turns out.

Relations between controllers and producers in many countries, including the USSR, come down to a "they and us" relationship, with the upshot that the producers try hard to conceal the defects, while the controllers are forced, under the pressing need to fulfil the plan, to turn a blind eye on the odd defect here and there. Quantity runs into contradiction with quality; quality becomes the enemy of quantity, an antagonism that is not, as a rule, to be found in Japan.

Defects can, of course, be eliminated through quality inspection, but Japanese specialists believe that this is a costly and time-consuming process: ("the cost of eliminating defects is always higher than the cost of preventing them"). But, most importantly, while inspection helps to remove the defects, it does nothing about the problem of the defects originating in the first place. The gist of the Japanese quality control system is to do away with the causes for which defects originate at every stage of the producer process, and it is expressed in these two postulates: "Don't worry about the final product, think of the process!" and "The main aim of quality control is to end all quality control!" The Japanese quality control system is also effective in that it involves all the participants in the producer process—from the manager to the worker—and covers every stage of the process: planning, design, engineering, preparation of materials and components, production, control, marketing, and after-sales services.

It is generally recognised that Japan's successful economic development since the war has also been due to rational organisation of management of production and marketing, a sphere in which it has developed *a unique system of management as a blend of national traditions and advanced foreign experience*

Japanese managerial methods are epitomised in the *Kanban system*, which is designed to do away with every type of loss in the process of production, including losses from the making of superfluous parts and components and the idling of equipment, losses in the process of transportation and in production proper, losses from the storage of excessive stocks, from spoilage, etc. The making of an excessive number of components which are not required there and then to turn out the final product or their making ahead of schedule and their subsequent forced storage amount to a loss. *Overfulfilment of plan—in terms of quantity or in time—is just as undesirable as underfulfilment.*

Both amount to a loss, which is why the Kanban idea is: "the exact quantity at the right time". In a sense, this idea seems to upend the planning process, which usually runs from the initial stage (preparation of materials, components, etc.) to the final stage (product output). Under the Kanban system, planning and production are made to run in reverse: the parts and components are made and served up for assembly in strict accordance with the range and quantity of the products being turned out, so that there is *a replenishment only of the parts and components used up in the final assembly*, which reduces stocks to a minimum and sometimes eliminates them altogether. Every part and component carries a ticket (Kanban), and once a part or component has been used up and more are required, the ticket is returned to the supplier as

the ground for a renewed order. For his part, the maker of a given component sends on, to his own subcontractors, the tickets signifying orders for the making of more parts of the given component, and so on. *Only that is made which is required, in the required quantities, and just when it is required.*

The Kanban system was pioneered by the carmaker Toyota, which is capable of turning out, from one and the same assembly line, cars of different models and modifications, with parts and components supplied for assembly like hotcakes. It is a system which best meets the present stage in the development of the Japanese economy, with its highly diversified demand, when the main concern is not gross output, but the issue of different models and modifications, depending on market demand.

Japanese managers have created both an original system of management and *a unique style of management*, which is informed with "groupism", a sort of collective leadership which seeks to reach a consensus, to encourage cooperation and loyalty on the part of managerial and other personnel, with an eye to the long-term, strategic objectives as against current, tactical tasks.

The Japanese manager is, above all, a team member working in close cooperation with his colleagues, a versatile specialist who is utterly loyal to his company, his firm or enterprise. Decisions are, as a rule, prepared and approved "from bottom to top", through a phased coordination in every echelon of management (lower, middle and upper echelons). One will rarely find in Japanese companies or enterprises the hard-nosed executive who insists on taking all the decisions on his own. Decisions are much more often prepared by the "tying-in of roots" method, which, like the practice in the planting of trees, consists in tying in the new plant with the old root system, i. e., in taking an agreed and thoroughly thrashed-out decision. That is why the decision-making process in Japan, as a rule, takes much more time than it does in many other countries, but once the decision has been taken it is put through much more swiftly and reliably. As they say, the Japanese take a long time to decide, but fulfil speedily. Professor Kobayashi states: "When we want to do something, we just try to learn and absorb all the possible answers, alternatives and developments not only in Japan, but in Europe, in developing countries and the U.S. Then, by combining and by evaluating the best of all this, we try to come up with the optimum combinations which are available. So that is one of the keys to explain the success of Japan."

When describing the Japanese economy, we usually stress that it is dominated by capitalist monopolies, which is, of course, very true, but the reality of things requires some most essential reservations.

Indeed, Japan's economic life is largely controlled by six giant financial and industrial groups, or associations, namely: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo (all three being direct descendants of the prewar *zaibatsu*) and *Fuyo, Sanwa and Dai-ichi Kangyo* (three of the new postwar giants). Each group includes major banks, financial institutions and insurance companies, highly diversified commercial houses and, as a rule, companies in the leading industries: enterprises in the heavy and light industry, engineering plants, marketing and transport enterprises, etc. These powerful groups have their tentacles virtually in every corner of Japanese economic life.

Still, first, these groups and their companies are *locked in competitive struggle* both on the Japanese and on the international market, which does not, of course, rule out temporary cartel-type agreements or market sharing, but then there is the anti-monopoly legislation which does exist in Japan, however, imperfect and inadequate it may be.

Second, there is no single monopoly in any sector of the Japanese

economy, although there are usually several giant companies in each leading industry controlling the lion's share of output or sales.

Thus, five giant companies in ferrous metallurgy account for two-thirds of the steel smelting, and in the automobile industry five giants turn out over 90 per cent of the passenger cars. Leading companies produce three-quarters of the colour TV sets, etc. At the same time, small and medium-sized companies make a large part of the products in many industries: they account for almost 95 per cent of the sales in the leather-goods industry, for 88 per cent in the garment industry, 84 per cent in the food industry, about 50 per cent in precision engineering, etc. *The small and medium-sized firms in manufacturing handle over 52 per cent of the sales and almost one-third of Japan's foreign trade*, including 20 per cent in export and 61 per cent in import. They also have a big role to play in agriculture, retail marketing, public catering, and the services.

All of this suggests that the Japanese economy has a two-fold character: alongside the giant monopoly groups there are millions of small and medium-sized companies, with very fierce competition neighbouring on monopoly practices. *Competition is the catalyst* in such important processes as the rise of labour productivity, the cutting of costs, the introduction of high technology, the rising quality of goods and services, etc. Competition has been doing its bit in Japan in the presence of the dominant giant groupings of financial and industrial monopoly capital.

STAKE ON ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

JAPAN would never have risen to its present level of development if it had confined itself to its domestic market.

Postwar Japan's *involvement in the international division of labour was not only a necessary condition for its economic boom but, in fact, a matter of life and death*, since the only realistic way of securing the import of the vital means of subsistence for Japan was to develop its export industries, i. e., to turn out competitive manufactures in demand on the world market. The Japanese have, indeed, fulfilled this task and have built up a powerful and highly competitive export potential, with exports becoming not just a means of paying for vital imports of energy resources, raw materials, foodstuffs, and high technology, but also *a powerful instrument for economic development and accumulation of foreign-currency resources*. From 1953 to 1970, Japanese exports multiplied over 15-fold; they increased 6.7-fold in the 1970s, and doubled again from 1980 to 1988, to be valued at \$265 billion. Japan's exports did much to boost its GNP (in 1980, almost 80 per cent of GNP growth came from exports). Only in the past few years has the export of goods been losing significance as the main motor of economic growth, with the ever growing importance of factors like higher domestic demand and the export of capital.

The leading element of Japanese exports is manufactures, above all technical consumer durables, such as cars and motorcycles, TV sets, video recorders, photo and film cameras, microwave ovens, refrigerators, electric calculators, copiers, etc. Those are the lines on which Japanese export has been specialised. Suffice it to say that the cost of Japan's imports of food and oil taken together is covered by earnings from the sale of cars alone (about \$45 billion a year).

Among the major items of Japanese export are goods turned out by the basic industries, notably metallurgy and the chemical industry, although their share has been shrinking. The export of turnkey enterprises, especially to the less developed countries, China and the USSR, is coming to be a relatively new and important item.

The United States continues to be the main market for Japanese

goods, taking up over one-third in terms of value. About a quarter of Japanese exports goes to countries in Southeast Asia.

Since the latter half of the 1980s, Japan has ranked third in the world export league, after the FRG and the United States, *steadily accounting for more than 10 per cent of the total*. Meanwhile, because of its voluminous internal market, Japan's dependence on export is relatively low, about 10 per cent of the GNP (as compared with 26 per cent for the FRG and 45 per cent for the Netherlands).

Export, it should be emphasised, has become a key source of accumulation and a capital-forming factor. Japan's trade surplus has been growing and has reached impressive proportions (\$82.7 billion in 1986, \$79.7 billion in 1987, and \$77.5 billion in 1988). Japan's gold and foreign currency reserves had gone up to \$97.7 billion by the end of 1988, which puts it ahead of the rest of the world on this indicator.

Japan would, of course, never have achieved its outstanding results in developing export and accumulating vast resources without *a complex system of incentives for the export industries*, including direct and indirect state subsidies for enterprises and companies working for export, tax exemptions and privileges, a foreign-exchange rate favouring exporters, easy credits, insurance against export-related risks, especially under long-term contracts, a "dual price" system, under which export prices have been kept at a lower level than internal prices, and finally, the creation for exporters of the most favourable conditions for their operations abroad by means of trade policy and provision of information.

Here are only a few examples. For decades the exchange rate of the yen with respect to the dollar was artificially and very markedly understated, which gave Japanese exporters tremendous advantages. The Japanese were in no hurry to make the yen convertible, and dragged out the process until they had established solid positions in the world economy and on the international market.

A list of the tax benefits held out to Japanese corporations would run to several pages. In some years, for instance, such tax cuts came to one-third of the total corporate taxes. Besides, Japanese companies received easy credits from a "confidential fund" of the Ministry of Finance to develop export and economic cooperation (25-year credits at a low interest rate). A large part of Japanese exports, especially of equipment, was financed by the state through the Export-Import Bank (35-40 per cent of the total value of exports). State insurance covered up to 45 per cent of the total value of Japanese exports, etc.

All-round promotion of exports was enshrined as the principal state task. That was when *economic diplomacy* was developed as the main line of Japan's foreign policy. The state took upon itself "paternal concern", as the Japanese call it, in the provision of political, economic, financial, juridical and administrative back-up of the external economic expansion of private capitalist associations, corporations, companies and firms, producing a stable government-private capital tandem, a peculiar system which, with some reservations, could well be regarded as *a form of foreign trade monopoly operated by the bourgeois state and big private capital*. This was made easier by the fact that in Japan foreign trade is among the most monopolised spheres of the economy. While a vast number of small and medium-sized firms are engaged in external economic activity, the lion's share (about 60 per cent) of Japan's foreign trade is handled by nine giant diversified merchandising houses closely linked to powerful industrial and financial groups.

Utmost promotion of export in Japan went hand in hand with restrictions on import by means of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Without undue haste, Japan, as its economy gained in strength and its goods became more competitive on the world market, gradually began to phase out

import restrictions, and announced its policy of "liberalisation" and "openness" of the economy only in the mid-1960s, but even then continued to "hasten slowly".

The *Daily Express* complained that the Japanese had erected so many barriers to foreign goods that trade with them was like playing football with a team that had boarded up its goal. That is, of course, an exaggeration, but there is a lot of truth in that, and it is not easy, even today, to find a chink in the boarded-up Japanese goal.

Import regulation had two main tasks: protection of the interests of national economy, notably agriculture, and promotion of the import of energy and raw material resources.

One could go on accusing the Japanese of "unfair trading practices", as the United States, the EC countries and many others have been doing, but one must give them due credit for the purposefulness of their *external economic policy, which is designed to protect the national interests*. It is true that this protection went mainly to the interests of big capital, and that in some cases it was determined by the political schemes of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and did not always meet the interests of the Japanese mass consumer.

Japan's external economic expansion is usually associated with the export of goods. For a fairly long time Japan did not have any noticeable role as an international banker or exporter of capital, but in the past several years major changes have been taking place in this area.

By the end of 1987, Japanese assets abroad had come to a total of more than \$1,000 billion, and liabilities to around \$831 billion, with an assets surplus of \$240.7 billion.

Japan's assets abroad consist mainly of investments in securities (shares, bonds, etc.), mainly US securities, but there has recently been a noticeable increase in Japanese direct investments. As of March 31, 1989 they had reached nearly \$186 billion, with more than one-third, once again, in the United States. And while Japan still ranks fifth in the world in terms of direct investments abroad, it is ahead of its rivals in their growth rate. In the 1990s, Japan's direct investments abroad are expected to top \$200 billion, the present US level. These investments go mainly into commercial and financial enterprises, although in the recent period more investments have gone into manufacturing and mining and into the purchase of real estate in other countries.

It is not surprising, therefore, that nine of the world's major commercial banks are Japanese.

Consequently, Japan is not only one of the world's leading exporters of goods, but is also evolving into a major international creditor and exporter of capital, and Tokyo, into a key international centre of finance.

Japan's economic potential, multiplied by its financial strength, makes the Land of the Rising Sun a contender for the role of one of the leaders of the capitalist world. Western futurologists have suggested that the coming century might well come to be known as the "age of Japan".

Saburo Okita, an authoritative scholar and one-time Japanese foreign minister, says that although "Japan is strong economically and financially, it is not yet prepared for the responsibility of global leadership". But, since the United States is no longer capable of providing world leadership on its own, Japan must join the United States in giving a joint lead in the world economy.

My own feeling is that the world economy will go along a different way: the world has not been moving to anything like single-handed leadership, "tandem" leadership, or even to the leadership of some "big three" or "group of seven" developed capitalist countries, but to a multitiered, multisectoral, interdependent and mutually complementary economy, in which each country, whether big or small, could make a

positive contribution, and that includes Japan. In this context, I must agree with S. Okita when he says: "Without a prosperous world economy Japan cannot prosper. We know that a prosperous island cannot exist in a depressed area."

This is all the truer since many authoritative analysts believe that Japan's prosperity is still largely fragile, while the well-being of its popular masses falls short of the country's increased economic and financial might. Thus, a poll taken by the prime minister's office in September 1988 discovered that while Japan has risen to the highest level in terms of per capita income, roughly 70 per cent of the Japanese polled still declared that they had no sense of the "richness of their lives".

One student of modern Japan says that the national wealth has not given the individual any sense of having a stake in it because of the high cost of living and housing, the relatively low level of social protection, and the worsening ecological situation.

The main plank in a programme recently adopted by the national centre of the newly formed New Japanese Trade Union Federation, Sin-rengo, is the demand for a higher living standard for Japanese working people, which clearly falls short of Japanese economic might and still lags behind the living standards of wage workers in the United States and West European countries.

Without idealising or absolutising the Japanese experience, we can, nonetheless, derive much that is useful from it for advancing our own perestroika. It would hardly be superfluous, therefore, to draw attention to the fact that the Japanese have attained their amazing successes by skilfully blending their own values with the achievements of foreign countries.

CONVERSION IN THE SOVIET DIMENSION

Alexei KIREYEV

ABOUT 18 MONTHS AGO, the Soviet Union called on the world from the rostrum of the UN to move on from an arms-producing to a disarmament economy. It pledged to take the first step in this direction by presenting its internal plan for the conversion of two or three munitions factories and to publish information on its experience of providing employment for arms industry specialists and using the industry's facilities for civilian production.

There is enough evidence now to appraise the early results of conversion in our country and the international community's response. That these results vary in character is indicated both by the imbalances which conversion has caused in the Soviet economy and by foreign reaction to it. Many in the West point out that some of the measures we call conversion are really something else and that the West must therefore be very circumspect in laying plans to ease its military burden.

DUE TO OUR PREDILECTION for new words, especially words of foreign origin, we speak of *conversion* whenever we mean a reduction in arms manufacture or military equipment. We would therefore do well to begin by specifying the actual meaning of the term.

In world usage, conversion is interpreted as switching from military to civilian production. According to a broader definition, it is the totality of measures for a restructuring of components of the national economy associated with military activity. Generally speaking, conversion is an orderly switch of arms production and other military activities to a peaceful track and a corresponding redistribution of financial, manpower, material and intellectual resources between the civilian and the military sectors.

Conversion is not a diversification of arms production resulting in munitions factories starting to furnish a wide range of consumer goods in addition to their traditional output. This diversification occurs in our country whenever we impose the manufacture of equipment for light industry and the agroindustrial complex on the defence industry, which normally produces no such items. In such cases, civilian items are mostly produced not instead of but along with military ones by expanding and modernising the consumer goods shops that have always existed in munitions factories.

To effect conversion is not to transfer to civilian industries new technologies, inventions or know-how worked out in the military sector. In the market economy this process is known as a spin-off, and the

state generally regulates and encourages it. Technologies developed for military purposes have led to the rise of whole civilian machine-building industries. One of the early specimens of a spin-off in our country did not appear until strong public criticism of the Energia-Buran space programme worth billions of roubles resulted in supplying the economy with the production forms and records of hundreds of innovations brought into being in implementing the programme.

Selling military hardware at home or abroad to be used as scrap is not conversion. As Vtorchermet has no equipment to cut large metal objects like destroyers, submarines or tanks any more than environmentally clean plants that can do it, warships written off are sold to foreigners at one dollar per unit of weight. When they come back to us in the form of imports we pay as much as 20 dollars for the same unit. It follows that selling military equipment as scrap is a rather ineffective attempt to recover at least a fraction of the money spent on manufacturing the equipment.

Lastly, using the armed forces and various weapons for the solution of economic problems is not conversion. It is well known that part of the Soviet Army has long been used on a permanent basis as an ordinary and gratuitous workforce on jobs that are not covered by its functions—from building railroads in the North to harvesting potatoes in the country's central areas. We widely publicise our experience of using military transport aircraft to carry civilian goods. However, we point out that, if necessary, soldiers can stop harvesting to pick up their weapons while pilots can take an airborne battalion aboard instead of loading fruit for Chukotka reindeer-breeders.

Conversion in the Soviet Union is being effected in very distinctive forms. The post-revolutionary period has seen the formation of a cumbersome military-industrial complex (MIC) controlled by the state and hence meeting the people's interests, or so it was believed in the past. Indeed, few are those (except some bribe-taking generals) who enrich themselves at the expense of the Soviet MIC. The latter serves the interests of society, not those of classes, and this means that in many respects no parallel can be drawn between it and its opposite numbers in Western countries.

But the Soviet MIC has demonstrably become in a measure an enclave exempt from democratic control, a combination of the world's largest armed forces, a military economy of incredible proportions and an enormous bureaucratised establishment. It has every component of the classical military-industrial complex described in the CPSU Programme.

Our country produces larger quantities of nearly all weapons than any other country, the only exception being surface warships and strategic bombers. Various sources, while lacking official information, agree just the same that the Soviet Army has the largest number of generals and that, moreover, they are more numerous today, in peacetime, than during the Great Patriotic War.

The inflated state military-industrial bureaucracy is entrenched in at least a dozen Union ministries, with the ministries of defence and defence industry unquestionably playing first fiddle. This structure is topped by the Military Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers and the defence departments of party bodies.

MIC commands a powerful ideological apparatus: national and provincial military newspapers and periodicals, radio stations, publishing houses, song and dance companies and even a theatre. Military censors keep a watchful eye on all publications dealing with military subjects.

Lastly, a sizable part of the country's scientific potential is controlled by MIC. The numerous research and production combines bearing

names that reveal nothing (such as "Agate" or "Garnet"), the defence industry academicians, laureates and heroes whose names only become known to the public from obituaries, the research institutes working on "general problems", the design offices of "machine-building plants" that might have looked harmless but for fences topped by barbed wire are merely what can be seen with the naked eye, so to speak.

The problem does not lie in all this being there. Any state solicitous for its security is compelled to develop every component of MIC to one extent or another. The problem is that in the past our MIC went too far beyond reasonable defence sufficiency. The West, which is richer and economically stronger than we, responded by building up its military power. This pursuit race overtaxed our economy. And so while the West approaches the issue of disarmament primarily from the standpoint of the political need for security, we are motivated above all by purely economic requirements.

This makes conversion a mechanism for a deep-going demilitarisation of that part of society involved in MIC. Of course, it is not a question of bringing our defence potential to nought. This would be folly today. What is implied is a far-reaching reform and restructuring of the entire MIC to enable it to meet defence requirements at a minimum cost in manpower and material resources.

It is part of the requisite restructuring of the Soviet economy. We have traditionally divided the economy into Group A and Group B but now we must subdivide it into a civilian and a military sector. In step with conversion, a change must be brought about in the balance between them by reducing the share of the military sector in favour of the civilian sector.

There can be no doubt that this restructuring of the economy will go very deep. Arms production is to decrease by nearly 19.5 per cent, the military budget by 14.2 per cent and the strength of the armed forces by 12 per cent. From 1989 to 1990, the Armed Forces of the USSR are to be cut by 500,000 men. This year alone over 500,000 munitions workers are to switch to civilian and consumer goods production. Conversion, which is to cover 420 enterprises, will range from five to 100 per cent.

The socio-economic tensions of the late eighties compel our country to speed conversion. This makes competent regulation all the more indispensable if we want to prevent any further increase in imbalances as conversion goes on.

HISTORY HAS HANDED DOWN two main economic regulators, planning and the market. Both are virtually non-existent in the sphere of military production conversion. The state programme for the conversion to be carried out between this year and 1995 was drawn up late in 1989 and protects primarily the interests of the military sector. Nor is this surprising, for it is a creation of MIC. From what Gennady Filshin said at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, MIC proceeded in a rather original manner by first telling the Planning, Budget and Financial Commission of the Soviet of the Union that it needed 63 billion rubles (exclusive of funds for capital construction) without really explaining, however, what for.

It is not very clear what that 63 billion is to be spent on (the money is obviously needed for defence, except R & D). But that episode suggested that MIC is not going to stand on ceremony very much even with USSR People's Deputies when it comes to getting from the budget the amount of money deemed necessary. Somewhat later, Nikolai Ryzhkov said that nine billion rubles would be required for just switching the production facilities of the defence complex to civilian production. Where is

that money to come from? Does the government plan to procure it at the expense of the military budget or civilian programmes? This remains an open question.

The function of a plan for conversion is already being performed in part by a programme for increasing production and raising the technological standards of equipment for the processing industries of the agroindustrial complex and by a programme under which the defence industry is to develop and put out new consumer goods in the 1989-1995 period. However, there is evidence that centrally planned conversion has failed to meet expectations, for command methods were used to implement it. Planners simply set munitions factories assignments for producing civilian equipment without regard to their specialisation, production volumes or technological standards. As a result, it took the defence industry nine months in 1989 to start producing 23 new items instead of the 120 required by the plan.

Nor is conversion regulated by the market. All the signs are that the arms industry is dominated by a thriving command system. Operation according to definite orders placed by the state, output unfailingly paid for under the state budget, prices guaranteeing highly profitable production, undivided control by general managers and general designers, the employees' interest in steadily high pay, priority access to raw and other materials, an impenetrable veil of secrecy all kept the defence industry out of the democratisation processes that unfolded in the economy step by step under the pressure of the circumstances even in the years of stagnation.

Munitions factory managers knew about economic accountability, self-financing and austerity only by hearsay. Deliveries of special equipment to customers known in advance shut the military sector even to rudimentary market relations and competition. Some elements of competition only existed at the stage of R & D, where the Military Industrial Commission assigned several design offices tasks of one and the same type. Afterwards, however, when it came to choosing the best design or technology, people seen as authorities often imposed their will, which meant starting quantity production of several parallel designs of one and the same type of weapon. As a consequence, our armed forces came to be considerably less standardised and unified than those of NATO countries.

With conversion on, munitions factories began casting about helplessly for buyers of their civilian output and asking for sympathy because no one wanted to buy it. For the first time ever, they had to lend ear to what they were told about marketing, efficient management and many other things unknown to the military sector before.

As there are neither plans for nor market regulators of conversion and no effort is made at least to realise the need for legislation, conversion has become a matter for everyone from the CPSU CC and the USSR Supreme Soviet to cooperatives and "Make It Yourself" groups, with no one really doing anything. Brought into being through years-long selfless work by the Soviet people, who are willing to sacrifice everything to the security of their country, the military-industrial complex is being torn to pieces and frittered away under the guise of conversion. The latter is deforming the destinies of tens of thousands of people, shattering their hopes and humiliating them.

WE ARE THEREFORE BADLY IN NEED of a conversion mechanism that would logically link set political goals with economic realities and potentialities. I think such a mechanism should comprise financial, organisational, legal and ideological instruments, with each of them taking the human factor into account by all means. After all, conversion involves not

only production but political and economic thinking and has a direct bearing on people's interests.

A financial prerequisite for conversion is to cut military spending. Late in 1989, the USSR Ministry of Defence announced that defence spending in 1990 would amount to 71 billion rubles, that is, would be 6.3 billion (8.2 per cent) less than in 1989. The following table shows the reductions in question (in billions of rubles).

Items of expenditure	1989	1990	1990 changes against 1989 (%)
Purchases of arms and equipment	32.6	31.0	-4.9
R & D	15.3	13.1	-14.4
Maintenance of the Army and Navy	20.2	19.3	-4.5
Military construction	4.6	3.7	-19.6
Pensions for servicemen	2.3	2.4	+4.3
Other expenditures	2.3	1.3	-43.5
Total	77.3	71.0	-8.2

Computed according to *Pravda*, June 10 and December 16, 1989.

It is most disturbing that, from what the above data indicate, spending on defence R & D is being reduced drastically in comparison with the planned cut in spending on arms and equipment. Instead of desisting from the purchase of further batches of military hardware a considerable part of which is regarded by specialists as quite obsolete, we are to spend less on R & D, that is, on promising development, which now encompasses, by the way, equipment for the light and food industries. Thereby we risk losing an invaluable potential of the science of defence by dispersing and despecialising unique R & D teams.

To be sure, it is easier to cut funds for what has not yet gone beyond blueprints. But we should realise that after designing a pear peeler or a biscuit-packing conveyor, braindrained design offices will no longer be able to develop supersonic airliners, which are no less necessary today than pear jam.

General designers point out with good reason that expenditures for some of the more promising scientific research programmes have been slashed. For example, spending on R & D shares with a mere eight per cent in the cost of the programme for the MiG 29 fighter and spending on ensuring deliveries, roughly as much while the lion's share, or up to 85 per cent, is to be spent on operating aircraft: fuel, lubricants, spares, and so on. It is clear that cuts should affect primarily spending on deliveries and operation yet they hit R & D.

This reality is indicative of a kind of egalitarian approach to items in the military budget expressing itself in attempts to effect conversion chiefly by undermining the technological basis for the future rather than by reducing excessive funding of purchases of arms and equipment and of expenditures for their use. As this item of expenditure accounts for nearly half the Soviet defence budget, it is obvious that a reduction in these expenditures, at least one commensurable with that envisaged in the case of R & D, would provide a much greater saving in absolute terms.

The organisational levers of conversion in our country are operated according to directives as in other instances. The restructuring of indu-

stry attending upon conversion was accomplished by transferring several dozens of plants run by the Ministry of Light and Food Industry Machine-Building, which had fallen apart and was liquidated, to defence ministries, and second, by partly or fully switching several hundreds of munitions factories to civilian production.

As a result, a whole branch of production, one manufacturing equipment for the light and food industries, dropped out of civilian machine-building. It was added to the already longish list of machine-building industries absent from the Soviet economy. All TV sets, household sewing machines, practically all refrigerators and tape recorders and most electric vacuum cleaners and washing machines are now produced by the defence industry. Altogether more than a quarter of the consumer goods other than food products that are put out in our country comes from munitions factories.

The very first thing that the military-industrial complex did on absorbing the facilities of the Ministry of Light and Food Industry Machine-Building was to extend its secrecy rules to them. Thereupon, having set out to modernise them, it discovered that it is often easier to close down an old plant and build a new one in its stead than to try to modernise a plant whose fixed assets are hopelessly outdated.

It also emerged that the technological difference between the civilian and military sectors of the economy is so great that the latest technology simply cannot be used in enterprises putting out products for peaceful uses. The Ministry of the Automotive and Farm Machine-Building Industry, for one, turned out to be unable without a thorough restructuring and retooling of its plants to use titanium and aluminum alloys, certain plastics and other materials requiring special processing. This raised serious doubts about whether technologies developed in the course of, say, implementing space programmes could be put to use even in civilian enterprises now run by MIC.

No lesser organisational difficulties arise where conversion involves some part of arms production. It is clear that conversion cannot be accomplished by merely cutting output for defence. You cannot simply dis-mantle but must reconstruct a production line that rolled off, say, 10 tanks per unit of time and then reduced output by half.

World experience suggests that in such a contingency those effecting conversion face two main dangers: soaring prices for civilian output coming from the arms industry and the impossibility of selling it because there are no buyers.

Conversion in our country is being carried out in such a way that even the monopoly held by producers and a half-empty market do not guarantee munitions factories a market for their civilian products. Prior to conversion, ties in the sphere of supply and sales between the military and civilian sectors of the economy hardly ever crossed, each sector having its own suppliers and customers.

Now that artificial barriers are coming down and the internal COCOM is being eliminated, it is highly important to regulate in time intercrossing supply and sales operations and prevent a rupture of relations based on cooperation or a cutting off of orderly cooperation channels. The importance of this is plainly underrated. As a result, munitions factories have started by way of conversion to turn out civilian equipment which is not needed in such quantities or is needed but the potential buyer does not know it is being turned out somewhere.

THERE IS POSITIVE EXPERIENCE of organising conversion in enterprises that, rather than waiting for instructions on starting production of definite items for civilian uses, have worked out their own solu-

tions. It is obvious, for example, that for aircraft plants it is best to switch to making airliners. The largest plants can make long-distance Il-96-300 liners instead of combat or military transport aircraft.

Attractive lines of conversion are provided by cooperation with foreign partners. For instance, an agreement between the Sukhoi Design Bureau and the American Gulf Stream Aerospace Corporation will make it possible to proceed to the manufacture of supersonic Gulf Stream IV-SU service planes. Such small aircraft for 50 passengers and with a range of between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometres are lacking on the world market. According to tentative estimates, this miniliner would cost not less than 40 to 50 million dollars abroad and as for us, its price would range between six and eight million rubles, which means over six dollars per ruble.

The alternatives of conversion that would result in delivering highly profitable civilian equipment to foreign countries are evidently preferable to selling to foreign countries armaments no longer needed at home, as proposed by some defence industry executives. For years past, the Soviet Union and the United States have shared doubtful fame anyway as major suppliers of arms to the world market, and an increase in arms sales would be contrary to our own foreign policy initiatives aimed at limiting international traffic in arms.

Conversion leading to civilian goods exports is one of the preferable solutions also in terms of supplying the market with consumer goods. Instead of making the defence industry manufacture household appliances, which it has never done, we could buy them in the West and, moreover, the quality of many of them would be higher. And we could pay for them in hard currency earned by making unique civilian equipment of our own.

Such alternatives are proposed by, for instance, the Volgograd Barrikady combine, a manufacturer of missile launchers on whose basis it has now developed several models of machinery for the civilian economy. These include a pile driver whose price on the world market is about 800,000 dollars; a 230,000 dollar felling and skidding machine; equipment for use in emergencies; extinguishing installations; safes on wheels. All these items are unique and are in demand on the world market. It is estimated that the hard currency they would earn could be used for purchasing not only consumer goods but whole plants for their production.

Such examples are regrettably isolated and are only a fruit of the initiative of particularly enterprising executives who see reproduction cycles worked out over the years disintegrate as a consequence of directive conversion. Experience has also shown that conversion should be planned and a search for alternative civilian output begun from below, that is, from the level of every defence enterprise and every workplace.

Strictly speaking, there is nothing novel about this. The plan for conversion drawn up by the British Lucas Aerospace Company is a classical example of planning conversion. The trouble is that we do not seem to have time to study the experience of other countries before undertaking something. At a time when we are hit by a crisis of underproduction, the temptation of trying to get everything "here and now" is too great.

However, the planning of conversion cannot be left entirely to the defence industry itself. Western experience indicates that one of the most dependable guarantees of selling output is contracting. In the market economy, those who produce capital goods no longer work for an unknown market. All industrial output is intended to fill orders from concrete customers.

Hence the advisability of adopting the following pattern. The USSR Council of Ministers would with the aid of central planning, financial,

statistical and forecasting agencies establish the country's long-range requirements for means of production and consumer goods and hand down the resultant list to defence enterprises earmarked for conversion. The list should understandably comprise the range items and information on quantity, prices and other technical and economic data.

For their part, enterprises subject to conversion would decide according to their technological, financial and production potentialities on the alternative civilian output which they consider most acceptable and would bring its range and main parameters into line with the Council of Ministers list. This would make the planning of conversion a result of meeting each other half-way, a process in which optimum alternatives for switching to civilian production could be found.

Such planning would rule out the possibility of MIC continuing to absorb civilian industries. Organisationally, it would be preferable to see that capacities released from arms production are transferred from defence to civilian ministries and reoriented accordingly with budget funds redistributed in favour of the civilian sector.

The adaptation of defence enterprises to the conditions prevailing in the civilian economy might meet with considerable difficulties. Western experience suggests that special funds are needed for paying the expenses of the transitional period. To avoid drawing on the budget for extra allocations, such funds could be formed both centrally and at local level, by defence enterprises setting aside part of their earnings from military contracts.

Indeed, like contributions to social insurance, such allocations should be a necessary condition for placing defence contracts with enterprises. This would provide every plant manager with something of an insurance fund in case of conversion, a fund out of which he could independently pay the expenses of reconstruction and the job retraining of employees.

A similar fund could be set up also centrally for government financing of major conversion programmes. The fund could be made up of contributions from the budgets of defence ministries and enterprises as well as organisations wanting to obtain new technologies from MIC. Besides, a contribution could be made to it by deducing a legislatively specified percentage of appropriations under the military budget. The result would be a kind of social tax on military expenditures curbing their growth.

THE CONVERSION under way is assuming proportions that make it imperative to enact legislation in order to channel and regulate it. In the United States, where conversion is not on the agenda as yet, a debate on conversion bills has been going on for a quarter century now. Right now Congress is discussing three bills submitted by both Republicans and Democrats.

Conversion in our case is not yet regulated by law, and in fact, the issue has still not been raised in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Yet such far-reaching structural changes may in the absence of appropriate legislation have consequences that are hard to realise at the moment. A law on conversion would not only help put the mechanism of demilitarising the economy in proper shape but produce a strong foreign political effect by confirming that we are serious about planning to move from an arms-producing to a disarmament economy.

Such a law should understandably contain a precise definition of the concept, objects, subjects and mechanism of conversion, provide for entrusting specific entities from the USSR Council of Ministers to production enterprises with drawing up plans for conversion, renewing them

periodically and carrying them out if necessary; specify the procedure of setting up and using conversion funds; enshrine social guarantees for persons whose interests may be affected by conversion and determine the procedure of providing appropriate compensation.

It would apparently be right to decree that the main lines of conversion be worked out by an extradepartmental group representing the people's highest authorities, with all components of the military-industrial complex and the general public participating. The group should specify the main parameters of conversion: scientific and technological designs to be declassified, sources of funding, time limits of attaining set goals, and so on.

On being approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and State Security, the results of this work would become a guideline for the agencies planning conversion. This would make it impossible for any one of them to go too far in pursuing its departmental interests to the detriment of the entire economy. In discussing the plan for conversion submitted for approval, the Supreme Soviet could compare it with earlier guidelines and amend it if necessary.

There should be a direct connection between the law regimenting secrecy in the defence sector and the law on conversion. All that is listed among scientific and technological designs or has to do with definite ministries will be reduced according to the procedure now in force. This is why no trace can be found any longer of the plants of the one-time Ministry of Light and Food Industry Machine-Building transferred to MIC, nor can we tell what they produce today. "It follows that we are stuck deep in the defence complex," to quote a People's Deputy.

At the moment declassifying a technology consists in proving that it is no secret any more because it has long been known to all. In drafting a law regimenting secrecy, it would evidently be advisable to provide for the reverse procedure, which would bind defence agencies wanting to classify a design to demonstrate that it must be kept secret.

In connection with drafting a law on conversion, it is also necessary to settle through legislation the issue of ownership of new technologies and production equipment developed in the military sector. Currently innovations are usually at the disposal of those who are the first to turn them into hardware, there being no protection for designers' rights. This practically makes it impossible for defence research institutes and design offices to use the results of their work for commercial purposes, which is bound to be crucial in the conditions of economic accountability for their surviving conversion.

The law on conversion should provide for setting up an all-Union data bank or centralised information system to pool information on existing military technologies and the possibilities of using them in civilian production. The bank or system would be a kind of meeting-place for designers of new technologies and civilians who buy and use these technologies.

THE FOREGOING focusses on technological and economic problems but it may be disavowed to a considerable extent if it results in forgetting people with their interests, anxieties and hopes. The main headache of agencies effecting conversion is so to switch to civilian production as to provide the largest possible quantities of consumer goods. How this affects people many of whom have devoted the best years of their lives to "defence" does not seem to worry anybody.

For decades running, the military sector was a priority as to the composition and training of personnel. But due to restrictions imposed by sec-

recy, this vast intellectual potential is still used inadequately. In view of the discharge of a large number of servicemen, the civilian sector can take on many competent specialists in the prime of their working lives. Indeed, according to data released by the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army, the age composition of political workers who have received a higher pedagogical education and are being discharged owing to reduction of staff is as follows: 25 years or under, 26 per cent; 26 to 30, 42 per cent; 31 to 35, 16 per cent. It follows that 84 per cent of the political workers being demobilised are men under 35 years of age.

Irrespective of why it is primarily young people that are being discharged, there is no doubt that in view of the current acute shortage of teachers, so rare an opportunity of reinforcing the country's schools must not be missed. Yet there is still a lack of link-up between possibilities and requirements. If the Chief Personnel Directorate of the Defence Ministry were to take the trouble to inform the USSR State Committee on Public Education of the number of military officers to be discharged, of their specialisation and their willingness to work in the educational system, it would probably be easy enough to secure jobs for them through the organisations concerned and have the local authorities provide them with housing. But no such information is forthcoming.

As for people employed in the defence industry (Western sources set their number at more than six million), they are in an unenviable plight for the time being. As a matter of fact, they must either stay on at a converted plant and reconcile themselves to lower pay and the loss of many social opportunities or begin migrating from industry to industry until they get a job in a cooperative which can pay them decent wages.

Workers at the Volzhsk computer plant, for one, where most of those making special equipment used to hold fifth grade, earned from 280 to 300 rubles. Currently they get 50 to 100 rubles less. At the Kharkov tank plant, a mere 15 per cent cut in the production of the main item led to an outflow of workers. I do not mean general workers or janitors but the finest armour welders, assemblers, turners, highly skilled tool makers. The reason why they quit is not that they are "fed up with hard work" but that they are uncertain of the future of their plant. Besides, some of them cannot resign themselves to being demoted from members of the working-class elite to ordinary gas welders. In other words, there is also the problem of professional pride.

Thus the social aspect of conversion is practically unexplored ground in our country. The trade unions, councils of work collectives and other social organisations whose duty is to defend the interests of labour show amazing passivity. In the West, meanwhile, the unions are the most active force championing the drawing up of plans for conversion and the adoption of state programmes guaranteeing maintenance of the social status of job holders in the event of going over to civilian production.

It seems to me that the social deadlock over conversion could be broken by, among other things, dividing military industrial giants into smaller units, leasing converted shops or sections, switching to team contracts and setting up cooperatives enjoying a large measure of autonomy and definite rights in the area of civilian production. In that case, it might be economically wiser and socially less painful to stop all military production in some enterprises and transfer them to work collectives which could solve problems of further development on their own with due regard to the requirements of the national economy.

Another promising method is, in my view, for military units and organisations already performing civilian economic functions to set up civilian enterprises that would operate on the principles of economic accountability, using available manpower resources. What I mean is car

repair workshops, housing construction combines, service sector facilities, and so on.

ALTOGETHER CONVERSION is expected to give the Soviet military-industrial complex an entirely different dimension by transforming it from an input-intensive into a paying complex and from a directly managed into a market complex. The division of the economy into two unconnected sectors—military and civilian—makes an interbranch comparison of production costs impossible. The veil of secrecy prevents us from comparing ours with international costs. As a result, we do not know how really competitive our defence sector is. And so the fact that Rust landed on Red Square and that a fighter plane flew to Belgium without a pilot may have been not so much accidental exceptions but danger signals confirming a general rule.

To my way of thinking, conversion should result in our drawing near the Japanese type of organising production, which in peacetime serves almost exclusively civilian purposes (the share of military output in Japanese industry is a purely symbolic 0.54 per cent) but can if necessary manufacture military equipment meeting world standards.

Conversion, which is reducing the scale of specialised military production, will lead, nonetheless, to strengthening the country's defences, which will not be based on a small group of industries but on the entire competitive potential of the national economy. While we still consider our defence sector a model of technological discipline and quality compared with our ill-functioning civilian industries, conversion should lead to a production structure with a common "denominator", that is, with quality no longer depending on who "owns" a particular enterprise or whose orders it fills. As for standards to be accepted in our civilian sector, they should be equal or even superior to those existing in our military sector.

When this comes all that we classify will probably become immediately an item of mass production, mastering which will enable us to make the new item perfect and find dozens of uses for it, with the military sphere neither the only nor the most important one to use it. As a result, our defences will be guaranteed by our whole economic potential, which will no longer be wasted on military purposes in peacetime.

The Soviet Union's steps towards conversion have already set many countries thinking about the advisability of appropriating billions of dollars for military construction. Most of our potential adversaries are discussing plans for cuts in military spending, a reality which induces private companies to search for ways to convert their military capacity to civilian production. Evolving and implementing a concept of radical conversion of the Soviet MIC would stimulate demilitarisation of the world economy as a whole and add to the defence potential and political prestige of our country.

HER ROYAL MAJESTY

Victor POPOV

IN THE PAST and at the beginning of this century, monarchy was the state system in most countries of Europe, being considered as the wisest and most lawful form of government. The whole of Europe, with the exception of France and Switzerland, with their republican systems, consisted of monarchies. Now monarchy has been replaced by the republic as the most accepted form of government in the world. In Europe, out of 34 countries, there are fewer than ten monarchies, the heads of which, moreover, in most cases play a symbolical part.

This is precisely why the British monarchy is of particular interest.

Above all, let us note that this is the most ancient of the European monarchies. The present British Queen Elizabeth II is descended on her mother's side from King Egbert, who came to the throne in 829, that is, almost eleven centuries ago. True, once back in the 17th century, under Cromwell, for a brief period of eleven years Britain experienced a republican form of government, but preferred to return to the traditional monarchical system.

Is merely this tradition so dear to the British people, while the monarchy has, in fact, outlived itself? No, there are no grounds for such a conclusion. On the contrary, recently, according to public opinion polls, nine out of ten Britons are for the retention of the monarchy, and the number of its supporters in the country is growing rather than shrinking over the years. In my opinion, the main reason for this, no matter how paradoxical it might sound, is a certain *democratisation* of the institutions of the monarchy, the fact that, at least superficially, it is drawing closer to the people. Whereas in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the significance of royal power in Britain was steadily decreasing, this process has now come to a halt; the role and influence of this power have started to grow, and the respect for it, especially for Queen Elizabeth II, to gain in strength.

I have had an opportunity to speak to many British people from different walks of life, and only once did I hear a less than completely favourable opinion of the Queen, and even then it was from a diplomat with a jaundiced opinion of everyone. Queen Elizabeth II or, as her official title runs, "By the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith", enjoys undoubted respect and recognition in the country. The British mass media, which are merciless towards all politicians, including the Prime Minister, never permit themselves to criticise the Queen.

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THE HISTORY of the British monarchy over roughly the last fifty years has abounded in many astounding events that draw the attention and often, too, the sympathy of the English people.

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Let us begin with the fact that Princess Elizabeth, who was not even first in line for the throne, suddenly became the heir to the crown.

In 1936 King George V died. In England, on the day when the King dies, it is usually his eldest son who replaces him (according to the formula: The King is dead. Long live the King!). George V's eldest son Edward VIII was proclaimed monarch. Yet, after only eleven months on the throne, during the same year, he had to abdicate. The story was a rather romantic one. The King fell in love with an American woman, rich, but not of noble descent and, moreover, twice divorced. Yet he announced that, in spite of everything, he intended to marry her. Neither the Church of England, the secular head of which is the monarch, nor the members of the royal family, shocked by the King's decision, nor the ruling circles of the country could accept this. Edward VIII had to choose—power or love. He chose the latter and abdicated the throne, but, since he had no children, his younger brother George VI became King. It then became clear that, since George VI had no sons, it was his elder daughter Elizabeth Alexandra Mary, who was only just ten years old at the time, would be the heir to the throne.

The new King was an exceptional person and his inclination was to *play an independent role*. Thus, he refused to fulfill the recommendations of Winston Churchill, who persistently advised him, at the beginning of the Second World War, to move to Canada because of the serious danger and the possibility of an invasion of Britain by Nazi Germany. He decided to remain in England and suffered, together with many Londoners, the repeated Nazi air attacks on the capital, including on his own residence—Buckingham Palace.¹ George VI took an interest in the life of the country and studied its domestic and foreign policies. For instance, he advised and achieved the appointment of a number of foreign ministers.

In February 1952, when Princess Elizabeth was in Kenya, George VI died unexpectedly, and she became Queen. The first to congratulate Elizabeth on her return to Britain was her grandmother, Queen Mary, who said: "Your old Grannie (she was 84 years old at the time—V. P.) and Your subject must be the first to kiss Your hand, the hand of the Queen." That is how Elizabeth II's reign began.

I was fortunate enough to meet and talk to the Queen on many occasions, and my colleagues, ambassadors of other countries, accredited in London, as well as many British people, have spoken to me about their meetings with her, especially at the two huge receptions held by the Queen every year. So I have received an impression of the Queen and her personal qualities.

The Queen is modest and easy to talk to. When talking to her, after a few minutes you forget that you are with the monarch, Her Majesty, the head of the state. You are attracted by her tact and attention, her calm, and I would say cultured, manner in discussion. British people note that she never makes a person she talks to feel she is the monarch and he is a mere subject.

George VI and his wife, Queen Elizabeth, assumed that their daughter would come to the throne, and gave her a good, solid home education. She heard lectures on law, constitutional history and geography, music and art, and studied French, which she speaks fluently. Her favourite pastimes are reading literature, historical novels, biographies of political figures, as well as detective novels, above all those of Agatha Christie. She enjoys one of the most beautiful and, at the same time, courageous sports—horse-riding, to which she took from childhood. This, in fact, runs in the family. Her husband, Prince Philip, also loves riding competitions and is the chairman of the World Horse-Riding Federation, while, in 1971, their daughter Anne became European champion in one form of horse-riding and was proclaimed sportswoman of the year.

Horse-riding is a sport for the bold, and the Queen, certainly no timid woman, has often demonstrated her bravery. In 1959 she was to visit Ghana. At that time, upheavals began in this West African country, so the visit involved a certain risk. The Queen's security might have been in question. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan informed her of this and suggested putting off the visit, to which the Queen responded: "No, danger is part of the job."

Indeed, she has been in danger on several occasions. I recall one instance. If I am not mistaken, it was in 1983. As usual, the Queen's birthday was celebrated in June with a parade of the royal guard.² This is attended by the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers, the leader of the Opposition, other political figures, ambassadors accredited to Britain, Londoners and people from other parts of the country. Until very recent years, the Queen received the parade on horseback, riding round the troops, who saluted her. This time, however, on the way to the parade ground, on a nearby street someone fired several shots at her. The horse swerved to the side, the escort rushed to help the Queen, but she kept control of the horse and rode calmly out on to the parade ground, and received the parade as if nothing had happened.³ Those of us attending the parade and waiting for the Queen's arrival on the parade ground did not hear the shots and only found out what had happened from radio and television broadcasts.

Once, a stranger managed to get into Buckingham Palace, which is situated in the centre of London. He turned out to be Michael Fagan, a vagrant. What is more, this was not his first visit to the Palace. He had entered it first a week before, but had confined himself to drinking a bottle of wine he found. The second time he took courage and, in the middle of the night, entered the Queen's bedroom. (It is amazing how he found it in the enormous palace. The former Prime Minister, Lord Callaghan, said to me "I used to go to the palace once a week, to meet with the Queen, but have no idea where her bedroom is") When the Queen woke up, he asked her for a cigarette. Apparently he would have considered it a great honour to be given a cigarette by the Queen. The Queen did not panic but continued talking calmly to this uninvited guest—or "intruder" as he was called by the newspapers, while pressing hard on the button to summon the guard, which did not, however, hurry to her aid. Only twenty minutes later did the palace servants realise that something extraordinary had happened.⁴

The whole of London discussed this event for many weeks. One deputy foreign minister spoke to me with indignation: "It is unthinkable that anyone could penetrate at night to, say, Reagan, Mitterrand or Brezhnev, but in London it is possible."

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WHENEVER I SPEAK to Soviet audiences about Britain, the usual question is: "What is the role of the Queen?". Sometimes I am asked directly: "Does the Queen do anything apart from taking part in receptions and parades, or not?" Many people imagine today's monarchs as people who play no role in the lives of their countries, leading a "royal way of life", which, in their eyes, is synonymous with an "idle" one. I cannot be specific about other monarchs, but in relation to Queen Elizabeth, there is nothing further from the truth than this impression.

Once, during a discussion at Windsor Castle, some 20 miles from London, I asked Her Majesty which of her palaces—Buckingham or Windsor—she preferred to live in. The Queen replied with some astonishment: "...Why in Buckingham Palace I work. It's my place of work, while I live at Windsor, so I naturally prefer it." The Queen sees her life as a job that she carries out for a large part of the day. Her working day

usually begins in the morning with the reading of official documents and lasts until 6 or 7 in the evening, if there is no evening reception or dinner (in 1988, for instance, the Queen took part in 588 receptions). She reads material from Cabinet Ministers, reports by Ambassadors and the instructions sent to them from London. According to her press secretary, Elizabeth II studies the press attentively.

The Queen receives the credentials of foreign ambassadors and holds discussions with them in the presence of one of the heads of the Foreign Office, and then, at the end of their term, grants them a farewell audience. About once a month she chairs a meeting of the Privy Council, a consultative organ consisting of the Prime Minister, a number of members of the government, members of the royal family, as well as certain ambassadors to the major powers, including the USSR. Special mention should be made of the Queen's regular discussions, usually on Tuesdays, with the Prime Minister, which last from half an hour to an hour and a half. These discussions are strictly confidential and it is hard to find anything in the press about their character or content.

During meetings with former Prime Ministers James Callaghan, Harold Wilson and Edward Heath, I asked what happened at these discussions. In their words, the discussion of issues with the Queen is very serious. She prepares thoroughly for them and often herself decides the topic of the discussion. Problems of both domestic and foreign policy, and current events are discussed.

As the head of state, the Queen makes a considerable number of visits, sometimes quite extended, to many countries. There is no continent she has not been to during her visits to fifty countries during her reign. No British monarch has made as many official visits as Elizabeth II.

She is justifiably considered as one of the busiest women in Britain. The Queen, together with the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, is the woman in the country best informed about questions of both life in Britain and the country's foreign policy. Like her famous great-grandmother Queen Victoria, Elizabeth II keeps a diary which, when it is published, will undoubtedly be of great informative value.

The Queen identifies with the nation, its unity. It is repeatedly stressed in the country that she is the "symbol of the nation" and to a certain extent even stands above it. This also explains the so-called royal immunity. It is well known, of course, that foreign diplomats enjoy "diplomatic immunity" (to courts, taxes and so on) since they are not citizens or subjects of the country in which they reside. Something similar might be said about the Queen. Many of her subjects' obligations do not apply to her. She cannot be taken to court or even be called as a witness, for this is her "royal court" and she cannot judge herself in her own court. She does not need a passport: all passports are given to her subjects in her name. She does not need a driving licence either since these, too, are issued in her name.

The Queen's five official vehicles have no license plates, and she pays no tax on them. Nor, besides, does she pay any tax on her palaces or the so-called Civil List, setting the annual outlays of the Queen and her family. It is characteristic that she is the only one in the country to enjoy all these rights. The members of the royal family, including her mother (who bears the title of "Queen Mother"), her husband Prince Philip, the heir to the throne Prince Charles and other relations do not enjoy such privileges and are subject to all the laws of the country, just like all other subjects of Her Majesty. The press often includes announcements about violations of laws and rules by certain members of the royal family, mainly connected with traffic violations, and they are not allowed to get away with it.

It is also interesting that, sometimes, the Queen as a woman is ignored and by tradition she is treated as a man. On the Isle of Man, for

instance, which is not formally part of the United Kingdom, but enjoys a special position, her title is "The Queen, Lord of Man", while on the Channel Islands, which enjoy the same status, she is titled "The Duke of Normandy".

OF CONSIDERABLE interest is the question of the real rights and prerogatives of the British monarch. Strangely enough, talking to the British, one comes across different points of view on this. Some of them believe that the Queen plays no substantial role in the political life of the country, that her functions come down merely to signing documents drawn up by the government and to making speeches written by the Prime Minister, that her activities are purely ceremonial in character. Others, on the contrary, suggest that the Queen can, in a number of cases, play a significant role as a result of both some of her prerogatives and her influence on the country's ruling circles.

James Harvey, a British researcher into Britain's state law, stresses that all the authorities in the sphere of constitutional law are agreed on one thing—the monarch enjoys considerably more power than is usually presumed. King George V, the present Queen's great-grandfather, when still the Duke of York, said that the rights of the monarch could provide an opportunity to exert a considerable influence on the political course. The official government publication *Britannia* also notes that, although "the Queen acts on the advice of her ministers", the country is governed by Her Majesty's Government *in the name of the Queen*.

One of the monarch's chief prerogatives is to appoint the Prime Minister. In the majority of cases, this is a purely formal matter. The leader of the party that triumphs in the elections is automatically confirmed by the monarch in the post of Prime Minister. There have been cases, however, when this appointment depended to a considerable extent on the sovereign. Here are a few of the examples. In 1923, when Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law retired, instead of appointing the deputy Prime Minister Lord Curzon as Prime Minister, George V chose Stanley Baldwin, the leader of the House of Commons. In 1931, the King accepted the resignation of the Labour Party leader Ramsey MacDonald. Everyone expected the Conservative Stanley Baldwin to be appointed Premier, but George V proposed to Ramsey MacDonald that he form another Cabinet, in coalition with the Liberals.

Elizabeth II has also made use of her right to appoint the Prime Minister on two occasions. In 1956, after the Suez Crisis and Anthony Eden's resignation, it was thought that she would appoint R. Butler, who was the deputy Prime Minister. The Queen had doubts, however, since there was serious opposition to Butler within the Conservative Party, accusing him of dividing the Party during the Suez Crisis. Elizabeth II invited Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill for consultations, though at the time neither of them held any official posts, and considering their wishes, she appointed Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister. Seven years later, when Macmillan retired for health reasons, the question of the candidature for the premiership arose once more. Opinions in the Conservative Party were again divided: some supported the appointment of Hailsham, others Alec Douglas-Home. Once more the Queen decided to consult with a number of politicians, including her own uncle, Field Marshal Montgomery, a war hero who had commanded the British forces in Africa and during the Normandy landing. The Field Marshal, in turn, asked the Whip of the House of Lords: "What do you want: the best PM or a man to win the election?" "We want both," was the answer. "You can't have that," said Montgomery, "Home'd make the best PM, Hail-

sham's the best man to win the election." Alec Douglas-Home was appointed Prime Minister.

The right of the monarch to give advice and warnings to some extent also means the right to exert an influence. Sometimes kings have, of course, intervened quite actively in the political life of the country. True, the country did not, as a rule, find out about this immediately, but later, sometimes even after the death of the sovereign. After the death of George VI, for instance, it became known that he had warned the Labour Party against overhasty measures to nationalise industry. By tradition, the British monarch is closely connected with aristocratic circles and the war departments, and this gives him additional opportunities to exert an influence.

The monarch has to be kept informed about all the most important decisions made by the Cabinet and has the right to express his opinion and give advice on these decisions, as well as on the appointment of ministers. He can demand that his opinion be transmitted to the Cabinet and considered by it. As the well-known British law expert Jennings wrote, it might be said that the King is a member of the Cabinet, the only one, moreover, not belonging to any party.

The Queen is the Commander-in-Chief of the country's Armed Forces and the secular head of the Church of England. She bestows noble titles and confers decorations, true, at Parliament's recommendation. Four orders the Queen confers independently, however. These include: the most important of all decorations, established in the 14th century—the Order of the Garter (abolished during the Revolution in 1688 and reinstated in 1703); the Order of the Thistle, which has the motto "No-one Shall Insult Me With Impunity" (conferred only on Scots); the Order of Merit (conferred for special services to the state) and the Royal Victorian Order, established at the end of the 19th century as a military order for bravery to junior officers, soldiers and seamen (now it can also be awarded to non-military personnel).

The system by which the awards are made is also of interest. The orders and titles are conferred twice a year—at New Year and on the Queen's official birthday. The awards number in total about 1,000 to 1,500. A limit is set on the numbers of certain awards. No more than 24 British can have the Order of the Garter and the Order of the Thistle, for instance.

Virtually every organisation and any Briton can propose a candidate for an award. The proposal is considered by a special committee, set up in 1923, of three people—members of the Privy Council. The sittings of the committee are held in camera, and its decisions are confirmed by the Prime Minister. Before their publication, each candidate for an award is asked whether this "gesture of favour on the part of Her Majesty" is acceptable to him.

The Queen, on the Government's recommendation, appoints people to the top government posts, including those of governor, ambassadors, and judges, and on the recommendation of the Archbishop—to the top church posts. Finally, the Queen opens Parliament, in a ceremony during which she makes a speech from the throne, prepared by the government.

How far are these prerogatives real? It is not easy to answer this question. Some of them, like giving the throne speech or the post of the Commander-in-Chief, are purely formal. The character of the others depends largely on the personality of the monarch. Thus, Queen Victoria, although interested in the affairs of the Empire, did not interfere in the running of the country, and after the death of her husband, Prince Albert, she handed over all external affairs to the Prince of Wales.

Queen Elizabeth II, in the opinion of many people in Britain, is not satisfied with the role of a passive observer. The question concerning the

political views of the Queen herself is therefore interesting. The answer to this is far from simple. The Queen's personal life and her views are carefully guarded. She has never been interviewed by any journalist. (In Parliament, it is considered "unconstitutional" to refer to the Queen's opinion or ever to refer to her in a speech). Usually, it is only when a new monarch comes to the throne that the secrets of the former sovereign are disclosed.

A certain impression can be gained of Queen Elizabeth's views from individual, extremely rare judgements she has made and that have found their way into the press, mainly via an information leak (by chance or, as some people assert, deliberately), from accounts by people who have spoken to her, as well as statements by the members of her family, above all her husband Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh, and her son Charles, the Prince of Wales. In the 1980s, the question that has most concerned the country's political circles and foreign ambassadors to London is the extent to which the Queen shares the views of the Prime Minister and the conception of Thatcherism. Theoretically it might be assumed that the political attitudes of the Queen and Mrs Thatcher should coincide completely.

The Queen and her family, in my opinion, cannot but take pride in what Britain has achieved over the past decade, the achievements that have come to be called the British Economic Miracle. Over this period, the country's leaders have managed to consolidate its foreign political positions, raise its prestige in the world, for which the Queen, and especially her overseas visits, are largely responsible. During the 1980s, Britain achieved a considerable growth of labour productivity (coming second only to Japan). It became involved, in time, in the scientific and technological revolution and began to take a leading position in it. The real wages of the British working people have increased more than in some other Western countries. The numbers of shareholders have trebled to reach 9 million people. In recent times, capital revenues have also trebled in Britain. It is, of course, mainly the rich strata of the population, to which the Queen belongs, that have gained from this.⁵

Yet the Queen and the members of the royal family must have known that the British people had to pay a high price for the country's major successes. The government has not managed to resolve the unemployment problem; although unemployment has dropped, it remains high. Less is spent on health care than is necessary, and less than in many other Western countries. The population's democratic rights are being curtailed and broad circles in Britain are dissatisfied with the Conservative government in the spheres of both domestic and foreign policy.

This probably explains the fact that, as the British mass media testify, the views of the Queen and the members of the royal family do not coincide fully and in everything with those of the Prime Minister.

A well-known British journalist, the author of a biography of Prince Charles, notes the paradoxical fact that the Queen and, to a certain degree Prince Philip, were more sympathetic towards the Labour Prime Ministers Harold Wilson and James Callaghan than Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher. The British people I asked for an explanation of this said that the monarchy, at least formally representing the whole nation, must orient itself not on individual strata of society and not on a single party, but must, therefore, strive to emphasise its closeness to the whole people, its concern for the entire country. *The Observer* magazine once noted that "The Queen and Prince Philip have been an admirable duo, popularising the monarchy, changing its appearance" precisely in the sense of closer proximity to the people.

Once Prince Charles said, on this, that the monarchy could not exist if it did not take account of the people's attitude towards it. After all,

if the people did not want it, it would not exist. This also explains the, at first glance, incomprehensible "democratisation" of the monarchy and the political views of the royal family in recent times.

This has been manifested primarily in questions of ecology. Some years ago, this question became the focus of the relations between the royal family and the government. At the conferences of ministers for the environment of the North Sea countries, Prince Charles criticised the ecological policy of the British government, particularly with respect to the North Sea, which he called "a rubbish dump". The Prince's statement was hardly a chance one. Evidently, the question of the necessary measures against pollution of the country had been under discussion for a long time in the royal family. In any case, Prince Charles's father, Prince Philip, had energetically supported the purity of nature back in the 1970s, when ecological issues were not as fashionable as nowadays.

Prince Charles's speech was met with irritation among government circles. The residence of the Prime Minister made a statement to the effect that the Prince's attacks had "caused deep resentment in some quarters". The Queen, however, took advantage of a lunch in honour of the King of Norway, at which Margaret Thatcher and Prince Charles were both present, to specify her own point of view. She stressed that it is important to protect the North Sea from pollution. *The Sunday Times* newspaper noted at the time that the Queen had approved of her son's statement and, at the same time, "was warning Mrs Thatcher that she too could go too far". The stand taken by the royal family is probably among the main reasons for Mrs Thatcher's active speeches in recent years on behalf of the environment, by which she has even won fame as a "green".

The topic of the interrelations between the two ladies has long since occupied the pages of the British press, but the summer and autumn of 1986 were marked by a particular increase in the attention focused on them. *The Sunday Times* then published an article in which, on the basis of a discussion with the Queen's press secretary, it was asserted that Elizabeth II was concerned about Margaret Thatcher's policies, especially the fact that the government shows inadequate interest in the country's ordinary people. Attention was drawn to their disagreements on the issue of the fate of provincial towns and of the attitude towards the miners' strike of 1984-1985. The press secretary at first refuted this announcement, but later admitted that some of his statements had "provided the basis for this announcement".

This story became even more believable when the editor of the newspaper, E. Neil, declared that a representative of the royal court had been acquainted with the article in advance, but had introduced into it only one insignificant correction. A scandal broke out. Conservative circles expressed their concern that the Queen held too liberal views and might be drawn into political arguments and thus a situation might arise when she would oppose her own government.

A year later, the question of the disagreements between the royal family and the government once again filled the pages of the British press. This time it was a matter of Prince Charles having expressed concern about the situation of the unemployed in the country, which was taken as criticism of the government's policy. The Prince's statement worried the British Cabinet. One of Mrs Thatcher's closest associates, the former chairman of the Conservative Party Norman Tebbit, speaking on the television programme "Panorama", which is very popular in the country, declared that Prince Charles's words might jeopardise the monarchy. He even went as far as to make an overt personal attack on the Prince, "wittily" remarking that the latter's sympathy for the unemployed was quite understandable, since he, too, belonged to this category. It was presumed that the Queen was behind the Prince's statement, and

the premier behind Tebbit's.

Diplomats accredited to London have often told me that the views of the Queen and of the Prime Minister do not coincide on another issue—their attitude towards the Commonwealth. They explained this primarily by their different positions within the Commonwealth. The Queen is head of the Commonwealth, which unites 49 countries, and in 17 of them she is the head of state. For her, the problems of the Commonwealth come first. She considers the Commonwealth as her own family, and herself to some extent as responsible for the fate of its members. The Prime Minister is within this Commonwealth, equal in position to all its other members. For the Queen the interests of the whole Commonwealth and of Britain are important; for the premier—only the interests of her own country. Moreover, in foreign political links, the Prime Minister prefers above all, the "special relationship" with the USA, then the EEC and only then the Commonwealth.

This difference of views transpired in 1983, during the USA's invasion of Grenada, one of the countries of the Commonwealth where formally the power belonged to the Governor General, appointed by the Queen. Elizabeth II was completely uninformed concerning the USA's invasion plans. On the eve of the invasion, the British Foreign Minister announced in Parliament that the presence of major US armed forces around the shores of that country was a result only of a need to organise the rescue of US citizens on the island. To the question of the possibility of such an invasion, he declared that he had no knowledge of such intentions.

The US invasion of Grenada was a violation of its sovereignty and an insult to the Queen as sovereign of this state. The Governor General, appointed by Elizabeth II and subordinate to her, was forced to recognise the invasion as a fait accompli. Then, in London, many politicians said that the Queen expected a sharp reaction from the government in defence of her sovereign rights. The royal family considered it its task to strengthen and raise up the Commonwealth, presuming that a reduction of its role would mean a weakening of the positions of Britain and the crown. Mrs Thatcher was interested less in the opinion of the Commonwealth, which she considered an "archaic institution", than in the maintenance of the "special relationship" with the USA.

Yet neither side has ever permitted the relations between them to reach the point beyond which mutual public accusations might begin. Mrs Thatcher herself emphatically demonstrates her respect for the monarchy and for Queen Elizabeth II. She usually arrives at the royal palace fifteen minutes before the appointed time, thus to express her respect for the monarch. She is known to prepare carefully for each meeting with the Queen. It is also known that Mrs Thatcher has always been a supporter of the monarchy, understanding both the advantages it has for the country and her party, and the loyalty of the British people to the monarchy.

THE READER will also be interested, of course, in the Queen's views on the Soviet Union, especially since she and her family have had grounds for a specific attitude towards our country. Elizabeth II and her husband were related to the Romanovs—both Nicholas II and Alexandra Fyodorovna, the Tsar's wife, who were shot, together with their children, in the summer of 1918. The Queen's great grandfather Edward VII and the Russian Tsar Alexander III were married to sisters, and Elizabeth II's grandfather George V was cousin to Nicholas II on his mother's side. Elizabeth II is thus a second niece to Nicholas II. The Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Philip, is a second nephew to the Russian Empress Alexandra Fyodorovna.

When Britain and the USSR first exchanged ambassadors, King George V, recalling the events of 1918, would not accept the credentials from the Soviet ambassador, so they were then handed to the Prince of Wales. Only in 1932 did the Soviet Ambassador Ivan Mayskiy hand over his credentials directly to George V. For many years, the execution of the Romanov family was also an obstacle to contacts between the royal house and representatives of the Soviet leadership, and right up until 1947 the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent out all notes to diplomatic representatives in London outlined in mourning black on the anniversary of the shooting of Nicholas II.

But the years went by, the situation changed, and in 1942 George V's son, George VI, received the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov, and in 1943 awarded the city of Stalingrad the royal sword. On May 8, 1945 he sent Mikhail Kalinin a telegram congratulating the Soviet people on victory.

In 1956 Queen Elizabeth II received the Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin at the Palace and held a conversation with them. Later, on Khrushchev's 75th birthday, Queen Elizabeth II sent birthday wishes to the former premier, then a pensioner, while hardly anyone in the Soviet Union remembered him anymore. I have never heard an unkind word from the members of the royal family about our country (although it should be noted that, after the events in Afghanistan, some of them expressed sharp remarks about the USSR, accusing it of aggression and interference in the internal affairs of other countries). On the contrary, during the handing over of my credentials in 1980 and particularly during a long discussion in 1986, the Queen demonstrated a lively interest in the development of relations between our two countries, in the way of life of the Soviet people, the education system in the USSR, and the study of English in Soviet schools. She told me that she had learned a lot from what Prince Philip had recounted after his two visits to our country. "Is it true that, in Moscow, the streets are very wide, with 6-8 traffic lanes?" When I confirmed this, she noted: "London is a marvelous city, but it is such a pity its streets are not suited to modern transport". When, in her presence, her younger sister Margaret, and I began to argue about the USSR's policy on the eve of the Second World War, Her Majesty tactfully avoided taking sides, and then Prince Philip joked how the Princess enjoyed arguing and thus skilfully diverted the conversation on to another topic.

Concerning Mikhail Gorbachev's first visit to Britain in 1984, the Queen said that she considered it very important for both countries, and added: "Although I personally have not had an opportunity to meet him, I have been told that he gave the impression of an honest and businesslike man to everyone with whom he spoke." The Queen noted that contacts between leaders play an important role for a better understanding of peoples and their governments. It seems to me that she attached considerable significance in general to the role of the individual in history. As confirmation of my opinion, she expressed this idea: "It was Napoleon who unleashed the Napoleonic Wars, had it not been for him, who knows how events in Europe might have developed at the beginning of the last century; maybe there would not have been such grandiose wars at that time. And if Queen Victoria had lived until the First World War, then perhaps it would have been possible to avoid a world war, after all, there were very close and friendly relations between the Queen and her nephew, the Kaiser Wilhelm, and they respected each other so much that they would have not permitted a war."

Another subject of interest to the Queen is the development of cultural links between our two countries. The Queen said she had been informed that cultural exchanges had started to develop favourably between our

two countries, that concerts by Soviet musicians and artistes had created a good impression in Britain. "Your artistes are popular here. That was the case previously, a hundred years ago. We have prepared a small exhibition specially for you.⁶ On the stands you will find excerpts from Queen Victoria's diaries, in which she makes notes on concerts here, at Windsor Castle, by Arthur Rubinstein and a Russian choir. The Queen invited Rubinstein to play here twice: the first time when he was a child, and even then she realised he would be a great musician."

Elizabeth II and the members of the royal family were sympathetic towards the people of Soviet Armenia, when they suffered the disaster of the earthquake. The Queen Mother gave 5,000 pounds of her own money for Moscow Hospital No. 7, where the children who suffered during the earthquake were treated. The money was used to purchase medical equipment, blood transfusion systems, disposable syringes, and so on.

In April 1989, during his official visit to Britain, Mikhail Gorbachev visited the Queen. The Soviet national anthem was played for the first time at Windsor Castle. The Queen and Prince Philip showed the Gorbachevs round the castle. The Queen told Mr. Gorbachev she was very pleased to have them visit. During his conversation with the Queen, Gorbachev invited Her Majesty to make an official visit to the Soviet Union. The Queen answered that the timetable for her visits was filled for several years ahead, but hoped to visit the Soviet Union "in due time". When journalists asked Margaret Thatcher what Elizabeth II's reaction had been to the invitation, she replied: "Very, very positive, I am pleased that the Queen accepted the invitation. The time will be determined." When the same question was asked to the Queen's son Prince Edward (he came to Moscow in 1989), he shared the opinion of the British journalist that the future visit of the Queen of Britain would be another bridge between the two peoples. He said that the contacts between Russia and Britain were quite firm in character and have, for understandable reasons, a much longer history than, say, Britain's relations with America.

IN THEATRICAL CIRCLES, the expression is widespread that kings on the stage are created by those surrounding them. It is probably correct to apply this also to real life. A monarch is judged not only by his words and actions, but also the conduct and attitude towards him on the part of the members of the royal family and their views, above all those of the Duke of Edinburgh and the heir to the throne, Prince Charles.

The heir is 42 years old. When he reached forty, in 1988, many books came out in Britain devoted to him. All the works included the idea that he is no average person. In descriptions of his life, the term "first" is often encountered. He is the first heir to the British throne to have had a university education. The Prince studied at Cambridge, one of the most prestigious universities in Britain and, as the Prince of Wales, he spent some time at a Welsh university on a science course. He studied history, archeology and anthropology. He is the first British heir to the throne to pilot a helicopter and supersonic aircraft (he underwent his military training at one of the most famous British colleges, in Greenwich). No heir to the throne before him has ever commanded a military vessel (he was commander of an antisubmarine frigate) nor made a parachute jump. No member of the royal family before has studied at Commonwealth schools, while Charles spent some time at college in Australia.

Finally, for three centuries, no heir to the throne has married an English woman, while back in the 1960s Prince Charles told journalists that he would prefer to marry an English or Welsh woman. Indeed, in 1981, he married Lady Diana Spencer, member of a noble English family,

VIEW FROM THE ELEVENTH FLOOR

Victor KARYAGIN

SO AS NOT TO PERPLEX THE READER, let me explain straight-away that the Protocol Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is located on the 11th floor of the high-rise in Smolenskaya Square. There I spent exactly 11 years out of my long career in our foreign policy department.

Now that I've started by explaining the little mystery linked with the number 11, I would like to share a few recollections of the years I spent in the protocol service.

In my reminiscences there is no diary-like chronological description. They deal chiefly with individual aspects of the protocol service as a component of diplomatic work. I will illustrate this narration with events and facts which I took part in or witnessed or am familiar with from the accounts of completely trustworthy eyewitnesses. In the last instance I tried to buttress truthfulness of narration with a search for other eyewitnesses or sources and, as a rule, I found them, since the times which I have described were not that long ago. In a number of instances I was lucky enough to obtain the consent of eyewitnesses (some of them are still alive) to individual events and to use their information or stories for publication. Working on these notes, I drew on my personal notes and also unclassified dossiers of some sections of the ministry, press materials and literary sources.

In touching upon some events, I did not pursue the goal of analysing or interpreting them. The reader should find it more interesting to look at these events from within, events which are rarely chronicled in newspapers and are only remembered by eyewitnesses. When talking about actions by individuals, I likewise do not want to give them a political, historical or personal characterisation. However, the facts and observations which I am citing can obviously be additional material for people who are engaged in such research. Thus, I suppose I should begin with some brief preliminary information.

In July 1957 a top Soviet party and government delegation arrived in Berlin, where I was working as a staff member of our embassy, and I was attached as an aide to Fyodor Molochkov, the chief of the Protocol Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had come as a member of the delegation. Several days had passed in hectic intensive work, which is usual for such occasions. At the end of the visit a big reception was given on behalf of the delegation in our embassy on Unter den Linden

Victor Karyagin, Merited Cultural Workers of the Russian Federation, is Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

My job was to stay with the officials, and soon I received instructions from Ambassador Georgi Pushkin to arrange at the end of the reception a talk between Nikita Khrushchev and Roza Thälmann (the widow of the legendary leader of the German Communists, Ernst Thälmann). When the guests gathered I failed to notice the arrival of this distinguished guest, which I now reported to the ambassador. In response, having received several reserved but unambivalent "compliments", I, as a modern satirist would say, sensed that I should save many people but above all myself.

I had personally turned the invitations for the GDR state leadership and prominent party functionaries over in good time to Hummeltenberg, the Chief of the Protocol Department of the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it took me a few minutes to learn from him right at the reception that the invitations had been timely sent to the SUPG Central Committee. For the next few minutes I contacted by telephone Mrs. Thälmann, who said that she had not received an invitation. To this day I am grateful to this remarkable modest woman, who did not take affront, but said that she was ready to come.

I hopped into a fast new Opel-Kapitän borrowed from one of my colleagues in exchange for a dependable but clumsy Soviet Pobeda, and raced across town to the eastern outskirts of Berlin, where I was already expected. Along the road, having again heard out my explanations and apologies, the guest impassively reacted with a brief but expressive word: "schikanen" (intrigues). At that time I could not guess what she knew: the then GDR leadership had simply slighted her.

An hour later we were in the embassy, right at the moment when Khrushchev reminded us of his request.

The guest was taken back to her out-of-town home by a probationer of our department, an intelligent polite youth who had received an enviable gift—a photograph of Ernst Thälmann with a dedicatory inscription by Rosa Thälmann. He is now an ambassador in a European country.

For me this story, aside from a sigh of relief and gratitude to fate for the favourable outcome ended in an offer from Molochkov to go to work at the Protocol Department upon my return to Moscow. This was not part of my plans, which I honestly said, having of course expressed gratitude for the offer. However, when the term of my stay abroad ended in February 1958, I was not given a choice. Thus I became a staff member of the protocol service on the 11th floor of the high-rise in Smolenskaya Square.

THE THAW that arrived here in the mid-1950s also brought new winds to the sphere of foreign policy activity. Our country's participation in international affairs underwent changes and began taking on new forms. Chronologically this coincided with the disintegration of the colonial system and the birth of Third World states. In several years' time the map of the world was recarved, and the nature of international relations and diplomacy as such changed beyond recognition.

The new trends in Soviet socio-political life were reflected daily in the newspapers. The proclaimed principle of collective leadership, acquiring eerie outlines at times, was reflected by such means as attendance of all Soviet party and state leaders at receptions given by foreign embassies. Because of the large number of guests the receptions were held in big restaurants (the Metropol and the National); they were noisy and lavish. The next day the newspapers would carry detailed, column-long reports with a list of the persons in attendance, from the top party and state leaders to functionaries. We carefully followed the publications, and we to staff members of TASS or the Press Department of the Foreign Affairs

Ministry if one of the celebrities was not mentioned. I can remember that TASS correspondent Gerasimov, who was responsible for covering such events, was suspended from his job several times with strict reprimands.

Memoirs and other literature contain colourful sketches of the meeting between Soviet leaders and the diplomatic corps at the former "distant" dacha of Stalin in Semyonovskoye, when Anastas Mikoyan took the wife of the American ambassador Charles Bohlen on a ride in a rowboat, and Lazar Kaganovich talked with the wife of the Israeli ambassador in her native tongue.

The arrivals of distinguished foreign guests from India, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia and other countries were spectacular. The airport would be bedecked with pictures of the members of the Soviet "triumvirate" and the arriving guests, and also with the flags of the two countries. On hand were the entire diplomatic corps, hundreds of representatives of the working people, and Young Pioneers, who handed the guests flowers. The streets of Moscow from the airport to the Kremlin were filled with working people (a standing order was that there were supposed to be not less than 100,000 people) with small flags and portraits of the guests. Pennants and banners with greetings were hung up along the route. As it approached Moscow the guest's plane would be met by an escort of fighter planes, and in his travels about the city his car would be accompanied by a motorcycle escort. Incidentally, as far as the escort of fighter planes is concerned, the Air Force command was very dissatisfied with these "parades", since civilian aviation at the time consisted of relatively slow propeller-engine aircraft, while the jet fighters—MIG-15s—were forced to lower their speed to the minimum and managed to stay in the air solely thanks to the pilots' skill. In honour of the guests we would arrange mass rallies, lavish receptions in St. George's Hall in the Kremlin, luncheons or dinners for smaller numbers, gala theatre performances, fact-finding tours about the country, visits to industrial and agricultural enterprises, research and cultural institutions, exhibitions, military units, etc.

These events, which accompanied the new political line, were conceived as a demonstration of the overcoming of the personality cult, but at the same time as propaganda of the achievements in state, national, economic, military and cultural development.

Diplomatic activity was geared to search for a way out of the dead-end of self-imposed economic, scientific and cultural isolation. A new mechanism was being born in international trade, economic, scientific, technological and cultural ties and exchanges. In addition to the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, main departments were set up at the USSR Council of Ministries for external economic ties and for science and technology, which were transformed soon afterwards into state committees. The State Committee for Foreign Cultural Ties was formed to coordinate international ties in culture, education, sport and other humanitarian spheres. The appropriate subdivisions, which handled external ties, were established at the ministries, departments and organisations that took part in international exchanges.

As these changes unfolded, major developments occurred in the work of the apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which prior to this had been largely regulated by the procedure established in 1947 by Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Under this decree Soviet institutions and citizens had the right to enter into contact with foreign representatives solely through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and only in the sphere pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade—through the channels of the latter. One does not need much imagination to picture what odd situations things sometimes

got to. (One of my colleagues later related that once he had to engage in the problem of neutering canaries, and conducted an official correspondence with the Danish embassy on behalf of interested ornithological societies.) But that was the way it was. What was most remarkable was that this decree continues to function to this day, although everyone, aside from a narrow range of experts, have long forgotten or never knew about its existence at all. Meanwhile the sanctions provided for by this decree should have prompted serious reflections on the part of our legislators, meaning the times of perestroika, commitments within the framework of international accords, the human rights problem, etc.

Whatever the case, the new times drew into the vortex of international contact numerous Soviet departments, institutions, organisations and a host of people who were not prepared for this. In the context of the new situation these people needed a knowledge of the rules of dealing with foreigners, of etiquette, of everything that is called protocol. Everything used to be simple, since with the former volume of contacts and business there were quite enough specialists with the requisite knowledge and skills, but for others the sphere of international relations, and all the more so ties with foreigners, was beyond the bounds of reality or, at best, existed only on the pages of newspapers. And this did not affect ordinary citizens alone.

However, in the new conditions the experts, too, were no longer able to get by with the old rules, since these new conditions required new regulations. They had to be worked out, i.e., a new Soviet diplomatic protocol had to be created, and urgently, with experience being promptly generalised in the process.

This process was accompanied by a painful but energetic "shake-up" in the protocol service which was not prepared for vigorous activity in the new conditions. Initially one chief of the Foreign Ministry Protocol Department was replaced after another: from 1953 to 1955 this post was held consecutively by Anatoli Kulazhenkov, Dmitri Zhukov and Yevgeni Kiselyov - all experienced and worthy diplomats who before and after successfully headed other sectors in the central apparatus and abroad. Finally, in 1955 Feodor Molochkov was recalled from abroad; after a five-year hiatus he again took charge of the protocol service, where he had been since 1940.

Meanwhile the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers had set up their own protocol services, which were headed, respectively, by Gennadi Fomin and Yevgeni Tarabrin, who also had considerable diplomatic experience. But probably not everyone is cut out to work in protocol—their service did not jell. The bottom line was that a resolution was issued which imposed upon the Foreign Ministry Protocol Department the function of state protocol, with full responsibility. This, however, was preceded by a period of organisational failures which reaffirmed the wisdom that too many cooks spoil the broth.

The last straw that broke the camel's back was the protocol mess during the trip to Britain of Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin in April 1956. This trip was noteworthy in many respects. Someone got it into his head to arrange it on a warship of the Baltic Fleet, the cruiser "Orjonikidze", accompanied by an escort of two destroyers. At that time the world first learned of our chief nuclear scientist Igor Kurchatov, who within the visit framework delivered lectures on nuclear power engineering to the British. This visit was also memorable in that during it Commander Lionel Crabb, a deep-sea diver of the British Navy, had been ordered by British intelligence to "examine" the bottom of the Soviet cruiser, and he disappeared forever; it is believed that he was carried away by the underwater current.

Eyewitnesses related that the reception given by the Soviet side was

the confused part of the visit. In this matter the protocol service cannot share the responsibility with anyone or allude to anyone's "intrigues". More people were invited than the premises could accommodate, and it was foolhardy to count on the usual percentage of no-shows; what is more, many "uninvited" guests (security people, etc.) had come. As a result, the quarters were so cramped at the reception that one literally could not squeeze through the mass of people. Despite the fact that security staff members paved a way for Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who had arrived for the reception, he lost a shoe in the crowd, and it could not be found right away. It was soon after this visit that a resolution was adopted which put an end to the protocol "triumvirate".

Every time I listened to the story of Eden's shoe that was later told by different people, I recalled another story with his shoe. It was in January 1954 during the Berlin conference of foreign ministers of the four powers. That day the sitting was held in West Berlin in the building of the former Allied Control Council. When a break was announced and our delegation, whose work apartments were on the second floor next to the session hall, headed for the exit after having concluded its business, High Commissar Vladimir Semyonov had me go back for some trifle he had left on the desk. After I fulfilled his request I hurried to catch up to the delegation which was already getting into the cars. I raced down the long wide staircase, the tips of my shoes barely touching the stairs, my only thought being to get to the car in time. When the lower floor landing was just a few steps away, a group of people appeared to the left from the corridor where the British delegation was accommodated. Hardly having managed to slow down, I found myself amidst this group and, with my foot brought forward for the next step, I accidentally kicked someone's shoe off. The person, who was wearing a dark blue striped suit, displayed no emotion; he calmly bent down and started putting his shoe back on. In response to my apologies one of his companions just as imperturbably made a gesture meaning that I could continue on my journey, and only then did I realise that the person who had bent down was the British minister.

The chief of the department of the commandant's office in West Berlin for ties with the Soviet authorities, who had been observing this scene from the balustrade, joked prophetically that the British would not forget this. Let that be so. But about 15 years later I "exonerated" myself by offering my fur-hat to Prime Minister Harold Wilson when he, after having arrived in Moscow, left the airplane without a hat in the minus-30 degree January cold, and if not for my fur-hat, his ears would have frozen during the long welcoming ceremony.

In any event, that episode in Berlin many years ago remained in my mind as a graphic illustration of British poise and gentlemanly reserve. Years later, when I was already working in protocol, I confessed my clumsiness to our etiquette instructor Gaik Dulyan. In exchange he told me a subtle riddle about how to distinguish a real gentlemen from simply an educated person. The latter, having opened by chance the door to a room where a lady is putting herself in order, profusely apologizes with the words: "Oh, excuse me, madam!", while a gentlemen in such a situation would say, taking his leave: "Pardon me, sir!"

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MEANWHILE the creation of new norms of protocol, the acquisition of skills and "self-education" involved tragicomic victims. In spring 1957 our diplomatic service in the Centre and abroad had been agitated by an order from the minister (Shepilov at the time) in which the chief of the Protocol Section and several junior staff members had been reprimanded for a blunder.

It all happened like this. On the eve, a Romanian party and government delegation had visited the USSR. When it was met at the border station of Ungeny, and then in Moscow, the national anthem of Romania was played, in keeping with protocol. The anthem was played again when the Romanians attended a production at the Bolshoi Theatre. At this point our ambassador in Bucharest, Alexei Yepishev, suddenly stated for all to hear that the "wrong" Romanian national anthem was being played (shortly before this the music had indeed been somewhat changed). Yepishev had evidently assumed the role of music lover after having been prompted by one of the guests; he did this by turning to Anastas Mikoyan, who, however, made believe that nothing had happened. During the intermission the ambassador considered it necessary to repeat his "performance". Now Mikoyan had no other recourse than to shout angrily: "Investigate and punish those responsible!". The aforementioned order appeared as a result. One of the victims was the current chief of the protocol service, who was then a minor official. Evidently his bitter experience stood him in good stead.

One learns from one's mistakes. A strict procedure was established according to which prior to the arrival of distinguished foreign visitors their embassy in Moscow has to officially present or endorse a musical recording or arrangement of the national anthem of its country, and also samples or an image of the state seal and flag, as well as the standard of the head of state (if this exists).

In all fairness, I must admit that I received a protocol "shock" two years later.

Foreign guests were greeted and seen off at the time at Vnukovo-1 Airport (there was no other one, for that matter). The technical service was primitive, even by the standards of the time. In those days it was the custom to exchange speeches at the airport, for which purpose microphones were mounted on the field. This was handled by the city's radio installation office, which we informed every time of a forthcoming arrival or departure, a special truck with equipment would arrive, cables would be set up, etc.

It so happened that in arranging the send-off of a delegation from the Korean People's Democratic Republic, I tried several times, without success, to reach the radio installers by phone, and, caught up in other matters, automatically placed a check next to this entry in my notebook. When the absence of microphones was discovered at the airfield, there was still enough time to rectify the situation: the airport service-loudspeakers could be turned on at the airport, even if without going on the air. However, A. Shelepin, who had recently been appointed KGB chairman and was on the rise, and who was present at the send-off, prohibited me from doing this. He did not hide his desire to do a bad turn to Andrei Gromyko, saying to the group of officials who had gathered for the send-off that now, through the fault of Foreign Ministry staffers, Voroshilov and his guest would be "talking into their hats instead of a microphone".

Would someone have wanted to be in my place? It is only commendations that you have to wait long for until all the O. K.'s and signatures are unhurriedly gathered. As for the reprimands I received one that very evening. This was the most unique and memorable birthday gift I've ever received.

Every cloud has a silver lining, however. My misfortune imparted, as we would say today, a powerful impetus to the "technological revolution": the airfield was urgently equipped with stationary radio broadcasting units, and the telephone number of the ill-starred radio installation office was forgot forever.

who has shipwrecked a vessel can no longer rid himself of a subconscious plaguing sense of doom.

A protocol staff member must definitely be able to resist the temptations in which the service abounds. In my time I lost co-workers who possessed remarkable work qualities but were unable to resist temptation.

PROTOCOL definitely requires uniformity¹ in the application of its norms in analogous situations: the nuances, as has been stated above, are very noticeable and sensitive. If used once, a protocol norm that gives honours can no longer be omitted arbitrarily the next time either with regard to the same partner or to any other one who occupies the same position under the same circumstances. Therefore, it can be maintained that protocol is conservative by its nature. Any precedent for protocol is fraught with a situation where it must become a norm, and if norms are abolished, this is also a precedent which creates a new norm. This is basic for each budding diplomat. As the exposition continues we will have reason to see on examples how attentively one needs to treat protocol rules.

So as not to tire the reader with dry, scientific-sounding formulations, I will adduce the following fact to illustrate my point. In the 1920s, in a neighbouring European state there was a ceremony in which a foreign ambassador presented his credentials; at it an honour guard would form up in the square in front of the presidential palace in honour of the ambassador and the national anthem of his country would be played. The arrival of the first Soviet ambassador was a notable political event, of course, and here the afore-mentioned usual ceremony suddenly took on a special political connotation. The fact of the matter was that the current Soviet national anthem, which was written by composer Alexandr Alexandrov to lyrics by Sergci Mikhalkov and Garold El-Registan, became the Soviet state symbol only on January 1, 1944 (with partial changes in the music and text made in 1977); prior to this, from the times of the revolution, the "Internationale" was our national anthem. Since relations between the two countries were polite out of need rather than amicable, and the local politicians naturally considered themselves referred to in the "Internationale's" frequent appeals to destroy the bourgeois world, it was decided to do away with this part of the credentials presentation ceremony once and for all, which was done, beginning with the Soviet ambassador.

Admittedly, there occur precedents which do not become a norm, but these are special incidents, one of which happened in our history. A Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact was signed in Moscow in April 1941. Etsuke Matsuoka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had come on this mission to the USSR, was accorded an exceptional token of esteem on the part of Iosif Stalin, who personally came to the rail terminal to see the Japanese minister off. This calculated gesture did not have any protocol consequences, but in any event no one knows of anyone else claiming analogous honours. However, the political importance of this step, with due consideration of the international situation of that period, cannot be rated too highly.

Generally speaking, according to individual reminiscences which I have heard from older-generation diplomats—Boris Podtserob and Fyodor Molochkov, who had an opportunity to observe Stalin close up, he did credit to the ceremonial facet of diplomatic functions, paying attention to the details involved in preparing for and holding them. For example, before the Yalta Conference he personally familiarised himself with the arrangements for the accommodation of the American and Bri-

tish delegations in the residences and in the Levadia Palace where the meetings were held, and he also delved into the same matters during the Potsdam Conference. He took an interest in the programmes of the stay of the foreign guests and could dictate the menu of a forthcoming diplomatic luncheon, and he knew how to be a gracious host and give a guest a surprise, like the huge salmon he presented to President Roosevelt in Teheran. He selected models of uniforms introduced for Soviet diplomatic personnel in 1943 and he suggested that a dirk be attached to the full dress uniform in the manner of the naval one. (In 1955, as is claimed, the everyday and parade uniforms of Foreign Ministry personnel were abolished, and a full dress uniform of a new type, without shoulder-straps and dirk, was instituted for ambassadors and envoys.)

However, under Stalin protocol was not burdened by a diversity of ceremonies and trappings. Before the war the diplomatic corps in Moscow consisted of 24 diplomatic missions, and by the start of the 1950s it numbered some 40 embassies and missions. Stalin did not attend diplomatic corps functions; other than Teheran and Berlin in 1943 and 1945 he did not travel abroad, and he began availing himself of the services of the protocol service of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs only by the end of the war on official occasions, and under other circumstances preferred receiving guests in a semi-domestic atmosphere at his "near" dacha in Volynskoye or at his Kremlin flat, where General Ignatashvili played the role of major-domo. The latter, incidentally, is mentioned namelessly by Khrushchev in his memoirs as Beria's man: he surrounded Stalin with servants of Caucasian descent, which irritated the suspicious leader, and he was ultimately removed together with his staff. From that time, according to Molochkov's reminiscences, the diplomatic protocol service increasingly came to be used to arrange representative functions in the Kremlin.

Official welcomings and send-offs of ranking foreign visitors was headed chiefly by Vyacheslav Molotov, who from 1939 held the post of People's Commissar (from 1946, Minister) of Foreign Affairs, combining this initially with the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and, beginning in 1941, First Deputy and Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars. Molotov arranged receptions for the diplomatic corps and members of the Soviet public on the anniversary of the October Revolution, and more rarely, on other occasions. With rare exceptions, Soviet officials did not attend receptions given at foreign embassies; only functionaries of the diplomatic service, military men and cultural celebrities used to go there—according to an approved list each time; for some this was an insulting disappointment, for others it was deliverance from possible troubles in future. Everything is relative.

The ceremony of official welcomings and send-offs of distinguished visitors was simple: an honour guard would be formed up at a railway terminal or airport and march past, the national anthems of the guest's country and ours (one refrain for each) would be played, and flags would be hung. The greeters would consist of a minimal number of officials. This was, strictly speaking, all there was to it.

The procedure according to which an ambassador or envoy presented his credentials was also simple: at the appointed hour the chief of the Protocol Department would bring the foreign diplomat in a government car to the Kremlin, where the ceremony of the presentation of the credentials to the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet would be held, and it would end in a talk. This ceremony has largely survived to this day, if we do not consider that during the first years after the revolution the ambassador or envoy would be greeted by an honour guard of Kremlin cadets at the entrance to the Kremlin.

WITH STALIN'S DEATH the issue of continuity was decided by proclaiming the principle of collective leadership. A day before the funeral the appointment of Georgi Malenkov to the post of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Klement Voroshilov, to the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the nomination of Khrushchev to the post of Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (in September 1953, First Secretary) were announced. This triumvirate was immediately dubbed the "troika" in the West.

For us, there was nothing new from the standpoint of state development in the fact that a "troika" had been created: after Lenin's death Stalin was the head of the party without occupying state posts; the government was headed by Alexei Rykov prior to 1930, and after him, by Molotov; the invariable "national elder"—the Chairman of the All-Union Executive Committee, and then of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet—was Mikhail Kalinin until his death in 1946; he was succeeded by Nikolai Shvernik.

In 1941, when the circumstances, above all international ones, demanded that Stalin function not only as the head of the ruling party but also in a constitutional capacity as leader of the state, he combined two posts—head of the party and head of the state.

At the new turn in our history, the repetition of the situation revealed painfully weak spots in the structure of power. Strictly speaking, Voroshilov, whom, thanks to purposeful propaganda, the people had perceived from as early as the 1920s as a folk hero of the civil war, occupied the post of nominal head of state, did not seem to bother anyone. The point at issue was Khrushchev and Malenkov, each of whom had cause for worry.

In 1955 Malenkov was replaced by Bulganin, with whom Khrushchev, judging from his own statements, had good and even friendly relations. A sort of tandem formed and later, when Khrushchev began functioning as the single leader, this surprised no one abroad, and was taken for granted. However, when, in the mid-1950s, his time had not yet come, Khrushchev teamed up in foreign policy with Bulganin, as member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The incongruity of the situation was obvious and gave the Western press cause for all sorts of jokes. It is difficult to guess how long this would have continued, but in June 1957 Bulganin came out with an anti-party group and after the famous June Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee he was deprived of all his positions for several months. In early 1958 Khrushchev combined the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Since on matters of state protocol the opinion of the first person in the state regarding his ceremonial functions is decisive, it is interesting to recall how this facet of our diplomatic life looked in that period.

We have had occasion of late to read the reminiscences of people close to Khrushchev who underscored his virtues. It is difficult, however, to concur that he was powerless against his glorification and the deliberate swelling of his authority, including by the granting of ceremonial honours. It was at the end of the 1950s, when Khrushchev's positions were unconditional, that our service began receiving more and more assignments to "improve" the state ceremonies by imparting more grandeur to them.

Today, juxtaposing the events of long ago, events which are now past history, I am inclined to think that Khrushchev himself liked functions which bore the stamp of pompousness. His returns from foreign trips were somewhat reminiscent of the entries of a conqueror: gathered at the airport were all the members and candidate members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, secretaries and department chiefs of the

Central Committee, ministers, marshals, members of the diplomatic corps, and working people, and the welcoming would often end in a grandiose rally.

I can recall that on the 20th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War a meeting of the public with the participation of the diplomatic corps was held in the Kremlin; it was attended by Khrushchev himself, and many top officials who had military ranks in the war, arrived in new general's parade uniforms with all the trappings.

Returning, especially from his early foreign trips, he often instructed that ceremonial details be introduced that he had taken a liking to abroad, but were unusual for us, like a podium with a canopy for the guests of honour during welcomings and send-offs, carpets at the airport or railway terminal, and the like. Most of the elements of the ceremony for welcoming distinguished foreign guests that were mentioned above were also suggested by him personally.

The story of the artillery salutes—a tradition that lasted eight years here—is an interesting one.

In September 1959 Khrushchev visited America, after which began the preparations for a visit by President Dwight Eisenhower to the USSR in 1960. An ad hoc commission was formed; it was headed by a deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (under the actual leadership of A. N. Shelepin, who was a department chief at the Party Central Committee). The commission visited Irkutsk and Khabarovsk, which was on the itinerary of the proposed trip, and it mapped out in these cities a wide range of construction and restoration work—from tearing down slums to building new hotels and mansions and sprucing up the cities in general. Anyone who has been to Irkutsk and stayed in the Sibir Hotel or vacationed by voucher at a sanatorium on the coast of Lake Baikal at the source of the Angara might be interested to know that these comfortable facilities were built in only half a year. We know how to get things done when we have to. (I have not been there myself for a long time, and I would like to hope that everything is being maintained properly.)

A small group was formed in our department: headed by its chief D. Nikiforov, it took part in the commission's work. However, our main function was to work out a welcoming ceremony, a programme for the guests' stay and some other organisational matters. Judging from the assignments we received, Khrushchev did not want to be in the president's debt, so we had plenty of work to do. A new welcoming ceremony scheme (several versions) was worked out jointly with General Ivan Kolesnikov, the commandant of Moscow; it included an artillery salute, a first in this country. In cooperation with the US embassy, which was represented by political adviser B. Closson, a programme for the visit was compiled. Nor were gifts forgotten: for Eisenhower, who, while viewing the Soviet exhibition in New York, praised the Moskvich car and noted that when he retired he would like to have such a car, a Moskvich-407 was assembled by hand, and for Khrushchev a cruise launch with an inboard motor had already been delivered and demonstrated to us in the American embassy garage.

However, none of this was fated to take place. There was only ... shooting. And not the blanks of an artillery salute in Moscow, but combat missiles near Sverdlovsk at the U-2 spy plane which pilot Gary Powers was flying.

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PUTTING ASIDE for a while the matter of artillery salutes, I would like to relate a few details from the events in connection with the Powers affair, which I became a witness to.

Just before May 1, 1960, GDR Prime Minister Grotewohl and his wife had stopped in Moscow on their way back to Berlin from a Black Sea resort. V. Beletsky (now a retired ambassador and a thriving cooperator) and I were assigned to accompany him, in the capacity of interpreter and representative of the protocol service respectively. On May 1, we brought the Grotewohls, who had been invited to the military parade and demonstration of working people, to Red Square, and took our places together with the Soviet ministers in the area by the foot of the mausoleum. Soon an officer from Khrushchev's security walked over to us and extended his invitation to Grotewohl to ascend the mausoleum rostrum. We stood in a group of military men and officials of the security service in expectation of the Soviet leaders. Sensing some tension, special messengers kept darting off to the special communications devices, and from the exchange it could be divined that the Soviet border had been crossed by an unidentified aircraft which was penetrating deep into Soviet territory. A few minutes later the guest and my colleague ascended the rostrum, and I accompanied Frau Johanna, at her request, to the diplomatic corps section, where she joined her compatriots. When we were together again after the demonstration, I learned the details, which Grotewohl had related to his ambassador, R. Dolling, cautioning him to keep the conversation confidential.

Several days later the sensational news that an American plane had been shot down over the USSR was supplemented by the even more sensational news that at a diplomatic reception a ranking Soviet diplomat had told the Swedish ambassador R. Sulman that the pilot of the downed plane was alive and had been captured, which the Swede rushed to tell American Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson.

As became known afterwards, Khrushchev purposely wanted to hold back this most important part of the news in order to release it at a suitable moment to corner the American administration. It should be said that a meeting of the heads of government of four powers—the USSR, the USA, Britain and France—was scheduled to be held on May 16 in Paris, and it was hard to conceive of a better occasion for this. However, the strategy did not come off. Nevertheless, Khrushchev went to Paris and at the preliminary session demanded that Eisenhower apologise for the provocation. Eisenhower refused and the meeting was broken off. Naturally, talks regarding Eisenhower's return visit to the USSR were not resumed.

The Powers incident had a tragicomic upshot at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soon there was another regularly scheduled meeting with an agenda that had nothing in common with the incident. It seemed to deal with agriculture. At the end of the meeting, when a resolution had already been passed and the people had begun moving towards the door, the chairman unexpectedly asked everyone to remain seated and gave the floor to Andrei Gromyko, who briefly reported that by decision of the Central Committee a ministry staff member had been punished for divulging a service-related secret, and he asked this staff member to explain the essence of his act. I am not going to retell everything that the experienced veteran of the service said in his own behalf. In the end he requested that he not be deprived of trust in future, because in the past he had never violated the sanctity of state and party secrets, including when Stalin had informed him of the forthcoming war with Japan six months in advance. The hall grew silent for a second and then started, for all the seriousness of the moment fantasy had entered into a tempestuous reaction with a sense of humour.

(To be continued)

THE ROADS TO RUSSIA

Friedrich Wilhelm CHRISTIANS

ISOLATION, VERTICAL THINKING AND IMMOBILISM

IN LATE 1979, when Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, the preparations for the Summer Olympics in Moscow had reached their apogee. All the important preparatory work had been concluded. The organisation of the endeavour which only a huge state with a centralised leadership was capable of had been through out down to the last detail.

And suddenly a kidney punch: the USA refused to take part in the Games, and the boycott of the Games by the West German Olympic Committee became known in May. The Soviet Union could not reconcile itself to this, and it reacted with panic. Fully overestimating my possibilities, a Soviet delegation came to Dusseldorf to visit me for the sole purpose of obtaining my intervention. My explanations to the effect that this was totally outside my sphere of competence did not have any results. My negotiating partners with whom I had been doing business for a number of years swore to me that they would do everything in their power so that our joint efforts to establish better understanding between our two peoples would not be torpedoed. All my explanations were assessed as excuses. Deeply disappointed, the delegation returned home.

A reluctance to reckon with the facts was typical of Soviet institutions of that time. I totally failed to explain to my Russian interlocutors on which matters I was competent to conduct talks with them and on which ones I wasn't. Since they regularly met with me even in the years of tense relations between Moscow and Bonn and during the period of official "silence", they took advantage of any opportunity to voice to me their critical attitude to Bonn's policies in general and to individual measures taken by the FRG. Often they merely wanted to vent their anger on me.

Somewhat later things got to rather unseemly actions. Of course, I constantly informed Bonn about this, which the Soviets were actually counting on. When I told Minister Genscher about my troubles in connection with this practice, he replied curtly and explicitly "Radio silence is being observed between us at present. When you are offered a chance to talk, use it. The main thing is that a dialogue continue."

My line was not politics but trade between our two countries. In those years it comprised just a few per cent of our trade with the West. Thus it was more of political rather than real economic significance. It was important for the Soviet Union to establish contacts with Western countries, using the channels of foreign trade for the purpose. However, with the start of the oil crisis in 1973-1974 the accents shifted. Thanks to petro-

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Conclusion. For the beginning see **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS** No. 3, 1980.

leum and natural gas exports Moscow suddenly acquired a large amount of Western currency, which reached 80 per cent of its export revenues.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, which was later renamed the Ministry of External Economic Ties, was in charge of and controlled all foreign ties. For a long time this department was headed by Mr Patolichhev. An old member of the party, he wielded rather considerable influence in the government and during the talks he represented "policy", although, essentially, our business partner was Victor Ivanov, a deputy minister, who was a sober-minded, knowledgeable specialist.

In the 1970s they were joined by the so-called first deputy minister of foreign trade, Yuri Brezhnev, the son of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In the Soviet hierarchy, there exist in the ministries, alongside the minister, a whole number of his deputies, who can be approximately compared to our state secretaries. Their number is fixed depending on the importance of the ministry. At talks we were used to considering the first deputy minister in effect a minister.

I often met with Brezhnev's son. I did not find him to be truly well-versed in his subject, but then we did not have a real opportunity to check this. Officials kept a certain distance from him, maintaining a soft and polite manner in associating with him. As far as I could judge he did not play any major role. From my talks with him I got the impression that he did not feel all that comfortable at his post. He liked the dissipated Western night life, although he was not an exception in this respect. All the same, Yuri Brezhnev was patently given preference by Western companies at the negotiating table. Sometimes I wanted some friend to give the senior Brezhnev good advice to keep his son home. I had to associate with him, although I well understood his unenviable position.

For me, central planning with its apparatus in the person of the Moscow ministries was more the problem. There I was hitting my head up against a brick wall again and again. Tikhonov, the next prime minister after Kosygin, once asked me how we could increase exchange in goods between our two countries. I advised him to put this question directly to any regional official or director of a combine in any outlying area of the Soviet Union, and to find out what needs there are, and to prompt him to discuss the matter of delivery of the required merchandise together with the heads of West German firms on the basis of consideration of mutual interests. However, Tikhonov crudely snubbed me, saying that he would not stand for that. Every thing had to proceed through Moscow, i. e., through the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

I told myself then that many years would pass before the "bottleneck" that was Moscow would be cut off. Now the time has come when the reverse is needed—the ability to conduct business talks in a decentralised fashion, which was never the case in the past; but there in no experience which could be drawn on.

As far as we know, Soviet agriculture has been a subject of priority concern for many years. There has not be a shortage of constructive proposals from abroad, above all from the USA and Italy, regarding assistance with machines and technology. Many small- and medium-sized West German enterprises have also displayed interest in this but did not take part in the effort. This was due chiefly to poor coordination of efforts by the Soviet side.

At that time I was conducting talks with the government agricultural adviser Mr Nuriev, who held the post of deputy prime minister. The negotiations began in 1983, when Yuri Andropov was General Secretary, and one could feel a general openness in comparison to the previous, Brezhnev, period. Instead of thick-headed functionaries we suddenly saw

energetically thinking executives with whom we could discuss problems and who knew how to hear out the other side.

In his talks with me Nuriev did not conceal shortcomings. For example, he related to me how only a fraction of the previous rich potato harvest reached the shops. The reason was chiefly structural problems—banal transport difficulties. A large part of the population lives in the West of the enormous country. However, the raw materials for industry come chiefly from the North and the East, while the food is from the South. Thus, the resources and the consumption centres are thousands of kilometres from each other. Right up until the 1980s there was no network of cold storages and of delivering perishables, fruits and vegetables from the fields of Uzbekistan, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia or the Crimea to shops in refrigerated trucks.

Mr Nuriev and I quickly reached accord with regard to the tasks before us. We agreed how we, i.e., the bank, should give consultations and establish ties with the pertinent firms. In agriculture Mr Nuriev had 11 ministries in different branches under his jurisdiction. One, for example, was animal husbandry, another was fruit and vegetable production, still another was grain production, and so on. In dealing with some of these ministries I encountered a difficulty I have mentioned before which threatened to become a hindrance to fruitful joint work—departmental thinking of the worst type.

There are a host of branch ministries in the USSR. I could never learn their exact number, all the more so since it is constantly changing. I suspect there are over 100 of them. Each is engaged in one specific sphere and does not maintain ties with related ones. I have already written about the "pipe"—narrow-departmental—thinking that is cultivated in this environment. Here there is no exchange of views or experience, communication is done on a vertical plane. Consequently, partners do not know one another well. Hence the alienation and barriers on the path towards developing horizontal exchange. For this reason, if Western currency settles in one ministry as a result of a successful export operation, only it can spend it, the currency cannot be turned over to other ministries that need it.

When Andropov became gravely ill in autumn 1983 and his influence weakened, the first sober shoots of reforms and a manifestation of independent initiative again became bogged down in the lethargic slumber we had observed for an entire 14 years. Under Andropov's successor, the also ill and even more feeble Chernenko, any initiative by our Soviet partners fizzled out. There was even less hope that that state of affairs would change. Immobilism, the mode of thinking with the least risk which we had been observing for a long time, was joyously celebrating its victory.

Despite all our efforts, we failed to make any progress with our initiative to form Agroconsult. In the final analysis I decided to ascertain who in the Political Bureau was responsible for agriculture. Mikhail Gorbachev, I was told. I learned that this was a young and energetic functionary whom I ought to talk to. I tried to arrange a meeting with him as early as 1984, and initially I was promised that it would take place, but it did not. I was told Mr Gorbachev knows about our initiative and that he would be given the prepared materials, and that we should orient ourselves to the beginning of 1985.

We looked forward to meeting Gorbachev. Would he be another in a long line of apparatchiks to whose train of thought and form of address we had gradually grown accustomed? Or, perhaps this was a new leader of the Andropov type who would again open all the doors. In any event, at that time, on the eve of 1985, our negotiating partners with whom we were already familiar considered Gorbachev a dark horse. In the West

his name was already appearing in newspapers from time to time: in autumn 1984 he visited British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as a Political Bureau member and drew everyone's attention with his astonishing openness.

A NEW MAN AND A FRESH WIND

IN MARCH 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. My next visit to Moscow was scheduled for mid-April. Shortly before this I received news that the new General Secretary would receive me for a talk on April 18. As I learned later, this was one of his first meetings with a foreign guest and, evidently, the first meeting with a Westerner in his new capacity.

One can only guess why he gave the nod precisely to me, the representative of a major capitalist bank. During the talk, which lasted two hours longer than the envisaged time, I learned that Gorbachev had been seeking an informal talk without preliminary preparations and without minutes being taken. What is more, I soon discovered that the formerly accepted rigid style with its ossified scheme and frequently boring repetitions of long familiar stands meant nothing to the new Kremlin leader.

I learned this as soon as I entered the Kremlin gates. Vladimir Alkhimov, the head of Soviet banking and chairman of the board of the State Bank, who was sitting next to me, told me that he himself did not know exactly what we would be talking about, that there was no list of topics. Gorbachev wanted a general talk to take place that would not be restricted to any framework. All that was important, he added, was that I spoke freely.

By all indications, this introduction, which was based on a preliminary talk between the two of them, was unusual in and of itself. At all my previous meetings with ranking Soviet functionaries, the topics under discussion used to be thrashed out in advance. Sometimes it was recommended not to touch upon, if possible, certain matters that were of interest to me, if not to cross them off the agenda entirely. This time no stipulations were made.

We were brought to the administrative wing where Gorbachev's office is located. The long corridors, which are always covered by the same carpet, were familiar to me for many years. Gorbachev invited me into his office, where there was a strong smell of fresh paint. Through the window, which was half shrouded by starched white curtains, I could see Red Square behind the Lenin Mausoleum. Gorbachev was standing in the middle of the room waiting for me. He walked quite unconstrainedly over to me and greeted me with an open, friendly smile.

I said that I knew his country for a long time, since I was a soldier in it at one time. Then the places linked with the battles in which I took part were enumerated. Gorbachev mentioned a big tank battle near Kharkov, but here I had to clarify something, since the tank battle in which I took part was near Kursk. I was not surprised by this extensive familiarity with my life, since I had been conducting talks of no small importance in Moscow for over 15 years.

The dialogue which followed this was so unusual and so different from all those that preceded it in the USSR that I would like to describe its very atmosphere. Gorbachev did not take his eyes off me for an instant. The expression on his face inspired affection and trust in me. And what this man said attested to his outstanding intellect and extraordinary analytical abilities. He put questions directly, without beating around the bush, and his remarks were purposeful and exact.

Gorbachev opened the business discussion with a brief introduction on history and philosophy. The era of mutual ideological prejudices was over,

he said. "We are not living in the times of the medieval knights!" Both peoples, the Soviet and German, did not distance themselves from each other even in difficult (postwar.—*Ed.*) times. Today the point at issue is to improve economic and political relations between our two countries. To avoid a new misfortune it is necessary to draw lessons from a past that should not be forgot.

In this connection he spoke approvingly of Willy Brandt, who came to precisely these conclusions when he concluded treaties with Moscow and Warsaw. When the discussion centred around Federal Chancellor Kohl, Gorbachev asked with a concerned expression where the Federal Republic was going. I responded: "The Federal government, like its predecessors, will adhere to the spirit and the letter of the concluded treaties. It fully realises the importance of political relations with the East European countries."

Gorbachev insisted: "Missiles are deployed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Therefore, the situation is worsening drastically. Europe should rid itself of these nuclear weapons. The USA wants to deflect a possible strike away from itself by sending them to Europe. However, even in peacetime the USA evidently wants to possess a tool for exerting pressure on Europe and the Soviet Union. What are the interests of the European governments in the present situation? Mutual cultural and economic relations could be much better. Lastly Europe is the cradle of civilisation."

I replied: "We have been informed by competent military experts that the Soviet Union has mounted over 420 SS-20 missiles and, therefore, over 1,200 nuclear warheads, a large part of which are targeted at Western Europe and which poses a direct menace to us. The Federal Republic does not possess nuclear weapons itself. It is a small country which is in the centre of Europe between the East and the West. You know like I do that each family, in my country as well as yours, suffered from the war. Consequently, it is in our common interests to avert a new war."

I realised that the discussion on medium-range missiles should not be continued at that point in time and at that place, that in April 1985 the contradictions on that issue were still insurmountable. That is why I tried to link the discussion with the theme of economic relations between our two countries. I continued: "I consider the interweaving of economic interests a very important means of preventing war. Deutsche Bank realises this full well and for this reason did not allow talks to be broken off with its trading partners in times when the official policy of our two countries was unable to maintain their bilateral dialogue due to certain events. However, the Federal Republic is a reliable political and economic partner whose fidelity to the agreements it concludes is well known all over the world."

Gorbachev then spoke: "Economic relations with the Federal Republic should indeed be broadened. I am of the view that we can put an end to the lag in trade that exhibited itself last winter and spring. There are a number of new problems, in particular, acceleration of scientific and technical advance. It requires fresh ideas of all us. In any event, the Federal Republic of Germany should not dump what is 'old hat' on us. This is an orientation in the spirit of the COCOM lists and protectionism."

German technology, I explained, enjoys demand all over the world; it is not cheap, but it is first-class. By delivering what is "old hat", the Federal Republic would not have maintained its positions on the world market. In response to my remark, Gorbachev noted: "I put it that way just in case."

As the talk continued we developed a common concept to the effect that the USSR with its enormous raw material stores and the Federal Republic of Germany as a country with advanced technology are ideal

mutually complementary partners in economic exchange. When we started talking about the economic might of the Federal Republic and Japan, it became obvious again how the discussion at that moment on military strategic matters still continued to prevail over thinking.

Said Gorbachev: "The Federal Republic and Japan are less armed and therefore they have more developed economies. Now the Federal Republic wants to obtain all types of weapons in the Western European Union, and this is dangerous. The USSR is closely following this."

I stressed with particular expression: "No one in my country wants to pose a threat to peace!"

Here Gorbachev asked: "Do the Germans really need more lessons?" I reiterated: "We do not have our own nuclear weapons. We export few weapons. However, we are just as much a member of NATO as the GDR is a member of the Warsaw Treaty. This ensures our security and should not evoke mistrust."

Gorbachev noted in a patently reconciliatory tone: "I lived with Moslems in the Caucasus for a long time. They have a proverb: 'Repeating a prayer does not hurt.'"

In conclusion Gorbachev spoke about the historical closeness of the cultures of our two countries. He expressed regret that he knew the Federal Republic of Germany only from one visit, in 1975, which he made at the invitation of the Communist Party (of Germany.—*Ed.*) on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the end of the war. This was a milestone for him. During a trip in an automobile, he recalled, he had to stop at a petrol station. He stepped out of the car to stretch his legs. The owner of the station, a rather elderly man, asked him and his companions if they were Russians. When they said yes he immediately became serious and began making reproaches against the Soviet Union.

Aside from the fact that Germany wound up split, his own family suffered greatly, he said. Gorbachev, for his part, explained that the Western allies had united their three zones at the time and turned them into a separate state that was unfriendly to the Soviet zone. The Soviet Union, therefore, should not be blamed for the division of Germany.

This reminded me of the remark that was supposedly made by Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Essentially it sounds like this (in any event, this was how I read it in the historic hall where the conference sittings were held): the great German people cannot be left divided for long. Of course, it should be kept in mind that Stalin wanted to preserve Germany undivided in the conditions of communist rule.

The meeting I have described above must have produced a strong impression on Mikhail Gorbachev. Afterwards he again spoke about it while on an official visit in the Federal Republic in June 1989.

Our exchange of views, as has already been stated, was very free. Gorbachev's hostility towards the USA kept slipping through, although President Reagan's name was not mentioned. As I could determine from my own experience, in all regions of the huge empire, in the mass media they avoided personifying the enemy when the point at issue was the USA. By the time of my talk with Gorbachev, the Soviet Union, as if anticipating the pertinent commitments, unilaterally ceased conducting underground nuclear tests in an effort to set about talks on detente and demanding that the USA do likewise.

I tried to object, alluding to the fact that the USA and NATO, drawing on the many-year experience of the policy of containing the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty States, had always had enough cause to display caution with regard to Soviet statements. At that juncture mountains of distrust had amassed and they could be eliminated only with great difficulty and endless patience. According to the experience which I acquired in this country, I felt the first prerequisites for further

consolidating mutual trust should be created through personal meetings.

Then I said the following, word for word: "Mr Gorbachev, neither can you, in your strictly centrally governed country (here the word "dictatorial" was on the tip of my tongue, but I refrained from uttering it) order your countrymen 'Trust!' This is just as unlikely in such a country with a democratic structure as the USA!" Pointing to Mr Alkhimov, who was sitting next to Gorbachev, I talked about the mistrust and near hostility with which I had been received during my first visits to Moscow. However, as a result of many talks and constant efforts to establish mutually beneficial contacts I had ultimately managed to arrive at mutual understanding and trust, which I now use as a substantial factor for the benefit of our two countries. It seemed to me that this set Gorbachev to thinking.

Generally speaking, the idea nagged at me that the new General Secretary knows how to listen to an interlocutor and that he, admittedly, puts questions to the point, yet tries to draw the information he needs from third sources and not only from his own advisers. This was manifest on the following example, in particular. Gorbachev had berated the Federal Republic for supposedly putting its own interests far behind those of the USA. Thus, our financial resources, such as the savings of citizens, are being sent abroad in large amounts to cover the huge US deficit. This had already led to a lack of investments needed for the economy of the Federal Republic.

I replied that this was quite wrong. From my own observations I, in any case, knew that many citizens of the Federal Republic have large sums in US accounts. Generally speaking, in my country any citizen can freely dispose of his savings, including foreign currency, and transfer them to any country of his choice. And if many German depositors have preferred to make investments in the USA, this takes place quite voluntarily on the basis of their own decision, first, because the American dollar is an alternative currency and enjoys demand and, second, because the US economy, by all indications, will continue to develop successfully.

My explanation impressed Gorbachev, yet it angered him since evidently he had been informed otherwise. That was the only time during our long talk that he frowned and removed his eyeglasses from their case to glance at a dossier before him with places underlined in red pencil. It became clear to me that the compiler of the note was in for a reprimand, and rightly so. I also thought that from the way it was worded I knew where the view reported to Gorbachev had come from.

I figured our talk should have dealt mostly with economic matters and possibly with some concrete thoughts which I had spent years holding talks and had already signed contacts. However, everything was different with Mikhail Gorbachev. A principled discussion was important to him. I somehow mentioned that, according to my observations, energy and resources were being wasted in his country. This also applied to some types of equipment and machine tools purchased for large sums of Western currency.

With my criticism I apparently struck home in his own observations, or, contrary to my expectations that he would object to my stern criticism, he energetically agreed with me. As the exchange of views continued, he kept reverting back to this topic, dwelling on economic planning and on attaining the targets set. He obviously realised the weakness of the thinking linked with the five-year plan as well as the work of the planning headquarters. He said that resources should be used more carefully. What is more, the five-year period for a long-term perestroika was too short, a minimum of ten years was needed. Soon after he took high office Mikhail Gorbachev decisively revealed shortcomings and was

not afraid of the personal consequences in his effort to change the traditional planning system.

My overall impression of his detailed talk with him was the following: the talking was done by a man who had ventured to work sweeping changes in the country based on his many years of observations. Whereas prior to him a sort of tranquil poise was cultivated as a guarantee against undesirable changes, i. e., against a danger to the existing power structure, it was now high time to put an end to this.

This impression of mine was not all that incorrect, which I could see later from my talks with authoritative persons, including ranking advisers from among the General Secretary's immediate associates. When I once told these gentlemen about my far from harmless observations from Brezhnev's times, they agreed with me absolutely. And they added that since 1970 they themselves had calculated the blunders and incorrect decisions down to the minute, which they presented in a report in 1982 when Andropov took office.

Thus, my first encounter with Gorbachev, his very personality and the content of the talk produced a deep impression on me. In April 1985 the Kremlin leader was not widely known, even in the Soviet Union. When journalists asked me after this meeting what kind of man this was I responded: "If anyone can change the country, he's the one!"

My Soviet partners, talks with whom began developing more intensively, also wanted to know how the new leader impressed me, since they had yet to see him personally. I told them that they, on the Soviet side, as well as we, abroad, should expect a great deal from this General Secretary. His charm and the direct look of his lively brown eyes, his energetic speaking style and well-considered analysis—all this taken together made encounter with him an event for me.

Something similar happened to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In December 1984, several weeks before the new General Secretary took office, she had lengthy talks with Gorbachev. However, he made his first official foreign visit in autumn 1985, to Paris, which, of course, was symbolic. At that time the world press (hundreds of journalists were situated right at his feet during the final press conference) stated, that he had made a completely different impression than all his predecessors, namely, one of an open and wordly man.

I was initially astonished by the label that had been tagged on him so quickly, no matter how much I may have agreed with it. I tried to understand where this worldliness came from. Aside from trips to Eastern satellites before his state visit to Paris, Gorbachev only visited Britain, Canada in 1983, and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1975 at the invitation of the German Communist Party for the 30th anniversary of the end of the war.

However, I gathered different information about him. In his young years, as a student, Gorbachev was under an interesting influence. He took two complete courses of study—five years of law in Moscow and the same number of years at a correspondence agricultural institute in his North Caucasian homeland. During his period of study in Moscow, Gorbachev is said to have maintained close contact with Zdenek Mlynar from Czechoslovakia. Later, in 1968, during the "Prague spring", Mlynar became a sort of main ideologue of Alexander Dubcek, who wanted to introduce a humanised socialism in his country. Historically, the Czechs and Slovaks had always felt like Central Europeans. One does not need a great deal of imagination to guess how the 20-year-old Gorbachev came under the influence of the ideas and concepts of his energetic classmate. Even then he exhibited a capacity for a critical view of things, for analysis, and an ability to apply all this in practice in political life. Today

this inclination has blended with his natural capacity for readily understood wordings and openness in dealing with people.

In summer 1985 a story typical of Gorbachev was going about Moscow. The new General Secretary was seeking—in the past this was totally unthinkable—to debate matters with local residents informally, without minutes being taken. He would show up in the Moscow environs, without advance warning, to talk to workers in factory facilities or canteens. During his trip to Leningrad he would also walk unaccompanied among crowded boulevards and talk to passers-by. This greatly unnerved the TV people who tried to keep up with him.

Earlier hardly anyone gave particular thought to the way the mass media presented figures in the top Soviet hierarchy. Brezhnev, Khrushchev, and especially Stalin did not behave even remotely like Gorbachev. The "old master" Stalin could be heard only rarely on the radio. He never appeared on television, which was playing almost no role at the time of his death in 1953. His manner of speaking, his heavy Georgian accent and his gesticulations had more of an alienating effect. And such was the system from which he came; under tsarism, for that matter, the ruler was always shrouded by an aura of unapproachability, and he could only be observed from a distance. Brezhnev was simply unable to speak freely before an audience. He adhered to the style and traditions of the great Russian grandees.

The open and simple manners of Mikhail Gorbachev were initially assessed as a sensationally new style which the mass media, functionaries and the people in particular did not know how to handle. The centuries of the tsarist regime, 70 years of Soviet power, and the almost servile mentality forcibly imposed on people, and given their strict subordination to rulers had fostered in citizens a unique sense of confidence and protection, but in the context of personal dependence. And suddenly Gorbachev has called upon people to put an end to the former fear and to take control of their lives. This was something entirely new and astonishing, and a good deal of time was needed for such sweeping changes to settle into the public mentality.

Gorbachev speaks with the people and about the people like no one else. Glasnost for him means shedding light on problems and setting goals. Of course, thanks to his frank statements he inspires in ordinary people hope for improvements in supplies of industrial goods and foodstuffs. However, the farther away fulfilment of these basic expectations gets, the greater the concern in the population at large, and comparisons to the previous periods are only natural in this case. They were far from rosy, but as far as supply is concerned, things were better.

Concern that the Gorbachev course for reforms can fail, crashing against these underwater reefs, is widespread in the West, and with due cause. Soviet functionaries who lived free and easy under the preceding regimes can harbour certain hopes, too.

The thick-heads who are fighting against the radical reformers, the weakened economy, the apparatus of officials that is corrupt and hamstringing any activism, the ethnic unrest that is being put down by force and the extremely unsatisfactory social security—these are the tense areas where the new thinking should hold firm, for it manifests, as Gorbachev puts it, "the new morality, the new mentality", which requires from each person his share of the common responsibility for the world of the future. There is really not that much time left for all this, and Gorbachev knows this better than anyone.

WILL A "SOVIET AGE" ARRIVE?

MANY ROADS have led me to Russia over the past decades. Throughout this long period both the motives and the atmosphere that reigned at my

meetings with Soviet people have been so different. The changes constantly accompanied all my talks and impressions. Relations have not always been amicable, and at times it seemed almost presumptuous to hope for better times. Flare-ups of crises lay in wait at literally each meeting. However, their causes were not at all connected with the topics of my talks and the actual content of the negotiations. Irritation was caused mostly by the threatening political situation. And once the time came to check the instances in which objective disagreements led to political imbalances in East-West relations and the ones in which mutual mistrust or a lack of understanding of the other side, and possibly a simple misunderstanding led to a worsening of relations.

Is all this really past history? Is the Cold War chapter closed and is now to be studied by scholars? History itself teaches us caution. However, it never wants to explain only the past; it searches for answers to the future; therefore it simultaneously forces us to ask ever newer questions. What will happen to the Soviet Union and its empire? What will happen to communism? Are we on the threshold of a "Soviet age", but not in the previous meaning of this term, i. e., that which is linked with our former fears, which were warranted and led to the conclusion of the defensive-offensive North Atlantic alliance, but in the sense that the Soviet Union is today becoming a free, law-governed, peace-loving and economic flourishing state?

Hope and skepticism go hand in hand. Today, when we look at the Marxist hemisphere, emotions of joy and fear are balanced on the scales.

A host of tendencies appear possible. I believe that some facts indicate that in the foreseeable future the Soviet Union will not embark upon either the Chinese or the Hungarian path of development. Unlike the Chinese leadership, Gorbachev understood early that economic reforms should go hand in hand with political ones. The submissive "comrade" he needs for solving economic problems will not leave his critical views behind the factory gates. But this is what the Chinese leadership demanded of its citizens. The result was the drama of summer 1989.

Gorbachev has permitted a free exchange of views in the street and within the party itself. He has ordered a revolution from above, thereby setting in motion a carefully growing public consciousness, at least amidst the intelligentsia. In the party Gorbachev launched an open and directed debate with theatrical producers. The elections of people's deputies of the USSR became elections between rivaling deputies, and congresses of people's deputies turned into a wide forum of exchange of views with the world public observing. In other words, there cannot be any comparisons to a Western-style parliament. The Communist Party controls the monopoly right to give orders in the edifice which old functionaries have dubbed the "telephone booth" with patent disdain yet with submissiveness. The elections were a breath of fresh air, and the agilely opened valves can be assumed to have delivered Gorbachev and the USSR of the "Chinese fate".

Nevertheless, the question of how things stand with the party's primacy faces Gorbachev incluctably and ruthlessly. Can he and does he want to extensively tap the inner potential of the CPSU so that other parties would be unnecessary? Judging from the Western experience, no party will venture such a political bind without risking turning into a shapeless, difficult-to-define movement slapped together solely by the charm of its main leader.

The incongruity between autarchic aspirations and national interests has had a sobering effect. It has become obvious that timid decentralisation alone is insufficient to meet the needs of the agitated peoples of the Soviet Union. There are over a hundred nationalities in the huge empire. The Soviet leadership will have to find out whether a federative stru-

cture which will partially reduce the fear of small ethnic groups of a "big" neighbour, but especially of coercion by the predominant Russian population, will take shape in the country. Democracy and federalism are Siamese twins in the USSR.

Of no less importance are the social conflicts which are emerging with the spontaneous work stoppages and strikes which have swept the entire country today. However, this phenomenon is neutral with regard to the system. This has also been the case in other countries. In Greece, Spain or South American countries, the transition from a dictatorship to democracy has also been accompanied by the struggle of the working masses. People want to taste freedom at least once. Excesses are nearly inevitable, if the threat of violence has been used for decades to regulate social disorder. However, these disorders naturally worsen the supply crisis and readily evoke dreams of a strong hand not only in orthodox party circles but also in the man in the street.

Attacks should be feared from the conservative camp for other reasons as well. Functionaries who have been divested of their privileges will be up in arms; those who have been done economic harm will be resentful, and persons hurt socially will offer resistance.

Possibly the Central Committee or Political Bureau will put an end to the reformist ardour of the party chief and bring things back to a new phase of stagnation. The sober serious forecasts about the further development of the USSR seem impossible against such a mobile background. The lessons of the past teach that development does not take place along a straight line, that spurts, falls and failures are the rule rather than the exception. Gorbachev received a majority vote only when Chernenko followed Andropov. The stagnation and even the return to the old after the short breath of fresh air under Andropov were obvious.

Perhaps the sluggish colossus that the Soviet Union is will go through still another period of retreat, and only on the third, more decisive and extensively considered attempt at liberal reforms will it be able to carry out real perestroika. But it will definitely happen, just as the current attacks on perestroika will continue.

No one will argue seriously about the current extremely difficult situation in which the colossal country has found itself after 70 years of a centralised planned economy. The infrastructure of thinking is a negative one, so it is unrealistic to implement the reform ideas over a short span, even if they alone contain a chance for some improvements. The country and its people must go through a severe and lengthy period of cleansing. Nor will the possible successor of the General Secretary be able to ignore these shortcomings that are incontrovertible, yet being presented to the whole world to see, and dangerous politically.

People in the West are asking again and again how well-considered are Soviet efforts to carry out the current reforms by political means. The thought occurs: can a new Marshall Plan like the one of American aid to Western Europe after the Second World War become such a tried and tested means? Top politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have already demanded, with the most noble intentions, that a sort of aid-for-development fund be provided. However, I believe that there is present a profound lack of knowledge of the political and psychological specifics of the initial situation.

Of course, the Soviet Union, the world's largest country, possesses natural wealth that has not been discovered yet and is poorly studied and considerable national resources of manpower and intelligentsia. However, it is not a developing country in the usual sense. It has biological and material reserves and brilliant scientific, above all technical, achievements and a high cultural level. My numerous discussions with outstanding people in a wide range of fields—under Leonid Brezhnev

and nowadays—have fortified my belief that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept from the West only partnership support for its own efforts, i. e., under conditions of full parity. The patronage recommendations which the West could give and is eager to do so have always evoked only understandable irritation in the Soviet Union.

We Germans have a special role to play in terms of this aid. From as early as the times of Peter the Great, whom Soviet people call Peter I with a certain distance, right up to the 1917 revolution, Germans from all social estates served the tsarist empire. And today all Russians know about this, if only subconsciously. In the more than two centuries Germans left a notable imprint, whether in the urban environment or in rural localities, even the most distant province. During the reign of Catherine the Great German settlers developed entire regions and made them fertile, serving at the tsarist court or in the army, where the Baltic gentry occupied a dominating position. The German as a helper in need is thus a classic figure in the Russian national consciousness. And he was always there when the need arose.

Goncharov erected a monument to him in his remarkable novel *Oblomov*, which he wrote in 1859. Every time business suffered, the Russian Oblomov, that undistinguished but nice nobleman who is lovable for his indecision, could count on help from his friend Stoltz, who was of German extraction. The novel is popular in the Soviet Union to this day. In a confidential talk about certain shortcomings of our cooperation, one Soviet participant in the talks once exclaimed, hinting at this historical experience: "We need an *Ivan Stoltz*!"

Soviet people value in Germans most of all their organising talent, which they do not find in themselves. How incapable Russians are of reacting quickly to unforeseen disasters was shown by Chernobyl in 1986 and the earthquake in Armenia in December 1988. On the other hand, they are very good at improvising.

However, I should urge caution. If I spoke about the Germans' influence on the history of Old Russia, I cannot fail to mention that the temporary dominance of the German influence, above all on the policies of the tsarist court, was immoral. The Slavic movement at the turn of the century, which greatly impeded understanding between Russians and Germans, owes its emergence to it. One should never forget this experience when offering aid. Nor will we forget about the consequences of this development for our Western neighbours. They, as we know, are very sensitive to any new foreign policy orientation of the Germans in the area of closer cooperation with Moscow.

We are now proceeding to a Europe which beginning in 1993 will be cooperating more closely not only economically but politically as well. Shouldn't we now be giving more thought to a sort of European division of labour in international cooperation? A list of certain priorities can be compiled: the British are for cultivating relations with their American relatives, the French and Italians, with their African neighbours, the Spanish and Portuguese, with their descendants in Latin America, and the Germans, with Central and Eastern Europe. This scheme excludes in advance a German-only business campaign to the East.

Germany's eastern policy would be not a narrow national initiative of the classical imperialist model but would be based on a "European mandate". The development of economic relations with the Soviet Union, of which competition among West European states is typical at the present moment, would be increasingly determined by European consortiums. Thus the Federal Republic could not be reproached for seeking to obtain unilateral economic advantages. Lastly, the USA should also involve itself in this process.

However, all the above does not provide an answer to the question:

will we be witnessing a "Soviet age"? In the final analysis, only the Soviet Union itself can give the answer.

Will the record of history help us? After all, it is not amenable to mathematical calculations. Ideas and people sometimes create a "state of weightlessness"; chance and paradoxes have determined the course of world processes rather often. Didn't the capitalist Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm help the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin establish themselves? And isn't it a paradox that 70 years after the October Revolution Gorbachev is attempting during his revolution "implemented from above" to attain the same goals that the French bourgeoisie were working for 200 years ago? In the eyes of orthodox Marxists the Great French Revolution was nothing more than a rebellion against absolutism and liberal coquettism with the aid of which people helped to formalise the prevailing relations. But enlightened Soviet socialism has suddenly started talking now about human rights, a law-governed state, freedom of assembly and free exchange of views.

A storming of the Kremlin "Bastille", as we all can only hope, will not take place. The revolutionary nature of the current moment in the development of the USSR lies philosophically in the transformation of the consciousness of people, in the irreversibility of the chosen path, and in a breaking down of the old systems of thinking. A revolution is never destruction alone, it is always the embryo of a new order. Gorbachev himself issued the order for the second Soviet revolution from above, which is seeking to tear down the old infrastructures of society, the economy and thinking in order to build the future on this heap of ruins.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky called Russians a young people that has only begun to live. Now that this people has cast off the shackles of age-old fatalism, will it manifest the enormous strength dormant in it that is capable of leading it on a great campaign to the "Soviet age"?

For decades we have been in the state of a stubborn rivalry between the capitalist and Marxist systems. It will not lessen. However, it is aimed not at one elbowing out the other but on a gradual levelling out of the orders in this rivalry. To stress the point, we can formulate it as follows: whereas in the past the possession of excessively great power led to revolutions, in future, world information links open to all will break down backward structures.

We are on the threshold of the third millennium. The 20th century, one of the most horrible in the history of humanity, with more than 60 million killed during both world wars and countless deaths in later conflicts, will be behind us within a few years. A change of millennia always inspires people. Will times change? Will this be the first time in their memory that people will cease being afraid of a new world war in the next generation?

These expectations cannot be considered unwarranted. There have appeared signs of such changes in world processes which were hard even to imagine in the past. The system of the military rivalry of the two military blocs that seemed so solid has begun to move. Stands that remained unshakeable for a long time are now being called into question and are no longer suited to the existing alignment of forces in the world. Each nation is talking to every other nation.

Both superpowers have realised the fact that alone they cannot settle conflicts whether militarily or politically, whether in the Middle East or near their borders, in their own backyard, such as Afghanistan or Nicaragua. And this has objectively led them to the need for cooperation and mutual understanding. Their realisation of the interdependence of the world has removed from the agenda foreign policy doctrines of containment and military superiority.

Five decades without war owing to a balance of fear of the prospect of "supersuicide" many times over could be replaced by a phase of energetic peaceful development. The governments of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic have clearly voiced their will for this.

In his country Gorbachev is working on the foundation of the new Soviet home and is already thinking about the outlines of a common European home. However, the new edifice is still very fragile. Any storm, like the one that thundered on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, can tear it down.

No one, with the exception of arch-conservatives and servile administrators, doubts the need for sweeping reforms, but heated debates about the pace and methods of actions have already become frequent. Gorbachev has incorrectly assessed the time factor and the behaviour of such different groups of people in the atmosphere of the ever worsening supply of the population with the prime necessities. Yeltsin and like-minded people are demanding that perestroika be sped up and are calling for more radical action. Ligachev with his very strong grouping, up to and including Political Bureau members, is cautioning about the negative consequences of premature changes, and not only in agriculture. Gorbachev is being berated for his ill-considered steps abroad, too, where it is much easier to criticise.

Of course, Gorbachev is impatient; he is pressing, demanding, and tirelessly criticising sluggishness and laxity. He knows that after him no new trailblazer will come to bring his endeavour to completion. In the conditions of extraordinary concentration of the shortcomings sharply castigated by him and the constant concern for not being too late, I suppose it is hard to expect a well-considered, "moderate" mode of actions at all.

Alongside the desired results, the new thinking has triggered unforeseen and even uncontrollable actions, such as strikes and unrest which later imposed their own rhythm of changes on the government.

Difficult domestic problems are becoming imminent in the USSR. The multinational state needs a constitution based on a federal foundation and, therefore, on a different understanding of the role of the state. A new identity has to be found. The above also applies to the rights of individual bodies such as the Congress of People's Deputies and the new Supreme Soviet to co-participate in the administration of the country. How and where will the Central Committee, which has been so influential up until now, find itself in the current force field? Gorbachev has set these titanic tasks at great risk to himself.

He perceives the tectonic vibrations which herald a new structure of this world in the coming millennium differently than millions of his indifferent party comrades. He knows about the dangers threatening the might of the Soviet Union; at the same time he is aware of the chances that are opening up for the huge empire with its limitless resources. His understanding of realities and his perspicacity draw before him an image of the Soviet Union which should fight for its place in the constantly growing power "triangle" of the USA, Europe and the Pacific basin. He may be dreaming of a "Soviet age". He knows, however, that his dream will become reality only when his country duly withstands the competition with the new economic giants in the West and East, with Western Europe and the Pacific basin countries.

I am in favour of helping him with this. Everyone—the peoples of the Soviet Union, the peoples of Asia, Europeans and our American friends—only stand to gain. We should scrap the balance of fear in favour of a

COMMON SENSE AND DEFENCE.

An Independent Public Appraisal

OVER A HUNDRED PEOPLE joined in a Guest Club discussion. USSR People's Deputies, officials of the Foreign and Defence Ministries and the CPSU CC, noted political scientists, natural scientists, army officers, journalists, teachers, ecologists, members of social organisations studying problems of the army arrived from various regions of the Soviet Union extending from the Baltic to the Pacific to take part in the first independent public appraisal of the war danger and the activity of the Soviet Armed Forces ever attempted in our country. The discussion was sponsored by *International Affairs* in collaboration with the USSR Social Inventions Pool, its Kazakh branch and the Power Engineering Research and Design Institute.

The purpose of the three-day game of experts, which took place at Planernoye, a holiday hotel near Moscow, was to contribute to the formulation of a concept of security covering every aspect of the problem and representing a product of cocreation by the most diverse political and social positions finding expression in the country today. The results of the work done were set out in a document circulated to the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions concerned.

THE WAR MENACE AND THE WAR DANGER

N. Karasev (D. Sc., Economics, Chief, Department of Social Sciences, Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy). The starting point for discussing a defence construction programme and model is an exact definition of the degree of the war danger.

In this game of experts, we've already tried to offer certain new instruments, certain new concepts—perhaps I should call them an interpretation of concepts—such as would enable us to offer a new approach to assessing the war danger. We're agreed that in analysing the process I'm talking about, we must draw a methodological distinction between two closely connected categories. In fact, one category is part of the whole, that is, of the other category, but at the same time it has a special characteristic which it's important to take into account in making a strict analysis. The war danger is one category and the war menace, the other.

We've noticed that the two concepts are often mixed up. This confusion prevents us from analysing the degree of the war danger and the war menace quantitatively and qualitatively. We've suggested formulating the concept of the war danger as the totality of forces and material factors likely to lead to war in some social, political and economic conditions. In other words, it is a potential danger emanating from the existence of definite forces and material and political factors which may lead to war in a definite social, political and economic context.

We've defined the concept of war danger as something of a process of military factors becoming more active in certain social, political and economic conditions.

This methodological approach led us to the inference that the war danger may persist even where the war menace diminishes or becomes less acute. We came to the conclusion that the war menace against the Soviet Union has diminished substantially, markedly, considerably. There was no disagreement on this point.

Question. * May I ask a concrete question? You began by assessing the trend of the war danger. Has anyone in your group pointed out that the trend must have a starting point?

N. Karasev. Yes.

Q. Was the earlier assessment of the war danger adequate?

N. Karasev. Indeed, group members spoke of the need to break up assessment of the war danger into stages. One of them said there were three stages after the war: from 1945 to 1972, from 1972 to 1990 and now.

Has the war danger at these stages been assessed adequately? Whatever has to do with an assessment takes place in *concrete* situations and concerns them. You can't reappraise history from today's standpoint. Military construction was conditioned by political construction because military construction served the interests and principles of the political leadership. Of course, there is also feedback. Any political leadership worth the name lends ear to its advisers. Especially in the case of a political leadership opting for giving priority to *military means*; it understandably gives priority to *military* advisers.

We agreed that with this approach, the war danger can't be assessed without assessing a number of independent factors. I mean primarily the group of factors having to do with the structure of the forces and material foundations of the war danger as a potentiality. The group includes material and military production: structure, dimensions, pace, and so on. Then there are the strength of the armed forces and their various formations, their dispersal, stationing, and so on. This can be assessed and calculated quantitatively. Estimates of military production, armed formations, and so on, indicate that little has really changed in this sphere.

In line with these propositions, we singled out five groups of sources of the war danger that is still threatening the Soviet Union.

First, I wish to stress that we must make a more in-depth appraisal. What do I mean? A thesis advanced by experts was that today the United States and NATO wouldn't deliberately attack the Soviet Union. The thesis is apparently correct. It's correct today. And this makes it concrete. But it is not concrete unless we single out the reasons. Why wouldn't they attack? Why wouldn't they do it today? If we disregard this question, if we have no knowledge of it, if we overlook this question and fail to analyse it, which would mean discounting it in analysing our actions, we may simply *destroy* the cause. Now the military cause is recognised both by our official opinion and globally to be the existence of a definite military strategic parity.

As it happens, one source of the war danger threatening us is *destruction* of military strategic parity.

Q. You described one source of the war danger as the possibility of parity changing to our disadvantage. Have you analysed the question whether the other side would *want* to attack us if it had superiority? Does it have any *inherent reason* to attack us?

N. Karasev. We examined the war danger as a potentiality (you will have noticed that I distinguish between it and the war menace). And we think the increase in potential danger that would result in the circumstances must be calculated. Our point of departure was therefore not the assumption that US imperialism is simply an aggressor and would attack

* Some participants withheld their names.—Ed.

us as soon as we became weaker but the fact that the totality of factors which in principle have so far made us adversaries is still there to a considerable extent. The reason why our country and the United States were opponents was not that we had military strategic parity. We sought that parity because we were *opponents*. And we must add to this the *existence* of contradictions between the two systems, meaning contradictions between national interests that are interpreted differently.

A second source is the present dangerous level of military strategic parity due to the high level of confrontation.

Third, there is the danger coming from military technology. This is a tentative definition although group members defined the danger variously, speaking of accidental, unprovoked, unsanctioned and other technical actions leading to war.

Fourth, personally I consider that the war danger also comes from the *interconnection* of today's world. In our country, this interconnection has lately been interpreted as a positive trend which only underlies new political thinking. That is right but it is also evidence of a very dangerous situation.

Fifth, the non-stabilised inner political situation in the Soviet Union and the persisting danger of a *failure* of perestroika as conceived by the country's present political and state leadership may be regarded, in the opinion of some members of our group, as a further war danger threatening the Soviet Union.

Q. You said the group had formed two points of view in appraising the war danger. One, the war danger was decreasing appreciably and two, it was unchanged, that is, was not decreasing appreciably. My question therefore is. Why did you choose now only one point of view in listing proposals and why did you reject the other?

N. Karasev. Because we found a common denominator as soon as we introduced a distinction between war danger and war menace. This explains why I said we were united by a common methodology. And we all agreed that the war menace shows an *appreciable* decrease. Nor was there any objection—at least I heard none.

What proposals for reducing the war danger threatening the Soviet Union did we formulate?

First proposal. The Soviet Union should keep its defences at the same level of the war danger *with due regard* to the trend towards its *diminution* and do its best to contribute to this trend.

Second proposal. There's a need to seek a drastic lowering in the level of military strategic parity, to force that level as far down as possible.

Third proposal. The technology of the evolution of nuclear weapons is such that nuclear disarmament must take place *now* if it is to take place at all.

Fourth proposal. Adequate actions by the Soviet Union in the context of likely military economic, military ideological and military provocations.

Fifth proposal. Refraining in Soviet home and foreign policy from moves likely to be seen as provocative. What we mean is confidence and openness. If something is no longer a secret in the West but is kept secret in our country, this gives rise to a certain distrust and has a provocative impact, as it were, or may in any case be regarded as provocative.

Lastly, our military construction should be entirely consonant with the *aims* of our new foreign policy and with level and character of the country's social and economic development.

SECURITY, THE STATE AND SOCIETY

Yu. Streltsov. (Senior researcher, USSR AS Institute of World Economy and International Relations.) The concept of security has a new

quality today. It is changing under our very eyes. Lately it's *internal* security that has undoubtedly been acquiring particular importance as a component of our country's overall security.

Generally speaking, the level of the country's security today depends on the level attained by the weakest component. It is not for *nothing* that we say our country is being torn from within and that the *greatest* danger threatening it is internal. *This* is the weakest component now. Suppose tomorrow we set about treating human rights as we did the day before yesterday, *this* would pose the greatest threat to us because the international community would react to it. The fact that we have huge armed forces makes no difference because our internal security finds itself exposed to a formidable threat.

However, we decided not to concentrate on analysing this aspect of the problem, on analysing internal security, but tried to analyse the whole range of external threats and interests involving our external security because this is ultimately the decisive thing for our armed forces. I'm certain our army must concern itself with external problems. As for internal troops and anyone else—whatever their name—they should take care of internal problems.

To define war menace and war danger correctly, we should begin by looking at state interests. It should be obvious that if the country's interests are *global*, we need armed forces operating at global level. If they aren't, we need corresponding armed forces.

We agreed almost unanimously that our country should be called a major European country having key interests in Europe, definite interests in Asia (we need to specify them) and a set of global interests dictated, however, by other components of security. There is, for instance, our global confrontation with the United States. It is one of our interests that undoubtedly persists. Or take the ecological aspects: it's unquestionably a global problem and hence one of our global interests.

An interesting idea put forward was that of the *concentricity* of the country's interests, from internal economic, political and other interests to regional and global ones forming concentric circles. If we try some time in the future to specify this range of interests, we are likely to come to conclusions enabling us to tell the most important interests—vitally important ones if you will—of a regional, global or some other nature from less important ones. And then we'll get a system of component interests very important for building our armed forces.

Q. What would you describe as an interest requiring the use of our armed forces in present-day conditions?

Yu. Strellsov. The starting point for answering that is recognition of the circumstance that the war danger will exist in principle for as long as there are power politics and armed forces.

Is there any interest which might necessitate the use of armed force? Yes, for assuming that there exists in principle a danger of attack from without, such an attack on the state is an interest requiring defence of the state and hence the use of armed force.

The question now is: How great is the threat of an attack upon us? I think most of us consider that it's next to non-existent. This is not to say, however, that it will stay so tomorrow unless we stop the more dangerous military political and military strategic trends. These exist too, I'm afraid. This is why we must consider both the present situation and its likely evolution. We must realise that there are political and military technological components of the war menace interacting in various ways, showing mutual harmony or disharmony. Right now they show disharmony, as our group established.

V. Yerofeyev. (Senior researcher, USSR AS Institute of Europe.) I would like to ask you a question with reference to the "concentric" in-

ternal, regional and global circles you mentioned. Would you say that Afghanistan may be regarded as a regional interest? You know that attempts were made to justify our action there as an action needed to safeguard our southern flank as well as on ideological grounds. Does your formula admit of such interpretations?

Yu. Streltsov. We didn't discuss Afghanistan. Let me give you my personal opinion. There was no justification whatever, as our scientists realised long ago, from the moment the action went ahead, for what was in fact an act of aggression, for moving in troops. Every state should regard it as an important object of its foreign policy strategy to have a friendly or at least a neutral belt around it. But you can't do that by force. You can't win friends forcibly.

We are now in a situation where we must move away from our former policy based on ideologised clichés and on commitments imposed by an ideologised approach. In other words, our commitments should be in keeping with our interests and not the other way round.

We would therefore like to make a recommendation. We ought to ask some agency to see to it. In any case, there is a need to verbalise the Soviet Union's national interests and specify the priorities involved. That would make it possible to really assess a threat to the country's interests and, in a measure, to the country itself.

Q. Is introducing the concept of national interests useful as the starting point for deciding on the requisite defence power? As a matter of fact, we've always held that the war danger is a danger threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of our state, our friends and allies. Do we have to complicate the problem by introducing a concept which we've borrowed, by the way?

Yu. Streltsov. The issue was touched on in our group. Most members came to the conclusion that the category of interest should be preserved as the object of analysis. It isn't we who've invented it, and so all we have to do is consider how far it corresponds to our present condition. While the definition of external interests of the state seems to imply a commitment, a desire to defend them by force, that isn't a must, generally speaking. In all circumstances, as long as there is a period of transition, with new political thinking existing alongside old political thinking, its forcible methods, and so on, there's no getting away from the likelihood of having to defend our interests somewhere abroad. Of course, we should do our utmost to avoid that. But we can't say exactly even now that five years hence there won't be a different situation more dangerous for us in foreign political terms. In such a contingency, how would we treat our armed forces, which we need as a factor providing some sort of guarantees?

If you've changed your place in the world and come to look on it differently, to reappraise your interests and possible threats, you're likely to come to the conclusion that you need new and different armed forces. I don't think they should remain the mammoth they are now. At any rate, they shouldn't be the immobile, poorly trained mass of people we now have.

Q. You said our armed forces and their formation would depend on interests to be specified. Who is to specify them? You said they should be specified. But whose interests are they to be?

Yu. Streltsov. Basically, those interests should be defined by diverse social groups. We've admitted at last that we are different members of our society: the general public, professional military men (we can't do without them), politicians, scientists. They should ultimately enable legislators to arrive at formulating a set of interests, which in turn would make it possible to establish whether or how far those interests are threatened.

Q. Who would assume responsibility for operations by those armed forces? Who could I approach to state my position since it looks as if interests are going to be defined by all?

Yu. Streltsov. It wouldn't be done by all. I understand that we are now building a law-governed state. What does this mean to me as an individual? It means separating powers and demonopolising authority. The legislative authority would shape state policy and appropriate funds for the armed forces to build themselves as decided by the highest legislative authority of the country. As for the executive authority, it would execute decisions accordingly. And the judicial authority would say how far it all conformed to the Constitution, and so on.

Q. Please specify. When you said that groups would express interests, did you mean the interests of those groups or the state?

Yu. Streltsov. I meant state interests. State policy should serve state interests.

Major G. Mishulin (Krasnodar). Are you equal because you have authorities on the problem in your group to listing the interests of our state so as to enable us subsequently to make a professional appraisal of the state of our armed forces on that basis?

Yu. Streltsov. I believe that calls for research—real research. We aren't in a position—the group said so—to go any further at the moment, to say more than that ours is a European power having major European and definite Asian interests.

G. Mishulin. That means you are in a blind alley. Your group has reached the level of method and can't go any further.

Let me therefore ask a question concerning method. Do you think that in forming a military concept, those who do so will only take account of the external interests of the state? Or is there a connection between external and internal interests?

Yu. Streltsov. My fundamental view is that the mission of our armed forces is not to suppress internal interests somehow, to bring them to bear, and so on. That's a task for our internal troops with their functions and equipment.

A. Terekhin. (Deputy Director, Kharkov Centre for the Reproduction of Culture and Social Innovation). I subscribe to what Yuri Streltsov said here about, among other things, the concept of state interests. I think we're coming to treat this concept, in particular the concept of interests, as a problem. It's here that we are trying to establish in whose interest we're holding this discussion, meaning also the work of the groups and every particular person. Since we are talking about state interests, putting them first, it isn't a public appraisal we're making. We could probably call it a public appraisal if we were to discuss the interests of society and social groups.

THE PRESSING NEED OF A MILITARY REFORM

Major-General V. Dudnik, (Cand. Sc., Education, Chief, Chair of Party Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces, Lenin Military Political Academy). We've seen the problem of balancing the interests of society and the state find forceful expression in the attitude to military reforms. We've established a very clear-cut difference between society and the state in approaching the point at issue. It has translated into mounting an ideological intimidation campaign and persecution in the scientific sphere directed against those who find a military reform necessary and possible. They were put under total administrative pressure by banning discussion of the subject by word of mouth or in the media. Increasing ideological pressure was exerted by the political structures of the party and the individuals concerned, and they levelled

devastating criticism at those who were said to "brainwash servicemen by peddling the idea of a military reform". Lastly, we've established and agreed with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and with the Supreme Soviet that all indications point to a differentiation among servicemen, primarily the professional military, over the problem of a military reform. At the end of the discussion, a field captain said that in his opinion, which was shared by fellow-officers, the country would be left without an army in the near future unless a military reform were carried out, for without a reform there would be nobody to issue or carry out orders.

The conclusion we arrived at on the level of public interest and public opinion was that a military reform is imperative and must be brought about.

Colonel Y. Martynenko (Cand. Sc., Economics, senior lecturer, Chair of Political Economy and Military Economics, Lenin MPA). Before seriously discussing the problem of a military reform in practical terms, we must answer three key theoretical questions.

One, what is the ultimate purpose of all changes in the military sphere? This is a key question. I think it may be stated as follows: How are we to reliably guarantee the security of our country in the new political, economic and social conditions at optimum cost in manpower, material and financial resources? To put it more briefly, we need to safeguard national security in a way placing a minimum burden on the people.

Two, how have political, social and economic changes at home and abroad influenced and how will they influence military construction in general and the construction of our armed forces in particular? This is decisive for answering the rather difficult question of how efficiently the existing military system is functioning. In answering it, we should bear in mind, as speakers pointed out, both the armed forces and the military system as a whole, which includes defence industries and other components.

Three, can the existing military system guarantee the country's security adequately and in an optimum manner following partial, non-radical changes?

The third question is a logical continuation of the first two. Its point is whether the restructuring under way in our armed forces can guarantee national security in the foreseeable future, keeping the resources allocated for defence to the minimum. Some say ironically that we aren't restructuring anything, and spokesmen for the defence industry say conversion has merely created more problems for them. But this is a different subject.

Time is a particularly important factor in tackling these questions. *First of all*, the restructuring of our armed forces is trailing badly political, social and economic changes in our country, which are coming about at a quick pace. As a consequence, social tension in society and the armed forces is mounting.

Second, our military economic mechanism is much too input-intensive. At a time when we are effecting conversion and adopting on a large scale new methods of managing the national economy, that mechanism is beginning to falter, preventing the economic reform in the country from going into high gear.

Let me give you just one example. We recently set out to ascertain how many organisations controlled by the military department are engaged in supplying and distributing industrial products (except military hardware). There turned out to be over 20, that is, over 20 major holders of goods. Not surprisingly, a Japanese said: "The Soviet system of distributing resources is the simplest. Everything is hauled to

Moscow and then back all over the country." This is basically the system existing in our armed forces. We can agree to the practice of distributing, say, refrigerators or bulldozers for the armed forces in Moscow but can't understand why matches, knives, gloves, axes, bottles and other ordinary necessities must be distributed in the upper echelons of the administrative system. Experts estimate that we don't need more than three or four holders of goods.

The *third* circumstance, one adding to the significance of the time factor in working out a military reform, is that we must now pool the numerous proposals for improving military construction and conversion that have lately been put forward on all levels in the armed forces, in the defence industry and among the population.

V. Dudnik. The proposed reform is not a reform of the army but a complex phenomenon encompassing primarily a reform of military policy, including the conception of the political aims and tasks of using armed force both at home and abroad. It's a reform of the structure controlling the military sphere, the second component subject to reform. The third component is a reform of the army itself, including the problems and system of training service personnel and a reform of political bodies and the system of party political work. The reform should also alter the content and interpretation of two fundamental principles of building our armed forces: undivided authority and democratic centralism.

This obviously calls for forming and discussing alternative models of armed forces. The requisite steps should be taken in a definite order. We would like to offer our legislators the following logical procedure.

First we need a concept of the military reform in question. It's only after evolving it that we can pass a law on defence and then move on to the adoption of various regulations. If we were to choose a different course, it would block the very possibility of a reform.

We therefore came to the unanimous conclusion that we need a professional army to be based, however, on the mixed principle of recruitment established by the Law on Universal Military Service.

A. Pankin (Deputy Editor-in-Chief, *International Affairs*, coordinator of the expertise). Let us recall the recent experience of Romania, where the recruited army made common cause with the people while the professional Securitate remained loyal to the regime. Doesn't that add any new dimension to our discussion of a professional army?

V. Dudnik. Every concrete case should be examined in its concrete context. That's the only way to grasp its meaning. But I'd like to give another example. Not long ago, a group of our military experts met with experts from NATO. Our men asked how NATO went about orienting its service personnel morally and politically to a strike against the enemy and how it defined the enemy. The answer they got was this: "Our conception of the main principle of the moral and political training of armed personnel is that servicemen must fulfil any task set by the President, anywhere on the globe. It follows that the enemy will be where they must fulfil such a task."

But there are two guarantees and two restrictions. US field manuals say that an order issued contrary to the national interest shall not be carried out. But there is a legal guarantee to the effect that the commanding officer who has issued an order running counter to the Constitution and the soldier who has carried it out shall be penalised in equal measure. Thus what would seem to be retaliation actually safeguards the soldier against his commander since he is held answerable for carrying out an unlawful order.

This is why we're now talking of the *principle*. On the practical side, it must include mechanisms and guarantees to prevent a profes-

sional army from operating against its people's interests in *any circumstances*.

I'm a professional military man. General Shaposhnikov, who in 1962 refused to open fire in Novocherkassk, is also a professional military man. So is General Grigorenko. And so was Captain 2nd Rank Sablin, who was shot for opposing Brezhnev. It follows that never in our history have professional military men, meaning the progressive-minded ones, have come out against their people.

A. Terekhin. What I'm going to say may shift the question to a slightly different area. I think the very important question we must answer is: How far are the professional forms of organising activity in, say, the military, scientific or some other field, which may have been acceptable in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries—how far are they really in keeping with the tasks being set today with a view to, say, guaranteeing security? Perhaps the emphasis in this case should be shifted from professional to interprofessional or quasi-professional organisations.

To illustrate, I may as well refer to developments in Nagorny Karabakh. I understand that there's something like a local force, a non-professional military one, fighting there. But it's fighting efficiently enough, for it exercises what I would call non-professional military self-determination.

Another illustration of the same phenomenon is, I suppose, the Russian officer corps in, say, the 19th century made up of nobility. Initially its members were members of civil society constituting a social class or group. As for their military professionalism, it was a sort of material environment in which they existed. This also goes, I believe, for the men you describe as professionals who refuse to carry out anti-civilian orders. First they adhere to a certain social position and exercise self-determination in the social milieu as members of civil society, while their professional self-determination on whether to shoot or not to shoot comes second.

V. Dudnik. From the point of view of ordinary logic, half-heartedness and inconsistency lead to an impasse or nowhere. This means that we can't propose anything semi-professional, semi-this and semi-that. Half-heartedness can't lead to success and never has. Secondly, we are now discussing blocking mechanisms or other mechanisms as it would involve going deeper.

But let me comment on your reference to the army officer corps of old Russia. The problem is so complicated that we can't use such arguments because our knowledge of this sphere is distorted. We must therefore leave it out of our discussion as we cite facts and factors.

V. Martynenko. We could propose an algorithm for the programme of working out and implementing a military reform. It would consist of several main components. We should begin by analysing the factors necessitating a military reform. They are numerous but we believe seven of them are of fundamental importance. (1) *a reform of the political system of society*; (2) *a new military doctrine*; (3) *an economic reform*; (4) *the international situation*; (5) *the exacerbation of interethnic contradictions*; (6) *social tensions in society and the armed forces*; (7) *the conversion of military production*, which we admittedly started in the absence of a scientifically sound programme. There's also the factor of *cuts in the armed forces*.

The impact of these factors on the country's military system is bringing out a whole range of contradictions. We think they may be put in three groups.

First group, contradictions between various components of the mili-

tary system itself, specifically between the armed forces economy and the defence industry.

Second group, contradictions born of the fact that military construction is lagging behind social progress. It's a dangerous lag, the kind that Lenin warned against.

Third group, contradictions arising from a discrepancy between the present state of our military system and the level of the war danger.

In what forms can these contradictions be resolved? There are practically two forms, evolutionary and revolutionary, and they are known to all. The evolutionary form implies partial modifications of the military system, or what the leadership of the Defence Ministry proposes today. The revolutionary form calls for a military *reform*, which is interpreted as substantial, radical changes in the nation's military system.

I don't think we can reject either of these forms. In the interest of defence, we should encourage the effort of advocates of both ways: evolutionary and revolutionary. (Working on the former today are institutes and directorates of the General Staff.) This means that the main task assigned to the drafters of the reform is to provide reliable security at the minimum cost. And it is suggested working out three or four alternatives of updating the existing military system and six to seven alternatives of reforms optimising it.

The research teams faced with concrete tasks will need concrete forecasts of economic development for at least ten years ahead, and a forecast of changes in the international situation, and so on. In other words, they must be enabled to work fruitfully rather than evolve abstract models.

S. Karaganov (Dr. Sc., History, Deputy Director, USSR AS Institute of Europe) You cite phenomena and events of recent years as the reason for reform. It implies that it's only now that we need a reform, doesn't it? But there can be a different interpretation. It may be that our armed forces, like the whole of our society, by the way, have been evolving in the wrong direction for decades. I have no intention whatever of accusing the military. Our armed forces developed according to decisions adopted by the political leadership.

But there is a little fine point. It's clear enough, for instance, that for years our estimate of the war menace was simply wrong. Our armed forces developed accordingly.

V. Martynenko. I wouldn't call that the "reasons" but factors. You may have noticed that mention is made of a reform of the political system, to which we may add a democratisation of society. Perhaps the reform should have been undertaken earlier. But the prerequisites for it were lacking because the political system itself didn't allow it. We heard here of numerous cases of people paying a price for opposing the system. The military system forced them out.

V. Dudnik. We believe that if we want the military reform to become a reality, we must apply certain principles and take account of certain factors. First of all, we must determine the degree of the war danger threatening our country and the world and the degree of the real war menace. It's only after we've done so that the problem of a military reform will be put on a realistic basis. We don't really know our military doctrine. There is talk about it but nobody really knows it. Most importantly, nobody knows the scenario of likely military operations in the event of having to demonstrate the defensive character of our military doctrine. As a result, our people and our public opinion are groping their way in the dark, nor can we state an opinion on specific proposals already there.

We must answer the question and evolve a model (possibly a

mathematical one) of the level of defence sufficiency which is the topic of much debate but nobody so far has said what it's like. Lastly, we need a model of our possibilities meaning the use of all our capabilities that make up the concept of defence sufficiency. We must put together the problems of perestroika in the country and the reform of the armed forces and solve them on parallel lines. There's a tendency now to deal with them separately. This is blocking both perestroika and military reform.

Lastly, we should ask government bodies to provide legislators and the public with adequate information, including what concerns "reasonable sufficiency". We know who holds a monopoly of information in the sphere under discussion. By withholding information, that monopolist is inviting anybody to accuse public opinion of incompetence.

It would be wrong, however, for public opinion to try to draw up real military reform programmes. Yet attempts of this nature are made to hasten progress. We see our task in calling on legislators to create a logical and temporal framework for a reform without decreeing the substance of the reform. After that we should ask the government to draft and submit that substance. It would be up to legislators to accept or reject the government's draft. Otherwise legislators would head into a trap, for they would lack the information, professional competence and the physical energy needed to accomplish such a task.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Chomchoyev (Chief of Staff, Yakutsk Civil Defence). With reference to information base, you say that it's only for professionals to speak of the armed forces and mould public opinion. I'm a professional but I can't agree with you on that point.

V. Dudnik. No such thing was said. It was said that those possessing information should make it available to the individuals, agencies and social organisations concerned. I can add that it's necessary to carry out the decision of the 19th CPSU Conference "On Glasnost", which says so explicitly.

V. Martynenko. Besides, I don't think we can ignore any longer so powerful a factor for the progress of our society as public opinion. We must work out various alternative reforms (I call them "outline models") by analysing public opinion as expressed in the media and proposals coming from the defence industry and field troops. Those proposals aren't studied as they should be.

But this calls for a military education programme. What I mean is not instruction or training of servicemen but educating the population by acquainting it in simple form with the fundamentals of military construction.

After evolving alternative models of reform there should be a comparative analysis of development models of the military system. It should result in selecting two or three of the best models and in studying them in detail. But in so doing, no model should be rejected. Some model might be unsuitable as a whole but might offer a sound personnel training system. Why not use that component of it? The whole work should be coordinated by an interdepartmental military centre under the Supreme Soviet. The centre should carry on its work with the aid of temporary research teams. Efficient teams could be formed by bringing in, say, participants in our discussion. I know some of the experts who I'm sure could suggest excellent assessments of many problems. The temporary research teams are funded by the Supreme Soviet and would submit a really independent appraisal.

The ultimate result of research should be an optimum model concentrating all proposals from supporters of both the evolutionary and revolutionary approach. It should be based on six to eight of the best alternatives and take in the ideas of the outline model evolved by public

opinion. After that a set of concrete measures should be worked out, and the government should make relevant decisions and pass appropriate legislative acts. Besides, steps should be taken to prepare people's social consciousness to accept the model.

Q. How does the Military Economy Chair manage to draw up a military reform programme, or, to work out its economic aspects to be precise, without a single figure to go by? Why, even the pattern of military expenditures wasn't revealed until last December.

V. Martynenko. We've got specialists who've been working on that as holders of key jobs in a number of institutions. They do have information. Of course, we can't make public all their recommendations with specific calculations because we have military censorship.

Do you know that joke about what a military censor did on reading the manuscript of *The Song of Igor's Campaign*? As it mentioned the regiment, the commander's name, his title ("Prince"), he had the title of the epic changed to *The Song of the Military Unit in which Igor Serves*.

I've come across comparable situations more than once.

V. Dudnik. To carry out a military reform, it's necessary to meet a further condition. The military political part of the military system must be separated from the military strategic and military executive parts. What I mean is that the Defence Ministry and the General Staff must be separated and that each of them must fulfil its own tasks. The Defence Ministry is an agency responsible for political planning and the issue of instructions while the General Staff is an executive body responsible for strategy and tactics. Right now all this is lumped together.

There are two questions of seemingly secondary importance but we think they are fundamental and, moreover, represent a historical precedent in world practice and the pattern of parliamentary work. It's like a prerequisite for military reform. We should propose adopting a procedure making parliamentary activity in uniform unwelcome. The inferiority complex steps in the moment a captain tries to prove to a marshal, even a retired one, that the army is in need of a reform.

Our parliamentary committee should set up a working body bringing into it members at the expense of the General Staff, which is numerically too large.

K. Nani (methodologist and game technician, Rostov-on-Don.) I think it's important to make a comment. In discussing the problem of a military reform, we should distinguish between army and armed forces, for these are two different concepts as I see it. We are apparently in a situation—possibly in the socio-cultural sphere and at world level—where the armed forces are borrowing organisational forms used in the army.

V. Dudnik. Your comment should be borne in mind.

Q. You are against the military participating in any parliamentary activity, aren't you?

V. Dudnik. I'm not as radical-minded as that but it may come to that in time. I'm against people entering parliament in uniform. Seaman Zheleznyak did just that, and we know the outcome.

In the US Congress, military men attend hearings in mufti.

K. Pankratov (post graduate student, Moscow Institute of Physical Technology). It was suggested here that the functions of the Defence Ministry and General Staff be separated. Has there been any discussion of the idea of the Defence Ministry being headed mostly by civilians as in the majority of other countries?

V. Dudnik. I can give my personal opinion. Military matters are too

serious to be entrusted to the military alone. It's a matter for the whole of society.

A. Terekhin. As far as I know, programmes can be drawn up and implemented according to at least two strategies. What is suggested here is one strategy. It implies entrusting a group of 1,000 or 2,000 with drawing up a certain programme and then bringing in, say, the population or other groups. Experience seems to have shown, however, that programmes worked out by some people are not accepted by others, with the result that most such programmes are simply ignored.

But there's an entirely different strategy, a different possibility of drawing up programmes. It's the one we are apparently trying to use here. When a group representing diverse sections of the population or diverse professions gets together to draft a military reform programme, each participant does so according to *his own* concepts. Each group sets its own limits to programme and programming. Afterwards we combine all the various programmes, getting a multitude of programmes that form, however, one system. That means getting no common programme. It also means that every programme component should be mobile or dynamic enough to make it possible to alter the whole system of interaction between programmes by replacing one component.

V. Martynenko. How would you organise the drafting of a reform at state level?

A. Terekhin. There is no state or state level as far as I know. Can you tell me where that mythical state is?

V. Dudnik. Or where state interests are?

A. Terekhin. Exactly. While people here in Moscow who see themselves as the state or are associated with certain government structures are discussing the problem of a military reform, that reform is being carried out in real local situations and much faster, too.

We have militarised formations of militants possessing a very high degree of dynamism. They are armed to a considerable extent and are equal to terrorising the population in an area extending for thousands of kilometres, and conducting combat operations.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. Alimurzaev (Dr. Sc., Economics, leader of experts' game, Rostov-on-Don). I would interpret in my own way a statement made earlier. It's a question of two possible types of work. One of them is to draw up a programme and then to publicise it and call on others to carry it out. That's one type of programming. It can and does exist. The other type is to have everyone draw up a programme for himself, saying, "This is how *I* am going to reform the armed forces, and *here* is where I will begin." Look, we have a colonel and a lieutenant-colonel here, that is, army men. Theirs would be another type of programming.

S. Kordonsky (commentator, *Vek XX i Mir* magazine). Have you considered the time factor? I mean, how much time is left?

V. Dudnik. Yes, we have. The trouble is that we are disastrously behind the times, as in the case of many programmes. This doesn't negate the need to implement them but the implementing must be done with circumspection, stage by stage, after a scientific analysis, a theoretical estimate and an anticipatory experiment.

The skill of the politicians we now want to present our proposals to should apparently consist in keeping abreast or even ahead of life as far as possible.

We live in a real world. I agree that we're late. We are years late. More than five years, in fact. So what are we to do?

A. Pankin. Military reform provides an especially vivid example of how much the changes in home policy are lagging behind those of the foreign policy. The international situation now permits unilateral cuts

in the armed forces strength along with conducting to success negotiations aimed at still larger cuts on mutual basis. These processes would seem to spur the work on the military reform so that the cuts should fit into a new and more modern model of the army which would best suit the security requirements.

However, so far the radical steps have been mostly mechanical, with attempts to squeeze them into the obsolete forms. It runs counter to common sense. A likely consequence may be a situation in the military construction when, speaking figuratively, we get a short and blunt sword in place of the reliable protection of the long and sharp sword. At home the military leadership's attempts to resort to old ways in solving new problems have resulted in social tensions related to the situation around the army. No enemy as yet was able to bring about such a clear anti-Army pitch in the sentiments of our people who traditionally were proud of their army.

The situation gets paradoxical. The international situation permits us to undertake without haste the military reform, tremendous as it is, and to do so with circumspection, while the situation at home calls for rapid and urgent action.

It is my belief that if in our home policies we resort to the methods which are successful in our foreign policy, we may avoid both rash action and inaction. Indeed, we have a ramified system of negotiating with foreign partners up to potential adversaries; yet, for all intents and purposes, we are lacking a mechanism of internal negotiations. Though negotiations in good-will spirit have always been a powerful stabilising factor.

What we are doing in this experts' meeting is, in fact, a development of such mechanisms. We have a pretty representative range of the public's diverse opinions on the matters of security. Yet our work proceeds constructively. The primary reason is that whatever the position of every participant or the place he comes from, we are all equal here, there are no "superior" or "inferior" officials among us. Our conclusions are not pre-arranged; they are born in the process of search, and any idea, whether conservative or reformist, is scrutinised thoroughly and without bias.

If these discussion methods of our "testing ground" are extrapolated to the society at large, then, I believe, a reliable military system can be expected to come up which would guarantee our nation's security from outside menaces, and which would be safe for the surrounding world and safe for the society.

The Editorial Board transfers the fee for this material to "Dolg" Programme of Aid to Afghan Veterans launched by the USSR Foundation of Social Inventions.

THE BULGARIAN BAROMETER

EARLY IN NOVEMBER LAST YEAR, Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov of Bulgaria asked Soviet Ambassador V. Sharapov and me to lunch.

We talked about the top-level meeting of the WTO countries' general staffs and foreign ministries, which had brought me to Sofia, about the visit which Petur Mladenov was going to pay to China, about how, on an April Sunday in by-gone days, Soviet Embassy diplomats had helped voluntarily in erecting a new building for the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry. In short, it was an ordinary conversation, and the country where it took place seemed tranquil.

Yet there was no tranquillity. By late October and early November, the political and economic situation and social tension in the country had almost come to a head. Radical changes were long overdue. It was a classical situation that might persist, with the upper strata of society unable to go on ruling in the old way and the lower strata, or the people, refusing to live on in that way.

Someone from the highest leadership had to bring himself to throw down the gauntlet to Todor Zhivkov. Petur Mladenov, member of the BCP CC Political Bureau and Minister of Foreign Affairs, did so.

After a fresh quarrel with Todor Zhivkov, he wrote the following letter: *

TO THE FULL AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE BCP CC
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL CONTROL AND AUDITING
COMMISSION OF THE BCP

Comrades,

I was born in 1936 in the village of Urbabintsi (then Kula District). The village is now called Toshevtsi in memory of guerrillas who fell fighting and one of whom was my father. He headed the village party organisation from 1931 to his death in 1944. My mother was messenger of the Benkovski guerrilla detachment, a BCP member and a member of "Active Fighters Against Fascism and Capitalism" organisation.

My own life story is simple. I went to school in my native village until the age of 14 and then attended a gymnasium, first in the town of Vidin. While at school, I was elected chairman of the Young Pioneers' organisation. In Vidin I became secretary of the school committee of the People's Youth League. Afterwards I was a cadet at the Suvorov school in Sofia and the military school in Shumen (then Kolarovgrad). Subsequently I entered the Kliment Okhridski University in Sofia, where I studied philosophy. In 1957, I was admitted to the Moscow State Institute for International Relations; elected one of the secretaries of the Moscow Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth League (DCYL); graduated in 1963 with honours.

In 1963, I was elected secretary of the DCYL district committee in Vidin and member of the BCP district committee, and subsequently First

Secretary of the DCYL district committee and alternate member of the BCP District Committee Bureau.

After 1966, I headed Department of International Relations, DCYL CC, and then was a secretary of the DCYL CC responsible for work among university and secondary school students and young pioneers as well as for the league's international ties and for international youth tourism. In 1968, was also executive secretary of the organising committee of the Ninth World Festival of Youth and Students in Bulgaria.

In 1969, I was elected First Secretary of the BCP DC in Vidin. In November or December 1971 was appointed head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the BCP CC by decision of the Political Bureau.

On December 16, 1971, I was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by decision of the People's Assembly, after the tragic death of Ivan Bashev.

In April 1971, was elected to the BCP CC at the 10th BCP Congress. In 1973 elected alternate member of the BCP CC Political Bureau and in 1977—member of the Political Bureau. Thus I have been a member of our party's highest leading body for over 18 years.

Some may consider the above autobiographical data unnecessary. But I am giving them intentionally to show that I am one of you and a person like you and that I was born to and brought up by Communist parents.

It would never have occurred to me to take up the time of members of the BCP CC Political Bureau with my questions but for a serious circumstance which I consider to be of fundamental importance.

Here it is. On October 23, 1989, I was to meet and have a business lunch with the US Ambassador. Cde. Todor Zhivkov knew about it just as about all other meetings and events. The purpose of the meeting was to analyse the state of bilateral relations on the basis of conversations between L. Gotsev and US Assistant Secretary of State Eagleburger as well as my conversations with US Secretary of State James Baker, of which you have been informed in detail.

On that day, October 23, I received the Swedish Minister of Foreign Trade at 11.30 a.m. When, at 12.20 p.m. or 10 minutes before my meeting with US Ambassador Polanski, I entered my office I was told that Cde. Todor Zhivkov had tried to reach me by telephone. Waiting for me just then was Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Ganev. I asked him to come into my office and had myself put through to Cde. Todor Zhivkov. Without waiting for the beginning of my conversation with Cde. Zhivkov, Cde. Ivan Ganev said that as I was going to meet with US Ambassador Polanski, I must declare at the meeting that the United States was grossly interfering in our internal affairs, which was inadmissible, and that restructuring in Bulgaria could only take place with Zhivkov. I wonder who had instructed him to talk to me so offhandedly. The question arises whether I had done anything to give reason to believe that I was not clear about how restructuring should be carried out in Bulgaria.

And then Cde. Todor Zhivkov called me up. He said in an irritated voice that the United States was grossly interfering in our internal affairs and that the Americans must be told so outright (in other words, he repeated what Ivan Ganev had said). He said that he knew about my meeting with the US Ambassador and that meetings at which people engaged in beating the air were useless.

I replied that I had no such intention, that preparations for the meeting had been going on for a long time and that our country needed it. I said I deplored his inappropriate tone. After that I declared that in doing my job, I had never tried to concern myself with petty, unimportant matters. Of course, I was not sure whether I had always succeeded.

On hearing that, Cde. Todor Zhivkov adopted a more restrained tone.

In view of the foregoing, I ask the BCP CC Political Bureau to take account of that gross, improper and gratuitous attack upon me.

I think such an attitude to me on the part of Comrade Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the BCP CC and Chairman of the State Council, makes it impossible for me to perform any longer either my functions as member of the BCP CC Political Bureau or my functions as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. I ask you to consider this letter of mine as my resignation from both posts.

Analysing the incident, I believe the real reasons for Cde. Todor Zhivkov's irritation and rudeness lie in his realising that he has led the country to a deep economic, financial and political crisis; that by carrying on a policy of insincerity and petty ruses aimed at keeping himself and his family in power by all means and for as long as possible, he has "succeeded" in isolating Bulgaria from the world to such an extent that we have gone as far as to isolate ourselves even from the Soviet Union; and that we (and we alone) now find ourselves in the same trough with the rotten dictatorial family regime of Ceausescu. In short, Todor Zhivkov's policy has pushed Bulgaria out of the march of time.

Do you think it is easy to be Foreign Minister of a country headed by such a leader?

I think it is high time the Political Bureau, the Central Committee and our party concerned themselves with these matters. What should be borne in mind is that the Bulgarian people have been concerned with them for a long time and openly. I believe we all realise that the world has changed and that if Bulgaria wants to be in harmony with the world, it must pursue a policy adequate to modern times. Unless we believe in something else, we ought to believe in the Soviet Union and the CPSU.

Comrades, like every one of you, I think I have a real idea of Todor Zhivkov's morals. I know that he would stop at nothing, not even at the worst crimes, should it be a question of what is "the holy of holies" to him—his power. I know that he will fabricate lots of lies and calumnies directed against me (he has already done so before). I cannot rule out the possibility of his trying to make short shrift of me and my family. If this were to happen, the moral responsibility for it would also fall on you, my comrades, with whom I have been working for a long time and whom I respect, like and have a high opinion of.

I sincerely thank all the comrades with whom I have worked.

With comradely greetings,

PETUR MLADENOV

Sofia

October 24, 1989

I need hardly point out that it was a selfless and highly risky step to take. Mladenov was alone in the Political Bureau. There came distressing, agonising days and nights of internal conflict, of waiting, of a consolidation of forces on both sides of the dividing line.

On November 10, the BCP CC Plenum elected Petur Mladenov General Secretary of the Central Committee, and somewhat later he became Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Todor Zhivkov had to resign after 35 years of rule.

All that is past history now.

Currently Bulgaria is in the throes of a political struggle whose outcome is by no means certain. The elections due in June will answer many questions. But they are unlikely to bring about final tranquillity.

I am commenting on events in Bulgaria because I feel that the situation there is unique inasmuch as it is developing according to canons which set Bulgaria apart from other one-time socialist countries. Bulgaria may become a laboratory for creating a state of a new quality combining valuable elements of socialist ideas with the best assets of the other system. Its experience is worth looking at from various standpoints.

To begin with, the country still has a large and fairly solid Communist party (I understand that it is to be renamed after the elections). The party is no longer the Brezhnevist-Zhivkovist type of organisation it became after taking off Stalin's greatcoat. We could study its restructuring also in the interest of perestroika in our own party. Ideological pluralism is no slogan any more. The BCP now includes the Alternative Socialist Alignment, the Road to Europe and other factions. It has abandoned, if with difficulty, the principle of democratic centralism. Enforced loyalty to the party has given way to the principle of convincing members of the correctness of solutions offered by the party.

The BCP is renewing itself amid the challenges of internal confrontation. I happened to attend a sitting of its recent (14th) Extraordinary Congress. Occasionally I got the impression that nothing much had changed since Zhivkov's days. Many delegates simply could not accept the new ideas of reform. They protested vehemently and tried to obstruct spokesmen for reform movements. But their arguments fell flat, for their positions plainly rested on sentiments and approaches of yesterday.

The party has not lost its cause at all. It may remain influential or even retain power irrespective of election returns.

However, there is no ignoring certain programme slogans of the opposition. Some opposition leaders command respect, for they have abided by their principles throughout the past decades, in spite of all. Such are the veteran Social Democrats who went through hard times after their party was banned (late 1940s). Some members of agrarian party found themselves in Bulgaria's GULAG and their leader, Nikola Petkov, was shot in 1948. On the other hand, many leaders betray too strong an ambition for power. They go too far by rejecting all that was accomplished in Bulgaria over the past decades. "...No more tradition's chains shall bind us..." This is familiar to us. It would be wrong to proceed in this manner—there is no reason to pull up everything by the roots.

In Eastern Europe, Bulgaria is still the only island not entirely overwhelmed by the tsunami of swift metamorphoses and anti-socialist transformations. There is a prospect for a coalition of all rival political forces, the Communists included.

If, however, this prospect fails to materialise, the socialist idea will be dealt a telling blow both in Bulgaria and elsewhere, and we will thus get further evidence of the inviability of the system which used to be called socialism.

Boris PYADYSHEV

